

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 30 April 1987, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. M. Vejvoda

(Czechoslovakia)

The PRESIDENT: I call to order the 410th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with our programme of work, the Conference continues today with consideration of item 8 of its agenda, entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". In accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member who wishes to do so may take the floor concerning any subject which is relevant to the work of the Conference.

On my list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Argentina, Poland, Canada and Sweden.

I now give the floor to my first speaker, the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Cámpora.

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, in the month of April we have been privileged to have a person of your talents presiding over the Conference on Disarmament. The fruits of your work as President are of great significance in the view of the Argentine delegation. You have taken steps which have revealed in the light of day the true motivations that dictate the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Your efforts deserve our full appreciation, and we wish to congratulate you warmly for all that you have done. It is the wish of the Argentine delegation to extend a welcome to Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi of Indonesia with whom we wish to entertain the same relations of close co-operation that we enjoyed with his predecessor.

The elaboration and negotiation of agreements on disarmament is a complex task, as all of us who participate in this Conference on Disarmament know well.

Our task is complex to a great extent because it depends on conditions outside this forum. If international tensions are acute, it is very difficult for our work to progress. We have seen all the years of the 1980s go by without producing any results whatsoever.

Fortunately, however, for a couple of years now the international climate has improved, and consequently the prospects for disarmament have also improved.

But our work is also complex for other reasons. It is certainly no easy task to delimit a sphere of activity in order to prohibit its military application without affecting that very same activity in the aspects of its peaceful use.

The dual nature of science and technology in offering potential for both peaceful and military applications gives rise to the difficult question of deciding where the dividing line between them falls.

It is a matter of delimiting a sphere of activity for purposes of prohibition, and to monitoring and verifying the prohibition, without at the same time affecting the permitted and legitimate exercise of that activity for civilian purposes.

We can see the very same difficulty when we try to ban a given category of weapons.

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

In the past an attempt was made to create a régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons whose effectiveness over time is very debatable.

Nuclear weapons have not stopped being produced and moreover international co-operation has been severely restricted on the pretext of preventing such weapons from falling into the hands of new countries in addition to those that kept for themselves a monopoly on production.

At present the Conference on Disarmament has amongst its most attainable and promising objectives that of the elaboration of a convention banning chemical weapons.

Once again we can see the complex nature of a task that should be carried out in order to give an absolute guarantee that the rules laid down will not leave any loophole which will permit the activities of the chemical industry to be diverted to ends not allowed by the Convention. But at the same time we should take care that those rules designed to prohibit the production of chemical weapons do not form an impediment to the development of the chemical industry for civilian purposes.

Nor can we accept that the provisions of this Convention should serve as an excuse to restrict international co-operation and limit the benefits of the development of the chemical industry to a handful of powerful countries that may currently have a monopoly on major advances in the chemical industry, just as in the past they held advantages in the nuclear energy industry in order to create a discriminatory nuclear weapon non-proliferation régime.

In the field of activity of the Conference on Disarmament, the analysis of questions related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space is becoming increasingly important.

Here we have a repetition of the situation already described, arising out of the ambivalence of space technology, which can be used either for peaceful purposes or for military purposes.

Examination of space-related issues is giving us more and more knowledge as to how to differentiate between activities that will allow us to use outer space peacefully and those activities of a military nature that are also being developed by the so-called space Powers.

Gradual steps are being taken towards listing those activities which should be banned in any disarmament agreements in order to prevent an arms race in space.

This complex task of trying to delimit the scope of activities in order to prohibit those that would lead to an arms race in space should be carried out with the utmost care, so that it will not obstruct or encroach upon the peaceful use and exploration of space for the benefit of mankind.

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

Moreover, the prevention of an arms race in space should not be used as an excuse to limit international co-operation or to impose unjustified embargoes on the transfer and export of equipment connected with the exploration and peaceful use of outer space.

We have heard hints about a desire to create a régime for the non-proliferation of space weapons despite the fact that this Conference on Disarmament has not as yet managed to define what a space weapon is.

We are sure that economic interests, and in particular the economic return on space exploitation, are matters that a space Power or group of Powers may legitimately wish to keep for themselves.

Nevertheless, it would not be morally justifiable to attach conditions to international co-operation on disarmament grounds when dealing with situations or space programmes that are obviously peaceful ones.

Disarmament should not lead to international agreements which are discriminatory and unfair.

Disarmament is a process that should be viewed with the necessary flexibility in specific situations. Otherwise, if no account is taken of particular circumstances, this could hardly lead to results that are satisfactory to all.

Perhaps it might be of use to examine the results of the nuclear weapon non-proliferation régime in the light of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, which was held here between 23 March and 10 April of this year. It is clear to all that the main issue that this Conference tried to solve was how to harmonize the promotion of international co-operation without this involving the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In our view, the Conference was an extremely useful exercise as it showed that the present system is inappropriately rigid.

Delegates from countries that have signed the Non-proliferation Treaty were heard to complain bitterly about the lack of co-operation on the part of the supplier countries. Similar grievances were heard from countries that are members of military alliances. And certainly there was no shortage of statements criticizing the current restrictions on international co-operation from countries like Argentina that are not party to the Treaty.

In our view, we are making a mistake when international co-operation is subjected to inflexible and unlimited restrictions above and beyond what is strictly necessary in order to curb the spread of sensitive technologies which could be used for military application.

The risk of a global, regional or subregional arms race is closely connected to the existence of the root causes of confrontation or the existence of relations between States which are based on power.

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

It is obvious that any region or subregion that is the scene of rivalry among States will also face the risk of rising military budgets.

