

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 22 March 1984, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. I. Datcu

(Romania)

GE.84-61103

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. TAFFAR
Mr. A. BOUBAZINE

Argentina: Mr. J.J. CARASALES
Mr. R. GARCÍA MORITAN
Mr. R. VILLAMBROSA

Australia: Mr. R. BUTLER
Mr. R. ROWE
Ms. J. COURTNEY

Belgium: Mr. M. DEPASSE
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. POPTCHEV
Mr. C. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GY
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. QIAN JIADONG
Ms. WANG ZHIYUN
Mr. LIN CHENG
Mr. LIANG DEFENG

Cuba: Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. J. JIRUŠEK

Egypt: Mr. S. ALFARARGI
Mr. I.I. HASSAN
Mr. A.M. ABBAS
Mr. R. MONIB

Ethiopia:France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE

Mr. H. RENIE

Mr. G. MONTASSIER

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE

Mr. J. DEMBSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER

Mr. F. ELBE

Mr. M. GERDTS

Mr. W-E. VON DEM HAGEN

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER

Mr. F. GAJDA

Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. M. DUBEY

Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO

Mr. ANDRADJATI

Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Mrs. P. RAMADHAN

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N.K. KAMYAB

Mr. F.S. SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Mr. M. PAVESE

Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI

Mr. K. TANAKA

Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Mr. T. ISHIGURI

Kenya:

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA
Ms. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. O. HILALE

Netherlands: Mr. J. RAMAKER
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria: Mr. J.O. OBOH
Mr. L.O. AKINDELE
Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA
Mr. F.O. ADESHIDA

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru: Mr. P. CANNOCK
Mr. C. CASTILLO RAMIREZ

Poland: Mr. G. CZEMPINSKI
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. I. DATCU
Mr. T. MELESCANU
Mr. O. IONESCU
Mr. A. POPESCU
Mr. A. CRETU

Sri Lanka: Mr. J. DHANAPALA
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden: Mr. R. EKEUS
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Ms. E. BONNIER
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. L.E. WINGREN
Ms. A.M. LAU

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. P.Y. SKOMOROKHIN
Mr. S.V. KOBYSH
Mr. G. VASHADZE
Mr. V. USTINOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
Mr. B.P. NOBLE
Mr. J.F. GORDON
Mr. G.H. COOPER
Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. N. CARRERA
Ms. K.C. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. R. HORNE
Mr. P. LEMBESIS
Mr. J. DOESBERG
Mr. J. PUCKETT
Mr. H. CALHOUN

Venezuela:

Mr. LOPEZ OLIVER
Mr. T. LABRADOR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC
Mr. D. MINIC

Zaire:

Ms. E. ESAKI KABEYA

Secretary-General of the Conference
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAZPAL

Deputy Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

The Conference will today continue the consideration of agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Pakistan and Sweden, and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the USSR, Ambassador Victor Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade President, today the delegation of the Soviet Union would like to dwell upon a question of extreme importance -- the great and real danger of spreading the arms race to outer space. The importance of this problem is determined by the fact that if urgent and effective measures are not developed to prevent the arms race in outer space, mankind will face a new threat on a scale which it is difficult even to imagine now.

During the current session of the Conference on Disarmament many delegations have already expressed their serious concern at the extremely dangerous consequences of the saturation of outer space with lethal weapons. The Soviet delegation fully shares this concern. We are convinced that the prevention of the militarization of outer space is one of the priority problems facing mankind, and here on Earth much depends on whether it is solved.

The Soviet Union has consistently advocated, and continues to advocate that the peaceful future of space should be ensured. We would like to stress this today too.

The beginning of the space age in the history of mankind is inseparably linked with the name of a citizen of the Soviet Union -- Yuri Gagarin. On 9 March, the 50th birthday of the first man to fly in space was celebrated. There are people in world history whose names embody an entire epoch, the beginning of a new direction, the outstanding achievements of their time, Yuri Gagarin is one of these in our century. His name symbolizes the space age, which started with the launching of the first man-made satellite of the Earth.

The Message of 12 April 1961 of the CPSU Central Committee, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Government of the Soviet Union in connection with the first flight of man to outer space pointed out: "We believe that the victories in the exploration of outer space represent the achievements not of our people alone, but of all mankind as well. We are glad to put them at service of all peoples, in the name of the progress, happiness and wellbeing of all peoples on the Earth. We place our achievements and discoveries not at the service of war, but at the service of the peace and security of peoples".

