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31 July 1979
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FORTY SIXTH MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Tuesday, 31 July 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. P. VOUTOV

(Bulgaria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

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|------------------------|---|
| <u>Algeria:</u> | Mr. A. BENSMAIL |
| <u>Argentina:</u> | Mr. A. DUMONT Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD |
| <u>Australia:</u> | Sir James PLIMSOLL Mr. A. BEHM Ms. M. WICKES |
| <u>Belgium:</u> | Mr. P. BERG Mr. G. VAN DUYSE |
| <u>Brazil:</u> | Mr. S. DUARTE |
| <u>Bulgaria:</u> | Mr. P. VOUTOV Mr. I. SOTIROV Mr. H. HALACHEV |
| <u>Burma:</u> | U SAW HLAING U THEIN AUNG U NGWE WIN |
| <u>Canada:</u> | Mr. R. HARRY JAY Mr. J.T. SIMARD |
| <u>Cuba:</u> | Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH |
| <u>Czechoslovakia:</u> | Mr. V. TYLNER Mr. J. JIRŮŠEK |
| <u>Egypt:</u> | Mr. O. EL-SHAFEI Mr. M. EL BARADEI Mr. N. FAHMY |
| <u>Ethiopia:</u> | Mr. T. TERREFE Mr. G. ALULA |

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE

Mr. M. COUTHURES

Mr. C.A. GRIFFITH

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HENDER

Mr. W. KOETTER

Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. J. PÖHLMANN

Hungary:

Mr. M. DOMOKOS

Mr. C. GYÖRFFY

Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:

Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN

Mr. S.T. DEVARE

Indonesia:

Mr. S. DARUSMAN

Mr. D.B. SULEMAN

Mr. SILABAN

Iran:

Mr. D. AMERI

Italy:

Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO

Mr. C. FRATESCHI

Mr. FOLCO DE LUCA

Japan:

Mr. M. OGISO

Mr. T. NONOYAMA

Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya:

Mr. S. SHITEMI

Mr. A. JET ODENDO

Mexico:

Mr. M.A. CÁCERES

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco:

Mr. S.M. RAHHALI

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN

Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Mr. J.V. SCHEFFERS

Nigeria:

Mr. T.O. OLUKOKO

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru:

Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA

Mr. H. KRUCZYK

Romania:

Mr. C. ENE

Mr. V. TUDOR

Sri Lanka:

Mr. I.O. FONSEKA

Miss H.L. NAGANATHAN

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. L. NORBERG

Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN

Mr. N.V. PESTEREV

Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV

Mr. E.D. ZAITSEV

Mr. S.B. BATSANOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMTERHAYES

Mr. P.M.V. FRANCIS

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY
Mr. D. KOELEMAY
Mr. R. MIKULAK
Mr. M. SANCHES
Mr. J. CALVERT
Mr. W. DUNLOP
Mr. H. DALEY
Mr. A. RADIANKO

Venezuela:

Mrs. R. LISBOA DE NEGER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. MULONGANDUSU ESUK

Secretary:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 46th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee resumes today consideration of item 1 of its agenda, "nuclear test ban". In connexion with this item, the following documents are being circulated today:

- CD/43 - Letter dated 25 July 1979 from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the second report of the Ad Hoc Group
- CD/45 - Working paper on international seismological datacentre demonstration facilities in Sweden
- CD/46 - Draft CD decision for a continued mandate to the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events

In addition, document CD/44 entitled "Outline of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction: working paper" is also being circulated today to the Committee. This document has been submitted by the delegation of Poland.

I have also requested the Secretariat to circulate an informal paper on the organization of work of the Committee during the week 30 July - 3 August 1979.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): I shall touch only briefly on the item on our agenda for this week: the nuclear test ban. I shall not underline once again the importance the Netherlands attaches to the conclusion of a CTB; it would be tedious to repeat that year after year.

It seems, however, that we now find ourselves in an important phase in the process towards the conclusion of a test ban. We have, as yet, received no recent report from the three negotiating nuclear weapon Powers, namely, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, -- on the state of affairs of the trilateral negotiations -- and certainly not a detailed one. It appears that possibly a link is being forged between the conclusion of a CTB and the entry into force of the SALT II agreement. The CTB negotiations, the argument goes, might be postponed because either one does not want to burden the legislature of one of the parties with another significant arms control agreement, or one wants to be sure that SALT II will in fact enter into force before one wishes to make further progress in other disarmament fields. Sometimes both arguments are advanced as valid reasons for a delay in the finalization of a CTB.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

Whether these theories are true or not, the fact is that no trilateral test ban treaty has as yet been submitted to this Committee, and that is a source of renewed concern to my Government.

There is, of course, no doubt that the conclusion of the SALT II negotiations was a milestone of major importance in the arms control and disarmament process. There is no doubt that this Treaty, once ratified, must greatly improve the international climate and should provide a basis for further disarmament measures in various other sectors. There is also no doubt that rejection of the Treaty might very well affect the international disarmament climate negatively. But -- and this is the point I wish to make, because all I have said so far is common knowledge -- linking directly a CTB with SALT -- pronouncing a sine qua non -- could unnecessarily aggravate an already bad situation.

What would happen if SALT II is not ratified and does not enter into force? Would it not then be of some value to have, at such a time, at one's disposal a comprehensive nuclear test ban to restrain an otherwise even more uncontrolled arms race?

But even leaving aside the possibility of such a highly regrettable development, there is also the serious problem of timing. Towards the middle of next year, the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be held. Now, we all know that that will not be an easy Conference. For example, important decisions will be necessary in the coming years to improve international arrangements with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Review Conference will have to play a role in the process towards what is called a new international consensus in this field. This problem will need all our attention. We should not then have to divert our attention too much to the question of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race. If there is no CTB at the time of the Review Conference that would be bad. No SALT would be worse. No SALT and no CTB would be very bad indeed, and could have grave consequences.

Let us now consider a more optimistic scenario and assume that the trilateral CTB talks are being pursued, at this very moment, with vigour. Let us assume that there is no intention of linking CTB with SALT at all; let us assume that the results will be available soon; that the CD will then be reconvened immediately to negotiate a CTB treaty. Even in such a perhaps overly optimistic case, considerable effort will still be required to bring the negotiations to a conclusion before the NPT Review Conference next year. But the longer the trilateral CTB negotiations take, the worse the situation.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

Now, we have the impression that one of the main reasons for such a delay might be a number of complicated technical problems related to verification. If that were the case, one may wonder whether it would not be useful to submit the basic outlines of the treaty to the CD without having resolved all those technical problems.