But it is also obvious that there will be no arms race in a region or subregion where the countries in it have concluded co-operation agreements and provided each other with guarantees concerning the peaceful application of so-called sensitive technologies.

We have seen that a State can be signatory to the Non-proliferation Treaty and yet be denied any co-operation in the nuclear energy field, purely and simply because it is situated in an area of conflict. This is why the supplier countries will say that they provide no assistance to that country, because it would involve the risk that the assistance might be put to other than peaceful uses. In other words, the need to subscribe to an inflexible set of rules is not the only applicable criterion for effective control of the non-peaceful use of sensitive technologies, because there are cases of States that have agreed to the rules but receive no assistance because the region to which they belong is an area of tension between the countries in it.

We believe that any mutual guarantees given among countries of one and the same region or subregion should be accepted internationally.

Closing the door to the peaceful application of sensitive technologies for countries of a subregion that have given each other mutual guarantees of peaceful use is tantamount to depriving them without any valid justification of the possibility of obtaining the economic benefits arising from such technologies for the benefit of their people.

My country hopes to share in the benefits of the economic development that stems from modern scientific progress.

At the last General Assembly, the Argentine delegation co-sponsored resolution 41/11, submitted by the delegation of Brazil, declaring the South Atlantic a zone of peace and co-operation, and we did so inspired by the aims I have outlined in this statement.

The Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic presupposes transparency in the conduct of countries in the area. This must be recognized by the international community, and more particularly by those countries that today have advanced technologies for the progress of mankind, so that they may be opened up to international co-operation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the very kind words he expressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Ambassador Turbanski.

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): Thank you, Comrade President. Let me begin by welcoming the new Indonesian representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Tarmidzi. My delegation looks forward to continuing the long co-operation we have always had with his delegation.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

As the spring session of the CD draws to a close, my delegation would like to share some thoughts on its results. Despite some progress, a better political climate and business-like exchanges of views on many issues, apart from chemical weapons, no visible results have been achieved. This is especially true with regard to the whole complex of priority nuclear items. It must create a feeling of disappointment, especially in the light of developments in other disarmament forums -- in particular the whole range of the Soviet-United States talks. The latest initiatives from the Soviet Union, especially on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles, are a further convincing demonstration of new political thinking, a dynamic approach to disarmament. This is also what we need in the proceedings of our Conference, which in general cannot be described as a dynamic disarmament body. So far, it has not sufficiently used its unique mechanism to grasp the existing opportunities, as if it was out of touch with the recent developments.

The Conference can and should play a more active role in the search for solutions to today's most crucial problems.

This is especially true in the present stage of international relations, when new hopes and expectations seem to be appearing and no opportunity should be lost. If this Conference is not going to be reduced to a marginal role in these developments, it must be not only a mirror but also an independent source of new thinking and energy.

The Conference has once again demonstrated its inability to establish ad hoc committees on items 1, 2 and 3, and especially -- I would stress -- on a nuclear test ban, which is not only of the highest priority but also, we feel, the issue which is most ripe for negotiations in the Conference. Moreover, despite efforts by many delegations and successive presidents of the Conference -- and here I would especially like to stress your efforts during the month of April, and endorse the assessment made by the previous speaker, Ambassador Cámpora -- despite these efforts aimed at finding a way out of the deadlock in which we find ourselves, no substantial work has been done on these items, apart from the plenary statements and the meeting of the Group of Seismic Experts. The main cause of this deplorable situation is still the same as in the previous sessions -- the reluctance of some delegations to engage in real negotiations. We hope that the efforts to start substantive work on these items will continue during our summer session and will ultimately bear fruit.

The Conference was successful in establishing ad hoc committees on two other nuclear-related items, radiological weapons and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear-weapons. Despite strenuous efforts by its Chairman, Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary, the Committee on Radiological Weapons was not able to start substantial discussion. One wonders whether some delegations have not lost their interest in both track A and track B.

The situation we face in the ad hoc committee on item 6 is rather unusual. The need to nominate a Chairman at last is obvious.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

The Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament is still under preparation. We note that under the able guidance of Ambassador García Robles, certain progress on some outstanding questions, including verification and conventional armaments, can be registered. We hope that the summer session will close with a draft text of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

I have already presented my delegation's views with regard to the work of the Committee on Outer Space. The work has started, though some valuable time was lost. It would be premature to make any evaluations of the Committee's work at the present session. Instead, I would like to stress that my delegation is looking for more intensive and more goal-oriented efforts by the Committee during its summer session. We hope that a new and important contribution to the work of the Conference on preventing an arms race in outer space will be provided by the Montreal workshop.

The situation with regard to the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is much more optimistic than the overall picture of the Conference's activities, as can be seen from the new "rolling text" of the Convention, reflecting the current stage of negotiations, which has been submitted to the Committee by its Chairman. The new formula governing the work of the Ad hoc Committee -- a cluster formula, a flexible formula, one might say -- has proved its value, and at the same time demonstrated again the Chairman's competence and ability to lead us most efficiently toward our final goal -- a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. I wish to thank Ambassador Ekéus and the cluster co-ordinators for their efforts, for their contribution during the spring session of the Committee.

Owing to the active contribution of many delegations during the spring session, new important steps toward further progress were taken, especially in the areas where the Soviet Union came forward with fresh ideas and proposals. The work of the Committee and of the working groups, as we see it, was business-like and fruitful, though one can say that nothing is done until everything is done. That is why we should always have in mind that the ultimate task before us is not only to register progress but to finalize the text of the Convention. In this context, let me again draw your attention to the March 1987 statement of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which reiterated their readiness to destroy these weapons of mass destruction irreversibly.

