

CD/PV.45
26 July 1979
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FORTY-FIFTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 26 July 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. P. VOYTOV (Bulgaria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENSMAIL

Argentina: Mr. A. DUMONT
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Sir James PLIMSOLL
Mr. A. BEHM
Ms. M. WICKES

Belgium: Mr. P. BERG
Mr. G. VAN DUYSSE

Brazil: Mr. S. DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. P. KAMENOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U THEIN AUNG
U NGEW WIN

Canada: Mr. J.T. SIMARD

Cuba: Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. V. TYLNER
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt: Mr. O. EL-SHAFEI
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFFE
Mr. G. ALULA

France: Mr. BENOIT D'ABOVILLE
Mr. M. COUTHURES
Mr. C.A. GRIFFITH
Mr. GESBERT

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. W. KOETTER
Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. J. POHLMANN

Hungary: Mr. M. DOMOKOS
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India: Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN
Mr. S.T. DEVARIE

Indonesia: Mr. D.B. SULEMAN
Mr. SILABAN

Iran: Mr. K. RADJAVI
Mr. D. AMERI

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. M. MORENO
Mr. C. FRATESCHI
Mr. L. SALAZAR
Mr. FOLCO DE LUCA

Japan: Mr. M. OGISO
Mr. T. NOHOYAMA
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. A. JET ODENDO

<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. M.A. CACERES
<u>Mongolia:</u>	Mr. L. BAYART
<u>Morocco:</u>	Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
<u>Netherlands:</u>	Mr. R.H. FEIN Mr. J.W. SCHEFFERS
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. T.O. OLUMOKO
<u>Pakistan:</u>	Mr. M. AKRAM
<u>Peru:</u>	
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. B. SUJKA Mr. M. KRUCZYK
<u>Romania:</u>	Mr. C. ENE
<u>Sri Lanka:</u>	Mr. I.B. FONSEKA
<u>Sweden:</u>	Mr. C. LIDGARD Mr. L. NORBERG Mr. S. STROMBACK Mr. J. LUNDIN
<u>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:</u>	Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHIN Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV
<u>United Kingdom:</u>	Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES Mr. N.H. MARSHALL Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY
Mr. D. KOELEMAY
Mr. R. MIKULAK
Mr. M. SANCHES
Mr. J. CALVERT
Mr. W. DUNLOP
Mr. M. DALEY
Ms. S. BUCKLEY
Mr. A. RADZIANKO

Venezuela:

Mrs. R. LISBOA DE NECER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC
Mr. D. DJOKIC

Zaire:

Mr. MULONGANDUSU ESUK

Secretary:

Mr. RIKHI JAIPAL

Assistant Secretary-General:

Mr. R. BJORNERSTEDT

NON-MEMBER COUNTRIESDenmark:^{1/}

Mr. V. EDEBJERG
Mr. J. LEERHOY

Finland:^{2/}

Mr. J. ENQUIST
Mr. ILPO MANNINEN

^{1/} By decision of the Committee on Disarmament of 17 July 1979
(see CD/PV.42, page 17).

^{2/} By decision of the Committee on Disarmament of 25 April 1979
(see CD/PV.30, page 26).

Mr. RADJAVI (Iran) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, allow me first to associate myself with the distinguished representatives who have congratulated you on your appointment as Chairman of the Committee for the month of July. Your devotion to the cause of disarmament and your wealth of experience permit us to foresee the achievement of positive results. We wish you every success in the execution of your difficult task.

I should also like to thank all the representatives who have welcomed me to this Committee, and to greet in my turn the presence among us of the distinguished representatives of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Cuba, Italy and Peru.

Finally, I should like to congratulate H.E. Mr. Rikhi Jaipal on his nomination as Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General.

