

CD/PV.44
24 July 1979
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FORTY-FOURTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on
Tuesday, 24 July 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. P. VOUTOV

(Bulgaria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENSMAIL

Argentina: Mr. A. DUMONT
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Sir James PLIMSOLL
Mr. A. BEHM
Ms. M. WICKES

Belgium: Mr. P. BERG
Mr. G. VAN DUYSE

Brazil: Mr. S. DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. P. KAMENOV

Burma: U NGEW WIN

Canada: Mr. R. HARRY JAY
Mr. J.T. SIMARD

Cuba: Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. V. TYLNER
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt: Mr. M. EL-BARADEI
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. G. ALULA

France: Mr. BENOIT D'ABOVILLE
Mr. M. COUTHURES
Mr. C.A. GRIFFITH
Mr. GESBERT

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. W. KOETTER
Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. J. POHLMANN

Hungary: Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN
Mr. S.T. DEVARE

Indonesia: Mr. D.B. SULEMAN
Mr. SILABAN

Iran: Mr. D. AMERI

Italy: Mr. M. MORENO
Mr. C. FRATESCHI
Mr. L. SALAZAR
Mr. FOLCO DE LUCA

Japan: Mr. M. OGISO
Mr. T. NONOYAMA
Mr. T. IWANAMI
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. A. JET ODENDO

Mexico: Mr. M.A. CACERES

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FELN
Mr. A.J. MEERBURG
Mr. J.W. SCHEFFERS

<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. T.O. OLUMOKO
<u>Pakistan:</u>	Mr. T. K. A. MAPKER Mr. M. AKRAM
<u>Peru:</u>	
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. B. SUJKA Mr. M. KRUCZYK
<u>Romania:</u>	Mr. T. MELESCANU
<u>Sri Lanka:</u>	Mr. I.B. FONSEKA
<u>Sweden:</u>	Mrs. I. THORSSON Mr. C. LIDGARD Mr. L. NORBERG Mr. S. STROMBACK Mr. J. LUNDIN
<u>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:</u>	Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN Mr. Y.K. NAZAIKIN Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHIN Mr. N.V. PESTEREV Mr. V.P. SMIDOVICH Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV Mr. S.B. BATSANOV
<u>United Kingdom:</u>	Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS
<u>United States of America:</u>	Mr. A.S. FISHER Mr. A. AKALOVSKY Mr. D. KOELEMAY Mr. R. MIKULAK Mr. M. SANCHEZ Mr. J. CALVERT Mr. W. DUNLOP Mr. M. DALEY Ms. S. BUCKLEY

Venezuela:

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Mr. D. DJOKIC

Zaire:

Mr. MULONGANDUSU ESUK

Secretary:

Mr. RIKHI JAIPAL

Assistant Secretary-General:

Mr. R. BJORNERSTEDT

NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES

Denmark:^{1/}

Mr. E. KASTOFT

Mr. V. EDEBJERG

Mr. J. LEERHOY

Finland:^{2/}

Mr. J. ENQUIST

Mr. I. MANNINEN

^{1/} By decision of the Committee on Disarmament of 17 July 1979 (See CD/PV.42, page 17).

^{2/} By decision of the Committee on Disarmament of 25 April 1979 (See CD/PV.30, page 26).

Mr. KASTOFF (Denmark): Allow me to begin this, my first intervention in the Committee on Disarmament, by expressing my gratitude to you and all the members of the Committee on Disarmament who have allowed the Danish Delegation to participate in the current discussion in this Committee on the very important subject of chemical weapons. I also wish to add my voice to those of other delegations having welcomed the important joint initiative of the USSR and the United States concerning major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. That initiative augurs well for the future work on this subject-matter.

Turning to the agenda item under discussion today, I should like to state that the Danish Government agrees with the views expressed in this Committee with regard to the urgency of reaching agreement on complete and effective prohibition of development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction.

In 1980 a conference will meet to review the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Article IX of that convention constitutes an obligation for all States parties to reach an early agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In order to strengthen international confidence and security and create a favourable atmosphere for this conference, it is essential that progress in efforts towards implementation of this article be made before the opening of the conference. Consideration of issues relating to a chemical weapons convention by the CD would contribute to the early conclusion of such a convention.