Looking at the present state of work of the Committee, one can say that almost all important elements of article IV (Chemical weapons) have been cleared up and resolved, the only exception being principles and the order of destruction of chemical weapons. However, in this field too, concrete and useful proposals were put forward by delegations. Finding a mutually acceptable solution seems at this stage to involve not conceptual study or a need to solve a disagreement of principle, but rather realism and necessary compromise.

In the view of my delegation, solving this issue would also have some psychological meaning, as it concerns the very core of the Convention.

The situation is quite similar with respect to article V (Chemical weapons production facilities).

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

It is clear, however, that final agreement on articles IV and V depends on the outcome of work on such definitions as chemical weapons, chemical warfare agents, and chemical weapons production facilities.

Precise definitions of these terms will also be needed in the context of article VI. For these reasons we support the proposal made by the distinguished representative of China, Ambassador Fan, on 16 April, that an effort should be made to define more precisely what we mean by chemical weapons. To avoid ambiguities after the Convention enters into force, we should eliminate all conceptual imprecision in the text both of the convention proper and all its integral annexes.

In our opinion the situation is much more complex with regard to the area of non-production. It seems that the most crucial question bearing on the possibilities of tangible progress is an agreement on relevant threshold production quantities for facilities producing chemicals belonging to categories 2, 3 and 4. The first steps in this direction have already been made. Further progress depends now on an active and constructive approach by all the delegations, without exception.

One of the outstanding issues is that of model agreements between the International Authority and States parties concerned. The concept of such agreements was very usefully considered during this session, but a lot of strenuous work remains to be done. However, the solution of some problems associated with model agreements is hardly possible without precise knowledge of relevant facilities. Though the experience of IAEA might be used to some extent in working out a model agreement, we should not forget the very specific characteristics of the chemical industry.

The series of informal discussions on the concept and procedure of challenge inspection, organized by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, was, we feel, a useful exercise. Together with some plenary statements, especially by the USSR and the United States delegations, it contributed to better comprehension of different positions and demonstrated more clearly points of common understanding.

Many proposals on this subject were put forward by the delegations. They have to be closely examined by the Committee or by the relevant working group. Many delegations, including my own, consider the United Kingdom proposals very interesting and useful, especially the idea of alternative measures. Like every new idea, it has to be developed and then evaluated again on the basis of its own merits.

That is why we would appeal to those delegations who at this stage are not prepared to engage in elaboration of possible alternative measures to join common efforts toward developing the idea, which we believe might help to identify a solution to the problem of challenge inspection.

With regard to the structure and functions of the Consultative Committee there is, in our opinion, a prevailing realistic approach on the part of the delegations.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

We think that one of the specific characteristics of the present stage of CW negotiations is the relative ease both of finding rational solutions to many problems and of losing the very essence of the talks in never-ending discussions on technical details, which could be better and faster solved at a later stage. I think there is a growing understanding that we should avoid the second possibility.

In general my delegation is satisfied with the results achieved, though they could have been more meaningful had some delegations not chosen to slow down the pace of work.

There might be different opinions on the significance of progress in the CW Committee, but I think that at this advanced and at the same time complex stage of negotiations, even moderate progress is a valuable achievement.

In short, there seems to be a good basis for optimism for the summer session, which will no doubt be of crucial importance for the fate of the CW convention. We continue to believe that a decisive step can and should be made before the end of this year's session. We also hope that delegations will use the inter-sessional period to prepare the ground for efficient and fruitful work in the summer.

As has already been pointed out by some speakers, an encouraging development has taken place with regard to the strengthening of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons. In pursuance of a decision of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention, the Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts has worked out modalities for the exchange of information and data on research centres and laboratories, outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins, as well as the promotion of peaceful co-operation in the field of biological research.

My delegation welcomes the results achieved, though in our opinion the scope of the exchange of international and other measures could have been broader.

Nevertheless, we share the opinion that an important step has been made toward building up confidence among States parties and enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention.

We hope that further steps toward strengthening verification procedures in the Convention will be taken in the near future. Appropriate proposals in this respect were made by the socialist countries during both the second Review Conference and the Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and kind words extended to the President, and now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Beesley.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): Thank you Mr. President. May I take the liberty of beginning by reiterating my appreciation to you for your extremely constructive role as President in particularly difficult circumstances? In particular, as you well know, I am one of the many who strongly supported your efforts to devise a basis for commencing work on items 1, 2 and 3 -- the major nuclear issues on our agenda. I continue to hope that, at least in the June session, we may be able to proceed successfully building upon the work that you have done.

I little knew when I spoke of the vigour and vitality of your country, as exemplified through the extremely competent athletes it has produced in the field of tennis and hockey, that as recently as last night your country would again be proving its prowess in that field in an important athletic bilateral in Vienna between your country and Sweden, another speaker on our list today. Mr. President, I do not wish to be facetious, but with the outcome of an athletic contest in which there were no winners and no losers is not such a bad precedent for us to bear in mind in this forum, for we well know that that is the only basis on which there can be any effective and enduring arms control or disarmament agreement. Perhaps an even more apt example, of course, was provided by another important athletic bilateral in Vienna yesterday between the USSR and Canada. Not only were there no winners and no losers, but we managed to achieve the elusive zero-zero option. Speaking more seriously, Mr. President, I would that all our contests and confrontations amongst all of us could be confined to the athletic field with that kind of play and that kind of result.

Mr. President, before proceeding to the rest of my statement I would like to join others in welcoming most warmly the distinguished representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Tarmidzi, representing a country with which Canada has long had the closest relations.