Guided by precisely those goals, from the first days of the space age the USSR advocated the development of concrete international co-operation in space and on 15 March 1958 put forward a detailed programme for the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The experience of international negotiations confirms that in those cases when realism and responsibility to mankind have prevailed over other considerations in the policies of States it has been possible to achieve mutually acceptable agreements aimed at preventing the militarization of outer space. The important list of such agreements is a valuable achievement by mankind, which should be preserved and multiplied.

However, the continuation of such co-operation at present and, what is most important, of the entire policy of using space in the interests of peace and preventing its transformation into a testing ground of military preparations, has been jeopardized.

That is why the task preventing the arms race in outer space has become particularly urgent. Moreover, a crucial moment has now been reached, and as matters now stand either the States concerned will sit down without delay at the negotiating table to work out an agreement or agreements prohibiting the stationing in outer space of weapons of any kind, or else the arms race will spread on outer space. The overwhelming majority of States is seriously concerned at the real increase in the danger of the arms race spreading to outer space.

The principled approach of the USSR to the solution of this problem was reaffirmed in the statement of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, K.U. Chernenko, of 2 March 1984, the foreign policy chapter of which has been distributed as Conference document CD/444. He firmly spoke in favour of "not spreading the nuclear arms race to new spheres, including outer space". The Soviet leader stressed that the United States can also make a major contribution to strengthening peace by coming to an agreement on the renunciation of the militarization of outer space.

It is not by chance that the United States is mentioned in this context, if we take into account that, as recent events show, United States strategic planning, as proclaimed, inter alia, at the highest level, ascribes a growing role to the use of military space technology. It is in the United States that official plans and programmes have been announced for developing and using weapon systems in outer space and from it against the Earth. This is a question not of some abstract "star wars", but of a lethal danger absolutely relevant to the Earth, the creation of systems designed to destroy not only space-based, but also ground, sea and air targets.

The dangerous character of such a policy has been convincingly proved by scientists and experts of various countries. The Soviet scientists E. Velikhov, G. Arbatov, M. Sagdeev and others discuss it in their works. Many scientists and public figures in the United States also emphasize that the testing and stationing of any weapons in outer space considerably increase the possibility of unleashing war on Earth. The statements on this score made by former United States Secretaries of Defence Brown and McNamara, as well as by the eminent scientists Ch. Towns, I. Raby, R. Garwin, H. York, G. Bețe, are well known. In connection with the development in the United States of one of the most sophisticated anti-satellite systems, a group of eminent United States scientists and public figures has warned that once such systems have appeared in the arsenals of countries it will be very difficult to remove them. One cannot but agree with the conclusion of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute that space technology promotes not only a qualitative nuclear arms race, but also the formulation of doctrines for conducting wars with the use of such weapons.

The United States is making tremendous efforts in order to achieve the goals of military superiority in outer space. According to the data of the United States National Science Foundation, United States aerospace companies employ more scientists for research and development work than the chemical, health, petroleum, automobile, rubber and engineering industries taken together.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The United States is completing the design and has already started the testing of an ASAT system based on F-15 fighters equipped with intercepting missiles with self-guided warheads. At the same time the United States continues to develop weapons on the basis of new physical principles, including the laser. An important role in United States military plans is assigned to the reusable "Space Shuttle". It is envisaged to use it to launch military satellites, orbital command posts, and new types of space weapons.

The plan for the development of a "large-scale and highly efficient anti-ballistic missile defence" proclaimed by the United States Administration in March 1983 is particularly dangerous.

Implementation of the United States programme for the creation of space-based ABMs could disrupt the linkage between strategic offensive and defensive armaments fixed in the Soviet-United States agreements of 1972. In fact, it would result in opening the lock-gates for a new round in the strategic arms race. The attempts to create the impression that the space-based ABM system conceived in the United States will be defensive are beneath criticism. This programme is designed to destroy early-warning space systems and the command and communication centres of the other side, and thus to render the latter as vulnerable as possible to the United States nuclear "disarming" strike. Hope is placed in impunity, in being able to make a nuclear first strike while being secure against a retaliatory one. The new United States military space conception can only bring the world closer to the nuclear abyss.

As far as the economic side of the space arms race imposed by the United States is concerned, it involves tremendous resources. It should be noted that in accordance with Directive 119 concerning the beginning of a vast research programme to create new space weapon systems signed by the President of the United States on 6 January 1984, the allocations for development of laser space systems will grow by 12 times by 1988. Washington plans to spend \$27 billion during the next five years and \$95 billion by the year 2000 for the creation of the space-based ABM systems.

