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2 August 1979
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FORTY-SEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 2 August 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

U SAW HLAING

(Burma)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENSMAIL

Argentina: Mr. A. DUMONT
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Sir James PLIMSOLL
Mr. A. BEHM
Ms. M. WICKES

Belgium: Mr. P. BERG

Brazil: Mr. S. DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. H. HALACHEV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U THEIN AUNG
U NGWE WIN

Canada: Mr. J.T. SIMARD

Cuba: Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. V. TYLNER

Egypt: Mr. O. EL-SHAFEI
Mr. M. EL-BARADEI
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. M. COUTHURES
Mr. C.A. GRIFFITH

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. W. KOETTER
Mr. M. CRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. J. PÖHLMANN

Hungary:

Mr. M. DOMOKOS
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:

Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN
Mr. S.T. DEVARE

Indonesia:

Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. D.B. SULEMAN
Mr. SILABAN

Iran:

Mr. D. AMERI

Italy:

Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. M. MORENO
Mr. C. FRATESCHI
Mr. FOLCO DE LUCA

Japan:

Mr. M. OGISO
Mr. T. NONOYMA
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. TSUNOO

Kenya:

Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. A. JET ODENDO

Mexico

Mr. M.A. CÁCERES

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco:

Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Nigeria: Mr. T.O. OLUMOKO

Pakistan: Mr. J.K.A. MARKER
Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. M. KRUCZYK

Romania: Mr. C. ENE

Sri Lanka: Mr. I.B. FONSEKA

Sweden: Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. S. STROMBACK

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
Mr. N.V. PESTEREV
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America: Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY
Mr. D. KOELEMAY
Mr. R. MIKULAK
Mr. M. SANCHES
Mr. J. CALVERT
Mr. W. DUNLOP
Mr. M. DALEY

Venezuela: Mrs. R. LISBOA DE NEGER

Yugoslavia: Mr. D. DJOKIC

Zaire: Mr. MULONGADUSU ESUK

Secretary: Mr. R. JAIPAL

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 47th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee continues today consideration of item 1 of its agenda, "Nuclear test ban". In connexion with this item, may I recall that the following documents are before the Committee:

CD/43 - Letter dated 25 July 1979 from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the second report of the Ad Hoc Group.

CD/45 - Working paper on international seismological datacenter demonstration facilities in Sweden.

CD/46 - Draft CD decision for a continued mandate to the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts for International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

I have also requested the Secretariat to circulate an informal paper entitled: "Reproduction from the 'Abridged report with resolutions from the Eighth World Meteorological Congress' (WMO), 1979, with the decision".

Mr. SIMARD (Canada) (translated from French): I should like to make a few brief remarks on the topic on our agenda this week: the nuclear-test ban. If I may be allowed the superlative, this subject is the one with the highest priority among all those with which we are concerned. We must once more acknowledge, however, as we reach the end of our work, that our Committee has been unable to fulfil its mandate with regard to this issue. Every year recently we have hoped that a draft text emanating from the trilateral negotiations would be submitted to us. We very well understand that the complexity of these negotiations is such that they take a certain time to produce results. Nevertheless, it seems to us important, nay vital, that a great effort be made to ensure that our Committee has a draft before it by the summer of 1980, which is the date set for the second Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

(Mr. Simard, Canada)

Under article VI of that treaty, the nuclear-weapon signatories undertook to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race. As Prime Minister Trudeau said in his speech of 26 May 1978 at the special session on disarmament, the nuclear test ban was one of those measures which, in combination with a number of other measures, could suffocate the nuclear arms race. We also think that, if horizontal proliferation is to be prevented, it is essential that the nuclear-test ban should soon be put into effect.

At the level of vertical proliferation, the nuclear-test ban will help to prevent the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. At the level of horizontal proliferation, such a treaty, if it is multilateral, will considerably strengthen the non-proliferation régime. It is with reference to that aspect that we should like once more to stress the role that the Committee on Disarmament must play in working out such a treaty. Our Committee should receive as soon as possible from the three negotiating Powers, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, the key elements agreed on in their negotiations, and, taking those as a starting point, develop in a multilateral treaty a comprehensive nuclear-test ban in all environments, together with the protocol covering the so-called "peaceful" tests.

We thank the United Kingdom delegation and its partners in the trilateral negotiations for the report submitted to our Committee on 31 July 1979. We regret, however, that the negotiating Powers did not see fit to give our Committee more detailed information on the progress of their negotiations, as was done on the same day in the report on the bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons. An attentive perusal of this report, although it is short, reveals a certain number of positive elements. Thus, we were particularly happy to note that it is specifically stated that after a certain period the parties to the treaty would hold a conference to review its functioning. We believe, if we are deducing correctly from this sentence what it seems to imply, that this provides an acceptable solution to the problem of extending commitments under such a treaty. We must confess that the suggestion of a treaty which automatically ends after a few years would be a considerable disappointment. For our part we would even prefer a treaty of indefinite duration with the usual withdrawal clause in the event

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of the vital interests of a State being threatened. It would seem that the three negotiating Powers are now contemplating a solution which might be described as intermediate, that is, that after a specific period the situation would be reviewed. This approach seems to us more acceptable than the automatic dissolution of the treaty obligations after a few years, which would gravely affect its credibility and its "multilateralizing" effect. For the same reasons, we would like to stress the importance of a sufficiently long initial period.

We were also happy to note in this report that the three negotiating Powers are proposing that an international system for the exchange of seismological data should play an important role in verification. We think that the negotiating Powers can agree among themselves whatever verification procedures for such a treaty they deem necessary. But we also think that if it is wished to make the treaty truly multilateral, all the States parties should have the possibility of participating in a meaningful way in the verification process. The international proposed seismic network seems to us to provide the international community with the best means of assuring itself that the obligations of such a treaty are being respected. This undertaking must therefore be given adequate resources to enable it to play its part to the full. In that connexion, we hope that the fears voiced by the representative of the Netherlands in his speech of 31 July will prove groundless. We also take this occasion to thank the Group of Experts for the excellent work they have accomplished so far. We support the recommendations contained in the report submitted to us, and we hope that the Group's mandate will be extended. We will continue to participate actively in its work.