Before embarking on a brief examination of the questions before this Committee, I must point out that the Iranian Revolution, which has shaken the foundations of the former regime, is engaged in a thorough reassessment of Iranian foreign and domestic policy. The Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran aims in its domestic policy at creating a fairer, more humane society, in conformity with the high values of Iranian culture and of Islam. This implies a revision of objectives, the redefinition of priorities in all social, economic, political and military fields, and consequently the institution of a new foreign policy of national independence and positive neutrality. It follows, so far as concerns the crucial problems of arms and disarmament, that the Iranian people, the leaders of its Revolution and its Government intend to break away from the hypocritical practices of the former regime, since the latter, while masquerading as a defender of disarmament, devoted a very large part of its gross national product to armaments. In 1973 Iran became the world's biggest customer for arms sales. Iranian military expenditure grew at a rate double that of the gross national product: in 1953, under Dr. Moussadeq's National Government, Iran's military expenditure was only 2 per cent of the gross national product; in 1971 this proportion reached 12 per cent, and in 1977 25 per cent, a rate which on the average is three times higher than in the United States of America or the Soviet Union, and six times higher than in France or Great Britain. Since the oil price rises, the budget of the Iranian army increased fivefold, rising from \$2 billion in 1973 to \$10 billion in 1975, and kept on increasing until the eve of the great Revolution of 1979.

(Mr. Radjavi, Iran)

Thus, Iran's military budget in 1977-1978 was comparable to that of Great Britain. The former regime devoted annually more than 30 per cent of the State budget to its armed forces. Consequently, in proportion to its revenue, the regime of the ex-Shah had the heaviest military budget in the world. At the same time the State budget, still according to official figures, allocated only \$1 billion to hygiene and public health. In these circumstances, when the supporters of the former regime talked about disarmament this was pure cynicism and hypocrisy.

The Provisional Revolutionary Government, I emphasize once again, intends to break away from this practice definitively.

That having been said, I must express my delegation's satisfaction concerning the signing of the SALT II treaty, which curbs the progress of the strategic arms race.

Everything no doubt has to start somewhere, especially in relation to such a complicated question as disarmament. We consider SALT II an improvement on SALT I, and we hope that it will be the forerunner of a future international agreement on disarmament within the framework of the United Nations. Indeed, nuclear disarmament is an absolute priority and a final objective, and it is upon the nuclear Powers, particularly the two great Powers, that the responsibility for progress towards achieving that objective rests. This does not mean that the non-nuclear-weapon States should remain passive in the field of disarmament. On the contrary, since each individual person is concerned, and every human being is threatened by the danger of nuclear conflict, it is the duty of all nations, every country, all States, to use every possible means to slow down and put an end to the nuclear arms race. That is why the concerted efforts of the international community to ensure increased United Nations participation in negotiations on nuclear disarmament, as recommended by the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, are of primary importance in this field.

The establishment of an atmosphere of confidence, and partial agreements for arms control, certainly represent an advance in this direction, but they can in no way take the place of authentic measures to stop and subsequently reverse the nuclear arms race.

(Mr. Radjavi, Iran)

In this context we at present feel encouraged by the signing of the SALT II Treaty in Vienna, and in spite of all its lacunae we welcome the treaty, which represents a step forward, and we await its application in full. It is only on this condition that the SALT II Treaty can be considered as an advance towards the reduction of nuclear arms. The SALT talks are a positive process if they do not stop at SALT II, but move on towards SALT III, then towards the final goal of the complete elimination of nuclear arms.

This continuous process is an important factor in establishing an atmosphere of confidence. Although the SALT II Treaty is an arms limitation treaty rather than a real disarmament treaty, we hope that it will contribute towards stabilizing and decelerating the arms race, and towards the promotion of proper disarmament treaties.

We have also noted with satisfaction documents CD/31 and CD/32, and the speeches of the Ambassadors of the United States of America and the Soviet Union concerning the joint United States-USSR proposal on radiological arms. We are at present engaged in examining this proposal with all the attention due to such an important topic.

Another important event has been the first session of the new United Nations Disarmament Commission resuscitated by the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament. Consisting of all the Members of the United Nations, this new Disarmament Commission, during the months of May and June, has been an open forum for the ideas of the whole world. The Commission succeeded in preparing the various elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Having noted with satisfaction the statement of the representative of the People's Republic of China before the Disarmament Commission on the subject of China's direct participation in the work of the Committee on Disarmament in due course, we greatly hope to be able to welcome China to the Committee as soon as possible.

The United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects is to take place in September of this year.

Although we are disappointed by the fact that the Preparatory Conference was unable in the course of its two sessions to adopt complete rules of procedure, including rules for the decision-making procedure, or to establish a general basis for agreement on the prohibition of incendiary weapons, we nevertheless express the hope that the September Conference will be crowned with success.

