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The situation in Kampuchea

SECURITY COUNCIL

Forty-fourth year

Letter dated 25 July 1989 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.  
of the Permanent Mission of Democratic Kampuchea to the  
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, the text of a memorandum entitled "Vital importance of the role of the International Control Mechanism in the framework of a comprehensive political solution to the problem of Kampuchea", which was prepared by the three parties of the Cambodian National Resistance and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, under the aegis of His Royal Highness Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, Leader of the Cambodian National Resistance and President of Democratic Kampuchea (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 31 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) IENG Kounsaky  
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

\* A/44/150.

**ANNEX**

**MEMORANDUM  
VITAL IMPORTANCE OF THE ROLE  
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL MECHANISM  
IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL  
SOLUTION TO "THE PROBLEM OF KAMPUCHEA"**

The reestablishment of the independence, neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia in a genuine national reconciliation among all Cambodian parties as well as the restoration of peace, security and stability in South-East Asia depend heavily upon the effectiveness of the fulfillment of the tasks of the International Control Mechanism (I.C.M).

The tasks of the I.C.M. should be as follows:

- 1 - To control and verify the total withdrawal of all categories of the Vietnamese forces, in uniform, disguised or concealed, along with all their weapons and war materials, hidden or otherwise.
- 2 - To control and verify a cease-fire which will come into force after the formation of a provisional quadripartite government of Cambodia under the leadership of H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, and the positioning and deployment of the I.C.M.-U.N. and of the U.N. Peace-Keeping Force (UN-PKF) in Cambodia.
- 3 - To control and verify the withdrawal of Vietnamese settlers.
- 4 - To control and verify the phased reduction, to the four Cambodian parties, of foreign military aids which will end on the day when the total withdrawal of Vietnamese forces as described in point 1 is certified by the I.C.M. and the provisional quadripartite government of Cambodia.
- 5 - To control and verify the release operations of prisoners of war and civilian internees.
- 6 - To control and verify the non-return, under any pretext whatsoever, of the Vietnamese forces, disguised or otherwise, into Cambodia, and to ensure the respect of borders.
- 7 - To demobilize and disarm the excess of troops of the armed forces of the four Cambodian parties which exceed 10,000 men for each party.
- 8 - To confine to barracks the armed forces of the four Cambodian parties.
- 9 - To prevent the monopolization of power by any single Cambodian party, and to prevent a civil war.
- 10 - To assist the repatriation of Cambodian refugees.

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11.- To control and supervise the elections.

To ensure the effectiveness of the I.C.M. in fulfilling its afore mentioned tasks, it is imperative to take into consideration the following elements:

**A. CONTROL AND VERIFICATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL CATEGORIES OF THE VIETNAMESE FORCES, IN UNIFORM, DISGUISED OR CONCEALED, WITH ALL THEIR WEAPONS AND WAR MATERIALS, HIDDEN OR OTHERWISE**

**I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS**

The invasion and occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam have lasted for already almost 11 years. It is known to all that Vietnam wants to absorb Cambodia into an "Indochina Federation" under its domination, and to annex her as was the case of Kampuchea-Krom or lower-Cambodia (the present South-Vietnam).

However, the resolute struggle of the Cambodian people and their national resistance forces under the leadership of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) and H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, Leader of the Cambodian National Resistance and President of Democratic Kampuchea, with the ever increasing and steadfast support of the international community, has checked this Vietnamese strategy of "Indochina Federation" mapped out by the Indochinese Communist Party (the present Vietnamese Communist Party) since its founding in 1930.

All the military, diplomatic and political means used by Vietnam in an attempt to satisfy its ambition, have failed. Particularly, since 1985, as the failure of the Vietnamese large-scale offensive along Cambodia's western border has become apparent, the Hanoi leadership has talked about "annual unilateral withdrawal", but in fact prepared to continue its occupation of Cambodia under a new form. In a confidential circular No. 17/SRMC in June 1987, the Vietnamese administration in Phnom Penh revealed that it was not possible to stamp out the Cambodian National Resistance and that, consequently, new measures must be taken to consolidate the Phnom Penh regime with the help of the Vietnamese disguised or concealed forces while at the same time launching a diplomatic campaign aimed at giving to that regime, if not the de facto recognition, at least a better allurements on the international arena.