The treaty could not be finalized by the CD in any case, until the trilateral parties have solved their differences on the outstanding details. If they fail to reach agreement on the technical details, concerning verification and such, the CD would of course not come to a final conclusion. However, if they do resolve their problems while the CD is negotiating the basic outlines, much valuable time with a view to the NPT Conference would have been gained.

In our opinion, the CD must necessarily assume a significant role in the negotiations on a CTB. Not because of more or less theological considerations concerning what the CD is supposed to be, but for the very practical reason that what in the end is required is a multilateral CTB. Only as a truly multilateral treaty can the CTB have a function in the non-proliferation regime. It would be a shame if an opportunity were lost to achieve a widely acceptable important arms control agreement.

To arrive at such a multilateral treaty, the negotiations in the CD must be taken seriously. I am convinced that, as always, the members of the Committee will act in a responsible way and they will take into account the particular position of the nuclear weapon Powers involved. But a widely accepted, effective multilateral treaty implies, ipso facto, that also the views of the non-nuclear-weapon States are respected. I imagine that those countries would wish to concentrate on the comprehensive character of the treaty, its duration, its termination clauses and its complaint and verification provisions, and in particular the international seismic system to be established. Therefore, only after a real dialogue could one expect non-nuclear-weapon States to join the treaty.

An essential part of a CTB, if it is to be a world-wide multilateral agreement, would be a properly working international seismic system. Such a seismic network would provide opportunities for all parties to the CTB to become involved in the verification process. Now it is, of course, quite understandable and acceptable that the nuclear-weapon States, amongst themselves, should wish to make some additional arrangements, additional to the international seismic system. Such additional arrangements could strengthen the confidence that the obligations under

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

the treaty are faithfully fulfilled. But a different matter is that there have been tendencies in the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts to weaken the proposed international system -- apparently because those trilateral arrangements are in the make. We have noticed that some nuclear-weapon States attempted to diminish the role that international data centres must play in the dissemination of identification data, while other nuclear-weapon States accepted this in silence. This is serious, because that identification task of the planned data centres was the main one going beyond present seismological practices. The Netherlands hope that this incident is not a foreboding of the attitude the trilateral partners will take with respect to the international seismic system.

In general, however, my delegation is of the opinion that the seismic experts accomplished their task satisfactorily. We are grateful for the new report, which will provide a more detailed basis for the proposed system. In the meantime, much detailed work remains to be done, both on the national level and between countries wishing to do so. The seismic group made certain recommendations about their future work in this respect. Those ideas are sound, and we would therefore support a renewed mandate of the group in that direction. It must be clear, of course, that the submission of a trilateral draft CTB to the CD would change the situation and we would have to review at that time what the seismic group is supposed to do.

Finally, I would like to thank the World Meteorological Organization for its co-operation with the seismic experts. The last WMO Congress, this summer, took a decision which will make it possible, in the future, to use the Global Telecommunications System of the WMO for the seismic data exchange. This will be most helpful for our future work.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): The tripartite negotiations between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States on a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in all environments and its protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, have continued intensively over the past year.

A large measure of agreement has already been reached between the three negotiating parties. As was explained in their statement of 8 August 1978, the parties are fully agreed that the treaty should establish a ban on any nuclear weapon test explosion in any environment and that the provisions of a protocol, which would be an integral part of the treaty, would apply to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. They envisage that, after a certain period, the parties to the treaty will wish to hold a conference to review its operation.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

Negotiations over the past year have concentrated on the question of verifying compliance with the treaty. There is agreement that the treaty should provide for verification by national technical means and for the possibility of on-site inspection. Another important aspect of verification will be the exchange of seismic data. In this connexion, the three negotiating partners wish to express their warm appreciation of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts of the Committee on Disarmament. That Group's recommendations will, in large measure, influence the way in which the exchange of seismic data is implemented in practice. The negotiating parties consider that a Committee of Experts drawn from the Parties to the treaty should be established to assist in the implementation of the exchange.

Though there is agreement on the main elements of verification, negotiations are still proceeding on the detailed arrangements. As members of the Committee on Disarmament know, verification is a complex subject, involving many technical issues that require time to negotiate.

The three negotiating partners recognize the close, legitimate and valued interest of this Committee in the earliest completion of the negotiations -- and the calls to that effect in successive United Nations General Assembly resolutions, as well as in the Final Document of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. They are determined to achieve an agreement which will meet international expectations and attract the widest possible adherence.

The treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic offensive arms reflects their determination to establish significant arms limitation measures. The United Kingdom shares that determination. In this connexion, the three negotiating partners wish to draw attention to the Joint Communiqué issued on 18 June 1979 at the conclusion of the discussions in Vienna between the President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. They noted that there had been definite progress at the tripartite negotiations and "confirmed the intention of the United States and Soviet Union to work together with the United Kingdom to complete preparation of this treaty as soon as possible".

The delegations of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States wish to assure the Committee on Disarmament that they will continue to make every effort to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion.

Mr. FONSEKA (Sri Lanka): As I have, on more than one occasion, remarked in this Committee, my delegation always speaks as one of its new members. I am constantly aware and scarcely need to be reminded of the admonition given by my own Minister for Foreign Affairs when he spoke in this Committee at the beginning of its current session. He told the Committee that, as a new member, we are here both to listen and to learn. The provisional verbatim records of the Committee will show that we have done a great deal of listening, and in examining these records you will not find any extensive, let alone significant statements, made by my delegation during this Committee's spring and summer session. Unfortunately, the provisional record has no way of recording the role of members who listen and I trust I shall be forgiven if, today, at this meeting I try to make up at least in part for the listening that my delegation has done during this session.

May I commence my remarks by attempting to outline what in my delegation's view is the role of this Committee. I shall not be saying anything new, but it does seem relevant to remind ourselves of it. The First Committee of the General Assembly is the traditional deliberative body, and certainly since last year this First Committee has devoted its time almost exclusively to the subject of disarmament. At the special session of the United Nations the General Assembly decided to revive the United Nations Disarmament Commission. As I had occasion to say at an informal meeting of this Committee, the question was asked what need is there for the United Nations Disarmament Commission when there is a First Committee of the General Assembly whose exclusive task is to deal with disarmament. Briefly the answer given by those of us who thought that a United Nations Disarmament Commission was a necessary institution, and that a revival of it was necessary was that, during the regular sessions the First Committee is preoccupied with many resolutions. It was a time when important leaders of delegations come to the General Assembly. And therefore it was not always possible to give some consideration, in depth, to the issues of disarmament. Nevertheless, as members might recall, there were extensive debates on what UNDC would do. In the course of that debate, lines were drawn as to functions of UNDC. It was emphasized by some that the CCD or the body to be established under the special session's Final Document would remain the negotiating arm, and that any attempt by UNDC to encroach beyond its deliberative function would not be taken kindly. I have a clear recollection of that -- there were long debates in the working group on the subject. Let us agree with that definition of the function of UNDC.