In asking for the floor today Mr. President, I did not do so for the purpose of conducting an overview of the kind we have heard with interest today, but rather simply to report on a workshop relating to seismic verification which took place in Canada last year, and to give advance information on another workshop which I have already mentioned concerning outer space which will be held in the middle of May in Montreal. The workshops have one point in common: they relate to verification of eventual agreements in the field of disarmament and arms control, which is an extremely high priority for the Government of Canada. I will also make a brief reference to some very concrete verification issues relating to our negotiations on a chemical weapons convention, on which Canada is also doing some extremely practical research.

On the first subject, I would like to introduce a working paper relating to item 1 (Nuclear test ban), reporting on the proceedings of a workshop hosted by Canada on waveform data exchange last October in Ottawa.

On a number of occasions I have emphasized in this forum the importance that Canada attaches to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. The realization of a negotiated and verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty constitutes a fundamental Canadian arms control and disarmament objective, and Canada will continue to pursue this goal with vigour, persistence and determination.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

There are, regrettably, no short cuts or panaceas for the achievement of this important objective. It can be realized only through realistic and practical steps which will develop the confidence necessary to enable us to move forward. Our failure during this spring session to reach agreement on a mandate for a subsidiary body on a comprehensive test ban -- a failure that is the fault of none of our successive Presidents -- is most disappointing. Agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee would allow us to make progress in a concrete, pragmatic and constructive fashion. I hope that we can do better in the summer session.

We have made clear consistently that Canada attaches particular importance to the improvement of means of verification of a comprehensive test ban, and Canada is devoting considerable human and financial resources both domestically and internationally to seismic verification. Measures Canada has taken include, as you know, the major upgrading of key seismic facilities in northern Canada and support for basic seismic research.

In order to expedite the work of the Group of Scientific Experts, Canada conducted in October in Ottawa of last year a workshop for seismic experts to discuss questions relating to the exchange of level 2 waveform data with a view to resolving some of the questions concerning the exchange of such data.

I am pleased today to table document CD/753 of 28 April, to which are annexed the proceedings of the Ottawa workshop. As the document indicates, the workshop, which was attended by 43 representatives from 17 countries, produced specific technical recommendations on the methods, protocols and formats for seismic waveform exchange. These have already been tabled by the Canadian delegation in the Group of Scientific Experts, the key forum for co-ordination of international efforts to develop an effective global seismic monitoring network -- I would like to repeat that: an effective global seismic monitoring network -- as recommendations for seismic waveform exchange in that eventual system. I hope that these proceedings will be of interest to all members of the CD. I would like to take the opportunity of thanking those delegations who have expressed appreciation to the Government of Canada for hosting this workshop, but I would be remiss if I did not, on behalf of the Canadian Government, express our gratitude to the participants who helped to make the workshop a success.

Mr. President, we are convinced that the Conference on Disarmament has a substantive role to play in the achievement of a comprehensive test ban.

As we all know, there are important related talks going on bilaterally which we hope will produce results on which the CD can build in its summer session. In this regard, the inherent complementarity of the bilateral and multilateral negotiations has been recognized by the United States and the USSR, both of which have reported to the CD on the progress of the bilateral discussions. I am amongst those who applaud the reports we have received and, of course, I express the sincere hope that this process will continue.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

I hope that the working paper I have today tabled will not only provide further evidence of the substantive role which the Conference on Disarmament can play in achieving a comprehensive test ban, but will also give encouragement to the CD to establish an ad hoc committee as soon as possible in order to let us get on with the job expected of us.

Let me turn now to the subject of outer space. Much of the existing international legal régime governing the military uses of outer space is the product of treaties and agreements negotiated and concluded by the two major space Powers. While not directly engaging other countries, those treaties and agreements, most notably the ABM Treaty of 1972, constitute an important element of the existing legal framework, not least in their contribution to bringing about greater predictability in the military uses of the space environment and in their embodiment of a commitment to a co-operative approach to defining, through negotiation, agreed limits on the military uses of outer space. The Canadian Government firmly supports such an approach, and indeed urges the United States and the USSR to continue to seek agreed ways to use outer space for national security purposes in a manner consistent with broad international security and stability, that is to say the security of all the nations and all the peoples of the world.

However, arms control in relation to outer space has always had an important multilateral dimension. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967, concerning which I had the privilege of participating in some of the negotiations, has been and remains the keystone of a legal framework which currently governs activities in outer space, including certain military activities. Canada believes that the multilateral dimension of arms control in outer space is gaining increasing importance and will continue to do so. Canada's approach has also been premised on the belief that, in this multilateral context, verification issues will have a particular importance. Canada therefore welcomed the establishment for the first time in 1985 of an Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and the renewal of a mandate for it in each succeeding year. Canada has been active, as you know, in making substantive contributions to the deliberations of this subsidiary body each year, particularly in the form of working papers. These contributions reflect the work of a programme of sustained research in Canada under the auspices of the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs.

Canada is deeply committed to promoting progress in arms control and disarmament negotiations. The Canadian emphasis is on the practical, which is one reason why we have identified research into the verification of arms control agreements as an area where we can make, and hope to make, a useful contribution. As the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, has indicated, effective verification procedures cannot only help ensure compliance with arms control treaties but also facilitate their negotiation -- hence Canada's work in developing verification procedures and technology that meet the practical requirements of arms control agreements actually under negotiation or envisaged.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

I want now to focus on some of the research undertaken in Canada which comprises the joint efforts of government, the academic community and the commercial sector. This approach is nowhere better illustrated than in the research relating to outer space. Canadian activities in this regard represent an attempt to develop and pursue an approach which is practical and innovative.

