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Report of the Panel of Experts on the Standing Police Capacity's first year of operation

Note by the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to paragraph 61 of my report on the implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/62/627), wherein I expressed my intention to submit a report, prepared by a panel of experts, on issues relevant to the future of the Standing Police Capacity, including its core functions, as well as the required strength, needs of expertise and location of its base. In paragraph 77 of its report dated 7 July 2008 (A/62/19), the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group expressed its intention to receive this report on the comprehensive review of all aspects of the Standing Police Capacity's first year of operation. Furthermore, in paragraph 2 of its resolution 62/273, the General Assembly endorsed this recommendation of the Committee.

I have received the report of the Panel of Experts. I fully support the recommendations made therein, and the Panel of Experts shall remain available to brief the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group on the content of the report, if requested to do so.

I have the honour to transmit the report (see annex) and should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the General Assembly.

(Signed) **Ban Ki-moon**



Report of the Panel of Experts on the Standing Police Capacity's first year of operation

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I. Introduction

1. In paragraph 61 of his report dated 28 December 2007 on the implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/62/627), the Secretary-General informed the General Assembly of his intention to submit a report, prepared by a panel of experts, including representatives of Member States, on issues “relevant to the future of the standing police capacity, including its core functions, as well as the required strength, needs of expertise and location of its base”. Furthermore, in paragraph 77 of its report dated 7 July 2008 (A/62/19), the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group expressed its intention to receive “no later than July 2008 the report on the comprehensive review of all aspects of the Standing Police Capacity’s first year of operation”. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 62/273, by which the Assembly endorsed the recommendation of the Special Committee and its Working Group. It is submitted following the end of the first year of operation of the Standing Police Capacity in November 2008.

2. The Panel of Experts, led by the United Nations Deputy Police Adviser, comprised members of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the police advisers of six Permanent Missions of Member States to the United Nations, all in an individual capacity (see annex I).¹ In addition, the Panel of Experts received support from a non-governmental organization, the Stimson Center, which assisted with research and the preparation of the present report. The secretariat of the Panel, which comprised members of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the Stimson Center, reviewed a wide range of documentation and interviewed members of the Standing Police Capacity and many stakeholders at United Nations Headquarters and in field missions where the Standing Police Capacity has deployed in its first year of operation.

II. Key concerns and issues

A. General considerations

3. The United Nations police is one of the fastest sectors of growth in the work of the Organization and, by far, the largest area of involvement of the United Nations in support of the rule of law. As of October 2008, more than 11,000 United Nations police officers, out of an authorized strength of over 17,100, were deployed in 18 peace operations (see annex II), representing an increase of more than 100 per cent in authorized personnel since 2006. The mandated responsibilities of the police component of peace operations have evolved over the past 15 years from monitoring host State law enforcement services to reforming, restructuring and rebuilding those services during and after devastating civil wars, and collaborating with the legal, corrections and judicial components of United Nations operations to support the establishment of the rule of law. In two instances, United Nations police have assumed interim law enforcement responsibilities and are increasingly involved in assisting Governments in maintaining and restoring public order, particularly with

¹ All police advisers of the Permanent Missions of Member States to the United Nations were invited to participate to the Panel of Experts.

the use of formed police units, which now account for nearly half of all United Nations police personnel deployed around the globe. The growing demand for United Nations police services and the increasing complexity of their assigned tasks stem from the recognition that the rule of law is fundamental to lasting and self-sustaining peace and that competent and professional policing services are essential to the rule of law.

4. Early implementation of mission mandates can be crucial to the credibility of a new peace operation, but meeting demand for United Nations police personnel and, in particular, qualified police leadership and key specialists to establish new missions has proven difficult. The Standing Police Capacity was initially proposed in 2004 in a recommendation of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to establish “a small corps of senior police officers and managers (50-100 personnel) who could rapidly undertake mission assessments and organize the start-up of police components of peace operations” (see A/59/565, para. 223). On 16 September 2005, the General Assembly endorsed, in its resolution 60/1, “the creation of an initial operating capability for a standing police capacity to provide coherent, effective and responsive start-up capability for the policing component of the United Nations peacekeeping missions and to assist existing missions through the provision of advice and expertise”.

B. Establishment of the Standing Police Capacity

5. The General Assembly gave the Department of Peacekeeping Operations the authority and funding to establish the Standing Police Capacity, essentially as the field deployable arm of the Police Division, in the 2006/07 support account budget. On 3 July 2006 a note verbale was circulated to Permanent Missions to the United Nations in New York seeking seconded candidates for 17 posts. On 5 July 2006 vacancy announcements for eight more posts were listed on the Galaxy online recruitment system. The application windows closed on 3 September and 2 October 2006 for seconded and Galaxy posts, respectively. A selection team led by the then United Nations Police Adviser reviewed applications in November, drew up short lists of candidates, and completed 86 interviews by mid-March 2007 (for 52 seconded, out of 716 nominees, and 34 Galaxy candidates, out of 1,635 applicants). Owing to shortcomings in the recruitment process, strictly focused job descriptions made it difficult for candidates to be considered for more than one post. Some potential selectees withdrew from consideration, one declined appointment, and in some cases interviews failed to identify suitable candidates. On 30 March 2007, another note verbale was circulated to Permanent Missions re-advertising seven seconded posts. Two Galaxy posts also were re-advertised, in April and May 2007.

6. The Standing Police Capacity had reached its initial operating capacity by the end of October 2007, when a majority of its professional staff had assumed their posts. Altogether, the Standing Police Capacity’s professional staff assumed their duties between April 2007 and May 2008, under one-year appointments; 17 were seconded by Governments and 8 were hired through Galaxy. There were two team assistants on internal temporary vacancy announcement appointments.

