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First Committee

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Official Records

Chairperson: Mr. Marco Antonio Suazo (Honduras)

The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

Agenda items 81 to 96 (*continued*)

Action on all draft resolutions submitted under disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairperson: This afternoon, the Committee, in accordance with its programme of work and timetable, will begin the third stage of its work, namely, action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items 81 to 96. The Committee will take action on the draft resolutions listed in revision 1 of our informal working paper, beginning with those in cluster 1, "Nuclear weapons". After completing action on draft resolutions in cluster 1, the Committee will proceed to take action on draft resolutions contained in cluster 2, "Other weapons of mass destruction", followed by action on draft resolutions under clusters 3 and 7.

I should like to remind delegations that the Committee will follow the procedure that I have already outlined and that has been explained in several information documents on the ground rules; these were circulated last week, and we spoke about them yesterday. Consequently, I again appeal to all delegations to observe the outlined procedures and to avoid any interruptions once voting on clusters begins.

Allow me also quickly to remind delegations that the sponsors of draft resolutions may make general statements at the beginning of the meeting with regard to a particular cluster. But, in accordance with the rules of procedure, those delegations may not make

statements in explanation of vote, either before or after action is taken on the draft resolutions.

The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolutions in cluster 1, according to revision 1 of the informal working paper that delegations received yesterday.

I shall now give the floor to those delegations wishing to make general statements on cluster 1, "Nuclear weapons". May I also ask delegations to respect the rules on the time frame for these statements, namely no more than 10 minutes, otherwise we will not be able to finish.

I call first on the representative of Mongolia, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.28.

Mr. Baatar (Mongolia): I have the honour to introduce a biennial draft resolution entitled "Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status", contained in document A/C.1/63/L.28, on behalf of the sponsors, France, Kazakhstan, Morocco and the United States of America.

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the first General Assembly resolution on Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status, resolution 53/77 D. Subsequent General Assembly resolutions 55/33 S, 57/67, 59/73 and 61/87 and various activities undertaken by the Government of Mongolia in cooperation with the international community to implement them have contributed to enhancing stability and building confidence in the region and to further promoting Mongolia's security.

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.



Since its declaration in 1992, Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status has also become an essential element of the global non-proliferation regime. The Secretary-General concluded in his report (A/63/122) that in the past decade Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status has been consolidated and institutionalized and is gaining wider recognition.

Considerable progress has been made in the consolidation of Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status since the adoption of the most recent General Assembly resolution under the same title, resolution 61/87.

Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status has been supported and reflected in a number of bilateral documents, such as the Moscow Declaration of 8 December 2006 and the Mongolian-Russian joint communiqué of 13 April 2008, as well as in multilateral documents including the Havana document of the fourteenth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), held in 2006, and the Tehran document of the fifteenth NAM Ministerial Conference, held in 2008.

My Government continues to work to institutionalize Mongolia's status with a view to concluding a trilateral treaty with Russia and China. Following its initial contacts in 2002, we prepared a draft treaty in 2007 and presented it to the Russian and Chinese sides. I should like to thank the Russian and Chinese delegations for having held open and sincere discussions in the margins of this Committee and for their willingness to move forward in the near future.

Following the decision of the first Conference of States Parties to Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, held in 2005 in Mexico, Mongolia has established a national focal point to deal with nuclear-weapon-free-zone-related issues and has contacted focal points of other nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty agencies. In order to contribute to the preparations for the second conference of parties to nuclear-weapon-free zones Mongolia is planning to host a focal-points meeting in Ulaanbaatar on 27 and 28 April 2009. We are also continuing to promote awareness regarding nuclear-weapon-free status, nationally and internationally. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia earlier this year organized a round-table discussion on Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and related issues.

Mongolia submitted a working paper on nuclear-weapon-free zones to the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference

of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) held in Geneva from 28 April to 9 May 2008. Moreover, Mongolia submitted a document entitled "Memorandum of the Government of Mongolia on promoting the country's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status" for circulation as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/63/73-S/2008/297). We believe that that document will prove useful in considering the draft resolution on Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status.

The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/63/L.28, which is before the Committee, is essentially a procedural one and includes some technical updates. It takes note of the report of the Secretary-General and expresses appreciation to the Secretary-General for efforts to implement resolution 61/87. Like the previous resolution, it endorses and supports Mongolia's good-neighbourly relations with its neighbours and invites Member States to continue to cooperate with Mongolia in implementing the provisions of the resolution.

The draft resolution has been subjected to careful examination by interested delegations and enjoys wide support. My delegation therefore hopes that the Committee will agree, as with similar text in the past, to adopt the draft resolution without a vote.

Ms. Moal-Makame (France) (*spoke in French*): I take the floor on behalf of the 27 States members of the European Union (EU) on the draft resolution entitled "The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation" (A/C.1/63/L.38). The European Union is committed to promoting the universalization of this instrument and to strengthening it where necessary. We wish to contribute to that through the adoption of this text, which follows upon the achievements of the resolutions previously introduced by the Chair of the Code, most recently in 2005. Given the importance we attach to the Code, the European Union has decided to depart from its customary practice and to mandate its presidency to introduce a draft resolution to the First Committee on behalf of its member States. The text has been sponsored by more than 100 States Members of the United Nations, and I wish again to thank them for their support.

The Code reflects the outcome of broad consultations. Its essential objective is to increase transparency through pre-notification procedures for

missile and space vehicle launches and through exchanges of information on related policies and programmes. Since its adoption, 130 States have acceded to the Code.

The draft resolution that we have submitted this year is an updating of previous resolutions. It encourages the exploration of further ways and means to deal effectively with the problem of the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. This matter has been the subject of the work of experts, which has taken place this year in the United Nations framework and which brought about the adoption of a report that we will no doubt have occasion to revisit.

Next, I take the floor on behalf of the European Union with respect to draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.55, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty". The candidate countries Turkey, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Stabilization and Association Process countries and potential candidates Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, as well as Norway, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this statement.

As they do every year with similar texts, the States members of the European Union are sponsors of this draft resolution and wish to indicate their particular support for its message. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a crucial instrument for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and the European Union attaches the greatest importance to its entry into force as soon as possible. It also welcomes the fact that Bahamas, Barbados, Colombia and Malaysia have submitted their Treaty ratification instruments during the past year. It also welcomes the signature by Burundi, Iraq and Timor-Leste and calls upon these States to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible so that they may become States parties.

We note, *inter alia*, that the ministerial meeting on the CTBT, held in September in New York, reflects a new impetus in favour of the entry into force of the Treaty. More generally, the European Union continues to call upon all States, in particular the annex 2 States, to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay and without conditions.

The European Union continues its determined action in favour of the Treaty and in support of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). On

15 July it adopted a new joint action amounting to €2.316 million in support of verification, surveillance and oversight activities of the CTBTO and member States. Among its objectives is to contribute to the strengthening of radionuclide detection capacities and to bring technical assistance to signatory States from Africa so that they can fully participate and contribute to the Treaty's monitoring system.

The European Union is aware of what is at stake regarding the entry into force of the CTBT in the context of the next Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and it has also decided internally to take every opportunity to make contact with States not yet parties to the CTBT in order to move forward the cause of its universalization. Moreover, the European Union calls upon all States parties to respect their financial commitments towards the CTBTO. The effort must be maintained in order, *inter alia*, to make it possible to complete the verification regime planned by the Treaty and thus to ensure its complete credibility.

The Chairperson: I call on the representative of Mexico, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.55.

Ms. Rodríguez (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): Mexico is proud today to introduce the draft resolution entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty" (A/C.1/63/L.55) on behalf of its large number of sponsors.

Twelve years have passed since the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was adopted and opened for signature, and it is essential that the Treaty enter into force as quickly as possible. The universalization of the Treaty should be a collective goal of the international community. The main message of this draft resolution is to urge all States to sign and ratify the Treaty, particularly those whose ratification is required for the Treaty's entry into force.

The draft resolution also urges States to maintain their moratoriums and refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. Further, it reaffirms the need to continue efforts to create a verification regime for compliance with the Treaty. The draft resolution also welcomes the ratification of the Treaty by Colombia, Barbados, Malaysia and Burundi and the signature by Iraq and Timor-Leste this year.

Finally, it requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to prepare a report on the efforts of States that have ratified the Treaty towards its universalization and possibilities for providing assistance on ratification procedures to States that so request it, and to submit such a report to the next session of the General Assembly.

Convinced of the importance of this draft resolution we maintain our invitation to all those delegations that so wish to join the list of sponsors. Finally, we call upon delegations to give this draft resolution their strong support.