The programmes for the creation of space armaments determine in many respects the political actions of the United States and other NATO countries in the international scene. It was at the end of the 1970s that the United States suspended bilateral talks with the USSR on anti-satellite weapons. We have repeatedly, including from the rostrum of the United Nations, referred to the need to resume those negotiations, but the United States continues to avoid them.

In connection with this position taken by the United States, I should like to draw the attention of delegations to an item in today's issue of the International Herald Tribune which cannot fail to be of interest. I shall quote some extracts from the newspaper in the original: "Senior Pentagon officials, led by Assistant Defence Secretary, Richard N. Perle, are fighting to delay or prevent Administration initiatives in several secondary areas of arms control". I quote from further in the report: "Mr. Perle ... has managed to block any United States initiative on anti-satellite weapons and ratification of the threshold treaty, citing difficulties in verifying Soviet compliance. He has slowed movement on the chemical treaty and in development of a new United States position at the Vienna talks on conventional troop reductions in Europe".

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

With regard to the delays in the submission by the United States of its widely publicised draft comprehensive treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the possible consequences of those delays for the negotiations at the Conference, the Soviet delegation reserves the right to return to this question at the opportune time. Today we should like to point out that as a result of this activity by the Pentagon, and I quote once again from the newspaper item, "the Administration is not expected to propose negotiations to ban these [anti-satellite] weapons at this time".

The Western countries are also thwarting the beginning of practical negotiations on preventing the arms race in outer space on a multilateral basis. This is being done, however, somewhat more subtly. The United States and its allies do not explicitly say "no" to the negotiations, but try to shelve the matter by making different proposals about the need "to study the existing norms of international law concerning the use of outer space for peaceful purposes", as it was stated, in particular, at the Brussels session of the NATO Council. It is difficult to say which is greater in this position: the expectation that the negotiating partners are naive, or a lack of respect for them. It should be clear to anyone that there is no need to conduct international negotiations merely to study the existing norms of international law. It would be enough for that purpose to assign one of the experts of the legal department of any foreign ministry, delegation or secretariat of an international organization and one could count on obtaining sound information on this problem. If that is not enough, an appropriate research institute could be requested to deal with it and perhaps a scientific symposium could be held on the subject. To involve in this study such an important disarmament negotiating body as the Conference on Disarmament is unreasonable, to say the least. The Soviet Union, for example, knows full well its obligations under existing agreements concerning the use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

We are convinced that it is necessary reliably to bar the ways in which the arms race and military confrontation can spread to outer space, which has been peaceful up to now. This is precisely why the Soviet Union put forward in 1983, at the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth, which on our request has been distributed as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/476).

In accordance with General Assembly resolution 38/70, this draft was transmitted to our Conference for consideration.

The Soviet initiative -- I have in mind our draft treaty -- has been favourably received in the United Nations and has given rise to a wide political response all over the world.

The Soviet delegation would like briefly to describe the basic provisions of the draft treaty on the prohibition of use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth, having in mind that within the subsidiary body of the Conference on the prevention of arms race in outer space and with the assistance of appropriate experts we shall be able to give more detailed explanations.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In our draft we propose to prohibit the testing and deployment in outer space of any space-based weapons, to solve completely and radically the problem of anti-satellite weapons and to ban the testing and use of manned spacecraft for military, including anti-satellite, purposes. Taking into account these new provisions, our initiative goes considerably further than our proposal of 1981 on the non-stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. Its salient feature consists in the fact that it takes into account in many respects the positions of other, including Western, countries, and the considerations they have put forward in the United Nations and in the Committee on Disarmament.

The important feature of the document submitted by us consists in the combination of political and legal obligations of States not to allow the use of force against each other in and from outer space with measures of a material nature aimed at preventing the militarization of outer space. It prohibits resorting to the use or threat of force in outer space and the atmosphere as well as on the Earth through the utilization, as instruments of destruction, of space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in outer space in any other manner. At the same time it prohibits resorting to the use or threat of force against space objects.

The Treaty envisages the complete prohibition of the testing and deployment in outer space of any space-based weapons for the destruction of targets on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.

We propose also a radical solution to the question of anti-satellite weapons: the complete renunciation by States of the creation of new anti-satellite systems and the destruction of any such systems which they already possess. The parties to the Treaty would also undertake not to destroy, damage, disturb the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other States in any other manner.

In addition, it is proposed to ban the testing and use of manned spacecraft for military, including anti-satellite, purposes; they should be entirely dedicated to the solution of various scientific, technological and economic tasks.

The draft envisages the obligations of each party to take internal measures to prohibit activity contrary to the provisions of the Treaty.