It is in the framework of carrying out its continuing occupation of Cambodia under a new form that, concurrently to its armed forces in uniform, Vietnam has undertaken, on the one hand, to disguise and conceal its forces in Cambodia under various appearances, and on the other hand, to hide large amount of arms, ammunition and war materials in different parts of Cambodia.

**II. THE VIETNAMESE FORCES, IN UNIFORM, DISGUISED  
OR CONCEALED PRESENTLY IN CAMBODIA**

At present, there are in Cambodia five categories of Vietnamese forces:

**1st category:** The officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers in uniform of the Vietnamese People's Army with their weapons and war material.

**2nd category:** The Vietnamese officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers who, after having learned to speak Khmer language, have been incorporated into the Phnom Penh regime army and thereby wear the uniform of Khmer soldiers of that army. Their task is to consolidate that army, if not to prevent its collapse.

Up to March 1989, the number of these Vietnamese officers and soldiers incorporated into Khmer units of the Phnom Penh regime army was about 30,000 which is equivalent to 30 percent of the 100,000 Vietnamese forces presently in Cambodia. Since then, the incorporation of Vietnamese forces into the Phnom Penh regime army has been carried out at a faster rate.

**3rd category:** The civilian and military cadres, from the rank of second lieutenant up to major, who after having learned to speak Khmer language, married Khmer women, live among the Cambodian population and carry out activities of normal appearance. They have been in fact assigned to control, behind the scene, the civil and military power of the Phnom Penh regime in villages, communes, districts and provinces, and even in central administration.

The Vietnamese forces covered under this category play a very important role because they constitute in fact the backbone of the state power in the country.

**4th category:** The Vietnamese settlers established in Cambodia, in violation of the 12 August 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (article 49, last paragraph). They are part of a plan conceived and put into practice systematically by the Hanoi leadership designed to Vietnamize Cambodia. They modify the geographical nature of Cambodia, change her legal status and, as it has been stressed in UNGA resolutions on "The Situation in Kampuchea", change her demographic composition. They are not political or economic refugees. Their number is estimated at more than one million.

These settlers, a great majority of whom, have been organized in group of 10 to 20 families each, within which there is a platoon of paramilitary army. The total number of these paramilitary elements is estimated at about 60,000.

Furthermore, there are political and administrative cadres, combatants, experts in sabotage and intelligence. As such, they are part of the occupation forces and participate alongside with the Vietnamese forces in uniform to drive the Cambodian inhabitants out of their villages and native lands, to kill them and to defend the areas controlled by the Vietnamese forces of occupation. The number of these Vietnamese forces is estimated at about 50,000. These forces, painstakingly concealed among the Vietnamese settlers, are assigned to ensure the political and military organization and control of all those settlers.

These facts show that, in the issue of the Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia, the political and military aspects prevail upon the humanitarian one.

5th category: All Cambodian elements not natives of Cambodia in the military formations of any kind or holding supervisory functions in all political or military, administrative, economic, financial or social bodies, having worked in liaison with the Vietnamese military units.

### **III. VIETNAMESE CACHES OF ARMS, AMMUNITION AND WAR MATERIALS IN CAMBODIA**

Since 1987, the Vietnamese forces have undertaken the construction of a large number of caches of arms, ammunition and war materials in many places in Cambodia. They have proceeded and continue to proceed in the following manner:

1. They send several battalions, sometimes even a whole army division, including units of combat forces and engineer units, to station in the forest for a period of six months or one year or more.
2. The engineer units establish themselves far from the combat units. Out of sight of all, a few kilometers away from their own encampments, they undertake to build caches. They dig large ditches of four to five meters deep, ten metres long and five to ten metres wide. The walls and floors of the ditches are built with concrete and covered by several layers of paint to prevent humidity. Arms and war materials are coated with grease, wrapped with plastic and put into metallic boxes. Ammunition are also put into metallic boxes. These boxes are piled one on top of the other up to about two metres high. These ditches are then recovered by concrete plates and later on filled up by compacted soil of two metres high up to the natural level of the ground.