I should like to end this short statement by stressing once more the importance which my Government attaches to the submission to the Committee in the near future of the three negotiating powers' draft on the nuclear-test ban. We believe that would be in the true interests of all, both of the nuclear-weapon powers and of the other members of the international community. If, through being negotiated in our Committee, such a treaty achieved wide acceptance, and in the first place that of all the nuclear-weapon Powers, it would help to slow down the nuclear arms race and to strengthen the non-proliferation régime, which means that it would strengthen the security of all of us.

Sir James PLIMSOLL (Australia): Mr. Chairman, let me begin by taking advantage of my early participation in this debate to be one of the first to congratulate you on taking the chair and to offer you the assurance and the support of my delegation and, I know, all other delegations. Australia and Burma have very good relations. Since I came here I have had the pleasure of getting to know you and I am looking forward to serving under you. I would also like to express my appreciation of the period of the chairmanship of your predecessor Mr. Voutev. I am not doing this simply as a formality or because it is customary. As I said before when he took the chair, I have known him for more than 20 years and he was there in a very difficult period.

The fact that the Committee moved so smoothly is due in no small part to the determination on his part to push us forward with our work in a way that secured the maximum co-operation. So, as I say, I pay that tribute not in any formal sense because it is the proper thing to do, but because I feel it.

The question before us is in many ways the most important question on our agenda for the current session. It is important because of its substance. I will develop that theme in a few minutes. But it is also important because it is attainable. There are other disarmament and arms control measures before us, such as nuclear disarmament, destruction of nuclear stocks, and chemical warfare, that are very complicated, not least because there is such an intermingling of ordinary civil industry and armaments factors. But the stopping of nuclear tests is attainable. It is technically attainable. There are still problems of working out how to do it, but it is attainable. Therefore it is something on which we can reasonably ask for rapid progress.

It is a question to which the Australian Government and people attach great priority. The Prime Minister of Australia mentioned it in his address to the United Nations special session devoted to disarmament. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia mentioned it when he addressed the opening meeting of this Committee. There is a great deal of feeling in Australia, a great deal of feeling among the public, that there should be an end to nuclear testing. Some of that feeling derives from the fear of contamination -- the realization of the consequences to humanity of contamination -- and to some extent those fears

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are lessened when there are no atmospheric tests or tests in water. But even so, testing underground contains its own long-term dangers, not only for people today but for future generations. And this is apart from the general feeling, which is a reasonable feeling, that the ending of nuclear tests would be a major step forward towards ending nuclear proliferation -- either horizontal proliferation or vertical proliferation.

I must say quite frankly at the outset that the Australian delegation was very disappointed in the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom on behalf of the three negotiating Powers. It is true that it showed some progress. It is true that it contains some optimism, and I think we all share some optimism that there will be an agreement. But it did not offer, as we would have hoped, either the promise of an imminent agreement or very great detail on what is now holding up an agreement.

We have to accept first that the negotiation of this treaty -- or the outline of the basic treaty provisions -- is a matter for the three nuclear-weapon Powers that are now negotiating, not only because they have the expertise but because they have great interests at stake in terms of national security, interests of their own development and of the security of other countries associated with them, and of the world. We admit that, we do not contest that. We also accept that there are great technical problems, even without the problems being spelt out. We can for ourselves envisage what the problems are -- verification, for example, has been mentioned. We recognize that the issues before the three negotiating Powers are complex. They are interrelated and the solutions are not always immediate. But nevertheless it is highly desirable that progress should be made on this as quickly as possible, not only because of the substantive issues involved in this particular matter itself, but because of the relationship of the ending of nuclear tests to our whole conception and programme of action on arms control generally and disarmament.

It has a particular relationship to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Now, if we could have a comprehensive test ban treaty, it would stop all nuclear explosions by all parties for the duration of the treaty -- all nuclear explosions, for military purposes and for peaceful purposes. The effects

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of that would be far-reaching and beneficial. In the first place it would limit and perhaps even stop the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons by the parties to the treaty. It would be very difficult for them to develop new nuclear weapons or to improve existing ones. It might not be impossible theoretically: it might be possible to simulate conditions to allow development to take place, but it would be difficult. One of the cries of so many non-nuclear-weapon States -- and this is reflected in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in other things -- one of the cries of many non-nuclear-weapon States has been that they are being expected to accept restraints when the nuclear-weapon States are continuing to develop and increase their stocks. Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty the nuclear-weapon States that acceded to it undertook to pursue their efforts to end nuclear tests. We are asking them to do so. As I have said before in this Committee, Australia would not regard it as a valid reason for not acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that the nuclear-weapon Powers have not reached this agreement. We think that the stakes in the survival of mankind and the prevention of war are so great that, through this treaty, countries should enter into commitments not to develop their own nuclear weapons. It would be part of the international structure. It would increase the incentives to countries to remain non-nuclear if we had a treaty banning nuclear tests, therefore making it at least difficult and perhaps impossible to have vertical proliferation.

Similarly, a second consequence of having a treaty would be that it would prevent or act against horizontal proliferation. Our aim is a multilateral treaty to which all countries of the world would accede, and it would mean that countries which do not have nuclear weapons today would not be able to acquire them. They would be pledging themselves not to have tests which would make the acquisition or the effective testing of them possible. I think it is important to note that States which have not become parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty could nevertheless become parties to the comprehensive test ban treaty, and in that way they could give assurances that they would not

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become nuclear-weapon States or that they would not try to become nuclear-weapon States, even though they felt that they could not become parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In addition, the existence of a comprehensive test ban treaty would be a point of pressure on other countries, even if they did not accede to the treaty. It would at least put moral pressure on them, because after this treaty has come into force, any country which enters into nuclear testing is bearing a heavy responsibility -- a heavy responsibility of explaining to the rest of the world of what it is doing.

So Australia has wanted very urgently and ardently to see this treaty for the reasons I have given -- because we see it as part of a whole system of disarmament and arms control; because it is attainable; because it could contribute significantly to regional security; because it could provide further reassurances to the international community and to regional countries that nuclear programmes in non-nuclear-weapon States were directed to peaceful purposes. Now we are waiting for the three nuclear negotiating Powers. Until they come up with either more detailed proposals or a draft, there is a great limitation on what this Committee can do. I hope that they will come up with a draft treaty before this Committee meeting next year so that we can consider it at our first session.

