

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 29 March 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. I. Datcu

(Romania)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. TAFFAR
Mr. A. BOUBAZINE

Argentina:

Mr. J.J. CARSALES
Mr. R. GARCÍA MORITAN
Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia:

Mr. R. ROWE
Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium:

Mr. M. DEPASSE
Mr. J. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. P. POPTCHEV
Mr. C. PRAMOV
Mr. N. MICHAÏLOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U PE THEIN TIN
U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. G. SKINNER

China:

Mr. QIAN JIADONG
Ms. WANG ZHIYUN
Mr. LIANG DEFENG
Ms. GE YIYUN
Mr. SUO KAIMING
Mr. JIANG ZHENXI
Mr. ZHANG WEIDONG

Cuba:

Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. J. MATOUSEK

Egypt:

Mr. S. ALFARARGI
Mr. I.I. HASSAN
Mr. A.M. ABBAS

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. H. RENIE
Mr. G. MONTASSIER

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. J. DEMBSKI
Mr. H. THIELICKE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. M. GERDTS
Mr. W-E. VON DEM HAGEN
Mr. F. ELBE
Mr. J. PFIRSCHKE

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. H. TOTH

India:

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO
Mr. ANDRADJATI
Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N. KAZEMI KAMYAB
Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. M. PAVESE
Mr. L. FERRARI BRAVO
Mr. B. CABRAS

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI
Mr. M. KONISHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. KAWAKITA
Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA
Ms. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. O. HILLALE

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria:

Mr. J.O. OBOH
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan:

Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI
Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU
Mr. T. MELESCANU
Mr. O. IONESCU
Mr. P. BALOIU
Mr. A. CRETU
Mr. A. POPESCU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS
Ms. E. BONNIER
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Ms. A.M. LAU
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mrs. I. THORSSON
Mr. L-A. WINGREN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN
Mr. S.V. KOBYSH
Mr. G.V. ANTSIFEROV

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. G.H. COOPER
Mr. D.A. SLINN
Mr. J. RICHARDS
Mr. J-F. GORDON

United States of America:

Mr. N. CLYNE
Mr. N. CARRERA
Ms. K.C. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. R. HORNE
Mr. R. NORMAN
Mr. P. CORDEN

Venezuela:

Mr. LOPEZ OLIVER
Mr. T. LABRADOR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Mr. D. MINIC

Zaire:

Mrs. E. ESAKI KABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order. The Conference today continues the consideration of agenda item 6, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Sri Lanka, Burma, Egypt, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Yugoslavia. Before giving the floor to the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala, to introduce document CD/492 which has just been circulated, I should like cordially to welcome the presence here among us of Mrs. Inga Thorsson, Ambassador and Secretary of State, who was for several years the distinguished leader of the Swedish delegation. Mrs. Thorsson's tireless and impressive work for disarmament and peace is well known too, and is appreciated by us all. I should like to thank her warmly for the interest she takes in the work of our Conference.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka.

Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka): Thank you, Mr. President. Before I commence, I would like to associate my delegation with your sentiments in welcoming the presence of Mrs. Inga Thorsson with us this morning.

Mr. President, with your permission I would like to make a brief statement on behalf of the Group of 21 in order to introduce document CD/492, entitled "Draft Mandate for the Ad Hoc Subsidiary Body on a Nuclear Test Ban", which the secretariat has kindly distributed today.

The substance of document CD/492 is identical to that of CD/438, which the delegation of Mexico presented to the Conference on 24 February 1984. The draft mandate contained in document CD/492 has been endorsed unanimously by the Group of 21. I have been mandated by the Group to request you, Mr. President, to place document CD/492 before the Conference for consideration and decision at its plenary meeting scheduled for Tuesday, 3 April 1984.

You will recall, Mr. President, that at the commencement of our work this month you initiated open-ended and informal consultations on the creation of subsidiary bodies under various items of the agenda, including item 1. Approximately four weeks have elapsed since then with no progress achieved despite the hard work you have put in. Without going into details I would like to emphasize that the action of the Group of 21 in submitting CD/492 for a decision reflects its concern over the inability of the Conference to make any progress on this highest priority item, despite your efforts and the efforts of a large number of delegations. It also reflects the great importance the Group attaches to the continuation of the efforts to find ways and means to discharge the responsibilities of the Conference relating to this highest priority item on its agenda.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank you very much for introducing this working paper, and I now ask the head of the delegation of Sri Lanka to deliver his statement.

Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, the Sri Lanka delegation takes the floor for the first time during your Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We would therefore like to express our sincere admiration of your experienced and skilful diplomacy, leavened as it is by your inherent and infectious charm which has been so much in evidence as you conducted the affairs of the Conference this month. The successful resolution of some of the organizational problems that confronted us when you took over the Presidency is ample proof of the service you have rendered this Conference.

May I also take this opportunity of thanking Ambassador Turbanski, our President for the month of February, for his successful steering of the Conference during the initial month of our current session.

Mr. President, in my statement of 14 February 1984, I indicated that my delegation would be addressing itself later in the session more specifically to the various items of our agenda. I propose to deal today with item 5, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, a subject in which my delegation has had a sustained interest, dedicated as we are to preventing an extension of our terrestrial arms race into another part of our universe -- outer space. Sri Lanka's lack of a space capability does not diminish our profound concern over recent trends in this field which enhance the risk of armed conflict. Since the dawn of the space age in 1957 with the launching by the USSR of the Sputnik, we have witnessed the incorporation of satellites in modern weapon systems. The increasing allocations for space-related activities in the military budgets of nations having a space capability have underlined the military significance of space. History has taught us that the prevention of militarization is self-evidently easier to achieve than demilitarization. While we do believe that world security is indivisible, we would like to preserve and seal off outer space as a zone of peace for the use of mankind's progress rather than its destruction. Sri Lanka's role in the still unfulfilled task of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace again stemmed from a basic desire to prevent the militarization of an area of the world's surface where Great Power competition was in 1971 only incipient.

The undeniable technical complexity of this aspect of our work in the Conference should not be an argument to postpone or avoid its urgent consideration. Complexity can be unravelled through collective study and analysis. But we must embark on such an endeavour. The complexities of this issue, as my delegation sees it, lie more in the political sphere than in the technical. Where no international law covers the myriad possibilities posed by space technology we must create law through international agreements. It is not enough to say that the existing agreements are inadequate.

Taking cognizance of the need to continue to take preventive action in this regard, the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament declared by consensus that -- and I quote:

"In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies."

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

My delegation considers that the inscription, in 1982, of this item in the agenda of this sole multilateral negotiating body was symbolic of the importance and urgency attaching to this question and the manner in which the international community wanted it treated by this forum. Even while we in the Committee, and Conference, on Disarmament have been seized of the problem, we have been witnessing disturbing and accelerated trends relating to space-weapon developments. Last year and the year before, the international community quite rightly urged this body, which has primary responsibility for dealing with this issue, to make haste in averting the imminent danger of launching an arms race into outer space. And yet while we appear to be paralysed in a state of inaction over the modalities of dealing with the question, the dynamics of the arms race seems to proceed on its own momentum. ASAT competition has begun. One ASAT system has probably reached operational capability and its rival system has recently made its test appearance. The major nations with a space capability seem to be poised to embark upon the development of space-based defensive weapons. High energy laser, particle-beam weapons and outer-space ballistic missile defences are being developed. The investment of resources thus involved is enormous. My delegation makes no apology for quoting the following from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute publication "Outer Space - a New Dimension of the Arms Race" because of its striking relevance. I quote --

"During the time it takes to read this sentence, the United States will spend some \$2,000 on its military space programme. Assuming that the Soviet budget is the same, then the amount spent every 10 seconds amounts to over \$4,000. The military space effort includes the launch of one military satellite every third day, the prime aim of these being to increase the fighting efficiency of the military forces on Earth."

The figures quoted are two years old. They would be much higher today. An arms race in outer space is as unwinnable as on earth. And yet the spiral has entered outer space, threatening cosmic chaos.

What we see as disturbing is the gradual but inexorable process of integrating space capabilities to the strategies and doctrines associated with nuclear weapons. Here on earth we are told that nuclear brinkmanship rather than common security could preserve peace. Even if one were to agree that there is a correlation between the doctrines practised by the nuclear-weapon Powers and the preservation of peace since World War II, which assertion has been questioned by the international community, it is an irrefutable fact that this method of peace-keeping has correspondingly increased instability in terms of ever-increasing levels of armaments. If the consequences of the arms race on earth are any indication, further refinement and sophistication of these doctrines through space capabilities would only lead to greater instability. If the research and development effort on military-related space activities currently under way in the major countries with a space capability are brought to their logical conclusion, which is the testing and deploying of space-based defensive weapons, it would gravely undermine, if not totally negate, whatever credibility there is in the current doctrines which have ostensibly kept

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

peace since World War II. The past experience with regard to the technological momentum of the arms race does not make us believe that the results will be otherwise. This is perhaps the point, as the United Nations Study on Nuclear Weapons puts it, at which history might disprove the theory of keeping peace through nuclear terror. Moreover, if these developments culminate in actual testing and deployment they will have serious repercussions on the viability, let alone the spirit, of such existing treaties as the ABM treaty and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. These are perhaps the paradoxes of the nuclear age. But we cannot afford to be awed into silence or inaction by the complexities of these developments, because the consequences of the dangers inherent in these developments will be far reaching.