Some caches are made underground of several metres long, dig from two to three metres deep under the ground of large trees. These undergrounds are also built with concrete and covered by several layers of paint.

Several months later, when grass and trees grow to the point where the areas which cover the caches assume their natural shape, the units of the Vietnamese forces move their encampments to other places.

During the period of encampment, the forces of combat units carry on their usual activities against the resistance forces. In so doing, they divert the attention of all.

Thanks to information given by the population and the vigilance of the national resistance forces, two Vietnamese important arms caches have been up to now discovered in Kompong Som area (south-eastern Cambodia): one at Kang Keng (north-east of the bifurcation of the roads leading to Ream and Kompong Som sea-port), and another at Kamlaut Pobeng near Kompong Seila, near the national road 4.

#### IV. VIETNAM'S OBJECTIVE

All these Vietnamese disguised or concealed forces and these caches of arms, ammunition and war materials clearly testify that Vietnam is actively preparing to carry on its occupation of Cambodia under a new form, and that it has no intention to restore to Cambodia her independence, freedom and territorial integrity, and to the Cambodian people their right to self-determination.

The announcement made by Vietnam that it would unilaterally pull all its forces out of Cambodia by the end of September 1989, while it is actively undertaking to disguise and conceal its forces and built caches of arms, ammunition and war materials, is aimed in fact at:

1. making the world community rubber-stamp its so-called "unilateral and total withdrawal" from Cambodia, and
2. consequently, ending the foreign military aids to the national resistance forces.

In order to reach this objective, Vietnam could make further concessions on some aspects of little importance so as to induce the world community to ratify its so-called "unilateral and total withdrawal". Vietnam could, for example, accept the control and verification of the withdrawal of its forces in uniform, but not of its disguised or concealed forces.

If that was the case, after the total withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces in uniform, there would remain in fact nearly 100,000 Vietnamese forces, disguised or concealed, in Cambodia, and several thousands of metric tons of arms, ammunition and war materials, ready to spark the war at an opportune moment, more particularly at a time when all foreign military aids to the national resistance forces are stopped, and the national resistance forces disarmed

These subterfuges explain why Vietnam rejects an effective and thorough control and supervision of the United Nations of the total and definitive withdrawal of its forces from Cambodia, seeks by all means to maintain the regime it has installed in Phnom Penh and obstinately refuses the formation, in the spirit of a genuine national reconciliation, of a provisional quadripartite government of Cambodia under the leadership of H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk.

**V. VITAL NECESSITY OF AN EFFECTIVE CONTROL AND VERIFICATION OF THE TOTAL AND DEFINITIVE WITHDRAWAL OF THE VIETNAMESE FORCES FROM CAMBODIA**

In order that Cambodia regain fully her independence, sovereignty, peace and security, and that the Cambodian people genuinely exercise their right to self-determination, it is of vital necessity to carry out an effective control and verification of the total and definitive withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.

For this purpose, it is imperative that the I.C.M. assure this control and verification in particular of the total and definitive withdrawal of all the categories of the Vietnamese forces (as described in para II above, Section A) from Cambodia, namely:

- a. The Vietnamese officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers in uniform of the Vietnamese People's Army with their weapons and war materials;
- b. The Vietnamese officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers speaking Khmer language, wearing the uniform of Khmer soldiers of the Phnom Penh regime army and incorporated into units of the army of that regime, with their weapons and war materials.
- c. The Vietnamese military and political cadres, who, having illegally acquired the Cambodian nationality, wield, behind the scene, the control of civil and military power at village, commune, district provincial level;
- d. The Vietnamese settlers dispatched to Cambodia in violation of the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949;
- e. All Cambodian elements not natives of Cambodia in the military formations of any kind or holding supervisory functions in all political or military, administrative, economic, financial or social bodies, having worked in liaison with the Vietnamese military units.

The arms, ammunition and war materials hidden in many caches secretly built by the Vietnamese forces must be destroyed.

The I.C.M. should finally control and verify the non-return, under any pretext and any form whatsoever, of the Vietnamese forces into Cambodia.