(Mr. Fonseka, Sri Lanka)

We are left then with this Committee -- our Committee -- the Committee on Disarmament, and throughout that same debate at the special session it was emphasized that it is this Committee which was established under the Final Document -- as the negotiating body. And that, any other organ of the United Nations should not, or should exercise caution, if it wishes to go beyond, into the negotiating area. So this Committee, as the Final Document, paragraph 120 says, is designated as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum.

But, let us ask ourselves what is the kind of negotiation this Committee has undertaken during its first session. My delegation certainly does not subscribe to the view that because there has been a special session, there has been a Final Document, there has been machinery established, that right away disarmament is going to take place. No, my delegation does not subscribe to such a view. We do not believe that disarmament is an instant phenomenon. It is not. But, let us ask ourselves, to what extent has this Committee in the first five months of its work performed or fulfilled the role of negotiator which has been specifically assigned to it.

I do not wish to make an evaluation too early, but while things are still fresh in members' minds let us try to pinpoint what the negotiations are that we have undertaken. We did do something: we adopted the rules of procedure. Adopting the rules of procedure was no small task -- it took us a whole month. Members present will recall how intense and how detailed the debate was. The only way in which I can illustrate the importance of these rules is that this Committee's predecessor, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, did not have rules of procedure. As to why it did not have rules of procedure I shall not attempt to answer. It functioned for 17 years, or thereabouts, without any rules of procedure. Members might say that that body functioned quite well and adequately without rules of procedure, but seemingly the wider international community thought otherwise and, in paragraph 120 of the Final Document which established this Committee -- I hope the use of the word "establish" will not trouble any member but nevertheless, there it is -- that final paragraph specifically asked that the Committee should adopt its rules of procedure, and we took a whole month over it. And let us take that as a significant advance, as a significant achievement of this Committee.

(Mr. Fonseka, Sri Lanka)

The next month we negotiated our agenda and programme of work. That again was no easy task -- it took a month and, as members will recall, a little more. The distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador Thomson, who was our Chairman, was asked to help us a little beyond his term that month so that he could complete this very important task which had commenced during his chairmanship. That agenda included a framework, which is familiar to all members. It was known as the "Decalogue". That in itself was not easy to negotiate and to agree upon, and it certainly -- as members know -- has some value. I am understating it when I say some value -- it was of great value because it set the framework which this Committee can use in its future deliberations. If nothing else, perhaps when this Committee meets again next year, one important area has been settled seemingly for all time. That framework sets out the entire gamut of disarmament. The second part of the agenda, as you know, was the programme of work, and during the spring session we were able to deal with only one item on our programme of work and that was "chemical weapons", and we had to really arrange, or think about the programme for the next session.

When we commenced the summer session we worked out our programme of work for the summer session -- that did not take too much time. But let me briefly set out what members know. On that programme of work the first item was the "Nuclear test ban". I presume that it was placed as the first item out of recognition of the importance which many members of this Committee attach to this subject of a nuclear test ban. The next was the "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"; the third, "Assurances or guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States", which we are familiar with as "Negative Guarantees". The fourth: "Chemical weapons" and fifth: "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: radiological weapons".

Let us see what we have been able to accomplish on that programme of work. On the subject of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament -- I shall come to the test ban treaty later -- on the subject of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, what have we got that is tangible? What have we got? Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee are usually generous and usually polite. You yourself, like your predecessors,

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constantly refer to the progress we make, the flexibility we show, but at some point in time members must ask themselves what have we got to show? Now, on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, something was placed before this Committee -- and that is SALT II; but this Committee can claim no credit for SALT II. It was an agreement negotiated outside this Committee and was merely placed before this Committee. In saying that let me assure the delegations of the countries which negotiated this agreement that my delegation has no wish to minimize the importance of that agreement.

The next item, was "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: radiological weapons". If we were to ask ourselves what has been produced under this item -- and I am trying to get to the essence of what we were able to achieve -- we were presented with the draft of a treaty on radiological weapons. Members of this Committee were asked for their views. Members responded, saying that they had referred the draft to their capitals and were awaiting a response.

The next was "negative guarantees". Something was achieved there, and Ad Hoc Working Group has been established -- its report is due -- and before me I see the draft of that report. I shall not prejudge its usefulness nor try to evaluate it -- I have just seen it.

I then come to the "nuclear test ban treaty" or "nuclear test ban". For two days at the beginning of this session, according to our programme, we had two days for discussion of the "test ban". I recall that at an informal meeting, when the subject of the test ban was discussed, there was a rather emotional argument as to whether this is something to which we should attach so much priority. Why this emphasis on the word "priority"? Another delegation made the comment that if it was the desire to discuss a nuclear test ban, perhaps it would not be there. In other words, it was of the view that this was not something that was of a pre-eminent order of priority as was being insisted upon by other members. Again, as I recall, the delegation that said it might not be present was not that unkind -- it was present. But their total silence on the subject was what was most significant. The 21 and 22 June were the two days, according to our programme, on which we were supposed to discuss the

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nuclear test ban. What happened on 22 June was a rather protracted discussion on whether Viet Nam should be allowed to address this Committee. My delegation did not take part in that protracted discussion but members, if they were to look back in retrospect, might ask themselves whether that protracted debate on Viet Nam being allowed to address this Committee was really necessary, since we now know what happened. But the point that I wish to make is that, of the two days that were initially allocated to a discussion on the test ban, we spent a whole day on a debate quite unrelated to the nuclear test ban.

We have just had the benefit of the statement made by the distinguished delegate of the United Kingdom, on behalf of the tripartite negotiating parties on the subject of the test ban. I shall not try to make an evaluation of that statement, but from what little I did follow I do not know whether many members of this Committee will consider that as a significant advance on the position we were in before that statement was made. But members will have time to look over that statement and, as I said, it is not my intention to evaluate it -- certainly not to dismiss it.

We then went on to the subject of chemical weapons; where did we get to on chemical weapons? Towards the end of the spring session, the Chairman, unable to arrive at a conclusion or consensus within this Committee, left us with all that he could achieve -- I do not underestimate the great efforts made by the distinguished delegate of Belgium in trying to arrive at a consensus -- but all that he could give us at the end of the spring session was his feeling -- and I quote: "that the Committee should continue its consideration of all the proposals made to the Committee. These proposals deal principally with the methods and procedures to be adopted with a view to negotiating a convention" -- and that was how we went home at the end of the spring session. In arranging its summer work programme, this Committee allocated yet another period for us to consider chemical weapons -- from 16 to 23 July.