This is an issue of direct interest to a very great number of countries. While recognizing the great importance of bilateral negotiations, my delegation believes that it should be possible at this stage to identify certain aspects on which discussion in the CD might usefully focus without unduly complicating the bilateral negotiations on chemical disarmament which are taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union. My delegation listened attentively to the recent interventions by Ambassadors Fisher and Issraelyan on the state of the bilateral talks -- and noted with satisfaction that a joint progress report on these negotiations may soon be made available to the CD.

In view of the value of joint, informal discussion between diplomats, scientists and military experts as previously demonstrated, most recently by the CW-visits to the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, my delegation feels that the

(Mr. Kastoft, Denmark)

continuation of such meetings should be encouraged, since they may not only add to a clarification and broader understanding of the many complex problems involved in establishing a CW-convention, but also point to practical approaches to the solution of these problems.

Realizing that chemical warfare agents not covered in a convention might prove attractive for inclusion in a so-to-speak "permissible" chemical armamentarium, Denmark believes that a ban on CW should be as comprehensive and as well-defined as possible, and should therefore also include the military use of herbicides and defoliants, in the case of the latter not only because of their immediate effect on the battlefield, but also because of a possibly prolonged and presently unknown distant ecological effect on man, animals and soil.

It is generally accepted that implementation of measures of disarmament should be subject to adequate international control. This, of course, should also apply to a chemical weapons convention. Denmark is fully aware of the extremely complicated nature of the issues raised by verification of a CW-convention, and feels that consideration should be given to the development of verification procedures as little intrusive as possible. This could include monitoring of air and waste water samples collected even at great distance from manufacturing sites. Valuable contributions in this respect have already been made by the Netherlands (CCD/533) and Finland (CD/14 and 39). In addition, the possibility of making use of modern technology, including observation satellites, should be explored.

For the time being it would appear, however, that on-site inspections constitute the only fully effective means of verification. Until non-intrusive techniques have been sufficiently developed and an international consensus has subsequently been achieved on their application, visits performed by a highly qualified international agency seem to be indispensable. It would appear that such visits, properly arranged, could be carried out without unjustifiable intrusion and without the disclosure of State or commercial secrets. My delegation therefore feels that the establishment of an adequately controlled CW ban need not await the development of more sophisticated extraterritorial verification procedures.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): To begin my statement today, I should like to make a few general comments on agenda item 4.

Attaching exceptionally great importance to the problem of the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, we have always emphasized the need for a comprehensive

(Mr. Erdembilэг, Mongolia)

approach as a basis for its solution, for we take the view that the attainment of an agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all forms of chemical weapons and their complete destruction, together with the practical implementation of such an agreement under appropriate methods of control, would be real steps towards genuine disarmament.

The discussion on this question during these two weeks in the Committee has again shown the unflagging interest of the participants in a more detailed consideration of this agenda item. A number of new working papers have been submitted. I have in mind not only those documents which have already received a symbol, but also the unofficial working papers circulated by the delegations of Poland and the Netherlands. Experts from a number of delegations have also expressed their views. The representatives of States not members of the Committee have also been given the opportunity of speaking in the Committee and expressing their views on this subject. Thus, the Committee already has additional material and ideas for in-depth study and subsequent concrete consideration of the relevant documents.

The Mongolian delegation is studying with interest the unofficial working paper recently submitted by the Polish delegation. We basically share the opinion of our Polish colleagues concerning the structure of the future convention, and we are willing to participate in the detailed discussion of this document and to express our views.

The unofficial working paper dated 19 July 1979 submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands also deserves careful study. It contains a number of questions and answers which, of course, cannot satisfy all of us. There is nothing surprising in that.

The participants in the present discussion had, and probably will have, different approaches to the whole complex bundle of issues associated with the prohibition of chemical weapons. In our opinion, the chief considerations are to consolidate the overlapping positions which are now taking shape and to seek a solution by reconciling views on particular aspects of the problem.

