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Report on some aspects of the strike at the United Nations
Office at Geneva from 25 February to 3 March 1976

Note by the Secretary-General

With the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, the Secretary-General transmits herewith a report by the Joint Inspection Unit on some aspects of the strike at the United Nations Office at Geneva from 25 February to 3 March 1976 (JIU/REP/76/6). The ~~C~~omments of the Secretary-General and of the executive heads of the specialized agencies with headquarters at Geneva, and those of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions will be issued as addenda 1 and 2, respectively, to the present document.

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REPORT ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE STRIKE
AT THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA
FROM 25 FEBRUARY TO 3 MARCH 1976

Prepared
by
Joint Inspection Unit

Geneva,
June 1976.

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INTRODUCTION

1. The Joint Inspection Unit has decided to study some aspects of the strike which took place at the United Nations Office at Geneva from 25 February to 3 March 1976. An investigation into the causes of this event reveals a number of problems concerning in particular the methods used in fixing the salaries of General Service staff and the nature of the relations between the administrations of the organizations and their staff. These questions are directly concerned with the efficiency of the services and the rational use of the organizations' funds, and their examination thus falls within the Joint Inspection Unit's terms of reference.
2. The recommendations of this report will be solely concerned with the lessons for the future which it should be possible to draw from the study of the machinery, regulations or practices at present in operation.
3. Chapter I of this report includes information and observations to familiarize the reader with the events leading up to the strike and its settlement. Chapter II examines problems of the General Service category in Geneva and in particular defects concerning:
 - (a) the methods used for determining salaries;
 - (b) the power of decision;
 - (c) the relations between the organizations and their staff;
 - (d) career development for General Service staff;
 - (e) the salary scale for General Service staff and the relation between salaries and pensions of the General Service and Professional categories.

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. The Battelle Survey and its Results

4. The strike broke out at the United Nations Office at Geneva on 25 February 1976 following prolonged disagreement between the administrations and the staff representatives of the seven Geneva-based organizations on how to interpret or apply the results of a survey undertaken by the Battelle Institute for the determination of General Service salaries at Geneva. The decision to hold this survey was arrived at by agreement between the representatives of the seven Geneva-based international organizations applying a common system for General Service salaries, on the one hand, and the representatives of their staff associations on the other; the survey covered the year 1973. Its purpose was to ascertain the levels of salaries payable to two categories of male office workers:

Category A : accounts clerks;

Category B : beginner clerks*.

5. Job descriptions were attached to the instructions given to the Battelle Institute; the salaries recorded for those types of posts were to be compared with the salaries actually paid to an accounts clerk at level G-5, step VI, and to a junior clerk at level G-2, step VI, in accordance with the scale in force on 1 July 1973. The results of the survey were as follows:

- The levels of gross salaries ascertained through the survey were SwF 50,005 per annum for an accounts clerk and SwF 33,378 per annum for a junior clerk. These two figures, by a predetermined method agreed upon by the administrations and the staff, were to be updated and converted into figures to be used to establish the net salaries at G-2, step VI and G-5, step VI and from them a new General Service salary scale for the Geneva-based United Nations organizations was to be constructed.

6. The method for conversion of the gross figures resulting from the Battelle study into figures to be used for constructing a new salary scale was to be as follows:

(a) Updating of the figures gathered by the Battelle survey from 1 July 1973 (i.e. the middle of the year covered by the survey) to 1 August 1975 (the date on which the new salary scale was to go into effect as decided later by agreement on 3 March 1976) by applying the increase in the Swiss wage-level index (the OFIAMT index) $\frac{1}{100}$ for the period 1 July 1973 to 1 August 1975.

* Note for the English version only: the title of this category was changed in French from "employé débutant" to "employé subalterne" and although the English title was not officially changed a more accurate designation might be "junior clerk", which is used in this report.

$\frac{1}{100}$ The OFIAMT index is an index published annually in Switzerland by the Federal Office of Industry, Trades and Labour (OFIAMT). The index refers to Switzerland as a whole.

(b) Conversation of the gross figures thus obtained to net salary figures by deducting Swiss cantonal and federal taxes.

The net figures thus obtained are compared in the following table with the United Nations net salaries actually paid on 1 August 1975:

Battelle survey (net figures after updating)	G-2-VI	SwF 34,504	G-5-VI	SwF 48,432
Net salary actually paid on 1 August 1975	G-2-VI	SwF 29,339	G-5-VI	SwF 38,835
Difference	G-2-VI	SwF 5,165	G-5-VI	SwF 9,597
Percentage difference	G-2-VI	17.6%	G-5-VI	24.7%

This method reveals a difference of 24.7 per cent at the "accounts clerk" level and of 17.6 per cent at the "junior clerk" level between the salaries actually paid on 1 August 1975 and those which, according to the results of the survey, should have been paid on that date.

7. The Geneva-based organizations calculated the costs which would have resulted from the application, under the methods described above, of the results of the Battelle survey plus the costs of increased dependency allowances. For this purpose they assumed an overall increase in salaries of 23 per cent which was a weighted average taking into account the number of staff in each grade. The total cost for the United Nations, including that of extra-budgetary posts, was estimated at roughly \$ 17,900,000 (this figure may be compared with the final estimated cost for the United Nations of \$ 10.4 million shown in the table following paragraph 9). The periods covered by this estimate were, for salaries, 1 August 1975 to 31 December 1977 and, for family allowances 1 April 1975 to 31 December 1977, the first date in each case being the agreed date of retroactivity and the second date being the end of the United Nations' current budgetary period.

8. Such were the overall figures, which were subject to discussion and bargaining between the representatives of the administrations and those of the staff. The dispute was essentially concerned, not with the methods used in the Battelle survey, but with the application or interpretation of its results: the staff representatives, in virtue of past agreements demanded automatic application of the results, whereas the representatives of the administrations, notwithstanding the commitments made, appeared convinced that those results did not reflect the real situation with regard to salaries in the Geneva market and, in view of the high cost, wished to "analyse" the results. The meaning of words such as "analysis", "interpretation" and "binding character" of the results of the Battelle survey were disputed and the different connotations advanced by each side was a cause of the deterioration of relations between the administrations and the staff (see also paragraph 24).

B. The Agreement of 23 April 1976

9. In April 1976 a sole negotiator was appointed by the Secretary-General in agreement with the executive heads of the Geneva-based organizations. A series

of meetings took place between him and the representatives of the staff. These meetings culminated on 23 April 1976 in an agreement which is reproduced at Annex I ^{2/}. Percentage salary increases were agreed for the new salary scale to go into effect on 1 August 1975 and this new scale was further increased with effect from 1 February 1976 by applying the extrapolated average increase of the OFIAMT index. The resulting percentage increases in salaries by grade on 1 August 1975 over salaries that had been paid on that date under the then existing salary scale were as follows:

- G-1 and G-2 : 15%
- G-3 and G-4 : 14%
- G-5 : 12%
- G-6 and G-7 : 11%

In addition the agreement of 23 April 1976 provided increases in dependency allowances with effect from 1 April 1975, as described in paragraph 3 of that agreement (see Annex I). The total cost of the agreement of 23 April 1976, in addition to funds already provided in the budget, including costs for extra-budgetary posts, is estimated to be \$ 25,300,000, broken down as follows:

Estimated Cost in Millions of U.S. Dollars
(at exchange rate of SwF 2.66 to U.S.\$ 1.00)

	1 August 1975 (1 April for allowances) to 31 December 1975	1976	1977	Total
a) United Nations Office at Geneva	1.7	4.2	4.5	10.4
b) All other Geneva-based UN organizations	2.8	5.9	6.2	14.9
Total	4.5	10.1	10.7	25.3

10. The agreement of 23 April 1976 seems to reflect for the most part not so much on the results of the Battelle survey but rather a correction of the lag from January 1969 to August 1975 between: (i) the actual OFIAMT index movement, and (ii) the yearly average increment of the OFIAMT index over the previous three years which had been used each year to adjust General Service salaries ^{3/}. For example, the calculations of the lag as shown in Annex II gave

^{2/} The appointment of a sole negotiator had the effect of providing a rapid though interim solution of a complex and grave problem and also indicated the line that could be followed in the future to arrive at a more lasting and comprehensive solution (see paragraphs 42-48).

^{3/} For the calculation of the lag in the OFIAMT index see Annex II.

a percentage increase for the two grades of 11.9 per cent whereas the unanalysed results of the Battelle survey (see paragraph 6 (b)) gave 17.6 per cent and 24.7 per cent increases for the same grades. The increases adopted by the agreement of 23 April 1976 (see paragraph 9 above) correspond more closely to those resulting from the calculation of lag. Thus the results of the Battelle survey carried out in 1975 were largely discarded and General Service salaries at Geneva now reflect the results of the 1968 Battelle survey adjusted by the real increases in the OFIAMT index (as opposed to the average index over a period of three years).

11. Some explanation must now be given in order to appreciate the circumstances in which the results were arrived at, the validity of these results and the consequences which flow from them.

C. Conditions for fixing General Service Salaries and Methods applied at Geneva

12. As the reader may know, the general conditions for fixing General Service remuneration are laid down by rules accepted by all the organizations applying the common system (see in this connexion document A/AC.150/8 of 20 April 1971, prepared for the Special Committee for the Review of the United Nations Salary System, and document ICSC/R.36 of 26 January 1976). We shall simply mention here that the salaries of General Service staff are supposed to reflect the "best prevailing conditions of employment" in the locality in which they work. This principle was first stated by the Committee of Experts, familiarly known as the Flemming Committee, which met in 1949 and was adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 470(V) of 15 December 1950 (Annex I, paragraph 7).

13. This decision led to a distinction between the methods used for computing the salaries of General Service staff (which are linked to the conditions prevailing in the various localities where the United Nations system may employ staff) and the methods used for computing the salaries of staff recruited internationally and belonging to the Professional category (whose salaries are computed on the basis of comparison with those of the best-paid national civil service). Many serious difficulties have been encountered in applying the "best prevailing conditions" principle in the very large number of localities concerned.

14. Some technical explanations are needed in order to understand the problems dealt with in this report 4/. In order to determine the "best prevailing conditions of employment" in a given locality, it is essential to be able to compare the remuneration paid in certain clearly defined posts in the organizations with that paid for corresponding jobs by the private or public employers in the locality in question. The surveys made for the purpose of such comparisons entail solving certain problems:

(a) Selection of the employers to be covered by the survey: the enterprises in question must not be below a certain size and must offer a number of posts comparable to those in the international organizations. The group of enterprises in which it is considered feasible to make a survey is termed the "universe" or "population of enterprises". In many cases a sample is drawn from the group by lot (the expression "random sample" is sometimes used) in order to facilitate the sur-

4/ For a more complete explanation of the methods used for determining General Service salaries in the main duty stations see documents cited in paragraph 12, particularly ICSC/R.36. It may be noted that this document uses the expression "best prevailing rates" whereas the General Assembly in resolution 470(V) adopted the term "best prevailing conditions of employment". For the significance of this difference see paragraph 34 (a).

