

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 29 June 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Alfonso García Robles (Mexico)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 513th plenary meeting of the Disarmament Conference.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will today continue its consideration of items 1 and 2 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear test ban" and "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, under rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members may make statements on any other question connected with the work of the Conference if they wish.

On my list of speakers for today, I have the representatives of Indonesia and Sweden.

Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia): Let me, first of all, on behalf of the Indonesian delegation, warmly congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference for the month of June. It is indeed a great honour to have such an eminent and internationally renowned President guiding our deliberations. Your wealth of experience and expertise are universally recognized, and my delegation wishes to pay tribute to your unparalleled services in favour of a world in peace through disarmament. Knowing your dedication and perseverance in pursuit of the noble goals of disarmament, my delegation is fully confident that we will make significant progress under your able guidance. My delegation would also like to express its gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Simon B. arap Bullut of Kenya, who so competently guided our deliberations during the month of April.

In my delegation's statement today, I would like to touch upon both nuclear and chemical weapons issues. The present session of the Conference commences in an improved international climate in the relations between the major Powers - a positive development which my country welcomes. Here in Geneva, we have noted that the bilateral talks on strategic arms limitation and the talks on chemical weapons have reconvened, following a series of rapprochements between the super-Powers. Complementary to the rapprochements under way in Europe, such as the signing of the INF Treaty, the conclusion of the Stockholm Document, the continuation of the Vienna talks and the reconvening of the Geneva talks on strategic arms limitation, efforts to bring about peace and security in other parts of the globe are also under way. Endeavours to settle the question of Kampuchea - an issue which constitutes an obstacle to a just and lasting peace and security in the region - are also progressing. We do hope that these positive moves towards peace and security will enhance the prospect of achieving the goal of disarmament, and that these constructive developments will provide the Conference with a timely opportunity to inject fresh resolve into its efforts towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

The issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which is very crucial to the achievement of the goal of disarmament, has been discussed by the Conference on Disarmament since its inception. Regrettably, no sign of success has been observed. Other multilateral forums have also provided viable ways for the international community to address the issue, but again no progress has yet been made. The original parties' aim in concluding the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests was clearly set out among other things in the preambular paragraph of the Treaty, which, inter alia, described

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them as "seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions ... for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances". The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty acceded to it in good faith in the hope that the objective of refraining from testing nuclear weapons would be realized in the near future. Unfortunately, almost 30 years after the signing of the Treaty, it is apparent that nuclear weapon tests are still being conducted.

Despite a widespread belief that the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) would prevent the development of new warheads by nuclear-weapon States and increase the pressure on States which have nuclear capabilities not to conduct tests of nuclear weapons, it is being argued that nuclear-weapon States need to be able to develop new systems of nuclear weaponry to maintain the credibility of deterrence. The policy of maintaining such credibility as a corner-stone in the conduct of negotiations, with a CTBT as a long-term goal, would hamper the global efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons once and for all. As a country belonging to the non-aligned movement, Indonesia is not in a position to accept the above-mentioned practice because we would only face annihilation in a nuclear war. This policy could also create the doubt that a CTBT would only be considered when there are no nuclear weapons left.

There is considerable frustration at the moment in the absence of any international forum in which a CTBT can be discussed. The Conference on Disarmament has failed for some years to agree upon a mandate for an ad hoc committee which would consider these issues, as a result of the different positions held by political groupings in the Conference. In the absence of a mandate to negotiate in the CD on this very issue, Indonesia, together with five other countries, namely Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia and Venezuela, launched an initiative in August 1988 proposing an amendment conference for the PTBT as a way of putting the issue back on the international agenda. My country sees it as an exercise of the right accorded to it by the Treaty, which we faithfully observe, and we continue in our endeavours toward the achievement of the aims set out by the parties on signing the PTBT. In other words, it is an effort to gain momentum in the process toward the materialization of the goal of disarmament in conformity with, and complementary to, the process of rapprochement, negotiation and new developments in the relations among the major Powers.

Sufficient support has been accorded to the initiative, and the depositary States are now required to convene a conference to amend the Partial-Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT). While one of the depositary States has already supported the request, the other two clearly oppose such a move. We sincerely hope that these depositary States will adopt a positive approach and fulfil their obligations and responsibilities by conducting consultations for the preparation and the convening of the conference itself as soon as possible, and hopefully before the fourth NPT review conference in September 1990. Such a sign of good will by the participatory States would be a positive step in the right direction. While it is unrealistic to expect immediate results, hopefully a full and frank discussion would identify difficulties and, in turn, lead to a breakthrough in the CD and allow it to fulfil its task of negotiating a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

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The cessation of the nuclear arms race and the aim of nuclear disarmament constitute two of the most crucial issues to be dealt with by the Conference on Disarmament. Paragraph 13 of the Final Document of SSOD-I states that "enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority". Regrettably, these words, which were accepted by consensus by almost all members of the international community during the convening of SSOD-I, have now been cast aside. A number of technological developments and qualitative improvements in nuclear weaponry have overruled the voice of a great number of countries which attempt to contribute to the establishment of international peace and security through nuclear disarmament.