(Mr. Radjavi, Iran)

The Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic is also greatly interested in the non-proliferation Treaty. We hope that the second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to take place this summer and next spring, will achieve positive and concrete results in order to ensure the success of the 1980 Conference.

Despite the heavy workload of this second part of the annual session of the Committee on Disarmament, we are glad to note that the Committee has been able to complete the prolonged procedural discussions which have preoccupied it during its first session. The Committee's success in adopting its rules of procedure and its agenda for 1979 should allow all its members to concentrate on fundamental problems.

Turning now to problems concerning the Committee directly, and in conformity with our agenda for 1979, I should like to address myself to a number of items on our agenda, asking your indulgence if I do not confine myself strictly to the programme laid down for today.

The primary objective of disarmament efforts is to stop the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament. We consider that this aspect of the question should be given high priority in any consideration of the problems of arms control and disarmament. The role and responsibility of the two great Powers must be constantly borne in mind in any viable disarmament effort aimed at stopping an accelerating arms race. Although the two great Powers have in fact recognized their responsibility by entering into the process of the bilateral SALT negotiations, their stocks remain intact.

The absence of a real agreement to reduce the level of nuclear armaments cannot be held to justify the continued production of nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is the arms race entered into by the great Powers which provides the principal stimulant for the constitution of a nuclear arsenal on a world-wide scale. This also leads both to a great waste of resources and to an enormous destructive force.

It must be emphasized that a large proportion of all scientific and technological manpower and of the research expenditure of the industrial Powers is reserved for this purpose, and that a few industrial countries alone account for three quarters of the military expenditure of the entire world. At the same time, during the three decades and more of the "nuclear era", the accumulation and

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modernization of the nuclear arsenal have progressed at an alarming pace, at a yet more alarming human and material cost. Furthermore, the proliferation of nuclear arms continues, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Also, on observing the realities of the nuclear prospect, it is clearly apparent that only countries possessing the technological and economic resources necessary for the production, build-up and sophistication of their nuclear arsenal bear the responsibility for stopping the arms race and moving on to nuclear disarmament.

The importance of this question has been recognized by the United Nations from the outset, and it is hardly surprising that the very first resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations was concerned with the prohibition of nuclear arms.

The Final Document of the tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, reaffirmed, in its numerous paragraphs, the high priority which should be given to stopping the nuclear arms race. Thus, in paragraph 50, it declares:

"The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(c) A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time."

Taking account of this, we have noted with interest working paper CD/4, submitted by the socialist countries, which contains views and suggestions concerning a possible approach within the Committee on Disarmament to the question of nuclear disarmament.

The Iranian delegation fully realizes the difficulty and complexity of this question, which involves political and technical problems urgently requiring solution. We therefore follow this problem with great interest, in the hope that the working paper will be considered by the Committee in such a way that all its positive elements and its lacunae will be identified.

(Mr. Radjavi, Iran)

The Islamic Republic of Iran affirms its attachment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and accords great importance to a complete stoppage of nuclear-weapon tests. A treaty to put an end to nuclear explosions is an essential step towards arresting the development of new types of nuclear weapons. It is also an important element of the non-proliferation regime. Above all, however, the test-ban Treaty has become the symbol of an advance in the field of negotiations. Further prospects of arms limitation would be seriously compromised by a failure to reach agreement on this subject.

Paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly declares:

"The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind."

Later in the paragraph, the General Assembly stresses the urgency of concluding an agreement which "could attract the widest possible adherence".

That is why my delegation shares with many others a feeling of disappointment on noting how slow the pace of the trilateral test-ban negotiations has been, especially since, the problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes having been solved, all the necessary elements are there, and the majority of the States Members of the United Nations have consistently voted for the immediate stoppage of nuclear tests. These countries will hardly view the discovery of numerous obstacles to an agreement with favour, particularly if the agreement is to be of limited duration. For the moment we are impatiently longing for the preparation of a treaty.

Such a document will no doubt be greatly welcomed, and presumably, in view of the time taken to prepare it, it will obtain the support of all the nuclear Powers.

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The question of effective international agreements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has been on the agenda of the bodies dealing with disarmament for several years. Indeed, so long as the nuclear Powers take their stand on deterrence, the non-nuclear-weapon States must receive effective assurance that they will not be subjected to the use or threat of use of these weapons. In these circumstances, the Islamic Republic of Iran naturally feels closely concerned by this subject.