Mr. Benítez Versón (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): As in previous years, Cuba has sponsored and will vote in favour of many of the draft resolutions in cluster 1, "Nuclear weapons". That is the case with draft resolutions A/C.1/63/L.7, entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", A/C.1/63/L.14, entitled "Nuclear disarmament", A/C.1/63/L.15, entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons", A/C.1/63/L.16, entitled "Reducing nuclear danger", and A/C.1/63/L.19, entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*".

Cuba believes that draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.14, entitled "Nuclear disarmament" is one of the First Committee texts that most completely addresses the issue of nuclear disarmament, which is and must continue to be the highest priority within the sphere of disarmament. This year, draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.14 has indeed been strengthened. Here, we are particularly gratified that a number of proposals made by the Cuban delegation have been incorporated into the text.

We regret that, although each year a resolution is adopted on follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, as will be the case this year when we adopt draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.19, the advisory opinion continues not to be implemented. Here, Cuba reaffirms the importance of the Court's unanimous conclusion that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

The Chairperson: I call on the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.27.

Mr. Bolourian (Islamic Republic of Iran): My delegation, in its statement during the general debate, stated its intention to present a draft resolution on the issue of missiles, taking into account the successful conclusion of the work of the third Panel of Governmental Experts. In that regard I should like to make a few points.

Egypt, Indonesia and the Islamic Republic of Iran are the traditional sponsors of the draft resolution entitled "Missiles". This year's text has been issued as document A/C.1/63/L.27.

The third Panel of Governmental Experts, which was established pursuant to resolution 59/67, had serious, in-depth and comprehensive discussions in a constructive manner on the complex issue of missiles in all its aspects, including areas where consensus could be reached. Notwithstanding the complexity of the issue and the existence of divergent views, the Panel successfully concluded its work by adopting a consensus report. The report has already been distributed as document A/63/176.

The adoption of the report by consensus is encouraging and reflects the value of discussions and deliberations on the complex issue of missiles by experts within the United Nations. As the Secretary-General said in his report to the General Assembly in 2006 (A/61/168), there is no other forum where experts from States with extremely diverse perspectives can engage in a comprehensive and thorough discussion of these issues with the explicit objective of reaching consensus on the issue of missiles in all its aspects. Moreover, the third Panel, in the conclusions of its report, emphasized the important role of the United Nations in providing a more structured and effective mechanism to build such a consensus.

Since the introduction of this item into the agenda of the General Assembly in 1991, increasing support has been given to addressing the issue of missiles in all its aspects within the framework of the United Nations. For instance, the Non-Aligned Movement, in the final document of its Ministerial Conference held in July 2008, emphasized the need to keep the issue of missiles in all its aspects on the agenda of the General Assembly and welcomed the successful conclusion of the work of the third Panel of Governmental Experts.

Draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.27 has been prepared in keeping with the spirit of its predecessors. Operative paragraph 1 welcomes the report of the Secretary-General. Paragraph 2 seeks the views of Member States on the report and requests the Secretary-General to submit those views in a report to the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

We hope that delegations will be able to support the draft resolution, as they have supported the corresponding resolutions in previous years.

Mr. Hallak (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): In our statement on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East we spoke of this as a time when nuclear arsenals are growing, stockpiles increasing and new kinds of weapons being developed, when there is a threat that such weapons will be used and when nuclear-weapon States have not fulfilled the commitments and pledges they made during the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Today, States are being pressured in order to stop them from possessing the means to defend their security and sovereignty, which is a right enshrined in the Charter, in international law and in international conventions.

At a time when we are looking forward to the total elimination of nuclear weapons and to achieving the universality of the NPT, the actions of Israel — which possesses these weapons outside the non-proliferation regime — are being overlooked. Rather, Israel is being supported at a time when States parties are stripped of their right to use technology for peaceful purposes and in pursuit of development, the main reason for which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established.

In the Middle East, Israel persists in an aggressive armaments policy based on a gigantic arsenal of conventional and non-conventional weapons of all kinds, including weapons of mass destruction, foremost among them nuclear weapons. It is conducting a dangerous military nuclear programme that jeopardizes the security of the area and the entire world, without any effective international control — and indeed without any international response to this grave situation.

The Middle East is thus the most severely threatened region in the world and the most exposed to falsification of facts. Syria was one of the first States to call for turning the Middle East into a zone free of all

weapons of mass destruction, foremost among them nuclear weapons. It has worked tirelessly to achieve that goal. It has offered numerous initiatives to that end, most recently the draft Security Council resolution put forward by Syria on behalf of the Arab Group on 29 December 2003 (A/58/667, annex), which was intended to rid the region of all weapons of mass destruction, foremost among them nuclear weapons, under joint control by the international community and the United Nations, in a manner that enhances the multilateral conventions on disarmament.

The failure thus far to adopt that Arab initiative only encourages Israel to persist in its refusal to accede to the NPT and to subject all its nuclear installation and activities to IAEA safeguards. In that respect we call on the international community to bring pressure to bear on Israel to accede to the NPT and to find an effective mechanism to achieve that goal in a way that contributes to the stability of the region and achieves a just and comprehensive peace there.

The Chairperson: We have heard the last general statement on this cluster. The Committee will now take action on draft resolutions submitted under cluster 1. I shall now give the floor to representatives wishing to speak in explanation of vote before the voting.

Mr. Benítez Versón (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): As on previous occasions, Cuba will abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.38, entitled “The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation”. My country has expressed objections to the less-than-transparent and selective process under which the Code of Conduct was negotiated. The Code was drafted and adopted in a process outside the United Nations framework that did not include all interested countries.

Cuba believes that the issue of missiles in all its aspects can and should be considered within the United Nations and in an inclusive, transparent manner without discrimination or selective criteria. All interested Member States have the legitimate right to participate openly in all phases of the consideration of the subject and in the adoption of related practical measures.

In our view, the Code of Conduct has significant defects and limitations and does not adequately reflect the primary interests of a significant group of countries. Among these problems we can mention the following: first, the Code does not address the matter of the peaceful use of missile technology or the need to

cooperate in this sphere in order to address the specific needs of developing countries.

Secondly, its focus is limited to the horizontal aspect of proliferation and ignores vertical proliferation. We believe that a broad, balanced and non-discriminatory treatment of the issue of missiles demands that we go beyond horizontal proliferation to include other, vertical, aspects that are no less important, such as the design, development, testing and deployment of missiles.

Thirdly, the Code fails to address the most serious problem: the existence and constant development of nuclear weapons, of which ballistic missiles are merely a delivery system.

Fourthly, the Code refers only to ballistic missiles and ignores other types of missiles, in spite of their importance.

Fifthly, the Code does not address matters tied to assistance and cooperation, matters that must be borne in mind when addressing the issue of missiles.

As has happened in the past, during the consultations on the text, the main sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.38 indicated clearly that they were not prepared to consider proposals for amendments. We regret that lack of flexibility; it does not help in reconciling views. We hope that this modus operandi will be reconsidered in the future by those promoting draft resolutions on this item.

Cuba is fully committed to all aspects of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, including ballistic missiles. We are convinced that the legally binding and multilaterally negotiated instruments constitute the best mechanisms and that they are ultimately the only truly effective mechanisms for addressing matters of disarmament and non-proliferation, including the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

Mr. Ruddyard (Indonesia): My delegation has requested the floor to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.38, entitled "The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation". My delegation remains convinced of the need for a multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive, transparent and non-discriminatory approach to the issue of missiles in all its aspects, as a contribution to international peace and security. Indonesia therefore

supports the involvement of the United Nations in addressing the issue of missiles in all its aspects.

The draft resolution remains unchanged since the previous resolution on the subject, resolution 60/62, adopted three years ago, including the continued exclusion of the word "development" from the text. The inclusion of the word "development" in addition to the existing word "proliferation" would have yielded a balanced text with regard to these weapons and their means of delivery. In addition, the draft text does not clearly mention the central role of the United Nations in the area of missiles, which we deem very important.

For that reason my delegation will abstain in the vote on this draft resolution.

Ms. Radian-Gordon (Israel): The current situation vis-à-vis nuclear proliferation in the Middle East warrants the question whether draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.2, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", has any connection with reality. There is no doubt that a risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East indeed exists. There have been many alarming proliferation developments in recent years in the Middle East; none of them involved Israel, but all of them have challenged our security. Three out of four widely acknowledged cases have taken place in the Middle East, and another case is under investigation.

These developments demonstrate an alarming attitude of certain States of the region to their international commitments in the nuclear domain. Our region also suffers from the irresponsible behaviour of some States outside the region who continue to export ballistic missiles and technology related to weapons of mass destruction to countries of the region.