As we approach the end of this decade, it is apparent that the concept of deterrence is still being upheld. For reasons of regional security, the testing and refinement of nuclear weaponry has been and always will be pursued. Today, we are in a paradoxical situation whereby those countries attempting to contribute to the establishment of peace and international security through disarmament are, at the same time, the very same countries carrying out policies based on the deterrence of nuclear weaponry, with the consequences I mentioned earlier.

Nuclear disarmament is, indeed, an extremely lengthy process with meagre visible achievements. It should be understood, moreover, that the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the continuation of nuclear disarmament negotiations cannot be pursued in isolation. An issue of such crucial importance to mankind, which concerns the preservation of our entire civilization, must be the legitimate concern of all States.

The Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be held here in Geneva in September 1990. In view of this important event, we should recall that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have faithfully adhered to its provisions. We would expect the nuclear-weapon States to do likewise, as an indication of their continuing commitment to fulfil their responsibilities. It is being argued that the conclusion of the INF Treaty, as well as other talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons among the super-Powers, indicate their adherence to the Treaty. Article VI and the eighth and twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty stipulated, inter alia, that negotiations would be pursued in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date ultimately to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Bearing in mind the excessive destructive capacity of the existing nuclear arsenals, we are of the view that a cessation of the nuclear arms race should be embarked upon with a full-fledged negotiation on a comprehensive nuclear test ban by all members of the international community. It is our belief that if nuclear disarmament is pursued along these lines, then we will see the concrete materialization of the commitments stipulated in the NPT.

In the establishment of a régime to totally ban chemical weapons, doubts have arisen as to whether the Conference has achieved a tangible result. It has been argued that the plethora of technical details means that more time is

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needed. It could also be argued, however, that the improvement in the international political climate which presents us with a positive momentum should be seen as an opportunity to speed up the conclusion of the régime. A great deal of effort has been directed towards the conclusion of a convention to totally ban chemical weapons. The technical as well as the conceptual details of establishing such a convention have been thoroughly examined during these last few years, and we believe that the establishment of the régime is within our reach. The efforts and dedication of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Pierre Morel, as well as the five Chairmen of the Working Groups, in guiding the work of the Committee deserve our special appreciation. In this regard, my delegation particularly appreciates the initiative to invite experts to give their comments and suggestions to the Committee. This constitutes a useful practice which could enrich our discussions in drafting the convention.

The issue of verification of the convention is of utmost importance for the Committee. We believe that the establishment of a comprehensive and applicable verification régime embodied in the future convention will be the litmus test of the sincerity of States' intentions to remove the chemical weapons they possess. Another element which is no less important is the order of destruction of chemical weapons, as well as their production facilities. A verifiable order of destruction which assures the total elimination and banning of these weapons will be a source of credibility for the future convention. This particular part of the draft convention is in need of a practical and problem-solving approach which takes into account the wish of those who really want to see these horrific weapons banned soon once and for all.

At the last spring session of the Conference, my delegation mentioned that we could only judge the success of the Conference in establishing the régime if, at the end of this summer session, we could see the result of our exercise in treaty language incorporated in the "rolling text". It should be remembered that the international gathering of 149 States in Paris in January of this year resulted in an obligatory mandate to redouble our efforts to conclude the régime at an early date. Technical information suggests that protection against a chemical-weapon attack is nearly impossible in a tropical climate like ours. Recovery from such a catastrophe is also said to be an extremely difficult task. These are only two of the many reasons why Indonesia, as a densely populated tropical country, has as one of its principal disarmament goals a total ban on chemical weapons.

My delegation has an open mind and constructively considers any idea or initiative which would contribute to the goal of totally banning chemical weapons. Any initiative which will enhance endeavours to finalize a global, comprehensive and verifiable chemical weapons convention negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament should be supported. Our readiness to positively consider such an initiative also applies to efforts outside the framework of the CD, provided that they would speed up the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention being negotiated in the CD.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr. Wayarabi for his statement and for his kind words about the presidency.

I now give the floor to Ambassador Hyltenius, representative of Sweden.