7. At about that time, the first members of the Standing Police Capacity began to report for duty, including the two team leaders at the P-5 level and the Standing Police Capacity’s single P-4 logistics planning adviser. The Chief of the Standing

Police Capacity assumed his duties in May 2007, at the D-1 level, and one more officer reported in late June 2007, giving the Standing Police Capacity five professional staff by 30 June 2007. Four more team members arrived in July 2007, including the first member recruited via Galaxy. The team assistants joined in July and August 2007.

8. The Standing Police Capacity leadership team managed the new round of candidate selection, which commenced in late July 2007 and required, on average, half as long as the first round to complete. Fewer posts were involved, but interviews conducted by the secretariat of the Panel of Experts suggested that greater speed was the product of greater managerial focus and the assignment of “case officers” to follow individual recruitments and to advance the process when possible. For example, where Permanent Missions and capitals agreed, United Nations proceedings such as medical evaluations occurred in parallel with government secondment processes. As a result, the first team member from the second round of recruitment joined the Standing Police Capacity in September 2007; four more members arrived in October, two in November, one in December, and four in January 2008. In late April and early May 2008, the final four team members reached New York. Six of the 25 professional posts are held by women, and the Standing Police Capacity was drawn from all five continents.

C. Core functions

9. In paragraph 93 of his report on the overview of the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations (A/60/696), the Secretary-General noted that the Standing Police Capacity would “have two core functions: (a) to start up new United Nations police operations, including participation in pre-mission planning, as required [hereafter “first core function”]; and (b) to assist existing United Nations police operations with police reform and in capacity-building activities and operational audits [hereafter “second core function”]”.

10. In an internal directive on the Standing Police Capacity issued on 1 May 2006, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations assigned a clear priority to the first core function, under which it was expected that the Standing Police Capacity would normally operate as one cohesive team. Delayed recruitment and harsh operating conditions in Chad, the first core function deployment case, demanded a phased deployment, which was interrupted by an outbreak of fighting in the country. By early spring 2008, however, the Standing Police Capacity was fielding up to three teams at one time. By the end of its first year of operation, the most heavily deployed specialties, based on the average number of days that each specialty deployed, were the following: legal affairs (146), detention (143), team leader (135), community policing (129), transnational crime (126), police analyst (109), chief (107), policy planning (99), and investigations (98) (see annex III).

11. The internal directive for the Standing Police Capacity envisioned a standing cadre of police and civilian professionals with law enforcement expertise who possess a unique blend of leadership and managerial qualities. Consistent with that emphasis, Standing Police Capacity members interviewed by the secretariat of the Panel tended to see the unit as an elite team, distinct from other United Nations police personnel. However, in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Standing Police Capacity tends to be seen as a quick-deploying United Nations

police unit as well as the initial police leadership cadre for new missions, rather than as the precursor to the leadership.

12. These differing views of the Standing Police Capacity under its first core function may need to be taken into account not only for its role in mission planning and execution, but for other United Nations elements' and host Governments' expectations about that role. The aim of the Standing Police Capacity is to make the police component of a new operation more effective at implementing its mandate sooner. This involves not only office set-up and equipment for the Standing Police Capacity, but also nurturing relationships within the mission and with the host Government. Such relationships take time to build; rapid rotation of the United Nations personnel involved not only dilutes capacities, but it may lead national officials to reason that they should not "invest their time" until the arrival of regular contingents of United Nations police personnel. Such outcomes may undermine the purpose of the Standing Police Capacity under its first core function. Present policy direction states that the Standing Police Capacity should relinquish its tasks in a new operation once its police component is deemed to be operationally effective by the Head of Mission, but also assumes that this will require only four months to achieve, on average. However, various elements of the Standing Police Capacity were deployed in Chad for nine months, owing to delays in the recruitment process for personnel of the police component of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCAT), including in key managerial positions.

13. The Standing Police Capacity is presently too small to be consistently effective in performing its first core function. Although it has four police reform officers/advisers, it has only one or two posts in all other critical specialties and clearly needs more of those specialists if the team's availability for rapid mission start-up is not to be jeopardized by rendering, for example, assistance under its second core function. Moreover, the capacity of the Standing Police Capacity to support its first core function is presently confined to starting one small police component per year, such as the one for MINURCAT. The Standing Police Capacity did not and does not have the personnel needed to start up the police component of a mission the size of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), let alone UNAMID and MINURCAT together (the two missions were authorized within months of each other in the latter half of 2007), nor of a possible mission to Somalia.

14. A large police component in a complex United Nations operation may require up to 250 personnel to be posted at its headquarters when fully established, as is the case with the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Based on recent experiences in the field, including the increased deployment of formed police units, achieving minimum initial functionality in most of the police headquarters' elements of a new mission (operational as well as capacity-building) requires 60 to 75 personnel. Comparable minimum functionality for the police component of a smaller mission with mostly capacity-building duties would involve 20 to 30 personnel. The Standing Police Capacity at present has 25 professionals to undertake mission start-up tasks under its first core function as well as its assignments under its second core function.

15. The work of the Standing Police Capacity under its second core function has proven to be quite time consuming, with multiple requests for mission assistance or assessment received to date. Under this function, the Standing Police Capacity is

requested to fulfil or assist with virtually any function that a Head of Mission deems critical in the realm of policing and law enforcement. Standing Police Capacity personnel working under this function have stayed in the field nearly as long as most members involved in mission start-up. By mid-2008, requests for assistance appeared to be outstripping the ability of the Standing Police Capacity to meet them in a timely fashion, even as its support to MINURCAT ended and no immediate start-up requirement replaced it. For example, Standing Police Capacity support to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) accounted for approximately 80 weeks of Standing Police Capacity staff time between March and August 2008. In addition to UNMIT, by October 2008 the Standing Police Capacity had undertaken assistance or assessment missions in support of the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). These deployments were due to a very large extent to the close cooperation established at the working level between the Standing Police Capacity and other components of the Police Division. The Standing Police Capacity had also received requests for assistance from the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and UNAMID. The Police Division was also continuing to plan for a possible start-up mission in Somalia, with a strong possibility of a Standing Police Capacity deployment there. It should be noted that a system for prioritizing requests for assistance, including objective criteria, has yet to be in place.

