

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.515
6 July 1989

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 6 July 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart (Mongolia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 515th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I should like to extend a cordial welcome to the participants in the United Nations programme of fellowships, training programmes and advisory services on disarmament who are attending this plenary meeting today. As you know, the first part of the programme is being held in Geneva, and the participants are invited to visit some countries which are members of the Conference, the United Nations Office at Vienna and United Nations Headquarters in New York. I should like to wish all the participants success in their studies here in Geneva, during which various members of the Conference on Disarmament will be giving them an account of current disarmament problems.

The Conference will today continue its consideration of agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Hungary and Peru. I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Varga.

Mr. VARGA (Hungary): Mr. President, speaking for the first time during your tenure of office, I offer my congratulations to you on your succession to the presidency for the month of July. I wish you the best of success in discharging your responsible duties. I also express the appreciation of my delegation to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador García Robles, who guided the proceedings of this body in June with wisdom and professional skill. The Conference on Disarmament has profited a great deal from his vast experience and prestige in multilateral disarmament. I also extend a hearty welcome to our new colleague, Ambassador Serguei Batsanov, the new head of the delegation of the USSR. My delegation will continue its close co-operation with him as we did with his distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Youri Nazarkin, to whom I wish the best of success in discharging his new responsibilities. I take this opportunity to bid farewell to our distinguished colleagues Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy and Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina and wish them all the best in their future careers.

The Conference on Disarmament has resumed its work under a continuing auspicious international climate. Events which have taken place since the closure of our spring session testify to a growing awareness - particularly in Europe - that results achieved in the field of political co-operation should be reinforced with tangible results in disarmament. The proposals put forward by the member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization augur well for a speedy and fruitful outcome of the Vienna negotiations. The proposals put forward by the two sides come close together concerning the radical cuts in the conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe. It shows not only a genuine desire to achieve an agreement but also holds out excellent chances of success. We hope that will be the case in the foreseeable future, perhaps within the time-frame suggested.

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

The Conference on Disarmament has its own share to contribute to the positive general trend in world events. Negotiations on the comprehensive and total ban of all chemical weapons are definitely one of the areas where the Conference on Disarmament is in a position to make a significant step. The work resumed in the five working groups under the dynamic guidance of Ambassador Morel, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, in the view of my delegation, should be directed towards the solution of the remaining problems which have been identified so far, and the agreements achieved should be fixed in the rolling text. When I speak about the remaining problems, I mean those of considerable political importance. The five working groups in our view should give their attention to resolving the problems which may facilitate the earliest completion of the convention on the global ban of all chemical weapons.

My delegation considers that the Conference has done useful work with the accomplishment of quite a number of national trial inspections. The practical experience gained and the conclusions drawn will facilitate the final elaboration of the verification system of the future convention. I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to the Swedish delegation for the excellent work it has accomplished.

While in Geneva the Conference on Disarmament is engaged in the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban and an increased significance is attached to the problems of verification, a number of countries are busy in their efforts aimed at contributing to the solution of that key issue.

Hungary was one of the first to conduct a national trial inspection late last year. As declared on several occasions Hungary does not possess chemical weapons, nor an industrial establishment for their production. It does not conduct any sort of research on chemical weapons, nor does it intend to acquire such weapons in the future. Furthermore no other country stores any kind of chemical weapons or conducts any kind of related activity on the territory of Hungary. Our participation in trial inspections serves purely political purposes: to promote negotiations and help create mutual confidence.

The objectives of the first trial inspection were limited: to provide opportunities for a Hungarian team to learn and practise the basics of inspection. In view of the favourable experience gained, and the desire to maintain the momentum of the negotiations in Geneva, we think it useful to give consideration to following up - at the appropriate time - the national trial inspections by different types of multilateral activities including multilateral verification experiments.

Another area of vital importance, where it is absolutely essential for the Conference on Disarmament to make definite progress, is the issue of nuclear disarmament. During the spring session Ambassador Yamada of Japan generated momentum for the setting up of the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban. My delegation fully supports his efforts and sincerely hopes that Ambassador Yamada will soon succeed in overcoming the remaining difficulties - in practical terms, a couple of disputed words - and that the Ad Hoc Committee

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

will be able to start practical work still during this session. In view of the forthcoming Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty the importance of such a development could hardly be overestimated.

In my today' statement I would like to dwell on the issue of the prohibition of radiological weapons in some detail. This may also be considered an area where the Conference on Disarmament could achieve tangible results within a comparatively short period. That would have a significance of its own even if the issue may not be considered by some a high-priority task.