(b) Once the posts to be covered by the survey have been selected (highly specific job descriptions are needed for ready identification of corresponding posts in the outside sector), the data collected by the enumerators provide a range of remuneration for each post. Major differences are found in the remuneration paid for the same job in the same locality. It is therefore necessary to select, within this range, the level of remuneration which will most accurately represent the "best prevailing conditions of employment" for the job in question;

(c) For reasons of statistical prudence, it is not possible simply to select the highest level of remuneration; there are all too many and too varied reasons why exceptional salaries are paid. In order to arrive at a reasonable choice, use is made of a method of selection which for example in Geneva has been the following: the range of outside remuneration for a given job is divided into three equal brackets; the bottom bracket then represents the worst rates and the top bracket the best. The top bracket is then divided into 100 equal parts and the seventy-fifth part from the bottom is selected as the salary to be considered. This is what the specialists call the "seventy-fifth percentile" (or "third quartile") of the top third;

(d) This gives us what is termed the "outside matching point" for the comparison to be made. It is then necessary to define as clearly as possible the "inside matching point". Whatever degree of care and accuracy is brought to bear in selecting the post to be compared, it is obvious that jobs corresponding to a post of that type in the organizations may be found at various levels or steps; it is then necessary to choose the level and step at which the comparison is to be made. For example, when there are 11 steps at each level, step VI of the level selected in identifying the post is termed the "midpoint of the organizations' scale at the appropriate grade".

15. These explanations will serve to illustrate the nature of the difficulties we have mentioned. They include in particular the task of determining the "best prevailing conditions of employment", the selection of comparable posts in the United Nations and in the local enterprises, the choice of the enterprises to be surveyed, the definition of the jobs to be compared, the requisite frequency of the surveys, the value of the local indices to which interim adjustments have been tied, etc. The history of those difficulties is set out in the documents cited in paragraph 12 above and their annexes. Satisfactory solutions have nevertheless been found in some localities (New York in particular), whereas the problems encountered at Rome, Paris or Geneva, for example, have never been properly solved. Committees of experts have been convened on various occasions to try to determine what solutions could validly be applied.

16. At Geneva, for example, a group of three experts was appointed in 1960 to evaluate the criteria and methods endorsed by the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination and to recommend an appropriate formula by which General Service salaries in the international organizations in Geneva might be periodically adjusted. The recommendations of the Committee, which proposed inter alia that the basis for comparison should be the salaries paid by the

Geneva cantonal administration (plus 15 per cent), were not accepted by the international organizations except to a very limited extent. Only one of its recommendations, concerning the use of the OFIAMT index for the annual adjustment of salaries and the carrying out of a five-yearly survey for purposes of comparison with Geneva governmental salaries, was accepted in principle, but it was applied not to a comparison with the Geneva cantonal administration but with all major Geneva employers.

17. During the 1965 review by ICSAB of the guiding principles for fixing General Service conditions of employment, the ILO proposed a new procedure for local salary surveys. This method relied in particular on a stratified random sample of all employers of office workers, the rate corresponding to the seventy-fifth percentile being compared with the midpoint of the organizations' scale at the appropriate grade. It was further decided, as ICSAB had suggested, to entrust the collection and analysis of the data to a competent independent institution. Lastly, the jobs selected for comparison in the 1966 survey were the following: two jobs at G-2 level and one each at G-3, G-4, G-5 and G-6.

18. The survey made by the Battelle Institute in 1966, using the method described in the preceding paragraph, produced an unexpected result: analysis of the data by an interagency committee showed General Service salaries to be some 16.8 per cent above best prevailing rates. It is impossible to overstate the importance of this development to an understanding of everything that has happened in Geneva since that date, including the strike of 25 February 1976. The results of the survey, which should have led to a sharp reduction in General Service salaries, came as an unpleasant surprise not only to the staff but also to the administrations of the international organizations. All the authorities concerned were embarrassed by the situation. The results were referred to various bodies for further study: through negotiations with the staff, the gap was narrowed to 12 per cent; an ICSAB panel evaluated it at 10 per cent; and ACABQ, consulted in its turn in the autumn of 1967, narrowed it further to 9 per cent and recommended that it should be closed over a period of four years (1968-1971).

19. Once the problems created by the unexpected outcome of the 1966 survey had been more or less satisfactorily solved, the organizations and the staff representatives turned their attention to the task of devising a new method.^{5/} The ILO and its Staff Union were commissioned to study the matter. The new procedure which they proposed early in 1968, and which was examined and approved jointly by the Geneva-based organizations and staff associations, had the following main features:

- Salary comparisons to be made in relation to two jobs only: a G-2 junior clerk and a G-5 accounts clerk;
- Data to be collected on salaries paid to male employees only;

^{5/} ACABQ on 21 November 1976 encouraged the undertaking of a new survey and research for "improving the methodology" (see annex II of ICSAB/XVI/I of 15 July 1968) but seems not to have been consulted after the adoption of the new method.

- The outside matching point to be the seventy-fifth percentile of the top third of the rates determined 6/.

This new procedure was submitted for consideration to ICSAB which, although obliged to base its judgement on incomplete documentation submitted at the last moment, made a number of serious criticisms (ICSAB/XVI/I of 15 July 1968, report of the sixteenth session of the Board, paragraphs 45-55).

20. The Board was unable to say "whether it would have come to the same general conclusions in any review undertaken with its own resources on an independent basis". It noted that one of the factors in favour of the proposed plan was that "staff representatives have pledged to the organizations and the Board to co-operate to the fullest possible extent in resolving future difficulties and not to resort to strikes, demonstrations or threats of mass action. It is on the basis of this firm undertaking that the Board is prepared to endorse the broad lines of the new approach, subject to (a number of) comments". The most important of those comments are to be found in paragraphs 52 and 53 of the report, which are quoted in full:

"52. Under the new methodology proposed for Geneva, a survey would still be made (by sampling techniques) of all outside rates for a limited number of specific jobs, but only the top third of the outside rates would be retained for consideration, and the seventy-fifth percentile of the top third would be taken as the 'outside matching point'. In relation to the whole of the outside rates this point would be the ninety-second percentile. This rate would, however, continue to be equated to the midpoint (step VI) of the corresponding United Nations scale.

53. The Board would see no objection, in view of the position in Paris and Rome, to using only the top third of the rates, nor to taking the seventy-fifth percentile of those rates as the outside matching point. It does, however, have serious doubts whether step VI of the United Nations scale can be considered as an appropriate inside matching point for purposes of comparison. The nature of the Geneva labour market is rather unusual, in that few employers use regular scales of pay or even rates of pay which are strictly related to job evaluation. Length of service plays a large part in determining rates for individuals, which tend to be 'rates for persons' rather than 'rates for jobs'. This being so, it seems to the Board that there is at least a strong possibility that the ninety-second percentile should be compared to the maximum of the United Nations scale rather than to step VI, a rate reached in the United Nations system after five years' service in the job". /Underlining inserted/.

6/ The seventy-fifth percentile of the top third is equal to the ninety-second percentile of the entire range ($66.66 + 33.3 \times 75$). Hence the new

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procedure raised the "outside matching point" substantially by comparison with the previous one, which relied on the seventy-fifth percentile of the entire salary range.

21. Subsequent events showed that no practical account was taken of this reservation although in the surveys for the years 1968 and 1973 data were collected on the correlation between age and seniority and salaries paid. But they were not used because, for reasons never clearly defined, the organizations considered these data to be "far from conclusive".

22. A new survey, covering 1968, was carried out early in 1969 using the methods outlined in paragraph 19. The results indicated that the new scales should be about 4 per cent higher than the existing scales. Since these results seemed reasonable to the various parties, there was no great controversy over their assessment and the construction of the new scale was relatively simple.

D. Negotiations related to the Battelle Survey

23. Since the principle of making a survey every five years had been accepted, a survey for the year 1973 should have been made in 1974. (The preceding survey having covered the year 1968.) However, 1974 passed without any decision being taken to that effect. The administration of the United Nations Office at Geneva had concerned itself with the problem since July 1974, but the consultations it held with the representatives of the other agencies revealed that no one wished to make a survey so soon because it seemed that most of the staff associations were not pressing for it. Ultimately it was only at the beginning of 1975, at the insistence of the Staff Council of the United Nations Office and various other staff associations in the other agencies, that the problem began to be actively considered. In addition to the question of the "binding character of the results" of the 1975 Battelle survey (see paragraph 24 below) negotiations between the administrations and the staff focused on a number of issues. The divergent positions on each and the solutions agreed after negotiation are shown in the following table:

Issue	Position after initial negotiations		Agreed solution
	of Administrations	of Staff	
a) Date of application of new salary scale	1 October 1975	1 July 1975	1 August 1975
b) Date of application of increase in dependency allowances	1 October 1975	1 April 1975	1 April 1975
c) Year to be covered by the 1975 Battelle survey	1974	1973	1973
d) Date of the next salary survey	Meeting in 1979 to consider when a new survey should be made.	Meeting in 1978. Survey covering year 1979.	Not yet decided.
e) Method for updating salaries for 1973 obtained from the Battelle survey	Average of last three years of OFIAMT index	Real OFIAMT index for 1974 and 1975	1973 OFIAMT index to update results for 1973; 1974 OFIAMT index to update results for 1974; average of last three years of OFIAMT index to update results for 1975.

24. Moreover, the administrations expressly asked that both sides should make a firm commitment to accept the results of the Battelle survey as binding on both sides without discussion as to their interpretation. Since this is an extremely important point, it seems necessary to quote from the minutes of the meetings of the Representatives of the Executive Heads and Staff of the seven organizations concerned. Thus the minutes of the plenary meeting of 29 January 1975 read in part as follows:

"The representatives of the Executive Heads ... asked ... that both sides should agree that the results of the survey should be binding on both sides.

The staff representatives stated that they could not, at the meeting, commit themselves on the binding character of the survey results and wished time to consult and give a reply at a later meeting. The representatives of the Executive Heads were of the opinion that the survey would be meaningless if there was no firm advance commitment to adhere to its conclusions; the non-acceptance of the conclusions would lead to questioning the applicability of the methodology itself".

Again, the minutes of another plenary meeting of Representatives of the Executive Heads and of the Staff, held on 30 April 1975, stated that:

"the Representative of the ILO's Administration took note of the consensus reached on the binding character of the results of the Survey and pointed out that 'discussions in the Plenary Meeting of their translation into salary scale' must be restricted to the question of the construction of the salary scale and of the timing of the implementation of the results, but in no circumstances could the binding character of the results be questioned". /Underlining inserted/.

This position of the administrations seems to have been motivated by the experience with the 1966 Battelle survey when staff representatives objected to the results (see paragraph 18). However, the administrations maintain that the above wording was never intended to preclude an analysis of the results and pointed out that at a meeting with the staff on 7 May 1975 it was agreed that a working party would "follow up on the conduct of the survey and analyse its results" (see paragraph 8).

25. On the other hand, there was no real negotiation on the method of the survey itself; the two sides reached agreement fairly quickly to adopt purely and simply the method used in the survey for 1968 and to entrust the survey to the Battelle Institute as before.

26. The Battelle survey was carried out between September and 19 December 1975, when the results indicated in paragraph 6 above were made available. The date of publication of these results saw the start of the negotiations on how to apply them, which led both to the strike and finally to the compromise agreement of 23 April 1976 (see paragraph 9).