16. The internal directive does not address the question of resolving competing requests for Standing Police Capacity assistance. Should such requests continue at the present or at a higher pace, however, there will be a need for triage on the basis of urgency, feasibility within the time frame proposed, the number of staff needed and availability of requested skill sets. The better the Standing Police Capacity becomes at undertaking all its functions, the more its reputation will drive such demand for its services and advice. There is also a need to consider how to address the contingency of Standing Police Capacity personnel being recalled for urgent mission start-up duty when a mission assistance task remains incomplete and rapid recall of Standing Police Capacity may damage the assisted mission.

D. Administration, command and control

17. On 17 October 2006, the Executive Office of the Secretary-General endorsed a recommendation of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations that the duty station of the Standing Police Capacity be at the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy. It was also decided at that time that the Standing Police Capacity should be initially deployed to New York for 12 to 18 months from the time of its inception. In paragraph 78 of its report (A/62/19), the Special Committee stated "the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations takes note of the intention of the Secretariat to relocate the Standing Police Capacity to the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, and looks forward to the consideration of this matter by the Fifth Committee according to established procedures". Planning continues for the redeployment, proposed to take place in the summer of 2009. All Standing Police Capacity personnel were recruited with the clear understanding that they could be deployed to the United Nations Logistics Base.

18. When not deployed, the Chief of the Standing Police Capacity reports to the United Nations Police Adviser. When deployed on mission start-up, the Chief of the

Standing Police Capacity reports to the Head of Mission. A technical reporting line is also maintained to the United Nations Police Adviser.

19. When deployed on an assistance mission, the Standing Police Capacity team reports to the Head of Mission through the head of the police component and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, where appropriate, with a technical reporting line to the United Nations Police Adviser and others in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support, where required, except on an assessment or investigative mission, when Standing Police Capacity personnel may report directly to the Head of Mission with copies as appropriate to the head of the police component, depending on the subject(s) of the investigation or assessment.

20. Once the Standing Police Capacity moves to the United Nations Logistic Base, the logistics base will provide day-to-day administrative support and will manage routine, non-substantive tasks associated with Standing Police Capacity recruitment and contracting. Its funding will shift from the Headquarters support account budget to the United Nations Logistics Base budget. The Standing Police Capacity will remain an arm of the Police Division, however, and its substantive reporting chain will be unaltered, including in the context of budgetary submissions and reports and for all performance appraisals.

21. The budgetary process for the United Nations Logistics Base begins in July for approval by the General Assembly the following June. Anticipating its move to the United Nations Logistics Base, the Standing Police Capacity is therefore already making assumptions about requests for assistance and mission start-up that look as far ahead as June 2010. Its ability to meet future demands will depend critically on its ability to be reimbursed from mission budgets for costs incurred in providing mission start-up support, and marginal costs incurred providing assistance to established missions. This would let Standing Police Capacity planners focus on more predictable cost elements, improve ability to respond to urgent tasking and reduce the total budget of the Standing Police Capacity.

22. Standing Police Capacity deployments are approved by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, through the United Nations Police Adviser. The internal directive stipulates that the Police Adviser pass deployment recommendations through the Assistant Secretary-General for the Office of Operations. Since the establishment of the post of Assistant Secretary-General for the Rule of Law and Security Institutions, deployment requests have been routed, in practice, through that office, in consultation with the Office of Operations and other relevant components of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The Standing Police Capacity has also acted on direct instruction of the Secretary-General, as in the dispatch of two Standing Police Capacity investigators to Kosovo in March 2008.

23. As has been demonstrated in the Panel interviews, current Standing Police Capacity deployment rates suggest careful attention to deployment tempo. The internal directive contemplates a tempo of 67 per cent: 120 days deployment followed by 60 days at duty station. The latter period was intended for training and pre-deployment activities. From 1 November 2007 to 31 October 2008, Standing Police Capacity staff averaged a deployment tempo of 28 per cent (see annex III), but not all Standing Police Capacity members were onboard for the whole period. Only 16 Standing Police Capacity professional staff had reported for duty by the end

of November 2007, 1 reported in December 2007, 4 in January 2008, and 4 in April and May 2008. Moreover, the field deployment rate does not take into account the substantial activities directly related to planning or learning from deployments, which typically entail several weeks of staff work by Standing Police Capacity personnel immediately pre- and post-deployment. Field deployments also involve a 7-day workweek (as opposed to the 5-day workweek experienced at Headquarters), so individuals' per-week level of effort is higher when deployed. Finally, deployment rates do not take into account temporary assistance provided to the Police Division on a contingent basis to help manage the surge in police field activities in the period 2007/08.

24. In the absence of appropriate leave arrangements during deployments, no time has been built into the work schedule for leave-taking. Without other options, Standing Police Capacity members must use the 60-day period for leave, thus reducing its effectiveness as a training and pre-deployment phase as originally contemplated. In retrospect, the cycle described in the Standing Police Capacity internal directive has proven to be too prescriptive, and it should be reviewed to better address the needs of field operations. Most Standing Police Capacity members were emphatic about the lack of time off in their duty cycles.

25. Mission personnel in many locations are eligible for occasional recuperation break based on the difficulty and/or danger of the operational environment in which they are deployed. Ten Standing Police Capacity personnel who deployed to MINURCAT served more than 60 consecutive days in the field, but did not take occasional recuperation break because, when occasional recuperation break eligibility for it would have opened up, they were under maximum pressure to complete assigned tasks, working against an assumed 90-day temporary deployment constraint, and occasional recuperation break cannot be taken as terminal leave; that is, when departing a mission assignment. Shorter assistance mission deployments also may be intense but may fall short of qualifying for occasional recuperation break or run afoul of the prohibition on occasional recuperation break as terminal leave.