The results of the present discussion may, we think, show how far our Committee is ready, at this stage of its work, to proceed to the settlement of the organizational aspect of the question with a view to beginning negotiations on the substance.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

As it seems to us, there is in the Committee, in the first place, a broad degree of agreement regarding determination of the scope of the prohibition, based on the criterion of a common objective. This key point is also dealt with in the draft convention submitted by the socialist countries in 1972. In the second place, the prevailing opinion is that only a comprehensive approach can lead to the elaboration of a stable international instrument, although there is also some support for the idea of reaching agreement on partial measures in this field, i.e. on the prohibition, as a first step, of the most dangerous and lethal chemical means of warfare. In the third place, we are united in the view that the future agreement must not only answer the purpose of the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons; it must also be verifiable -- in other words, it must provide for appropriate methods of checking the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons.

On this complicated issue of control, we, as before, take the view that it is perfectly possible to secure effective control on the basis of national means of verification, in combination with a few admissible international measures. But the latter must not be used to the detriment of the national interests of States.

I should like to emphasize that our progress would have a positive effect on strengthening the universality of such important international instruments as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and also the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

In this connexion our delegation notes with satisfaction the useful work recently done by the Preparatory Committee for the Conference of the Parties to the Convention which is due to review the operation of that Convention in 1980.

The Mongolian delegation has attached, and still attaches, great importance to the continuing negotiations between the USSR and the United States of America on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The submission of their joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament will undoubtedly be of real help to it in its task of achieving a generally acceptable agreement in this important field of disarmament.

Allow me to say a few words on agenda item 5. In its Final Document, as you know, the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, concerned with disarmament, stressed that, in order to halt the arms race, both qualitative and

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quantitative disarmament measures are important, and that efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare.

In this connexion the Mongolian delegation would again like to point out the urgent need to reach an international agreement on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. We still think that the Committee on Disarmament can make an important contribution in this respect and that the draft convention contained in document CCD/559, submitted to the Committee by the socialist countries on 9 March 1978, can serve as a sound basis for negotiations on this matter.

In our opinion, it is exceptionally important that in this matter a spirit of realism and political will should be displayed by those who are not prepared to share the deep-seated popular concern aroused by the intention of certain circles in the West to proceed with the production of the "basic components" of this lethal weapon and to place it in the arsenals of the western European States.

The Mongolian delegation has repeatedly expressed its position on this matter. That position remains unchanged.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to return once again to the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the special session. Paragraph 77 of that document stresses that in order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

The special session also recommended that efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, and referred to the possibility of concluding specific agreements on the prohibition of particular types of weapons of mass destruction which may be identified.

In this connexion the Mongolian delegation notes with satisfaction the importance of the joint USSR-United States proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, submitted to the Committee on Disarmament on 10 July 1979 (document CD/31-32). In our opinion, this constructive step should be regarded as a timely response to the appeal contained in paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the special session and a valid substantiation of the hope expressed by the General Assembly in its resolution A/RES/33/66.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

It is perfectly natural that this USSR-United States initiative should have received the general support of the members of the Committee. At this juncture it is important that the Committee should proceed without delay to a concrete discussion of it.

We propose that the document should be given detailed consideration with a view to its elaboration in final form at the present session of the Committee, so that the results of the work done can be submitted for the consideration of the United Nations General Assembly at its forthcoming thirty-fourth session.

In conclusion, I should like to touch briefly upon the question of strengthening the security guarantees of non-nuclear States.

At its thirty-third session, the General Assembly adopted a decision on the need to take effective measures to strengthen the security of States which do not possess nuclear weapons, through the conclusion of appropriate international agreements.

In accordance with resolution A/RES/33/72, the Committee on Disarmament has had a useful discussion on this matter. The decision has been taken to establish an ad hoc working group to agree upon the text of an appropriate draft convention. Two drafts are on the negotiating table: the first is that presented by the group of socialist countries (document CD/23) on the basis of the USSR proposal introduced at the thirty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, and the second is that submitted by the delegation of Pakistan (document CD/25).

We feel obliged to show some restraint and to state merely that our Committee could have achieved more in this matter if it had not spent a great deal of **time** at its spring session on the discussion of procedural issues. It should also be noted that the unwillingness of some members of the Committee to go into the substance of the question is in fact creating certain difficulties in the Committee. The same can be said with regard to the Committee's consideration of document CD/4.