II. PROBLEMS CONCERNING GENERAL SERVICE STAFF AT GENEVA

A. Defects in the Methods used for determining General Service Salaries

27. We have seen above that the method adopted for the Battelle survey for 1973 was chosen by agreement between the representatives of the administrations and those of the staff of the seven organizations, totalling 14 participants. Furthermore, it was applied both for the years 1968 and 1973 by a private institute with a reputation for responsibility. We have also noted the insistence of the organizations' representatives on securing a firm agreement as to the binding character of the results of a survey carried out by that method.
28. The basing of General Service salaries on best prevailing local conditions of employment is considered to be a sound principle which should continue to be applied in the future, although perhaps with some change as suggested in section E below. The application of this principle by the methods used before 1968, though presenting numerous difficulties, did give credible results. It was only after the methods were radically changed and these new methods applied in the surveys for the years 1968 and 1973 that the credibility of results became doubtful. The fact that the survey for 1968 produced results acceptable to both administration and staff, no doubt by pure chance, led to the use of the same methods for the survey of 1973, with this time, and again by chance, aberrant results. The agreement of 23 April 1976, as explained in paragraph 10, reflected not the extreme results of the Battelle survey for 1973 but rather a correction in the lag of the OFIAMT index. As a consequence the current salary scale derives from the scale which resulted from the Battelle survey for 1968 adjusted by the application of the real OFIAMT index. But the Battelle survey for 1968 used the same defective methods described below which were used in the survey for 1973 and which produced results which were discarded. Consequently the agreement of 23 April 1976 can not be regarded as reflecting the best prevailing outside conditions of employment.
29. This departure in Geneva from the guiding principles and in particular from the principle of best prevailing local conditions of employment does not conform to decisions of the General Assembly (see paragraph 12) and casts considerable doubt on the validity of the current level of General Service salaries.
30. The paragraphs below explain why the methods used for the surveys for the years 1968 and 1973 were defective so that lessons may be drawn for the future.
31. The two categories of jobs to be covered by the survey were the subject of lengthy job descriptions which were communicated to the Battelle Institute. These job descriptions were exactly the same (with some very minor corrections of detail) as those used for the 1968 survey. However, a reading of these descriptions reveals:

That despite their length they do not go into enough detail to describe a job corresponding to a particular grade. The job description for a junior clerk indicates a minimum age (21 years) and the required level of education, but does not specify any maximum length of service. The job description for an accounts clerk also indicates the required level of education and knowledge of languages and states (in translation) that "the candidate must have several (normally at least five) years' practical experience in the accounting field". The rest of the job descriptions consists in each case of a list of typical functions to be performed. Such a presentation is not the description of a post corresponding to a particular grade. These are really descriptions of a certain "type of occupation", for the functions described can be performed at various grades, depending, in principle, on the complexity of specific tasks, degree of supervision, etc. This is borne out by an examination of the grades at which staff members performing these functions are employed in the international organizations which clearly shows that the description given for a junior clerk can be applied to staff members at grades G-2, G-3 or G-4 and that that given for an accounts clerk can be applied to accounts clerks at grades G-4, G-5, G-6 or G-7.

32. This finding should be considered in conjunction with the reservations made by ICSAB in 1968, as stated in paragraph 20 above, concerning the unsuitability of the inside and outside matching points selected. In the results of the Battelle survey itself it will be found that the salary of SwF 33,378 corresponding to the third quartile of the top third for the category B post of junior clerk is paid to workers of an average age of 58 years with 29 years' service in the enterprise and 18 in the job category in question. After service of this length in the United Nations, an accounts clerk appointed at grade G-5 would have reached the ceiling of his grade and would probably have attained the highest step of grade G-6. It is thus obvious that the outside and inside matching points were chosen in an irrational way, and this casts doubts on the validity of the results. If, for example, the inside matching point as suggested by ICSAB had been the top step of grades G-2 and G-5, this would have had the effect of reducing the increases suggested by the Battelle survey from 17.6 per cent for G-2 to 3.4 per cent and from 24.7 per cent for G-5 to 7.1 per cent. These major differences illustrate the practical importance of the ICSAB reservations.

33. Furthermore, the results of the study show that, for the two posts considered, the highest gross wages taken into account by the enumerators were four times as high as the lowest ones:

For the post of "junior clerk", the lowest gross wage in the range was SwF 11,900 and the highest SwF 47,600. The corresponding figures for the post of "accounts clerk" were SwF 18,850 and SwF 78,733. Such differences are obviously not normal. They merely confirm the fact that the job descriptions given to the Battelle Institute did not describe the functions corresponding to the particular grade and step but rather those corresponding

to a group of grades, as indicated in paragraph 31 above. Moreover, even if the job descriptions supplied had been specific enough, it would in any case have been reasonable to eliminate, as probably aberrant, some proportion of the observations made at the top and bottom of the range.

34. There are also other methodological shortcomings which cast doubt on the validity of the survey results:

(a) No provision was made for taking into account, in the construction of the salary scale, a comparison of hours of work (which seems to be of about 10 per cent greater for outside employees earning salaries at the ninety-second percentile than in the international organizations), or the existing arrangements with regard to annual leave, which are also much more liberal in the United Nations than with the majority of Geneva employers. Thus although the General Assembly decided in 1950 in resolution 470(V) that General Service salaries should be fixed by the Secretary-General "normally on the basis of the best prevailing conditions of employment", in Geneva only salaries and taxes seem to have been considered, and other "conditions of employment" such as hours of work, leave and welfare or social security arrangements have been ignored.

(b) The fact that the survey covered the year 1973 and not 1974, and was carried out at the end of 1975, certainly made it more difficult to obtain accurate information on the wages paid in enterprises, and reduces still further the credibility of the figures obtained.

(c) Certain chiefs of personnel of the enterprises consulted by Battelle stated (in translation) that Z/: "computer processing of accounting data has become the general practice in medium-sized and large enterprises (and even some small ones) in Geneva and has substantially changed the work of the bookkeepers since 1969; the job definition of an 'accounts clerk' for the survey therefore pays insufficient attention to these new accounting activities and, in choosing the wage-earners to be covered by the survey, the chiefs of personnel, being unable to use the definition, came to arbitrary and often disparate decisions".

(d) With regard to the junior clerk it was stated that "male junior clerks are increasingly rare and have been extensively replaced by female staff since 1968; hence the wages taken into consideration are often marginal cases and, here again, the chiefs of personnel had a freedom of decision which made the information recorded extremely heterogeneous".

(e) Major banks in Geneva refused to participate in the survey for 1973, although they had provided information for the previous survey. Their non-participation was explained by their inability to identify similar positions in their banks because they felt that the job descriptions were not sufficiently specific.

Z/ The quotations in (c) and (d) are extracts from a document prepared by the Battelle Institute on 29 January 1976 and entitled (in translation) "Comments on the precautions to be taken in interpreting the statistical data".

(f) Lastly, and of great importance, if a valid salary scale is to be constructed from the results of any survey, those results must also be capable of being applied to a coherent system of job classification in the organizations. However, as pointed out in section B of this report, the situation in this respect varies, and in some cases the Geneva-based organizations, particularly the United Nations Office at Geneva, have no such system.

35. Furthermore the information provided by the organizations concerning staff members employed in the grades corresponding to the categories chosen for the survey confirms that these posts do not represent a significant sample of the General Service staff as a whole:

(a) Thus WHO informed us that it had only five G-2 posts corresponding to the job description for a junior clerk used for the survey and that it had no G-5 post for an accounts clerk, the corresponding jobs being at level G-6 in WHO (out of a total of 794 General Service staff, including 40 at level G-2 and 142 at level G-5 (see annex III)).

(b) WHO has no posts corresponding to a junior clerk at level G-2 and its accounts clerks (six posts) are one at G-6, three at G-5 and two at G-4.

(c) ILO informed us that it had ten G-2 posts corresponding to the job description for a junior clerk and 20 accounts clerks at G-5.

(d) The United Nations Office informed us that, of a total of 1,496 General Service staff in 1976, it had the following posts corresponding to the descriptions used for the survey:

59 posts at level G-2;

12 posts at level G-5.

But it should be noted that:

With regard to junior clerks, the United Nations administration has included in its figures clerk-typists, one of whose main function is to type, but at below test speed. These functions do not correspond to those of the job description used for the survey, and the numbers provided by the United Nations administration should therefore be reduced to those for G-2 clerks only: i.e., to 45 (or 3 per cent of its total General Service staff);

and that:

With regard to accounts clerks, there are also a large number of posts at level G-6 which correspond just as well and even better to the job description used for the survey.

Lastly, taking as a whole the G-2 and G-5 posts included in the figures given above, the job descriptions now in force are quite often hardly comparable owing to their extreme variety, and very few can be accepted as corresponding even approximately to the model job descriptions used in the survey.

36. All these findings lead to conclusions on two points. Firstly, the shortcomings of the method used in 1975 are so serious and so numerous that, despite all the efforts made to correct or interpret them, it appears certain that no salary scale which could be constructed using the results of this survey would reflect the best prevailing conditions of employment at Geneva except by pure chance. This situation is regrettable from all points of view since the agreement of 23 April 1976 (see Annex I) which reflected largely the application of the real OFIAMT index to a salary scale resulting from the Battelle survey for 1968 and which in turn was based upon the defective methods described above also cannot pretend to reflect best prevailing local conditions of employment (see paragraph 10). It is urgent to find ways to ensure that Geneva salaries are a faithful reflection of the best prevailing conditions. Unless this is done, there is no way to determine precisely whether the salaries paid over the last seven years and those now paid are out of line.^{8/}

37. Secondly, the wide difference between the salary increase indicated by the Battelle survey for 1973 as updated (average 23 per cent) and that resulting from the continued application of the OFIAMT index (average about 12 per cent) casts further doubt on the results of the survey and/or the suitability of the OFIAMT index. Of course it is normal that best prevailing local conditions of employment for specific job categories would not improve precisely at the same rate as a general wage index for much broader job categories which takes account of all wage earners and not only those receiving the best prevailing salaries. It is indeed probable that the better paid employees would not have their salaries increased at the same rate as the average of all employees. Also the OFIAMT index is based on the average of all salaries paid in Switzerland and not, as for salary surveys carried out on behalf of the Geneva-based organizations, on salaries in the Geneva area. These differences explain why results obtained from surveys would not be the same as results obtained by applying the OFIAMT index even if both methods were correctly used. But the divergence between results provided by the two methods is too great to be explained by the above factors and leads to the conclusion that one or both of the methods are inadequate in their present form to meet the purposes. Nevertheless, the principle of five-year surveys with interim adjustments by means of a wage index is sound and should be maintained but with the elimination of the defects in methods described above.

38. In these circumstances, the techniques for determining General Service salaries unquestionably need to be refined and their application made obligatory. The necessity for refinement on a number of points emerges clearly from this report. But it is also emphasized in the document referred to in paragraph 12 above, prepared by the Administrative Committee on

^{8/} In this connexion the Geneva consumer price index with September 1966 equal to 100 has evolved as follows: 1967 : 105.7; 1968 : 109.0; 1969 : 111.7; 1970 : 117.9; 1971 : 124.6; 1972 : 133.3; 1973 : 147.8; 1974 : 160.1; 1975 : 165.5 (see Annex II for increases in the OFIAMT index).

