

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 12 June 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mrs. B. Theorin

(Sweden)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. Ould ROUIS
Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia: Mr. R. ROWE
Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium: Mr. M. DEPASSE
Mr. J.-M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. De SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. P. POPTCHEV
Mr. C. PRAMOV
Mr. N. MIHAILOV

Burma: U Maung Maung GYI
U Hla MYINT

Canada: Mr. J.A. BEESLEY
Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. Qian JIADONG
Ms. Wang ZHIYUN
Mr. Liang DEFENG
Mr. Lin CHENG
Mr. Zhang WEIDONG
Mr. Yang MINGLIANG
Mr. Suo KAIMING
Mr. Lu MINGJUN

Cuba: Mr. E de la CRUZ

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:

Mr. I. HASSAN

Mr. Marawan BADR

Mr. A. HELMY

Ms. W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Ms. K. SINEGIORGIA

Mr. F. JOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. de la GORCE

Mr. H. RENIE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. Rose

Mr. W. Kubiczek

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER

Mr. F. ELBE

Mr. M. GERDTS

Mr. W.E. Von Dem HAGEN

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER

Mr. F. GAJDA

Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. M. DUBEY

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO

Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI

Mrs. P. RAMADHAN

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N.K. KAMYAB

Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Mr. KALAMI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Mr. B. CABRAS

Mr. M. PAVESE

Japan:

Mr. S. ABE
Mr. M. IMAI
Mr. M. KONISHI
Mr. T. KAWAKITA
Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:

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Mexico:

Mr. Z. GONZALES Y REYNERO
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands:

Mr. R.J. Van SCHAIK
Mr. J. RAMAKER
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. J.O. OBOH
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
Mr. F.O. ADESHIDA

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU
Mr. T. MELESCANU
Mr. A. POPESCU
Mr. M. BICHIR

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA

Sweden:

Ms. B. THEORIN

Mr. R. EKEUS

Ms. E. BONNIER

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Mr. L.E. WINGREN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV

Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV

Mr. I.V. SCHERBAK

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

Mr. D.A. SLINN

Mr. J.F. GORDON

United States of America:

Mr. L. FIELDS

Mr. N. CLYNE

Mr. R. HORNE

Mr. P. CORDEN

Mr. A. HORGWITZ

Mr. R. MIKULAR

Mr. R.O. WATERS

Venezuela:

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Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Mr. D. MINIC

Zaire:

Mrs. Esaki KABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

At the outset, allow me to extend, on behalf of the Conference, a warm welcome to His Excellency Mr. Shin'ro Abe, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, who is addressing the Conference today as first speaker. His presence among us today is further evidence of the interest taken by Japan in the work of this multilateral negotiating body. We are looking forward to hearing his statement, and we wish him a useful visit to Geneva.

May I also cordially welcome Ambassador Robert Jan van Schaik, the new representative of the Netherlands, who joins us today for the first time. I am sure we are all looking forward to co-operating with him in advancing the work of the Conference.

I am convinced that I represent the whole Conference when expressing appreciation of and gratitude for the highly qualified services of Ambassador Jaipal, the Secretary-General of the Conference, as well as of Mr. Berasategui, the Deputy Secretary-General, and of all the other members of the secretariat. We count on their unfailing support also for this summer's work.

It is indeed an honour and a challenge for my delegation to take up the presidency of the Conference of Disarmament for the month of June. In preparing for this task we have had the valuable help of Ambassador Dhanapala, the outgoing President, who has shared with us his experiences, impressions and advice.

I think it is fair to say that the first part of this year's session was probably — apart from some encouraging progress in the work on a chemical weapons convention — one of the most disappointing in the whole history of this negotiating body. When we should have dealt with the real task of this Conference, that is, to negotiate multilateral disarmament agreements, we instead lost much time and effort in deliberations on procedural matters. As a consequence, we now face an extraordinarily long list of unsolved problems for the rest of the session. However, this perspective should not discourage us in our work. It makes imperative still greater efforts. In this context, I would like to urge delegations to present their positions clearly and in substance here in the Conference and in its subsidiary bodies, rather than to try to disguise them in a continuing and fruitless debate over the establishment or not of such bodies.

I take it for granted that basically all Governments here represented consider it to be in their self-interest, as it is in the common interest of mankind, to pursue real and serious disarmament. I do not have to remind anyone here that nuclear war is — without comparison — the greatest threat the world has ever had to face, that there is indeed a risk that the use of nuclear arms would constitute global suicide.

We have recently, on 22 May, seen one expression of this urge to stop the arms race in the form of a Joint Declaration by Heads of State and Prime Ministers of India, Mexico, Tanzania, Greece, Argentina and Sweden. The political leaders of these countries stress the increased risk of nuclear war caused by a lack of constructive dialogue among the nuclear States. They point out the fact that the

(The President)

people they represent are no less threatened by nuclear war, than the citizens of the nuclear States. They warn that the probability of nuclear holocaust increases as warning time decreases and weapons become swifter, more accurate and more deadly. They appeal for general and complete disarmament and assure the nuclear States of their good offices to facilitate agreement. The Declaration concludes that today the world hangs in the balance between war and peace.