But while we are waiting for them, there are things that the rest of us can be doing, and this is where the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has a direct bearing on our consideration. We have the report before us that shows that the Group has made progress. One of the values of the Group is in the width of its participation. It brings in some countries that are not members of this Committee, and it brings in people with a high degree of technical expertise who have also shown that they have a genuine devotion to finding technical solutions. But the report does not represent the last word that can be said, and therefore the Group should continue and should have a new mandate. Australia supports the proposal for this which is being put forward by Sweden, contained in document CD/46.

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We support the proposal as it is, but I will make a few comments on it. Let me begin my remarks on the Swedish proposal by paying some tribute to Sweden, not just for this but for its constructive activity in this field and its promotion of international co-operation over many years. The Swedish proposal refers to the analysis and data-handling procedures of the envisaged data centre, as one of the things that should be studied under the renewed mandate. The Swedish delegation has described the demonstration of its national data facility in some detail in document CD/45. This exercise held in Stockholm last month was a valuable one. It demonstrated one solution to the handling of seismic data, which is one element -- only one element, but a key element -- in an international seismic network. The exercise was highly instructive as an example of how seismic data could be processed. It is a pity that more countries did not avail themselves of the opportunity which the demonstration afforded.

But the most important element proposed for the renewed mandate, which is contained in CD/46, is the first subparagraph of paragraph 2, which says that the work of the Group should include the further elaboration of detailed instructions for an experimental test of the global system for international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. A verification system is basic to any arms control measure like the comprehensive test ban, and we want an international system, with data internationally available. I think there are three elements that we want out of this. We want to concern ourselves with the reliability of the system; with the international breadth of participation; and with free flow of information. Apart from the substantive benefits, it will build confidence. We also need to be looking at the institutional aspects of an international seismic network. I will not go into detail on that. It is something that we should all now be turning over in our minds in preparing ourselves, if not in discussion in this Committee, at least in getting ready for further discussions in this Committee. We should be thinking about the institutional aspects of an international seismic network.

I have been emphasizing the role of verification in a comprehensive test ban. But my remarks have been predicated on the fact that the treaty will be truly international. That means there must be a genuinely multilateral,

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effective seismic network. And I might say it will have great benefits not only in regard to the comprehensive test ban or in the regard to arms control, but also in the non-military field by increasing our international co-operation, understanding, and detection of seismic phenomena generally. As I have said, there has to be a genuinely multilateral, effective seismic network. That in turn leads me to urge the three negotiating Powers to do their utmost to facilitate now and actively the accomplishment of the test set out in the first subparagraph of paragraph 2 of the Swedish draft resolution, namely, the setting up of this global system.

The negotiating Powers should come forward quickly with a comprehensive test ban treaty or its outline, and should do it before the next session if they can. I make that qualification because I am not saying that they are holding back out of malice or out of lack of willingness. There are real difficulties. We know that. But I urge, and we all urge, that they should move as quickly as possible and try to let us have the treaty before the Committee on Disarmament meets next year. Then the Committee on Disarmament should act quickly on it, and play its part in giving it a multilateral aspect. I come back again to this theme that the treaty has to be a multilateral one, and in being multilateral it has to be seen not only in relation to a comprehensive test ban but also to non-proliferation aims and measures in general and in relation to arms control generally. It will play a part in building up international confidence. The more that we can widen out the range of contacts between countries of the world in these disarmament and arms control fields -- not only in nuclear matters, but generally -- the more firmly-based, politically and otherwise, will be the peace of the world. I hope that when we have this treaty -- and I am confident there will be one -- there will be wide accession to it, and all countries of the world will accede to it. I hope that before the expiry of the first term of the treaty, all five nuclear-weapon States will have acceded to it. Though this Committee is limited in what it can do at this session, it is important that we should make clear the great importance we attach to the treaty and the great importance we attach to its early submission and conclusion.

Mr. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO (Italy) (translated from French): Before our session draws to an end, I should like to make a few comments on the problem of chemical weapons, a problem which has received the full attention of the Italian Government for many years and on which the Italian delegation has already had the opportunity of expressing a certain number of views during the first stage of our work.

In particular, we proposed then --- and I should like to remind the Committee of our document CD/5, dated 6 February 1979 --- the establishment of a working group which would make, with the help of experts, a more searching attempt to find solutions to the problems which continue to hamper the conclusion of a multilateral convention acceptable to all members of the Committee.

Other working groups have been established during the session to look at certain subjects, on which discussion was perhaps less advanced, and they have proved to be very useful, giving rise to a less formal dialogue and a better organized, more direct and fruitful exchange of views.

We regret, therefore, that our proposal could not be realized, despite the wide response it aroused. The establishment of a working group would, in fact, have helped to put our discussions on a more solid basis, by enabling us to identify more precisely the areas of convergence, as well as the difficulties to be resolved.

The favourable reception our approach received from many delegations --- and in particular from the Group of 21, which has made a similar proposal --- is the best confirmation for us of its validity. It leads us to hope, therefore, that the issue will be taken up again at the beginning of our next session.

My delegation has listened with the greatest attention to the joint report submitted at our last meeting by the United States of America and the Soviet Union on the state of the bilateral negotiations on which those two countries have been engaged for some years now on the question of chemical weapons. We are particularly grateful to the two negotiators for their information, which will certainly be very useful to us in our future work. We shall study their report with the attention it requires, and will come back to it at a later stage.

While awaiting the outcome of the bilateral negotiations, our Committee should not, however, give up its role, which is to seek, with the active help of all its members, multinational disarmament agreements corresponding to the common

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interest of all. Our Committee should, therefore, increase its efforts and carry out to the full its negotiating function, which, far from hampering the bilateral talks, could have the beneficent effect of giving them impetus by helping to clarify aspects on which there are still doubts or differences of view.

It is against that background that my delegation would like to put forward today some thoughts regarding the essential elements of a convention whose object is the banning of chemical weapons.

First of all, the scope of the convention. In the Italian delegation's view, the agreement should cover the effective and total prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of all chemical weapons, as well as their complete destruction.

The ban should include all substances used for specific military purposes, as well as their precursors and means of delivery. The convention should also proscribe research and tests carried out with the intention of producing prohibited agents, as well as the training of personnel for chemical-warfare purposes and any hostile activity based on resort to chemical weapons.