Co-ordination and published by the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC/R.36). Among the points specified in that document, it was requested in particular that the guiding principles should:

- "Include ... (e) Criteria for fixing internal and external matching points" (paragraph 16);
- Take account of the need for "reasonable consistency of grading practices at the duty station so that the jobs identified for salary survey purposes are representative of the totality of the United Nations organizations represented at that duty station" (paragraph 18).

However, any elaboration on the existing instructions will be a waste of effort, unless they are endowed with unquestioned legal authority. From the beginning, "the guiding principles for the determination of conditions of service for the General Service category" were the product of inter-agency work undertaken by the Consultative Committee for Administrative Questions. This text, elaborated for the first time in 1952, then revised in 1958, in 1964 and finally in 1972, never received approval from an inter-governmental organ which would have given it legal force. The comments or suggestions of the International Civil Service Advisory Board no doubt gave added substance to these guiding principles, but they were not fully accepted by the organizations. This situation has unquestionably facilitated the (at least partial) non-application of these principles, e.g. in Geneva, where the organizations concerned have neglected to apply, in particular, the instructions concerning the choice of internal and external matching points and the choice of typical jobs. This is the reason why the Joint Inspection Unit thinks that, once these guiding principles have been finally drawn up, they should be submitted to the General Assembly for approval as soon as possible.

B. The Power of Decision

39. Salary negotiations in the international civil service do not, generally speaking, take place in a clearly defined legal setting. In this connexion reference may be made to the analysis of the problem given in an article published in the "Revue de droit international":

"The staff are at a particular disadvantage in relation to the administrators in that their representatives do not seem to know exactly to whom they should submit their claims, whether to the Secretary-General, to the delegates of Member States, or to the many bodies specializing in the study of administrative and budgetary problems. This feeling of powerlessness is aggravated by the grouping of the organizations in 'families'. The UNESCO Round Table denounced:

'The uncertainties which exist at various levels of analysis: who is the interlocutor of a staff association in an organization of the United Nations system? The Director-General or Secretary-General? The General Conference? ACC? ICSAB? ACABQ? The Fifth Committee?' 9/

40. But, in addition to this general problem, the special situation which prevails at Geneva gives rise to further difficulties. At Geneva, any negotiations on problems of staff remuneration entail the participation of 14 different parties: seven groups of representatives of the executive heads of the organizations and seven groups of representatives of the staff associations. It is obvious that, when a specific difficulty arises, divergent views may be and generally are expressed, particularly on the side of the "employers". The circumstances in which the recent negotiations were held showed clearly that, although the representatives of the executive heads of the organizations endeavoured to present a common position on the main points at issue, their views diverged appreciably as soon as a serious problem was raised.

41. This dilution of responsibilities may even be thought to account in large part for the mistakes made both in the choice and application of the method and in undertaking to accept the results of the survey as binding. On the "employers" side, throughout the period preceding the strike no one felt responsible for the salary negotiations as a whole, either among the executive heads - because the decision to be taken was not a matter for only one organization and none of them under the existing arrangements could claim leadership - or among those they appointed as negotiators, because there was a tendency to evade the difficulties rather than tackle them. Thus a certain lack of technical rigour was compounded by an approach to problems which transformed what should have been a scientific measurement of the "best prevailing conditions of employment" into a mere bargaining session. Consequently, for the future and in the interests both of the organizations and of their staff, it seems plain that a solution must be found in order to establish a genuine power of decision.

42. It would appear that the only reasonable type of solution that can be envisaged for Geneva is the appointment, on the side of the "employers", of a

9/ Revue de droit international, October-December 1975, "The international civil servants' strike" by Alain Pellet. Translation by the United Nations Secretariat.

sole negotiator 10/. This negotiator should be equipped with unquestioned powers of discussion and decision so as to be able properly to conduct negotiations with the staff representatives, with the sole proviso that any decision having financial implications exceeding the existing budgetary provision should be subject to approval by the General Assembly of the United Nations and the general conferences of the various organizations 11/. This in fact was the type of solution that the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the executive heads of the international organizations at Geneva finally adopted following the strike: their appointment of the United Nations Controller as sole negotiator made it possible to arrive at the settlement of 23 April 1976 referred to earlier.

However, this decision, which was taken at a time of grave crisis and as a result of exceptional circumstances, does not involve any institutional change for the future. Yet an institutional solution is needed if a repetition of the situation which led to the strike is to be avoided: there are various methods by which such a solution could be achieved.

43. The most straightforward method would be to implement promptly and on the basis of a long-term commitment the provisions of article 12, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Civil Service Commission. This article is quoted in full:

"Article 12

1. At the headquarters duty stations and such other duty stations as may from time to time be added at the request of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, the Commission shall establish the relevant facts for, and make recommendations as to, the salary scales of staff in the General Service and other locally recruited categories.

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 above, the executive head or heads concerned, after consultation with the staff representatives, may request the Commission to determine the salary scales at a particular duty station instead of making a recommendation. The salary scales so determined shall apply to all staff in the same category at the duty station.

3. In exercising its functions under paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the Commission shall, in accordance with article 28, consult executive heads and staff representatives.

4. The Commission shall determine the date or dates on which it can assume the functions set out in this article".

44. The procedure envisaged in this article has not yet been put into effect, since the Commission has had to devote its first two years of work to considering Professional salaries. In this connexion, a clear distinction should be drawn

10/ The staff representatives of the various organizations, on their side, being free to devise whatever arrangements for their representation they deem most appropriate.

11/ Conferring on the "negotiator" powers concerning essentially common aspects of salaries and allowances would not reduce the responsibilities of executive heads for other aspects of staff relations (see paragraphs 49-58).

between the provisions of paragraph 1 and those of paragraph 2. Under paragraph 1, the Commission has a mandatory function to "establish the relevant facts" for headquarters duty stations. This means that it must in the future assume responsibility for the verification of indices and the conduct of possible surveys, and may thus be expected to ensure that rigorous, scientific methods are applied at all duty stations. It is urgent that the Commission should be given the means enabling it to assume these functions. It is most desirable that the necessary decisions should be taken on this matter as soon as possible 12/.

45. The provisions of article 12, paragraph 2, relate to the determination of the salary scales at a particular duty station, which is something altogether different from establishing facts or making recommendations. However, for functions of this type to be exercised by the Commission, it is necessary that the executive heads of the organizations, after consultation with the staff representatives, should take the initiative of requesting the Commission to assume them. It is under the provisions of this paragraph 2 that the decision might be taken at Geneva to establish a sole negotiator appointed by the Commission.

46. However, it is not at all certain, despite the recent events and their consequences, that the executive heads of the various international organizations at Geneva after consultation with their staff are prepared to ask that this paragraph 2 should be applied.

47. Another possible solution would be simply to institutionalize on a permanent basis the appointment of a sole negotiator chosen by the executive heads, as was done temporarily to solve the crises created by the strike. But such a solution would require difficult inter-organization negotiations and, moreover, would not provide the same safeguards of independence as the institutional solution involving a negotiator appointed by the Commission. The functions of this negotiator would, if the Commission is able to accelerate the application of article 12, paragraph 1, of its statute, essentially consist of determining the salary scales in consultation with the staff and in the light of the "relevant facts and recommendations" presented by the Commission.

48. It is therefore necessary to envisage the use of other methods in the event that straightforward implementation of article 12, paragraph 2, should prove impossible. The General Assembly is in a position either to request the executive heads of the Geneva-based organizations to make use of article 12, paragraph 2 of the statute of the Commission, or to devise an alternative method by amending this article. It might decide that the Commission should determine the salary scales of staff in the General Service category at duty stations chosen by the Commission, when the Commission is of the opinion that it can usefully assume this type of responsibility in place of the executive heads of the organizations concerned. The Joint Inspection Unit believes that the most serious consideration should be given to this possible amendment and, if it is adopted, that the Commission turn its attention in the first place to Geneva.

12/ The World Health Assembly has expressed its wishes on the subject in resolution WHA29.25 of 13 May 1976.

C. Relations between the Organizations and the Staff

49. On 9 April 1976, in his statement to the staff of the Geneva Office, the Secretary-General of the United Nations said:

"I have always felt that many of the gravest conflicts that humanity has experienced arise from, or at least are aggravated by, a breakdown in communication".

At first sight, it does seem that such a "breakdown in communication" took place, particularly at the United Nations Office at Geneva. This impression is founded in particular on the failings which were evident during the strike itself. In practice, the information disseminated daily during this period emanated from the Staff Committee alone. On the administration's side, all that can be mentioned is a statement by the Director-General over the Suisse Romande television network three days after the strike had begun, i.e. 27 February 1976, giving only general information on the situation, and a number of meetings of unit chiefs presided over by the Director of Administrative and Financial Services. However, there were no official instructions or communications to the staff or the unit chiefs defining the position of the Secretary-General of the United Nations or the heads of the Geneva Office, UNCTAD, etc., regarding the strike, its causes and the conduct to adopt. It should also be noted that, during the strike, the reason given by the Staff Committee to explain the suspension of telecommunications, despite the very grave consequences which such a measure might have had, was that "it felt that that was the only way to draw the personal attention of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the seriousness of the situation". 13/

However, over and above these symptoms which were brought out by the strike itself, consideration should be given to the way in which the machinery for communication between the administration and the staff is organized. A comparison of the system of communication at the Geneva Office and the systems in the other organizations shows that significant differences undoubtedly exist.

50. If we consider, for instance, the measures taken by the Director-General of WHO, we find progress, since 1973 in particular, a staff participation exercise comprising a coherent set of activities; among these the following may be mentioned:

- Consultations with the staff, organized in the form of discussion groups; these groups, 28 in number, brought together some 500 staff members in both the Professional and the General Service category; each group prepared a report containing recommendations, suggestions and analyses. These reports were summarized in a single document, and a second round of consultations on the report and on the actions taken pursuant to the recommendations began in November 1974;

- A WHO Journal welcoming communications from staff members has been published regularly and has enabled a link to be forged between field workers in the regions and staff at headquarters;

13/ This citation does not imply any approval of the explanation.

- The Director-General has organized lectures for all staff in both categories; various speakers, including the Director-General himself, have participated and the staff have been encouraged to ask questions;

- Assistant Directors-General, divisional directors and unit chiefs have been encouraged to develop and extend their own staff meetings and have acted effectively on these recommendations;

- An "Ombudsman" was appointed on an experimental basis in January 1974 and has helped in solving a large number of staff problems. His post was made permanent in 1975;

- A small "Staff Participation Committee" has been set up which reports directly to the Director-General and which is responsible for examining and considering all the aspects of staff participation mentioned above;

- Working groups with Staff Committee participation have been formed to deal with certain problems brought to light by the consultations with the staff, such as staff training and career development at all levels, improving the post classification system, problems of sex discrimination, and revision of the Personnel Manual and staff regulations.

