

CD/PV.43  
19 July 1979  
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE 43RD MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 19 July 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. P. VOUTOV

(Bulgaria)

GE.79-62702

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. BENSMAIL
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. A. DUMONT Miss H. FREYRE PENABAD
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. A. BEHRI Ms. H. WICKES
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. P. BERG Mr. G. VAN DUYSE Mr. DOINLET
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. S. DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. P. VOUTOV Mr. I. SOTIROV Mr. P. KAMENOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U NGEV WIN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. J.T. SILLARD
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. V. TYLNER
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. O. EL-SHAITEI Mr. M. EL-BARADEI Mr. N. FAHMY
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. T. TERRERFE Mr. G. ALULA

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDIER  
Mr. W. KOETTER  
Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER  
Mr. H. MULLER

Hungary: Mr. N. DOIKOS  
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN  
Mr. S.T. DEVARE

Indonesia: Mr. D.B. SULEMAN  
Mr. SILABAN

Iran: Mr. D. AMERI

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO  
Mr. C. FRATESCHI  
Mr. FOLCO DE LUCA

Japan: Mr. N. OGISO  
Mr. T. NONOYAMA  
Mr. T. IWANAMI  
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITELI  
Mr. A. JET ODENDO

Mexico: Mr. M.A. CACERES

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDENBILIG

Morocco: Mr. S.M. RAHHALI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN  
Mr. J.W. SCHEFFERS

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADENIJI  
Mr. T.O. OLUMOKO

Pakistan: Mr. J.K.A. MARKER  
Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. J. AURICH-MONTERO

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. H. PAC  
Mr. H. KRUCZYK

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. I.B. FONSEKA

Sweden: Mrs. I. THORSSON  
Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. L. NORBERG  
Mr. S. STROMBACK  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN  
Mr. N.V. PESTEREV  
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV  
Mr. E. POTIARKIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES

Mr. C.K. CURVEN

Mr. P.M.V. FRANCIS

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER

Mr. A. AKALOVSKY

Mr. D. KOELEMAY

Mr. R. IHKULAK

Mr. M. SANCHEZ

Mr. J. CALVERT

Mr. W. DUNLOP

Mr. H. DALEY

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLIARDAT

Mrs. R.L. DE NECER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIC

Zaire:

Mr. MULONGANDUSU ESUK

Secretary:

Mr. RIKHI JAIPAL

NON-MEMBER COUNTRIESDenmark:<sup>1/</sup>

Mr. V. EGEBJERG

Mr. J. LEERHOY

Finland:<sup>2/</sup>

Mr. E. RAJAKOSKI

Mr. J. ENQUIST

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<sup>1/</sup> By decision of the Committee on Disarmament of 17 July 1979  
(see CD/PV.42, page 17).

<sup>2/</sup> By decision of the Committee on Disarmament of 25 April 1979  
(see CD/PV.30, page 26).

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): I should like to make some observations on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, one of our top priority items and a problem in which the Polish delegation has taken a keen interest both in this Committee and in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

First, however, I should like to take this opportunity to extend to Ambassador Vittorio Cordero di Montezemolo, the new leader of the Italian delegation, our warm welcome and good wishes for the success of his new mission. We look forward to co-operating closely with him in the pursuance of our common objectives in the same spirit of good will which we shared with his distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Nicolo di Bernardo.

The outcome of the informal consultations which the Committee has pursued of late on the most appropriate methods and forms of its work in regard to a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and on their destruction, proves unmistakably that there is a real possibility of continuing in this body concrete and business-like work towards that end. Above all, the fact that the representatives of the two Powers engaged in bilateral negotiations took an active part in such consultations indicates, in our view, that there is a practical possibility of the Committee on Disarmament conducting its work in the field of CW simultaneously with the bilateral effort. I would even say that it demonstrates that our common goal can be sought without interfering with the negotiations which the two parties have continued in Geneva.