26. All Standing Police Capacity personnel received initial one-year appointments and all are anticipated to receive renewal appointments for a further two years, consistent with positive performance reviews. Two-year renewals at present avoid the need to initiate recruitment and replacement procedures this fall, and the Panel of Experts understands that new hires for Standing Police Capacity are to receive two-year initial contracts with potential one-year extensions. Contracts at the United Nations Logistics Base are, however, normally for one year, which will require coordination between the United Nations Logistics Base and the Police Division. Full and effective implementation of the electronic Personnel Appraisal System (e-PAS) for all staff will, in any case, be essential to ensure that the Standing Police Capacity retain the highest quality staff. Since a presence at Brindisi will take the Standing Police Capacity out of daily physical contact with the New York mission planning and management establishment, the idea has arisen of designating a New York focal point for the Standing Police Capacity from within it.

E. Mission planning and implementation

27. The Standing Police Capacity is a new and innovative concept that has received, according to the Panel, high praise for both its mission start-up and its assistance work, in particular from mission leaders who have received its support.

28. The MINURCAT and UNMIT deployments were successful proof-of-concept of the Standing Police Capacity. The ability of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to rapidly deploy a start-up police capacity adds an important new element to the United Nations ability to initiate a peacekeeping mission, as does the ability to dispatch personnel in response to specific requests for assistance from ongoing missions. Still, the experience of the Standing Police Capacity in its first year has also identified areas that must be strengthened in order to fully utilize the concept. These include contributions, primarily at the field level, to mission planning and implementation, most importantly under the first core function.

29. Notwithstanding the challenges mentioned below, the Panel strongly believes that the establishment of the Standing Police Capacity has been one of the most innovative and concrete initiatives of the United Nations in recent memory.

First core function: start-up of new United Nations police operations

Mission planning: Chad

30. The Standing Police Capacity deployment to MINURCAT was the first test of the Standing Police Capacity concept under its first core function. Initial development of policing concepts of operation for what became MINURCAT began in late 2006. United Nations technical assessment missions with police participation were dispatched in November 2006 and early February 2007, resulting in concepts of operation outlined in reports of the Secretary-General in late December 2006 and February 2007 (S/2006/1019 and S/2007/97). These called for the training and advising of 850 Chadian gendarmes and police by United Nations police personnel, plus an advance mission to fully develop the requirements of the anticipated multidimensional operation. In March 2007, the Government of Chad declined the proposed United Nations military presence. The Secretary-General issued a new report in August 2007, in which the Chadian police and gendarmes would remain under the command and control of the Government of Chad while being trained and equipped by the United Nations. The Government of Chad also accepted a European Union military force that would, inter alia, assist in protecting civilians at risk, including internally displaced persons and refugees, within its capabilities, and facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance. That force would also provide the wide area security which is a pre-requisite for the deployment of a police presence.

31. In September 2007, the Standing Police Capacity participated in a European Union-led information-gathering mission to Chad and the Central African Republic. On 25 September 2007, the Security Council endorsed the recommendation to establish a Chadian police unit “which would be dedicated exclusively to maintaining law and order in refugee camps, sites with concentrations of internally displaced persons and key towns in neighbouring areas and to assisting in securing humanitarian activities in eastern Chad” (see Security Council resolution 1778 (2007), para. 5). At that time, the Standing Police Capacity consisted of just nine professional staff and was managing the second round of its own recruitment. Notwithstanding its team members’ skills in particular areas of policing or training, or their prior service in United Nations

peace operations, only one member of the Standing Police Capacity appeared to have personal experience or expertise in setting up a new mission or its police component. This issue, as well as a lack of familiarity with Headquarters planning and management procedures, may have contributed to coordination and logistical challenges related to start-up. Although the role of the Standing Police Capacity in planning for Chad may have been clear to the Standing Police Capacity itself and perhaps within the Police Division, interviews suggested that its role, responsibilities and reporting chain were not clear to others in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, most critically the Office of Operations Africa Division planning team for Chad, with which Standing Police Capacity relations appear to have been insufficiently structured. These difficulties could have been reduced, had there been greater emphasis in Standing Police Capacity recruitment on prior peacekeeping experience and mission start-up experience in particular.

32. Members of the Standing Police Capacity received copies of and are reported to have used the pilot version of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations new Mission Start-up Field Guide. Planning personnel from the Department of Field Support appear, however, to have been given only a relatively high-level concept of operations for the police component of MINURCAT that laid out some support requirements but left major gaps. The Department of Field Support inferred specific Standing Police Capacity operational requirements from this document. The secretariat of the Panel looked for but was not able to find a police deployment plan (an “operations order”) that laid out the mission, key timings and tasks, and support requirements of the Standing Police Capacity in Chad. In the absence of an operations order shared prior to deployment with all components, the Department of Field Support was not able to prepare a material resourcing plan. The material resourcing plan lays out the support requirements, including those drawn from the strategic deployment stocks, needed for a new deployment.

33. In general, as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations assesses that the establishment of a new operation is imminent, it may launch a technical assessment mission for the country in question, with the participation of other United Nations stakeholders. The Standing Police Capacity was not operational when such assessment missions were conducted for MINURCAT and, in the future, the Standing Police Capacity should, as part of the Police Division, contribute at least one person to the police element of such assessments in order to facilitate its subsequent activities under the first core function. Other personnel should come from other sections of the Police Division, to gain familiarity with the mission environment and better ability to define the basic concept of operations for the planned police component. The Standing Police Capacity personnel will, in turn, be better able to advise the other components of the Police Division regarding operational (and cost) implications of alternative police concepts of operations. Ultimately, the Standing Police Capacity police logistics and planning personnel should fully operationalize the police concept of operations embedded in the mission strategic plan. Upon approval, they should assist in the preparation of the draft material resourcing plan for the police component.