My delegation has traditionally taken particular interest in this subject and has been doing its utmost to make its contribution. I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador de Rivero of Peru, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, for his efforts to maintain the momentum of the negotiations.

The value of the subject for arms control and disarmament has also given rise to lengthy debate in relation to the prohibition of radiological weapons "proper" or "in the traditional sense", as well as the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. In the bulky material accumulated during the last decade various arguments have been put forward for or against various aspects of the question. Taking stock of this discussion, it can be concluded that there is a general consensus that radiological weapons should be banned irrespective of the fact that such weapons may not be in existence. One may trace also an "almost-consensus" that appropriate international measures are warranted on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities.

I prefer to refrain from going into details on the arguments I was referring to a minute ago. However I would like to amplify an aspect rarely mentioned so far. Apart from the value of the subjects for disarmament and arms control - which my delegation thinks is there - the prohibition of radiological weapons and the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities can be regarded also as global, world-wide confidence-building measures. Practical experience shows the vital importance of appropriate confidence-building measures as indispensable steps to prepare the basis for more far-reaching disarmament measures. What adds to this importance is that in one way or another both tracks are concerned with particular aspects of nuclear activities. Results in this area would be of considerable political importance in view of the forthcoming 4th Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The non-proliferation régime is worth preserving and strengthening. This can be achieved through a series of measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, working out appropriate collateral measures - such as the ones under consideration - could also have a beneficial effect, especially if we consider the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities.

Since 1979 an enormous amount of work, of intellectual and professional input, has been invested in the negotiations on the subject. One cannot but pay respect to the work accomplished and wish to maintain and use the results achieved so far. Being aware of the difficulties encountered in the substance

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

and in the way of handling the two aspects of the issue, the Conference on Disarmament recommended in 1986 that "the ways and means of how best to proceed further" should be considered by the subsidiary body dealing with the matter. By implementing that decision and following a new working method it has created a good textual basis for work in relation to both tracks. We hope that developments in the Ad Hoc Committee and in the contact groups on tracks "A" and "B" will prove that this way of proceeding is feasible.

The "rolling texts" drawn up on tracks "A" and "B" respectively contain most of the basic elements required for the elaboration of the final text. Whatever is still missing can easily be recovered from documents containing the results of previous consideration of the issue. The method of drawing up alternatives in relation to particular central issues has the advantage of clearly showing the different approaches to the subject matter and also indicates the possibilities for resolving them.

Looking into the matter in a more concrete manner one comes to the conclusion that the major stumbling block in both tracks is that no agreed solution has been found for the scope of prohibition. It comes as no surprise that because of this a number of other main elements, including the question of verification, are hard to settle. In a way this is a reflection or the "fall out" of the unresolved questions on the scope.

The possibility of any further move therefore - in our view - depends on whether or not the issue of the scope of prohibition can be finally settled. Assessing the negotiations carried on in the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, my delegation considers that an adequate amount of material has been accumulated in connection with the elements on the scope of prohibition of both tracks "A" and "B". The elements which could be included into the scope of the future instrument or instruments appear at present in the form of alternatives. At an appropriate stage of negotiations it becomes inevitable to start drawing up a single formulation for the scope of both subject matters. The working paper, an advance copy of which has been distributed today under the symbol CD/928, represents an attempt - for purposes of illustration - to suggest a practical solution for working out a single formulation for the scope of tracks "A" and "B" respectively, based on the elements appearing in the working documents under consideration in the contact groups of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons.

As far as track "A" or "radiological weapons proper" is concerned, two distinct approaches can be identified, which - fortunately - are far from being irreconcilable, much less mutually exclusive. One of them, the one proposed by the original authors, advocates the prohibition of radiological weapons as such and subsequently the prohibition of the hostile use of radioactive material. The proposal is supplemented by an appropriate definition on the radiological weapons, incidentally giving rise to prolonged controversies. The alternative approach calls only for the prohibition of the use of radioactive materials for hostile purposes. This approach calls into question the military feasibility of radiological weapons as such and holds the definition of radiological weapons unnecessary and ambiguous.

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

The common feature in the two approaches is that both of them recognize the necessity of the prohibition of the use of radioactive material for hostile purposes. This common feature perhaps can be used as a basis for designing a scope which could amalgamate the substance of the two conceptions. Once there is agreement in principle that the hostile use of radioactive material is prohibited, it follows logically that the military hardware specifically designed for the use of radioactive material for hostile purposes should also be banned. It is equally logical, further, that the production, stockpiling, acquisition or possession of radioactive material specifically prepared, configured or designed for use for hostile purposes should also be banned.