Without repeating our confirmation of the Mongolian delegation's position on the urgent matters under discussion in the Committee, as enumerated in my statement, we should again like to assure members of the Committee that we are willing to consider these matters in a businesslike and constructive manner at the present session of the Committee with a view to jointly working out appropriate international agreements designed to achieve practical measures in the field of disarmament.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Since last week, the Committee on Disarmament has been considering one of the most burning problems of disarmament -- the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons. We have already heard a number of interesting statements on this question at our plenary and informal meetings, and the present useful exchange of opinions and ideas will undoubtedly be continued. In addition, members of the Committee have taken an active part in the informal contacts and meetings arranged by the Chairman, where careful and thorough consideration was given to various suggestions concerning the organization of the Committee's further work and the prospects for the discussion of the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Analysis of the proposals and viewpoints stated in the course of recent meetings and contacts as well as during the spring part of the session leads quite definitely to the conclusion that there has emerged in the Committee on Disarmament a general mood in favour of more concrete, businesslike and purposeful work on the question of chemical weapons.

The Soviet delegation welcomes the more active examination by the Committee of this question for a whole number of considerations, first of all, because the Soviet Union was and remains a most resolute and consistent advocate of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

As far back as the 1920s, the Soviet Union for the first time came out in favour of a complete prohibition of chemical weapons, including the elimination of their stocks, under effective control. We may mention as an example the Soviet proposal, made in 1929 in the Preparatory Commission for the Conference on Disarmament, on the elaboration of a corresponding protocol. The draft protocol provided for the destruction -- within a three-month period -- of all means of chemical attack (gases, devices for the use of gases, etc.) and bacteriological war, whether in the possession of the armed forces, held in reserve or in process of being produced. Immediately upon the entry of the protocol into force, enterprises manufacturing such products were to have been closed down. At the same time, on the initiative of the USSR, a broad international campaign was started for expanding the number of parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

After World War Two, the Soviet Union, jointly with other socialist countries, conducted an active campaign for the prohibition of all types of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The well-known proposal by the socialist countries submitted to the United Nations General Assembly in 1966, on the initiative of Hungary, played an important part in drawing the attention of the world community to the task of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the strengthening of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

An active role was played by Poland and other socialist countries in the adoption by the General Assembly in 1968 of the decision on the carrying out of a study on the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

At that stage the USSR and the other socialist countries advocated a simultaneous prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

In 1969 they worked out and submitted to the General Assembly a draft international convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their destruction. Unfortunately, this approach did not meet at the time with due support. As a result it was only possible to prohibit bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons. The socialist States played an important part in solving this question also by submitting an appropriate draft convention to the Committee on Disarmament on 30 March 1971.

The almost five-year period during which the bacteriological convention, as it is often called for short, has been in force has fully confirmed the great significance of this document, the first real disarmament measure in history to provide for the removal from the arsenals of States of an entire category of extremely dangerous weapons of mass destruction.

Article IX of the Convention, as you know, affirms the objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and expresses the obligation of the States parties to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement.

Eager to begin bringing the provisions of this article as quickly as possible into effect, the socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, prepared and submitted to the Committee on Disarmament a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons (CCD/360). This action was taken on 28 March 1972.

At that time the Soviet Union appealed more than once for the starting of serious multilateral negotiations on chemical weapons.

In 1972, at the twenty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, the USSR representative affirmed that the task now was to obtain a solution of the problem in its entirety, that is, to prohibit the development, production and storage

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of any type of chemical weapons. The Soviet side believed, he continued, that the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons was an important and mature measure, and that efforts must be made to achieve an agreement on such prohibition.

While consistently advocating a complete prohibition of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union expressed at the same time its readiness to accept a stage-by-stage solution of the problem.

At the 1974 Soviet-United States summit meeting in Moscow, the two States agreed to consider the question of a joint initiative in the Committee on Disarmament regarding the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention on the most dangerous, lethal chemical means of warfare.

The Soviet Union is making every effort to ensure the successful progress of the negotiations pursuant to this agreement, which began in 1976 and are now concentrated on the goal of the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

At the Vienna meeting between the USSR and United States leaders in June 1979, the two sides reaffirmed the importance of a general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons, and agreed to intensify their efforts to prepare an agreed joint proposal for submission to the Committee on Disarmament.