The provisions on verification of compliance with the future Treaty deserve particular attention. The verification system envisaged in the USSR draft is quite extensive and far-reaching.

In our view, the control provisions provide for reliable implementation of the obligations by the parties to the Treaty. They are based on an effective combination of national and international verification measures. At the same time, the USSR is prepared to elaborate and agree upon some additional measures concerning mutual assurance of States parties in its implementation.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Along with the presentation of the draft comprehensive international treaty, the Soviet Union has made important steps aimed at creating a more favourable situation for the prevention of the militarization of outer space.

The Soviet leadership has adopted an extremely important decision: the USSR undertakes not to be the first to launch into outer space any kind of anti-satellite weapons, in other words, declares a unilateral moratorium on such launchings for the entire period of time when other States, including the United States, refrain from launching anti-satellite weapons of any kind into outer space. Such a decision is another concrete demonstration of the good will of the Soviet Union, of its readiness genuinely to strengthen the peace and security of peoples. We would like to hope that the United States will follow this example.

Moreover, the Soviet Union displayed a readiness also to achieve an agreement on implementing the measures proposed by it on a bilateral basis with the United States, as we declared at the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly. In particular, we are ready to conduct separate negotiations on anti-satellite systems and to resume bilateral negotiations with the United States as a step towards a solution of the common task of prohibiting the use of force in and from outer space.

We are convinced that the Conference on Disarmament can do much to prevent the arms race in outer space on the basis of the draft treaty proposed by the Soviet Union. The USSR, together with other socialist States, has already spoken (in document CD/434) in favour of the establishment of an ad hoc committee of the Conference on the item "Prevention of the arms race in outer space". In advocating the creation of such a body, we believe that it should have a mandate which would provide the possibility of conducting negotiations aimed at concluding an agreement on this important and urgent question.

What is most important now is immediately to find ways to ensure in practice the earliest adoption of the range of political, legal and material measures which would reliably secure outer space from a military threat. If space weapons are ever to be prohibited we have apparently reached the time limit when it is still possible to do so.

We express our firm conviction that the elaboration of measures to prevent the arms race in outer space can already be initiated during the current session of the Conference on Disarmament. To this end it is necessary for all the States represented at the Conference to display political good will.

The task facing the Conference is absolutely clear, and our duty is to move from words to deeds, to the elaboration of concrete measures to prevent the arms race in outer space.

We should always remember that military preparations involving outer space are fraught with the appearance of weapon systems which will make arms limitation and the implementation of control measures in the field of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, more difficult.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, our country shall continue to deploy every effort so that the ominous plans to spread the arms race to outer space do not become a reality.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Mansour Ahmad.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. President, may I begin by extending to you the warm and cordial felicitations of my delegation on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March and at the adept manner with which you have been conducting the business of this forum. Our pleasure at seeing a diplomat of your ability at the helm of the Conference on Disarmament is heightened by the fact that you, Mr. President, represent a country which by virtue of its principled policies has earned a position of respect in the community of nations. My Government deeply values the close and mutually beneficial ties of friendship and co-operation that exist between our two countries. May I assure you of the full co-operation and support of my delegation in the discharge of your responsibilities.

I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to place on record the Pakistan delegation's admiration for the skill and sincerity with which Ambassador Turbanski of Poland presided over this body in its crucial first month. It was in no small measure due to his unflagging efforts that we can now look back to the previous month with some satisfaction.

I have taken the floor for the first time during our present session; may I extend a warm welcome to the Ambassadors of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, Indonesia and Sri Lanka who have joined us since the conclusion of our 1983 session. My delegation looks forward to working with them in close concert and I am confident that they will contribute richly to our deliberations.

We have convened this year under the more impressive title of "Conference on Disarmament". My delegation sincerely hopes that this change in nomenclature will prove to be more than a mere exercise in superficial image-building and impart to our deliberations a more urgent sense of purpose.

Recent years have seen the emergence of two distinct trends: at the level of governments, a sharp escalation of the arms race, which threatens to erode the restraints, albeit limited, of the past, and the ensuing deterioration in East-West relations; and at the popular level, a heightened world-wide awareness of the urgent and compelling need for effective nuclear disarmament measures. Both these factors were responsible for the record number of disarmament-related resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its sessions last year and the year before, reflecting acutely the despair and concern of the world community. The many dimensions and repercussions of the new spiral in the arms race and the ever-increasing global expenditures on armaments have already been pointed out here with great clarity and precision during the past few weeks. I would, therefore, desist from repeating what my distinguished colleagues have already said eloquently and convincingly. But the fact that the two Superpowers and their alliance systems are primarily responsible for the state of affairs bears repetition. The two between them have accumulated the most awesome inventory of weapons that human history has ever known. It is said that something like five per cent of their nuclear arsenals is enough to wipe out human civilization from the face of this earth. It was, therefore, only natural that the whole world

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watched with keen interest and with hope and expectation while these two Superpowers conducted two sets of nuclear arms limitation talks. The suspension of these negotiations has not only come as a serious blow to these hopes but has also placed the future of mankind in greater jeopardy.