My delegation is aware of the fact that such an approach involves a certain change in the original positions. But in order to achieve a change something has to be changed.

Turning to track "B", the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, I would like to say as an introduction that it has become during the last years an independent subject in its own right, thanks to the idea originally introduced into the proceedings by the Swedish delegation.

Addressing myself to the issue I would like to start from the fact that the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 already offered some protection to nuclear facilities, saying in paragraph 1 of Article 56 that installations containing dangerous forces such as nuclear generating stations "shall not be made the object of attack even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among civilian population". This general prohibition is weakened however with considerable numbers of restrictions.

The question may be raised whether or not further international legal protection is called for in relation to nuclear facilities. The nuclear industry has gone a long way since 1949. And here I would like to highlight somewhat an aspect that has comparatively seldom been referred to in our proceedings. The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency adopted in 1986 in the framework of the IAEA were worked out in practically no time after the Chernobyl catastrophe. The spirit of the two conventions suggests that States are indeed aware of the dangers of nuclear accidents which may result in an international transboundary release of radioactive material that could be of significance with regard to radiological safety for other States also. It is evident that these States do not desire man-made nuclear accidents, since they strive to prevent or avoid the consequences of those caused by the caprices of technology. Further elaboration of this idea is hardly necessary.

Returning to the subject matter after this short historical review, I would like to say that the conventions referred to above may have a practical value for our negotiations together with the message their basic spirit conveys to us.

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

Contact Group "B" of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons has also succeeded in accumulating a considerable amount of material on the possible elements relevant to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. However - as was the case with track "A" also - the positions cluster around two distinct but contradictory approaches, which differ from each other in quantitative and qualitative terms. The approach based on the so-called "mass destruction criteria" stresses the avoidance of the release and dissemination of radioactive material and would apply the prohibition of attack to a relatively narrow range of facilities specified according to technical specifications dealt with in the sections on Definitions and Criteria. The other, occasionally referred to as the "sanctuary approach", stresses the "non-attack" aspect and applies the prohibition of attack to a broader, or unlimited range of facilities.

To work out a common approach - in our view - poses a twofold task. The first is basically of a political nature, to devise an appropriate combination of the non-attack clause and the avoidance of the release of radioactive material. The second, and more technical one, is to describe and define the facilities to which the scope will be applied. The latter involves deep professional understanding of the related nuclear technologies and of the potential dangers involved in practical terms. The heart of the matter is anyway the issue of the scope. The version suggested in our working paper illustrates the way of thinking I was describing above. At this stage my delegation is not putting forward any suggestions as to the second part of the task in view of the difficulties mentioned.

Closing my statement, I would like to emphasize that at the present and forthcoming stages in the negotiations it is indispensable to make efforts to reconcile the differing approaches, which are clearly visible. An agreement on the scope would definitely facilitate the harmonization of positions on other main elements too. If a realistic, consensus-based approach could be worked out, it might help convince also those who at this stage may have reservations on the issues as such.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words that he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Peru, Mr. Calderón.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Allow me to address my first words, Sir, to you, to express the pleasure with which we see you in the Chair. You can be assured that you will find my delegation ready in every way to contribute to the success of our work. Likewise, I should like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador Alfonso García Robles for the admirable way in which he conducted the work of this sole multilateral negotiating forum in June. Ambassador García Robles, who has close links with Peru, is an eminent figure in the area of disarmament and his tireless devotion to this work is for us a daily challenge and an outstanding example. This is a good opportunity for my delegation to convey its best wishes to the distinguished Ambassadors of Sri Lanka, Mr. Rodrigo, of Italy, Mr. Pugliese, and of Argentina, Mr. Cámpora, who we hope will come back to us soon, if only for a while.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

I should like to refer first of all to agenda item 7. As was stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru, Mr. Guillermo Larco Cox, in the statement he made to the Conference on 25 April this year, "the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities could be dealt with in a brief, forceful agreement of a basically political nature". It is therefore fully consistent with this position of my country that today I have pleasure in introducing a draft convention on the subject. Aware as my delegation is of the series of implications of a political and technical nature that are involved in the negotiation of a convention of this type, we are not claiming that with this draft convention we shall resolve the disputes that have arisen over the last six years, nor do we think that we have taken care satisfactorily of all the different facets of the positions adopted in this body. But we do seek to put forward a new approach in dealing with this major question of attacks on nuclear facilities, guided by the conviction that through the political will of the States represented here we could reach agreement on this subject within a short space of time.