Quite naturally, therefore, the Soviet Union fully shares the opinion of the vast majority of States on the urgent need for the speedy prohibition of chemical weapons, and their concern about the absence of an appropriate international agreement. In our view, in a situation characterized by the continued accumulation and improvement of chemical weapons, and by the emergence of new types and varieties of them, not only are efforts to prohibit these weapons of mass destruction seriously impeded, but additional dangers are created for the process of détente and the strengthening of universal peace. Finally, we still believe that, in view of the broad development of the chemical industry in many States of the world and the natural concern of those States to safeguard their security interests and economic development, the convention will be effective if as many States as possible, and, of course, all the militarily important Powers, are parties to it. And this, in turn, implies the active consideration of this question at the multilateral level, i.e. in our Committee on Disarmament.

That is one side of the matter. Another is that, since 1976, two States members of the Committee on Disarmament have, as was mentioned above, been conducting bilateral negotiations on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. As members of the Committee are, of course, aware, some progress -- and, on a number of points, considerable progress -- has been made in these negotiations. On some other

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

points, however -- and they are of considerable importance -- difficulties are being encountered. This is largely due to differences of principle regarding particular questions. Another point to be remembered is that a great number of technical problems are encountered in the negotiations, and they have to be studied in detail and from all sides. In short, there is a vast amount of disagreeable, but absolutely essential, spade-work to be done.

In his statement in the Committee on 19 July, Ambassador Fisher, the representative of the United States, said that the USSR and the United States were preparing a joint statement on the progress of these negotiations. That work is now coming to an end. Preliminary agreement has been reached between the delegations of our countries in Geneva on a draft statement, which has been sent to our respective capitals for approval. At this stage I would merely like to stress that we attach particular importance to the bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations, on the success of which progress in the elaboration of an international convention largely depends.

The problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons, as the extensive experience of its discussion in different forums proves, is a very complicated one. For we mean to remove from the arsenals of States an entire category of weapons, and weapons of mass destruction at that. Furthermore, this problem is connected -- more closely than any other of the problems which have been closely considered at disarmament negotiations in recent years -- with the activities of what is in many countries one of the key branches of industry, the chemical industry. It is perfectly clear, therefore, that such a step as the prohibition of chemical weapons must be approached with the utmost care and deliberation, both from the viewpoint of the national security of States and from that of their economic and technical development.

The Soviet Union believes that the difficulties which are in the way of solving this important problem must be overcome. In our approach to this problem, we are guided by the decisions of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which described the prohibition of chemical weapons as a mature and most urgent requirement. For this reason, the Soviet delegation will spare no effort to ensure that the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons becomes a reality as soon as possible.

Mr. TYLNER (Czechoslovakia): My delegation shares the view that the negotiations on the prohibition of development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons have reached a stage where our Committee on Disarmament might start discussing the outlines of a treaty. The outcome of such discussions might also positively contribute to bilateral negotiations.

My delegation is aware of the fact that this will be a treaty which will concern weapons used on a relatively broad scale in the past and retained at present in not unimportant quantities. The implementation of it will require complicated technical arrangements and will necessitate a rather long period of time for the destruction of the existing stockpiles. In this respect, the treaty might, to a certain extent, serve as a model for further steps in the field of disarmament with respect to weapons of mass destruction and, at the same time, be an important contribution to general disarmament.

Czechoslovakia is one of the socialist countries which, in 1972, tabled in paper CCD 361 the draft of a treaty prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. My country spares no effort in order to lead the negotiations on the treaty to the expected conclusions. The discussions which have been going on for many years in the CCD and which are going on this year in our Committee on Disarmament -- very often with the participation of outstanding specialists -- have accumulated a sufficient amount of data permitting work to start on the outlines and basic elements of the treaty. In this respect we consider as particularly important the informal working paper of the Polish delegation of 19 July, which we fully support. The Netherland's working paper is also useful in this respect.

Permit me now to make a few brief comments on some of the major points of the envisaged treaty.