As to regional limitation of atomic proliferation, to which we attach great importance, our position and policy are clear. They consist in reducing the risk of nuclear conflict by restricting the sphere of use of nuclear weapons through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. One aspect of this approach concerns the responsibilities of the nuclear Powers towards the States situated in the zones. The establishment of such zones would allow the creation of a sort of assurance against nuclear aggression. It is to be hoped that the proposals put forward within the United Nations by various countries and groups of countries to this end will be favourably received by the countries of the regions concerned and by the great Powers, so that coverage can gradually be extended to all the non-nuclear countries.

Since most of the non-nuclear-weapon States are unfortunately not at present within nuclear-weapon-free zones, however, this solution cannot for them be regarded as the best assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The question of effective international agreements to guarantee the security of the non-nuclear weapon States has been the subject of intense discussions, both in the preliminary stages and during the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly declares:

"... the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons..."

and in that same paragraph the General Assembly urges the nuclear Powers to conclude effective arrangements for that purpose.

That is a positive response which, if it was applied in letter and in spirit, would answer the non-nuclear-weapon States' needs.

(Mr. Radjavi, Iran)

We therefore welcome the Pakistan initiative contained in documents CD/10 and CD/25, and are glad to note the setting up of the working group to initiate negotiations on the subject of the assurances necessary for non-nuclear-weapon States; we hope that these negotiations will achieve positive results. Working paper CD/23, presented by the socialist countries, is also an appreciable contribution to our work. The recent proposal CD/27 by the United States of America, in which it is suggested that the individual pledges given by the nuclear States be incorporated in a General Assembly resolution, a proposal which in itself represents progress, cannot alone be an adequate substitute, however, for the assurances required by the non-nuclear-weapon States.

A convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons is also among the priority items of our agenda. This question, whose importance is exceeded only by that of the problem of nuclear disarmament, calls for immediate action. These inhuman weapons with indiscriminate effects, although existing in the stockpiles of certain countries, are not yet part of the panoply of active defence. This is the moment for action, before these weapons, too, become indispensable, and before new countries seek to acquire them; this action would be in conformity with paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the special session.

Thus, the high priority attached to this question is indisputable.

Such action must not be limited to the great Powers, for it concerns numerous countries, both industrialized and developing. Serious efforts have already been made at the multilateral level by several Governments as a contribution to a ban on chemical weapons, and these efforts must be continued.

The realization of the joint United States-USSR initiative is taking a great deal of time, and we hope that the difficulties will not in the end impede its success. With their impressive stockpiles of nuclear weapons, the great Powers can hardly claim to rely on chemical weapons for security purposes. Furthermore, the existence of the Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical weapons should facilitate decision-making in this field. We therefore expect the two great Powers to make all the necessary efforts to resolve the important problems still outstanding between them.

We are therefore naturally in favour of the proposal contained in document CD/11 from the Group of 21, concerning the urgent need to establish a special working group, open to participation by all members of the Committee, with

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the aim of preparing a draft convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. In the same spirit we hope that the informal negotiations at present taking place will soon achieve a positive result.

We have tried to touch briefly on some of the points concerning the control of armaments, which require action. My delegation fervently hoped that the second part of the present session will have fruitful results, allowing us to say in our report to the General Assembly that we have at least made a promising start in the exercise of our responsibilities in respect of the questions referred to this Committee.

Mr. STUART (Canada) (translated from French): These two weeks are devoted to the consideration of item 4 of our work programme: chemical weapons. They provide us with an opportunity to take stock of problems we must face up to if we are to succeed in eliminating such weapons. The Committee has tackled two aspects of the question at this session, namely, procedure and substance. It has not, alas, been possible to reach agreement at the procedural level as to how, in what framework, as required by many United Nations resolutions, the Committee was to take up the question of negotiations for the preparation of a convention on chemical weapons. For our part, we supported the establishment of an ad hoc working group as the most appropriate method. That suggestion was repeated at the beginning of our session by Italy, the Netherlands and the Group of 21 -- in documents CD/5, CD/6 and CD/11 -- which we, too, supported. We regret that, for reasons known to us all, it was not possible to reach agreement on this question.