Mr. HYLTEINIUS (Sweden): Mr. President, my delegation has already had the opportunity to express its great satisfaction at seeing you presiding over this Conference but before addressing the subject matter of my intervention today, I should like to take this opportunity to express my thanks and best wishes to those colleagues who have left since my delegation last took the floor in the plenary, namely, Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy and Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka. I am very grateful for the excellent co-operation I have enjoyed with all of them and wish them every success in their new responsible positions.

There are several nuclear issues on the agenda of this Conference. It is no coincidence that the question of a nuclear test ban is the first item, and that it attracts the most attention among them. But there are also other nuclear matters which deserve attention and where progress should be possible both in view of international developments and of forthcoming events, and which call for action by the Conference on Disarmament.

The Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is approaching. It is already affecting the work here in the CD and elsewhere in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The first meeting of the Preparatory Committee in New York last May left the impression that a strong commitment prevailed among the States Parties as regards the need to work for a successful review conference, thereby reinforcing the Treaty and assuring its extension after 1995. As was the case at previous NPT review conferences, there is no doubt that actions, or lack of actions, by the nuclear-weapon States to improve the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States will be closely scrutinized.

What has come out of the obligations laid down in article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith in the field of nuclear disarmament? Well, there are positive things to point to - for example, the INF Treaty and the negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms. But on the crucial issue of a comprehensive test ban there is still no progress to record.

Today, I should like to address two other nuclear items on our agenda which are of importance in this context, namely, the question of negative security assurances and the issue of radiological weapons. There is no need, in this forum, to give an account of the long history of the question of negative security assurances. Let me just recall the demand, made by non-nuclear-weapon States in the 1960s, during the negotiations on the NPT, for guarantees that they would not be attacked or threatened by nuclear weapons. This demand was turned down, and no such provision was included in the Treaty. The first special session in 1978 marked a certain step forward as all nuclear-weapon States gave unilateral negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States. However, these assurances were not satisfactory from the point of view of the non-nuclear-weapon States. With one exception, they were coupled with restrictions and conditions that significantly reduced their value as a means of strengthening the security of

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the non-nuclear-weapon States. As they were formulated at that time, and as they still stand, they are primarily shaped to suit the security doctrines and the political aims of the nuclear-weapon States themselves.

The subject has been under negotiation in the CD since the late 1970s. As was pointed out in a statement made on behalf of the Group of 21 by the distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan on 17 March, its initial promise has petered out and it has been stagnating.

Sweden continues to take an active interest in the issue of negative security assurances pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. My delegation therefore strongly deplores this situation. We consider that this matter is of relevance not only to the general cause of non-proliferation but also to our own national security interests. Military technology, including the development of new and more long-range nuclear and conventional weapon delivery systems, is generating potential new threats to the security of several parts of the world, including the Nordic area. To meet this situation we feel that arrangements should be introduced that could help in building confidence and reasserting control over events in a time of crisis. Unconditional negative security assurances would constitute important measures of this kind. I may add that against the background of the Swedish policy of neutrality we have, however, rejected the idea of relying for our security on so-called positive security assurance, which in our view might place us in a state of dependence and may invite interference from other States.

The most fundamental element of effective negative security assurances is obviously legally binding undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States under any circumstances. The obligation on the part of the nuclear-weapon States should in fact be as simple and clear as that. With respect to the legal framework for negative security assurances, Sweden has serious reservations as to the idea of an international convention which would impose further obligations on non-nuclear weapon States. Those States should not be obliged to make any further commitments if, by adhering to the NPT or a treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone or in some other legally binding way to be defined, they have undertaken not to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

Existing assurances show important differences, which need to be eliminated and replaced by objective criteria to meet the rightful claims to security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The insistence on exceptions is tantamount to trying to justify the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States under certain circumstances. I would in this context like to focus on two kinds of exceptions, namely, with respect to non-nuclear-weapon States that either have nuclear weapons on their territories or are involved in a military operation in alliance or association with another nuclear-weapon State. It has been pointed out time and again that such exceptions create considerable ambiguity as to the exact applicability of the assurances and give room for subjective interpretations by the nuclear-weapon States.

The Final Declaration of the third NPT review conference contains the following statement with regard to work in the CD on negative security assurances:

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"Being aware of the consultations and negotiations on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which have been under way in the Conference on Disarmament for several years, the Conference regrets that the search for a common approach which could be included in an international legally binding instrument, has been unsuccessful. The Conference takes note of the repeatedly expressed intention of the Conference on Disarmament to continue to explore ways and means to overcome the difficulties encountered in its work and to carry out negotiations on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this connection, the Conference calls upon all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to continue the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament devoted to the search for a common approach acceptable to all, which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character."