It is the responsibility of this Conference to contribute to avoiding the unspeakable tragedies of war. This is what is expected from us and it is with this in mind that we must now resume our work. Among the items on the agenda—all of them important—there are three which I would like to mention particularly because of the urgency of the subject-matters as well as the attention they attract among the general public. I am thinking of the nuclear test ban, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the prevention of nuclear war.

The test-ban issue is the number one item on our agenda and in essence the classic task of this body. The continuing failure to achieve any progress is of serious concern. It must be our immediate task and constant preoccupation to establish a mutually acceptable work format for this issue in order to make it possible to solve the remaining substantive problems with regard to a treaty on a nuclear test ban.

The arms race in outer space is a relatively new item on the agenda of the Conference. The urgency of bringing the development of weapons and the use of force in space under control of international law by creating appropriate agreements should be obvious to us all. The accelerating pace of uncontrollable military technology and absurd military spending would, if unhampered, further seriously threaten an already precarious international peace.

Nuclear weapons and the possibility of their use have brought the very survival of humankind into jeopardy. With this frightening prospect, it must be the duty of nations to make all efforts to prevent a nuclear war. It is obvious that the Conference on Disarmament must give its full attention to this priority question.

In our view, and for the reasons I have mentioned, it is essential that we reach agreement soon on how to tackle these three issues in a substantive way. All delegations must bring their efforts to bear to that end. It is, however, obvious that without preparedness to compromise and co-operate we will not achieve progress. If we succeed now in establishing an agreed framework for these items, we will stand a good chance of seeing some concrete progress by the end of the session. If we fail, we will, I am afraid, face one of the gravest crises of multilateral disarmament talks, and this at a particularly serious moment in history, when concrete negotiations are absolutely necessary, and only a year before the next NPT Review Conference. Such a situation cannot be permitted to develop. It must be avoided through our collective effort.

Another item of importance during this session will, of course, be continued work on a chemical weapons convention. We are obviously faced here with the eminent risk of uncontrolled proliferation of these weapons to more and more countries. It is therefore necessary that these negotiations are carried on swiftly and efficiently

(The President)

and in a spirit of constructive co-operation. If so, a draft convention can be put together soon and be presented to the members of the Conference and other States for their consideration.

It is gratifying that the Conference has been able to establish an ad hoc committee for the item of radiological weapons. With the skilled and experienced chairmanship of Ambassador Vejvoda, there are good prospects for some tangible progress with regard to this question.

Finally, let me mention one remaining issue that the Conference should face as soon as possible during this session, that is the review of the membership of the Conference. A number of States, deeply committed to the cause of disarmament, have announced their interest in being members of the Conference. We have an obligation to react in a proper and expedient way to these demands.

I have mentioned some but not all of the important issues in front of us. My delegation offers you its services during its presidency. We must all take our responsibility so that the Conference can embark upon the substantive tasks at hand.

Let us now go to work.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Japan, Yugoslavia and France.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, His Excellency Mr. Shintaro Abe, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan.

Mr. ABE (Japan): Madam President, it is indeed a great pleasure for me to attend this Conference on Disarmament today.

On behalf of the Government of Japan, I should like to express to you my sincere congratulations on your assumption of the heavy responsibilities of the Presidency for this month. I hope that this Conference will produce fruitful results under your wise guidance and with the benefit of your great knowledge and experiences.

I should also like to express our appreciation to the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, your predecessor and President for the month of April, for his valuable contribution to the Conference.

The question of peace and disarmament has never been so serious as it is now for the peoples of the world.

The tense international situation in recent years is hanging heavily on the minds of all people. In this situation, several important bilateral disarmament negotiations and even this Conference, the sole body for multilateral disarmament negotiations, have, frankly speaking, failed of late to make such progress as will meet fully the expectations of the people of the world.

Since I took office as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, I have energetically toured many countries, in consideration of Japan's attitude of pursuing the peace of the world, not only as a member of Asia, but as a member of human society on Earth, and had the opportunity of exchanging views with United States, Soviet and other leaders on the course mankind should follow in the future. The honest impression I

(Mr. Abe, Japan)

obtained from those dialogues is that the world is permeated with the sense of frustration and impatience and that the inmost concern and profound apprehensions of the people of the entire world are bent to this question of peace; in particular, there is a strong desire for ensuring peace and security against the ever-intensifying arms race and its unchecked continuation.

Bearing in mind such a sense of unrest shared by so many people of the world, I have come to attend this Conference on Disarmament as the first Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to do so, in this fifteenth year of Japan's membership of the Conference, in order to express my views on peace and disarmament and to stress that it is high time for this Conference, which has successfully made several brilliant achievements, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to take action in concrete terms and become a driving force for the advancement of world-wide disarmament.

What is the cause of all this tenseness of the current international situation?

It goes without saying that its fundamental cause lies in the fact that East-West relations, particularly those between the United States and the Soviet Union, have never been so cold in recent times as they are now, because of the vicious cycle of unerasable feeling of distrust between the two sides, causing them to seek their security in the expansion of armaments, which in turn gives rise to renewed distrust.

Of course, I am inclined to believe that the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union at the present time are not in such a critical condition as they were at the time of the Berlin or Cuban crises. But I do believe that the present tensions in East-West relations have especially serious implications of an unprecedented nature for the survival of the whole human race.