Let me cut a long story short. My delegation is trying to see what we have achieved, or what advance we have made. A number of delegations, certainly the Group of 21 are of the view that it is time for negotiations and not discussions -- I should say discussions are sufficiently advanced -- and that

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we could establish a working group on chemical weapons. That has not happened. It has not happened in spite of many delegations categorically, or by implication, telling us that it is feasible. My delegation does not think that the establishment of a working group means that a convention on chemical weapons is brought infinitely closer. No, it is still a procedural stage, but at least the establishment of the group would be an indication of the willingness, goodwill, political will -- whatever you wish to call it -- of the members of the Committee on this very important subject of chemical weapons on which several pronouncements, I should say resolutions, have been adopted by the General Assembly. I would really like to ask that we think we have achieved in tangible terms of disarmament as distinguished from procedure. As I said, we have had the SALT II Treaty tabled before this Committee; we have a radiological weapons treaty -- a draft placed before us. My delegation has not made any comment on the radiological weapons treaty. All I can say is that, like most other delegations, we have referred it to our Government. I hope that what I am about to say will not give the impression to the two Powers that have placed this draft before us that my delegation in any way treats this as a frivolous matter, as unimportant. But my preliminary reaction to the draft treaty on radiological weapons can best be illustrated by a little analogy. In so doing, I do not in any way wish to underestimate its importance. I had occasion to say at an informal meeting that this treaty is one which had been asked for and proposed in 1948, and if it took 31 years for it to come before us it is no simple document. But the only way I can react to this treaty now is to give you this little analogy. It is something like a group of multimillionaires coming to an agreement or an understanding among themselves that they will put an upper limit on their incomes. They then come to the rest of their business fraternity, shall we say, other members of their Chamber of Commerce, and ask them to subscribe to that agreement. But when the other members have not come anywhere near making a million what is the immediate relevance to them of an agreement or an understanding among the group of multimillionaires to agree to have an upper limit or ceiling on their incomes? When you have not made your first million, a thousand million is a trifle beyond your comprehension. If I may say in parentheses, someone might ask what

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was the currency in which these multimillionaires expressed their wealth? I think in today's context -- and the distinguished delegate of the United Kingdom will agree -- they have to be sterling multimillionaires. And if there was a need for a depositary for that agreement, the best place to deposit it would be in the United Kingdom. It might be, or members might think, that this is a very exaggerated view of the radiological weapons draft treaty which has been placed before us but, to the average member of this Committee, that is about a proper appreciation of what a radiological treaty means. Certainly to my delegation, that is how it seems.

I would like to refer to another facet of the two issues, or four issues, that I have brought up. I made a reference to chemical weapons, to the test ban, to SALT, and to radiological weapons. But there is a relationship between these which I should like to place before this Committee as something that occurs to my delegation. Our Committee exercises a collective responsibility for what it does and what it produces. On the one hand, we have, what has been tabled before us in the SALT Treaty, we have before us a draft radiological treaty. On the other hand, there is a large group of members of this Committee who have been emphasizing the urgency of the nuclear test ban. The distinguished delegate of the Netherlands this morning, a while ago, gave a very relevant scenario of the situation -- if we have no draft we have nothing to work on. As I said, some members have emphasized a nuclear test ban and others chemical weapons. I ask, if the Committee is to consider certain treaties put forward by certain delegations, and can find no time to discuss other matters of interest to other delegations, if there is no reciprocity of response or interest, then what is the role of this Committee? What is the role of these other delegations? If we are told that a CTB, a nuclear test ban and a chemical weapons convention are not ripe for negotiation -- we may even agree they are not ripe for negotiation -- but to say that it is premature to take certain minimal procedural steps does not help very much. Certainly to those members of the Committee who place emphasis on these issues, to find that there is no reciprocity of response, this to my delegation is a trifle disheartening.

(Mr. Fonseka, Sri Lanka)

I should like to refer to another aspect of the work and role of this Committee to which members have made frequent reference. Members have agreed that treaties, agreements and conventions can be negotiated bilaterally and brought before this Committee, but at the same time -- certainly throughout this session -- members have emphasized or asked what is it that prevents us from having parallel negotiations in this Committee? What other role has this Committee to perform? If it has to wait until a draft treaty or a draft agreement is placed before it, what is its negotiating role? This is what members have asked during this session -- what is wrong with having parallel negotiations? If it is the view that this Committee has no right, has no capacity, to undertake any kind of negotiation outside that which is brought to us, bilaterally negotiated -- if that is clearly put to us, let me say that we will perhaps understand each other better. We will know what our proper role in this Committee is. But, if that is the position, that this Committee has no right, no role to perform in the way of parallel negotiations on important issues, what are the other members of this Committee doing here? I believe that a draft treaty is brought before this Committee because those who bring the draft treaty are of the view that this Committee can give it universality and credibility; otherwise bilateral treaties can be concluded between any two members and this Committee merely informed. But if it is brought before this Committee for its views it is because the membership of this Committee gives that treaty a certain character, a certain credibility. Now, what do the members of this Committee get in exchange for what they have to give? If we are told that there is no scope, it is not your role to negotiate in parallel on an issue, what are the other members of this Committee getting for the quality, the character, the credibility that this Committee can extend to a treaty brought before it? I do not have the answer.

I would wish to make just one other point. All members of this Committee have a certain constituency to which they are answerable, to which they are responsible. The first constituency unquestionably are the Governments that send us here -- we are answerable to them. The second constituency -- and this might be disputed -- to which members of the Committee owe an obligation is the United Nations. It may be somewhat simpler for some delegations to offer

(Mr. Fonseka, Sri Lanka)

explanations to their respective Governments. They are familiar with how and what takes place in this Committee, they get educated on the problems involved and can provide explanations. But may I say that for my delegation it is not that easy to go back and tell my Government that I have spent five months in this chamber and this is all I have done or that this Committee has been able to achieve. It is not easy, and I like to think that my delegation is not alone in experiencing that difficulty.