When you try to prohibit attacks on nuclear facilities, what you are seeking to do is to ban a type of act of aggression that has the particular characteristics of entailing an additional risk of the possible release of radioactivity to the detriment of neighbouring populations and the environment. In other words, what we want to do is to single out attacks on nuclear facilities, precisely because of the additional threat they pose, and I say additional threat because it is not, of course, a fact that in all cases this would produce indiscriminate release of radioactivity. If we sought to focus our attention solely and exclusively on those attacks against nuclear facilities that would produce an effect of mass destruction, then by interpretation a contrario we should have to accept discrimination amongst attacks on nuclear facilities, which is quite unacceptable from the standpoint of international law. Indeed, it would be paradoxical if an attack on a nuclear facility of 0.5 megawatts were to be outside the scope of the future convention, despite the flagrant violation of international law and the serious harm that this attack could cause the country attacked, merely on the grounds that the radioactivity released had not reached the required number of becquerels. The point is that this question of attacks on nuclear facilities cannot be considered in isolation from the principles clearly and categorically established in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter, concerning the obligation of Member States to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or legal independence of any State or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. This basic rule, which falls within the category of jus cogens, does not allow us to differentiate between acts of aggression, because that might endanger its full effectiveness. The only reason which justifies singling out attacks on nuclear facilities as compared with other acts of aggression is the latent risk of the spread of radioactivity, with possible implications of mass destruction. But from the legal point of view there is absolutely no basis for differentiating between attacks on nuclear facilities, unless what we are trying to do is not to have a universal type of convention but rather a partial and localized one for highly populated areas or for countries with a large number of reactors and nuclear facilities.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

Now if what would allow us to single out attacks on nuclear facilities from the rest is the risk or threat, and not the actual or imminent fact, of causing an uncontrolled release of radioactive material, another problem raised by the experts is whether one can differentiate between nuclear facilities that are designed for military purposes and those designed for peaceful purposes. It should at least be borne in mind that alpha, beta and gamma rays do not differentiate between persons or things, and once out of the plant they are just as harmful whatever they were made for. To paraphrase what was once said by General Gallois, this is a reflection of the equalizing power of the atom or in other terms, it is an indication of the fatefully egalitarian nature of nuclear fission: even if it was originally devised for the opposite purpose, once nuclear fission is out of control, it is equally harmful for man and his environment. Despite what I have said, we have to agree that it is not easy to draw a line between military and non-military uses of nuclear facilities, especially if we bear in mind that the use may be either direct or indirect, but it is not indispensable or obligatory for us to decide this question. To tell the truth, it is perfectly possible to draw up the convention without going into this problem. In the end what we have to do is to exclude once and for all the risk or threat that could menace defenceless people if acts of aggression were directed at nuclear facilities.

Another problem that sometimes complicates our handling of this question is whether in the planned convention the emphasis should be on safeguarding installations in time of peace or in time of war. Now strictly speaking, what we are trying to do is to ban attacks on nuclear facilities at any time and in any place. It is, of course, legitimate that there should be additional concern when the possibility of attack arises in time of war. Nevertheless, this would be something incidental or contingent, which should certainly not be shirked by the future convention, but has no reason whatever to be regarded as the decisive element. What is essential is to prohibit those acts of aggression, which do not always occur in wartime. What is more, they are likely to occur in a situation other than open conflict, as happened a few years ago. So if what is wanted is a universal convention, serving everyone's interests, it will have to establish general rules rather than exceptions. In the case of war, what we have to try to achieve with this comprehensive prohibition is to introduce a limitation in international law on the military targets or objectives that may be selected by the adversaries, apart from strengthening humanitarian law with reference to Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

To sum up, my delegation thinks of the future convention as being a set of rules derived from jus cogens with the purpose of prohibiting certain acts of aggression because of the specific characteristic they have of involving a risk of mass destruction. That is to say, the prohibition is confined to attacks, whatever their nature. The property we want to protect is nuclear facilities, in that they have this inherent possibility of releasing radioactivity indiscriminately. Finally, the justification for making this commitment is that it is in the interests of States to avoid unnecessary or intolerable injury from radiation to their peoples and to the environment.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