Mankind now possesses highly developed scientific technologies that make free movement in outer space possible, and yet, or because of that, it has not succeeded in preventing the vast quantitative increase and the appalling qualitative advance of the modern weapons systems. Consequently, there exist on Earth large accumulations of nuclear weapons, said to be the ultimate weapons, and numerous other dreadful modern weapons in such volumes as will annihilate the human species several times over.

In this state of affairs, if the tensions in East-West relations should continue as they are and a nuclear war should break out, intentionally or accidentally, the Earth would undergo, within a matter of ten minutes or so, a holocaust on an unimaginable scale and from this the whole of mankind would be the loser, being brought to the verge of total annihilation, as every informed person all over the world points out.

How wisely we, as human beings, should cope with such a situation; in more concrete terms, how we should control and reduce the instruments of horror mankind has created with its own civilization, without ruining ourselves overwhelmed by such instruments, and how we should maintain peace and transmit peace and prosperity on Earth to posterity; that is the most crucial problem facing us today.

This is the very consideration, I believe, that should be the starting point of disarmament.

In considering this problem, I cannot but call upon the United States and the Soviet Union, the Powers possessing the majority of the existing nuclear arsenals

(Mr. Abe, Japan)

and the capabilities of most modern weapons systems in space and other non-nuclear fields, to realize their very special responsibility to mankind. It is earnestly required of the two Powers that they should indeed take the initiative in practicing disarmament in concrete terms, accompanied by effective verification measures, and that is the way they should respond to the hopes and expectations of mankind. In other words, the world peace rests first and foremost with the leaders of these two Powers.

In this connection, I now wish to point out several matters.

First, I would like to take up the very important issue of nuclear disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, that is, the START and the INF negotiations. These negotiations have been suspended since the end of last year, and regrettably there is not even the faintest sign of their possible resumption now.

At the London Summit held a few days ago, the participating Western democracies, including Japan, expressed their conviction that international problems must be resolved through reasoned dialogue and negotiation and stated that they would support all efforts to that end. They also expressed their wish to see the speedy resumption of the now suspended disarmament negotiations.

I have been advocating, on every occasion, a resolution of the INF negotiations on a global basis and in a manner that will not injure the security of Asia, including Japan. I may take this opportunity to re-emphasize this point and urge strongly the Soviet Union to recognize its heavy responsibility as a major nuclear Power and return to the negotiating table at the earliest possible time for substantive progress of nuclear disarmament negotiations with the United States.

It goes without saying that progress in the nuclear disarmament negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States is vitally important also for maintaining and strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime.

Many non-nuclear-weapon States, including Japan, have chosen to count on the nuclear-weapon States' will to take every precaution to control nuclear weapons and to make every effort to promote nuclear disarmament. On that account, the non-nuclear-weapon States renounced on their own the so-called nuclear options. With the Third Review Conference of the NPT scheduled for next year, I am convinced that it is a matter of historical significance in eliminating the sense of distrust of the non-nuclear-weapon States and the non-NPT-member States toward the regime that the nuclear-weapon States should pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures for the realization of nuclear disarmament.

Now there are 120 countries which have joined the NPT. We should correctly evaluate the important role the NPT regime has played in preventing the increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States. We should also reaffirm the need for positive efforts of various countries to enhance the universality of the treaty and the strength of the NPT regime. For this reason, I would also like to urge all the non-member States to the NPT, including China and France, to accede to this Treaty at the earliest possible opportunity.

(Mr. Abe, Japan)

Let me now turn to another major nuclear disarmament issue: nuclear test ban.

This issue has been taken up as a matter of first priority in response to honest wishes of people for a long time since the dawning of the Nuclear Age. Nevertheless, it is regrettable to note that a comprehensive nuclear test ban is in reality still very far away.

To our knowledge, as many as some fifty underground nuclear test explosions were conducted in the course of the past year. Japan has been steadfastly opposed to any nuclear test explosions conducted by any States. Accordingly, I wish to urge strongly again that the nuclear-weapon States should do their best to restrain themselves from conducting nuclear test explosions.

It is to be regretted that negotiations on a nuclear test ban at this Conference should have come to standstill, owing to the lack of consensus on solutions to the verification problems. In order to find a breakthrough in this impasse, I believe that now is the time when the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the Soviet Union and the United States, should exert their maximum efforts to find a way towards a more "realistic" solution.

Therefore, I would like to submit the following proposal:

If a CTB cannot be achieved at one stroke, we should make an in-depth study on a second-best measure, namely, a step-by-step formula, under which underground nuclear test explosions of a yield now considered technically verifiable on a multinational basis will be taken as the threshold, an agreement will be reached on banning test explosions overstepping this threshold and then the threshold will be lowered by improving the verification capability itself.

Needless to say, the objective of this proposal is nothing but the acceleration of the process for a CTB, in view of the fact that no substantial progress has been made toward that goal over a long period. Therefore, in addition to improvement of technical verification capability, it should naturally be accompanied by a search for a means by which effective verification and inspection, based on trust among States, is made possible. I honestly believe that, in the present situation, this formula is the most realistic option left to us and I earnestly hope that it will open a way for an early realization of a CTB. I also take this opportunity to assure all of you that Japan is prepared to make available even further our advanced technology of seismic detection to increase the verification capability in this field, when such an approach has been accepted.