Time is short if the summing-up in the Final Declaration of the 1990 Review Conference is to list any concrete results achieved, and not only renewed appeals for action. The prerequisites necessary for progress seem to exist: all five nuclear-weapon States are participating in the work of the Ad hoc Committee, and they have recognized the legitimacy of the claims by the non-nuclear-weapon States for negative security assurances. Today old concepts and principles on disarmament and security-related issues are being reviewed and reformulated. The time is now ripe for all the nuclear-weapon States concerned to take the long-awaited step and give effective and binding assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States under any circumstances.

The second issue I would like to address today is the question of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, dealt with by Contact Group B of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. Despite the very able and energetic leadership of the Chairman of the Contact Group, Mr. Gevers of the Netherlands, there are no signs that fundamentally opposing views in key areas are moving closer together.

Let me once again take my starting-point in the Final Declaration of the third NPT review conference, which highlighted the fact that attacks on nuclear facilities could involve grave dangers due to the release of radioactivity. The review conference acknowledged that the matter was under consideration in the Conference on Disarmament and urged the co-operation of all States for a speedy conclusion. Since the adoption of the agenda item on radiological weapons, Sweden has strongly advocated the inclusion of a prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities in a forthcoming treaty on radiological weapons in order to give the negotiations a concrete and meaningful objective.

It is not my intention today to give a total overview of the Swedish position on this issue. I shall instead take up a few specific points that were touched upon during the spring session in Contact Group B and in plenary statements. It is the firm belief of my delegation that the main purpose in dealing with this agenda item should be to prohibit mass destruction caused by the emission of radioactivity. The Swedish position has been elaborated with

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the aim of presenting a realistic and feasible approach acceptable to all countries and leading to a global prohibition that would truly reduce the risks of attacks against nuclear facilities.

One could, of course, settle for a more simplistic approach by advocating a treaty that prohibits attacks on any facility that in any respect handles nuclear material. Then, complicated technical discussions on what is really meant by nuclear material would not be necessary, and the concept of the mass destruction criterion could be left out. However, my delegation questions the realism of a prohibition that does not build on the criterion of mass destruction.

During the spring session, the issue of scope was once again in the focus of the debate. Fundamental questions were raised relating to the three alternatives now under debate. Should all attacks on any nuclear facility be prohibited by a treaty of this kind? Should all attacks on nuclear facilities falling under any of the categories covered by the treaty be prohibited? Or should only attacks on nuclear facilities covered by the treaty that actually lead to the spread of radioactive material constitute a violation of the treaty?

As I have just said, Sweden regards the first option as unrealistic. The concepts related to the latter two options are more germane to one another. A prohibition of all attacks on facilities covered by the treaty presupposes sanctuaries or protective zones around the facilities in question. Sweden has in principle no difficulty in agreeing to constituting such areas. However, there are problems with sanctuaries - problems that have been ventilated in our negotiations before. For example, if a power reactor makes a direct contribution to the military effort of an adversary through its electricity supply, it would represent a legitimate military target, according to the international law of war. With the high precision of modern weaponry, the electricity supply could be cut without attacking the reactor itself - that is, virtually without any risk of catastrophic radiological consequences. If a sanctuary were established, either this option would be ruled out or we would instead be faced with a complex question of defining the form and size of sanctuaries, either in a general manner or individually for each plant.

It was against this background that Sweden introduced a proposal on the scope of a treaty that imposes an absolute liability on the part of an attacker to ensure that no attack is carried out in such a manner that catastrophic radiological consequences will follow. A State party to the treaty would have to instruct its military commanders accordingly, e.g. through military manuals.

Sweden's position on this specific issue related to scope is based more on technical considerations than on principle. We are open to suggestions from other delegations on how to solve these problems. I would in this context specifically like to point to document CD/331 of 13 September 1982, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, which partly deals with this issue. As that document points out, the protective zones would for obvious reasons have to be kept free from military installations and other legitimate military targets. Pointing at problems like differing safety standards between States and the fact that some countries have a high density of nuclear

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installations whilst in others they lie scattered far apart or exist only in small numbers, the paper draws the conclusion that "it is a moot point whether protective zones can in fact be established in the near future".

The Swedish delegation agrees that it may be important to prohibit weapons before they are developed and deployed. In fact, entire sectors of a potential arms race have been closed by such agreements. We disagree, however, with those who wish to extend this contention to radiological weapons in the "traditional" sense, because in our view it will not even theoretically be possible to manufacture radiological weapons, not even in the long run. A treaty on radiological weapons limited to "track A" would indeed be a hollow victory for the CD. This would be particularly obvious if at the same time attacks on nuclear facilities - a real danger that exists today and that concerns people - remained outside the prohibition of radiological warfare.