The importance and the urgency of dealing with this question is therefore clear. However, as I mentioned earlier, this Conference continues to debate the modalities of dealing with the question. We have a very practical and important basis for work on this question in the recommendation contained in General Assembly resolution 38/70 which has been hailed by many delegations here as a substantial achievement. This resolution is very important, not only because it is the only resolution on this question that emerged from the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, but more importantly because it reflects the widest agreement achieved so far amongst the Member States of the United Nations as to how the international community should handle this question. Other bodies, in addition to concerned citizens, look to this Conference to deal with this subject on a priority basis in acknowledgement of our primary role. My delegation would like to address itself as to how these expectations can realistically be fulfilled.

My delegation does not harbour the illusion that the exhortations for the peaceful use of outer space and the prevention of an arms race in outer space contained in resolution 38/70 -- worthy as they are -- can be translated into instantaneous reality. We are aware that this Conference -- unlike the United Nations General Assembly -- has to work by consensus. I would therefore like to dwell upon the common elements of various approaches adopted by the delegations in this Conference rather than dealing with the differences that seem to exist. Last year my delegation had occasion to identify and examine in detail the various approaches adopted by delegations on this question. We did so with a view to delineating the common elements of these approaches which could provide a basis for our work in accordance with the mandate of this body. We pursued this at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly and the resolution which I referred to earlier reflects the results of this work. There is a broad general agreement in this Conference on the principle that a subsidiary body should be set up to deal with this question, in accordance with the mandate of the Conference. The mandate of this Conference is that it should undertake negotiations on disarmament issues. It is also clear from the documents submitted by all three groups in this Conference (namely CD/329/Rev.1, CD/413 and CD/434) that they explicitly or implicitly acknowledge the negotiating responsibilities of this body in relation to this agenda item, prevention of an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

Quite apart from this technical and legalistic approach it seems to my delegation that the only way of preventing an arms race in outer space would be to negotiate on and conclude an agreement or agreements on this question which could be acceptable to all. What is at issue, however, seems to be how we should frame the stages of our work leading to negotiations. It is clear that if we are to negotiate, any work preparatory to negotiations should be oriented towards that end.

The position of the Group of 21, with which my delegation is fully associated, indicates a great degree of flexibility about this aspect, whilst setting forth clearly the objective, which is negotiations on this question. It is also clear that to give the subsidiary body a mandate which accepts the objective of conducting negotiations does not prejudice the substantive position of any delegation. My delegation for one does acknowledge that identification and study of the issues are an integral part of any meaningful negotiations. But this is only a part of the negotiating process. Without a proper linkage to negotiations, this exercise could not have an intrinsic value of its own as far as the mandate of this forum is concerned. The exercise, therefore, should be given a time-frame and conducted within a framework of an all-inclusive and comprehensive approach leading to negotiations and should take account of the complexities and interrelationships involved. It does not, however, mean that the examination of issues per se should be an end in itself, since it would not be in line with the final objective to which I referred earlier. If however, in the process of this examination, there is agreement that any particular issue or an aspect of the issue should be dealt with and negotiated on a priority basis, then the Conference could deal with that issue or issues accordingly. My delegation, for example, would be willing to discuss and negotiate separately on anti-satellite systems or on other military-related space applications if there is agreement in the Conference to do so. What my delegation cannot understand is how the recognition of the logical and explicitly stated link between preparatory work and negotiations could prejudice the substantive positions of any delegation.

Having said this, I must add that we should not lose time in obtaining a clear comprehension of the fundamental issue. Are we here to come to grips with the problem of an emerging arms race in outer space or to keep on examining issues until the problems become unmanageable or insurmountable, with the attendant complexities getting compounded? As I have explained earlier this has occurred in other areas of disarmament effort in the past, for reasons known to all of us.

There have been many contributions towards negotiating agreements on this issue, the earliest in the Committee on Disarmament being the additional protocol to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty submitted by the delegation of Italy (CD/9) in 1979. The most recent contribution of the USSR in submitting a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against Earth, as reflected in document CD/476, is another constructive effort in this regard. In the same spirit my own delegation outlined possible areas of work on this subject in its

(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

statement of 14 April 1983. Our concept of the scope and objectives of an Ad Hoc Committee is a comprehensive one which would even include a formulation of confidence-building measures through greater international co-operation. Just as the absence of war is not peace, my delegation does not believe that the absence of an arms race in space will ipso facto result in a stable peace among the stars. Consideration must be given to incorporating some of the worthwhile features of existing agreements. For example, Article 5 of the Moon Agreement and Article 11 of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prescribe procedures concerning information to be provided on activities concerned with the exploration and use of the moon and outer space. This is a practical recognition of the concept that outer space is a province of all mankind, requiring a free flow of information on the subject. The introduction of secrecy into the development of science and technology in space denies the people of the world the right to know, and creates suspicion and distrust.

My delegation acknowledges the valuable statement made by the Swedish delegation on 22 March, particularly as regards the useful survey of existing agreements for the prevention of an arms race in outer space highlighting some of their inadequacies. This contribution only served to underline the vital necessity of embarking on a serious and structured study of the problem within the framework of an ad hoc committee as a means of negotiating an agreement or agreements banning an arms race in outer space which would effectively plug the loopholes. The vital necessity of creating an ad hoc committee on Item 5 of our agenda was also stressed in the valuable statements made by the ambassadors of Mongolia, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Italy and Argentina in our current session.

It is therefore the hope of my delegation that the position put forward by the Group of 21, which does not prejudice the substantive position of any delegation, would be understood in that light. Bearing these considerations in mind, my delegation hopes that the Conference, through the consultations which are currently being held on this subject, would be able to come to an agreement on a formulation for the mandate of the subsidiary body to be set up on this question without further delay.

May I conclude by adapting the dictum made famous in mankind's exploration of space to state that one inch forward by creating an ad hoc committee in consonance with the mandate of this Conference would be a giant step in the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Burma, Ambassador U Maung Maung Gyi.

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI (Burma): Mr. President, From the time I first had the pleasure of knowing you on your arrival here, I have a growing esteem of your human qualities and your diplomatic skills. It therefore gives me particular pleasure and confidence to participate in the work of the Conference under your Presidency. May I also say how very appreciative we are of the work that has been accomplished during the first month of the session under the able guidance of Ambassador Turbanski of Poland.

It has been repeatedly emphasized in the United Nations and in this multilateral body that the gravest problem that confronts mankind today is to avert the threat of a nuclear catastrophe which continues to grow relentlessly despite all the efforts that are being made, and the main objective of this Conference should therefore be directed towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of a nuclear war. When we speak of nuclear-war prevention in a broader sense than some of the measures that are being envisaged under item 3 of our agenda, the consideration of measures under items 1 and 2 relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, nuclear disarmament and a comprehensive test-ban treaty embraces the whole spectrum of concrete measures that have a bearing on nuclear-war prevention. Then again, it does not appear conceivable that effective steps towards nuclear disarmament can be taken until a comprehensive banning of nuclear test explosions in all environments is achieved.

The present situation, under which negotiations on a comprehensive banning of nuclear tests are being kept in abeyance, is contrary to all efforts that have been made in the past, for no other disarmament issue has been so much discussed, debated and negotiated as the banning of nuclear-weapon tests. Since the early 1950s it has been the subject of multilateral, bilateral and trilateral negotiations. The priority concern given to the test-ban issue by the international community is reflected in the number of resolutions that has been adopted by the General Assembly from the time of its treatment, since 1951, as a separate item; the total now exceeds 40 resolutions, which is a greater number than on any other disarmament item.

In spite of the fact that so much effort is being devoted to this priority issue, the result so far achieved is a Partial Test Ban Treaty of over two decades ago, which continues to remain partial in the full sense of the word and will remain so until the loophole is closed by the banning of nuclear-weapon tests in all environments.

The Partial Test Ban Treaty has been considered a doubtful measure of disarmament for it has not inhibited the testing and development of nuclear warheads, thus making it possible for the continued competition in the nuclear-arms race between the Superpowers. However, there are also positive aspects of the partial test ban, for it was the first international agreement of world-wide scope, and is proof of the fact that disarmament agreements can contribute towards the relaxation of international tension and stimulate further agreements. However, the Treaty has scarcely placed any inhibitions on the further testing of nuclear weapons by the two Great Powers, for they have carried out more tests after the entry into force of the Treaty than in the period preceding it.

The principle of an effective verification system in a comprehensive test-ban treaty has been accepted by all States and it does not appear that we need to re-emphasize this over and over again. In view of this universal commitment, and confirmation by qualified authorities that all technical aspects have been defined

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

regarding the verification of a test ban, as has been said many times in the past, what is now required for the elaboration of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is the political will of States. This has been re-emphasized by the United Nations Secretary-General in the foreword to his Report in 1980, which stated that: "In my first statement to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1972, I stated the belief that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem had been so fully explored that only a political decision was necessary in order to achieve agreement. I still hold that belief."

A comprehensive test-ban is considered as an essential first step towards the halting of the nuclear-arms race, for the competition on the qualitative aspects of nuclear warheads is considered to be the most destabilizing factor of such a race. Continued research and development of nuclear weapons, like research in other fields of weapons development, is a self-generating process which should be curbed by the banning of all nuclear test explosions. The objective of agreements under effective control on disarmament measures is to enhance the security of States at the international level. The principle that is valid for disarmament measures in general should also be valid for a comprehensive test-ban. No doubt a comprehensive test-ban treaty cannot in the technical sense be considered a disarmament measure, as it involves no reduction of armaments, but in a more generic sense applied to arms limitation measures it is an effective first step in the process of nuclear disarmament. For a test ban under effective control would impose equal and non-discriminatory obligations that would enhance the security of all States. This principle has been accepted over the years, for the traditional stance of the major nuclear-weapon Powers had been to conduct negotiations on their own merits. A recommitment to negotiate a test ban on this principle could avoid the possibility of postponing negotiations to an indefinite future.