Next, I must not fail to mention the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons as well.

Chemical weapons cause far-reaching injuries and effects, extensively as well as indiscriminately, not only on combatants but also on ordinary citizens. The fact

(Mr. Abe, Japan)

that chemical weapons are actually incorporated in the weapons systems of a number of countries and are stockpiled in enormous quantities on this Earth poses a grave threat to the peace and security of international society. In fact, there occurred this year an inadmissible event in that chemical weapons were actually used in the Iran-Iraq conflict.

This is eloquent testimony of the need for us not only urgently to reduce and destroy the existing large amount of chemical weapons stocks, but also to seek the early conclusion of a global and comprehensive convention banning chemical weapons so as to preclude their development and production.

In April this year, Vice-President Bush of the United States, by attending in person a meeting of this Conference and presenting a draft convention, expressed the positive attitude of the United States Government toward this particular issue. Prior to this, in February of this year, the Soviet Union also gave a positive sign regarding verification matters, though limited in scope to the destruction of chemical weapons stocks.

I appreciate and welcome such concrete proposals put forward by the United States and the Soviet Union. Japan will continue to participate actively, as in the past, in the deliberations and negotiations on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons at this Conference. I wish Japan's advanced technologies would make some contribution in this field.

Finally, I would like to touch briefly upon the question of prevention of an arms race in outer space. Outer space, which we may call the last remaining frontier for mankind, has infinite potentiality as a stage for our future activities. As a country promoting various projects for the peaceful use of outer space, Japan is keenly interested in the prevention of an arms race in it. I hope that in this field, too, a study in concrete terms will be made at the Conference on Disarmament. To that end, also, it is desirable that the United States and the Soviet Union both take a positive stance.

I have now expressed my earnest desire that the United States and the Soviet Union, of all countries, address themselves, seriously and ahead of other countries, to accelerating disarmament.

By this I do not mean to say that other countries, including my own, can remain idle with folded arms. Various multilateral agreements which this Conference on Disarmament is trying to conclude as its goal must be acceptable to all of the 40 member countries that the distinguished delegates in this Chamber represent and, therefore, the concerted and positive efforts of all the countries are required for the attainment of this goal.

Japan had the greater part of her land ravaged and the lives of millions of its people were lost during the last war. From this sad experience, the

(Mr. Abe, Japan)

determination that "the scourge of war must never be repeated again" is firmly imprinted in the mind of every Japanese. The Government of Japan, on the basis of this commitment of its people to peace, has constantly made it its basic foreign policy not to become a military Power that may menace the neighbouring countries, to adhere to the three non-nuclear principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their introduction into Japan, and thus to strive for the promotion of disarmament.

Preservation of peace is a common desire shared by all mankind. It is essential that we should realize, steadily and patiently, feasible and concrete disarmament measures one after another, while fully recognizing the reality of international society. To that end, I believe we can choose no other way than to increase mutual understanding and mutual trust through constant dialogue and contact, bilateral and multilateral, and seek points of agreement. In this sense, I am strongly reminded of the importance of the role to be played by this Conference on Disarmament and of the responsibility to be borne by every one of us here taking part in the Conference.

Geneva is a city where, since the beginning of the modern age, people have gathered and conferred on numberless occasions in search of international understanding and co-operation and of ways for overcoming difficulties, whenever mankind has stood at the crossroads of war and peace. Their noble spirit is engraved in every corner of the town and will never fade away. Now we must recall anew the painstaking efforts of our predecessors who have left their footprints in this city and seriously think of the heavy responsibility we bear not only for ourselves, but also for the prosperity and well-being of our posterity.

The future of mankind depends on us who are living today. Our road ahead will not be flat and smooth. Let us make further efforts together for the attainment of our common ultimate goal, a general and complete disarmament, by transcending differences of our positions, in a spirit as expressed in an oriental saying, "Constant dripping wears away a stone".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan for his important statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vidas.

Mr. VIDAS (Yugoslavia): Madam President, at the outset of the summer session of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like, first of all, to congratulate you, the representative of friendly Sweden, on your appointment as President of the Conference for the month of June and to wish you success in carrying out your responsible task. By its initiatives, particularly in the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament, Sweden has significantly

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

contributed to disarmament negotiations. The Conference on Disarmament has benefited a great deal on many occasions from the expertise offered by the Swedish experts. The delegation of Yugoslavia has always had very close co-operation with the delegation of Sweden, sharing the same views and having the same preoccupations on the magnitude of disarmament problems. I would like to assure you this time again that you may count on my delegation's full support and co-operation in the discharge of the tasks facing you.

I would also like to express our appreciation to the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala, for the successfully accomplished task as President for the month of April. His efficient stewardship and personal qualities greatly contributed to unimpeded work by the Conference.

We have listened with great attention and interest to the statement by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Japan, His Excellency Mr. Shintaro Abe, and it is, indeed, a great pleasure for me to welcome him.