Israel expects that under the title of "Risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East" the international community would call, at a minimum, for compliance by States with their relevant international obligations. This is particularly true of Iran's ongoing clandestine activities in the nuclear sphere and its total disregard of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Security Council resolutions.

Lamentably this draft resolution chooses to ignore relevant IAEA and Security Council resolutions as well as the evidence contained in relevant reports regarding such violations. Moreover the draft resolution focuses entirely on Israel and singles it out.

It does so while overlooking Iran's hostile policies and statements, including calls made by the Iranian President for Israel's destruction. These have been accompanied by vicious anti-Semitic remarks, as were made yet again a short while ago during the General Assembly's general debate.

Adopting such a resolution will not serve the greater objective of curbing proliferation in the Middle East. Nor will it contribute to the role and standing of this body. We call upon representatives to vote against this draft resolution and distance themselves from attempts aimed at deviating from the focus of addressing the real risks of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and thus diminishing the credibility of this United Nations body.

The Chairperson: May I remind representatives that the Committee is hearing explanations of vote before the voting and not hearing general statements.

Ms. Moal-Makame (France) (*spoke in French*): I am speaking on behalf of the European Union on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.2, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East". The candidate countries Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Montenegro and Serbia, as well as Norway and the Republic of Moldova join this statement.

The European Union intends to vote in favour of this draft resolution. The European Union is fully committed to the implementation of resolutions on the Middle East adopted by the Security Council and at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The European Union supports the objective of the universalization of the NPT. That is a well-known and constant position.

It also favours the creation in the Middle East of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. We call upon all States of the region that have not yet done so to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. We also call upon them to accede to the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions and to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a full-scope safeguards agreement and an additional protocol.

For more than 10 years the European Union has been involved, along with Mediterranean countries, in

the Barcelona process, which has made it possible to find common ground on a wide range of issues and has the objective, inter alia, of working towards establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including their delivery systems, in the Middle East.

On 13 July this year Mediterranean and European Union heads of State or Government met in Paris to launch the Union for the Mediterranean. This ambitious initiative is aimed at gathering all the States sharing the same objective, namely to revitalize efforts to transform the Mediterranean into a peaceful, democratic, cooperative and prosperous area. The establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, relying on verification instruments, is one objective of this initiative.

Since the last session of the General Assembly, the European Union has worked to continue the process of consideration and rapprochement around the objective of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Along with the assistance of the European Union Institute of Security Studies, it held last spring in Paris an informal forum that brought together representatives from States of the region, the European Union, the League of Arab States, the secretariat of the Council of the European Union, national authorities dealing with nuclear issues, universities and think tanks. The European Union wishes to continue this exercise. Other initiatives on the same subject have taken place in several European Union countries.

In addition, the European Union wishes to recall that guidelines have existed since 1999 for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and that these must be the subject of consultations among all parties. This is particularly true in the Middle East. Moreover, the European Union considers that a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East must be truly verifiable. There is no doubt that the IAEA will have a major role to play in this regard. That is why it is important for all States in the region to sign, ratify and implement an additional protocol and fully cooperate with the Agency.

Equally, it goes without saying that the resolution of violations of non-proliferation obligations in the region is essential if we wish to see the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In this

regard, the European Union expresses its concerns regarding the absence in this draft resolution of references to certain relevant developments concerning nuclear proliferation in the Middle East that continue to stand in the way of the objective sought.

The European Union regrets Iran's persistent failure to meet the demands of the Security Council and of the IAEA Board of Governors by refusing to suspend enrichment, to shed full light on its past and present activities or to accord the IAEA the access and cooperation that it is seeking to settle pending issues mentioned in its reports, in order to restore trust. The European Union remains committed to promptly finding a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and reaffirms its firm commitment to a dual-track approach.

We urge Iran to open the way for negotiations by complying with Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008). We reaffirm our support for proposals presented to Iran in June 2006 by the Secretary-General and the European Union High Representative, which were developed in a revised offer given to Iran on 14 June 2008.

Moreover, the European Union has noted the comments made by the Director General of the IAEA relative to the allegations concerning a non-declared nuclear installation in Syria. We welcome the fact that the IAEA decided to carry out an investigation concerning this in late June, and we stress our desire to see full cooperation by Syria with the Agency so that the Agency can fulfil its mandate in satisfactory conditions. The European Union continues to look forward to the IAEA inspection report.

The goal of creating a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East cannot be achieved unless all States of the area are convinced that their security will not be diminished but will be enhanced by becoming part of such a mechanism. This presupposes a dialogue among parties, peace negotiations and the building of trust.

Mr. Kang Myong Chol (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.58*, entitled "Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", sponsored by Japan, the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea rejects strongly the last

preambular paragraph. The last preambular paragraph includes the following phrase:

"Recognizing the importance of implementing Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) of 14 October 2006 with regard to the nuclear test proclaimed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ...".

Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) is no more than a product of irresponsibility and unfairness on the part of the Security Council. The Security Council, rather than making an issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear test should have called to account the country that caused the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to carry out that test. The nuclear test carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is an exercise of a rightful measure for its self-defence. Its nuclear deterrence constitutes a reliable guarantee for the peace and security of the Korean peninsula and beyond.

Lurking behind this paragraph is the crafty motive of Japan to divert elsewhere the attention of the international community from Japan's remilitarization attempts. Japan should commit itself before the international community to full implementation of its obligations under the six-party agreements, refraining from absurd calls for implementation of Security Council resolution 1718 (2006), which will only complicate the ongoing process of the Six-Party Talks. For these reasons, my delegation will vote against the draft resolution as a whole.

Mr. Bolourian (Islamic Republic of Iran): I have taken the floor to explain the position of my delegation regarding draft resolutions A/C.1/63/L.1, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East", and A/C.1/63/L.2, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", on which the Committee will take action in a few minutes.

Since Iran's initiative in 1974, the General Assembly has consistently endorsed the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and has recognized that such a zone would greatly enhance international peace and security. Adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by all parties directly concerned is a prerequisite for ensuring the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

As was reflected in many statements by Member States during our exercise in the Committee, all in the Middle East region except the Zionist regime have become parties to the Treaty. That regime remains the only impediment to realizing such a zone in the Middle East. The Middle East could have become a nuclear-weapon-free zone had it not been for that regime's continued refusal to subject itself to any type of international monitoring.

Addressing the threat posed by the unabated nuclear-weapons programme of that regime to regional and international peace and security requires meaningful actions. It is no secret that the United States, through the adoption of extremely damaging policies, is actively hindering any meaningful action in international forums to address this real threat.

Indifference with regard to the Zionist regime's nuclear weapons is a disservice to the non-proliferation regime. In this context we believe that the inconsistent approach of certain European countries to the non-proliferation regime has sent a wrong message to the Zionist regime. If those Western States continue to turn a blind eye towards this real proliferation threat, they will lose their remaining credibility throughout the Middle East region.

Unjustified and unwarranted focus on peaceful and safeguarded nuclear facilities rather than on addressing the existing proliferation threat posed by the unsafeguarded and secret nuclear weapons installations of the Zionist regime is counterproductive and constitutes a dangerous distraction. We remain committed to sparing no effort in promoting the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

The Chairperson: We have heard the last speaker in explanation of vote before the voting.

The Committee will now take a decision on draft resolutions in cluster 1. First the Committee will take a decision on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.1. I give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Alasaniya (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.1, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Egypt at the 10th meeting, on 16 October 2008. The sponsor of the draft resolution is named in document A/C.1/63/L.1.

The Chairperson: The sponsor has expressed the wish that the draft resolution be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.1 was adopted.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.2. A recorded vote has been requested. A separate recorded vote has been requested on the sixth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution. I give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Alasaniya (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): The Committee is taking action on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.2, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Egypt at the 10th meeting, on 16 October 2008. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/63/L.2 and A/C.1/63/CRP.3.

A separate recorded vote has been requested on the sixth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.2. The Committee will now take a separate vote on the sixth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.2, which reads as follows:

"Recognizing with satisfaction that, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Conference undertook to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty, called upon those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities, and underlined the necessity of universal adherence to the Treaty and of strict compliance by all parties with their obligations under the Treaty".

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize,

Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

India, Israel, Pakistan, United States of America.

Abstaining:

Bhutan, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ethiopia, Mauritius.

The sixth preambular paragraph was retained by 157 votes to 4, with 5 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of Iraq advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.]

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.2 as a whole. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democrat Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Palau, United States of America.

Abstaining:

Australia, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, India, Niger, Nigeria.

Draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.2 as a whole was adopted by 159 votes to 5, with 7 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegations of Niger and Nigeria advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.]