One of the major undertakings of the Verification Research Programme of Canada's Department of External Affairs over the past several years has been to bring together teams of experts from government, universities and industry to focus on Canadian space technology and know-how in its application to the process of arms control verification. A Canadian concept, termed PAXSAT pax being -- with apologies to the Chairman of our Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space, as he does not need to be told this -- the Latin word for peace -- PAXSAT is the term which has emerged from these investigations. This concept centres on assessing the feasibility of applying space-based remote sensing technology to the tasks of verification in the context of multilateral arms control and disarmament.

Canada's PAXSAT research has concentrated on two potential applications of space-based remote sensing to multilateral arms control verification. The first is space-to-space remote sensing (which we refer to as PAXSAT A), dealing with verification of agreements involving space objects. The second, entailing space-to-ground remote sensing (which we refer to as PAXSAT B), focuses on how to assist in the verification of agreements involving conventional forces. I want to discuss very briefly this somewhat distinctive Canadian concept in very general terms, outlining the context of multilateral arms control verification and some of the major assumptions underlying the Canadian PAXSAT projects.

From the outset, PAXSAT research has recognized the important technical, political and military realities and trends in addressing the outer space issue. As a result, certain themes form core elements of the PAXSAT concept and contribute to the prospects of actually realizing such a multilateral verification system. These include the following:

Firstly, there must be the prospect of a significant multilateral agreement to warrant the level of sophistication of technology and the expenditure of funds required for the actual development of such an advanced technical verification system.

Secondly, parties to such a multilateral agreement should have the option, at least, of participating in its verification procedures.

Thirdly, use of the PAXSAT system should be treaty-specific: it would be used only with respect to the agreements to which it expressly applied, as part of an overall verification process for those agreements alone.

Fourthly, the treaty being verified would establish the requisite political authority for the verification mechanism and its operation.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

Fifthly, technology requirements would be met collectively by participants and would, of course, be open to all States.

Sixthly, PAXSAT should be based, to the extent possible, on existing openly available technology, without requiring major costly improvements. The technology possessed by the Canadian commercial sector was adequate to provide a base for the PAXSAT studies.

Although the PAXSAT research is not yet complete, it has reached the point where its technical feasibility can begin to be assessed, at least in tentative ways. The workshop which Canada will host in Montreal next month, which we are pleased to learn will be attended by you, Mr. President, and in which all delegations in this forum have been invited to participate, will provide an occasion for further discussion and explanation of the concept. We also plan to make a report to the CD in June following our recess.

Mr. President, before concluding I would like to turn to another issue of major importance, the negotiation of a comprehensive, verifiable ban on chemical weapons, which remains the most active item on our agenda. Canada is pleased that the negotiating momentum which developed last year and the year before, under two very able chairmen, is being increased at the current CD session under the skilful Chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéyus and we intend to continue our active participation in those negotiations. At the beginning of the summer part of the session the Canadian delegation will, as in the past, be providing to all participants our updated compendium of all CD documents relating to our chemical weapons negotiations.

Statements this week in this forum relating to further allegations of chemical weapon use in the Gulf war are tangible proof of the need to make deliberate haste in these negotiations. They also underline the importance of including in the treaty we are negotiating a provision for an unqualified, verifiable ban on the use of chemical weapons going beyond use and including, of course, possession, destruction, etc. Canada commends the recent action of the United Nations Secretary-General in initiating an investigation of these latest allegations of chemical weapon use.

The verification of such allegations of chemical or toxin weapon use is a subject to which Canada has devoted considerable research effort. We have initiated our own investigative activities in relation to certain such allegations in the past. We have drawn on this experience and that of others in making reports to the United Nations Secretary-General. In December 1985 we submitted to the Secretary-General a handbook dealing in a systematic and detailed way with various procedural aspects of such investigations. The handbook was also subsequently put forward in this forum. I want to announce that Canada has continued its follow-up work in relation to other practical and technical aspects of such investigations. The results will be made available to the United Nations very soon.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

The results will be made available not only to the United Nations because Canada's activities in this regard reflect a pragmatic, operationally oriented approach which we consider essential if effectively verifiable agreements are to be concluded. I am not in a position to report on the precise nature of the presentation to be made, but I have no doubt that it will be of interest to every member of the CD. I believe that when we are in a position to report to the Conference in June on the research we have conducted and the practical results which have emerged from it, every member of the CD will find the report of interest and of direct relevance to our own chemical weapons negotiations.

The foregoing comments are intended to illustrate the approach which Canada has tried to follow consistently in the Conference on Disarmament. We have attempted to make concrete contributions through working papers and workshops, in lieu of rhetoric, concentrating on practical problems of verification of the arms control agreement we are together trying to achieve.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Beesley, the representative of Canada, for his statement and for the kind words extended to the President, and I now give the floor to the last speaker on my list for today, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): I have asked for the floor in my capacity as the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. In August, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will have the task of putting together its yearly report to the Conference, which will then be incorporated in the report of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Today I wish to draw the attention of all members of the Conference to document CD/CW/WP.167. This document, entitled "Current stage of the negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Convention", reflects the status of the negotiations on a Convention at the end of the first part of the 1987 session of the CD. It is thus not a report to the Conference or to any outside body. The document will be ready tomorrow in all the working languages of the Conference. The secretariat has informed me that it will distribute copies tomorrow in the document boxes of all delegations.