The third report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events was submitted to this Conference on 15 March. It is not the intention of my delegation to make observations on the report itself. However, we consider it appropriate to comment on the work in this Conference in relation to the progress that is being made by the Ad Hoc Group of Experts. The Ad Hoc Group was first established by this Conference's predecessor, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in 1976 and its existence is older than this Conference itself. The terms of reference of the Ad Hoc Group was to consider and report on international co-operative measures for the identification of seismic events so as to assist in the verification of a comprehensive test ban. Accordingly, in the previous phase of its work, the Ad Hoc Group has drawn up the elements of an international exchange of global data in order to facilitate international co-operation and verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The work of the Ad Hoc Group in its third report has reached a stage where detailed preliminary plans for a comprehensive experimental testing of the global system are being drawn up. Considerable progress has now been made by the Ad Hoc Group to assist, as the terms of reference explicitly state, in the verification of a comprehensive test ban. However, no substantive work has yet begun in this Conference on the elaboration of an international co-operative system. The mandate was given to the Ad Hoc Group on the basis of a broad agreement on the capabilities of a world-wide system for the detection of seismic events, and bearing this in mind, the opinion of my delegation is that it is now propitious for this Conference to define and elaborate the elements of international co-operative measures on verification in parallel with the work that is being conducted by the Ad Hoc Group. For this purpose, Protocol I annexed to the Swedish draft treaty on the banning of nuclear test explosions in any environment could serve as a basis for our work.

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

In this connection, we might recall the situation that developed after the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty if we do not wish to repeat what happened at that time. As was envisaged in the Partial Test Ban Treaty, talks on a comprehensive test ban resumed after the former's entry into force. But considerations focusing solely on technical issues, instead of contributing to negotiations, served to replace them.

This multilateral body has now been in existence for five years, and since its inception three years were spent on trying to reach a consensus on the establishment of an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban. It was only during the 1982 session that it was possible to establish a working group. An overwhelming majority of members who favoured a broad negotiating mandate had in the spirit of compromise accepted a limited mandate with the expectations that it would serve as an initiating process for the holding of negotiations. Practical experience in conducting the work on a nuclear test ban under such a mandate has shown that there are little prospects for achieving further progress.

During the course of last year, the Committee devoted the whole of the 209th plenary meeting in April, and also parts of some other meetings as well, to the question of the mandate of the working group, during which my delegation joined other delegations in expressing the need to revise the mandate to enable negotiations to take place. In spite of the fact that an overwhelming majority of the delegations were in favour of broadening the scope of the mandate, the Ad Hoc Working Group continued to function under the same mandate on the basis of the Chairman's statement, which was not in accordance with the usual practice of the adoption of an agreed text by the Committee.

In the consideration of further work for this year, my delegation's views are that an assessment of the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban for last year should serve as the point of departure. As is mentioned in the report, proposals were made and working papers presented to the Committee, but a structured discussion to arrive at a consensus approach on issues has not been possible, which could be attributed to the fact that delegations would not be forthcoming to commit themselves to reaching a compromise which would require a certain process of negotiation but which does not appear to be possible under a non-negotiating mandate.

The situation is reflected in paragraph 13 of the report, in which it was stated that the Working Group could only recognize generally the principal elements of a verification system. And it should be noted that the elements of such a system have already been the basic premise on which negotiations were conducted in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and which were also the Agreed Conclusions of the Tripartite Report. With regard to detailed discussions on the elements of a verification system, an agreed approach was not possible on any of the issues for work if the Group went no further than expressing views of individual delegations or groups of delegations. My delegation can share the views of other delegations who have stated that the mandate of the subsidiary body on a nuclear test ban has not been exhausted in so far as the scope of the discussions is concerned. However, the views of individual delegations and groups of delegations can only be structured to arrive at agreed conclusions under a mandate that would make it possible for the initiation of a negotiating process.

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

This morning the distinguished Ambassador of Sri Lanka has introduced, on behalf of the Group of 21, a paper on the draft mandate for the Ad Hoc Subsidiary Body on a Nuclear Test Ban. My delegation has joined in the unanimous support of this paper by the Group, and my statement today reflects our support for this paper. We therefore wish to welcome its presentation today to the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Ambassador of Burma for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Egypt, Ambassador Alfarargi.

Mr. ALFARARGI (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, allow me today, as I am taking the floor for the first time in the Conference on Disarmament, to express my pleasure at seeing the work of the Conference throughout this month: guided by you, the representative of a friendly people to which the Egyptian people is attached by the bonds of warmth and affection. The relations between our two countries are currently blossoming, and your experience and ability have been confirmed by your constructive handling of the work during the previous week, which has given it fresh impetus and led to the solution of many problems which have arisen.

I should also like to take this opportunity to convey to your predecessor, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, who presided over the work of the Conference last month, my thanks and appreciation for all that he achieved during that period, which is a confirmation of his profound sensitivity to issues and his inestimable knowledge.

I should also like to address my thanks to all those who welcomed me to this circle; my immediate reaction is a real desire to pursue the co-operation between my delegation and all others in order to achieve our objectives. I should also like to take this opportunity in turn to welcome our new colleagues, the Ambassadors of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Ethiopia, Hungary, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, and wish them every success.

Mr. President, allow me to begin my statement by inviting you to share with me some personal feelings: the feelings of a newcomer who believes in the cause of disarmament and its necessity, and who has worked to that end for several years. In returning today among you to resume our efforts to achieve disarmament objectives, I entertain many feelings of concern and incomprehension: concern at the faltering efforts made by this first-rank negotiating forum; and incomprehension, even questioning, concerning the real reasons for this failure.

A quarter of a century has now passed since the adoption of resolution 1378 (XIV) by the General Assembly on 20 November 1959, which affirmed that "general and complete disarmament" was the most important issue facing the world. Nevertheless, despite the international community's insistence and its continual urgings to achieve that objective, and despite the large number of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on Disarmament, over sixty at the latest session alone, which reflects both a negative and a positive trend, despite all this, the fact is that what has been achieved is very slight and limited, in most cases never going beyond the level of modest, partial activities.

(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

Given this state of affairs, do we not have the right to wonder what has led us to this situation and try together to face up to it, in a common effort to overcome the obstacles and fulfil mankind's aspirations for peace, security and stability? Reference has often been made in this connection to the "lack of political will", particularly on the part of the major Powers who bear the chief responsibility in connection with disarmament, in that they have vast military arsenals. However, if we accept this fact, we are nevertheless convinced that the lack of such will is only the natural result of the "lack of trust" existing in international relations in general, and particularly in the relations between the two major Powers, with the result that doubt has ended by replacing trust, the cold war has replaced understanding, and the world has witnessed stubborn policies based on force in international relations and a lack of respect for the principles set forth in the United Nations Charter which represent the foundation-stone of this Organization; and it has also witnessed an unbridled arms race and the stockpiling of weapons in arsenals.

If we recognize that there is a link and a reciprocal influence between the international climate on the one hand and disarmament negotiations on the other, in that stability in international life would necessarily create a more propitious climate for negotiations and allow progress in disarmament matters, and that success in that field would subsequently be reflected in the international context whose stability would increase, it seems clear that it is of paramount importance to restore the trust that has been lost in international relations and to seek to obtain all guarantees for mutual understanding and co-operation; this can only be done by respecting the principles of the United Nations Charter and the rules of international law, by explicitly refraining from violating the sovereignty of other States and the integrity of their territories, by respecting the right of peoples to freedom, independence and self-determination, and by rejecting the arms race and the intensive production of destructive and devastating weapons likely to constitute a real threat to international peace and security.

The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, was for us a guiding light; its Final Document contained a comprehensive framework of principles and objectives for general and complete disarmament, in particular by establishing in paragraph 45 the high priority which must be attached to nuclear disarmament. That session set up the Committee, now the Conference, on Disarmament, and entrusted to it some vital responsibilities as the sole international multilateral body for disarmament negotiations. Today, although six years have passed since we began our work, we are still unable to reach our goals. Nor has anything been done to achieve the objectives and aspirations of the international community formulated by the second special session. One may even wonder if these goals and aspirations have become more difficult to achieve now than six years ago. Thus, while it is really regrettable that the Committee on Disarmament passed away without achieving anything concrete, I hope at least that the Conference will have more success in this field.

The responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States -- especially the two major Powers who have the largest nuclear weapons arsenal -- is a paramount one for achieving nuclear disarmament. Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty those States have undertaken to pursue negotiations on effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The non-nuclear-weapon States, for their part, have undertaken not to seek to join the nuclear club nor to seek to acquire

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nuclear weapons; and whereas the latter have respected their undertakings, the nuclear-weapon States have continued to build up a multitude of nuclear weapons in their arsenals, while developing new types of weapons, and their armaments expenditures have reached astronomic heights.

Today, on the eve of the preparatory meetings for the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we have the right to ask what has become of all these undertakings, and when do the nuclear-weapon States intend to respect their undertakings with regard to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

A ray of hope glimmered when, more than two years ago, the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe and on the reduction of strategic arms began in Geneva. On that occasion, Egypt stated in an official communiqué that it welcomed these negotiations, stressing their importance for a country like Egypt which is a Mediterranean country whose security is firmly linked with that of Europe. It also stated that "any success obtained for security and stability in Europe would have a positive effect on the efforts of the countries of the Middle East to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone".

From this standpoint, we have closely followed the progress of these negotiations; we felt considerable concern when noting their stalemate, and indeed regret when their suspension was announced. All that we can say in this connection is that we hope that the two countries will very soon resume their places at the negotiating table and strive to create the necessary climate to establish a constructive dialogue and agree upon the necessary guarantees for their success.