We do not think, however, that this disagreement over procedure should prevent us from making progress in our consideration of questions of substance. Moreover, this two-weeks' debate proves that such is not the case, and constitutes a favourable precedent for our Committee's treatment of the question of chemical weapons. Indeed, for the first time our discussions are relatively well-ordered and this leads us to hope that we shall achieve modest but tangible results on the basis of which it will be possible to move forward. The informal paper submitted by the Netherlands on 10 July 1979 makes it possible to tackle a certain number of points systematically, in logical order, and the various answers given to its questions will provide the Committee with its first opportunity to realize where there are areas of agreement and where there are still differences to be overcome. We shall come back to this point at the end of our statement.

(Mr. Sinard, Canada)

We place great hopes in the report the United States and the Soviet Union are to submit on the status of their bilateral negotiations in the field of chemical weapons. If we understand correctly, it will represent a more substantial contribution than previous reports. The submission of their report should be of considerable assistance to us in sizing up the situation. That is a task to which we should like to make our modest contribution, reiterating now our delegation's position on the various general aspects of the main elements of a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons.

Allow me to remind you that on 29 March 1979 we informed the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that Canada had not only publicly stated that it would not be the first to use chemical weapons but also that, as long ago as October 1976, it had completely destroyed its stocks of mustard gas. On that occasion, too, we expressed the hope that those countries which had not yet announced their present policy with respect to chemical weapons would do so as well. We take the liberty of repeating that suggestion. We believe that such information would be helpful in enabling the Committee to assess the situation at a time when it hopes to embark on negotiations for a treaty on chemical weapons.

We believe that such a treaty should ban chemical weapons completely. We are opposed to a partial approach to the problem. As to the manner in which this comprehensive ban might be implemented, we suggested the following in our statement to this Committee on 29 March:

"As we understand it, it would seem that the best hope of early progress would be to go in the direction of an agreement based on the concept of 'excluded activities' rather than of 'excluded agents'. Although comprehensive in all respects, the treaty should provide for its own gradual implementation by successive stages, each subject to appropriate control. ... The first stage would be to ban production, the second stage would see to the destruction of production facilities and stockpiles. As I say, each stage would be linked with carefully designed and acceptable verification techniques."

Our position has always been that the production of agents for chemical weapons and chemical weapons systems, should be prohibited. We are also in favour of a ban on the production of all so-called "single-purpose" agents, including "single-purpose" precursors. Dual-purpose agents and dual-purpose precursors for chemical weapons should also be prohibited. As to the question whether herbicides and defoliants used as chemical weapons should be prohibited as well, we made the following statement in a speech at the United Nations on this question on 16 November 1971:

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"I believe it is quite clear, Mr. Chairman, that this statement applies to the use in war of all chemical and biological agents whether intended for use against persons, animals or plants".

We refer you to this statement, therefore, for more detailed information. We are also in favour of the destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons and of chemical weapons systems. At this stage it seems difficult to specify within what period of time this should be done. We are also in favour of the dismantling of existing chemical-weapons installations, for their moth-balling or conversion may leave a risk of reconversion to armaments purposes. The production of munitions, equipment and means of delivery should also be prohibited, as should planning, organization and training for offensive chemical warfare. The preparation of defensive measures should probably be permitted.

It is important to reaffirm that the use of chemical weapons is prohibited, for on this subject the 1925 Protocol suffers from reservations, and it has not yet been universally acceded to. Reaffirmation of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in a multilateral treaty would usefully enhance the effects of the Geneva Protocol. Finally, we are of course opposed to the transfer and acquisition of chemical weapons.

Although we are in favour of a comprehensive ban, it is probably necessary to give consideration to a certain number of exemptions from the ban on production, for medical and protection purposes, for example. The verification system should be so devised that production for industrial or peaceful purposes may continue. Certain branches of production which it may be necessary to verify could be subject to special verification methods to ensure that the treaty obligations are observed and that there is no diversion.

Like many, we agree that the main element for the definition of banned agents should be the general criterion of purpose or use. The toxicity criterion is pertinent but inadequate. It is for this reason that we have above all insisted on the prohibition of activities rather than of agents, although some agents must of course be banned. We are not therefore in favour of the compilation of an exhaustive list of chemical agents to be prohibited; in any case, it would be very difficult to establish such a list and keep it up to date.