The prohibition of use should be reaffirmed explicitly in order to fill the gaps arising from non-accession, or the entry of reservations, to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which my Government ratified on 3 April 1928.

The production of dual-purpose substances--for which it is difficult to lay down an exact demarcation line between use for war purposes and peaceful use in the civilian field--should be allowed to continue. The convention could, however, provide for appropriate control (for example, of quantities or final destination) depending upon the likelihood of the various agents being of potential use in chemical warfare.

While advocating a ban which would be general in scope, we would not wish to overlook the necessity of envisaging a few exceptions in the field of research or of scientific and medical application, or in order to take account of specific needs for protection, prevention or defence.

The problem of agents used in operations for the maintenance of public order, and of weedkillers, which have precise uses in the civilian field, should be given special consideration.

As to the definition of the agents to be banned, the Italian delegation considers that an essential role should be given to the criterion of use. Other

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criteria, notably that of toxicity, could have an appreciable complementary function, especially in view of verification requirements.

The prior declaration of existing stocks and of facilities for the production of chemical weapons would represent, in my delegation's view, a step of some significance in the process of encouraging and building up confidence.

The legal, economic and technical problems posed by the destruction of all chemical-weapons facilities, and by the dismantling or conversion of factories producing those weapons, must not be underestimated. An adequate period of time should be allowed for completing the elimination of stocks under effective international control and in a manner calculated to safeguard the requirements both of security and of the protection of health and the environment.

The dismantling of factories would in certain circumstances, in the opinion of the experts, provide more effective safeguards than conversion.

I should now like to take up the question of the verification of respect for written undertakings, which, in my Government's view, is one of the essential aspects of the future convention.

In that context, I would remind you of the views expressed by the Italian delegation at the meeting of 24 April 1979 (CD/PV.29) and, in particular, to draw attention to the correlation which must exist between the scope of the convention and the accompanying system of verification.

The Italian delegation said at that time, among other things, the following:

"In envisaging a verification system for a convention banning all chemical weapons and prescribing their removal from the military arsenals, the following requirements should be met:

- (a) To ensure that prohibited agents are not being manufactured neither in previous production facilities, nor in new factories;
- (b) To provide proof that prohibited agents are not being obtained from outside sources;
- (c) To ascertain that existing stocks of prohibited agents are eliminated;
- (d) To detect and observe suspicious activities.

Bearing in mind such requirements, it is the view of the Italian delegation that a certain degree of internationalization is indispensable to any effective verification pattern of a chemical-weapons ban. We should,

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in other words, adopt a mixed solution based on the combination of national verification means with international control procedures, including some forms of physical access to the territory of the State being verified, when the circumstances require it."

In confirming what I have just quoted, I should like to express my delegation's appreciation of the working documents recently submitted on the subject of verification by the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. In our opinion, the study sessions organized by those two countries a few months ago were a useful means of bringing out the fact that "on-site" inspections are not always necessarily incompatible with the requirements of the protection of industrial production and of commercial information.

I would not wish to go again now into the details of the international control machinery whose establishment could prove necessary for the effective verification of the various aspects of a convention on the banning of chemical weapons. The idea of a consultative committee has been raised. It deserves careful consideration, so that the duties, powers and responsibilities which might be given to such a body can be more clearly discerned. The experience of other agencies, such as IAEA, could also be taken into account.

Some delegations have rightly stressed the importance of confidence-building measures. Such measures can clearly be no substitute for national and international verification machinery. They may, however, play a very useful complementary role. We are thinking, in particular, of the exchange of information, of visits and of any other initiatives which may help to throw more light on the problem and establish a climate of mutual confidence. The possibility of encouraging the adoption of such measures at the regional level should be given special consideration.

A few days from now, the Committee on Disarmament will end its first session after the reform carried out pursuant to the recommendations of the special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament.

The multilateral negotiating body-- with its membership widened, its structures renewed, and its methods of work rationalized-- has worked with an enthusiasm, an alacrity and a constructive spirit from which we are pleased to derive feelings of comfort and hope.

The conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons-- the high priority of which has been stressed on many occasions by the General Assembly-- should be amongst our very first preoccupations from the beginning of the next session.

Mr. MARKER (Pakistan): Today I would like to offer some remarks regarding the item on the nuclear test ban. My delegation attaches the highest importance to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In my very first statement to this Committee, I had drawn attention to the desire repeatedly expressed by the General Assembly, including at its special session devoted to disarmament, for the early conclusion of a CTB treaty that would attract the widest possible adherence. Furthermore, this Committee was requested by the General Assembly, in its resolution 71 H of the thirty-third session, "to undertake on a priority basis, at its first session in January 1979, negotiations concerning..... a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests".

It is unfortunate that this Committee has been unable to give substantive consideration to the question of a nuclear test ban. Despite the hopes held out and the promises made during the past two years, the three States which are conducting separate negotiations on this subject did not find it possible to submit the results of these negotiations to the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation does not believe that the submission of a draft treaty by the three negotiating Powers is a prerequisite for the initiation of negotiations on a CTB treaty in this Committee. Regrettably, the Powers engaged in these negotiations do not share these views, and some of them have taken the position that they would not participate in negotiations for a CTB unless the trilateral talks are concluded. It is thus that the Committee on Disarmament has been unable to take up, in any meaningful manner, the negotiations on CTB, as it was called upon to do by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-third session.

My delegation has taken note of the "progress report" transmitted to the Committee last Tuesday by the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, on behalf of the United States, the USSR, and his own delegation. We appreciate this gesture, even though in substance it is much less than what we and, I believe, the entire membership of the Group of 21 had hoped for. This "progress report" does not, unfortunately, provide any precise idea of how far the trilateral negotiations have proceeded in the areas of agreement and disagreement.

However, some doubts may arise in relation to the title of the draft treaty and "protocol" of which we have been informed. From its title, it appears to my delegation that the scope of the prohibition of nuclear testing may not be as comprehensive as many of us had contemplated. The distinction drawn between the treaty and the protocol would seem to be at variance with the positions of the

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negotiating Powers that all nuclear explosions have the same characteristics. The outcome of the issue will, of course, be resolved in our future negotiations; but I would like to say, at this stage, that my country could not support any provision which contemplates discriminatory treatment of various States.