Appreciating that fact, the Polish delegation took the liberty of circulating the other day an informal working paper which, in a more or less orderly way, lists a set of problems that will have to be addressed and considered within the framework of an effective international agreement in the field of chemical weapons.

Our paper also hints in a general way at possible approaches to solving some of these problems. In fact, as a result of constructive and wide-ranging discussions and negotiations before the current session of the Committee comes to an end, this document could eventually become a basis for the elaboration of an outline of a future convention.

For the time being, our informal document may help us realize the magnitude and, indeed, the complexity of the problem at hand. Finally, it may help us organize and plan our work in the days ahead in regard to CW prohibition.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

The list of problems included in our paper has been based, naturally, on the documents which have been submitted to the Committee so far, and in the first place the three drafts of a convention on the prohibition of CW. We have also looked up and borrowed some formulations included in agreements which the Committee helped to negotiate over the last few years. Finally, we have tried to reflect the information which has so far been provided on the direction and results of the bilateral negotiations as well as the views and suggestions offered in this Committee, especially the ideas contained in the very interesting and useful informal working paper circulated by the delegation of the Netherlands a few days ago.

I should like now to comment in a very tentative way on some major issues referred to in the informal document which my delegation had the privilege to circulate last Tuesday.

Let me begin with the scope of the prohibition. It has all along been the view of my delegation that we must aim at a comprehensive CW prohibition. Accordingly, we believe that we must seek to ban all means of chemical warfare, that is to say, lethal CW agents, incapacitating agents and agents causing temporary disability. At the same time, we believe that such types and quantities of toxic CW agents as may be necessary for legitimate technological, prophylactic or other non-military, peaceful purposes, including, for instance, research on CW protective equipment and so on, should be exempt from the ban. It goes without saying that both the types and quantities of such prohibition-exempt toxic agents must be limited to the indispensable minimum, in no case exceeding justifiable non-military requirements. For the time being we have no firm view as to the desirability of including riot-control agents in the ban.

To sum up -- we propose a comprehensive ban on the basis of a purpose criterion, that is, CW agents of types and in quantities having no justification for peaceful purposes.

Secondly, we deem it necessary to differentiate CW agents on the basis of levels of toxicity so that we can easily distinguish between chemical agents with military potential and those which are commonly used in agriculture (herbicides, defoliants, pest control agents) which, because of their low toxicity levels, have no practical military significance. One important consideration which could be advanced in support of such an approach is that the criterion of toxicity would prevent us from imposing any limitations on the use of advances in chemistry and chemical technology for peaceful-development-oriented purposes.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

Thirdly, we must seek to prohibit the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling or other retention of CW agents, as well as to destroy existing stocks of agents having no justification for peaceful purposes.

One of the more difficult and complex problems will be that of declaring stocks of CW agents as well as their production facilities. In our view, such a process of declaring stocks and production facilities will be conceivable only after the entry into force of the convention. This should in no way hinder or prevent us from stipulating specific and practicable time-limits for the elimination or conversion of CW agents to peaceful uses. The same goes for the dismantling of production facilities.

Now, a few remarks about the broad and important issue of verification. We have listened to and studied with considerable interest the suggestions and observations in that regard made in the Committee and included in several documents. The observations contained in working paper CD/37, tabled by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, are among the more interesting ones if only because they are based on practical experience of a working control system. We need to gather information on such experience and to study carefully suggestions formulated on the basis of it. At the same time, we feel that to go into this problem in some detail at this specific time may be somewhat premature. Before we reach agreement on at least the scope of the prohibition and other key issues, detailed examination of verification mechanisms could result in an unwarranted waste of time. In other words, we would rather follow the logical sequence in dealing with a CW agreement.

We might also be well advised not to ignore the experience acquired with verification systems operating under some multilateral agreements concluded earlier. Actually, we do recommend that they should be considered very seriously, and this is reflected in points 13 to 17 of our informal working paper.