My delegation joins all those who have urged an early resumption of the dialogue between the Superpowers, because what is at stake is the very survival of the human race. We are convinced that the negotiations on "intermediate" and "strategic" nuclear weapons should be combined and conducted in a single forum. The distinction between them is an artificial one. The two are organically related. We believe that dealing with them separately can only enhance difficulties, not help resolve them, whereas a unified approach could offer greater possibilities to all negotiators.

It has been argued, and not entirely without reason, that the issue of nuclear disarmament can best be left to bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the existing indefinite hiatus in their dialogue is too dangerous to be accepted with complacency. Thus, taking into account the over-riding importance of the subject of nuclear disarmament and given the fact that the Stockholm Conference is unlikely to offer an opportunity for a resumed nuclear dialogue, as well as the fact that Prime Minister Trudeau's initiative for talks among the five nuclear-weapon Powers will take time and considerable effort to mature, my delegation is of the view that the Conference must accord due priority to the agenda item "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". It is not beyond the ingenuity of the Conference, with its flexible rules of procedure, to improvise or to innovate a format in which the nuclear-weapon Powers would be enabled to set aside their present inhibitions and to resume their nuclear dialogue in this multilateral negotiating forum. We believe that such an approach can bring forth many advantages and possibly even concrete results.

I need hardly emphasize that the issue of nuclear disarmament and that of prevention of nuclear war are closely linked. Those who have the greatest authority to speak on the subject agree that a nuclear war is not winnable and therefore must never be fought. The dreadful consequences of even a limited nuclear war, if such an eventuality is at all possible, are not lost upon anyone, much less upon the governments of the States represented here. Why then this continued insensitivity on the part of a handful of States to the pleas of an overwhelming majority of the nations of the world, as embodied in United Nations General Assembly resolution 38/183 G? How long must we continue to live under the ominous and ever-lengthening shadow of strategic doctrines which attempt to redress conventional imbalances with nuclear suicide?

It is our fervent hope that the Conference will find it possible to establish a working group to negotiate concrete measures on the prevention of nuclear war. This would not, indeed it cannot, preclude a discussion of the security perceptions of the two alliances. We are convinced that an airing of their security concerns and the doctrines that these have spawned can only do good.

Central to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament is a nuclear-weapon-test ban. In fact, agreement to negotiate a test ban is for us the litmus test of the good intentions of the nuclear-weapon States. The insistence of some nuclear-weapon Powers on a continued discussion of the issue of verification to the exclusion of a discussion on what is to be verified and

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their opposition to an expanded mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban is difficult to comprehend. In our view a more meaningful mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban would in no way rule out or suppress an exhaustive exploration of the verification issue. In fact, as a large majority of delegations would agree, the verification provisions of any disarmament agreement have to relate to its purposes and scope. A negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee for the NTB would facilitate rather than obstruct an examination of the verification issue. We hope, therefore, that the present difficulties over the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee for the NTB would be resolved in a manner which is forward-looking rather than static.

May I now turn briefly to the question of radiological weapons. I would like to state first of all that my delegation is not opposed to the conclusion of a legally binding international instrument prohibiting the so-called radiological weapons. Having said that, I must express my delegation's perplexity at the pre-eminence being accorded to this subject at the expense of such questions as the NTB, cessation of the nuclear-arms race and prevention of nuclear war. A distinguished colleague, while informing us of the significance attached by his delegation to the prohibition of radiological weapons, stated inter alia, "if we can but save one future life by taking what to some may appear to be an unimportant step now, are we not thereby being faithful to our duty"? I fully share this sentiment. For me it encompasses first and foremost the abolition of nuclear weapons and the prevention of mass death and destruction from radiation. My delegation's position on the question of radiological weapons rests on the premise, uncontested so far, that for the present, attacks on nuclear facilities constitute the only concrete form that radiological warfare can take and that the issue of eliminating the possibility of such attacks must, therefore, be settled within or along with a future radiological weapons convention.