As we all know, provisions on verification will form an important part of the CTB treaty. The Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts has done considerable work on this question. But the negotiation of a CTB, and the paralysis of the CD on this subject, should not be the consequence merely of an absence of agreement among the major nuclear-weapon Powers on the question of verification. It has been proposed that the mandate of this Working Group should be extended. We share the view that the tasks to be assigned to the Working Group would have to be carried out at some time, and my delegation hopes that other similar negotiating mechanisms of the Committee will also be extended.

In conclusion, let me say that the adoption of a comprehensive test ban treaty at the present stage constitutes an important gesture of the goodwill and commitment of the major nuclear-weapon Powers to halt the qualitative development of nuclear arms. In this connexion, I would like to share many of the thoughtful comments made by the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, and particularly his remarks regarding the connexion being made in certain circles between a comprehensive test ban treaty and the SALT II Treaty. In our view, it is incumbent on the two major nuclear-weapon Powers, which are still responsible for the highest number of nuclear tests every year, to demonstrate their political will by calling a halt to the further sophistication of nuclear weapons. We would suggest today, as we have done on previous occasions, that while negotiations for a test ban treaty are under way, the two major nuclear-weapon Powers should call an immediate and unilateral halt -- a moratorium -- on all nuclear tests, for whatever purposes.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to my predecessor, to my country and to myself.

Mr. TYLNER (Czechoslovakia): First of all, allow me, Mr. Chairman, to express my congratulations on your assumption of the office of Chairman of our Committee for this month. At the same time, I would like to congratulate our Chairman of the previous month for the excellent work he performed in our Committee and for his wise guidance from which we benefited.

(Mr. Tylner, Czechoslovakia)

The Czechoslovak delegation wishes to express its satisfaction at the fact that the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts was able last week to terminate its work in accordance with the terms of reference approved by the CCD on 9 May 1978 (CCD/570).

The second report, which has just been presented by the Group of seismic experts, gives basic instructions for the implementation of a possible experimental test of the international co-operative system, envisaged under the CTBT. It is important that once again a consensus was reached on all technical items of the report; the latter can serve as a basis for the consideration, at a suitable time, of the global testing of the seismic data exchange system. We hope that this encouraging development in the technical field will have a positive impact on the CTBT negotiations.

The Group of seismic experts has made substantial progress since 1976 when it was established. However, the experts recognize that they have not yet fully exhausted the problems under study, and that further work is needed for the elaboration of detailed technical and methodical specifications. The delegation of Czechoslovakia suggests that we should take note of the efficient work accomplished by the Group of seismic experts and adopt its second report as an appropriate basis for detailed instructions needed for a global experimental test of seismic data acquisition and exchange. For this purpose, the extension of the mandate of the Group of seismic experts seems to be desirable under the terms suggested by the Group, and our delegation is ready to approve it.

Mr. DE LA GORCE (France) (translated from French): First of all I should like to join previous speakers in extending to you my delegation's warm congratulations on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee, and our very warm wishes for the success of your efforts. We feel sure that you will conduct this session to its close in the most effective manner possible. I should also like, on this occasion, Mr. Chairman, to express our thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Voutov, for the work he accomplished last month at the head of our Committee.

The statement which my delegation will be making this morning will be concerned with the question of chemical disarmament. We are about to conclude our deliberations on this question, and I would like to make some observations in connexion with it.

What conclusions can we draw from the various contributions made to the discussion, and in particular from the joint report of the two negotiating Powers?

(Mr. De La Gorce, France)

It seems to me that -- as the first conclusion -- we can discern fairly general agreement on a number of points, and it would be useful for the Committee to take note of it in one way or another before the end of the session.

First of all, there are the objectives of a convention. There appears to be a general understanding on this subject, and I would add that this understanding is largely inevitable because these objectives are bound up with the very nature of the exercise, namely, the prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling and transfer of chemical warfare agents and the corresponding munitions, the destruction of existing stockpiles, and the dismantling of existing production plants or their conversion to peaceful activities.

A problem arises in relation to these general objectives. Should they include the renewal or confirmation of commitments already entered into by the major part of the international community under the 1925 Geneva Protocol? This is an open question that we ought to discuss.

In addition to the general objectives, I note that there are also certain areas of understanding concerning the steps to be taken in future, firstly, on the adoption of a use criterion for the prohibitions to be laid down. It also seems to me that there is general agreement on the application of an additional criterion of toxicity. In this respect, we have learned from the joint report submitted by our distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union, on behalf of the two negotiating delegations, that agreement has been reached between the two countries on numerical values for toxicity rates.

Agreement has also been reached that the parties to a convention should retain the possibility of continuing the study and laboratory testing of a certain number of chemical agents that would be banned under the convention. Such studies and experiments would be undertaken for purely defensive purposes, that is to say, for the purpose of improving means of protection or, in other words, strengthening what may be termed passive deterrence.

An understanding has also been reached on a particularly important point bearing on the development of the civilian chemical industry and international co-operation in this domain, namely, that such development and co-operation should not be prejudiced by the terms of a convention.

Lastly, I would refer, again in relation to the steps to be taken, to the agreement which seems to me to have emerged from several contributions, and in particular from the joint report by the two negotiating Powers, on the adoption of the method of declarations with a view to the inventorying and destruction of stockpiles and the inventorying and dismantling of production facilities.

(Mr. De La Gorce, France)

The outline I have just made of these points of convergence or agreement reveals only a very general framework and, within this framework, there are obviously very important areas that are still obscure or controversial. Fundamental questions remain unanswered. The report we listened to yesterday provides numerous examples of these. I would add, moreover, that our discussions here have not dealt with all the substantive issues, and we have consequently been left in a state of uncertainty on a number of important points.

I shall mention a few of them on which some convergence might be achieved. For instance:

How far should the prohibition barrier be lowered? There seems to be a measure of understanding on the need to include, in one way or another, dual-purpose chemical agents or chemical precursors, to treat the question of certain herbicides in a specific manner and, lastly, to exclude incapacitants and irritants from the convention, under certain conditions at least.

How are the limits of the exceptions to the maintenance of utilization capacity for prohibited products to be defined?

Should the prohibitions on the transfer and acquisition of chemical weapons also cover -- and under what conditions -- transfers of know-how necessary for the purpose of passive defence?

Many other questions arise concerning the application of the declarations procedure I have just referred to, in respect of the scope of these declarations, their time-table and all the various aspects of the implementation of such complex operations.