The subject of the treaty will be the prohibition of development, production, acquiring and stockpiling of CWA. We think that the treaty should stress the permanent validity of the Geneva Convention of 1925 prohibiting the use of chemical warfare agents. When formulating the treaty, we should bear in mind, as a basic goal, the complete abolishing of CW. This calls for a comprehensive ban, comprising lethal, incapacitating and harassing chemical warfare agents and important precursors -- elements of binary CWA.

It is quite clear that the treaty is not to hamper in any way economic, scientific and technical progress. This is why the main criterion should be the criterion of purposes. The criterion of toxicity can be an additional one for the quantification of the limit beyond which the toxic substance is subject to prohibition. There is, we believe, a general consensus to allow the production of limited quantities of the prohibited substances for peaceful purposes, including minimal amounts of such substances for testing and research on means of chemical protection.

(Mr. Tylner, Czechoslovakia)

On the other hand, the treaty should contain provisions prohibiting any party thereto from transferring chemical weapons or information facilitating the production of such substances.

The treaty should equally bear on the obligation of the parties to destroy, dismantle or adapt for peaceful purposes existing production facilities of CWA. In accordance with the Polish working paper, we share the view that the treaty should provide for the obligation to announce a time-table for the destruction of such production facilities and of time-limits for supplying information on its carrying out.

Another major element of the treaty is the destruction of existing CWA stockpiles. We consider it therefore useful to provide for the obligation to declare -- after the treaty has been signed -- the stocked CWA, the time-table for their destruction and the time-limits for supplying information thereon.

The elimination of production facilities and the destruction of stocked CWA should be carried out under the supervision of national control organs.

The verification of the observance of the treaty is another problem. The States participating in the treaty will evidently have the obligation to take internal measures ensuring the observance of the treaty.

National organs of control should concentrate on: verification of the destruction of stocks, verification of the observance of the prohibition of production, and verification of complaints concerning violation of the treaty.

International procedures should be applied mainly in case of complaints of violations of the treaty.

The treaty should equally provide for the establishment of an International consultative body of experts, which would collect data for the carrying out of national controls and organize an exchange of experience. It might be recommended -- as is the case with other treaties -- to assess its implementation at regular intervals. Especially in the first period following the conclusion of the treaty, when a number of technical problems are expected to arise in connexion with the destruction of CWA stocks and with the elimination of production facilities, review conferences should promote a useful exchange of experience.

Permit me to stress once more my delegation's view that the Committee on Disarmament should start discussing the outlines of the treaty. The Czechoslovak delegation is ready to contribute, by participation of its experts, to the attainment of this goal.

A general acceptance of the treaty by all Governments is a prerequisite of its full effectiveness as an international instrument of disarmament. The experience with the Geneva Protocol and other treaties teaches us that this is a process requiring much effort. We feel therefore that in the case of the CW treaty special emphasis must be put on this question.

Sir James PLIMSOLL (Australia): I have been very pleased, as I know the other representatives around this table have been, at the way in which discussion has developed in the Committee and in our informal discussions, exposing some of the real issues that are involved in the control of chemical weapons. Many people felt when we met in June that we might not get much beyond a few generalities. But we have got considerably further. There have been a number of important statements and important papers submitted: the Netherlands put in a working paper, Poland put in a working paper, and we have heard substantive statements by both these representatives in explanation not simply of the paper but of the positions that their Governments take on the substance of some of those papers. We have also had valuable and rather detailed statements by the representatives of the USSR and the United States in this Committee and, in a more detailed way, again in the informal meeting of the Committee. We are awaiting now with great expectancy the joint reports of the United States and the USSR, and whatever I say is going to be subject of course to what they may come forward with.

Mr. Issraelyan said this morning that his Government attaches great importance to working with the United States on this. I think most of us around this table -- all of us around this table -- would share that. Their co-operation and their working together is vital for the security of the world. I welcome also the way things have emerged in the last few weeks here, where these two powerful nations, members of this Committee, are making the other members of the Committee partners in the development of this subject. It is a great basis for hope in the world, the fact that the rest of us are being involved and made partners. Now, those two countries have special obligations as permanent members of the Security Council, and because of their own strength and because of their own special detailed knowledge of issues involved in matters of security and of the weapons and other factors that go into the maintenance of security. So we look to them for a lead. We look to them to give us sometimes some guidance on the issues involved. I gather from what they have said that we are going to get a substantive report on some of the questions that have arisen. That is going to be a good basis for the future.