Mission implementation: Chad

34. Beyond planning issues, the Chad deployment highlighted the difficulties associated with deploying a rapid deployment capability when similar arrangements are not available and in place for other mission components. Lack of experience in

the areas of mission start-up, the larger system's difficulties in appointing senior mission leaders, and an adverse and dangerous operational environment limited what could have been a model case of early deployment of a complex integrated mission.

35. As part of the planning for MINURCAT, the Standing Police Capacity participated in the mobilization of funds to support the training, equipping and housing of the *Détachement intégré de sécurité*, which MINURCAT was to train. It did not anticipate, however, that the European Commission would delegate spending authority for its \$10 million contribution to the MINURCAT trust fund to its field representative in N'Djamena while the United Nations signing authority remained in New York, or the need to commit funds from the European Commission before the end of 2007. No Standing Police Capacity member was a financial or trust fund specialist and some had to learn on the job.

36. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General was not appointed until January 2008 and arrived in early March; the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General was appointed in March and arrived in early May; the Police Commissioner was appointed in July and took up his post in August. Only the remnant of a cancelled advance mission, posted in N'Djamena and augmented after the Security Council authorized MINURCAT, kept the Standing Police Capacity from arriving in N'Djamena even farther ahead of its logistical support. Attacks on the capital at the end of January by well-armed militias also led to the evacuation of MINURCAT staff, including Standing Police Capacity personnel to Douala, Cameroon, for two weeks, less than a month after the Standing Police Capacity had completed its phased deployment to Chad.

37. These were the conditions in MINURCAT into which the Standing Police Capacity and the main component of United Nations police deployed. Unlike military forces, which more frequently plan in terms of very basic logistical needs such as water, food, fuel and accommodation, the United Nations police do not normally take such needs into account, since, with the exception of formed police units, they deploy as individuals and anticipate support from the mission administration component. Moreover, most police officers lack the planning skills needed to plan deployments in harsh environments.

Second core function: assistance to existing United Nations police operations

38. In addition to its most important role under the first core function, the Standing Police Capacity also assisted police components in the field during this period. It played a central role, upon instructions of the Secretary-General, in the investigation of circumstances surrounding a major security incident in Kosovo in March 2008, which resulted in the death of a United Nations police officer. In Timor-Leste, the Standing Police Capacity assisted in the implementation of the recommendations of an expert mission on policing (see S/2008/329), including by restructuring the UNMIT process for advising the Timor-Leste National Police and providing detailed guidance for the resumption of law enforcement responsibilities by this institution.

39. The Standing Police Capacity assistance mission to UNMIT, in particular, demonstrated the value of the second core function and having the ability within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to send specialized personnel in response to specific policing-related needs of existing missions.

III. Observations and recommendations

A. Core functions, command and control

40. **The Panel of Experts assesses that the established core functions of the Standing Police Capacity, including start-up of the police component for new peacekeeping operations, assistance to and assessment of the police components of existing operations, and the conduct of investigations as requested, constitute an appropriate set of functions for the Standing Police Capacity.** With its current structure and capacity, however, the Standing Police Capacity is only able to meet current demand for its services with difficulty. **In this regard, a system for prioritizing requests for assistance, including detailed criteria, should be in place. In particular, the Under-Secretary-General should have the authority to recommend an intervention of the Standing Police Capacity, without necessarily a request to this effect from the field.**

41. **Regarding the first core function, the Panel recommends that the basic concept of operations of the Standing Police Capacity be revised from “precursor” to the police component of a new mission to “first rotation” of police leadership and performance of key police management functions in a new mission.** This recommendation is made on grounds that building a functional police component and relations with other mission components and various key interlocutors in the host Government takes time and benefits greatly from stability in the United Nations mission police leadership. **Handover to successor leadership should be benchmark-driven.** Experience has shown that this takes longer than the four months envisaged in the internal directive. If this recommendation is implemented, Standing Police Capacity members assigned to mission start-up will be correspondingly less available for deployment under the second core function (assistance, assessment and investigations). Meeting the latter requests in a timely and sustained fashion and developing the capacity to perform more robustly will require additional personnel, as discussed below in the section on the Standing Police Capacity structure.

42. Standing Police Capacity personnel were expected to be deployed in the field for 67 per cent of the time with a deployment time frame of 7 days for mission start-ups. The Panel of Experts assesses that both objectives need to be revised in the light of experience. Time on deployments must be balanced by time at the duty station, in order to undertake planning, capacity-building tasks such as after-action reviews — modifying best practices and guidelines accordingly — and conducting training and policy development activities. **In the view of the Panel, the Standing Police Capacity must spend a majority of its time deployed or undertaking deployment-related activities.**

43. **Standing Police Capacity members should participate, under the auspices of the Police Division, adequately in technical assessments for anticipated complex operations with police components, along with other representatives from the Police Division, and to build joint knowledge of the mission area. Standing Police Capacity participants in assessment missions should be detailed temporarily to Headquarters to contribute to police mission strategic planning, led by the Police Division within the established planning frameworks, particularly in order to draw insights for operational-level planning and build**

or renew relationships with other points of contact in the Police Division and on the relevant Integrated Mission Task Force or Integrated Operational Team.

44. Each Mission should assume all costs related to the deployment of the Standing Police Capacity (including all emoluments and transportation) for any mission-budgeted posts that it fills. Mission budgets should also reimburse the strategic deployment stocks at the United Nations Logistics Base for items drawn from the strategic deployment stocks by the Standing Police Capacity and left behind for continuing mission use.