The Chairperson: The Committee will now take a decision on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.5. A recorded vote has been requested. I give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Alasaniya (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.5, entitled "Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Switzerland at the 10th meeting, on 16 October 2008. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/63/L.5 and A/C.1/63/CRP.3** and Add.3 and Add.4.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,

Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining:

Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Montenegro, Netherlands, Poland, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine.

Draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.5 was adopted by 134 votes to 3, with 32 abstentions.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.15. A recorded vote has been requested. I give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Alasaniya (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now vote on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.15, entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of India at the 10th meeting, on 16 October 2008. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/63/L.15 and A/C.1/63/CRP.3 and Add.3 and Add.4.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain,

Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining:

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Marshall Islands, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Serbia, Uzbekistan.

Draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.15 was adopted by 110 votes to 50, with 11 abstentions.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.16*. A recorded vote has been requested. I give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Alasaniya (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now vote on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.16*, entitled "Reducing nuclear danger". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of India at the 10th meeting, on 16 October 2008. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/63/L.16* and A/C.1/63/CRP.3/Add.3 and Add.4.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,

Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining:

Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Marshall Islands, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Serbia, Uzbekistan.

Draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.16 was adopted by 108 votes to 50, with 13 abstentions.*

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.19. A recorded vote has been requested. I give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Alasaniya (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.19, entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Malaysia at the 18th meeting, on 27 October 2008. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/63/L.19 and A/C.1/63/CRP.3/Add.1*, Add.3 and Add.4.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic

Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining:

Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Montenegro, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.

Draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.19 was adopted by 118 votes to 30, with 22 abstentions.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.27. A recorded vote has been requested. I give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Alasaniya (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now proceed to the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.27, entitled "Missiles". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the

19th meeting, on 28 October 2008. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/63/L.27.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

Denmark, France, Israel, Lithuania, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Republic of

Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine.

Draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.27 was adopted by 112 votes to 9, with 50 abstentions.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.28. I give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Alasaniya (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.28, entitled "Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status", was introduced by the representative of Mongolia at the 19th meeting, on 28 October 2008. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/63/L.28 and A/C.1/63/CRP.3** and Add.5.

The Chairperson: The sponsors have expressed the wish that the draft resolution be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.28 was adopted.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.38. A recorded vote has been requested. I give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Alasaniya (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now vote on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.38, entitled "The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union at the 11th meeting, on 17 October 2008. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/63/L.38 and A/C.1/63/CRP.3/Add.3, Add.4 and Add.5. In addition, Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have become sponsors of the draft resolution.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh,

Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Zambia.

Against:

Iran (Islamic Republic of).

Abstaining:

Algeria, Bolivia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen.

Draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.38 was adopted by 145 votes to 1, with 20 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of the Sudan advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.]

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.40. A recorded vote has been requested. A separate recorded vote has been requested on operative paragraph 6. I give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Alasaniya (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now vote on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.40, entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Brazil at the 8th meeting, on 14 October 2008. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/63/L.40 and A/C.1/63/CRP.3** and Add.1*, Add.2 and Add.5. In addition Grenada, Jamaica and Uruguay have become sponsors of the draft resolution.

A separate recorded vote has been requested on operative paragraph 6. The Committee will now take a separate vote on operative paragraph 6 of draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.40.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea,

Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

India, Pakistan.

Abstaining:

Bhutan, France, Israel, Marshall Islands, Nepal, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Operative paragraph 6 was retained by 157 votes to 2, with 8 abstentions.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.40 as a whole. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,

Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining:

Bhutan, India, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Pakistan, Palau, Russian Federation.

Draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.40 as a whole was adopted by 161 votes to 3, with 8 abstentions.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now take action on draft decision A/C.1/63/L.54. A recorded vote has been requested. I give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Alasaniya (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now vote on draft decision A/C.1/63/L.54, entitled "United Nations conference to identify appropriate ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament". The draft decision was introduced by the representative of Mexico at the 19th meeting, on 28 October 2008. The sponsor of the draft decision is named in document A/C.1/63/L.54.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining:

Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland,

the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine.

Draft decision A/C.1/63/L.54 was adopted by 121 votes to 3, with 45 abstentions.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.55. A recorded vote has been requested. I give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Alasaniya (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now vote on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.55, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Mexico at the 19th meeting, on 28 October 2008. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/63/L.55 and A/C.1/63/CRP.3/Add.1, Add.2, Add.3, Add.4 and Add.5.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,

Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

United States of America.

Abstaining:

India, Mauritius, Syrian Arab Republic.

Draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.55 was adopted by 168 votes to 1, with 3 abstentions.

The Chairperson: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.58*. A recorded vote has been requested. I give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Alasaniya (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now vote on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.58*, entitled “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”. The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Japan at the 9th meeting, on 15 October 2008. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in documents A/C.1/63/L.58* and A/C.1/63/CRP.3/Add.1, Add.2, Add.3, Add.4 and Add.5. In addition, Albania, Andorra, Denmark, Kyrgyzstan, the Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, San Marino and Seychelles have become sponsors of the draft resolution.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria,

Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, India, Israel, United States of America.

Abstaining:

Bhutan, China, Cuba, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Myanmar, Pakistan.

Draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.58 was adopted by 163 votes to 4, with 6 abstentions.*

The Chairperson: The Committee has thus completed action on draft resolutions in cluster 1, “Nuclear weapons”.

I shall now give the floor to representatives wishing to speak in explanation of vote or position on draft resolutions or decisions just adopted. I have a number of speakers on my list and would ask them to make the most of the time available since the Committee will be discussing another cluster this afternoon.

Mr. Aly (Egypt): I take the floor to explain the vote of Egypt on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.38, entitled “The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation”. Egypt abstained in the vote on that draft resolution as it believes that the Code was a product of export control regimes developed outside the United Nations in a discriminatory and exclusive manner.

Furthermore, Egypt strongly believes that the Code is neither balanced in its approach nor comprehensive in its scope. By focusing on the issue of ballistic missiles while turning a blind eye to other, more advanced, means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction, the Code only adds to its weakness in promoting the peaceful use of space technologies. It has also failed significantly since its adoption to develop in a manner that could address its own weaknesses and shortcomings.

While believing that any consideration of the issue of missiles can take place only in the context of the United Nations in order to enjoy both legitimacy and effectiveness, Egypt, together with Iran and Indonesia, has this year sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.27, entitled “Missiles”. That draft resolution welcomes the conclusion of the work of the Panel of Governmental Experts on this issue in 2008 and requests States to present their views on it to the Secretary-General. We see this as the way forward to further consider, in a constructive and comprehensive manner, the issue of missiles in the context of the United Nations.

Mrs. Escorcía (Colombia) (*spoke in Spanish*): I wish to refer to draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.55, entitled “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty” (CTBT). Colombia has a strong commitment to the disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Our pacifist stance is reflected in our country’s active participation in all international forums dealing with these matters and in our adherence to all relevant international legal instruments.

In that connection, Colombia participated in the negotiation of the CTBT and signed it as soon as it was opened for signature. All members are aware of Colombia’s commitment to the Treaty, which has been made clear at the successive conferences on facilitating the entry into force of the Treaty and at the meetings of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

They are also aware of my Government’s efforts to find a domestic legal option that would allow it to ratify the Treaty. After exhaustive analysis, we have found a way to deposit our instrument of ratification, through a declaration that will form part of that instrument.

For all these reasons, we call today upon all annex 2 States that have not done so to ratify the Treaty, in order to demonstrate their political will and their commitment to international peace and security. We hope and trust that the Treaty will quickly enter into force so that it can become an effective instrument for containing the development of new nuclear weapons and for limiting the improvement of those already existing. Only in that way can we guarantee international peace and security for future generations.

Mr. Tan (Singapore): I am taking the floor to explain my delegation’s abstention in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.27, entitled “Missiles”. Singapore acknowledges the growing military significance of missiles in general, an issue that warrants increased international attention. Singapore supports all initiatives against the indiscriminate use of missiles, especially when they are directed at innocent and defenceless civilians and when they are used as weapons of mass destruction.

At the same time, we should not disregard legitimate security concerns of States and the right to use missiles in self-defence. Therefore, the international movement to examine the issue of missiles in all aspects needs to recognize both its impact on regional and global security and the legitimate right of States to use missiles for self-defence.

That said, Singapore is also concerned at the increasing number of groups of governmental experts being convened to discuss disarmament and non-proliferation issues. We believe that these issues should continue to be discussed by all Member States in an inclusive, open and transparent manner. However, should Member States decide that a group of

governmental experts is necessary, the scope and objective of its work must be clearly defined to ensure that the group can provide focused recommendations that are helpful to Member States.

Mr. Wang Qun (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): China abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.5, entitled “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems”. In explaining our vote, I should like to make some comments on China’s position on the draft resolution and on the question of interim measures.