The other constituency, as I said, is the United Nations. I know that members have different views on the degree and nature of the responsibility which this Committee has to the United Nations. In the case of my own delegation I have no problem, no problem at all, because my delegation is here as a consequence of the special session whose Final Document, part III deals with machinery, under which eight new members were nominated to this Committee. If it were not for the Final Document, my delegation and seven others might possibly not have been here, so my delegation has no problem. We have a certain responsibility to the United Nations. If I say to the General Assembly it may create problems, so I shall say to the United Nations. Now, the General Assembly of the United Nations has expressly recommended to this Committee that it should consider two issues as matters of priority and ask us to report back. It has asked this Committee to report back on the outcome of this Committee's deliberations on chemical weapons and on the test ban. In fact the resolution on the test ban, I might say, is a trifle too optimistic because it says that the Assembly is prepared to resume its thirty-third session if there was some movement or some progress in regard to the test ban. We now know the position as the distinguished delegate of the United Kingdom advised us today of how far the tripartite negotiators have been able to go. But I was speaking of our responsibility to the United Nations. What are we going to tell it about these two issues that have been referred to us as issues of priority?

I suppose that we could draft a report. We have a draft before us, and that report will contain what we have to tell the General Assembly. I do

(Mr. Fonseka, Sri Lanka)

not wish to get into the subject of the report on which you, Mr. Chairman, have arranged an informal meeting for this afternoon; it is for us to discuss the draft of the report that has been prepared for the Committee for presentation to the General Assembly. I was able to have a very quick look through it and it runs into 29 pages. May I make this preliminary comment? Now this is no reflexion on you, Mr. Chairman, or on all the very hard-working members of the Secretariat who have assisted you in preparing this report. You can do no more than produce the draft and make an analysis of what this Committee was able to do. That draft report as it now stands runs into 29 pages, and page 19 is the operative page. Up to page 19 there is an extensive description of what has been achieved in the way of procedure. May I say that it has been able to extend itself to 19 pages because it quotes from the document which the Secretary-General sent us as part of the General Assembly resolutions. If it were not for the quotations from that document the report might be even shorter. Let me say again, Mr. Chairman, that this is no reflexion on the work you have done in order to let us have the draft report. It is rather a representation of the collective work and responsibility of this Committee and it is not something that we can be too enthusiastic about.

I was talking about constituencies. May I tell you the reaction of another constituency about which, you might well say, we really need not bother, that is the media. I know that the media are not excessively concerned with what happens in the United Nations, whether it be in New York or here in Geneva. They find that what comes out of these international conferences is not exactly newsworthy. However, a colleague of ours in this Committee had, earlier during this session, gone to one of the representatives of the media here in Geneva and told him that he was going to make a statement in the Committee and he might be able to use it. The representative of the media said -- and I don't say this with approval, but this was his exact reaction -- "what comes out of your Committee, when we send it to our headquarters, goes into the waste-paper basket." Now I am not saying that we accept that judgement of the media or that that judgement of the headquarters of that particular news agency or newspaper

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is a fair assessment of the work of this Committee, but nevertheless there it is. Are we going to totally ignore this? I had an opportunity to talk to a gentleman from the media and this is exactly what he told me: "Your Committee spends all its time discussing procedure. This is not something that we can reproduce in newspapers or send to our agency and expect attention". I repeat I am not saying that the media should be our judge, but nevertheless the media are one vehicle through which the work of the Committee can be brought to the attention of the wider public who, shall we say, has an interest in the work of disarmament and certainly in the work of this Committee as a negotiating body? If we agree that the media are not our judge, can we not at least also agree that something needs to be done, that something needs to be rectified?

Mr. Chairman, I have spoken at length, but I did warn you that I would make up for my silence. I shall conclude by saying that these remarks are obviously those of a delegation which has come to learn and, some might say, has not learnt enough. I might add that a little learning is a dangerous thing. Perhaps next year at the conclusion of our next session, I shall have an opportunity of recalling what I have said now and perhaps express regret that I had not learnt, that I did not know enough of what this Committee is here for or what it can possibly achieve.

I have one other duty Mr. Chairman, which I propose to perform while I have the floor. Because my delegation did not intervene earlier during your chairmanship we were unable to wish you well. Let me take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to thank you for your great efforts and the guidance you have given this Committee during this month of July. Whatever I have said now is no reflexion at all on you Mr. Chairman and certainly not on the office of the chairman. It is an attempt to try to explain the point of view of my delegation on the role of the Committee and what it has been able to do. But let me assure you, Mr. Chairman, that you have personally done a great job to advance the work of this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Perhaps I should start by saying that we have just heard a very thought-provoking statement. We can only hope that the distinguished delegate from Sri Lanka will be positively surprised when he speaks again next year at this time about the achievements of this Committee.

The second report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and to Identify Seismic Events has now been put before you in document CD/43, and I will therefore start my intervention by giving my delegation's comments on that document. I then intend to turn to the subjects of the continued work of the Ad Hoc Group, the decision by WMO on the use of its Global Telecommunication System (WMO/GTS) for an exchange of seismic data and, finally, the recent demonstration of temporary data centre facilities in Stockholm to invited representatives and scientific experts from a number of countries.

The Swedish delegation considers the second report of the Ad Hoc Group, which presents a consensus view among the experts in the Group, to be a valuable contribution to the efforts to establish a monitoring system acceptable to all. The report is the result of considerable work carried out by scientific experts from more than 20 countries. The Swedish delegation appreciates the co-operative and constructive way in which the work has been conducted. We feel that the open and penetrating technical discussions have increased the understanding of the verification problems among the countries engaged in this work. Important contributions have been made by scientific experts from invited States not members of the CD and by representatives from WMO. We see world-wide participation in this work as particularly important and are therefore happy to note that experts also from Mexico and Spain have now joined the Group.

In its second report, the Ad Hoc Group has elaborated on scientific and technical aspects of international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events as outlined in its first report. These measures are foreseen to contain three basic elements: a global network of seismological stations, a fast international exchange of data over the global telecommunication system of WMO and, thirdly, special international data centres for the use of participant States.

The second report specifies in detail the seismological data that should be exchanged on a routine basis and recommends that all network stations should be equipped with modern seismograph systems capable of continuous recording of data in digital form.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

The Ad Hoc Group also points out that the requirements for reliability of equipment and consistency of reporting should be considerably more stringent than according to present practice.

The report calls for the transmission of seismic data over the WMO/GTS network and contains an investigation of the capabilities of that network to transmit seismic data in various parts of the world. This investigation was made in close co-operation with WMO. The conclusion was that in most places only few problems are expected to arise in transmitting such data.

The report also gives detailed technical descriptions of the scientific functions of the proposed data centres. They should be regarded as service facilities for the States participating in the international data exchange, by providing them with easily accessible data for national assessments of seismic events.