This experiment has met with some practical difficulties (particularly staff disaffection with a number of exercises during the second year of operation) but, in so far as they have been able to be identified, it is possible to set about resolving them, and a programme of improvement is in preparation.

51. Time did not permit a study to be made of the systems of administration-staff relations in all the Geneva-based organizations, but it seems that major efforts have also been made at the ILO in particular as regards improving the procedure for examining staff grievances.

Similar efforts do not seem to have been made in the United Nations Office at Geneva:

- Administration-staff relations have been organized through the Joint Advisory Committee (JAC) on which three representatives of the Director-General (usually the Chief of General Services, the Chief of the Personnel Administration Section and the Chief of the Finance Division) sit with representatives of the Staff Committee. The issues dealt with by JAC relate to conditions of work and service, recruitment and training methods, etc. This machinery affords a means of raising and discussing a number of problems but, on the other hand, does not appear to lead to quick solutions. It involves neither the staff as a whole nor the heads of the main substantive departments or divisions and, in consequence, the dialogue which it allows seems somewhat limited;

- In recent years a number of unit chiefs have organized lectures open to the staff at large on the working and objectives of their divisions;

- A number of working groups have been set up to study specific problems such as the establishment of a day nursery, the classification of gardeners and other technical staff, etc.

52. These various mechanisms do not add up to a staff participation system of the kind described earlier for WHO, for instance. Yet, in their comments to the Inspectors, both the administration of the United Nations and the staff representatives remarked that the existing methods of communication could suffice if appropriate conditions were created. According to the administration, the system of communication at United Nations Headquarters in New York is no more highly developed than that at Geneva, and has so far functioned properly. For their part, the Geneva staff representatives stress that a "breakdown in communication" was not the main cause of the strike.

53. It would in fact appear that over and above the crisis in communication there exists a crisis of confidence. At the Geneva Office there is an evident absence of any real dialogue based on understanding and mutual trust between the heads of the Office and their staff. Nor is there any common feeling that everyone is working for the same ideals or at any rate clear and well-understood objectives which command the personal allegiance of those concerned and which entail possible sacrifices. There are doubtless several possible explanations for this state of affairs:

- Firstly, the Geneva Office seems more like a collection of units endowed with semi-independence than a single organization with a clear and coherent programme. This situation undoubtedly makes it more difficult to organize participation by the staff, but this difficulty could be overcome if there was a will to do so;

- Secondly, there is no doubt that a series of misunderstandings has occurred regarding the actual representation of the staff within the Office and the establishment in 1973 of the "Staff Union of the United Nations at Geneva". The Secretary-General of the United Nations basing himself on the existing rules and regulations regarding staff representation, has taken the official position of not recognizing the existence of this Union.

54. The relevant provisions are contained in staff regulation 8.1 and staff rule 108.1. 14/

In theory, these provisions enable all staff members to be represented in the Staff Council and, through it, the Staff Committee, which is the real organ for consultation between the staff and the administration. However, the extent to which minority views, where they exist, are truly represented depends on the interpretation given to the provisions concerned.

14/

"REGULATION 8.1: STAFF RELATIONS:

(a) A Staff Council, elected by the staff, shall be established for the purpose of ensuring continuous contact between the staff and the Secretary-General. The Council shall be entitled to make proposals to the Secretary-General for

55. The rules and regulations do not prohibit the establishment of one or more staff associations, since they make no reference to the kind of groupings which the staff may form to put their views across and uphold their interests. But, the administration is not obliged to enter into contact with one or more associations or unions and may confine itself to recognising only those bodies which are mentioned in the text, i.e. the Council and the Committee.

56. However, a broader and more open interpretation, which is clearly the corollary of a climate of confidence in administration-staff relations, might entail granting official recognition to such associations or unions as the staff has freely decided to form and even facilitating proportional representation for all views, particularly minority views, in official bodies, especially the Committee.

By adopting the restrictive interpretation and in some way granting official recognition to only one staff association, the administration of the United Nations has not made it easier to create a climate of confidence. In these circumstances,

improvements in the situation of staff members, both as regards their conditions of work and their general conditions of life.

(b) The Staff Council shall be composed in such a way as to afford equitable representation to all levels of the staff.

(c) Election of the Staff Council shall take place annually under regulations drawn up by the Staff Council and agreed to by the Secretary-General".

"RULE 108.1: STAFF COUNCIL

(a) The Staff Council shall be consulted, through its elected officers composing the Staff Committee, on questions relating to staff welfare and administration, including policy on appointments, promotions and terminations, and on salaries and related allowances, and shall be entitled to make proposals to the Secretary-General on behalf of the staff on such questions.

(b) Except for instructions to meet emergency situations, general administrative instructions or directions on questions within the scope of paragraph (a) shall be transmitted in advance to the Staff Committee for consideration and comment before being placed in effect.

(c) The Staff Council at Headquarters shall be composed of 39 to 41 representatives elected on the basis of approximately equal electoral units. Any member of the staff shall be eligible for election to the Staff Council.

(d) Polling officers elected by the staff shall be responsible for dividing the Departments of the Secretariat into electoral units on the basis of the organizational chart of the Secretariat. The Staff Council shall obtain the approval of the Secretary-General for any rearrangement of electoral units. The polling officers shall organize annually the election of members of the Staff Council in such a way as to ensure the complete secrecy and fairness of the vote.

(e) Staff members in established offices away from Headquarters may select representatives to make on their behalf proposals to the Secretary-General regarding matters covered by regulation 8.1 (a) and regulation 8.2".

the misunderstandings and conflicts among the staff themselves regarding arrangements for representation have certainly contributed to a deterioration in the general climate and have made for greater aggressiveness in the way in which demands are presented.

57. It has now become clear that measures to create a climate of confidence are essential. The conclusion of the salary agreement should be a help in this regard, but it is not by itself enough. Such measures should include the initiation of a meaningful dialogue and demonstrate to the staff that their views on matters of concern to them and on their association with the common endeavour will henceforward be genuinely taken into consideration. Such measures, whose aim should be to reduce conflicts and enable a variety of views to be expressed and heard, might include, inter alia the establishment, by agreement with the staff representatives, of a true system of participation based, for instance, on the measures taken by WHO. Consideration might also be given to the possibility of holding a Round Table on the question 15/. The essential thing, however, is not just to devise new machinery but above all to show a will for understanding.

58. Another aspect of relations between organizations and their staff was illustrated by events which took place during the strike. Although there was no encroachment upon the freedom of the staff members who wished to work there was a suspension of certain services such as electricity, lifts, heating and, for a time, telecommunications. The administration did not seem to have sufficient legal or practical means in its rules to limit or avert some of these actions, the seriousness of which, particularly the interruption of telecommunications, should not be underestimated.

The main reason for this state of affairs is that the General Assembly of the United Nations and the general conferences of the various organizations have not yet formulated a position of principle concerning the phenomenon of the international civil servants' strike. This situation is in no way surprising, considering the relatively recent origin of this form of action: there were no strikes in the international organizations within the United Nations family until 1962 (ILO, UNESCO), and no strikes of any great length (i.e. several days) until 1974 (the strike at FAO, Rome). It is also a well-known fact that there are wide divergences between the domestic laws of Member States relating to the right of civil servants to strike. Nevertheless, a response should be worked out and studies 16/ should be undertaken promptly, either by the International Civil Service Commission or by an ad hoc committee, with a view to proposing solutions for this question and submitting them for the consideration of the General Assembly.

15/ A recommendation on this subject has already been made in July 1971 in the Report on Personnel Problems in the United Nations (JIU/REP/71/7, paragraph 480, recommendation No. 20). This recommendation has never been given consideration.

16/ The Joint Inspection Unit was informed that a meeting of the legal advisers of United Nations organizations took place in Vienna on 5 and 6 April 1976 and had a preliminary discussion on this and related questions.

D. Career Development for General Service Staff

59. We have seen that salary surveys are unlikely to have any meaning without a relatively precise classification of General Service posts. It is equally obvious, however, that the absence of a classification system opens the way to arbitrary behaviour; the position at Geneva in that respect varies from organization to organization.

60. For example, WHO has a "Post classification plan for General Service staff at Headquarters", which is published in the WHO Manual and thus has official status. This classification plan comprises a list of 16 types of occupations (administrative assistant, clerk, clerk stenographer, clerk/typist, secretary, clinical nurse, draughtsman, laboratory assistant, store-man, driver, messenger and guard, office-machine operator, reproduction-machine operator, labourer, maintenance team supervisor and unskilled manual worker). For each of these there is a standard job description and a minimum qualification requirement. For each of these types of posts there is also an indication of the available levels and the conditions for movement from one level to another, especially as regards length of service. This plan is being revised. Careful study would doubtless suggest some critical comments. In particular it seems at first glance that too much weight is given to length of service, and that such seniority gives access to very high levels in categories in which the minimum qualifications do not appear to justify career advancement of this nature. It is to be hoped that, in the current revision of the plan, greater allowance will be made for in-service training opportunities, that the level of qualifications required for the higher grades will be raised irrespective of the type of occupation and, indeed, that a system of movement from one type of occupation to another will be instituted on the basis of an adequate training programme ^{17/}. Since the Joint Inspection Unit proposes to study this question more thoroughly at a later stage, this report will not deal with the problem in detail.

61. The International Labour Office also has a post classification plan which lays down precise grade descriptions, each accompanied by detailed specifications of the level of qualifications required. The plan makes the following distinctions:

- At level G-1: one description for manual occupations and trades;
- At level G-2: descriptions of manual occupations and trades, office posts, secretarial posts;
- At levels G-3 and G-4: descriptions of manual occupations and trades, skilled posts, office posts, secretarial posts;
- At levels G-5, G-6 and G-7: the same categories as at levels G-3 and G-4 plus a category of supervisory functions.

^{17/} Annex III shows the statistical composition of WHO General Service staff.

62. At the United Nations, in contrast, there is virtually nothing by way of post classification. No list of types of occupations has been drawn up. A job title is assigned to each post description, but the titles are many and varied, and posts of the same nature may bear different titles while different posts may be given the same title. A complete list of the terms used is annexed in order to show the lack of consistency in the system 18/.

63. Moreover, in the United Nations there is no official document with which everyone, including the staff, can be familiar and which lays down criteria for recruitment or promotion. The only existing document transmitted to us by Personnel Services is an unsigned, undated document, with no page numbers or reference symbol, circulated to members of the Appointment and Promotion Board at Geneva. The title of this document is Criteria to be Applied by the Subsidiary Panel of the Appointment and Promotion Board in Promotion Cases. The information given in it concerns the qualifications required for appointment at or promotion to levels G-3 to G-7. The only types of occupations distinguished are those of clerks and secretaries. There is also a reference to "finance clerks" and "computer clerks" at level G-4. The only precise specifications are those concerning knowledge of languages and typing and shorthand skills. Nothing is said about any of the other occupational categories, although we found that staff in a great many categories, for example messengers, had been promoted to such high levels as G-4 and G-5 without any mention anywhere of the level of qualifications required or the conditions regarding length of service.