The I.C.M. is assisted by representatives of the four Cambodian parties in the fulfillment of its tasks.

The Vietnamese forces of occupation will also have their representatives working with the I.C.M. Their mission will be terminated once all the Vietnamese forces described above have been withdrawn.

#### **B. CONTROL AND VERIFICATION OF A CEASE-FIRE**

The I.C.M. should ensure an effective control and verification of the cease-fire among the conflicting parties during and after the total withdrawal of all the categories of Vietnamese forces mentioned above.

The cease-fire will come into force only within the framework of a comprehensive solution, more precisely after the formation of a provisional quadripartite government of Cambodia under the leadership of H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, and the positioning and deployment of the I.C.M. in Cambodia.

#### **C. PREVENTION OF THE MONOPOLIZATION OF POWER BY A SINGLE CAMBODIAN PARTY, PREVENTION OF A CIVIL WAR**

The I.C.M. will assist the provisional quadripartite government of Cambodia in its endeavours to prevent:

1. Clashes and incidents among the Cambodian parties;
2. The monopolization of power by any single Cambodian party;
3. A civil war.

For this purpose, with the consent of the provisional quadripartite government of Cambodia, the I.C.M.:



- i- proceed to disarming the excess of troops of the armed forces of the four Cambodian parties which exceed 10,000 men for each party;
- ii- Confine to barracks combatants of the armed forces of the four Cambodian parties each of which must no longer have a troop strength over 10,000 men.

D. CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS

The I.C.M. will take all necessary measures to ensure the control and supervision of the orderly proceeding of general and free elections of:

- i- a Constituent Assembly,
- ii- a Senate (in case the Constitution would adopt a Parliament with two Houses)
- iii- The President of Cambodia.

E. THE CONDITIONS ENSURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE I.C.M. IN THE FULFILLMENT OF ITS TASKS

The effectiveness of the I.C.M. in fulfilling its tasks depends upon the optimal solutions to be brought to three fundamental aspects relating to its composition and operational principle, namely:

- i- the mechanism of setting up of the I.C.M.
- ii- its reporting structure,
- iii- the mechanism of sanction in case of violation of the provisions of the Agreement by any signatory party.

The I.C.M. must have full access to all parts of Cambodia without the need for the consent of the Cambodian authorities. It must have its own transportation and communication equipment sufficient for the fulfillment of its tasks. These must be under its sole orders and constantly available to it.

The I.C.M. must be able to act on any complaints from responsible source including its own personnel, Cambodian quadripartite military and civil officials, the governments of neighbouring countries and of the members of the International Conference on Cambodia.

Governments and the world community must be duly informed of the findings of the I.C.M. on the respect or violation of peace, territorial integrity, independence and neutrality of Cambodia.

F. NECESSITY OF AN I.C.M.-U.N.

Taking into account the multitude, the importance and complexity of the tasks of the I.C.M., it is obvious that only the UN has the capability, expertise and impartiality as well as financial and material means necessary for the setting up and deployment of that body within the required time.

The length of the mandate of I.C.M.-UN should be 5 years, renewable.

The I.C.M.-UN will be backed by a Peace-Keeping Force of the United Nations (PKF-UN) with a minimum strength of 2,000 men.

G. IMPORTANCE OF THE ASSISTANCE OF THE FOUR CAMBODIAN PARTIES TO THE FULFILLMENT OF THE TASKS OF THE I.C.M.-U.N. AND PKF-U.N.

The I.C.M.-UN and PKF-UN will be assisted, in the fulfillment of their tasks, by the representatives of the four Cambodian parties who play a very important role. As a matter of fact:

- i- Thanks to their close relationship with the population, they can contribute to the effectiveness of the I.C.M.-UN and PKF-UN in their tasks to control and verify the withdrawal of all the categories of the Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, particularly in discovering the Vietnamese forces disguised or concealed, or furthermore in detecting the Vietnamese caches of arms, ammunition and other war materials.

- ii- They co-operate with the I.C.M.-UN and PKF-UN, each in the interest of its party and of peace, security and stability of the country, in preventing any attempt of domination and monopolization of power by a single party to the detriment of others.

20 June 1989

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