We believe also that the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, as well as the resumption of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions a few days ago in Vienna will inspire us to take hope, and will prove that there is a will to continue and deepen the dialogue.

If, on the one hand, we regret the present state of the Geneva negotiations, perhaps this will encourage those delegations which still entertain doubts as to the importance of the consideration of nuclear disarmament by our Conference to review their position, as experience has unquestionably proved that there is no connection between the obstacles in bilateral negotiations and the consideration, or non-consideration, of the issue of nuclear disarmament by the Conference. On the contrary, the efforts made by the Conference on Disarmament in this connection may represent a constructive contribution to bilateral efforts, in that they reflect the opinion of large sectors of the population of countries other than those of the negotiators, which have the right to participate in the drafting of resolutions and conventions which affect nuclear-weapon countries and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. Indeed, this point is made in the Final Document of the latest Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi, in which it was stated that: "Nuclear weapons are more than weapons of war. They are instruments of mass annihilation. The Heads of State or Government therefore find it unacceptable that the security of all States and the very survival of mankind should be held hostage to the security interests of a handful of nuclear-weapon States."

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I hope, therefore, as we prepare to hold the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in a year and a half, that we will not then be in the same position as we are today; to that end, I invite you all to redouble your efforts, in good faith, to achieve tangible progress in this sphere.

Every day that passes without anything being achieved in this area increases the difficulty of carrying out nuclear disarmament, and if the nuclear-arms race continues at its present rate without any genuine measures being undertaken to halt it, we will not have long to wait before this objective becomes unreachable.

We are all agreed on the urgent need for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, and that the attainment of this objective lies through a number of important stages, beginning with a treaty for the complete prohibition of nuclear tests.

The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly have always stressed the priority of this issue which, while it is not an objective in itself, is nevertheless a necessity and a major step towards bringing about the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament.

When the Committee on Disarmament began studying the first item on its agenda, on a nuclear-test ban, in an Ad Hoc Working Group with a restricted mandate, we were sure that the Ad Hoc Group's task, relating to the study of inspection and control measures, was a temporary one, and that the issue would be brought to the negotiating stage in order to draft a comprehensive convention on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

However, while recognizing the importance of providing for inspection and control measures in a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test-ban convention, we believe that such measures can be studied side by side with other questions relating to the draft treaty. We still hope to find in the Conference that "political will" to which the Secretary-General referred in his statement of 1972, when he said that "all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement".

Undoubtedly, the results of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Seismic Events, to the thirteenth session of which Egypt sent one of its scientists, are of great usefulness in this field. We take this opportunity to express our satisfaction with regard to the Third Report which the Ad Hoc Group adopted and submitted to the Conference, and we hope that the Ad Hoc Group will pursue its work with success.

The question of the prevention of nuclear war, as an immediate measure, is of capital importance pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament. President Hosni Mubarak stressed its importance in his address to the

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United Nations General Assembly on 28 September 1983, when he said that "at the top of our agenda stands the question of the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, on which we should concentrate our attention. Such a war might well annihilate human civilization and all its achievements since the dawn of time. There would be neither winner nor loser. The human race would be deprived simultaneously of its past, its present and its future."

When the United Nations General Assembly at its recent sessions adopted resolutions on the prevention of nuclear war, its intention was to demonstrate that the elimination of the danger of nuclear war is its highest priority and most immediate task, and that to safeguard mankind from a catastrophe on such a scale is a joint responsibility for all of us.

These resolutions, and particularly the recent resolution 38/183, stressed that the Conference on Disarmament should take "appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war", and requested the Conference to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on such measures, with the assistance of an ad hoc working group on the item.

Obviously, the Conference's approval of the inclusion of the prevention of nuclear war as a separate agenda item reflects the importance and the priority attached to the question. It therefore remains for us only to accept this challenge and rise to the level of our responsibilities by undertaking at once serious negotiations to establish the necessary measures for the prevention of nuclear war. We, for our part, reaffirm the position which we adopted in the group of 21 as set forth in document CD/PV.341, which centres on the need to set up a subsidiary body to undertake that work, in accordance with the many documents, initiatives and studies and the various proposals which have been put forward, or which may be formulated in future, on this issue.

Mr. President, allow me now to change the subject and go on to a matter concerning the immediate and temporary measures to be taken pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament; I have in mind the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

My country's delegation attaches particular interest to this question, and it is convinced that as long as the nuclear-weapon States maintain their nuclear arsenals the non-nuclear-weapon States have the right to obtain effective assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

It is true that the real and definitive guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons lies only in the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned assurances, which must be legally binding, would for the time being constitute a legitimate counterpart for the non-nuclear-weapon States which have voluntarily renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

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We have repeatedly had occasion to state our belief that Security Council resolution 255 is inadequate as far as guarantees are concerned, just as we have shown that the conditions included in the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States, with the exception of China, have emptied those declarations of their content. We hope that the efforts vainly deployed so far within the Ad Hoc Working Group will finally lead to a compromise on a draft "standard formula" setting forth the legal obligation to provide the necessary assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States; in this connection, we have no doubt that the undertaking not to use nuclear weapons is a constructive step in this field.

Although Egypt recognizes that primary responsibility for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament rests essentially with the nuclear-weapon States in general and the two major Powers in particular, it has made every possible effort to participate effectively in the adoption of measures undertaken by the international community to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this spirit, it was one of the first countries to sign the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it ratified in 1981, and its nuclear facilities are subject to International Atomic Energy Agency control.

Egypt has not stopped there. In 1974 it also took the initiative of advocating the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in an important and explosive region of the world, the Middle East, and since then it has taken part in all the draft resolutions subsequently adopted by the General Assembly, the latest being resolution 38/64. That resolution invited the countries of the region, inter alia, pending the establishment of such a zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories of such weapons, and also to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

We believe that respect by all countries of the region for the contents of that resolution and their declarations to that effect, with the deposit of those declarations with the Security Council as indicated in that resolution, would represent a major step towards the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Furthermore, if the nuclear-weapon States and all other States refrained from any action that ran counter to both the letter and the spirit of that resolution and undertook to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone, that would be of great help for the establishment of peace and security in the Middle East.

If all men have an equal right to the exploration of outer space and its use for peaceful purposes, as well as a common interest in exploiting the benefits of that exploration to promote well-being, they also have the right, as they expect benefits from man's expansion into space, to be profoundly

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concerned at the increasing competition, particularly among the countries possessing sophisticated technological means, in the field of the deployment of weapons in outer space.

It has been argued that this competition has not yet begun; whether this statement is true or false, that has not prevented the most optimistic scientists from saying that they have no doubt that today the world is on the brink of a perilous age. That opinion is strongly confirmed by the constant increase in military budgets for space programmes and research and by the statistics which show that eight out of ten spacecraft are part of nuclear or conventional forces.

Today, the militarization of outer space is no longer confined to the qualitative development of the arms race; it also contributes to the elaboration of new military theories which take account of the possibility of using outer space in future wars. The policy of the militarization of outer space now goes beyond the deployment of missiles intended to attack enemy satellites and extends as far as the use of satellites to support land forces. It is as if mankind, not content with the destructive and devastating armaments accumulated on earth, which would suffice to destroy the world several times over, also needed outer space to set up new systems of destruction.

The Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space held in Vienna in 1982 stressed the gravity of this situation and noted that the extension of the arms race into outer space would be a source of profound concern to the international community. It appealed to all countries, particularly those having major space capabilities, to contribute actively to preventing an extension of the arms race into outer space and to refrain from any act contrary to that objective. It also strongly recommended the Committee, now the Conference, on Disarmament to give priority to this question.

Subsequently, General Assembly resolution 38/70 reaffirmed that the utilization of outer space should serve exclusively peaceful purposes. It stressed that "further effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space should be adopted by the international community" and called on all States, particularly those with major space capabilities, "to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space". It also called on the Conference on Disarmament to set up an ad hoc working group on the question.

Aware of the disastrous consequences if the world embarked on an arms race in outer space, Egypt has from the start urged and invited the international community to shoulder its responsibilities and halt all attempts at the militarization of outer space and to ensure the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes.

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Attempts to study this matter within the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space met with fierce opposition from some countries which claimed that the Committee was not competent to deal with that subject, and that the Conference on Disarmament was the sole body empowered to do so.

What is obvious to everyone is that the Conference has never undertaken any serious work on the item although it is included in its agenda, and that even the efforts made to set up a working group have been vain, despite agreement in principle on the creation of such a group, because of disagreement on an appropriate formula for its terms of reference.

We are all agreed that it is unthinkable to speak two languages at the same time, and it is also unthinkable for our Conference to wait any longer before responding to the aspirations of the entire international community as reflected by the General Assembly at its latest session.

The Group of 21, in which Egypt participated, stressed in document CD/329/Rev.1 the importance of the creation of a subsidiary body for the negotiation of an agreement or agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space; in fact, this is the wish of 147 Member States of the United Nations Organization which have willingly accepted the latest General Assembly resolution.

We are deeply concerned at the lack of results of our efforts in this field, and fear that one day mankind may regret its exploration of outer space, a magnificent exploit in which it initially rejoiced, on which it based dreams of prosperity, and which it never considered as a new dimension for the forces of evil.