64. The incomplete and unofficial nature of the document just mentioned leads to decisions whose correctness cannot be verified, especially by the staff members to whom they apply. Such a situation might therefore explain why the term "paternalism" is sometimes used by staff representatives; but the arbitrariness thus allowed does not preclude a degree of laxity. For example, the promotion of staff members such as messengers to level G-4 or G-5 - that is to say, to levels of remuneration comparable to those of grade P-1 in the Professional category -

18/ See Annex IV. On this point, too, convergent recommendations were made long ago by the Joint Inspection Unit and the Administrative Management Service of the United Nations Secretariat. They were approved by the General Assembly in 1974, but the slowness of implementation by the Secretariat is tantamount to non-execution of these decisions. The Joint Inspection Unit is aware of the existence of a "Working Group of the Structure of the General Service Category", established at Headquarters of the United Nations in New York on 9 October 1973. The Working Group met on 58 occasions between 30 November 1973 and 27 January 1975. No consensus having been reached, a report has been published by the Chairman of the Group under his own responsibility. This report (JAC/213 and Add.1 of 21 November 1975 and 23 February 1976) contains a number of interesting proposals on occupational groups, classification of posts, etc. But this kind of procedure does not facilitate the taking of policy decisions. Under the present regulations it is the responsibility of the Secretary-General to define personnel policy and to take decisions accordingly. Consultation with the staff through the Joint Advisory Committee or by other methods should not mean that the drawing up of proposals and the approving of decisions is the responsibility of the staff. This confusion seems to be one of the causes of the absence of decisions on this matter.

without guarantees as to qualifications, or proper justification on grounds of the difficult nature of the duties does not seem to indicate economical management of the Organization's funds.

65. A rational classification of posts by grade, taking into account duties, responsibilities and qualifications, would put messengers in grade G-1 or at most grade G-2. At the United Nations Office, however, staff described as "messengers" are distributed between grades as follows:

At level G-1:	10
At level G-2:	20 (+ 3 "messenger-drivers" and 1 "clerk-messenger")
At level G-3:	21
At level G-4:	8 (+ 1 clerk-messenger)
At level G-5:	2
<u>Total</u>	<u>61 (+ 5)</u>

This means that more than 50 per cent of the messengers are classed in grades G-3 to G-5. This practice is based not on increased responsibility or competence but essentially on length of service. Seniority alone is thus rewarded, not only by step advancement within each grade, but by promotion from one grade to another. To reward seniority by promotion is not a very effective method of making up for the absence of a career development system. It is also costly and robs the application of the "best prevailing conditions of employment" principle of all real significance.

A messenger without dependants at level G-4, step VI, on 31 March 1976 earns Sw Frs 42,628 net per annum, or slightly more than Sw Frs 3,500 a month, which does not seem a normal remuneration for such duties and is more than the earnings of a Professional staff member at level P-1, step III.

66. It must doubtless be borne in mind that, if locally recruited staff, however modest their duties may be, are to be offered a career, it is necessary to afford opportunities for advancement which are not exhausted within a few years, in so far as the staff member concerned is expected to remain in the same type of occupation throughout his period of service. However, there are various ways of avoiding or reducing these difficulties. Mention may be made of the following:

- Modest posts of the kind described (guards, messengers, huissiers, etc.) might be filled by recruiting persons who are not likely to spend more than a few years in them, either relatively elderly persons (who have, for instance, retired from another job) or young people with sufficient ambition and academic qualifications who would follow training courses enabling them to change their type of occupation as well as their grade;
- Systematic modernization of equipment (for instance, the development of the pneumatic tube system already existing at the Geneva office) in order to reduce carriage by hand;

- Partial use of secretaries to carry messages or mail over short distances;
- Encouragement to staff to undergo practical training and change their type of occupation after a few years 19/.

67. In short, therefore, it would appear both feasible and urgent to find a general solution to this problem of more rational career development for General Service staff 20/. In order to do so it is essential, first:

- To define "types of occupations" for General Service staff and to draw up a precise description of duties for each of them;
- To establish the level of qualifications corresponding to each grade within each type of occupation;
- To devise a system of recruitment which gives due weight to the level of qualifications: the present somewhat primitive methods which place sole reliance on typing and shorthand tests for secretarial staff should be replaced by a comprehensive system of written and oral examinations covering all the general and technical knowledge required.
- To institute arrangements for in-service training designed to facilitate the transfer of General Service staff from one type of occupation to another;
- Lastly, to study all possible ways of abolishing or reducing in number and duration types of jobs which by their very nature make it impossible to organize a career for the entire duration of a staff member's period of service.

While these considerations apply particularly to the United Nations Office at Geneva, they could usefully be taken into account by all the organizations within the United Nations system.

19/ Such training should take place partially during and partially outside office hours.

20/ In this connection the practice of some Governments which place manual workers and messengers in a distinct category could be considered although the abolition of the maintenance category at the United Nations Office at Geneva and the incorporation of maintenance staff in the General Service category is a step in the opposite direction.

E. The General Service Salary Scale and the Relationship between General Service and Professional Salaries and Pensions

68. The anomalies in job classification to which we have just referred are all the more regrettable in that they are superposed on an altogether aberrant situation in respect of salary scales, both within the General Service category itself and in the relationship between General Service and Professional salaries.

69. Firstly, as a result of successive adjustments, the General Service salary scale at Geneva has become excessively compact, in that there is very little difference between grades. This is illustrated by the chart in Annex VII, which shows, for example, that the higher steps in grade G-1 overlap the first steps in G-4 and that the higher steps in grade G-3 are better paid than the first steps in grade G-6. Thus a huissier or messenger at grade G-3, step XI, earns more than an administrative assistant at grade G.6, step III. In any salary scale, it is usually considered normal for the highest steps in a given grade to be better remunerated than the lowest steps in the grade immediately above. A structure of the type we have just described is abnormal. It does justice to neither the qualifications nor the responsibilities of the staff and it saps their morale. The agreement of 23 April 1976 has exacerbated this situation still further, since, for reasons which certainly seem extremely hard to understand, it granted a higher increase to staff in grade G-1 (15 per cent) than to staff in grade G-7 (11 per cent).

70. Consequently, it seems absolutely essential, in addition to instituting a rational classification of posts, that the structure of the General Service salary scale should be reformed. Perhaps particular thought should be given to the possibility of:

- reintroducing grade G-1 as a real and not a fictitious grade (WHO has no staff members at grade G-1 and the United Nations Office has only 2 per cent of its General Service staff at this grade);
- widening the spread between the lowest and the highest salaries as far as possible and increasing the differences in remuneration between grades;
- reducing the number of grades from seven to five;
- establishing an appropriate transitional system for this reform in order to avoid reducing the salaries of serving staff.

Such a restructuring, which is within the competence of the International Civil Service Commission, should be carried out with all speed and at the same time as the establishment of a rational classification of General Service posts. There is no valid technical reason which could delay the preparation of a precise and workable project by more than a few months.

71. It is clear, however, that in restructuring the General Service salary scale account should also be taken of what should be the proper relationship between General Service and Professional salaries. The situation in that respect which has now been reached at Geneva is patently anomalous.

72. It is recognized that the highest General Service salaries might well reach or slightly exceed the salaries of the lower Professional staff since senior clerks and technicians with long work experience often have greater responsibilities than young professionals with advanced university degrees but little practical experience. But the overlap has now reached absurd proportions and has destroyed the functional relationship between the two categories of staff. Promotion from the General Service to the Professional categories is often not attractive financially, particularly as regards pensions. Professionals who have to supervise General Service staff may earn less than their subordinates.

73. Annex V compares graphically the salaries of General Service staff at Geneva under the new salary scale which resulted from the agreement of 23 April 1976 with Professional salaries also in Geneva. It will be noted that the salary at the top of grade G-2 (the second lowest or in some organizations the lowest General Service grade) exceeds that of the beginning of grade P-1 (the lowest Professional grade). The salary at the top of grade G-7 (the highest General Service grade) reaches well into the range of P-3 (the middle Professional grade) 21/.

74. The comparison between the pensionable remuneration of the two categories is even more striking. Annex VI is a graphical presentation of this comparison. It will be seen that a staff member retiring after having reached the top of grade G-1 in the General Service category would receive a higher pension than a staff member in the Professional category who retires at the top of grade P-1. A G-7 staff member when retiring could receive a pension equivalent to that of a P-5.

75. The above examples and Annexes V and VI illustrate a situation which is already out of hand. But it would appear that in the future, unless corrective measures are taken, this situation will become so untenable as to become a major obstacle to sound management of the organizations and the proper use of funds. The reason that the situation is likely to get worse is that Professional salaries are likely to rise relatively slowly, but General Service salaries (under the existing defective procedures, including the lack of a rational system for the classification of posts) may continue their rapid increase and thus the overlap between the categories may grow even worse.

76. Though it is obvious that corrective measures are needed, it is less obvious what these measures should be. The Joint Inspection Unit is not unaware of the difficulties of the overall problem. There are at present two principles used in determining the salary scales of international civil servants which result in a dual system of remuneration: the first, which applies to Professional staff, entails the selection, as the basis for calculation, of the scale of the "best paid national civil service"; the second, which applies to General Service staff,

21/ There is also overlap between General Service and Professional salaries in Paris, New York, Vienna and Rome but not in London.

is that of the application for the computation of their salaries of the "best prevailing conditions of employment". We are not questioning the advantages or validity of either principle. But, in certain duty stations (particularly Geneva and Paris), the application of the principle of "best prevailing conditions of employment" is becoming more beneficial to General Service staff than the application of the principle of the "best paid national civil service" to Professional staff, whereas in other duty stations, particularly in the developing countries, where local salary levels are on the contrary very low by comparison with those in the developed countries, this is not the case. The diversity of situations which exist throughout the world naturally makes it extremely difficult to apply these general principles and in certain cases gives rise to situations which sometimes seem hard to understand at the local level.

77. Nevertheless, it should be possible to find a solution which eliminates at least the most striking anomalies at duty stations where the strict application of the two principles is tending to destroy the normal hierarchy of remuneration. The Joint Inspection Unit in this report will not make precise proposals since these should come from the International Civil Service Commission in consultation with organizations and staff. It will only suggest some general directions which might be pursued further by the competent bodies.

78. In 1966 the General Conference of UNESCO adopted a resolution 22/ which in paragraph 5 stated:

"Notes with interest the Director-General's remarks concerning the disadvantages presented by the present dual system of remuneration and invites the Director-General to study an arrangement in order to avoid these disadvantages and to submit definite proposals to the General Conference at its fifteenth session with the recommendations of the Executive Board".

In June 1967 UNESCO produced a report in response to this resolution which made specific and new proposals for the determination of General Service salaries. The main feature of UNESCO's proposal was:

"As a preliminary to creating the new salary scale the salary would be established for the two base points on the scale: step 1 of Grade II would be based on the best prevailing outside rates for secretaries whose duties correspond to those of Grade II secretaries at UNESCO; 23/ step 1 of Grade V (the highest General Service grade at UNESCO at that time) would be related to the salary of P-1, step 1 in the Professional category".

22/ Resolution 30.1 of the fourteenth session of the General Conference.

23/ At UNESCO at that time there were 260 secretaries at Grade II which represented 30 per cent of the General Service category.