In negotiating a treaty on chemical weapons, verification questions will be among the most difficult to settle. We agree with those who have suggested that, in the context of a treaty, a national system of control for parties to the treaty possessing a chemical industry would be useful for implementation of any necessary internal laws and regulations and to serve as a link with the international verification procedures for which provision will have to be made. We dealt at length with the

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problem of verification in our earlier speeches; I shall therefore confine myself here to the main point. We assume that systems of verification in stages will be approved, with different approaches for the monitoring of different activities. Verification by challenge may be useful, particularly to monitor initial statements, but it will have to be backed up by other systems. Provision will have to be made for both national technical means and on-the-spot inspections. It will obviously be necessary, in particular, to ensure that existing stockpiles of chemical weapons are destroyed, that existing production plants are dismantled or converted and that highly toxic single-purpose agents, such as nerve agents, including precursor agents, are not produced.

It is probably premature, when negotiations at the multilateral level are still in their early stages, to determine the kind of structure which will be needed for the successful accomplishment of international verification tasks. A structure similar to that of the International Atomic Energy Agency might, however, be suitable. That is a possible model for a chemical weapons control agency, but all the facets of the question will of course have to be studied in much greater detail when we know the exact scope of the treaty.

We also spoke in favour of the concept of regional agreements in the field of chemical weapons, and we gave the reason for this in our statement of 29 March 1979: "At the same time, we should not overlook that regional agreements might well prove to be useful supplements to the main convention. By taking into account regional differences and specific sectional concerns not easily catered for in a global treaty, these supplementary instruments could increase the prospect that the international community can be brought, in one way or another, to accepting the obligations of a ban on chemical weapons. Presumably any such regional agreement that might emerge would derive its impetus from within the region concerned and should include the major military Powers of the area. Other States would be asked to undertake to respect the regional arrangement. Finally, under the regional arrangement, as under the global treaty itself, it will be necessary to ensure that no military advantage could accrue to any State as a result of the agreement".

Such regional agreements, with strict verification measures, could of course only be implemented if the principal military Powers were able to agree on a global verification system.

(Mr. Simard, Canada)

Several delegations have in the past suggested the adoption of confidence-building measures in the field of chemical weapons. We regard this as an approach to be encouraged. We particularly support measures such as the declaration of stocks and production facilities, even before the entry into force of a treaty. We also support all arrangements for technical exchanges and visits, such as those recently organized by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. Such measures, and others which might be developed, may, by adding to knowledge of the problem and creating a climate of confidence, help to promote progress in the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

What conclusions can be drawn from the discussions that have taken place during these two weeks? We have heard very interesting suggestions, which have been added to those already contained in documents CD/5 and CD/6. On 24 July, for instance, the representative of Australia suggested the establishment of a drafting group which, if we understood right, would prepare a kind of "position paper" on the problem, following all our exchanges, for inclusion in our report to the General Assembly. For our part, we have a flexible attitude to the question of the form to be given to these conclusions, but we think that something must be done and that we must seize this opportunity to go ahead. Document CD/26, which we found very useful, points out that no attempt was made to try to identify possible trends towards a consensus on any of the various aspects of the question of chemical weapons. We believe that this is what ought to be done now, this is the task we must settle down to. It seems to us that the role of the Chairman might be to ask an expert, or the Secretariat, or even "friends of the Chairman", to draft these conclusions, which, incorporated in our report, would provide a basis for the resumption of our work in this field next year. These conclusions could trace, in a very general and preliminary manner, the framework of a treaty on chemical weapons. They would relate to the various elements of such a treaty, in logical sequence. The papers submitted by the Netherlands and Poland could provide the basis for this work. We believe that with such an approach it would be possible to distinguish the broad questions to be negotiated with a view to the preparation of a treaty on chemical weapons; this would certainly also be useful for the international community, which would thus be able to assess the work of our Committee in this field and identify the "data" of the problem. We hope, therefore, that concrete action will be taken on all these suggestions.

U SAW HLAING (Burma): Mr. Chairman, as this is my first time to take the floor during the month, I would like to associate myself with other delegations on this Committee in congratulating you on the assumption of the chair. The initiative and wisdom with which you have guided the proceedings of this Committee during the past weeks is an assurance of the continued success of our work. My delegation would also like to extend a warm welcome to the new heads of delegations who have joined us of late. I look forward to establishing friendly and close co-operation with them. I am very much heartened to observe that Ambassador Jaipal has joined us in his dual capacity as Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament. His wide and varied experience of disarmament work will be of great value to all of us. To Ambassador Jaipal my delegation extends our warmest welcome and best wishes for his success.