Mr. President, before concluding my statement, allow me to express my satisfaction at the resumption of work by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the chairmanship of my colleague and friend, Rolf Ekéus, the Ambassador of Sweden; I have no doubt that the work of that Committee is of particular importance at this stage, and that the Committee will succeed in overcoming whatever obstacles arise and finally draft appropriate formulas for the agreed points in the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

In expressing my satisfaction at the encouraging statement by the United States to the effect that it will shortly submit a draft treaty in this field, as well as at the positive step taken by the Soviet delegation which would accept a permanent presence of international observers at destruction facilities for chemical-weapon stockpiles, I hope that these constructive initiatives will have the effect of furthering the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, so as to enable it to arrive at the goal for which we have waited so long, the preparation of a draft treaty on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Egypt for his kind words for my country and for the President of the Conference. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, this is the first time I take the floor under your Presidency, and a welcome opportunity for me to express the pleasure of my delegation to see you in that eminent position. In your present role you have demonstrated the same qualities of understanding and fairness, and the same faculty of dialogue, that have allowed our two Governments — and specifically, our two present Ministers of Foreign Affairs — to maintain an excellent working relationship even in periods of difficulty and strain.

Our plenary meetings this week are devoted to agenda item 6, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"; we have come to shorten this complicated caption to "Negative security assurances". Agenda item 6 is a separate element of our comprehensive work assignment; but its relevance to agenda item 3, the prevention of war, and in particular nuclear war, is evident. In that vein, my delegation, in Working Paper CD/357, had listed negative security arrangements as one of those areas in which States are called upon to make a meaningful contribution to war prevention. As one of the delegations that has concurred in General Assembly resolution 38/68 of last year, I would like to take this opportunity to stress our continued interest in the subject. My delegation hopes for a vigorous new effort at negotiations devoted to the search for a common approach or common formula, later to be embodied in a consolidated instrument of an appropriately binding character. Resolution 38/68, in our view, should provide an excellent starting point for this new round of negotiation. One should feel entitled to predict that our new attempts at fashioning a common formula or common approach will be facilitated by recent political events, regrettable as these events by themselves may be. In General Assembly resolution 38/67 of which the principal author was one of the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the view was still propagated that negative security guarantees should, as a priority matter, attach to those non-nuclear-weapon States which had foregone the nuclear option and not allowed nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territories, reiterating the view of the Warsaw Pact States that non-deployment should be the principal criterion for the availability of negative security assurances. In the meantime, other member States of the Warsaw Treaty have publicly announced that they were in the process of stationing nuclear weapons on their territory and have already, for all we know, proceeded to a very substantial deployment of new nuclear-weapon systems. We may thus assume that the Warsaw Pact countries, by effective action, have removed the non-stationing criterion from their catalogue of prerequisites for negative security assurances. I am certain that this will facilitate our search for a common formula when the newly re-established Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances embarks on its work.

While the Conference is still groping for an appropriate work format in which to deal with agenda item 3 on the prevention of nuclear war, and it is the hope of my delegation that this search will be crowned by success in the next few days, another event of immediate relevance to the prevention of war, and nuclear war in particular, will take place in Geneva as of Monday next week: The Preparatory Committee of the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will be convened for its first session. The distinguished representative of Egypt has just made reference to it. It will undoubtedly be incumbent upon many of us in this room

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to represent their countries at that meeting. The first session of the Preparatory Committee may, by itself, be of limited newsworthiness. And yet, the parties to the ~~Non~~-Proliferation Treaty and the international community at large find themselves at an important juncture when the preparatory process for the third NPT Review Conference gets under way. I would therefore like to dwell briefly upon the significance of the NPT and of an effective non-proliferation regime, recalling that my delegation, (again in working paper CD/357), had brought to bear its view that an effective policy of nuclear non-proliferation has a key role to play, together with other strategies, in the prevention of nuclear war. Right at the beginning of the preparatory process for the impending NPT Review Conference the unfortunate fact will be brought into sharp focus that some particularly prominent and well-intentioned members of the international community have not yet seen fit to put their signature to the Treaty. In some cases it is exactly those countries which are most eloquent in denouncing nuclear weapons which have thus failed to avail themselves of the potential of the NPT to limit the further spread of these weapons. It is the hope of my delegation that the NPT Review Conference and its preparatory process will impress upon an even larger number of States that no member of the international community would be served by the acquisition of nuclear weapons outside of the present group of nuclear-weapon States, and that, in fact, every attempt at such acquisition, let alone the actual realization of a nuclear arsenal, will have a grave, destabilizing influence from which all of us will suffer. Our own participation in the NPT review process will provide us with a constant opportunity to appeal to all States which have not yet become parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to do so in order to give the Treaty universal application. In thus stressing the high value of horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear arms, my Government is keenly aware of the relationship between horizontal and vertical non-proliferation. It is in a perspective of checking both manifestations of non-proliferation that my Government attaches priority significance to a positive, successful outcome of the Review Conference in 1985, an outcome which would add momentum to the Treaty for the remainder of its present period of validity, as well as for a further temporal extension.

Two problems are likely to be in the very centre of debates at the NPT Review, and both of them are of direct relevance to this Conference: nuclear disarmament, and the perspectives for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Obviously, the obligations under article VI of the Treaty concerning nuclear disarmament are of fundamental importance. The NPT is the only existing international document under which the major nuclear-weapon Powers are legally committed to nuclear disarmament, in the sense that they have undertaken to pursue negotiations to that end in good faith. The present situation in which one major nuclear-weapon State has one-sidedly left the negotiating table of two crucial negotiating fora devoted to nuclear disarmament, indicating its unwillingness to return to these negotiations without preconditions, is therefore clearly at variance with the stipulations of the NPT, and this unfortunate situation, should it still prevail at the time of the NPT review or during substantive consideration of the articles of the NPT during the preparatory process, will have to be brought up by the Parties to the Treaty. They, the Parties; are of course, the ones who have legal status to invoke the treaty commitment by nuclear-weapon States under article VI; others, non-Parties, lack that qualification. This simple fact should certainly not be overlooked by those States outside of the NPT community when they weigh the appeals addressed to them to join.

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The other major disarmament issue, the comprehensive test-ban treaty, as referred to in the preamble of the NPT, is of no lesser significance. My Government attaches great importance to the early establishment of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and leaders of my country have not failed to avail themselves of every major opportunity to go on record in that sense. In our view, a comprehensive test ban is a basic element in the balance between the responsibilities and obligations of the Parties to the NPT.

At the same time, we feel strongly — and we are aware that this is a shared view of this Conference — that the crucial part of a nuclear test-ban treaty is the elaboration of a verification and compliance system which allows parties concerned to rest confident that possible attempts at circumvention would not remain undetected. This is the rationale behind the existing mandate of our subsidiary organ on nuclear testing. From the perspective of my delegation, the progress from an adequate solution of verification problems — both in their technical and their political-institutional aspects — to full treaty negotiation appears logical. Having contributed to the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban last year we regret that a comprehensive consideration of the inherent problems has not yet taken place. This task, however, still looms, and it is the hope of my delegation that the pace of our work in this field can be accelerated and that the discussions be made more substantial and complete. The work format to be chosen for that assignment should certainly be similar to last year's, but some flexibility on the part of all participants in arriving at a reworded mandate would be helpful to instill a forward-looking perspective into the exercise. It would indeed befit the Conference to show an ongoing work process on nuclear testing at the time when the preparatory phase for the NPT review gets under way.

Our shared conviction that verification of a nuclear test ban is as essential as it is technically complicated has also been the guiding consideration in the establishment and operation of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Ad Hoc Group has just submitted its Third Report. I am aware that it is your plan, Mr. President, to put the report up for discussion at a later stage, but may I be allowed, even though prematurely, to dwell upon it. My purpose is to introduce a Working Paper entitled "Aspects of modern developments in seismic event recording techniques" (CD/491), and thereby to enrich our forthcoming debates on the Third Report of the experts, and on the future perspectives of their work.

Let me first express the appreciation of my delegation for the very comprehensive and well-crafted Third Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts, as equally for their progress on substantive issues under the highly qualified and efficient guidance of its Chairman, Dr. Dahlman. My delegation also notes with satisfaction the plans for a limited test run designed to confirm the functionality of some of the components of the envisaged global system. Although the test will only utilize Level I data for transmission by the global telecommunication system of the WMO, the enlarged participation in the experiment of States from all groups, and the comprehensiveness of the test, will allow real and significant progress towards a verification system of a comprehensive test ban.

It is against this background, and with the intention of further enhancing our progress on the way to the elaboration of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, that I would like to make available to colleagues today the aforementioned Working Paper. The Paper has already been circulated during the recent session of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts, but was not fully discussed and in fact transcends the present, more technical terms of reference of the Ad Hoc Group of

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Seismic Experts in opening wider perspectives for a future global seismic network. Let me recall that the most advanced model of such a global system was presented in the First Report of the Ad Hoc Group — in document CCD/558 — under the then somewhat futuristic name Network III, futuristic because at that time the model only presented the outlines of a hypothetical system. Due to developments in instrumentation — electronics, computer technology and in telecommunications, Network III has now become a distinct and concrete possibility. The Working Paper of my delegation goes beyond a Network III model in adding new components, providing an even more sophisticated outline for a global seismic network. It might therefore not be too pretentious to label this advanced model "Network IV". In presenting this Paper to you, and asking that it be distributed as an official document (CD/491) of the Conference on Disarmament, I would in particular like to draw your attention to efforts made in the Federal Republic of Germany to improve the detection capability of seismic stations in regions with unfavourable noise conditions by installing seismometers in boreholes. The concept of borehole stations in miniarrays as elements of a global network harbours great promise for the efficient monitoring of regional and local events in areas of interest. The model would allow for the setting up of a comprehensive, self-contained black box system with a high degree of automated recording and analysis of seismic data. Let me, however, emphasize that the inclusion of a number of very modern features in the model, far from placing an undue technological burden upon the parties to a future CTBT, would in fact render the monitoring network more manageable and simpler to operate. I would be pleased if, for our forthcoming debate on the Third Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts, delegations would see fit to include this new working paper in their examination and analysis.