China has always stood for the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons and is ready to implement interim measures, under the proper circumstances and as part of an appropriate process of nuclear disarmament. Meanwhile we believe that in implementing any nuclear disarmament measures, including interim measures, it is imperative to follow the two important principles set out in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: the maintenance of global strategic stability and undiminished security for all countries.

China believes that the most realistic and rational interim measure for nuclear disarmament at this stage is for all nuclear-weapon States to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons or to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones at any time or under any circumstances, and on that basis to accede to relevant international legal instruments.

China is the only nuclear-weapon Power that has made and implemented such a commitment. We call upon all other nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so to do the same.

China has noted the divergent views that exist regarding the real impact that decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems can have. In view of this, China abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.5, entitled “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems”.

The Chairperson: Before we continue, may I say that there are still 20 speakers, and the list is growing. I plead with members to make their statements in explanation of vote as concise as possible so that our work can advance.

Mrs. Ancidey (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) (*spoke in Spanish*): The delegation of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.38. We believe that The Hague Code of Conduct is limited to a restricted focus on missiles that considers the subject without taking into consideration other elements of key importance for developing countries. These include international cooperation in research and development of new technologies for peaceful purposes in outer space.

That is why the Code has not been able to draw a distinction between technology for delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction and that for peaceful activities. We are thus convinced of the need to work to make it possible for consideration of this subject to continue in a United Nations framework. That would foster a transparent, broad and non-discriminatory debate aimed at bringing about the necessary consensus.

In 2003 the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela subscribed to the Hague Code on the understanding that it could constitute an approach that would foster broad agreements exclusively to address the threat posed by the development of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. We believe that the lack of clarity in the operation of the Code in that area gives rise to reservations regarding its relevance for countries such as ours.

Mr. Rao (India): India has requested the floor to convey its position in the voting on a number of draft resolutions.

India abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.2, entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”, as a whole and voted against its sixth preambular paragraph, as we believe that the focus of this draft resolution should be limited to the region that it intends to address. India’s position on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is well known. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which codified the prevailing customary international law, provides that States are bound by a treaty based on the principle of free consent. The call to those States remaining outside the NPT to accede to it and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all their nuclear activities is at variance with that principle and does not reflect current realities.

On draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.5, entitled “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems”, India has long been sponsoring draft resolutions entitled “Reducing nuclear danger”, which have been adopted by this Committee by a large majority for a decade now. Last year, when the draft resolution entitled “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems” was introduced for the first time, India extended its support, given the common objectives of the two draft resolutions and the congruence in their content. India’s approach is to assess draft resolutions by an objective standard and on their merits. Unlike some of the sponsors of this draft resolution India did not use any other standard and has therefore cast a positive vote again.

As a country that maintains the most friendly and fraternal of ties with Mongolia, India welcomes the adoption without a vote of draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.28, entitled “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status”. We note the many steps Mongolia has taken to reinforce such a status and the support and security assurances for such status that Mongolia has received from Member States, particularly those that possess nuclear weapons. India fully respects the choice made by Mongolia and is willing to respond whenever required with every possible support and commitment to Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status.

Turning to draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.38, entitled “The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation”, India is fully committed to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including ballistic missiles. The proliferation of ballistic missiles in our region has had an adverse impact on India’s security. There is no legal regime governing the possession and use of missiles. The complexity of this issue arises mainly due to the untenable claims made by some States regarding the exclusive right to possess advanced weapons systems and to their continued modernization. Any initiative to address these concerns in a sustainable and comprehensive manner should be through an inclusive process based on the principle of equal and legitimate security. We welcome the fact that the Panel of Governmental Experts on the issue of missiles in all its aspects emphasized in its report, contained in document A/63/176, the important role of the United Nations in providing a more structured and effective mechanism to build a consensus.

India abstained in the voting on this draft resolution, as it does not adequately recognize the need for a more inclusive approach, such as the one recommended in the report of the Panel of Governmental Experts. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that several of the sponsors of the draft resolution have their experts on the Panel of Governmental Experts on the issue of missiles, which adopted its report by consensus.

On draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.40, entitled “Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas”, India voted against operative paragraph 6 and abstained in the voting on the draft resolution as a whole. We believe that the call in operative paragraph 6 for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia contravenes the well-established principle that nuclear-weapon-free zones must be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. This specific proposal has no greater validity than those regarding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other parts of the world such as in East Asia, Western Europe or North America, where nuclear weapons also exist and are deployed.

On draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.58*, entitled “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”, India remains committed to the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. India has consistently held the view that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing. We continue to support a credible time-bound programme for global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament. India cannot accept the call to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon State. As India supports the commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material cut-off treaty the question of a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons does not arise. Our negative vote on this draft resolution must not be seen as casting a shadow on India’s readiness to work with others to achieve global disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.

Mr. Bolourian (Islamic Republic of Iran): I have taken the floor to explain the position of my delegation on draft resolutions A/C.1/63/L.38 and A/C.1/63/L.58*.

The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation was drafted and endorsed outside the United Nations in an opaque manner and without the participation of all interested countries. Moreover, that selective, unbalanced and limited approach has been pursued in devising the content of the Code. Regrettably, the same approach governed the discussions on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.38. Rejecting any amendments on the said draft may be construed as a continuation of the intention of the sponsors to base their work on a take-it-or-leave-it approach. We were encouraged by the statement of the then Chairman of the Code in 2005, through which substantive and positive consideration of the amendments presented by the non-subscribing States was promised. Nevertheless, we have not noticed any substantive changes in the present draft resolution when compared with the previous one, and it seems that the aforementioned promise was not realized. Therefore, my delegation was once again forced to vote against the draft resolution on this item.

Turning to draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.58*, we share the main objective of the draft resolution, which is the call for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Indeed the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. The current draft resolution just adopted by the Committee, in our view, is not appropriately balanced. For instance, while the text refers to the Conference on Disarmament it is focused on only one issue, namely a fissile material cut-off treaty. In the meantime, the reference to the fissile material cut-off treaty is not consistent with previous agreements among Member States on its verifiability or with the mandate agreed upon by the Conference on Disarmament in 1995. Therefore, my delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.58*.

Mr. Mohamad (Malaysia): My delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.38, entitled “The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation”. My delegation takes note of the fact that more countries have subscribed to the Hague Code of Conduct since the last time a draft resolution on this item was considered by the First Committee. However, it is my delegation’s view that an instrument intended to address ways and means of dealing with the problem of ballistic missile proliferation must be comprehensive and must take

into account all our concerns. It is the United Nations that should address this issue. We hope that when we consider this item again in future, this element of highlighting the role of the United Nations could be inserted in the text, specifically in operative paragraph 3.

Mr. Vasiliev (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): The Russian Federation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.5, entitled “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems”, since we believe that it makes selective use of the provisions of the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), that is, the programme of 13 practical steps in the area of nuclear disarmament. At the same time, that outcome was a comprehensive compromise document, and all of its elements are intertwined.

We believe that the issue of decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear forces cannot be seen in isolation from defence doctrines and without taking into account today’s realities in the overall international security system. What is more, the sponsors did not take into account the technical and technological differences and unique features of the designs of nuclear weapons systems or the complexities of reliably verifying declared decreases in the operational readiness of strategic delivery vehicles. In practical terms, this makes the present initiative not feasible. At the same time, we confirm Russia’s readiness to meet its obligations under article VI of the NPT, including in conformity with decisions adopted at successive Review Conferences.

I would also note that the Russian delegation supported draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.38, entitled “The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation”, since we see the Code as an important forum for enhancing transparency and confidence-building measures, and ultimately one of the negotiating platforms for crafting a legally binding multilateral arrangement on a global regime for missile non-proliferation. In addressing this task the United Nations has an important role to play, including through the work of the Panel of Governmental Experts on missiles.

At the same time we must note that the Code is insufficiently effective in its current form. Subscriber States need to seek full compliance by all with their

obligations. It is heartening that the draft resolution had a large number of sponsors, but we have seen in practice that fewer than half of the participants frequently take part in Code meetings, and that individual countries do not meet their Code obligations, specifically by not sending prior notification of ballistic missile launches. Another important task is to further enhance and universalize the Hague Code of Conduct, first and foremost through accession by those countries that have major missile capabilities. We anticipate that the decision adopted today will serve as an impetus for remedying the situation with respect to the Hague Code of Conduct.

Mr. Hallak (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): My delegation wishes to explain its votes on three draft resolutions.