It is important that the CD should now take further steps in this matter. My delegation therefore proposes that the CD should decide that the Ad Hoc Group should be maintained and continue its work under a new mandate. In working paper CD/46 we have formulated a proposal for such a mandate. In its report, the Ad Hoc Group has pointed out several matters which remain to be specified or to be given further study. Our proposal follows the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Group in its second report. They include further elaboration of detailed instructions for an experimental test of the envisaged global system as well as further development of the scientific and technical aspects of the envisaged international co-operative measures. In addition, the Ad Hoc Group should contribute to the review and analysis of national investigations, such as investigations concerning the conditions for using the procedures for obtaining desired data at individual stations and procedures for analysis at data centres. As under its previous mandate, the work should be purely scientific, and the Ad Hoc Group should not attempt to assess the adequacy of the system for verifying a comprehensive test ban. The composition of the Ad Hoc Group in its continued work would remain unchanged. We hope, however, that experts from additional CD member States will participate.

As I stated at the outset, it was also my intention to deal with the WMO/GTS. The co-operation between the Ad Hoc Group and the Secretariat of WMO is well established so far as concerns the question how the WMO/GTS can be used for a global data exchange for test-ban verification purposes. My delegation introduced

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

the idea of such a use as far back as in 1965, and the response from the Secretary-General of WMO, Mr. D.A. Davies, was immediate and positive. This year, as a consequence of the first report of the Ad Hoc Group, the Eighth Congress of WMO has decided, in principle, that WMO should, if formally requested, assist the United Nations in the matter of routine transmission of seismic-event data. The Executive Committee of WMO was therefore authorized to study and take appropriate action on such a request if it is received prior to the Ninth Congress. I have mentioned this decision of WMO because of its fundamental importance for the implementation of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Group on international co-operative measures. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group has asked me also to mention the particular efforts of the Secretary-General of WMO in this context.

I will now give you a brief account of the demonstration of temporary data centre facilities in Stockholm and, maybe particularly, the ideas behind it.

As we have stressed repeatedly from the Swedish side, a CTBT must be a truly international treaty and not one concluded only between nuclear-weapon States. In order to make a CTBT effective and internationally accepted, it is necessary that the Committee on Disarmament should be fully enabled to play a substantive role in the negotiation of the treaty.

The question of how to achieve adequate verification has been one of the key questions throughout the many years of CTB negotiations. Seismic means have been generally accepted as the main verification methods. Different views have been expressed on the adequacy of seismic verification methods.

Our view is that seismic verification by means of a global monitoring system would provide adequate verification, by giving necessary deterrence against clandestine tests. We also consider that active participation in the verification of an international treaty, such as the CTBT, is the right and duty of all countries parties to the treaty. Every such country has the right to know that other parties to the treaty fulfil their treaty obligations, every country also has the duty to make its contribution to the over-all monitoring of such an international treaty.

The CTBT would be a good example of treaties where verification can and should be carried out in co-operation between all the countries involved. For test-ban verification, seismic data are needed from a number of observatories around the world. The Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts has suggested a seismic verification system with some 50 high-quality seismological observatories, with fast communication through the WMO/GTS and with international data centres for the compilation and routine analysis of the data.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

These international data centres are essential elements in the verification system. They could act as service facilities by providing compiled and pre-processed data from a global network of seismic stations to all States parties to the treaty. This will make it possible for all States to base the national assessment of individual seismic events on data from the entire globe and not only from their own national observatories. In this way small States also will be enabled to verify the CTBT in a meaningful way. Such equal possibilities for all States parties to the treaty would in our view be fundamental to the true international character of a CTBT.

My Government has on several occasions expressed its readiness to establish, operate and finance an international seismological data centre in Sweden, as part of a global monitoring system. This offer, and the work that for more than 10 years has been carried out at the Hagfors Observatory, have the single purpose of contributing towards the achievement of a CTBT.

Following invitations by my Government to the member States of the CD and of the Ad Hoc Group, representatives and experts from 26 countries and WMO attended a demonstration from 12 to 14 July of temporary data centre facilities in Stockholm. These facilities and the tentative results obtained from them are presented in working paper CD/45. As elaborated in that paper, we wanted to demonstrate one possible way of carrying out some of the main functions of the envisaged international data centres. I am not going to dwell on technical details of the demonstration. I want, however, to make it known that we intend to maintain the data centre facilities thus set up in Stockholm and make them available for the scientific and technical work that remains to be done in the development of international data centres, as foreseen for the global system of international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The delegations of the USSR and the United States recently carried out intensive work in the framework of the Soviet-United States negotiations on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons with a view to elaborating a joint USSR-United States report on progress in the negotiations. This work has been successfully completed and today I am submitting this joint report to the Committee on Disarmament. The text of the joint USSR-United States report on progress in the bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons reads:

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

"During the course of the Vienna meeting of the leaders of the United States and the USSR in June 1979, both sides affirmed the importance of a general, complete, and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons and agreed to intensify their efforts to prepare an agreed joint proposal for submission to the Committee on Disarmament. The USSR and United States delegations are guided by this principle at the tenth series of the bilateral negotiations, which began on 16 July, 1979.

"In the negotiations, the United States and USSR delegations take into account the fact that prohibition of chemical weapons is, as was stressed in the Final Document of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, one of the most urgent and vital problems in the area of disarmament. They are also guided by the requirement that a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, like any other international agreement in the field of arms control and disarmament, should strengthen rather than detract from the security of the parties.

"The USSR and United States delegations, taking into consideration the interest expressed by many delegations in the Committee on Disarmament concerning the status of the bilateral negotiations on a prohibition of chemical weapons, submit the following joint report:

"1. The two sides believe that the scope of the prohibition should be determined on the basis of a general-purpose criterion. Parties to the convention should assume the obligation never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, otherwise acquire or possess, or retain supertoxic lethal chemicals, other lethal or highly toxic chemicals or their precursors, with the exception of chemicals intended for permitted purposes of such types and in such quantities as are appropriate to such purposes, as well as chemical munitions or other means of chemical warfare. Negotiations are continuing on several issues relating to the scope of prohibition.

"2. By permitted purposes is meant non-hostile purposes (industrial, research, medical, or other peaceful purposes, law-enforcement purposes, and purposes of development and testing of means of protection against chemical weapons) as well as military purposes not related to chemical warfare.

"3. In order to facilitate verification, it would be appropriate to use, in addition to the general-purpose criterion, toxicity criteria and certain other provisions.

"4. Agreement has been reached on the following approximate values for the additional criteria of toxicity mentioned above:

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

- (a) $LCT_{50} = 2,000 \text{ ng. min/m}^3$ for inhalation and/or
 $LD_{50} = 0.5 \text{ mg/kg}$ for subcutaneous injections;
- (b) $LCT_{50} = 20,000 \text{ ng.min/m}^3$ for inhalation and/or
 $LD_{50} = 10 \text{ mg/kg}$ for subcutaneous injections.