The aim of this document is to register the progress achieved in the negotiations and to assist delegations in the further elaboration of the Convention when the CD begins the second part of its 1987 session. It does not bind any delegation at this stage, but is intended as a useful tool and as a basis for further negotiations.

It is based upon the report of the Committee to the CD on its work during the period 12-30 January (CD/734), and is in this respect an expression of the idea of a "rolling text", which under different chairmen has proved to be helpful for the work of the Committee.

The "rolling text" as it stood in February has been improved upon in important respects. Modifications have been introduced with regard to some articles as a consequence of new positions taken by delegations. Some important new texts developed during the spring have also been incorporated.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

Furthermore, in response to complaints by many delegations that the old presentational form with the annexes in the middle of the articles makes the draft convention almost unreadable in national capitals and for anybody who has not actually participated in the negotiations here in Geneva, the existing material has now been re-edited. In CD/CW/WP.167 you will find all the articles at the beginning of the document, followed by the various annexes. I am convinced that this new way of presenting the material will help all concerned.

There is good reason to look with satisfaction on the results of the work of the Committee during the two months and a half of negotiations since the beginning of the 1987 session. Many delegations have worked hard, and this has yielded some important progress in a short period of time.

Having said that, I feel obliged to remind the Conference about the work which remains.

Although there is a clear tendency of convergence of views between delegations with regard to some or most of the outstanding political problems, the task of negotiating solutions to those problems is a complicated and difficult one. Furthermore, the technical and legal problems to be addressed are indeed numerous.

If we are to make real progress towards the goal of a Convention within the foreseeable future, we must address the problems even more vigorously and with greater decisiveness. Delegations should by now, after 15 years of deliberation and more than 3 years of negotiations, be familiar with the problems. There is therefore no reason why delegations should not be in a position, when studying the "rolling text", to anticipate what solutions may be feasible for different problems. Thus the delegations should be able to prepare themselves for the next stage of negotiations, starting in June, and for acting with greater speed and resolve, without sacrificing the prudence which is the absolute prerequisite when dealing with issues of vital national security for States.

Many delegations have asked that no inter-sessional work be organized within the framework of the Committee during the period from now until we meet again in June. They have felt that this time is needed for inter-sessional work in their capitals. The outstanding problems are evident from the brackets, footnotes and blanks in CD/CW/WP.167. I now expect that these problems will be carefully worked on in capitals, so that when we meet again in June delegations will be equipped with sufficient instructions to negotiate generally acceptable solutions. All of the remaining issues, major ones and minor ones, will at one time or another be addressed during the summer part of the session.

As the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee I will make use of our recess for the month of May to consider in what ways our mode of operation can be improved upon so that from June on the Committee will be able to proceed more speedily with the many technical problems and more effectively cope with the limited but major outstanding questions.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

The Ad hoc Committee is indebted to the item co-ordinators, Mr. Nieuwenhuys of Belgium, Mr. Macedo of Mexico and Dr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic, who have all worked hard and conscientiously. We also have to thank the Secretary, Mr. Bensmail, Mr. Cassandra and Ms. Darby of the secretariat. May I also thank the many delegations which have expressed kind words to the Chairman of the Committee during the session.

May I also take this opportunity as the delegate of Sweden to welcome our new colleague, Ambassador Tarmidzi from Indonesia, and assure him of the close co-operation of the delegation of Sweden? I also thank your predecessor, Ambassador Lechuga Hevia, for his effective and hard work during the month of March. And finally, Mr. President, I thank you for your leadership of the Conference during the month of April. The high professional standard you have set, seasoned by your great experience in international diplomacy, and especially in the field of disarmament, has been of benefit for all members of the Conference. Our expectations were high when you took up the presidency: you have not disappointed us. May I also, on a purely bilateral note, express appreciation at the outcome of the meeting between Sweden and Czechoslovakia in Vienna last night, which was satisfying, at least from a diplomatic point of view.

Mr. President, we now wish you all a pleasant and profitable stay in New York for the session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and hope you will also get some well-earned rest.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President. That concludes my list of speakers. Is there any other delegation who would like to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

I should now like to turn to another subject: as you know, consultations have been proceeding in connection with the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee re-established under agenda item 6 entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". I am happy to inform you that those consultations have now been concluded, and that consensus has emerged on the name of the Chairman. Accordingly, I propose that the Conference appoint Ambassador Paul von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee re-established under agenda item 6.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should like to extend, on behalf of the Conference, warm congratulations to Ambassador Stülpnagel on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, and to these I add my own. We wish him success in the performance of his duties, which I am sure he will discharge with his well-known competence and diplomatic ability. I should like to ask the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to transmit our congratulations to Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

(The President)

I would also like to announce, and I am happy to announce, that the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons has told me that there are two co-ordinators on radiological weapons. They are, for track A, Mr. Sadaaki Numata, Counsellor, Deputy Head of the delegation of Japan, and for track B Mr. Hadi Wayarabi, Minister Counsellor, Deputy Head of the delegation of Indonesia.

The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the first week of the second part of the annual session. The timetable has been drafted in consultation with the incoming President of the Conference as well as the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. This is a matter which may be agreed upon by the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies, if they consider it appropriate. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts this timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Does anyone else wish to take the floor?

As I have no other business for today, I shall now make my concluding statement.

In a couple of minutes we are going to close the first part of this year's session. The conference has a full three months of work behind it, and it will have just over two and a half months in the summer before it reports to the General Assembly.