Both subjects on which I have touched today belong under the wider heading of prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters. Let me touch upon yet another and even more fundamental aspect of the same problem area, and allow me to single out one particular statement which we have recently heard in plenary. I refer to the statement of my distinguished neighbour, Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary, of 15 March, which he devoted to a number of legal aspects of the use, first use and second use of nuclear weapons. While I must disagree with him on a great number of the points he broached I should like to commend him for the argumentative and detailed manner in which he laid out his views. His is one of those statements that can help us to elevate the level of our debate, and to do justice to the pivotal significance of the subject matter of war prevention, differences of view notwithstanding. Obviously, Ambassador Meiszter's statement raises more questions than it answers. Among these are issues of logical compatibility between the concepts of non-use, non-first-use and (supposedly accepted) second use of nuclear weapons. There are issues relating to the credibility of non-first-use commitments undertaken and propagated by those whose declaratory policies are inconsistent with their military doctrine, armed forces structure, chain of command, over-all capability and on-going arms procurement. There are issues relating to the scope of Articles 2 and 51 of the United Nations Charter, issues relating to the distinction and a priori distinguishability of conventional and nuclear conflict, issues, in short, where legal considerations and fundamental questions of political philosophy are

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intertwined. In other words Ambassador Meiszter, by raising a number of legal points, has put before us the whole range of complex issues that characterize the task of war prevention. I would assure him that my delegation will not fail to engage him in an in-depth discussion of all these issues, so highly relevant to the central query of our work. I am looking forward to taking up, successively, many of his propositions, be it in plenary, be it — and preferably so — in the special work format which we expect to have available shortly for the consideration of agenda item 3.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement, for his kind words concerning relations between our countries and his kind words addressed to the President of the Conference. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Victor Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Today, the Soviet delegation would like, in a brief statement, to touch upon the question of the state of negotiations on one of the priority items on the agenda of the Conference — the prohibition of chemical weapons. First of all, I should like to recall that in his recent speech to the voters in the city of Moscow on 2 March 1984, K.U. Chernenko, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, stressed that freeing mankind from the possibility of the use of chemical weapons is a very important task. In accordance with its consistent policy in favour of the full and resolute destruction of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union has also submitted a number of proposals during the current year. One of them related to the monitoring of the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles at a special facility, and another — submitted recently by the Soviet delegation in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons — to the question of challenge on-site international verification. Our proposals have received a positive evaluation at the Conference.

During the current session, several other delegations have also submitted proposals on various questions relating to a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons which, in our opinion, might help to ensure further progress in the elaboration of the convention. We have in mind, in particular, the proposals of Yugoslavia, China, Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and others.

Thus, on the whole, the foundations exist for advancing rapidly towards a solution of the important task with which the Conference has been entrusted by the international community. It is no coincidence that in the speech already referred to, K.U. Chernenko said that the pre-conditions for the solution of the problem of a general and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons are now beginning to exist.

Hopes that the negotiations on the question will be businesslike and constructive have been expressed everywhere, and in this room, by representatives of nearly all States members of the Conference. Nevertheless, the situation developing today in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons gives cause for serious concern.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

With less than a month remaining before the conclusion of the spring part of our session, we have in fact not proceeded to carry out the task contained in the Ad Hoc Committee's new mandate — "to start the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting". There is apparently no need to point out that week after week has been spent on efforts to overcome various types of artificially created organizational difficulties. We are not inclined to attribute the delay in beginning effective work to the organizational activity of Ambassador Ekéus, the current Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Weapons. We would only wish that he made a little more use of his prerogatives as Chairman. What is the problem? Apparently, the root of the evil must be sought in the fact that someone has undertaken to stop the work of the body and not to allow the machinery of negotiations to get fully under way.

We have already had an opportunity of referring to the very enlightening statement of Mr. Perle, the Assistant Secretary of Defence of the United States who, as stated in the United States press, imposed a very hard-line position on the representatives of the United States administration at the Geneva negotiations.

There are numerous other reports from which it is clear that responsible administration officials in Washington are sowing seeds of pessimism concerning the prospects of the negotiations, are crudely distorting the position of the USSR with respect to monitoring questions, as can be seen in particular by the materials published in daily bulletin issued by the United States Mission here at Geneva, and are handling the matter in such a way as to create an atmosphere for the allocation of vast sums with a view to replenishing the United States chemical weapons arsenal.

Therefore, no one can be surprised that the United States delegation becomes allergic when it sees a text beginning with the words "The States parties to the convention ...". It is in general against any elaboration of the text, although this is provided for directly by our mandate. It views its task only as one of causing delay.

Much has been said in this room and outside it about a United States draft. Many delegations have constantly expressed enthusiasm over the intention of the United States to submit a draft. In the United States press there have been increasingly frequent reports on the content of such a draft. These reports, frankly speaking, cause us concern. Describing the various provisions of the United States draft with regard to monitoring, the authors of an article published in the issue of 2 April of the magazine "Newsweek", write, referring to authoritative sources: "Taken together, the provisions would force Moscow to let foreign inspectors take a hard look at the entire Soviet chemical industry and to poke around inside military bases. No one thinks Moscow will buy that idea — so a comprehensive ban on chemwar is a long way off".

There, distinguished delegates, is the reply to the question concerning the reasons for the standstill in the work of the Committee on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, on the prospects of the negotiations on this problem at the Conference, and at the same time on what awaits us in connection with the widely advertised United States draft. Thus, the United States draft convention, which has not yet seen the light of day, is being converted objectively into a brake on the negotiations. We have considered it necessary to express our views on this matter.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ambassador Kazem Kamyab.

Mr. KAZEMI KAMYAB (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, I would like to begin by extending to you my sincere congratulations on your election and the assurance of the support and co-operation of the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the carrying out of your responsibilities. Indeed, my Government attaches the greatest importance to the ties by which it is bound to your Government in the field of disarmament and your skill and diplomacy in handling the affairs of this forum make of you a worthy representative in this field.

Further, my delegation would like to express its deep appreciation of the work of Ambassador Turbanski during the first month of this Conference. His presidency, thanks to his untiring endeavours and undoubted integrity, contributed to the results which were achieved during his period of office.

Finally, I feel optimistic as to the future deliberations of the "Conference on Disarmament" as it is now called, and we welcome to our ranks the Ambassadors of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

In my statement today, I would like to reflect on the very important item on the agenda of this Conference which is duly given high priority because of its undoubted significance in relation to the preservation and promotion of world peace and security, that is, the item on chemical weapons.

The era of chemical arms as a means of mass destruction really started during the First World War, with the use of chlorine released from simple barrels and phosgene, an asphyxiating gas toxic only to the respiratory tract. Mustard Gas, also used at that time, appears today a dramatic reality. This gas uses the chemical agent BIS-42 CHLORETHYL SULPHIDE and causes untold damage to the human system and often results in a painful death.

According to WHO investigations, some of the long-term effects include chronic illness caused by exposure to chemical agents, delayed effects in persons directly exposed to chemical agents, the creation of new foci of infectious disease and the effect mediated by ecological changes. The delayed effects include carcinogenesis, as mustard gas and some other agents are alkylating agents which have been known to cause cancer. There was a significant increase in the incidence of cancer among those gassed during the First World War, especially cancer of the respiratory tract. Certain chemical agents can cause damage to the developing foetus and can also cause mutations due to chromosome breakage in man.

Although no long-term effects on the environment were noted after the First World War, there is a danger that anti-plant agents may cause damage to the flora leading to a significant change in the type of animal life which may flourish and may cause predominance of a disease-carrying animal dangerous to man. Equally, the quantity and quality of food produced may be affected. The psychological effects are difficult to assess.

The use of all these chemical warfare agents, deadly or merely incapacitating, was strictly forbidden by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This Protocol was the result of the horror felt at the use of chemical weapons during the First World War. It expresses the fundamental sentiments of the law of armed conflict: short of banning war altogether, there have to be some limits to its barbarity. This agreement, signed by around one hundred States, among them Iraq in 1931, was the first agreement prohibiting the use of weapons of mass destruction. This Protocol was confirmed by the United Nations General Assembly in the 1972 Convention and resolution No. 37/98 of December 1982 adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

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From the very beginning of the imposed war, we tried to bring to the attention of the international community the fact that the politics of appeasement will not pay. In the 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament, we brought to the attention of the Committee the question of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. Nobody was ready to listen; in all cases of use of chemical weapons we informed the responsible bodies but all our efforts were in vain; of course, it is not the first time that Iraq has used chemical weapons against a people. For instance, according to investigations made by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), page 165, Vol.I, Iraq used chemical weapons in 1965 against the Kurds of the region.

On 16 February 1984, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a statement accompanied by irrefutable evidence, brought once again the systematic use of chemical weapons to the attention of the Conference on Disarmament. Very shortly after we asked the United Nations Secretary-General to conduct an investigation into the use of chemical weapons by Iraq and after the statement in the Conference on Disarmament Iraq used chemical weapons on an unprecedentedly large scale, the resulting victims numbering more than 2,000 persons, some of whom are under treatment both in the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as in several countries abroad, and some of whom have died. Again on 9 and 17 March 1984, Iraq used chemical weapons on a massive scale in the regions of Majnoon Island and Jofeir, which resulted in the wounding of many combatants. Those wounded suffered from nausea, running eyes, respiratory ailments and vertigo. The victims have been hospitalized.

Very recently a reputable laboratory in Belgium issued its findings on Iranian war victims and reported that the wounds were due to the use of gases containing Yperite (mustard gas) and mycotoxins (composite parts of yellow rain).

Medical authorities in several countries where Iranian combatants are being treated reported that the wounds have been caused by chemical weapons, and independent press reports abroad have time and again confirmed this fact.