On the basis of these criteria, it will be possible to separate chemicals into appropriate categories, to each of which the general-purpose criterion would be applied.

"5. Different degrees of prohibition and limitation, as well as differentiated methods of verification, would be applied on the basis of these toxicity criteria and certain other provisions. These issues continue to be subjects of negotiations.

"6. Negotiations are also continuing on the definition of terms and several other issues.

"7. The two sides have agreed that parties to the convention should assume an obligation not to transfer to anyone, whether directly or indirectly, the means of chemical warfare, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States, or any organization to carry out activities which parties would undertake not to engage in pursuant to the convention.

"8. The two sides have come to an understanding regarding the necessity for States to declare, immediately after they become parties to the convention, both the volumes of acquired stocks of means of chemical warfare and the means of production of chemical munitions and chemicals covered by the convention. Plans for the destruction of declared stocks of chemical weapons should also be declared. These declarations should contain information on the volume and time-tables for destruction of such stocks. Plans for the destruction or dismantling of relevant means of production should also be declared. In the course of the bilateral negotiations, the two sides are continuing to make efforts to agree on the specific content of the declarations concerning stocks of means of chemical warfare and concerning means of production. In this connexion, the basic concept of means of production is also a subject that remains to be resolved.

"9. Agreement has been reached that stocks of means for chemical warfare should be destroyed or diverted for permitted purposes within 10 years after a State becomes a party. Means of production should be shut down and eventually destroyed or dismantled. The destruction or dismantling of means of production should begin not later than eight years, and should be completed not later than 10 years, after a State becomes a party.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

"10. In this connexion, the United States and the USSR believe that a future convention should contain provisions in accordance with which parties would periodically exchange statements and notifications concerning: the progress of the destruction of stocks of means of chemical warfare or their diversion for permitted purposes, the progress of the destruction or dismantling of means of production of chemical munitions and chemicals covered by the convention, and of the completion of these processes.

"11. The USSR and the United States believe that the fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the future convention should be subject to the important requirement of adequate verification. They also believe that measures with respect to such verification should be based on a combination of national and international measures.

"12. International verification measures should include the creation of a consultative committee. This committee could be convened as appropriate by the depositary of the convention, as well as upon the request of any party.

"13. The activities of the consultative committee in the interval between meetings should be carried out by a secretariat. The mandate of the secretariat is a subject of negotiations.

"14. The participants should exchange, through the consultative committee or bilaterally, certain data on super-toxic lethal chemicals produced, acquired, accumulated, and used for permitted purposes, as well as on important lethal chemicals and the most important precursors used for permitted purposes. To this end, it is envisaged to compile lists of the relevant chemicals and precursors. The two sides have reached a significant degree of mutual understanding in developing agreed approaches to the compilation of such lists. The scope of the data to be presented remains to be agreed.

"15. Additional functions for the consultative committee remain under discussion.

"16. In order to ensure the possibility of beginning the work of the consultative committee immediately after entry into force of the convention, the United States and the USSR believe it appropriate to embark upon the creation of a preparatory committee upon signature of the convention.

"17. A convention should include provisions in accordance with which any party should have the right on a bilateral basis, or through the consultative committee, to request from another party with respect to which suspicions have arisen that it is acting in violation of obligations under the convention, relevant information on the actual state of affairs, as well as to request investigation of the actual

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

state of affairs on site, providing appropriate reasons in support of the necessity of such an investigation.

"18. A party may agree to such an on-site investigation or decide otherwise, providing appropriate explanations.

"19. It should also be provided that any party could turn to the Security Council with a complaint which would include appropriate arguments. In case of suspicion regarding compliance with the convention, the consultative committee, upon request of any party, or of the Security Council of the United Nations, could also take steps to clarify the actual state of affairs.

"20. The question of other international verification measures remains unresolved.

"21. National measures would include the use of national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally accepted principles of international law. In this connexion, parties should not impede, including through the use of deliberate concealment measures, the national technical means of other parties used to carry out the aforementioned verification functions.

"22. The USSR and the United States believe that a future convention should reflect the obligation of each party to take appropriate internal measures in accordance with its constitutional procedures to prohibit and prevent any activity contrary to the provisions of the convention anywhere under its jurisdiction or control.

"23. Possibilities of confidence-building measures are being explored.

"24. A future chemical weapons convention should include a withdrawal provision of the type included in other arms control and disarmament agreements.

"25. The question of the conditions for entry into force of the convention remains unresolved.

"26. The two sides believe that an effective prohibition of chemical weapons will require working out a large number of technical questions which would be dealt with in annexes to the convention and which are now being studied.

"The United States and the Soviet Union note the great importance attached to the elaboration of a convention by the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Committee on Disarmament which was revealed, in particular, in the identification of the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons as one of the priority items on the agenda adopted for the current session of the Committee on Disarmament. Both sides will exert their best efforts to complete the bilateral negotiations and present a joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament on this most important and extremely complex problem as soon as possible."

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

This concludes the text of the USSR-United States report on progress in the bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In presenting this report we express the hope that it will be most seriously studied by the Committee members. Time and consultations with respective capitals will apparently be required for this.

I also wish to report that the bilateral negotiations mentioned at the outset of this statement are being continued.

Now I should like to say a few words on behalf of the Soviet delegation on a question that does not concern the prohibition of chemical weapons.

As today's plenary meeting is the last which will be taking place under your chairmanship, the Soviet delegation would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you, Comrade Chairman, on the very successful way in which you have guided the Committee's work. I should like to draw attention to the special experience and competence of the Chairman, the great skill he has demonstrated in fulfilling his functions, and his tact and objectivity. The month of July really was the most complicated, most important and most intensive in the work of the Committee in 1979. We have held about 35 official and informal meetings and meetings of working groups. From the point of view of substance, it has been the most important because, compared with all the other months, we have been dealing not with procedure but with substance. The Soviet delegation would also like to note that in July we made definite, tangible progress under your leadership, Comrade Chairman. Important documents were submitted, negotiations started within the framework of the working group, and discussions and negotiations began on the substance of the draft documents submitted. This is something in which we see that you bear a great deal of the credit.