Lastly, there is the basic problem of verification. It has been the subject of several contributions since the beginning of the Committee's work, and the statements made in the course of the discussions have revealed how much importance delegations attach to this problem. We now have before us a broad array of proposals. The joint report we heard yesterday has made an important contribution to the debate. It epitomized an agreement of principle between the two negotiating countries on the need for adequate verification and the principle of combining national and international means of verification.

This twofold aspect of verification presents one of the most difficult problems: National means of verification are highly developed in certain countries; in others they are much less so. There is thus a fundamental inequality

(Mr. De La Gorce, France)

in the possibilities offered to various States in the matter of verification by national means, and what the great Powers can do to ensure that the provisions of a future convention are observed is undoubtedly beyond the reach of the majority of States. This situation gives added importance to the problem of international verification. This problem is the subject of some interesting suggestions in the joint report submitted to us yesterday; methods and bodies are proposed, such as a consultative committee and a procedure for appealing to the Security Council. Some delegations have proposed other solutions, such as on-site investigation and verification by challenge; the latter method is referred to in the joint report presented to us yesterday. In any case, the question will be a particularly important and difficult one to be tackled by our Committee when it resumes its consideration of chemical disarmament at its next session.

Could we have done more during the second part of our first session? I think that some of us -- and this includes the French delegation -- feel rather disappointed. We were undoubtedly expecting something more and our deliberations did in fact take an interesting and positive turn. They pursued two lines: on the one hand, the consideration of matters of substance which has been very useful in giving us a better understanding of each one's point of view and enabling us to identify points of agreement and disagreement. We are all very grateful to the Netherlands delegation which provided a most valuable working paper for our discussions. The discussions were embarked upon; they could not be concluded for lack of time but we must, of course, resume them. On the other hand, there has been the idea of elaborating and negotiating the outline of a future convention. This was, of course, merely a very preliminary aspect of such negotiations but it nevertheless marked their starting-point, and my delegation was prepared to engage in this work for which contributions had already been received, notably the document submitted by the Polish delegation.

We are now so close to the end of our work that I wonder whether it will be possible to progress any further. However, what leads me to conclude on a note of hope is the particularly keen interest which all delegations have shown in this question and the declared resolve of many of them to contribute to effective discussions and negotiations on chemical disarmament. This leads us to believe that the subject will occupy a fundamental and special place at our next session, and that our discussions, although inevitably of a preliminary nature, will undoubtedly have been useful in outlining approaches and above all in clarifying intentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of France for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to my predecessor and to myself.

Mr. GHAREKHAN (India): My delegation is very happy that Sir James Plimsoll is the new Australian representative in this Committee. There are many reasons for my personal happiness at this, but one of the reasons is that I now have the company of someone who does not respect the hallowed tradition of making only prepared statements in this Committee.

I would like to offer you my very sincere congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship during this, the last, and perhaps the most important phase of our work for this year. I have had the pleasure of knowing you for some time and we have established official and personal relations between ourselves which are very satisfying, at least as far as my delegation is concerned. I am quite sure that, with your experience, you will be able to bring our work to a satisfactory conclusion, and in your task I would like to pledge the full co-operation of my delegation. I would also like to place on record the very sincere appreciation of my delegation to Ambassador Voutov of Bulgaria for the dignity and distinction with which he presided over our work during the month of July. His was, in many ways, perhaps the most difficult chairmanship so far, and my delegation was deeply impressed by the way, and by the patience, good humour and cheer with which he conducted our proceedings. It was largely due to his statesmanship that the Committee was able to overcome many of the obstacles that it faced during the month of July.

I would like to offer a few comments on the item which is on our programme of work for this week, namely the nuclear test ban. This, as it happens, is the last substantive item, and it was also the first substantive item on our programme of work. The fact that it was the first and the last item of the agenda was perhaps meant to indicate the significance and the importance we attached to it. But, in all frankness, I must state, on behalf of my delegation, that irrespective of the theoretical priority that we attach to this item, we have not made any progress on it, and my delegation is deeply disappointed at the complete lack of progress during 1979 so far on the item related to nuclear test ban. We listened with interest and anticipation to the statement which Ambassador Summerhayes was good enough to make on behalf of the three negotiating States. While our interest continues, our anticipation was, alas, misplaced and we were sort of disappointed that Ambassador Summerhayes' statement did not contain more than it did. As far as I could make out, there was only one new element in it, which was that there would be a

(Mr. Gharekhan, India)

review conference after a certain period of time of the States parties to the future treaty on the test ban. Now, even if we had not been told about this, it would have been assumed that there would be a review conference anyhow. But perhaps the significance of this reference -- and I am sure that the reference was not included just for the sake of being included -- perhaps the significance of that reference to a review conference lies in its indication that the treaty would be of relatively short duration. While we have all heard rumours to the effect that the treaty would be of short duration, I think this was the first official indication that the treaty would be of perhaps even shorter duration than is usually provided for review conferences. My delegation believes and shares with, I suppose, all the members of this Committee, the conviction that the Committee on Disarmament, as the negotiating organ, has the right and, indeed, some expertise to begin negotiations on a treaty on CTB. This is not merely from what Ambassador Fein has referred to as a theological point of view but also from the very practical consideration that the international community as reflected in this body should be associated with treaties that are meant to be multilateral. In the specific case of a test ban treaty, my delegation recognizes and accepts the fact that the initiative has to come from the nuclear-weapon States; I would even go further and say that, in the absence of some initial agreement among the three, or among the nuclear-weapon States, any exercise which this Committee might undertake would not be too meaningful because after all it is the nuclear-weapon States which have to stop testing. They are the only ones that are carrying out any tests at the present time -- nobody else is; and if they have to undertake a ban on nuclear tests it follows that there should be some preliminary agreement among themselves. The fact that such an initiative has not taken any concrete form during 1979, despite urgent appeals from the General Assembly, is a cause of concern to my delegation and also a deep disappointment.