This "bigger half" of the session has been, as has become a tradition in the CD, marked by serious drawbacks while, at the same time, some positive developments have also taken place. Positive signals have emerged mainly from the present dynamic development of bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations on nuclear and space weapons. The latest significant proposals of the Soviet Union envisaging the elimination of both medium-range and shorter-range missiles from Europe offer a real chance of reducing the danger of military confrontation on the European continent as well as in the whole world. It is clearly felt now that concrete agreement is within reach, and that in itself has a positive influence on the international political climate.

Continuing the positive account, I hope I won't over-simplify matters too much in saying that, as far as the CD's work is concerned, almost all positive developments took place in the Ad hoc Committee on CW. One could say that that committee in fact started this year's work last year, during its autumn consultations, when interesting new proposals were put forward and widely discussed. Then, in January and throughout the spring session, the Ad hoc Committee continued its relentless effort under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, both officially and informally in its full composition and in smaller groups, and some of the remaining differences were narrowed down.

(The President)

There are, in my view, two issues we consider positive. Now we can see clearly and completely what is going to happen with CW stocks right from the entry into force of the convention until their complete destruction. First, declarations are going to be made on the ownership of CW in each country. The exact location of CW stocks and their composition are going to be indicated. The storage facilities are going to be closed. The transfer of CW to destruction facilities is going to be assured. Finally, the CW are going to be gradually destroyed. All activities mentioned above will be verified, including through international on-site inspection. The same basic clarity has been achieved with regard to CW production facilities.

We can now say that, after the latest positive developments, the Ad hoc Committee can move forward toward the final drafting of the convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and, if good political will prevails, this process need not necessarily be too long. Many delegations expressed the wish that the CW convention should be concluded already this year. I fully associate myself with this call. In any event, it would be rather premature to doubt the feasibility of this task today, when only the first third of 1987 has passed.

The document announced today by Ambassador Ekéus entitled "Current stage of the negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Convention" will certainly help in taking necessary decisions on outstanding problems in national capitals during our recess.

To find much that is positive in other items of the CD's agenda would be a rather painful and time-consuming process. Let me therefore just note that the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and the commencement of its substantive work in the spring session, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese, can be considered a step in the right direction. The threat of the spread of an arms race into outer space represents a vital danger to all nations, including those who seek military superiority by conquering outer space. It is my deep conviction that the elaboration of new, specific measures which would defend outer space and exclude it from all military scenarios is urgently needed. Let us hope that the work of the Ad hoc Committee in the summer will pave the way for this widely shared view to become, as soon as possible, a consensus opinion in this Conference, which has all the necessary potentialities and credentials to negotiate the new measures required.

While speaking about the positive side of the spring session, I would not like to omit the tireless effort of the Group of Seismic Experts, which is now engaged in preparations for an experiment in the transmission of waveform data to be carried out in 1988.

Turning now to the negative side, we are again faced with the reality that our conference has failed to take any action on its first three so-called "nuclear" items. With respect to the nuclear-test ban, we may note a certain paradox: a number of interesting developments took place recently in various countries and at different forums, but our Conference stubbornly refuses to accord this important problem any treatment other than general statements at plenary meetings. We continue to discuss various draft mandates and to argue

(The President)

about wording while the adversaries of the ban silently applaud. I maintain that there is at least some scope for substantive work aimed at achieving such a ban, and that it should be made use of. With this in mind I submitted a draft mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on item 1 of our agenda, which stipulated that the substantive work we would engage in would be regarded as a first step towards achieving a nuclear-test-ban treaty. Unfortunately, we lacked sufficient time to complete the substantial consideration of the President's proposal, but at the relevant informal consultations a view prevailed that this proposal established a basis for possible future compromise on the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on the Nuclear-test Ban. It is obvious that this is a task for us all, and my only hope is that persistent efforts in this regard will continue throughout this year's session. Let me finally stress for the record that I fully realize that the main obstacle to the establishment of this Ad hoc Committee is the position of those delegations which are not prepared to negotiate the ban, which the international community considers an urgent priority.

The same applies to item 2 of our agenda. Some delegations do not hide the fact that they do not consider this Conference a body suitable for the negotiation of multilateral measures of nuclear disarmament. For this reason we never established the Ad hoc committee on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. All they permit this Conference to do is to carry out a vague, general and preferably unstructured debate on this item.

This Conference works on the basis of the rule of consensus. Thus, it finally appeared that action on item 2 in a way that the majority of this body would have preferred was not possible. But we still had a chance to engage in discussions which would at least make it possible to stress the importance of item 2, to focus attention on its various priority aspects and to consider existing proposals. I came to the conclusion that this exercise was worth pursuing, and I tried my best to offer the Conference a generally acceptable framework. At one point it seemed that we were on the verge of consensus. However, some delegations didn't feel sufficiently assured that discussion, under the proposed arrangement, would be sufficiently structured if a proposed list of topics were read only at an informal meeting, while others didn't agree with the announcement of the structure and its content in the official plenary meeting.

Thus throughout the spring session, no action was taken on item 2, which I personally consider regrettable. In the recent past important proposals on nuclear disarmament were submitted, such as the Soviet proposal of 15 January 1986, to rid the world of nuclear weapons by the end of this century. Some may support this proposal, others may ask questions about it, still others may offer alternatives. The initial exchange of views we had on this and other proposals last year was, in our view, certainly not useless. Its continuation and its further deepening is desired. I hope that in the near future we will find a way around procedural problems in order to engage in business-like, practical consideration of both items 2 and 3.

(The President)

I have deep esteem for the efforts of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. If substantial progress was not possible in it, it was because the positions of some countries on a number of long-standing items have not changed. In the middle of this month I drew the attention of the Conference to the fact that by then we were supposed to have wound up our work on the draft Programme and to have sent it to New York for adoption by the General Assembly before it concluded its forty-first session. But apparently the intransigence of some delegations on a number of priority problems has become a permanent barrier against the finalization of the draft Programme.