We consider the agenda item under discussion, "Prohibition of development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons, and their destruction", as one of the most important and complex issues this Committee has been entrusted with for negotiations. We have listened with attention in recent weeks to a number of interesting statements, exchanges of ideas and opinions from a good number of delegates at both plenary and informal meetings. These exchanges of views, opinions and ideas have been most constructive and useful, and my delegation feels that these positive trends will be continued in the future.

A Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction is scheduled to be held in 1980. Burma, as a steadfast and strong supporter of complete removal of weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of all countries, and as a signatory to this Bacteriological Convention, would like to see article IX of the Convention realized as soon as possible. To our mind, this Convention, being the first universally binding disarmament instrument, obligated all States parties to reach an early agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We are particularly pleased to observe that this Committee was able to initiate and sustain prolonged and constructive discussions on substantive aspects of this question. In so doing, my delegation believes, members of this Committee are responding, in a spirit of good will, to the request of the General Assembly in its resolution 33/59A, which, inter alia, called upon this Committee "as a matter of high priority, to undertake, at the beginning of its 1979 session, negotiations with a view to elaborating an agreement on effective

(U Saw Hlaing, Burma)

measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives". In this regard we have before us a few proposals, including the one submitted by the Group of 21 as Committee document CD/11.

The question of chemical weapons, unlike nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, deserves special attention in our deliberations and negotiations simply due to the fact that the science of chemistry, its attendant industries and technological know-how are within easy use of a great number of countries, irrespective of their size and degree of economic development. Moreover, unlike nuclear facilities, the existence of chemical production plants, stockpiling of chemicals and their means of delivery are fairly hard to be verified. Equally hard is it to differentiate the intended uses of chemicals between hostile and peaceful purposes. In the past years several countries have submitted working papers and draft conventions in which we could find a number of measures concerning issues and aspects on the scope of the convention, on chemical substances, on verification and inspection, etc. My delegation feels that pending progress in the bilateral negotiations the next feasible alternative open to this Committee is to endeavour to find common areas in which substantive negotiations could be initiated. We observe with appreciation that a draft statement on chemical weapons has been agreed in a preliminary way between the delegations of the USSR and the United States in Geneva and that it has been sent to the respective capitals for approval. We hope to hear the approved statement of the two negotiating Powers soon.

Mr. VOUTOV (Bulgaria): At this meeting our delegation would like to address itself to one of the important questions of the second part of the annual session of the Committee, radiological weapons, and namely to working papers CD/31 and CD/32 introduced by the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States and containing a proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

The distinguished members of the Committee are well aware of the attachment of mine and of many other delegations to the idea of a comprehensive prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. We are in favour of a comprehensive approach to this problem, an approach which, combined with political will and concern for the future of humanity, could block the way to the ever deadlier new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

At the same time, however, displaying a constructive spirit and a sincere aspiration to achieve any meaningful step whatever in the field of disarmament, we supported the idea of a certain group of delegations in this Committee to concentrate especially on the problem of radiological weapons. I hope that a number of delegations in this hall may recall that the Bulgarian delegation has shown purposeful participation in the numerous discussions on the problem of new weapons of mass destruction and particularly on radiological weapons, both with and without participation of relevant experts.

Welcoming the joint USSR-United States proposal on radiological weapons, and looking forward to a similar productive outcome in other well-known areas, we are taking into account the fact that, unfortunately, we have come too near to the end of our annual session, and there seem to be objective difficulties in arranging a full-fledged discussion in the Committee resulting in a negotiated draft treaty for presentation to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

At the same time, we note with satisfaction the extent of the preliminary discussion of the proposed draft which took place at the informal meetings. We see the usefulness of these sessions in the fact that it is only natural that the first comments, questions and clarification should take place in this body, composed of highly-qualified professionals, who no doubt provide first-hand assessments and advice to their Governments. All the points touched upon during this off-the-record debate are a contribution to the clarification of different aspects of the problem, thus bringing us closer to finalization of the future treaty, which hopefully will be welcomed and adhered to by the widest possible majority of the world community. In this connexion I would like to mention not only the introductory statements and an expert's view presented by the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States, but also the comments and the pertinent questions asked on behalf of a number of delegations. Not only did they not provoke bursts of laughter, as a highly respected Ambassador and a distinguished friend of mine feared they might, but on the contrary our delegation regards them as a contribution to the businesslike and creative atmosphere that happily prevails in this body.