Before I conclude, may I comment very briefly on chemical weapons. We agree with the assessment that at present the subject of chemical weapons holds the greatest promise. In this context my delegation wishes to place on record its appreciation for the painstaking and imaginative work done by Ambassador McPhail of Canada in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons last year, and the astute manner in which Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden is now conducting the business of the subsidiary body on this subject. My delegation eagerly awaits the promised United States draft of a chemical weapons convention which would provide an added impetus to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We value very highly the spirit of compromise demonstrated by the delegation of the Soviet Union in indicating its acceptance of the concept of permanent on-site inspection and technical monitoring for the destruction process of chemical weapons stockpiles. My delegation fully supports the earliest possible conclusion of a balanced and adequately verifiable comprehensive chemical weapons convention.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for his kind words for my country and for the President.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Mr. President, the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space last year directed a strong appeal to the Conference to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. My delegation welcomes this resolution. The overwhelming support for it should be understood as an expression of concern of the international community that the Conference on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating body, has so far not been able to start negotiations on the question of the arms race in outer space.

An arms race in outer space could have far-reaching implications for international peace and security and the over-all stability in the world. It could also have negative effects on civilian activities in outer space. The application of space technology has already brought considerable benefits for various civilian uses such as telecommunications, weather forecasting and earth resources surveys. An arms race in outer space would pose a serious risk and obstacle for States which are, or contemplate being, engaged in peaceful space activities.

Outer space has up to now been an area free from arms. As time goes by efforts to keep it so will become more difficult and more complicated. We have all learned from our experience of the arms race on Earth how very difficult it is to reverse a process which has already received large financial and political investments. Therefore, action must be prompt.

Preventing an arms race in outer space is already a complex task. Problems have to be addressed concerning the distinction between civilian and military applications. Another distinction between categories is, for instance, the one between stabilizing or destabilizing systems, like, for instance, satellites for arms control verification on the one hand, or so-called killer satellites on the other hand.

Military use of space technology goes back to the early days of the Space Age. However, what we are facing at this juncture is a new turn in developments.

Space systems used for military purposes have in general been of a passive nature. By "passive" I mean in this case that they are not meant as weapons or as weapons platforms. Passive systems are mainly for intelligence gathering purposes such as early warning, reconnaissance, etc. Some of these systems are important to disarmament and arms control, as means of verification of disarmament agreements and confidence-building measures and for the control of weapons testing. Other passive space systems could, however, be of direct relevance for the execution of war or warlike actions. This includes navigation and communication satellites. Some of them could be considered to be dual-purpose systems, although normally used for peaceful purposes.

Now, however, we are facing the threat of the emergence of active space systems, inter alia, weapons with direct destructive effects, mainly for anti-ballistic and anti-satellite warfare.

The Soviet Union has for several years tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) system which attacks its target, after hunting it during a couple of orbits, by exploding close to it. The United States has recently carried out a test of a new ASAT system, a direct ascent system which destroys the target by colliding with it without using explosives.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

The ASAT systems in existence or under development today have a limited capacity. We understand that they can hit targets only in relatively low earth orbits. Even so they threaten important military satellites, such as surveillance satellites used for the verification of arms-control agreements. With the development of new space technology the situation might become even more serious. ASAT weapons could then reach targets in higher orbits, eventually even the geostationary orbit, where we find communication and early-warning satellites. The destruction of such satellites could have serious repercussions. Such a development would be looked upon with the greatest concern by the potential opponent and would trigger off some similar and even more destabilizing measures. Furthermore, the blinding of an early-warning satellite could be understood by the other side as nothing less than as a preparation for, or part of, a nuclear strike.

The ASAT systems have even further implications. An important part of an ASAT weapon is the so-called homing device. Once such a device is fully developed and tested for ASAT purposes, it could with some modifications be used for the purpose of targeting the opponent's ballistic missiles, thus constituting an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system. An advanced ASAT system could imply a dual capacity of both anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile capability. A disturbing consequence could be that testing of ASAT weapons could in fact be used as a cover for ABM weapons testing.

Consequently there is a potential risk that the development of ASAT weapons could already erode one of the most important treaties in the area of arms control, namely, the Anti-Ballistic-Missile Treaty of 1972.

With this development we might in fact be facing a quantum leap in the arms race. But the possible developments do not stop here.

Increased resources are spent for research on and development of beam weapons. If developed, such weapons could be used for ASAT purposes. However, what has attracted more attention is their possible use for ABM purposes.