Though substantial progress was not possible in the Radiological Weapons Committee, an exchange of views has taken place on how best to proceed further with the two tracks under consideration. This gives rise to hopes that, after tackling procedural issues, negotiations will recommence on the basis of a fresh approach, and hopefully with more flexible positions on substance.

Let me express in conclusion my deep conviction that the CD would benefit greatly if it succeeded in ridding itself of a large number of purely procedural problems it has to deal with repeatedly each year. My experience as President for the month of April has convinced me that this Conference could substantially increase its effectiveness if it could shape up and put into practice a simple and reasonable procedure, especially with regard to the establishment of its subsidiary organs.

Before I conclude, let me read a quotation which is 80 years old, but still valid today. It is a quotation from the Second International Peace Conference in The Hague, where the following words were spoken:

"Let us examine this problem of arms limitation such as it has been raised in recent propositions so hotly challenged by both the Governments and the press. The advantages are only too easy to recall. Reduction of public and private expenses, obliteration of a ruinous as well as illogical system of armed peace. It is useless to enlarge upon it. It is the very simplicity of this concept which ensures its validity. A child would agree that that which is costly and difficult is war, and that which is easy and cheap is peace."

These words were spoken by Mr. W.T. Stead. Let's follow them steadily and believe in them: it is quite clear that peace and disarmament go hand in hand together.

In conclusion I would like to thank the Secretary-General of the CD and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Ambassador Komatina, Deputy Secretary-General Ambassador Berasategui, and all their colleagues in the secretariat, as well as interpreters for the efficient help they offered to me during my presidency. Permit me also to thank all the delegations which co-operated with me in my endeavour to put forward some issues on the agenda, even if it was a somewhat thankless task. Permit me, lastly, to wish those who are leaving Geneva a pleasant trip back home, and to

(The President)

all of us a fruitful recess so that we can meet again in June with even more flexible instructions in our bags, allowing us to move further forward in the summer session.

I give the floor to the distinguished delegate of Japan.

Mr. YAMADA (Japan): Mr. President, I do not wish to prolong the proceedings of the meeting today, but I would like to make some observations because I heard your closing statement.

I listened with great interest to the resumé of your presidency for the month of April. Let me express my delegation's sincere appreciation to you, Sir, for your untiring efforts, especially to make us move forward on agenda items for which agreement is still pending on how to proceed.

I wish to make a few comments on agenda item 1, the Nuclear-test ban. I have already touched on the subject twice in the plenary, and therefore I shall be brief.

I am certain that I am expressing the sentiments of a group of Western countries when I say that I share with you the disappointment on the lack of progress on this item.

On behalf of a group of Western delegations, I wish to express my sincere appreciation to the President for the valuable role you have been performing with respect to agenda item 1.

We continue to attach high priority to this item and share the hope, expressed by many delegations in the course of this spring session, for an early commencement of substantive work by an ad hoc committee on a nuclear-test ban.

There are many subjects and aspects of a nuclear-test ban which we can and must consider in the Conference. The delegation of Canada introduced today more very useful material directly related to the ban.

In the view of a group of Western countries, the draft mandate in document CD/521 continues to provide a viable framework in which to commence such work.

At the same time, we sincerely appreciate the initiative taken by you, Mr. President, to search for common ground among the various positions thus far expressed. We stand ready to continue to study the President's paper as a basis for further consultations, as we go on to address the issue towards the summer session.

Though we now go into recess, your term of office still lasts a month or so. I sincerely hope that you will, as the President, continue to exert your efforts in bringing about a solution on this subject. On my part, I will spare no effort in co-operating with your endeavour. Let us not blame others for failure, because it would not be conducive to the start of productive work in the Conference.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

Before concluding, may I associate myself with my distinguished colleagues in extending my heartfelt welcome to His Excellency Ambassador Aqus Tarmidzi of Indonesia to our Conference. Japan and Indonesia enjoy the most friendly relations as neighbours in the Pacific. I look forward to working closely with him.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished delegate of Japan for his statement, and for the kind words about the initiative of the President, and now I give the floor to the distinguished delegate of the United States of America.

Mr. BARTHELEMY (United States of America): Thank you Mr. President. I would like also to take this opportunity to welcome the arrival of the distinguished representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Tarmidzi, and to pledge to him the co-operation of my delegation in our work here.

I would like to take this opportunity to join the distinguished representative of Japan in noting the fair, balanced and creative role that you have played as President of the Conference during this month, and to note the constructive work that you did in particular on agenda item 1. Having said that, I do feel obligated to note that in your summary of the work of the Conference for the spring and for this month, it seems to me that you somewhat altered your tone and approach perhaps a little closer toward the position of the group to which you are a member. Of course, you are entitled to do that; you make your own assessment of the work of this Conference, but you will, of course, understand that each of the other delegations makes its own assessment of the work, and it may be different from the assessment that you have made, even though you sit in the position of President of the Conference. I wish to echo Ambassador Yamada in his urging all delegations here to concentrate on constructive proposals and work and to, wherever possible, avoid placing blame on other delegations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished delegate of the United States of America for his statement. As far as I remember in my concluding statement, I did not name any delegation and I did not put the blame on any group of delegations. With this I would like to ask if anyone else is ready to take the floor now. I see no one.

This now ends our spring session, and let me now adjourn this plenary meeting and the first part of the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 9 June at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting and the first part of the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.