45. The Panel recommends that, when the Standing Police Capacity moves to the United Nations Logistics Base, the Chief of the Standing Police Capacity should continue to report to the United Nations Police Adviser. For purposes of performance reviews, the United Nations Police Adviser should remain the first reporting officer. When the Standing Police Capacity is deployed, the Chief of the Standing Police Capacity or his or her delegate should report on substantive issues through the Head of Mission, but should retain a technical reporting line at all stages in the Police Division and to the United Nations Police Adviser.

B. Structure and personnel: improving ability to implement core functions

46. **The Panel recommends that the nominal organizational structure of the Standing Police Capacity be reviewed.** The present structure, with two mirror image deployable teams and several duty station-based analyst specialists, assumed that these two groups would deploy as such, jointly or separately, to launch the police components of new peace operations. This assumption has proven to be too rigid in practice. In fact, the actual deployments involved a mixture of the two teams, while smaller Mission assistance or assessment teams have deployed for extended periods. The Standing Police Capacity requires a more flexible structure that can configure deployment teams as needed for mission start-up, assistance, assessment or other specific requests. **The Panel suggests a functional management model, with flexible teams that group together specialties from which task-oriented teams may be assembled as required for any type of mandated assignment. With regard to tasks, the Panel recommends that the work of the incumbent to the post of prison adviser be focused on police detention issues.**

47. The present configuration of the Standing Police Capacity has also demonstrated a lack of certain necessary specialties. This was particularly obvious in the case of MINURCAT. In addition, the requirement to conduct start-up and assistance missions simultaneously strongly suggests the need for a greater depth in certain existing specialties, particularly where the entire burden is placed on one person. The Panel suggests two options for providing greater depth in the Standing Police Capacity. The first option would enable the Standing Police Capacity to start up and be the first rotation of police leadership for one small to medium-size police headquarters component per year, while continuing to meet requests for assistance from ongoing missions and responding to other requests for assessment or investigation from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations or the Secretary-General. The second option would enable the Standing Police Capacity to start up two small to medium-size police headquarters components or one major

component in a mission like MINUSTAH or UNAMID, while meeting other requests for assistance or assessment.

Option one

48. Under option one, the additional personnel needed to make the Standing Police Capacity fully capable of undertaking one mission start-up function per year, together with several smaller-scale assistance missions, would bring the Standing Police Capacity to a total of 54 staff, including 4 team assistants (see annex IV, column B). Recommended additions include a third team leader in order to permit the Standing Police Capacity to deploy simultaneously to two assistance missions, each with a team leader, as well as a small mission start-up element headed by the Chief of the Standing Police Capacity. The third team leader could also manage backstopping efforts, coordinate closely with the United Nations Logistics Base on logistics, and liaise with the Police Division on the scheduling and prioritization of other requests for Standing Police Capacity assistance.

49. Based on an analysis of the intensity of Standing Police Capacity deployment, by specialty, from January through May 2008, the Panel would also recommend adding a legal affairs officer, a community policing officer, a public order and formed police unit management officer, a police and criminal intelligence analyst, a policy planning adviser, an investigations officer, a training officer, an information technology specialist, and two police logistics planners. At least two team members in each specialty are needed to work double shifts, if necessary, on a start-up operation, with the possible exception of the public information officer, in order to deal with the range of issues in planning, logistics, and police communications and data management that arise in the first weeks or months of a new mission; and to have backup available in case of personnel illness or non-availability owing to deployment of a particular specialist on an assistance assignment. Two additional team assistants are recommended to support the Standing Police Capacity either at duty station or in the field, as required.

50. **Moreover, the Panel also recommends that, to ensure successful Standing Police Capacity deployment in the future, it should be complemented by the simultaneous or pre-deployment of the following categories of personnel: budget planners (to liaise with third-party donors regarding capacity-building support requirements, handover negotiation and management of donor contributions to the mission's integrated support team); human resource managers (for induction and management of United Nations police contingents in a start-up operation); civil engineers (for detailed assessment of infrastructure redevelopment needs); contract managers (to solicit and manage local bids to undertake necessary construction activities); gender specialists (to promote gender awareness and mainstreaming in local police activities); and administrative systems development (essential for developing the capacities of national law enforcement agencies in the areas of personnel, finance, budget, procurement and assets management, which are all fundamental requirements for building any institution). The Standing Police Capacity should also be supported by a New York-based Standing Police Capacity focal point (to liaise within the Police Division and other Headquarters entities on the activities related to the Standing Police Capacity); MINURCAT, a relatively small capacity-building mission in an extraordinarily difficult environment, demonstrated the**

utility and necessity of having these skills initially in the Standing Police Capacity itself.

Option two

51. Although the additions recommended under option one are substantial, relative to the current size of the Standing Police Capacity, they would not allow it to implement the start-up of a relatively large police component such as UNAMID or MINUSTAH, or to undertake two simultaneous start-up missions of more modest proportion, while continuing to field high-priority assistance requests under its second core function. **To enable the Standing Police Capacity to initiate police component headquarters in two smaller or one major operation per year, the numbers of most professional specialties would need to be roughly 40 per cent higher under this option than under option one. The Panel sees the need, at this higher level of function, for a Deputy Chief of the Standing Police Capacity to support the Chief in all aspects of his or her work and to allow the Chief to focus more on issues requiring strategic direction. Option two would involve a total of 76 staff, including 5 team assistants** (see annex IV, column C).

Other matters

52. **Standing Police Capacity team members should endeavour to acquire basic skills in at least one additional functional specialty, to better backstop one another in the field and to make the greatest use of Standing Police Capacity resources. Recruitment objectives, discussed below, should include the acquisition of individuals with broad and diverse backgrounds capable of handling or learning multiple tasks, and Standing Police Capacity professional development programmes should emphasize cross-disciplinary skills development.**

53. The expanded capacities of the Standing Police Capacity recommended here would also enhance the ability of the Police Division to meet the global lead responsibilities for United Nations policing assistance as entrusted to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in a November 2006 decision of the Secretary-General.