This proposal was associated with a detailed scheme for the construction of the salary scale and for adjustments. At the time it was rejected by ICSAB and the other organizations of the United Nations system. With hindsight, however, it can be considered that if a system such as that proposed by UNESCO had been adopted at Geneva, many of the current problems might have been avoided. Therefore, it is suggested that for the future some consideration be given to a system such as the one proposed by UNESCO with any new features that may be required.

III. CONCLUSION

79. The events which took place at Geneva from 25 February to 3 March 1976 may be considered to have been beneficial in at least one way, in that they brought clearly to light absurdities which must now be corrected. It would, indeed, seem impossible, without exposing all the international organizations to major risks, to continue to accept a situation which, at the United Nations Office at Geneva 24/, is marked in particular by:

- major shortcomings in the application of the methods for determining General Service salaries with the result that the principle of "best prevailing conditions of employment" is no longer adhered to;
- a hierarchy of salaries and pensions for the staff as a whole which, in too many cases, is inversely proportional to the level of qualifications and responsibilities;
- an absence of any rational career or post-classification system, and a de facto ranking system which contains serious anomalies;
- the absence of any definition of responsibilities in respect of the power of decision;
- a crisis of confidence between staff and management.

This situation is the result of an accumulation of various factors, some of which (inflation, currency fluctuations) it is doubtless not possible to control, but many of which are the result of errors for which it is not very easy to pinpoint responsibility, since they often date back many years and have emanated from New York as well as Geneva and from several international organizations. The recommendations which follow are designed to indicate the main points in respect of which reforms are necessary. But it is clear that such a serious situation cannot be remedied merely by making a few minor corrections. The General Assembly must be presented with a comprehensive plan, which should be carried out speedily and with determination.

24/ Although some aspects of the situation extend far beyond the context of the Geneva Office and Geneva itself.

IV. SUMMARY AND MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

80. A study of the strike which took place at the United Nations Office at Geneva from 25 February to 3 March 1976 has led the Joint Inspection Unit to make a number of findings which may be summarized as follows:

(a) The method used in making the surveys concerning the "best prevailing conditions of employment" in Geneva in 1969 (covering 1968) and 1975 (covering 1973) could not provide valid information because the job descriptions used for the surveys corresponded to "types of occupations" spanning several possible grades and not to specific jobs at specific grades: the inside and outside "matching points" were badly chosen; furthermore the two jobs selected were in no way representative of the jobs existing in the organizations. No heed whatever was paid to the severe criticism voiced by ICSAB concerning the method proposed. Despite that situation, representatives of the administration expressly asked the staff representatives, during the negotiations held in 1975, to give a firm undertaking to accept, in advance, the binding character of the results of the survey and a consensus was reached on that point. These mistakes led to the difficulties encountered when the results of the survey for the year 1973 became known.

(b) The agreement of 23 April 1976 which ended the salary dispute between the Geneva-based international organizations and their staff involved additional costs of \$ 10,400,000 for the United Nations for part of 1975 and for 1976 and 1977 and of \$ 14,900,000 for the other organizations for the same period. The salary scale resulting from the agreement is based on a compromise which has as its foundation the results of the 1968 Battelle survey, corrected to take account of real movements in the OFIAMT index since that date. Consequently, it cannot be considered to reflect the "best prevailing conditions of employment" because of the defects inherent in the method applied in 1968.

(c) The circumstances in which the pre-strike negotiations took place showed that there was at Geneva no effective machinery for the determination of a joint administration position for the purpose of instituting a common system of remuneration and conducting negotiations on the subject. This situation, which allows no-one to take the necessary responsibility, certainly goes far to explain the mistakes that were made and should be remedied in the future by the appointment of a sole negotiator.

(d) In addition to the defects in the system of communication, there is at the United Nations Office at Geneva a crisis of confidence between the heads of the main units of the Office and their staff.

(e) There is no rational classification of General Service posts at the Geneva Office. Insufficient account is taken of levels of qualifications and responsibilities and current practice shows serious anomalies in this respect.

(f) The General Service salary scale is far too compact. It is not normal for a staff member at grade G-3, step XI, to be earning more than one at grade G-6, step III. Nor is it normal that the remuneration at step XI of

grade G-7 should be higher than that of a Professional staff member at grade P-3, step I, still less that the pension of a General Service staff member at grade G-7, step XI, should fall into the range of that of a Professional staff member at grade P-5.

(g) The above factors constitute an anomalous situation which requires rapid corrective action.

In order that solutions to these problems may be found in the future, the Joint Inspection Unit makes the following recommendations:

Recommendation No. 1

A draft regulation on the method of applying the principles of the "best prevailing conditions of employment" should be prepared taking into account:

- The knowledge already acquired on the subject, particularly as recorded in the reports of ICSAB;
- The recommendations made in the report of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination published as document ICSC/R.36 of 26 January 1976;
- The remarks made in this report.

This draft regulation should be submitted, after consideration by the International Civil Service Commission, to the United Nations General Assembly for approval as soon as possible. (see paragraphs 27 to 38).

Recommendation No. 2

(a) The implementation of article 12, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the International Civil Service Commission should be accelerated and the Commission should be provided with the necessary means to that end, as soon as possible (see paragraphs 43 and 44).

(b) In order to improve the methods for the negotiation of General Service salaries, which at present at Geneva imply too many participants, the system of a sole negotiator should be instituted for the future (see paragraphs 42-48).

(c) Consideration should be given by executive heads of the Geneva-based organizations to establishing such a system by using the facilities offered by article 12, paragraph 2 of the Statute of the International Civil Service Commission or, as an interim measure, by means of an inter-organizational agreement (see paragraphs 45-47).

(d) The General Assembly could consider the possibility:

- of requesting executive heads of the Geneva-based organizations to ask the International Civil Service Commission to determine the General Service salary scales at Geneva, in accordance with article 12, paragraph 2 of the Statute of the Commission (see paragraph 48).

- or, as an alternative solution, of amending paragraph 2 of article 12 to enable the International Civil Service Commission to decide itself the best way to determine General Service salary scales at Geneva and at such other duty stations as it may decide (see paragraph 48).

Recommendation No. 3

Steps should be taken as soon as possible to improve the machinery of consultation between the administration and the staff at the United Nations Office at Geneva with a view to creating a better climate of confidence (see paragraphs 48-57).

Recommendation No. 4

A rule governing career development for General Service staff of the United Nations in both Geneva and New York should be prepared and the staff should be consulted in the process. This rule should cover in particular:

- The definition of "types of occupations" for General Service staff and a precise description of each type;
- The level of qualifications corresponding to each grade within each "type of occupation";
- A well-defined system of written and oral examinations in the fields of technical skill and general knowledge required for access to the various grades within each type of occupation;
- Training machinery designed to facilitate the transfer of General Service staff from one type of occupation to another.

This rule should give greater importance to the required level of qualifications than is currently attached to it, and should limit the scope of promotion on length-of-service grounds.

The Joint Inspection Unit recommends that action should be taken in order to issue this rule without delay (see paragraphs 59-67).

Recommendation No. 5

In parallel with the definition of a career structure for General Service staff, prompt action should be taken:

- to establish a new structure for the General Service salary scale designed to ensure a greater spread and to re-establish a normal hierarchy for the remuneration of the various grades (see paragraph 70); to re-establish also a reasonable relationship between General Service and Professional salaries and pensions (see paragraphs 71-78).

Annex I

AGREEMENT OF 23 APRIL 1976 ON
GENERAL SERVICE SALARIES AND DEPENDENCY ALLOWANCES IN GENEVA

At the joint plenary meeting held in Geneva on 23 April 1976

- (a) Mr. H. Debatin, Assistant Secretary-General, Controller, Office of Financial Services, United Nations, sole negotiator designated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Executive Heads of the Geneva-based Agencies, and
- (b) the representatives of the staff of the United Nations, the International Labour Office, the World Health Organization, the ICITO/General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Meteorological Organization, the International Telecommunication Union and the World Intellectual Property Organization agreed on the following, in conformity with the Declaration of the Executive Heads, dated 3 March 1976:

1. The net salaries of staff members under the General Service salary scales in effect on 1 August 1975 will be increased by the following percentages:

15% for G.1 and G.2
14% for G.3 and G.4
12% for G.5
11% for G.6 and G.7

2. New salary scales, adjusted as indicated above, will be applied retroactively from 1 August 1975. These salaries will be adjusted on 1 February 1976 by the extrapolated average of the movement of the OFIAMI index in accordance with the present procedure for interim adjustment of General Service salaries (for the two scales, see appendices A and B).

3. The new rates of dependency allowances, effective as from 1 April 1975, will be the following:

for a dependent spouse	1,750 SF net per annum
for each dependent child	1,800 SF net per annum
where there is no dependent spouse for one dependent parent, dependent brother or dependent sister	1,080 SF net per annum
if the staff member is without a spouse, the dependency benefit for the first dependent child is	3,000 SF net per annum

4. The salary rates for short-term staff in force on 1 August 1975 will be increased with effect from the same date, in line with the total adjustment for regular staff, i.e., by the same percentage amounts as in paragraph 1. The salary rates for short-term staff in force on 1 January 1976 will be further adjusted with effect from the same date to take account of the increase effected on 1 August 1975. These adjustments are subject to the provisions of paragraph 5.
5. Retroactivity will for the period of their continuous employment apply to all staff members still in current active pay status, as well as to all staff members who have retired since 1 August 1975. Periods of not more than 31 days' interruption will not be considered as a break of continuous employment. Retroactivity would not be granted to those staff members who have left the service of the Organization for reasons other than retirement between 1 August 1975 and 30 April 1976 inclusive.
6. All Organizations except ILO, ITU and WIPO will promulgate the General Service salary scales and the new rates of dependency allowances by the end of April 1976. ILO and ITU will prepare submissions for the next session of their Governing Bodies; WIPO will promulgate the new scales and rates the day following the date of promulgation by the United Nations.
7. The payroll of June 1976 of all Organizations except ILO, ITU and WIPO will reflect the payment of the new salary scales and the new rates of dependency allowances and it shall also reflect the payment of the amounts due to the regular and short-term staff on account of retroactivity. WIPO will implement these scales and rates in the month succeeding that in which the United Nations does so.
8. Interim periodic adjustments for dependency allowances will be made as follows:
 - (a) children's allowance: each time the Cantonal law setting the legal minimum of the children's allowance is changed;
 - (b) spouse allowance: in case changes are made in the Cantonal tax tables for the calculation of the tax relief element of these allowances.Changes will be made not more frequently than once a year.

Annex

The staff representatives of the UN, WIPO and WMO affirm their belief that the existing system, agreed in 1969, should continue to be applied in the future with one exception, i.e., the retroactive corrections of the extrapolated OFIAMI index should be made every year after the publication of the latest index.