As was pointed out by the distinguished representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Marker it is within the power of the nuclear-weapon States to give some concrete evidence of the goodwill and of the political will to bring about a ban on nuclear tests. And this could be and should be in the form of a moratorium on nuclear testing pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement. As my delegation has said several times, the very fact that they are engaged in negotiations on this issue shows that at least the three negotiating States recognize that they could live without tests in future. They have reached a certain plateau in their test programmes and in the sophistication and the qualitative improvement of their nuclear arsenals. This being the case, my delegation and many others in

(Mr. Gharekhan, India)

this Committee, as elsewhere in the United Nations, cannot really understand what difficulties the nuclear-weapon States have in agreeing to a unilateral moratorium on test programmes. We very much hope that such a moratorium will be announced well before the beginning of our work next year and possibly even during the next session of the General Assembly.

My delegation has received the report of the seismic experts contained in document CD/43. I would like to express our thanks and appreciation to the experts for their fairly comprehensive report and for their consensus report -- because it is important that this report should reflect a consensus among all the participants. India has been taking part in this Ad Hoc Group of Experts from its beginning and indeed, we were, for a long time, the only developing country to be associated with this work. My delegation is happy that more and more countries from the so-called third world are also taking an active interest in the work of the Ad Hoc Group. We shall refer this report to our Government for study, but there are one or two things that I could at this stage comment on in the report of the experts. It seems that the implementation of the recommendations of the experts would have certain financial implications for countries participating in the international co-operative effort. From this point of view, my delegation would have to -- my Government would have to -- consider the recommendation about the standardized equipment which is contained in the report. Furthermore, the report is silent about the cost of the international data centres. It is not quite clear who is to bear the expense of the proposed international data centres. Everybody understands that there are going to be three of them, and I would presume that the cost of setting up these data centres would be borne by the countries which offer to host them. My delegation has seen the draft decision which has been put forward by the delegation of Sweden on the extension or the renewal of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group, and my delegation is in a position in principle to support the continuation of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts. I would also like to take this opportunity to express our thanks to VMO for co-operating with this Committee. I suppose that the international co-operative effort in this field is more necessary for countries like mine and others which are not nuclear-weapon States than for the negotiating Powers. I would imagine that the States which are negotiating the treaty would have the necessary ability or capability to verify compliance through their own national means. I am not sure how significant or how vital the international co-operative measures are for the negotiating States themselves from the point of view of verification, but in any case for the rest of us the international effort would be of very considerable importance. It is from that point of view that we have been participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Group.

(Mr. Gharekhan, India)

I would also like to add that -- and here I should like to associate myself with what the Ambassador of Australia said, namely, that the future treaty on a test ban should be acceded to not only by the non-nuclear-weapon States, but by all the five nuclear-weapon States; and the same consideration applies to the General Assembly's call for a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons. This is an aspect, I think, which should be kept in mind by all of us when discussing the question of a nuclear test ban.

Mr. OGISO (Japan): My delegation has expressed its views on the comprehensive test ban a number of times in the CD and the CCD. The latest of such statements was made on 6 March this year and, since my delegation maintains the same view as stated on that occasion, I wish to refrain from repeating it here. On the other hand, my delegation has already had the opportunity of expressing its views in the informal meeting yesterday on the second report submitted by the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts.

I wish to express the appreciation of my delegation for the submission of the joint United States-USSR report on progress in the bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which was made in response to requests such as those contained in working paper CD/11 submitted by the Group of 21, as well as those my delegation made three times between 24 March 1977 and 27 March of this year, and others.

My delegation considers that the joint report is extensive and complete in its content and that it can contribute to the consideration and negotiation in the CD of the prohibition of chemical weapons. And it is gratifying that this joint report which was submitted to the CD will provide all member States including non-member States of the CD with concrete details on the subject of negotiations on the prohibition of CW.

My Government, of course, wishes to make a careful study and examination of the joint report which deals with various aspects of difficult technical problems, and I would like to reserve my comments on the report for later. However, I would like to ask for clarification on several points in the report, with a view to facilitating the study of this paper by my Government. I originally intended to ask this question at the informal meeting tomorrow but, for the benefit of two negotiating Powers which might need some time for preparation of the answers, I decided to raise the questions now.

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

In paragraph 1 of the report, it is said that "the obligation never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, otherwise acquire or possess, or retain super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal or highly toxic chemicals or their precursors...". In this regard, can we interpret this passage to mean that not only precursors of "super-toxic lethal chemical" but also those of "highly toxic chemicals" as well as of "lethal chemicals" are included as the prohibited substances? In other words, can we take it that this paragraph covers a wider prohibition of precursors than the prohibition originally intended to cover those of binary weapons?

In paragraph 2, "testing of means of protection against chemical weapons" is listed as one of permitted purposes in relation to the general-purpose criterion. In this sense, is it correct to say that the category of "testing" includes the use of certain CWA for protective "training"?

In paragraphs 1, 2 and 4, it is said that "the scope of the prohibition should be determined on the basis of a general purpose criterion", and, in paragraph 3, "In order to facilitate verification, it would be appropriate to use, in addition to the general purpose criterion, toxicity criteria and certain other provisions". In this connexion, is it desirable and reasonable that all highly toxic chemicals, whose toxicity is above the level shown in paragraph 4 (a), and which could be considered supertoxic chemicals, might better be totally prohibited, regardless of whether or not these toxic chemicals can be used for non-hostile purposes in accordance with the general purpose criterion? Also in relation to paragraph 4, can we interpret the wording to mean that such toxic chemicals having a lower toxicity than the level as shown in paragraph 4 (b) might be possibly prohibited, in case they are used for hostile purposes in accordance with the general purpose criterion?

In paragraph 14, it is said that "The participants should exchange, through the consultative committee or bilaterally, certain data on super-toxic lethal chemicals produced, acquired, accumulated, and used for permitted purposes, as well as on important lethal chemical and the most important precursors used for permitted purposes". In this regard, could we presume that, in case such data is exchanged bilaterally between the participants, such data will be made available to all other States parties to the CW treaty?

It is necessary, for the elaboration of the CW treaty, to make actual measurements of LD₅₀ or LCt₅₀ as mentioned in paragraph 4, as well as to categorize each chemical in the light of levels of toxicity. In this connexion, is it a correct understanding that the preparatory committee referred to in paragraph 16 is assigned such tasks as the measurement of toxicity and so on? If that is the case, should we not consider the establishment of a committee of experts under the

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

auspices of the CD in order to be assigned that task? Since if the compilation of lists of relevant chemicals and precursors is contemplated, such work is an essential part of the negotiation of the treaty to be conducted by the CD.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for his statement and for his kind words to my predecessor and to me.