First, on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.38, entitled “The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation”, we underscore our full commitment to the United Nations Charter and to collective multilateral action in the United Nations framework in order to ensure effective implementation of disarmament mechanisms, with a view to eradicating weapons of mass destruction, above all nuclear weapons. A clear approach to nuclear arms control needs to be adopted at all levels, while maintaining the right to legitimate self-defence as provided for by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

My country abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.38, entitled “The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation”, because the Code is selective and discriminatory and focuses on just one type of missile, namely ballistic missiles, ignoring other types of missiles that continue to be the monopoly of certain countries. The Code treats the issue of proliferation from a single standpoint without addressing the causes of proliferation. Even more important, the Code of Conduct runs counter to our multilateral approach in the United Nations.

The Committee has today adopted another draft resolution, entitled “Missiles” (A/C.1/63/L.27), which considers the issue in all its aspects through a comprehensive approach within the United Nations and without discrimination or selectivity. Furthermore, the approach of adopting documents outside the United Nations harms the non-proliferation system and harms disarmament mechanisms. It gives rise to trends that

run counter to the goal of non-proliferation and the aims of the non-proliferation regime.

Secondly, my delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.55, entitled “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty”, because Syria is of the firm view that such a critically important treaty, with its future obligations for all Member States, should not ignore the legitimate concerns of the non-nuclear States — the majority of the world’s States — which have not been given assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Nor does the Treaty permit access to advanced peaceful technology in all areas that are essential for accelerated development.

An important and just observation on the Treaty is that its text does not oblige nuclear States to dismantle their nuclear arsenals within a reasonable time. Nor does it explicitly refer to the illegal use or threat of use of nuclear weapons or affirm the importance of the achievement of the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It has also been observed that the text is limited to curbing nuclear tests without taking account of other kinds of testing or the qualitative development and production of new types of weapons. Observers further agree that the system of verification and on-site inspections opens the door to misuse of the data received from national monitoring systems. The strangest part of the text is that it permits signatory States to take measures against non-signatory States and also permits the Security Council to take such measures.

The Syrian Arab Republic views these major loopholes with extreme concern because Israel alone possesses nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. It is striving for the qualitative and quantitative development of those weapons and refuses to accede to the NPT or to subject its nuclear installations to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. All of this impedes and jeopardizes the effort to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It exposes the area and the entire world to the Israeli nuclear threat without any international response.

Thirdly, my delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.58*, entitled “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”, based on our earnest and total support for

efforts to bring about general and complete disarmament. However, we wish to register our reservations regarding the reference to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty because of our repeatedly expressed position with respect to that Treaty. We believe that this reference detracts from the primary goal of nuclear disarmament.

The Chairperson: I wish to remind members that 16 speakers in explanation of vote remain on my list.

Mr. Tarar (Pakistan): Heeding your call for brevity, Sir, I will skip the preliminaries and get right to the point. We wish to explain our vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/63/L.5, A/C.1/63/L.38, A/C.1/63/L.40, A/C.1/63/L.55 and A/C.1/63/L.58*.

Regarding draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.5 — I am sure we all know the subject so I won't repeat it — we voted in favour of the draft resolution. We share most of the elements referred to in the draft resolution, especially in the fifth preambular paragraph. Moreover we wish to underline that the notion of decreasing the operational status of nuclear weapons must be based on reciprocity. The draft resolution notes only one bilateral initiative. Pakistan too has proposed the establishment of a strategic restraint regime in South Asia, which, *inter alia*, encompasses the rationale and objective of this draft resolution. We hope that the sponsors of the draft resolution will also recognize and support a strategic restraint regime in South Asia.

On draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.38, we have been making our position known on the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. We abstained in the voting on the draft resolution because we feel that the Hague Code of Conduct fails to strike a balance between non-proliferation and disarmament and continues to maintain a lopsided focus on non-proliferation alone.

Regarding draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.55, Pakistan has consistently supported the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and has voted in favour of draft resolutions on this item in the Committee. As in the past, we voted in favour of this year's draft resolution as well. In keeping with our policy of restraint and responsibility Pakistan has observed a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, which we believe is in line with the objectives and purpose of the CTBT. Pakistan would have liked the draft resolution to have appropriately reflected the

unilateral moratorium it has been observing on further nuclear testing.

My delegation continues to believe that the objective of the call in the draft resolution to promote signatures and ratifications leading to the entry into force of the CTBT will be facilitated when major erstwhile proponents of the CTBT decide to restore their support. Acceptance of CTBT obligations on a regional basis in South Asia will also help to expedite the Treaty's entry into force.

Regarding draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.40, we abstained in the voting on the draft resolution as a whole and voted against the retention of operative paragraph 6. We have always supported the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned. The call in operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, however, fails to acknowledge the reality on the ground. Pakistan's delegation wishes to recall that Pakistan itself has sought unsuccessfully to promote this objective in the region for 24 years. The nuclear explosions in South Asia on 11 and 13 May 1998 disrupted the strategic balance. With those explosions the objective of creating a zone free from nuclear weapons was defeated. Pakistan was constrained to conduct its tests to restore strategic stability.

Turning very briefly to draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.58*, we do not agree with several provisions of the draft resolution and, in accordance with our consistent position, we cannot accept the call to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon State without conditions; nor do we consider ourselves bound by any of the provisions that emanate from the NPT Review Conferences or other forums in which Pakistan is not represented. While my delegation supports the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it cannot agree with some of the proposals in the draft resolution which are both selective and unrealistic. In view of those reservations, we decided to abstain in the voting on the draft resolution.

Mr. Čekuolis (Lithuania): Lithuania abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.5, entitled "Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems". Lithuania is pleased with the steps

taken by some States to reduce the operational status of their nuclear weapons systems, including detargeting and reducing alert levels. At the same time, Lithuania is cognizant of the fact that alert levels are commensurate with the prevailing security environment and that, for the time being, deterrence remains a fundamental component of the defence strategy of NATO, of which Lithuania is a member.

Mr. Benítez Versón (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): As was the case with a similar draft resolution last year, Cuba voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.5, entitled “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems”, because the text is going in the right direction and is inspired by a genuine interest in seeking to reduce the unacceptable threat that comes with nuclear weapons. Cuba will continue to support all initiatives that can contribute in any way to attaining the priority goal of disarmament: nuclear disarmament.

At the same time, we believe that the draft resolution just adopted has limitations that should be underscored. We recognize the importance of decreasing the deployment and operational status of nuclear weapons, but we stress that these are basically interim measures and cannot be a substitute for irreversible reductions and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Cuba would have preferred that focus — which is endorsed by the vast majority of the membership — to have been explicitly reflected in the draft resolution. We trust that the draft resolution, which is positive and should be supported and encouraged, can continue to be strengthened in the future.

Ms. Radian-Gordon (Israel): I wish first to explain Israel’s position on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.1, entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East”. Israel has once again joined the consensus on this draft resolution notwithstanding our substantive reservations regarding certain elements of the draft resolution. We have done so since Israel remains committed to a vision of the Middle East evolving into a zone free of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons as well as ballistic missiles. Yet Israel has always maintained that these issues, as well as all regional security issues, can be realistically addressed only within the regional context.

As widely recognized by the international community, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should emanate from within the region. It can only be based on arrangements freely arrived at through direct negotiations among the States of the region and those directly concerned, applying a step-by-step approach. This process should begin with modest confidence-building measures carefully selected so as not to detract from the security margins of any regional State, followed by the establishment of peaceful relations, reconciliation, mutual recognition and good-neighbourliness, and complemented by conventional and non-conventional arms control measures. This process could in due course lead to more ambitious goals such as the establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone.

In this context, it should be recalled that in the Middle East, unlike in other regions in the world where nuclear-weapon-free zones have been established, there are continuing threats against the very existence of the State of Israel. These threats are significantly exacerbated by the irresponsible behaviour of certain States in the region and beyond, concerning the export to the region of technologies related to weapons of mass destruction and the discrepancies between their non-proliferation commitments and their actual behaviour.

The international community should not overlook the fact that the vast majority of cases of non-compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) — three out of four widely acknowledged cases — have taken place in the Middle East and that another case is currently under investigation. Israel will continue to dedicate all its efforts to achieve a stable environment of peace and reconciliation in the Middle East, and we call upon our neighbours to do the same.

On draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.55, entitled “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty” (CTBT), recent years have indicated the severity of the nuclear proliferation challenges faced by the world today. They have been demonstrated, inter alia, by the numerous non-compliance cases, the majority of which have occurred in the Middle East. Today’s challenges emphasize the importance of the CTBT and the possible future contribution of the Treaty to security and stability in the nuclear sphere. Israel’s signature of the CTBT in September 1996 reflects its long-standing policy to bring itself closer, wherever possible, to

international norms on nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation.