The ICRC Press Release No. 1481 dated 7 March 1984 has also confirmed the use of chemical weapons by Iraq.

"The common symptoms observed by the ICRC with regard to all the wounded are 'extensive but superficial burns (first and second degree), serious respiratory problems, Kerato conjunctivitis', seeming to progress favourably. Nevertheless the clinical progress of certain patients showed, on the eighth day after exposure, severe problems of blood composition, accompanied by a considerable decrease in the number of white corpuscles. These problems, linked to respiratory and kidney deficiencies, have caused the death of several patients, two of whom died during the visits of the Delegates."

Apart from the steps that it is taking with the parties concerned, the ICRC would insist on the fact that the use of toxic substances on the battlefield is incompatible with the respect of humanitarian principles and constitutes a violation of the law of armed conflict and recognized customary law."

Upon the request of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Secretary-General of the United Nations Organization, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, undertook to investigate the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in a spirit of humanitarian concern, and accordingly sent a team of four eminent specialists to undertake a fact-finding visit to Iran.

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The specialists, picked for their expertise in chemical warfare, visited the fighting front near Ahwaz in western Iran and also examined soil samples soaked with the chemical substance. They also examined patients in hospitals in Ahwaz and Tehran and also in the coroners' mortuary in Tehran.

On their return from the Islamic Republic of Iran the specialists submitted a joint report to the Secretary General on 21 March 1984, in which they unanimously agreed that Mustard Gas and the nerve agent Tabun were used by Iraq in the war against Iran.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations deplored and condemned the act of using chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime when transmitting the report of the specialists to the Security Council for its information. (Document No. 6/16433 of 26 March 1984).

The report was signed by Dr. Gustav Andersson of Sweden, Dr. Manuel Dominguez of Spain, Dr. Peter Dunn of Australia and Col. Dr. Ulrich Imobersteg of Switzerland.

The concern of our delegation is due to the generally passive reactions of the Conference on Disarmament in the wake of the outright disregard of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 with regard to the ban on the use of chemical weapons.

This does not concern merely several innocent Iranians nor even uniquely the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but rather it concerns the damage done to the common human conscience. The contemporary civilized human community cannot and should not tolerate such crimes.

Apart from the very limited number of delegations who share our view -- and to them we are thankful and appreciative for their concern and their condemnation of the recent inhumane act of using chemical weapons -- no positive reaction has yet been manifested in the Conference.

Of course, from the point of view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, such reaction was most discouraging; from the very beginning of the imposed war we have faced such a situation.

Unfortunately, the international community did not take a firm position with regard to the Iraqi blatant aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran on 22 September 1980. This lack of political will on the part of the international community was reflected in Security Council resolution 279 (1980) of 28 September 1980. Contrary to the well-established precedent in that body, in this resolution there is no reference to the withdrawal of the forces to the international frontier. This situation led the then Foreign Minister of the Iraqi regime, Hammadi, to state that there is no international border between Iran and Iraq after the abrogation of the Algeria Treaty of 1975 and therefore the actual deployment of forces constitutes the international border between the two States; and there is no justification on the part of Iran to speak about aggression (Letter of Hammadi to the Secretary-General of the United Nations -- Document No. 3/14236-24 October 1980).

During the forty-two months' period of the war imposed upon the Islamic Republic of Iran, everyone has become well aware of the devastation of the Iranian cities and the indiscriminate and systematic bombardment of civilian populations in the civilian zone, sometimes as much as 400 kilometres outside the combat zones.

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More than 130 missile attacks, hundreds of air strikes and several thousand artillery shots systematically directed against the undefended Iranian cities have caused the martyrdom of 5,000 civilians and the disablement of 30,000. The report of the United Nations fact-finding mission No.5/15834 of 20 June 1983 is evidence of a part of the war crimes committed by the Iraqi ruler.

It was but recently that within a period of 40 days the number of wounded and martyred who were victims of the use of chemical weapons exceeded 2,000. However, as you have witnessed; in spite of the proof of the use of chemical weapons, the Conference did not in general show a responsible reaction, as would be expected, in connection with the violation of the 1925 Protocol. This same attitude was manifested by governments to the findings of the First Report of the Secretary-General's Mission to investigate damage to civilian areas subjected to military attacks, and it permitted Iraq to go as far as to use chemical weapons on an unprecedented level. The step taken by an international organization to investigate the use of chemical weapons is unique in this century and upon the reaction of governments to the findings of the United Nations on this occasion will depend to a large extent whether or not this report will act as a deterrent or as a green light to further violations.

History is clear, and the future will witness how those who strongly urged and advocated disarmament kept silence in the wake of the use of even a banned weapon by a feeble State.

We expect that all responsible countries of the world, regardless of their political leanings and affiliation, whether aligned or non-aligned, neutral or Superpower, will strip themselves of the shackles of their leanings and come into the open to denounce and condemn, in the strongest possible terms, any violation of international law and protocols which endangers the very existence of mankind; genuine value should be attached to humane principles and ideals. Otherwise there will be no difference in weapons for a violator, whether the weapon be nuclear or chemical.

I would like to express my sincere wish that the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which is now under preparation by this forum, will be ready at the earliest possible time and that it will be fully effective and bear fruit. I believe that the position adopted by this Conference and other related organs towards the use of chemical weapons against the Islamic Republic of Iran will show in reality the degree of sincerity and the sense of responsibility regarding the newly prepared Convention, and will form an excellent criterion to determine its status and capability in the future.

In the light of my understanding that the review of the Secretary-General's Mission to investigate the use of chemical weapons against the Islamic Republic of Iran can be of great benefit to the work of the Conference, I would like to request you, Mr. President, to allocate one meeting of the Conference on Disarmament to review the report.

I would like to take this opportunity to present a working paper, CD/484, on general provisions, which in our opinion are fundamental, for consideration in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

These provisions deal with the two-fold responsibilities under the Convention and the question of reservations and exceptions and the rules of the protocol governing the duration to be fixed for the elimination of stocks and

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facilities. Another provision deals with the question of international co-operation in the field of protection, and the agreement of States parties to consider the use of chemical weapons as a war crime.

We hope for a constructive outcome from the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and we expect all delegations to give full consideration to our proposal.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Iran for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President.

It is now 10 minutes past one, we still have two speakers and, if you agree, we intend to finish at about half past one so as not to have to convene another meeting this afternoon. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vidas.

Mr. VIDAS (Yugoslavia): Mr. President, today I shall deal with agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", but before doing so I would like to associate myself with your warm welcome to Mrs. Inga Thorsson, former head of the Swedish delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, with whom the Yugoslav delegation has enjoyed very fruitful co-operation in the past. This question deserves our attention, because ever since the first man-made satellite was launched into outer space, heralding the "Space Age", and in view of the rapid development of space technology since then, the inherent dangers of a potential arms race in outer space have become a matter of increasing concern. As time has gone by, this concern has increased along with the transformation of the potential into a real arms race in outer space and its far-reaching implications for international peace and security and over-all stability in the world.

Although outer space is a relatively new field of human activity, considerable results have been achieved so far in opening up the undreamed-of possibilities for its peaceful uses. The practical and very useful applications of the achievements of space technology for peaceful purposes are, for instance, in telecommunications, navigation, weather forecasting and earth resources surveys. Unfortunately, there are also many achievements, some of which are still in the process of development, which, apart from their peaceful uses, can even have a destabilizing effect, just as there are those which are designed exclusively for military offensive use.

The peaceful uses of outer space have become the constant concern of the United Nations General Assembly, which in 1959 set up the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as its permanent body. Over the years, as a result of its work and in other negotiating forums, a number of instruments were concluded concerning the military and peaceful aspects of the use of outer space, such as the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, 1963, which prevented, among other things, the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space. In 1967 a further success was achieved with the elaboration of the principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, contained in the Treaty having the same title. The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1968); the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972),

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and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1976) are also agreements regulating some of the important questions relative to human activities in outer space. The last of such agreements, which was endorsed in 1979 by the United Nations General Assembly and opened for signature and ratification, was the Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which elaborates, in greater detail than the 1967 Treaty, the obligation of States to ensure that the Moon and other celestial bodies within the solar system, other than the Earth, are used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The United Nations has this far sponsored two conferences on the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space. The second United Nations Conference (UNISPACE 82), held in Vienna in 1982, primarily dealt with future developments -- including such things as space transportation systems, space manufacturing and solar power stations in space -- and their potential benefits to international co-operation and the hazards that might arise from these activities. The military aspects of the question, however, also received considerable attention. Although the question of the competence of that Conference with respect to the issues relating to the arms race in outer space did not meet with the approval of all participants, the Conference, nevertheless, examined and approved in its report three paragraphs which, in general, recognized the grave dangers presented by the extension of the arms race into outer space and urged "all nations, in particular those with major space capabilities" to contribute actively to the prevention of such an eventuality. It also called on all States to adhere to the Outer Space Treaty and strictly to observe its letter and spirit; and strongly recommended that the competent organs of the United Nations -- the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament in particular -- give appropriate attention and high priority to the grave concern expressed about the question.

In continuing its activities, the Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which is now holding its twenty-third session here in Geneva, is considering three very important items:

Formulation of the draft principles on the legal implication of remote sensing of the earth from space. This concerns the detection and analysis of the earth's resources by sensors carried in aircraft and spacecraft;

Definition and/or delimitation of Outer Space and Geostationary Orbit; and

Consideration of the possibility of supplementing the norms of international law relevant to the use of nuclear-power sources in outer space, that is, to the procedure for notification in case of malfunctioning of a spacecraft carrying a nuclear-power source on board.