The leading military Powers build their national security on a policy of deterrence and their mutual security relations on a functional balance of deterrence. The balance of nuclear deterrence is based upon the threat that if one Superpower attacked the other Superpower with nuclear weapons, the attacking party would bring a nuclear attack upon itself. The consequence of the policy of nuclear deterrence is that if it fails, catastrophe is inevitable. Sweden questions nuclear deterrence policies and philosophies as such. I will come back in more detail to this problem later during the session. This being said, we still have to recognize that deterrence is the guiding doctrine against which the present development must be analysed. Thus, the balance of nuclear deterrence would be disturbed if one side acquired a first-strike capacity. If one of the major Powers succeeded in developing an effective anti-ballistic system, this would give it a possibility of striking at the opponent and at the same time avoiding destruction of its own territory. The mutual deterrence would be undermined and likewise the international security situation. There is therefore reason for serious concern if any of the major Powers devotes further resources to research and development on systems which, if transformed into deployment, would not be in conformity with the ABM Treaty. Such a new phase in weapons development would be detrimental to stability in international security relations.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

Although much less than is necessary has been achieved in the field of disarmament and to prevent an arms race in outer space, some significant measures have been taken. I will mention some of them.

The provisions relevant to the use of weapons in space are both of a general and a specific nature. We have the United Nations Charter, and we have provisions which apply to space activities. Specific rules can be found in multilateral instruments and in bilateral treaties between the Soviet Union and the United States.

To start with, Article 2:4 of the Charter of the United Nations prohibits the use of force or the threat of use of force. A first attack on a space object belonging to another country is thus clearly outlawed according to the United Nations Charter. In certain cases some might argue that an attack on a space object is a measure of self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. It is, however, inconceivable that this Article could be interpreted as permitting an attack on non-military space objects.

As far as the military systems are concerned, some of them, e.g. surveillance satellites used for verification, are protected as national technical means of verification under the bilateral SALT Agreements. Early-warning satellites are likewise protected under the United States-Soviet Accident Measures Agreement. Thus an important sanctuary is provided for certain satellites. For other military space systems the situation might not be so clear.

Among specific multilateral treaties the 1963 Partial Test-Ban Treaty was the first treaty to contain provisions relating to the use of weapons in outer space. This treaty bans the testing of nuclear weapons inter alia, in outer space.

In 1967 the United Nations adopted the Outer Space Treaty containing the fundamental principles for space activities. It marked an important step in that it bans certain arms from outer space. However, others are not covered by this treaty. It is generally stated in the Outer Space Treaty that space activities shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development and in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Charter. Article 4 prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction in earth orbits and on celestial bodies. This provision does not, however, impose restrictions on conventional weapons or on military space systems. The moon and other celestial bodies are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and all kinds of military activities are prohibited on those bodies. The Outer Space Treaty also contains provisions against potentially harmful interference with peaceful space activities and provisions of interest for verification, but they do not contain any clear obligations to provide information or about inspection.

Since radio communications are vital for space activities the International Telecommunication Convention deserves special mention. Its Article 35 prohibits harmful interference with radio services which are operated in accordance with the Radio Regulations of the ITU.

The 1975 Registration Convention deals with notification of space activities. However, the information supplied is so general that it can only be guessed what purpose a space mission has, and sometimes considerable time passes between launch and notification.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

The latest of the international space agreements which have been elaborated by the United Nations is the 1979 Moon Agreement.

From its provisions it can be concluded that the Moon Agreement would demilitarize all of outer space except the proximity of the Earth, or more precisely orbits around the Earth. But this Agreement has not yet entered into force.

As mentioned earlier, some provisions in the bilateral arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union relate to space activities.

The two SALT Agreements, of 1972 and of 1979, to the last of which the Soviet Union and the United States abide unilaterally, while awaiting ratification or new negotiations, contain similar provisions about verification (Articles V and XV, respectively). According to these provisions the Contracting Parties shall use "national technical means of verification" to monitor the adherence to the provisions of the Agreements. These national "means of verification" must not be disturbed or "interfered with". It is assumed that surveillance satellites are among those "means". The SALT II Agreement (Article IX) includes a relatively unnoticed expansion of the Outer Space Treaty in that it forbids development, testing and deployment of systems for placing in orbit nuclear weapons, etc. It also prohibits testing, development and deployment of Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems (FOBS).

According to the ABM Treaty of 1972 the two Superpowers undertake not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are "sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based". It is clear as earlier touched upon, that the placing of ABM systems in outer space would be a breach of this bilateral treaty, as would also be the development and testing of such systems.