Additional obligations undertaken recently by Israel, which are aimed at promoting peace and security in relevant spheres, include a comprehensive reform of Israel's export control legislation in order to bring it in line with the highest standards of export control as set by the international suppliers' regimes; support of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) codes of conduct in the security of radioactive sources and the safety of research reactors; and, recently, by our having joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

Since the establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in November 1996, Israel has participated actively in the development of all elements of the CTBT verification regime. In addition, Israel has been continuously paying all its dues to the CTBTO; it transfers data from its certified seismic stations to the international data centre and participates in all training, workshops and exercise activities related to the on-site inspections. Israel appreciates the significant progress made in the development of the CTBT verification regime, whose completion is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the Treaty.

However, completion of the verification regime still requires additional effort. Major steps required include the continuous build-up of International Monitoring System (IMS) stations and the conduct of future field exercises like the 2008 on-site inspection integrated field exercise held in Kazakhstan recently. It is Israel's view that the Treaty's verification regime should be robust in order to detect non-compliance with its basic obligations and to be immune to abuse, and at the same time to allow each State signatory to protect its national security interests. For Israel, completion of the verification regime constitutes a major consideration for ratification.

In addition, Israel's status in the policymaking organs of the Treaty, including those connected to the geographical region of the Middle East and South Asia, and in the Executive Council of the future CTBTO must be addressed. Sovereign equality must be ensured.

Israel's third consideration is connected to the regional situation and the importance Israel attaches to

the adherence to and compliance with the Treaty by States in the Middle East.

Pending its entry into force we believe that the CTBT should be advanced further by States taking upon themselves the following commitments and activities: maintaining the commitment not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion in line with the Treaty's basic obligations; completion as soon as possible of the CTBT's verification regime; operating, maintaining and testing the IMS and International Data Centre (IDC) prior to entry into force in order to gain experience and to provide early detection capabilities; where coverage gaps of IMS stations exist, taking temporary measures to fill those gaps, such as the operation of auxiliary seismic stations as primary ones until all primary stations are effectively functioning and transferring data; maintaining the technical and apolitical nature of the Preparatory Commission's work and respecting its rules and procedures; and using the IMS and IDC capabilities, without detracting from their primary objective as the verification instruments of the Treaty, to support tsunami warning systems in order to alert threatened populations in a timely manner and save human lives.

As it has done in previous years, Israel continues to vote in favour of the draft resolution to attain the entry into force of the CTBT. Our position stems from the importance that Israel attaches to the objectives of the CTBT.

Mr. Macedo Soares (Brazil): The delegation of Brazil wishes to explain its votes on draft resolutions A/C.1/63/L.15, A/C.1/63/L.16, A/C.1/63/L.38 and A/C.1/63/L.58*.

Brazil voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.15, entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons", because it agrees, as stated in the eighth preambular paragraph,

"that an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be an important step in a phased programme towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, with a specified framework of time".

We also share the view set out in the third preambular paragraph "that a multilateral, universal and binding agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would contribute to the elimination of the nuclear threat" and endorse the reference in the

seventh preambular paragraph that such an international agreement could lead to the ultimate destruction of nuclear weapons. Brazil's position, however, remains that negative security assurances cannot be a substitute for multilaterally agreed disarmament measures, which should be irreversible, transparent and verifiable.

My delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.16*, entitled "Reducing nuclear danger", because we are convinced that a review of nuclear doctrines, as called for in operative paragraph 1, is crucial in order to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons. We also support the provision contained in the fourth preambular paragraph that "nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war".

Allow me, however, to express the position of Brazil that reducing the so-called nuclear danger cannot in any way be a substitute for multilaterally agreed disarmament measures. My delegation, as we did before the adoption of the draft resolution on the same issue presented to the First Committee last year, would like to qualify the view expressed in the first preambular paragraph that "the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to mankind". It is our understanding that the mere existence of these weapons even before they are used already constitutes a grave risk to the whole world. We therefore would have preferred the main thrust of the draft resolution to be more in line with the fourth preambular paragraph, which is rather straightforward in mentioning the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Even though Brazil has not adhered to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation my delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution on that subject (A/C.1/63/L.38), as we did in 2005, basically because we acknowledge and respect the fact that 130 States have already subscribed to the Code as a practical step against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We also agree with the importance, as set out in the third preambular paragraph, of regional and international efforts to prevent and curb comprehensively the proliferation of ballistic missile systems designed to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as a contribution to international peace and security. Furthermore, we deem positive the view expressed in the seventh preambular paragraph that States should not be

excluded from utilizing the benefits of space for peaceful purposes. We are not in a position, however, to join the thrust of operative paragraph 2, which invites all States that have not yet subscribed to the Code of Conduct to do so.

Finally, Brazil voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.58*, entitled "Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", because we believe that its general thrust is compatible with the position supported by the New Agenda Coalition. As an active member of the Coalition, we agree with the importance as stated in operative paragraph 1 of all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons complying with their obligations under all the articles of the Treaty.

Furthermore, in line with the first preambular paragraph, we believe that all States should take further practical steps and effective measures towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, much remains to be done. Even though we welcome concrete proposals and initiatives on nuclear disarmament, as set out in the ninth preambular paragraph — such as the statement made last May by the five permanent members of the Security Council at the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference — as we stated during the general debate in the First Committee, so long as the States that possess nuclear weapons continue to believe that those weapons constitute a critical element of their security strategy, the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons will remain elusive and distant. I should also point out that the call in operative paragraph 14 for the universalization of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) additional protocol is a provision that we cannot support, since that instrument is essentially voluntary in nature.

Mr. Streuli (Switzerland) (*spoke in French*): As in previous years on similar texts, the Swiss delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.2, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East". This draft resolution promotes universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in the Middle East region, and Switzerland fully endorses that goal. Nevertheless, Switzerland notes that the draft resolution refers to only one part of the risk of nuclear proliferation in that region. By voting for the draft resolution Switzerland is demonstrating the importance it attaches to full and

complete implementation of the obligations under the NPT for all States in the region.

In this context, the full cooperation of States with relevant international bodies is crucial. Here, my country shares the concerns expressed by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board and by the Security Council with respect to the Iranian nuclear issue. Switzerland fully supports Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) and calls on Iran to comply with them as soon as possible.

In order to implement draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.2 and to achieve the goal preventing the risk of nuclear proliferation as broadly as possible, States need to take into account the current context and all developments affecting all countries in the region.

Ms. de Zoeten (Australia): I have requested the floor to set out the reasons behind Australia's position on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.2, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East". Australia is committed to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. As a strong supporter of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) we will continue to promote these objectives in the current NPT review cycle and in all other relevant international forums. Our strong advocacy for a universal NPT and the universal application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, including the additional protocol, is a matter of record.

Australia has long been a supporter of effectively verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at by Member States. We have been consistent in our support of General Assembly resolutions which call for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. However, a draft resolution entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East" that singles out Israel and does not include a reference to the other Middle East States of proliferation concern, two of which are currently under investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency, is in our view, an unbalanced resolution and we were therefore obliged, regretfully, to abstain.

Mr. Tarui (Japan): I wish to explain Japan's position on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.19, entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*". We greatly appreciate Malaysia's

sincere attitude and its firm commitment to the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament, which led to the submission of draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.19. Japan also believes that because of their immense power to cause destruction, death and injury to human beings, the use of nuclear weapons is clearly contrary to the fundamental humanitarianism which provides the philosophical foundation of international law.

Therefore, we would stress that nuclear weapons should never be used again and a continuous effort should be made towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. However, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which this draft resolution addresses, clearly demonstrates the complexity of the subject. Japan supports the unanimous opinion of the judges of the International Court of Justice on the existing obligations under international law to pursue nuclear disarmament and conclude negotiations on the matter in good faith. Japan firmly believes that we must take concrete measures to achieve steady step-by-step progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

In this context we believe it is premature to

"[call] upon all States immediately to fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons." (A/C.1/63/L.19, *para. 2*)

We believe that such steady incremental progress should be made prior to our embarking upon the negotiations which draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.19 calls upon all States to commence. That is the reason for Japan's abstention in the voting on this draft resolution.

Mr. Grinius (Canada): I take the floor to explain Canada's abstention in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.5, entitled "Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems". Canada's nuclear arms control and disarmament policy balances our disarmament objectives with our security obligations. While we encourage concrete measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems, these steps must be taken in a way that promotes international stability and must be based on the principle of undiminished security for all.