C. Support

54. **The Panel also believes that the Standing Police Capacity must ensure that a concept of operations is drawn up in collaboration with other components of the Police Division and coordinated, prior to deployment, with all components of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support.** It should verify that a companion material resourcing plan has been drawn up and submitted to support the initial deployment of the Standing Police Capacity.

55. **The Panel sees value in the establishment of three levels of support in relation to the functions of the Standing Police Capacity. The first level of support would be a kit to deploy with each individual member of the team to enable members to function for the first 14 days of their deployment.** It should include basic communications items, mobile computers, digital cameras, copies of the Mission Start-up Field Guide and other relevant equipment.

56. **The second level of support for a Standing Police Capacity start-up deployment would include heavy equipment common to most police components for United Nations peace operations**, ranging from office equipment to essential vehicles, police radio systems and other tools, that are needed from the first day on the ground. Composition should be determined jointly by the Police Division and Standing Police Capacity planners. These items should be held in one or more fly-away kits in the strategic deployment stocks at the United Nations Logistics Base; should be built into the material resourcing plan of any mission start-up in which the Standing Police Capacity participates; should have high shipment priority; should be turned over to the mission police component when the Standing Police Capacity team departs; and their deployment should trigger immediate replenishment by the United Nations Logistics Base, funded by the mission(s) to which the kits were sent. The United Nations Logistics Base would be responsible for maintenance.

57. **The third level would include those longer-lead items that may be partly available from the strategic deployment stocks and partly acquired under standing systems or missions contracts, including equipment required for a specific mission.** Funding would be drawn from a pre-Mandate commitment authority. The Police Division and the Standing Police Capacity would be responsible for identifying need. The Department of Field Support and the Department of Management would be responsible for the purchase and deployment of items not held in strategic deployment stocks.

D. Financial and material assistance to national authorities

58. **Adequate resources should be made available to facilitate immediate financial and material assistance to national law enforcement agencies in conjunction with the deployment of the Standing Police Capacity, particularly during the mission start-up.** This could include items, such as transport and communication equipment, that are immediately required to be used to support law and order institutions: the general approach used for the levels above could be applied for this purpose. **The establishment of a flexible standing United Nations trust fund in support of police and other law enforcement agencies, managed by the Police Division, should be considered to support this objective.**

E. Recruitment

59. **Staff turnover should preferably be phased by specialties, such that the Standing Police Capacity at no time faces deficits in critical skill sets or gaps between departing and replacement personnel.** With this need in mind, a recruitment and pre-selection process needs to be built into the fiscal year 2009/10 United Nations Logistics Base budget, to ensure timely Standing Police Capacity rotation and handover at current staffing levels and, with legislative body approval, to add selected specialties to the Standing Police Capacity.

60. **The Police Division should have better access to United Nations personnel records of applicants with current or recent mission appointments and good service records, both to facilitate hiring and, in consultation with the Office of**

Human Resource Management, potentially to compress the post-selection review process.

61. Non-police personnel with relevant backgrounds should be considered for many positions within the Standing Police Capacity, such as for planning and communications, with a view to building core, longer-term staff and improved institutional memory, as most police personnel are on temporary secondment. Such posts should be listed on Galaxy.

62. With the exception of posts requiring particular expertise, job descriptions for Standing Police Capacity posts should be broader, drawing candidates qualified to perform a variety of functions in the field. Recruitment should take place with strict attention given to geographical and gender diversity in recruitment. Moreover, as the Standing Police Capacity is intended to start up or to give expert advice to United Nations peacekeeping operations, prior experience in peacekeeping should be required rather than “desirable” — the criterion used in the 2006 and 2007 Standing Police Capacity vacancy announcements — for most functions.

63. A majority of senior Standing Police Capacity leadership should be fluent in English, with a proven working knowledge of French. Most Standing Police Capacity personnel should have proven working knowledge of English, with proficiency in one other United Nations official language. All Standing Police Capacity members deploying to a mission should meet its qualification standards for police, including language requirements, or, in the case of non-police Standing Police Capacity personnel, standards for other mission professional staff or administrative support staff. Prior experience with United Nations field mission start-up should be required for most specialties.

F. Conditions of service

64. Rapid deployment does not mean a surprise deployment. Only in rare cases would a new operation progress in less than a month from a possibility to a stage when United Nations personnel are required to be already on the ground. Thus, deployment timelines that the Standing Police Capacity collectively should be able to meet post-mandate and deployment notice given to individual members can and will be different. Planning decisions regarding the make-up of a rapid deployment team can and should be made well in advance of the signal to deploy. Team readiness should build on its participation in technical assessment missions and operational planning.

65. Moreover, although Standing Police Capacity members expect to be deployed for significant periods, they also have personal lives and family ties. Greater efforts should be made to manage deployment flow, using a template or protocol based on experience of mission demand to date and revised as that experience accumulates — not as a hard and fast schedule, but as a set of expectations. It should be the responsibility of planning elements and Standing Police Capacity points of contact in the Police Division to coordinate with the Chief of the Standing Police Capacity regarding possible new assignments, with as much lead time as is feasible. As the Standing Police Capacity grows into a more capable and flexible organization, the deployment expectations established by advance resource utilization planning will be easier to maintain.

66. All Standing Police Capacity members should be required to complete mandatory United Nations training requirements, Standing Police Capacity-specific training and mission-specific training before deploying to the field. Recruitment cycles for incoming personnel should include such necessary training time. Language training, most importantly French and English, should be a key element of Standing Police Capacity team members' professional development.