Thus, the urgent task of prohibiting attacks on nuclear facilities cannot be seen as a side-issue. Instead, by dealing with this question, the CD has shown its ambition to solve a genuine security problem that many nations face today and are acutely aware of. In the view of my delegation, this ambition can only add to the credibility of the Conference on Disarmament.

The prevention of the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of the utmost importance for security and stability in the world. There are several measures which can be taken to promote that goal. One is, of course, the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Another is an agreement on drastic reductions in strategic arsenals. But there are also other measures which can contribute to this end. I have mentioned two of them in my intervention today - improved negative security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States and a meaningful treaty on the prohibition of radiological warfare. It is high time for a determined effort to be made to reach agreement on these items on our agenda too.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement. I have no other speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to speak?

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): I asked for the floor in order to clear up what appears to be a serious misunderstanding. Our distinguished colleague from Indonesia has indicated, if I understand his statement correctly, and I believe I do, that two depositary States oppose the convening of an amending conference for the limited test-ban Treaty. To my knowledge, this is not the case. The requisite number of parties having requested such a conference, the United States is willingly carrying out its duties as a depositary State. We have notified all States parties of the intention of the depositaries to hold such a conference and we are consulting with the other depositary States regarding such a conference. There certainly should be no question that we will properly fulfil the duties incumbent upon a depositary of the limited test-ban Treaty.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom): As one of the depositaries of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, perhaps I should also say a few words. I think there is an obvious distinction between the national policy of any State and the responsibilities of a depositary Power. As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, we have made clear our very considerable reservations about the wisdom of the call for a conference to amend the Partial Test-Ban Treaty in order to make it into a comprehensive test ban. But, as a depositary Power, we have also made clear that we intend to carry out our responsibilities fully as a depositary Power and, indeed, as we have just heard, all three depositary Powers have already taken a number of steps in that direction. Perhaps I could add that - it is my personal feeling - what the distinguished deputy leader of the delegation of Indonesia said, I think, is not inconsistent with that distinction I have just made, but, just in case there were any grounds for misunderstanding, I thought it as well to make our position clear.

The PRESIDENT: I suggest that we should now consider Ghana's request to participate in the plenary Conference and in the subsidiary organs set up on agenda items 4, 6 and 8. Ghana's note was circulated at the beginning of last week, and there have not been any comments from members. That being the case, we could take a decision on the request without needing to convene an informal meeting, on the understanding that we are not setting a precedent for the future.

I invite the Conference to consider the draft decision in document CD/WP.368 concerning the request by Ghana. If there is no objection, I shall consider it adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Members of the Conference will remember that at the plenary meeting on 13 June last, the secretariat circulated a communication from the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. In his communication, he refers to paragraph 23 of the Committee's report, in which "recalling the request in the Final Document of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty with respect to article V, the Preparatory Committee decided to invite the Conference on Disarmament to proceed promptly with consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. In this connection, the Preparatory Committee decided to request the Conference on Disarmament to enable States parties not members of the Conference on Disarmament to participate in this consideration in accordance with the rules of procedure".

From consultations with members, there seems to be a consensus that the Conference should consider this matter at an informal meeting to be held on Tuesday, 18 July, immediately after the plenary meeting, on the understanding that if the debate is not concluded on that occasion it will continue at another informal meeting on Thursday, 20 July, again after that day's plenary meeting.

(The President)

If there are no comments, I shall take it that the Conference agrees with the proposed procedure.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As regards the participation of States parties to the Treaty which are not members of the Conference, the secretariat will inform them in writing of the decision taken today, so that they can if they wish submit requests to participate, by 11 July next at the latest. These requests will be considered by the Conference in accordance with its rules of procedure.

I should now like to refer to the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary organs next week. The timetable has been prepared after consultation with my successor and the Chairmen of the Ad hoc Committees. As always, it is merely indicative and can be modified as necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: In a few moments I am going to adjourn the 513th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, the sixth and last we have held in the month of June 1989.

As I do so, I think it is a good opportunity to remind you once again that the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its Final Declaration of 1985, urged all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, as a matter of the highest priority, in this Conference on Disarmament.

I should also like to draw attention, so that we may bear it very much in mind during the remaining two months of the 1989 session, to the "firm intention" at which the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament arrived last year and which is stated in its report to the General Assembly, of completing the preparation of the Programme "for its submission to the General Assembly, at the latest, at its forty-fourth session". I hope that we can achieve this honourable goal.

The next plenary meeting of the Disarmament Conference will be held on Tuesday, 4 July, at 10 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.