The Conference on Disarmament, during the spring session as in the past years, has been prevented from achieving any substantive progress in negotiations on the items of the agenda under consideration. More specifically, since May 1977, when the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques was signed in Geneva, this forum has not concluded any new agreement. All efforts made to that effect by the majority of members have been of no avail. In the first part of its 1984 session the Conference achieved less than in the same period last year. Out of all subsidiary negotiating bodies, only the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons continued its work. It took, however, more than one month to agree on this.

At the same time, the arms race continues unabated. World military expenditures will reach this year the fantastic amount of 970 billion dollars. This figure by far exceeds the total debt of all developing countries, which amounts to some 800 billion dollars. According to the published information, spending for armament in real terms is increasing an average of 3.1 per cent a year, while development finance is encountering many insurmountable difficulties. The high level of spending on arms has reached such drastic proportions that, if continued, will have grave consequences for both East-West and North-South relations as well as for peace and security in the world.

Failure to halt the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons, in which a comprehensive test ban would be the first necessary step leading to their gradual reduction, reflects a complete lack of responsibility for the destiny of mankind. Our age has seen the most dangerous development of nuclear weapons in terms of their unimaginable destructive capabilities. If we are to avoid a nuclear catastrophe and its aftermath and destruction of all life on Earth, the current insane arms race must be stopped. The use of nuclear weapons would bring about an ecological and demographic catastrophe. Given the present

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

level of nuclear weapons in the world, no nuclear-weapon State, particularly not those which are most heavily armed, can shirk its share of responsibility. The excess of nuclear weapons is no guarantee of an increased security, nor does it remove the danger of world holocaust. Quite the opposite. The world is one and indivisible. Therefore, the threat of its total destruction is hanging over all of us. In such circumstances, military or political alliances become completely irrelevant. The consequences of nuclear catastrophe will be borne by East and West, North and South, developed and developing alike. It is hard to imagine that anyone who survives the nuclear catastrophe will be able to rejoice in the victory won by the superiority of his arms or his social system.

Scientists, politicians and military experts have long ago drawn attention to the possible consequences of nuclear war. We are reiterating this here today because we, as members of the Conference on Disarmament, are responsible not only before our own Governments but also before the whole world for doing everything in our power to prevent such catastrophe. We believe that this task is not unattainable. What is needed is more determination and political will to open up the negotiating channels, as well as concerted political action to overcome the present impasse through negotiations conducive to specific weapons agreements and gradually leading to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

The first and most important step to be undertaken now by the Conference should be to establish without delay an ad hoc committee on prevention of nuclear war. On the basis of the proposals submitted or to be submitted to the Conference when it resumes its work, the ad hoc committee should elaborate its programme of work. My delegation in the statement to the Conference on 21 February of this year has already made some suggestions in that respect. Such a process is long overdue.

Instead of such a pragmatic approach, we have witnessed that many initiatives and concrete proposals submitted to the Conference with respect to the prohibition and elimination of specific types of weapons are a priori rejected, even before the minimum effort is made to see their merits and to amend them, if necessary. The proof, in fact, the only proof that somebody is willing to curb the arms race and contribute to the strengthening of world security at a lower level of armaments are negotiations on arms reduction and limitation and on disarmament. It is the reasons which are usually stated as excuse for the research, production and deployment of new weapons systems, particularly in areas where they do not exist, that should be the driving force behind the launching and maintenance of negotiations. The restoration of military balance of power is most often used to justify the increase of one's own weapons arsenals or military budgets. The re-establishment of the disturbed balance of power is, as a rule, sought at a higher level of armaments. This, in turn, invariably causes suspicion by the protagonists of the arms race that the other side is trying to achieve military superiority and, consequently, to acquire the nuclear "first-strike" capability. This is the logic of no return, of a vicious circle of the arms race, of constant interaction of causes and consequences. There is no end to this process. Instead of making

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

counterproposals, through the process of negotiation, and instead of the search for acceptable compromise solutions, rejection is often chosen as a response to the concrete draft agreement proposed to the Conference. What is, perhaps, seen by one side as a proposal exclusively motivated by propaganda reasons, or as a proposal aimed at solving only one of the many requirements of the agreement, must not be the reason for easily dismissing the proposals put forward by the sovereign Governments equal members of the Conference.

The re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban is the most urgent task the Conference should proceed to as soon as possible. The Conference should most seriously undertake the consideration of the draft agreements submitted to it in 1983 by the Soviet delegation and by the Swedish delegation. The consideration of these drafts would be an opportunity for those delegations which have reservations on some parts thereof to make their counterproposals. The draft convention banning chemical weapons submitted by the United States delegation is proof of such an approach. This is the only way in which a negotiating forum can work.

The Yugoslav delegation has repeatedly pointed out that the prevention of an arms race in outer space has acquired particular urgency. Today we are even more confirmed in our conviction that urgent steps are needed to prevent the process of militarization of outer space from assuming irreversible proportions. The contribution that could be made by the Conference in the consideration of this question through an ad hoc committee, which should be set up as early as possible, is both timely and indispensable. The first task, however, should be to discontinue immediately any existing plans and programmes to militarize outer space. Instead of carrying on discussion on who might or might not be in possession of sophisticated weapons systems in outer space, it is indispensable for the respective Governments to announce publicly and as soon as possible their political decisions not to develop such systems and to assume, as a first step, the obligation not to use the existing ones, if any, under any conditions. A second urgent step immediately following the above decision would be the negotiation and adoption of a verifiable agreement between the Governments concerned on the dismantling or removal of such systems. No protracted negotiations are necessary to achieve the foregoing because what is at stake are the political decisions of Governments to put an immediate stop to the new arms race in outer space, with its unforeseeable consequences for humanity. After this indispensable initial step, the Conference, as an appropriate forum, could undertake the preparation of adequate instruments.