Geneva, 23 April 1976

SALARY SCALES AND SCALES OF PENSIONABLE REMUNERATION¹

(at 1 August 1975)

(Swiss francs per annum)

General Service Category (Geneva)												
Grades		Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4	Step 5	Step 6	Step 7	Step 8	Step 9	Step 10	Step 11
G.1	Gross Net	34,990 27,173	36,170 27,999	37,350 28,825	38,530 29,651	39,710 30,477	40,890 31,303	42,070 32,129	43,278 32,955	44,549 33,781	45,820 34,607	47,091 35,433
G.2	Gross Net	37,736 29,095	39,063 30,024	40,390 30,953	41,717 31,882	43,057 32,811	44,486 33,740	45,915 34,669	47,345 35,598	48,774 36,527	50,203 37,456	51,632 38,385
G.3	Gross Net	40,583 31,088	42,230 32,241	43,954 33,394	45,728 34,547	47,502 35,700	49,275 36,853	51,049 38,006	52,823 39,159	54,597 40,312	56,371 41,465	58,145 42,618
G.4	Gross Net	45,157 34,176	47,202 35,505	49,246 36,834	51,291 38,163	53,335 39,492	55,380 40,821	57,425 42,150	59,469 43,479	61,514 44,808	63,558 46,137	65,710 47,466
G.5	Gross Net	49,455 36,320	50,663 37,755	52,871 39,190	55,078 40,625	57,286 42,060	59,494 43,495	61,702 44,930	63,909 46,365	66,267 47,800	68,658 49,235	71,050 50,670
G.6	Gross Net	53,169 39,384	55,603 40,966	58,037 42,548	60,471 44,130	62,905 45,712	65,423 47,294	68,060 48,876	70,697 50,458	73,333 52,040	75,970 53,622	78,607 55,204
G.7	Gross Net	60,023 43,839	63,045 45,803	66,212 47,767	69,485 49,731	72,758 51,695	76,032 53,659	79,305 55,623	82,578 57,587	85,860 59,551	89,431 61,515	93,002 63,479

¹ The scales of pensionable remuneration correspond to the gross salary scales shown in this table; where paid, the net amount of a non-resident allowance and/or the net amount of a language allowance is added to the gross figures.

SALARY SCALES AND SCALES OF PENSIONABLE REMUNERATION¹
(at 1 February 1976)
(Swiss francs per annum)

		General Service Category (Geneva)										
Grades		Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4	Step 5	Step 6	Step 7	Step 8	Step 9	Step 10	Step 11
G.1	Gross Net	36,853 28,397	38,086 29,260	39,319 30,123	40,551 30,986	41,798 31,849	43,126 32,712	44,454 33,575	45,782 34,438	47,109 35,301	48,437 36,164	49,765 37,027
G.2	Gross Net	39,726 30,408	41,113 31,379	42,569 32,350	44,063 33,321	45,557 34,292	47,051 35,263	48,545 36,234	50,038 37,205	51,532 38,176	53,026 39,147	54,520 40,118
G.3	Gross Net	42,698 32,434	44,549 33,637	46,400 34,840	48,251 36,043	50,102 37,246	51,952 38,449	53,803 39,652	55,654 40,855	57,505 42,058	59,355 43,261	61,206 44,464
G.4	Gross Net	47,712 35,693	49,846 37,080	51,980 38,467	54,114 39,854	56,248 41,241	58,382 42,628	60,515 44,015	62,670 45,402	64,982 46,789	67,293 48,176	69,605 49,563
G.5	Gross Net	51,172 37,942	53,480 39,442	55,788 40,942	58,095 42,442	60,403 43,942	62,737 45,442	65,237 46,942	67,737 48,442	70,237 49,942	72,737 51,442	75,237 52,942
G.6	Gross Net	56,025 41,096	58,566 42,748	61,108 44,400	63,753 46,052	66,507 47,704	69,260 49,356	72,013 51,008	74,767 52,660	77,520 54,312	80,273 55,964	83,027 57,616
G.7	Gross Net	63,297 45,778	66,713 47,828	70,130 49,678	73,547 51,928	76,963 53,978	80,380 56,028	83,851 58,078	87,578 60,128	91,305 62,178	95,033 64,228	98,760 66,278

¹ The scales of pensionable remuneration correspond to the gross salary scales shown in this table; where paid, the net amount of a non-resident allowance and/or the net amount of a language allowance is added to the gross figures.

Annex II

LAG BETWEEN OFIAMT INDEX MOVEMENT FROM JANUARY 1969 TO
AUGUST 1975 AND MOVEMENT OF GROSS OUTSIDE SALARY ADJUSTED
FROM JANUARY 1969 ON THE BASIS OF THE YEARLY AVERAGE
INCREMENT OF THE OFIAMT INDICES OVER THE PREVIOUS THREE YEARS. 1/

I. OFIAMT index movement

OFIAMT index 1968	=	391	
1969	=	414	
1973	=	602	
1974	=	673	
(a) interpolated ^{2/} index for January 1969	=	397	
(b) extrapolated ^{3/} index for August 1975 on assumption % of increase in 1975 equal to % movement of index in 1974 i.e. 11.79%	=	739	
(c) % movement between January 1969 and August 1975	=	+ 86.15%	

II. Movement of gross outside equivalents of inside matching points^{4/}

(a) <u>Inside matching points</u>	(b) <u>Gross outside equivalents</u>	
	<u>January 1969</u>	<u>August 1975</u>
G.2/VI (Junior clerk)	20,835	34,649
G.5/VI (Accounts clerk)	29,050	48,311

III. <u>Comparison</u>	<u>G.2/VI</u>	<u>G.5/VI</u>
(a) gross outside salary (before review) on 1.8.75 as shown in II	34,649	48,311
(b) theoretical gross outside salary on 1.8.75 if January 1969 salaries were adjusted by actual OFIAMT movement as shown in I, i.e., G.2/VI = 20,835 x 1.8615 and G.5/VI 29,050 x 1.8615	38,784	54,077
(c) difference	+ 11.93%	+ 11.94%

1/ Source: Budget Division, United Nations, Geneva.

2/ The OFIAMT indices represent the month of October of each year.

3/ The 1975 OFIAMT index is expected to be published in the June 1976 issue of "La Vie Economique".

4/ All figures are gross; to arrive at inside net salary figures, Swiss Federal and Cantonal income taxes are deducted from the Gross figures.

Annex III

STATISTICAL COMPOSITION OF GENERAL SERVICE POSTS IN WHO
BY GRADE AND TYPE OF OCCUPATION, DECEMBER 1975 ^{1/}

Types of occupations	G-7	G-6	G-5	G-4	G-3	G-2	G-1	TOTAL
ADMIN. ASSISTANT	69	94	3	-	-	-	-	166
ADM. SERV. ASST.	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
CHAUFFEUR	-	-	-	5	1	-	-	6
CHIEF USHER	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CLERK	-	-	44	40	15	6	-	105
CLERK-STENOGR.	-	-	34	128	79	4	-	245
CLERK-TYPIST	-	-	-	-	8	6	-	14
DRAUGHTSMAN	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
DRIVER	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GUARD	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	9
USHER	-	-	-	6	3	-	-	9
LABORATORY ASST.	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	6
STOREMAN	-	-	-	1	4	5	-	10
MESSENGER	-	-	-	-	3	10	-	13
NURSE, CLINICAL	1	2	5	-	-	-	-	8
OFFICE MACHINER OPR.	1	2	6	-	6	-	-	15
REPRO. MACHINE OPR.	2	2	4	5	6	-	-	19
SKILLED WORKER	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	4
SEMI-SKILLED WORKER	-	-	21	11	-	-	-	32
PERS. ASSISTANT	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
PROGRAMMER	4	3	1	-	-	-	-	8
SECRETARY	-	4	17	59	2	-	-	82
INSP. AND MAINT. WORKER	4	4	1	2	-	-	-	11
TECHNICAL ASST.	11	3	-	-	-	-	-	14
UNSKILLED MANUAL WORKER	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	9
TOTAL	100	115	142	257	140	40	-	794
AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL	12.6%	14.5%	17.9%	32.4%	17.6%	5%	-	100%

^{1/} Source: WHO

Annex IV

TITLES USED TO DESCRIBE THE JOBS OF GENERAL SERVICE STAFF
AT THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA 1/

Chief of Office, Chief of Unit, B-Personnel Off., S-Accounting Clk., Accounting Clk., Admin. Asst., P-Clerk, S-Clerk, Clerk, Editorial Asst., Fellowship Asst., S-Finance Clerk, Inform. Asst., Library Asst., Personnel Asst., Phot Librar., Profesnl Asst., Protocol Asst., S-Reference Asst., Research Asst., S-Secretary, Supervisor, D-Supervisor, C-Radio Tech., Radio Tech., C-Mechanic, F-Programmer, Research Off., S-Secretary, Admin. Clerk, Bil. Secretary, S-Bil. Secretary, Bookbinder, Clerk-typist, Draughtsman, Finance Asst., Finance Clerk, P-Investigator, Reference Clerk, P-Registry Clerk, S-Reference Clerk, S-Registry Clerk, Secretary, F-Secretary, F-Supervisor, Radio Techn., C-Gardener, Housepainter, Mechanic, Audit Clerk, P-Chauffeur, Clerk-reader, Clerk-steno., Coldtype Com., Cashier, Computer Opr., Conference Clerk, Computer Clerk, S-Documents Clerk, Documents Clerk, Editorial Clerk, Film Projnst., Layout Techn., Messenger, Offset Prman., Personnel Clerk, Production Clerk, Reference Clerk, Registry Clerk, Research Clerk, Security Sgt., Stenographer, Travel Clerk, Arch. Clerk, Bil. Clerk Typist, F-Bookbinder, Calligrapher, Chauffeur, File Clerk, Guard, Guide full-t., Investigator, Invoice Clerk, Key Pnch Opr., Mimeogrph., Office M Opr., Papercutter, Photo Techn., Safety Insp., Security Off., Statist. Clerk, Telephone Opr., Teletype Opr., Typist, Gardener, F-Gardener, Locksmith, Plumber, Stock Clerk, Supply Clerk, Copy holder, Paste up Man, Payroll Clerk, Registry Clerk, Carpenter, Platemaker, F-Mechanic, Programm. Asst., S-Radio Techn. and miscellaneous titles, or a total of 109 titles (not counting those listed as "miscellaneous") for 1,496 staff.

General Service staff of the United Nations Office at Geneva by grade


<u>Grade</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage of total</u>
G-1	31	2.1%
G-2	178	11.9%
G-3	325	21.7%
G-4	396	26.5%
G-5	295	19.7%
G-6	189	12.6%
G-7	82	5.5%
TOTAL	<u>1,496</u>	<u>100%</u>

1/ Source: computer print-out for titles and Personnel Service of the United Nations Office at Geneva for table.

Annex V

Swiss Francs

OVERLAPS AND RANGES OF GENERAL SERVICE
AND PROFESSIONAL CATEGORIES
NET ANNUAL EARNINGS
AS AT 31 MARCH 1976 1/




1/ Source: Budget Division, United Nations, Geneva.

Annex VI

Swiss Francs


OVERLAPS AND RANGES OF PENSIONABLE REMUNERATION
OF GENERAL SERVICE AND PROFESSIONAL CATEGORIES
AS AT 31 MARCH 1976 1/



1/ Source: Budget Division, United Nations, Geneva.

Annex VII

GENEVA GENERAL SERVICE CATEGORY SALARY SCALES
AS AT 1ST FEBRUARY 1976
OVERLAPPING OF LEVELS 1/



1/ Source: Budget Division, United Nations, Geneva.