Mr. FONSEKA (Sri Lanka): Mr. Chairman, as other speakers have done, may I first congratulate you on your assumption of the post of Chairman of this Committee for the month of August. I have very special and personal reasons to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, for I lived in your country many years ago and it was about 19 years ago that you and I were together in the same place, in a different kind of occupation. So we know each other well and you have my support and good wishes for the period of your office. May I also take the opportunity to congratulate your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Voutov. He might have some satisfaction in the knowledge that he is one of the three Chairmen during this session who had the burden of chairing our meetings for a whole month. That in itself is a significant achievement, but he is even more distinguished because, whereas his two predecessors who chaired this Committee for a whole month dealt with procedural matters, it was his more tedious and more burdensome task to have to deal with substantive matters, and in that context I must say that Ambassador Voutov dealt with the work of the Committee in a manner which deserves our congratulations. I would like to assure him that, as far as my delegation is concerned, he had our warm support, and he has our good wishes.

The distinguished delegate of India a moment ago referred to a new ailment that is catching on in this Committee, and that is a tendency to make impromptu statements. I do not know whether it will be called the Gharekhan ailment or the Plimsoll ailment, but I do hope that it will contribute to something more than the formal statements that we hear in the Committee and give delegations the opportunity of really taking note of what is being said in the meetings and responding to them.

When I spoke last Tuesday at our last plenary meeting, I made the remark that the subject of the nuclear test ban is being taken up by us for the second time, and it seems as if members exercising their rights under the rules of procedure make statements on any subject they deem fit. But it also occurs to my delegation that the time of the Committee is being diverted from the subject which is before us, namely, the nuclear test ban. It does not mean that delegations are less interested in the subject, but it does seem to be that this is an item on which members are rather reluctant to be forthcoming.

(Mr. Fonseka, Sri Lanka)

As far as my delegation is concerned I have no problem in associating myself completely with the remarks made by Ambassador Plimsoll on this subject of the test ban. I do not wish to repeat what was said by him and by other distinguished colleagues after him, including my distinguished colleague and neighbour, Mr. Gharekhan. But I would like to pinpoint just one aspect, just one remark that Mr. Plimsoll made, that the nuclear test ban is something that is attainable, and if it is attainable, I think it is incumbent on this Committee to treat it as having somewhat higher priority than some other issues on which members have commented and expressed their views at greater length.

I would like to take this opportunity to make a comment on the statements that have been made by delegations on the subject of the test ban. Delegates were able to hear only the other day the joint statement made on behalf of the three negotiating Powers by our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Summerhayes. It is reasonably fresh in our minds and does not need repetition. I would only like to recall statements made by two of the three delegations taking part in the tripartite negotiations on the test ban. I have before me the remarks made by the distinguished leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Lord Goronwy-Roberts on 24 January, when this session opened: "My Government is making strenuous efforts to achieve success in our negotiations here in Geneva with the Soviet Union and the United States. Good progress has been made. Tripartite agreement in principle has been reached on most of the major issues, and we hope quickly to resolve the outstanding ones". The statement went on, but that is the end of the quotation I am reading to you now. Another statement was made by our distinguished colleague Ambassador Adrian Fisher of the United States on 25 January, and it reads as follows: "As the United Kingdom representative has noted, substantial progress has been made in the CTB negotiations during the past year. The three delegations have agreed that the treaty will prohibit all nuclear weapons tests in all environments and will be of a fixed duration". And he goes on: "A fundamental issue in the negotiations has been verification of compliance. Although agreement in principle has been reached on a number of verification measurss, many critical technical details remain to be resolved."

I have repeated these statements to enable members of the Committee to compare what was said in January with what we were presented on 31 July. If you will permit me, Mr. Chairman, I would also like to take another quotation from another delegation, the Under-Secretary of State for Sweden, Mrs. Thorsson, on 6 March. She said this to the Committee: "While the conclusion of a CTB has been delayed, the testing of nuclear explosions, and thus the development of nuclear weapons, have continued unabated. Observations and analyses made at the Hagfors Observatory

(Mr. Fonseka, Sri Lanka)

in Sweden showed that in all 48 nuclear explosions were conducted in 1978". Although the statement goes on to identify which countries carried out these explosions I will end the quotation there. Members of the Committee may, if they so wish, refer to Mrs. Thorsson's statement and will know the details.

I really have nothing more to say except to express my delegation's thanks to the delegation of Sweden for the initiative it took to arrange a demonstration of a data centre in Stockholm last month, in which I was privileged to participate. For me it has at least symbolic value of the many initiatives which Sweden has taken in the field of disarmament and its continuing efforts to advance the attainment of disarmament more specifically in connexion with the subject we have before us today -- the matter of a nuclear test ban. It is therefore with pleasure that I support the proposal made by Sweden in document CD/46 for the renewal of the mandate for the Ad Hoc Group of seismological experts.

Mr. VOUTOV (Bulgaria): Mr. Chairman, I just want to congratulate you upon your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for this month. As I stated yesterday, you, Mr. Ambassador, and your experience and personal qualities are very well known in the Committee. I am sure that you will successfully bring to a close the work of this year's session of the Committee.

Secondly, I want to thank you personally for your congratulations to me on my chairmanship during the month of July. At the same time, I would like to express my deep gratitude to all the representatives of countries in this Committee and to those who congratulated me at previous meetings on my chairmanship. I am deeply touched by the words addressed to me personally, but would like to tell you, my dear colleagues, that these assessments of my work as a chairman must be applied to the whole Committee. I am thankful for the congratulations, and want to express my deep gratitude to all members of the Committee for their active and excellent work and, as mentioned by some Ambassadors, for major achievements during this last month, thanks to our joint work. I was happy to be Chairman of a Committee which did such excellent work during a very active month. I think it will continue and that in the future we shall congratulate each other for such constructive work.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Bulgaria for his statement and for his kind words to me. Is there any speaker who would like to take the floor? Because of the lateness of the hour I suggest that we continue our discussion of this item tomorrow morning at our informal meeting, following which we will consider the item on chemical weapons. Is there any objection?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The Ad Hoc Working Group on Negative Security Guarantees will meet at 3.30 p.m. in this room.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Tuesday, 7 August, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.