Since my delegation has received instructions on its participation in the outlawing of radiological weapons, I would like to make some comments on the meaning, the character and the substance of the future treaty the foundations of which, and I believe this is generally agreed, are readily available to us in the proposed major elements elaborated diligently by the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States.

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

Firstly, the treaty on the banning of radiological weapons is to be the first international legal instrument outlawing a type of weapons which, though still non-existing, is clearly seen on the horizon, as vividly outlined by the Soviet expert Colonel Surikov at the last informal meeting. May I underline at this point that I fully share the view of the distinguished representative of Australia, that this is yet another reason for us to hurry up and exclude the dangerous prospect of having some 50 States in the world armed with weapons that are not so distantly related to the nuclear weapons.

Secondly, my delegation readily agrees that against the background of the existing nuclear arsenals the ban on radiological weapons could not be considered as an outstanding achievement, but the treaty certainly has merits of its own when seen against the rapidly expanding peaceful nuclear activities of mankind. Having in mind this, as well as the new possibilities for rapidly increasing the efficiency of weapons based on radioactive materials, we believe that an international treaty to block this avenue in the arms race has its rightful place and significance in the work of this Committee.

Undoubtedly, assessing the true value of a ban on radiological weapons, we should not fail to take into consideration the growing problems of storing and disposing of spent fuels from peaceful nuclear activities, now that the enrichment and fuel-cycle questions have turned out to be more complicated than previously believed. By no means should we permit that the radioactive materials, or radioactive waste for that matter, be turned into a new type of weapons of mass destruction.

Thirdly, the major elements of the future treaty reflected in documents CD/31 and CD/32 are acceptable to the Bulgarian delegation. In our opinion there are all the necessary prerequisites for achieving an effective ban on this new type of weapons of mass destruction. The future treaty should be properly integrated in the framework of the existing international legal arrangements in this field -- I have in mind the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, without prejudice to the obligations or rights of States under those two instruments.

Fourthly, we share the view expressed during our preliminary discussions by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the influence of the future treaty on peaceful nuclear activities of the signatory States. As a country with a considerable peaceful nuclear programme, both in energy production and in other fields of our economy, we note with satisfaction the relevant texts, as well as the assurances of the authors of the joint proposal that nothing in the future treaty shall impede the multi-faceted peaceful use of radiation.

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

In conclusion, I would like to assure you that my delegation is going to take an active part in the final stage of the negotiations which we look forward to seeing take place in the very near future, so that we could solve the problem of outlawing this kind of weapons of mass destruction and block their way into the world's arsenals.

The CHAIRMAN: As my list of speakers for today is exhausted, I would now like to inform the Committee of the following:

Documents CD/41 submitted by the Netherlands and entitled "Working paper containing questions relevant to a Convention prohibiting chemical weapons", and CD/42, submitted by the German Democratic Republic and entitled "Working paper on draft paragraph XI, subparagraph 3, and paragraph XII, subparagraph 3, of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Development, Manufacture, Stockpiling and Use of Radiological Weapons" are being circulated today.

I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting and to convene an informal meeting to consider questions relating to our organization of work. If, as a result of the informal meeting, the Committee wishes to take a decision concerning the organization of its work, I will then resume the plenary meeting in order to formalize that decision.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Tuesday, 31 July 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting was adjourned at 11.50 a.m.
and reconvened at 12.35 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: We have agreed unanimously to take a decision that the Committee continue its work, as adopted in the programme of work on 19 June, according to which we shall consider and discuss the matters on the agenda until 3 August. Next week, therefore, we shall devote our attention to the nuclear-test ban, in connexion with the report of the seismological group.

It was also decided that from 6 to 10 August the Committee would consider its annual report. Therefore this year's session will end on 10 August. However, if the Committee considers it needs more time to adopt the report, that closing date will be extended.

Is there any objection? I see none.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.