The last contribution during the spring session to the elaboration of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction was made by the United States delegation through the submission of their text of a draft convention. In our view, this and other proposals considered in the Ad hoc Committee offer a sound basis for the Conference to present already this year in its report to the General Assembly the first agreed provisions of the convention and to finalize it next year. Less than this would be equal to failure of the Conference.

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

The Yugoslav delegation is awaiting with interest the renewal of the work of the Ad Hoc Committees on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, Radiological Weapons and so-called Negative security assurances. These are the problems to which the Conference gave much attention in the past period, questions on which it has gone beyond the mere identification of problems and positions of individual countries. What remains to be done is the most difficult task -- to translate what has been accomplished into the language of an agreement or the text of a disarmament programme. We believe that any of these subsidiary bodies can go a step further in comparison with their last year's performance. This is particularly true of the Ad Hoc Committees on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and Radiological Weapons. As far as the organization of work of ad hoc committees is concerned, we believe we should be more pragmatic. Taking into account the resolution adopted by the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly concerning radiological weapons, it seems that the first step to be taken by the Conference would be to resolve the situation with regard to the prohibition of radiological weapons per se. In view of the limited number of meetings of the ad hoc committees, we should, in our opinion, try to agree, at this stage, on the text of the agreement on the prohibition of radiological weapons, without prejudicing the final positions of States. The next step would be to address all unresolved issues related to the ban on any attack on nuclear installations. Of course, this order of things can be reversed. When this is achieved, and depending on the agreement reached in connection with the relationship between these two conventions, we should either adopt the former or defer its adoption if agreement is achieved on the elaboration of a single instrument.

Regarding negative security assurances, we consider that in conditions of widespread deployment of nuclear weapons on land, in international seas and oceans, it would be illusory to expect anyone to be spared their disastrous effect in case of a nuclear conflict. The only security assurance is to completely eliminate these weapons. Because of their properties as well as evaluations that the use of nuclear weapons could lead to global escalation, the nuclear threat cannot be viewed in isolation. The attempts to adopt a common legally binding formula for effective international arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons have failed, among other things, because all non-nuclear-weapon States do not find themselves in the same position. There are different categories of these States, and different legal, political and other considerations which have to be taken into account. Therefore, it might be useful if the Ad Hoc Committee adopted a new approach when it renews its work. If we agree that the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons would be equally dangerous for all, that they would be global, then the solutions for security assurances should be sought on that same global basis. To give a non-nuclear-weapon State security assurances today, in conditions of global deployment of nuclear weapons, against the use of such weapons is a very poor consolation. If used in other parts of the world, let alone in the immediate neighbourhood, the effects of nuclear weapons would be also very drastically felt on the territory of the State which has been given security assurances. It appears that, under the present circumstances, until nuclear weapons are totally eliminated, the only real and politically and morally justifiable security assurances is the prohibition of nuclear weapons. This should be the first necessary step parallel to a joint or unilateral declaration of the nuclear-weapon States that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Such declarations have already been made by the Governments of China and the USSR. These steps should then be followed by others, constantly expanding the scope of common security assurances.

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

The Yugoslav delegation has on several occasions expressed its views and made concrete proposals in relation to the need for promoting the effectiveness of the Conference. Several other delegations have also put forward useful proposals in that respect. The Conference, as is known, has appointed an informal group of representatives to consider a number of issues whose solution could promote the work of the Conference. We hope that this informal group will, at this session, succeed in preparing proposals which, if adopted by the Conference, could help it to carry its work smoothly, without standstills over the adoption of the agenda, continuity of its work, establishment of the subsidiary working bodies, participation of non-members in the work of the Conference and the preparation of the annual report to the General Assembly. We are confident that this group will discharge its tasks speedily and effectively so that the Conference will be able to take necessary decisions at the end of the current session in order to commence its work next year without any hindrance. My delegation will spare no effort to contribute fully to that end.

And, before concluding, I also wish to extend our welcome to the new representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador R.J. van Schaik, and to assure him that our two delegations will continue in fruitful co-operation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador de la Gorce.

Mr. DE LA GORCE (France) (translated from French): Madam President, my delegation would like to begin by extending to you its congratulations and its best wishes. We are happy to see you presiding over the resumption of our work and are certain that, under your guidance and that of Ambassador Ikeus, it will proceed under the best possible conditions.

Assurance of this is given by the outstanding qualities displayed by our Swedish colleague, especially at the head of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. The Swedish delegation is pursuing here with the greatest distinction a lofty national tradition to which the French delegation is pleased to pay tribute. Sweden has, indeed, won for itself a leading place in the international community by reason of its participation in co-operative efforts, particularly in the field of disarmament.