In the view of my delegation, this is the legal, political and moral framework within which the future convention should be drawn up. It is on these principles that we have prepared the convention that today we are submitting for the consideration of the distinguished delegations represented at the Conference. Working document CD/929, which we have submitted this morning, takes due account of the main elements that appear in the annex to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee submitted to the Conference last year. It also includes useful elements that were contained in the bilateral agreement signed a few months ago by India and Pakistan. Finally, it introduces new elements in an effort at conciliation and at rationalization of the rewarding debate that has been taking place for several years in this Conference. As we said at the beginning of this statement, we do not think that with this new draft we have managed to resolve all problems or dispel all doubts, nor do we think we shall have satisfied everyone, but what we want to do is to prompt thought and stimulate debate with an unorthodox, fresh and general approach based on a desire to provide for the different situations, all equally legitimate, raised by the question of attacks on nuclear facilities. At all events what we should not forget is that if we want to have an agreement that is universal in its scope and participation, then we shall have to accommodate the concerns of all, including those States that without having nuclear facilities on their territories find themselves threatened by the release of radioactivity caused by an attack on a nuclear facility in their neighbourhood. It is the wish of my delegation that document CD/929 should be submitted to Contact Group B of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, which is co-ordinated by Mr. Givers of the Netherlands, with a view to its being used as a basis for discussion and analysis. I do not think I need now explain the provisions that appear in the eight articles of the draft convention. My delegation considers it preferable to go into that matter in more detail at an appropriate time in the Ad Hoc Committee. Meanwhile we are at the disposal of other distinguished delegations that are interested in holding consultations with a view to arriving at a more generally acceptable text.

I should now like to make one or two comments on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. My first words of course are to Ambassador Morel, to congratulate him, and also the Chairmen of the five working groups, for the dedication and brilliance with which they are conducting their work. Bent as we all are on concluding the negotiations as soon as possible, in accordance with the spirit of the Paris Conference, my delegation cannot but salute the great effort that is being made by the Conference on Disarmament to fulfil its responsibilities in this field. As you know the negotiations taking place in the Conference on Disarmament with a view to arriving at the total prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons are unique in post-war multilateral negotiations, and that is worth remembering. In the first place, we are faced with negotiations that have no deadline; that is to say, we attend them and take part in them without any time-limit, remaining exposed to changes in the international environment, and hence liable to go over the same ground year after year. If we had a deadline for completing our work, or at least a particular year accepted by everyone, then our work might take on a different pace and a different look. The lack of such a date might make an unkind observer think the conclusion of the convention could be put off ad infinitum.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

Another factor that makes these negotiations unique is that so far the mandate still does not explicitly refer to the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. Obviously, this is in everybody's mind, but when it is a matter of establishing the relationship of the future convention with the Geneva Protocol of 1925, a divergence appears. Obviously, nobody is thinking of a total prohibition, but of a limited prohibition of use, whether it is first, second or whatever use. But the fact is that this is still not clear.

Another factor has to do with the proliferation of provisions and texts, all of them related to the future convention, which would also make it unique, because it would be necessary to agree not only on the basic provisions but also on all the regulations and subsidiary aspects connected with the application of the various articles of the convention. We are therefore faced with a situation in which we have to concern ourselves with both legislating and regulating, sometimes finding that the regulatory aspect prevails over the legislative. The interrelationship that in the end exists between them, their value from the legal point of view and the differences that could arise as a result of different régimes in domestic law do not allow us to rule out the possibility of new and unwelcome complications in the future.

Related to this last factor is the question of the "rolling text" - a good term coined some time ago - which has made it possible to maintain continuity over the past few years. Nevertheless, it is worth asking whether we should keep that term. Perhaps the time has come to give a new name to the text coming out of the Ad Hoc Committee, because it could happen that continuity comes to mean continuing for continuing's sake, which is not at all the same thing. We could think of a preliminary draft convention for next year, and that would appear to be the most logical thing if we wish to be consistent with the Final Declaration of Paris.

Finally, another factor that makes these negotiations special is the method of work. At first sight, it would appear logical to try to make specific progress in all areas related to the future convention, and yet when the pace and progress of the work is not smooth and even in all areas, that is to say, when there are ups and downs, we do not see why we cannot choose to defer until a later stage those subsidiary questions that need to mature further so that we can concentrate our attention and efforts on the major subjects that are interdependent and indispensable, in order to give the convention its final form. A popular saying is "Jack of all trades, master of none", and it might be advisable not to disregard that advice, incidentally making it easier for everyone to get a grasp of all the really substantive issues that will shape the future convention. I think it is very good to redouble on efforts and hold all kinds of meetings, but only in the knowledge that we are not going to disappoint expectations and that we are going to have a final text of the convention within our reach.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

(The President)

The Secretariat has circulated today, at my request, an informal paper containing the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during next week. As usual, the timetable is indicative and can be changed, if the need arises. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt the informal paper.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for today. I shall now proceed to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 11 July, at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 10.55 a.m.