67. Standing Police Capacity personnel working on mission start-up should be able to take occasional recuperation break in conformity with mission rules, while maintaining operational effectiveness. Some arrangement for leave should also be devised for team members' use upon return to the duty station from assistance or assessment missions that require up to 60 consecutive days of work. At a minimum, Standing Police Capacity eligibility for occasional recuperation break should be clarified.

68. For Standing Police Capacity personnel in operations-related posts deployed with individually armed United Nations police personnel, such as those missions with interim law enforcement mandates, weapons proficiency should be included in the set of qualifications for assuming such posts.

G. Related considerations

69. Through the course of its review, the Panel also came to the conclusion that there is also an immediate need to strengthen the field personnel generation, mission planning and mission logistics advisory capacity of the Police Division. Also, police logistics experts should be posted in the Department of Field Support, as is the current practice of the Office of Military Affairs regarding military logistics planning, to facilitate the effective meeting of police component needs in field operations, including proper supplying and replenishment of the United Nations Logistics Base strategic deployment stocks for police rapid deployment needs.

70. During the course of the review, it also became clear that Standing Police Capacity capacities must be matched by rapidly deployable capacities within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support in all areas required for field missions. A small number of contract managers, trust fund specialists, and related personnel also need to be available for rapid deployment during mission start-ups, both to assist the Standing Police Capacity and to support the establishment of a new operation.

71. A particular critical area is to ensure a strategic and joint approach to the rule of law at the early stages of the peace operation. A modest standing capacity to complement the Standing Police Capacity, incorporating broader areas of rule of law expertise, particularly judicial affairs, corrections and human rights, would contribute to an integrated and coherent approach to the rule of law from the early establishment of a mission.

Annex I

Members of the Panel of Experts

Chair


Ms. Ann-Marie Orlor, Deputy Police Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Members

1. **Colonel Saeb Nayef al Ouran**, Counsellor and Police Adviser, Permanent Mission of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Nations
2. **Mr. William Durch**, Senior Associate, Stimson Center
3. **Ms. Birgitta Ekelund**, Counsellor and Civilian Police Adviser, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations
4. **Mr. Colin Farquhar**, First Secretary (Police Adviser), Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations
5. **Mr. Stéphane Jean**, Policy and Legal Affairs Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations
6. **Mr. Odd Berner Malme**, Counsellor (Police Adviser), Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations
7. **Mr. Francisco Monedero**, Counsellor and Police Adviser, Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations
8. **Mr. Mark Pedersen**, Evaluation Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations
9. **Ms. Florence Poli**, Political Affairs Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations
10. **Ms. Justine Saunders**, Counsellor (Police Adviser), Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations
11. **Mr. Andrei Zykov**, Administrative Management Officer, Department of Field Support, United Nations

Annex II

United Nations police presence as of October 2008



		Deployed	Authorized
BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi	10 police officers	10
BONUCA	United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic	2 police officers	2
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	226 police officers	300
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	6 police officers	6
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti	1,868 police officers	2,091
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	1,065 police officers	1,141
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	2 police officers	8
UNAMID	African Union - United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur	2,039 police officers	6,432
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	69 police officers	69
UNIPSIL	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone	2 police officers	7
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo	1,910 police officers	2,195
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia	1,037 police officers	1,375
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan	600 police officers	715
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	1,542 police officers	1,608
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	1,136 police officers	1,200
UNOGBIS	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau	1 police officers	1
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia	17 police officers	20
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia	1 police officers	1
	Total:	11,533	17,181

Annex III

Standing Police Capacity deployments by occupational specialty

1 November 2007 through 31 October 2008

<i>Occupational specialties</i>	<i>Cumulative days deployed (averaged by specialty)</i>	<i>Percentage of on-staff days (deployed by specialty)^a</i>	<i>Number in specialty</i>
Chief	107	29	1
Team leader	135	37	2
Legal affairs	146	46	1
Detention	143	39	1
Community policing	129	39	2
Police analyst	109	37	1
Police reform	95	36	4
Transnational crime	126	34	2
Public order	80	31	2
Policy and planning	99	27	1
Investigations	98	27	2
Training	72	26	2
Public information	88	24	1
Logistical planning	51	14	1
Administrative support	43	12	2 ^b
Information technology	13	4	1
Special assistant	5	2	1
Average cumulative individual deployment	93	28	
Shortest cumulative individual deployment	0		
Longest cumulative individual deployment	183		
Total calendar days, 1 November 2007 to 31 October 2008	366		

Note: Bold indicates above average deployment percentage.

^a Percentages are based on individuals' varying lengths of service with the Standing Police Capacity in its first year.

^b Field deployment not part of job description.

Annex IV

Recommended skill sets and numbers in the Standing Police Capacity, for small/single and robust mission start-up

<i>Occupational specialties</i>	<i>(A) Current Standing Police Capacity personnel by specialty</i>	<i>(B) Total Standing Police Capacity personnel for small/single mission start-up capacity</i>	<i>(C) Total Standing Police Capacity personnel for robust/dual mission start-up capacity</i>
Chief	1	1	1
Deputy Chief	—	—	1
Team Leader	2	3	5
Special Assistant	1	1	1
Police and Criminal Intelligence Analyst	1	2	3
Community policing	2	3	5
Public order and Formed Police Unit management	2	4	5
Legal affairs	1	2	3
Policy planning	1	2	3
Public information	1	1	1
Investigations	2	3	4
Training	2	3	4
Transnational crime	2	2	4
Police reform	4	6	8
Police detention	1	1	2
Logistic planning	1	3	4
Information technology	1	2	2
Standing Police Capacity focal point (New York)	—	1	1
Civil engineering	—	1	1
Gender issues	—	1	2
Contract management	—	1	1
National administrative systems development (personnel, budget, finance, procurement, assets management)	—	5	6
Human resources systems	—	2	4
Administrative support (general service)	2	4	5
Total staff	27	54	76