Today we open the second part of our annual session. It is the firm hope of the French delegation that it will be marked by progress. First of all in the sphere of chemical disarmament. We are resuming our task with proven methods and on the basis of particularly comprehensive documentation. Our wish is the same as regards radiological weapons, an item on which negotiation must be continued in the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee that we have re-established. We also hope that the committee dealing with negative security assurances will be able to resume a task in which we continue to be very keenly interested. Finally, the Conference will have to consider

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

what is to be done with regard to the comprehensive programme of disarmament, concerning which we have also re-established an ad hoc committee.

Further tasks await us in the days ahead: the resumption of consultations concerning the establishment of subsidiary bodies in relation to other items on our agenda and the definition of their terms of reference. Among those items, there is one to which the French Government attaches major importance, namely, the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The French delegation, acting on instructions from its Government, would like today to set out France's views on this matter. It has already referred on several occasions to the problems of the military use of space and last year devoted a working paper, CD/375, dated 14 April 1983, to the subject.

The French delegation has also taken note with the greatest interest of the positions and ideas expressed by other delegations. It remarks the importance and interest which the international community now attaches to this question.

I should now like to explain:

Why my Government feels it necessary to set out today, on the occasion of the resumption of our session, its over-all position on these problems;

What are its concerns in connection both with the aspects relating to the deployment of anti-satellite systems and with the prospects of the development of anti-missile defense systems.

France is worried about the new turn, whether as regards anti-missile systems or as regards anti-satellite devices, that competition for the military use of space is likely to take. Anti-missile systems and anti-satellite devices alike eventually entail serious risks of destabilization because of the scope of the efforts that the USSR or the United States have undertaken or are preparing to undertake. Such a development would naturally have direct implications for France, for her security and for that of Europe. It would also affect the balance of East-West relations and international security. It is therefore of relevance to the entire international community, if only because of its impact upon the prospects for co-operation in developing the peaceful uses of outer space to which France remains deeply attached.

International opinion is justifiably disturbed at such developments, which seem to introduce a new and dangerous dimension into the arms race. It is important to assert that they do not constitute the only possible outcome in this respect and that there is an alternative in the form of negotiations with a view to specific and verifiable results.

If we have chosen to take a stand today in order to express as clearly as possible the conclusions we have reached, it is because there is a consensus that the Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate multilateral forum. Such an approach naturally does not preclude direct contacts between the United States and the USSR. At the recent ministerial session of the Atlantic Alliance, on 31 May last, France,

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

like its allies — and I quote the communiqués — welcomed "the United States willingness to discuss with the Soviet Union programmes of research on strategic defence".

Whether it be with regard to the limitation of anti-satellite systems or to that of anti-missile systems, we consider that appropriate contacts between those two countries should be encouraged. The question is none the less of concern to all the countries in the world, and the Conference on Disarmament, which is representative of the entire international community, is therefore the appropriate body for its discussion.

I shall now turn to the second point: what are France's thoughts and proposals?

Firstly, the prospect of the development of new anti-ballistic missile technologies is disturbing in several respects.

Deterrence, which has played a vital role in the maintenance of peace in Europe, is based on the maintenance, in the face of an attack, of an assured strike-back capability. The various technological developments notwithstanding, it has so far been possible to maintain such a capacity.

But nowadays France, like the entire international community, is inevitably disturbed at the appearance of new technologies that might jeopardize the stability — and hence the peace — that has so far resulted from the very high degree of invulnerability of the means for nuclear second strikes and from the direct control of those means by the political authorities.

A situation in which each of the two main Powers sought to render its territory totally invulnerable, that is to evade all second strikes — without, incidentally, being at all sure of success in that respect — would be fraught with danger.

On the one hand, the mere announcement of an intention to press ahead with the development of such systems would itself constitute an incitement to the revival of the offensive arms race: each Power would seek to saturate the anti-ballistic missile systems planned by the other and to multiply its non-ballistic delivery vehicles (such as cruise missiles).

Hence, far from promoting the reduction of offensive systems, the prospect of the deployment of new defensive systems is likely to lead to contrary developments.

On the other hand, the devices in question, some of which would be automatic, might, for reasons having to do with the technologies involved, uncontrollably replace political decision-making.

The substantial research programmes in question have so far developed on each side without infringing the provisions of the existing international agreements, notably the United States-Soviet treaty on anti-ballistic missile systems that was concluded in 1972. They are nevertheless of such a kind as to create, henceforth, a momentum that would be contrary to the restoration of strategic balances at the lowest possible level.

That is why the French Government is concerned at the efforts undertaken both by the United States and by the USSR to hasten the development of these new anti-ballistic missile systems.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

Secondly, the French Government would like the new and future anti-ballistic technology to be the subject of serious negotiation with a view to reaching agreement on verifiable limits that would come into effect before irreversible developments have occurred.

All the countries of the world have a common interest in seeing the restoration and maintenance of the strategic balance, followed by the reduction of the level of armaments and, therefore, to see the successful conclusion of the bilateral negotiations initiated between the United States and the USSR.

That interest is, of course, shared by France, too. My country confirmed last September, before the United Nations General Assembly, the conditions under which it, in its turn, would be able to participate in the efforts to reduce nuclear weapons; it emphasized the vital importance of maintaining a limit on ABM systems.