(Sir James Plimsoll, Australia)

But let me this morning address myself to the question of where this Committee should go during the current session and what our approach should be. I think it is premature to talk about disagreements. There are really so far no disagreements. There is a lack of agreement on some things. But that is not a semantic point. The failure to reach agreement, or the inability at this stage to reach agreement, does not mean that there is disagreement. Mr. Issraelyan said in his very interesting statement this morning that some of the differences between the Soviet Union and the United States at the moment are related to questions of principle and some of them are related to the sheer technical difficulty of some of these issues. I think that is where we all stand today -- that where there is no agreement, it is not a disagreement, it is the fact that we have not yet, with the best will in the world, and in great honesty, been able to work out how to give effect to the great technical problems that arise. Indeed we have not yet been able to work out sometimes what those technical problems are, or even in some cases what we should be attempting to solve. This is where the papers of Poland and the Netherlands are so valuable -- because they do help to direct our minds to the questions that have to be solved. They help us to ask the right questions by indicating to us what the things are that we need answers to.

There are special problems in chemical warfare, much greater problems than those of nuclear disarmament and nuclear arms control, though the threat to humanity is greater from nuclear weapons. The problems of chemical weapons are in many ways much more complicated when it comes to reaching international agreement if only because it is easier to detect nuclear weapons and nuclear industry. In the first place, any country with a chemical industry has some capacity either to make chemical weapons or to contribute to their manufacture. That includes every country in the world, almost, that has got some chemical capacity or some capacity to co-operate in making chemical weapons. The second great difficulty is that a lot of chemicals, chemical equipment, and chemical appliances can be used for military purposes as well as for civil purposes, peaceful purposes. A lot of chemicals, for example, are only lethal when they are combined with one another. A lot of uses are peaceful uses, sometimes of things that can be used in military applications.

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One must be impressed by the great overlap in some of the proposals that have been made in this Committee by Poland, by the Netherlands, and by others. The representative of Mongolia in his speech this morning referred to this, and so did some others. There is an overlap and, at the same time, an inability to reach agreement, at this stage, on what to do about it. The Polish paper says that in the treaty there must be provision for the possibility of retention, production, acquisition and use of banned chemical weapon agents for legitimate technological, prophylactic, or other peaceful purposes, including chemical weapons defence purposes. I agree with that. But the earlier part of the treaty of course refers to the destruction of stockpiles and control on production. Now, how do you achieve that? How do you reconcile that? That is one of the great problems which this Committee will have to tackle and which no doubt the United States and the Soviet Union have already given a lot of attention to -- certainly given a lot of attention to in their own national consideration. Mr. Issraelyan said this morning this is a question both of the national security of States and their economic and technical development. These have to be reconciled, and it is not going to be easy to do it -- it is going to take a lot of work.

This of course brings us to the whole question of verification. Problems of verification arise in acute forms because so much of chemical capacity and of chemicals themselves can be used for different purposes. There are going to be limitations on the value of inspection. To inspect all chemical productive capacity would involve a whole army of people -- an enormous number of people. The problems of preserving industrial secrets, commercial secrets as well as security secrets, are very considerable. One has to ask oneself how detailed an inspection is going to be justifiable either in results or in cost, because it is not just production that will have to be looked at, it is also the ultimate use. Chemicals can be stored perhaps for years and then be available for use in chemical weapons. Now, I am not stating these things as objections, I am stating them as things that have to be worked out and that are going to take quite a while to work out -- years perhaps.

So it leads me to put forward the view that what we should be doing at this session is of a tentative nature. I do not think that we should try to reach final conclusions on anything, even on what should be included in the treaty.

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I say it should be tentative for two reasons. First of all, we need to allow time for more consideration by the General Assembly and by the members of this Committee, in the light of what we are doing at this session of the Committee on Disarmament. A lot of us would be in a position to agree now on some elements in the paper if it is then subject to further consideration by our Governments, which could take into assessment the views of our own technical experts and of others who are responsible for decisions on matters of security and economic and technological development.