The "Accident Measures" Agreement (1971) and the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement (1974) together oblige the Soviet Union and the United States to refrain from interfering with or attacking early-warning systems of either side, including satellites which are components of such warning systems.

The fact that most of the financial and technical investments in space development takes place in two countries may imply that bilateral agreements are sufficient to regulate international relations in this field. However, according to my delegation, this is to seriously underestimate the technological developments outside the two Superpowers. As a matter of principle, as well as with long-term practical and technical considerations in view, it is important that the aspects mentioned with regard to the militarization of outer space be subject to multilateral negotiations and agreements. The principle aspect is, of course, founded on the general acceptance of the fundamental idea that the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries.

It is clear that some significant measures relating to the risks of an arms race in outer space have been taken. However, the existing body of international law contains too many loopholes to effectively prevent an arms race in outer space. What we have learned about the testing and development of anti-satellite weapons confirms that additional measures urgently need to be taken.

(Mr. Ekeús, Sweden)

The main task ahead of us should be to negotiate an international treaty banning all space weapons, including weapons directed against targets in space. Such a ban should cover the development, testing and deployment of ASAT weapons on earth, in the atmosphere and in outer space and must include the destruction of all existing ASAT systems.

Furthermore, damage, disturbance and harmful interference in the normal functioning of permitted space objects should be forbidden in international agreements in order to strengthen the Outer Space Treaty and confirm the International Telecommunication Convention.

The banning of the development, testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems, as agreed upon in the 1972 ABM Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States, should also be reiterated in a multilateral treaty.

A prohibition of Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems (FOBS) should likewise be included, in line with SALT II.

In addition, efficient measures should be adopted regarding the verification of the compliance with such a treaty or treaties. At the present stage of technical development it appears inescapable that some sort of international direct inspection be applied, including on-site inspection whenever feasible.

In the process of creating an international legal system prohibiting an arms race in outer space, military space systems which could have particularly destabilizing characteristics must be identified. It would also be essential to recognize that certain military space systems can have a stabilizing effect and that they can be a valuable contribution to disarmament measures.

The international use of satellites for the monitoring of disarmament agreements should be considered in the context of the proposal of France to establish an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA).

The notification procedures in the 1975 Registration Convention could be further developed to serve as a collateral measure to strengthen disarmament agreements related to space. Such a measure, and other similar confidence-building measures, would be helpful in the efforts to create a system of international agreements to curb an arms race in outer space.

Three proposals have been presented in intergovernmental fora containing draft agreements relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The first was presented by Italy in 1979 in the Committee on Disarmament. The two latest were presented to the United Nations by the Soviet Union in 1981 and in 1983, the latest of which has been distributed today as document CD/476.

The two first proposals demonstrated constructive attempts to come to grips with the problems in this area. They did, however, contain important shortcomings, inter alia, in that they did not cover the ASAT systems as they are conceived today.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

The latest proposal of the Soviet Union introduced today also by Ambassador Issraelyan contains a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. When the Conference has been able to establish an ad hoc committee on the arms race in outer space, my delegation will come back with detailed comments on this draft treaty. However, already now I note a welcome improvement compared to the 1981 proposal in that it covers ASAT weapons as known today and contains a ban on some specific activities directed against space objects.

The Soviet proposal addressed a number of important issues that need to be solved. Some proposed clauses, however, are ambiguous and would have to be clarified. Such solutions and clarifications could only be made through a substantive examination by the Conference on Disarmament.

Let me conclude by reiterating that the Conference on Disarmament must now actively engage itself in dealing with the growing threat of an arms race in outer space. An ad hoc committee should be established without further delay for this purpose. As a negotiating forum the Conference should of course aim at negotiating an agreement or agreements to prevent the extension of the arms race into outer space.

The Swedish delegation is prepared to consider all constructive proposals which mean that a substantive examination can be promptly initiated. An analysis of lacunae in international agreements against the background of existing and potential military applications of space technology seems to be a natural first task for an ad hoc committee. I have in this statement tried to contribute to this.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement. The list of speakers for today is now exhausted. Does any other representative wish to take the floor? That does not seem to be the case.

As you will have noted, the secretariat today distributed the programme of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. The programme is purely indicative, and may be changed if necessary, in accordance with our practice. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Conference wishes to adopt the programme.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Distinguished representatives, in our programme of meetings for this week we had allowed for an informal meeting this afternoon, if necessary, to consider organizational matters. I think that since informal consultations are taking place at present, there is no need to hold that informal meeting today. We have concluded our work for today. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Tuesday, 27 March, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.