In terms of this draft resolution, Canada is pleased that there is explicit reference to the significant steps already taken by a number of nuclear-weapon States to reduce alert times and detarget their weapons. Both the measures taken by these nuclear-weapon States to reduce the operational status of their weapons and the recognition by the international community of these significant steps are important. At the same time, however, there must also be recognition that, for the time being, nuclear deterrence remains an important element of international security and a fundamental component of the defence strategy of NATO, of which Canada is a member.

Reducing the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems remains important to Canada. Our sponsorship of the Japanese draft resolution, A/C.1/63/L.58*, which specifically calls upon nuclear-weapon States to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems “in ways that promote international stability and security” (*para. 8*) confirms this position. Unfortunately, as currently drafted, draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.5 does not contain such language, and we would hope that the sponsors would address this next year.

Despite our abstention today, Canada welcomes the level of debate generated by this draft resolution not only among delegations but with civil society. We hope that active discussion on this issue will continue. Canada would like to reserve the right to provide an explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.2 at a later stage in the context of our consideration of cluster 1.

Ms. Moal-Makame (France) (*spoke in French*): My delegation is taking the floor in its national capacity, first, to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.27, entitled “Missiles”. The draft resolution submitted by Iran raises problems for my delegation not so much because of its language but because of its considerable omissions. The issue of the proliferation of missiles that could be used as delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction is a subject of key concern for my country.

Indeed, the increased proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles that could carry weapons of mass destruction is an element that destabilizes global and regional strategic balances, because of their ever-increasing ranges and because of missile development programmes aimed at attaining new capacities.

Specifically, the text does not mention either the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct or the Missile Technology Control Regime, which, in the view of my delegation and in the view of all European Union member States, remain today the best existing tools to deal with the proliferation of missiles.

In this respect, I would recall that the European Union is fully committed to accession to and implementation of the Code by all, as reflected by this year’s submission by the 27 States members of the European Union of a draft resolution (A/C.1/63/L.38) supporting that instrument. I should also like to underscore that strengthening the Code is a priority for the French presidency, and the European Union is currently considering what action it could undertake to that end.

Moreover, my country is prepared to take part in broad reflection on ways to strengthen the international effort to fight this threat. Clearly, this reflection is first of all intended to be undertaken within the framework of the Code and of the Missile Technology Control Regime. But this requires that we strengthen, not weaken, those focused instruments, which are operational. In that regard I should like to underscore that the authority and effectiveness of the Code are not based solely on the number of subscribing States but also on the determination of all to remain committed to its implementation, inter alia, through the submission of pre-launch notifications and of annual declarations. My delegation takes this opportunity to call upon all States that have subscribed to the Code to submit their notifications and declarations.

My country would also like new ways to be examined in order to strengthen the fight against missile proliferation. The international non-proliferation regime appears to be insufficiently equipped to fight such proliferation. To date there is no binding multilateral treaty aimed at limiting the possession and development of missiles or of certain categories of weapons. Let me recall that in his 21 March statement in Cherbourg the French President proposed negotiations on a treaty banning short- and medium-range surface-to-surface missiles.

My country welcomes the fact that the European Union has indicated its interest with respect to that proposal, which I hope will enable us to fill a gap in the international non-proliferation regime. In these conditions, my delegation considers that the text

submitted by Iran in document A/C.1/63/L.27 would not bring about progress in dealing with this important issue of the proliferation of the delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, which is why we voted against the draft resolution.

My delegation will now explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.58*, entitled “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”. This year we decided to support the draft resolution presented by Japan, in order to show our support for States that are addressing the question of nuclear disarmament seriously and in good faith. It is true that the text does not satisfy us completely and gives rise to certain difficulties. For example, operative paragraph 8 calls for a further reduction in operational status, which is not possible except when the strategic context allows it and when our overall security conditions are maintained. Moreover, the process of the elimination of nuclear weapons mentioned, for instance, in operative paragraph 9 is not placed within the framework of general and complete disarmament. That paragraph also mentions a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in defence policies, which we cannot endorse.

However my delegation wishes to underscore that this year’s draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.58* is a great improvement over the texts of previous years. We take note of concrete proposals and initiatives on nuclear disarmament, including those offered by nuclear-weapon States — in particular those recently proposed by France and the United Kingdom. We welcome the increased transparency recently displayed by nuclear-weapon States concerning their nuclear arsenals, in particular concerning the number of nuclear weapons they possess.

My delegation welcomes these improvements, which take account of efforts already undertaken by some nuclear-weapon States, as well as their concrete nuclear disarmament initiatives, in particular those of France. We believe that the text before us is more balanced than last year’s and reflects the seriousness and good faith with which the sponsors of the draft resolution are addressing the matter of nuclear disarmament. That is why we decided to vote in favour of the draft resolution presented this year by Japan.

Here let me recall my country’s unprecedented efforts, along with its specific and realistic initiatives in the area of disarmament, including nuclear

disarmament. As the French President said in March in Cherbourg, France has an exemplary track record in this area. France and the United Kingdom were the first nuclear-weapon States to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty more than 10 years ago. France was the first State to decide to close and dismantle its facilities for the production of fissile materials for explosive purposes. It is the only State to have dismantled transparently its nuclear testing facility in the Pacific. It is the only State to have dismantled all of its surface-to-surface nuclear missiles. It is the only State to have voluntarily reduced the number of its nuclear-powered missile launching submarines by one third. France was also able to announce reductions in the operational status of its nuclear force in 1992 and in 1996. It also announced in 1997 that its nuclear forces would be detargeted.

France has never participated in the arms race. It follows a policy of possessing only what is strictly necessary, and its arsenals are kept at the lowest possible level in keeping with the strategic context. After the considerable progress made in the past 10 years, the French President indicated his determination for France to continue to make an active and concrete contribution to disarmament. He announced a reduction of one third of our airborne nuclear force component. He has decided that France could display unsurpassed transparency about its nuclear arsenal and he indicated that, following the announced reductions, the French arsenal would contain fewer than 300 nuclear warheads. He announced that France no longer had nuclear weapons beyond the operational stockpiles and recalled that no French nuclear weapons were targeted. This is unprecedented on the part of a nuclear-weapon State.

It is in this spirit of trust and transparency that the French President decided to open to other States the doors of our former fissile material production facilities for nuclear weapons, located at Pierrelatte and at Marcoule. The visit took place on 16 September, in the presence of the representatives of more than 40 countries members of the Conference on Disarmament. During the visit participants had access to the former enrichment facility at Pierrelatte and also visited the Marcoule site, one of the three plutonium production reactors, and also the former military reprocessing facility. They were thus able to see the concrete and effective outcome of France’s 1996 decision to end all fissile material production.

Finally, our head of State called upon the international community, by the time of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, to commit itself to a realistic and concrete eight-point disarmament plan of action. The eight points are: universal ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); dismantlement of all nuclear test sites in a transparent manner open to the international community; the opening without delay of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty; immediate establishment of a moratorium on the production of fissile material; development by the five nuclear-weapon States recognized in the NPT of measures for transparency; opening of negotiations on a treaty banning short- and medium-range surface-to-surface missiles; subscription to and implementation of the Hague Code of Conduct; and, in parallel, progress on all other disarmament issues. I recall that our concerns also include chemical and biological weapons; here, we call for the universalization of the relevant instruments.

In Cherbourg, the French President stressed that France's commitment to disarmament is not limited to words and promises: it is reflected in concrete action. The unprecedented recent visit to our former military facilities and the ambitious plan of action proposed by our President are testament to these renewed efforts.

My delegation welcomes the fact that the draft resolution submitted this year by Japan expressly mentions the efforts of France and its concrete initiatives in this area. We hope that others will join us on this road. Commitment by all States is necessary for progress in the area of disarmament.

The Chairperson: The Committee does not have any more time available. The interpreters have to leave, although a number of speakers remain on the list. We will start tomorrow with these speakers.

I am very sorry to have to say this, but to make such a long statement in explanation of vote shows a lack of respect for other delegations. The delegation could have distributed a longer statement and been a little more concise. If members want a new procedure with more general statements — or another general debate — I would be willing to comply with their wishes. But I suppose there is a lack of respect for fellow members of the Committee.

I say this because I was planning today to have had at least 20 draft resolutions adopted fully, including explanations of vote and statements. We were not even able to conclude 14. At this pace our work will proceed very slowly.

I call on the Deputy Secretary to make an announcement.

Mr. Alasaniya (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): The document containing oral statements on A/C.1/63/L.24, entitled “United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament”, will be available from the Secretariat tomorrow. The same goes for A/C.1/63/L.50/Rev.1, entitled “United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa”. Members can pick up those two oral statements from the Secretariat tomorrow.

Today at the back of the room members can pick up the document containing the oral statement concerning draft resolution A/C.1/63/L.46, entitled “Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa”. That is important because the Committee will be voting on that text tomorrow.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.