I have mentioned all these United Nations related activities and the existing body of international agreements only to point out that even the very complex problems of relations in outer space can be solved. What I particularly had in mind was to draw attention to the urgency of the problem and the existing gap in

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the resolution of the problems related to the arms race in outer space, and to the danger of turning outer space into an arena of armed conflict.

It is estimated that 75 per cent of all space activities are military-related. There can hardly be a day that the press does not disclose something new on the testing of weapons for use in outer space, or concerning immediate plans for their development. Although the information published in the press cannot always be considered reliable, in particular when military research or programmes are involved, we, as a negotiating forum which does not have access to such information from other sources, should be grateful to the press for giving us from time to time information, which may provide sufficient background as a warning, thus confirming the old saying: where there is smoke there is fire.

The consideration of the issues connected with the extension of the arms race into outer space is within the competence of the Conference on Disarmament. It has not, unfortunately, managed to make even the first step towards resolving these problems, that is, to establish a working body "with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space", as called for in General Assembly resolution 38/70. The Conference has wasted much of its energy on the harmonization of views with respect to the mandate of the subsidiary working body, proceeding from different viewpoints on the scope of the mandate of such a subsidiary body, although many members of the General Assembly Committee and here at the Conference have made enormous efforts to have this problem get off the ground.

At the meeting on 22 March we had an opportunity to hear two important statements on outer space. In one of them, the distinguished representative of the USSR, Ambassador V. Issraelyan, presented the views of his Government on the problem and submitted, at the same time, the text of a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. This text, in our view, deserves attention because, inter alia, it suggests the ways to resolve the question of the use of force in outer space, including the prohibition of anti-satellite systems. What should not be overlooked, however, in assessing the proposal made by Ambassador Issraelyan is the willingness of the USSR to negotiate the draft text and the readiness displayed to conduct separate negotiations on anti-satellite systems and to resume bilateral negotiations with the United States in this field. We consider this sign of goodwill to hold negotiations on outer space as very important at this moment when other channels of negotiation on some major issues of reduction of armaments and disarmament have been closed.

The statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden, Mr. R. Ekéus, offered, in a way that can hardly be improved, a very solid analysis of the existing space systems used for military purposes. He has also drawn attention to the solutions contained in the existing agreements on outer space and made a list of suggestions on what to do to amend them and make them comprehensive.

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This is, in our opinion, the manner in which we should approach our work, instead of wasting time on the artificial problem of the mandate of the working body.

Apart from these, several other useful documents were also submitted to the Committee on Disarmament in the past; among which I would like to mention document CD/320, submitted by the Canadian delegation, entitled "Arms control and outer space"; and document CD/375, submitted by the French delegation, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". It is also worth recalling in this connection the earlier French proposal for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency and the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Study on the implication of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency". The distinguished Ambassadors of Czechoslovakia, Italy and Argentina on 27 March, and today the distinguished Ambassador of Sri Lanka, in their speeches to the Conference, also made some useful suggestions.

All these and many other proposals which I have not mentioned represent a solid basis for the start of negotiations which would deal with a wide range of issues. In our view, a number of necessary steps should be made in that direction. Not desiring to give any priorities, we think that there is a need to identify the areas and activities which so far have not been covered by the existing international legal instruments, along the lines suggested by the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden. There is also a need to draw up, on the basis of the existing proposals, a programme of work within the competence of the Conference on Disarmament, that is to say, of the subsidiary working body, which should be established as soon as possible. The programme of work of the subsidiary working body for outer space should be the mandate of that working body: it is only in this way that we can concretely fulfil the negotiating mandate entrusted to the Conference. It would be pertinent to recall, however, that the Conference has completed the second month of its work this year, and that during that period only one of the ad hoc committees which were created is working actively -- the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Could anyone convince the proverbial man-in-the-street that the Conference on Disarmament is unable to negotiate only because the delegations cannot agree on the mandates of individual working bodies? We have our doubts about that.

Mr. President, before concluding my statement, I would like to express to you the sincere appreciation of my delegation for your skilful guidance of the work of our Conference during this month. Your diplomatic skill and experience greatly contributed to the successful resolution of some of the organizational problems which are facing our Conference. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. That concludes the list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States.

Mr. CLYNE (United States of America): Thank you, Mr. President. I would only like to respond briefly to the statement made by Ambassador Issraelyan this morning. First, I would like to note that the Soviet Ambassador and the Editors of Newsweek are obviously more informed as to the content of the proposed draft chemical weapons treaty than is my delegation. I would also like to note that periodicals do not set the policy of my Government, and that any attempt on the part of editors and writers of those periodicals at the interpretation of policy, once it is set, is only a manifestation of their freedom to do so. I reject and resent the personal attacks on senior officials of my Government. I note this is only the most recent in a series of personal attacks by Soviet authorities on Mr. Perle, and it follows closely upon two others that appeared in Izvestiya, yesterday I believe. I also reject the assertion that my delegation has deliberately held up work in the newly-formed Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Such an assertion stands the facts on their head. In this regard I will not comment on the pristine nature of the conduct of some other delegations in that Ad Hoc Committee. Such comment would not be helpful.

Mr. President, I believe that the kind of statement that we witnessed this morning by Ambassador Issraelyan is particularly unuseful and unhelpful in our work. What is required in our work is the willingness to tackle the difficult issues of substance, and narrow the range of our current disagreements. I assure this Conference that my delegation is willing, and, I believe, actively attempting to participate in that work. As to Ambassador Issraelyan's statement, I would take a page from the book of a former Soviet colleague of mine, when in such cases, he used to say, "I will study your statement and give it the attention it deserves". I will do that to the Soviet statement of this morning.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Thank you. I take it that no other delegation wishes to take the floor. The secretariat today circulated an informal document containing the programme of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. As usual, the programme is a tentative one and may be changed if necessary. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference wishes to adopt the programme.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): At this last plenary meeting for the month of March, the month in which the Romanian delegation had the honour to assume the Presidency, I should like first of all to convey to the distinguished representatives gathered here for the work of the Conference on Disarmament our most sincere thanks for the open-mindedness and friendly co-operation they showed us, which facilitated a constructive approach to the problems connected with the work of our Conference, thus enabling the President, through their support, to discharge the functions entrusted to him in the month of March.

I should like to take this opportunity to thank all the delegations which have referred to the excellent relations of co-operation and friendship between their countries and Romania, and who have expressed their appreciation with regard to my country's policy of peace and international understanding.

In discharging the functions of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, the Romanian delegation has been motivated by a sincere desire to place its abilities at the service of the Conference, in order to bring about the dialogue and negotiations which would allow us to advance in our work, and also to pass on as rapidly as possible to substantive negotiations on the problems included in our agenda.

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This year's session of the Conference is of exceptional significance under present conditions, in which the restoration and development of mutual trust, as well as the strengthening of the security of all nations, have become fundamental requirements for ensuring peace, détente and co-operation in the world.

As I had the honour to state in this forum, my country attaches particular significance to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. In our opinion, genuine security can be achieved only by initiating and constantly promoting effective disarmament measures and, in the first place, by the elimination of the danger of a fresh escalation of nuclear weapons on the continent of Europe and the prevention of a thermonuclear war which would be disastrous for mankind.

In order to achieve that end, we must undertake new, serious efforts, and set up all the appropriate organizational structures for the holding of negotiations on the matters entrusted to our Conference. At the end of March, it may be said that progress has been made in many spheres, and a good number of positions have been defined, thus enabling us to pursue the search for compromise solutions in order to embark as rapidly as possible on the beginning of negotiations on substantive problems in several bodies.

I am convinced that the establishment and start of work of subsidiary bodies on all the agenda items and, above all, on the prevention of nuclear war, must not be delayed any further.

For my part, I have considered it my duty, and I have applied myself accordingly, to use every day of this month in order to accelerate contacts with a view to improving communication among delegations, through both formal and informal consultations; I believe and hope that this will enable concrete decisions to be taken in the Conference.

As for negotiations proper within the Conference on Disarmament, the least that can be said is that we cannot consider ourselves satisfied at their pace and their results in comparison with our agenda and the tasks entrusted to our forum by the international community.

It is not our intention in this short statement to take stock of the activities of the Conference during the month of March. Such a balance-sheet would be both presumptuous and incomplete, as the work of this period is merely the continuation of that of the preceding month as well as the premise for the work to be done in the months to come. In this connection, I should like to thank once again Ambassador Stanislaw Turbanski of Poland for his excellent work and the results obtained in the month of February.

Our delegation has been guided in its approach to the responsibilities of the presidency by the same principle which underlies medicine, known as the Hippocratic Oath: primum non nocere.

Our sole desire has been to facilitate negotiation, using to that end all the tools available to our Conference, in order to ensure that we pass on as rapidly as possible to the substantive negotiations which are essential in present international circumstances.

While renewing our warm thanks to the delegations to the Conference, its Secretary-General, Mr. Rikhi Jaipal, the members of the secretariat and the interpreters, for their understanding and for the support they have given, the

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Romanian delegation firmly undertakes to work in future with the same energy and the same sense of responsibility in order to arrive at genuine negotiations which may lead us to solutions acceptable to all and, finally, to concrete disarmament measures.

I am sure that you will lend the same support to my eminent successor in the Presidency for the month of April, Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka. We have worked together closely during this month, and I have benefited greatly from his experience, his wise understanding of the problems facing us and his friendliness towards me.

I should like to assure the future President of all possible assistance and support from the Romanian delegation in the discharge of his major responsibilities.

Today, as my term of Presidency of the Conference for the month of March reaches an end, I should like to express the hope that the month of April will be a good month for the Conference on Disarmament; even if we have lost all taste for prophecy, we should not forsake hope, which it is our duty to harbour. Thank you all.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 3 April at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.