Secondly, over a period of time whatever decisions we make now should be sufficiently tentative to allow us to adjust them in the light of further discussions. There are some things that we might be able to agree on provided we know what some of the other provisions of the treaty are but which we cannot agree on without knowing the total situation that the treaty will result in. Let me give two examples. One is on the definition or the scope of the treaty. The representative of the Netherlands in explaining his paper said that he believed that in the scope of the treaty herbicides and tear gas should be included. Both those have applications that are not military. Australia does not use and does not intend to use, does not plan to use, tear gas or other chemicals for the control of crowds. But there are a number of countries around this table who have such things and regard them as a more humane way of controlling crowds than some of the other things that would be available. Then, herbicides. They have peaceful uses, and it may very well be that it is the purpose of the herbicide rather than its prohibition or its actual composition that is going to determine whether it can be included or not. In other words, in the very early part of the treaty, when one is defining technical weapons, when one is deciding the scope of the treaty, one may find that agreement on that is going to be subject to what is set out later in the treaty on how those particular things are to be covered, how they are to be controlled. Now I am again on that, not arguing substance. I am not saying that herbicides and crowd-control chemicals should be included or should not be included. I am giving it as an example of the way in which the scope of the treaty may be affected by the way in which it is provided in the treaty that particular things should be covered. Similarly on verification. It may be that some countries can accept the verification of certain things if the

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verification is done in a particular way, but not if it is going to be done in a different way. We have to allow, too, for the possibility of some technical developments on the means of detection. We know that in nuclear weapons there has been quite a development in recent years on means of detecting underground explosions, for example, and there has been other technical progress. It may be that, for certain things at any rate, it will be possible to apply scientific research to means of detecting certain things in regard to chemical weapons.

For those reasons we have to proceed on a rather tentative basis on whatever we do now. But at the same time I think we do need to come out of this session with a piece of paper that can be reported to the General Assembly. When I say a piece of paper I do not mean something that is very brief and just a list of headings, I think we have to go beyond that. We need something definite but provisional. I think that we ought to have a drafting committee which would combine the various papers that have been submitted, formally or informally -- the Netherlands and Polish papers, the joint United States-Soviet Union paper when that is put in, any others. We need to take account of the two substantive statements on detail that have been made by the Soviet Union and the United States. We should have a drafting group that would combine them, include all the elements that their sponsors want to have included, set them out under appropriate headings, and include the issues that have to be decided on which there is not yet agreement (and that will include most of it, I think). One of the attractions of the Netherlands paper was that it was raising questions, that it was indicating areas where there is not yet agreement. A drafting group could do that -- not a working group, because a working group, in the way that this Committee has used the term, is trying to get substantive agreement. I think we have gone about as far as we are going to get in this session on substantive agreement. I won't say we have gone as far as we are going to go on substantive discussion -- that will depend very much on what the United States and Soviet Union produce -- but we have got about as far as we are likely to get on substantive agreement. What we really need now is somebody who will put together and collate the papers that have been put in. It will be a statement of issues, including those yet to be decided.

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This would be of great benefit to the General Assembly but would also be of great benefit to our own Governments, because they too, each of our Governments, needs some lead from this Committee on what each of the Governments should be thinking about before the next session of the Committee on Disarmament. It would be a mistake to think that the members of this Committee are not doing any work when they are not sitting in Geneva in the Committee. In fact, a great deal of work, and perhaps the best of our work, is going to be done in between sessions when we are thinking about the issues that have been proposed and getting ready to state positions and discuss positions at the next session. The fact that the Committee is not meeting does not mean that we are not working or that we are not applying ourselves very diligently and sincerely to the questions of disarmament. If we could now get a paper which sets out the headings of things that might be covered in the treaty, sets out some of the substantive questions that should be considered under those headings -- if we report that to the General Assembly and specifically invite the other Members of the United Nations to let us have any views on it before we meet next year -- if we do that, we will have brought this question quite a way forward, and the Committee will have acquitted itself very creditably on this question at this session.

The CHAIRMAN: Document CD/40, submitted by the delegation of Hungary, which contains a working paper on the draft preambular part of the treaty on the prohibition of the development, manufacture, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, is being circulated today.

I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting and to convene an informal meeting to consider questions relating to our organization of work.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Thursday, 26 July 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.