To return to the past, France paid tribute to the effort and reciprocal limitation that characterized the bilateral United States-Soviet treaty of 1972 on anti-ballistic missile systems, even though that document permits the retention, in each country, of a not inconsiderable capacity for whose modernization it provides.

Further, France, as a party to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, is very anxious that it should be observed. But, as the President of the Republic pointed out in his statement to the thirty-eighth United Nations General Assembly, that treaty provides only a partial response to the questions raised by the development of space technologies, since it does not prohibit the permanent stationing of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

Thirdly, France proposes that all the countries concerned, and first and foremost the United States and the USSR, should engage in a genuine multilateral dialogue with a view to the duly monitored limitation of new anti-ballistic technologies.

In view of the interaction between anti-satellite systems and ABM systems, France believes that it is the resultant whole that should be the subject of thorough examination.

It is already unrealistic even now, and it would not necessarily be desirable, to fix as the objective the complete demilitarization of space. It is, however, desirable and possible to achieve undertakings that would have the following features:

They would be limited, having as their objective the forestalling of destabilizing military developments without affecting the military activities that contribute to strategic stability and those that can be of assistance in the monitoring of disarmament agreements, account being taken of the joint nature of certain civil and military uses of space;

They would be progressive, with a view to limiting as a matter of priority those developments that would be likely to create a state of affairs that would be irreversible because it would not lend itself to subsequent verification;

Finally, they would be verifiable; all States must feel confident of respect for the application of such limitations and none must find itself in a position to

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

benefit from a violation or the evasion of the agreed limits. There is a need to this end for the rapid initiation of an effort at international consultation covering the following points:

(1) The very strict limitation of anti-satellite systems, including in particular the prohibition of all such systems capable of hitting satellites in high orbit, the preservation of which is the most important from the point of view of strategic balance;

(2) The prohibition, for a renewable period of five years, of the deployment on the ground, in the atmosphere or in space of beam-weapon systems capable of destroying ballistic missiles or satellites at great distances and, as the corollary to this, the banning of the corresponding tests;

(3) The strengthening of the present system of declaration as established by the Convention of 14 June 1975 on the registration of space objects, with each State or launching agency undertaking to provide more detailed information on the specifications and purposes of objects launched so as to improve the possibility of verification;

(4) A pledge by the United States and the USSR to extend to the satellites of third countries the provisions concerning the immunity of certain space objects on which they have reached bilateral agreement between themselves.

The action proposed by the French Government therefore aims to preserve the great prospects for progress held out to the international community by the peaceful use of outer space. It also seeks to preserve in the actual military sphere the observation, communication and monitoring tools that contribute to stability and, as a result, to security and peace.

We cannot resign ourselves to the introduction and proliferation in space of new weapons that would create serious risks of destabilization and would trigger a new and ruinous arms race.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

I now give the floor to the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Jaipal, who will make a brief statement for the information of the Conference.

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General): Madam President, I wish to inform the members of the Conference that last month, when the Conference was not in session, we received 75 letters from various persons in the United States of America supporting the United States proposals for banning the production of chemical weapons and also supporting the establishment of ad hoc subsidiary bodies on nuclear test ban, prevention of nuclear war and prevention of an arms race in outer space. These communications are in my office and may be read by interested delegations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary-General of the Conference for his statement.

I would now like to turn to another subject. The secretariat has circulated today two working papers. Working Paper 128 contains a draft programme of work for the second part of the 1984 session of the Conference. I do not intend to take up this working paper today, since members would need time to consider it. I would like, however, to say that the draft programme of work follows closely the order of the programme for the first part of the session and I hope we shall quickly reach consensus on it. The allocation of time for the second part of the session, as for the first part, is divided equally among each substantive item, i.e. one working week for each item. I should also note that items are listed in the same order in which they appear in the annual agenda for the present session.

It is hoped that by 10 August, the subsidiary bodies of the Conference will have concluded their work, so that the plenary may then consider their reports. By that time, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events would also have concluded its work and submitted its report to the Conference. The period from 13 to the end of August covers consideration of the reports of subsidiary bodies, organizational questions, and consideration and adoption of our annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. In grouping together these three topics, it is intended to provide some flexibility in their consideration.

You will also notice that no closing date has been given in the draft programme of work. In accordance with past practice, it is presumed that the Conference will not extend beyond 31 August, and the Conference may be able even to adjourn earlier. The decision on the closing date may be taken nearer the time.

The second Working Paper, No. 129, deals with a draft decision on the request received from Norway, which was circulated in document CD/451. When that request was received, the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons had not been established and, accordingly, the Conference could not extend an invitation to Norway to participate in the Radiological Weapons Committee. The Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons has now been established and will meet next Friday. The Conference may now approve the request made by Norway.

You will recall that at the last plenary meeting of the first part of the session we adopted a time-table for meetings to be held during this week and it was agreed that we would hold an informal meeting on Thursday, 14 June, to consider organizational questions. I intend to convene that informal meeting at 3.30 p.m. on 14 June to consider the draft programme of work and other organizational matters. We could then take up Working Papers 128 and 129. In that connection, may I recall that consultations have been proceeding for some time in contact groups concerning the question of the establishment of additional subsidiary bodies under various items on the agenda. I intend to consult members as to how best to pursue this question further.

As there is no other business, I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 14 June, at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.