In conclusion, we would like to say that you are the first Chairman from the group of socialist countries; the Soviet delegation will recall your skilful and efficient chairmanship with pride.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union for his statement and the joint report which he presented on behalf of the two negotiating Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. I express the deep gratitude of the Committee for the information which they have given to the Committee. I would like also to express my sincere thanks to the representative of the Soviet Union for the kind, touching words he addressed to me.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I should like to make two quite short points. Firstly, I would like to underwrite the statement by the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union when he expressed the hope that this report would be given close scrutiny and detailed study. I think it would be useful for all of us. The second point I would like to make -- and here I seem to be following my distinguished colleague -- is to add my voice to that of others in the expression of appreciation of your chairmanship. You may have noted that I referred to you as Mr. Chairman, not as Comrade Chairman, this is not because of any lack of camaraderie between us but because of certain political overtones that this term has, and if I were to use that term it might go down to the disadvantage of both of us. This does not, however, in any way undercut my expression of appreciation for your performance in the chair. We have had, as national delegations, and I am afraid may continue to have, differences, but I think your performance as Chairman has lived up to the high standard of international conferencemanship and, if you will forgive my rather minor, somewhat less affectionate title of Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for his statement concerning the joint report, and especially for his kind words addressed to me which touched me deeply.

Since this is the last plenary meeting which I have the honour to preside, I would like to extend my warm thanks to all members of the Committee for their co-operation with the Chair during a very active month in the work of the Committee. It has been a privilege for me to be chairing this highly qualified Committee, and I can assure you that I very much value the help that I have received from all of you during this period.

(The Chairman)

This summer month of July has been really hot, not only outside of this building, but in this impressive hall of our Committee. We have entered into the substance of a number of items on our agenda. And if, quite naturally, not all of us have been satisfied with the tempo or the results of the discussion, I believe we all agree that the work we have done has not been in vain. It has been a contribution to the further clarification and precision of the position of different delegations and groups, and all this, combined with the political will factor, offers a basis for concrete results in the complicated disarmament problems that are now under consideration. I would like to note particularly the business-like and constructive atmosphere that prevailed in our debate.

May I be permitted to describe what, in my understanding, has been achieved in the various items on our agenda that the Committee discussed during the month of July:

As regards the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, I think we could be satisfied with the purposeful and extensive discussion on this highest priority issue. It has been a contribution to the conviction of many delegations that the CD is a suitable forum for the preparation and carrying out of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

I would like to note especially the significance of a number of unofficial meetings, during which a lot of questions were clarified and a lot of aspects of this important problem touched upon. In my view, exploratory consultations on the scope, prerequisites and elements of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, initiated at the 1979 session of the Committee, should be continued in all available forums with a view to reaching agreement on these subjects.

I would like to express my satisfaction with the fact that the Committee has been officially seized with the texts of the SALT II agreements contained in working documents CD/26 and CD/29. It should be noted that a number of Governments addressed to the Committee the texts of their declarations welcoming the signing of SALT II. I wish to share the opinion expressed by a large majority of the delegations evaluating SALT II Treaty as an important arms control achievement. There is no doubt that the SALT II agreements and the SALT process will exert a positive influence upon the disarmament problems that are of immediate concern to this Committee.

(The Chairman)

I believe all of us are looking forward to the entry into force of the SALT II Treaty and to the realization of the solemn pledges that have been made in the final communiqué of the summit meeting between President Brezhnev and President Carter in Vienna.

In respect of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: radiological weapons, during the month of July we drew nearer to taking yet another concrete arms control measure. I think we have enough grounds for such a conclusion having in mind the joint proposal of the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States on the major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. Let us hope that we are going to maintain the momentum of our discussion with a view to starting negotiations and completing in due time the elaboration of the draft treaty and submitting it to the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

The question of chemical weapons was given an important place in our Programme of Work for the month of July. I would like to stress with satisfaction that there has emerged in our Committee a general tendency to engage in more concrete and business-like work on the question of chemical weapons. Lastly, substantial efforts have been made to initiate the defining of the general outline of a convention. In my opinion, this is the best way of harmonizing our work with the bilateral negotiations with a view to achieving early agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Though we could not for the time being, agree on the creation of a working group, as urged by a number of delegations, we can claim that we now have a clearer picture of the approach to and the purposeful efforts required for the negotiations on this priority problem of disarmament.

In this connexion, I should like to welcome the joint statement of the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States which is very informative and will help us a lot in understanding the achievements reached at this stage of the bilateral negotiations.

We made a step forward in the question of the elaboration of effective international arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. I have in mind the creation of the Ad Hoc Working Group on negative guarantees which, under the chairmanship of the Egyptian delegation, engaged in an active and useful discussion which, hopefully, will produce positive results in the days to come.

(The Chairman)

As you see, I did not comment on the item concerning the nuclear test ban, since this was outside of our programme for July. But I wish to welcome the statement of the participants in the trilateral negotiations, presented by the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom at this meeting, and to note with satisfaction another NTB-related statement, that of the distinguished representative of Sweden, who commented on the valuable work and the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on the identification of seismic events.

I would like to end this short review by expressing again my heartfelt gratitude to all of you, for it was your valuable experience and advice, your goodwill and readiness for strenuous work, that created the foundations for the considerable volume of activities that the Committee carried out in this month.

I address special words of gratitude to the distinguished Secretary of the Committee, to the staff of the Secretariat and to the interpreters and translators for their active contribution to our work and for their valuable assistance, especially in preparing the draft of our report to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

In thanking you, I wish to pledge my best efforts to continue to serve this body in my capacity as representative of Bulgaria.

I am sure that the new Chairman, the distinguished Ambassador of Burma U Saw Hlaing, will successfully accomplish his tasks in the chair. His high personal and professional qualities are well known to the Committee, and I do not need to wish him success.

Mr. ALULA (Ethiopia): I am sure that the members of the Group of 21 would not want me to let this occasion pass without expressing on their behalf our heartfelt thanks for all the efforts you have been making in order to realize the objectives of the Committee on Disarmament during your term of office which is ending today.

Both the distinguished representatives of the USSR and the United States have just now expressed their recognition of the valuable efforts you have personally made in order to facilitate and harmonize our work during the month of July. The members of the Group of 21 would like to join the previous speakers in that recognition and appreciation.

(Mr. Alula, Ethiopia)

If no great achievement to the satisfaction of all of us is made it cannot be said that it was due to your lack of effort.

I, as an Ethiopian delegate, do not have any constraint or inhibition in calling you Comrade, Mr. Chairman, as seemed to be the case with others. As a matter of fact I am convinced that you are a comrade to all the people who are engaged in the promotion of peace.

With these few words, I would wish to thank you once again on behalf of the members of the Group of 21 -- Comrade Chairman.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, there is nothing that has happened in the last ten minutes to cause me to change any of the remarks that I made about your chairmanship. I still subscribe to them. I would, however, point out that it is awfully hard, in a summary of ten minutes, to reach complete agreement on all the things that took place in this busy month of July. And there are some areas where I perhaps disagree with your summary. I would just like to indicate that, while maintaining the United States position. However, this is not to take back, but underwrite my earlier remarks.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.