The Polish delegation believes that one of the major pre-conditions for the success of our endeavours to elaborate an effective and durable ban on CW is to retain, adapt and where possible to build upon the provisions contained in such milestone international agreements as, for instance, the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons or the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

Ratified or acceded to by many States, these international juridical instruments may be regarded as an important protective barrier before a future CW convention enters into force. By seeking to provide that a future



(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

CW convention in no way limits or detracts from obligations contracted under the above-mentioned agreements, we want to contribute to expanding and reinforcing a comprehensive system safeguarding man against the effects of the use of these weapons of mass destruction.

Finally, I wish to refer to the important role which chemistry as a science and the chemical industry at large play in present-day life, in health protection, agriculture and so many other realms. Since we must appreciate that role, we have to draft CW treaty language in such a way as not to hamper economic and technological development of States parties to such an agreement.

I have made only preliminary observations in connexion with the informal working paper which my delegation has drafted. Of course, we reserve the right to present further, more detailed comments when we embark upon a specific and substantive discussion of the issues involved in a CW agreement.

Before I conclude, I should like to say a few words about the principles which ought to underlie the Committee's substantive work in the field of chemical weapons. It will be continued in parallel and in concert with the negotiations pursued by the Soviet Union and the United States. Apart from the obvious desire to eliminate totally chemical weapons as repugnant weapons of mass destruction, we are of course well aware that the problem of an effective ban on CW must be perceived by these Powers as an element of the balance of forces and of mutual and equal security. And that is quite a legitimate view of things as far as their mutual relations are concerned.

If we are seeking the successful conclusion of our multilateral endeavours in that area, we must take due account of these perceptions. Indeed, it is plainly not our objective to attempt to draft a treaty unrelated to what is eventually agreed upon bilaterally. That would be an utterly impractical proposition. In fact, my delegation is fully aware that the effectiveness of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons reached in our Committee will ultimately depend on the outcome of the USSR-United States negotiations in that respect.

We have no reason to question the good faith of the two parties and we believe that there can be found a formula for their productive participation in the multilateral negotiating effort, for the establishment of a mutually useful link with the bilateral endeavours.

One way of securing that desirable effect would, of course, be to have an indication of the current state of their negotiating process as well as constructive

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

suggestions on the most desirable and promising approach this Committee should adopt within the framework of the problems referred to in the informal working papers, including the one which my delegation has circulated.

Anticipating the establishment of such a rapport between the bilateral and the multilateral negotiating fora, we can visualize the feasibility of resuming substantial discussions which, in the remaining time of the current session, could well result in:

An agreement on the order of deliberations on problems specified in our working paper;

Identification of the major tendencies or trends in dealing with that informal document;

Identification of tasks which may call for expert advice;

Determination of a practicable schedule of work with respect to CW at the next session of the Committee on Disarmament.

As my delegation sees it, these problems could most usefully be considered within multilateral consultations and informal sessions of the Committee.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): The Committee on Disarmament has now begun a period of two weeks which are specifically devoted to a discussion of the prohibition of chemical weapons. Today I will make a few brief remarks about the way in which the United States approaches this question.

I want to emphasize that the United States objective is a complete, effective, and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons. What we are after is the total elimination from national arsenals of this major class of weapons. To facilitate the attainment of that objective, and as a first step toward it, the United States has, as you are aware, been conducting active bilateral negotiations with the USSR. The United States reaffirmed its commitment to strive for a successful conclusion of those negotiations in the communiqué issued following the meeting between President Carter and President Brezhnev in Vienna last month.

In all candour, I must say that the negotiating process has proven to be more complex and difficult than we had initially expected. When we began the negotiations, we had hopes that by this time the United States and the Soviet Union would be able to present a joint initiative to this Committee. Despite efforts to expedite progress in developing such an initiative, it is evident that, given the importance and the intricacies of the issues involved, considerable additional negotiation will be required.

(Mr. Fisher, United States of America)

The United States and the Soviet delegations intend to present a joint progress report, which will give the Committee a picture of where their negotiations stand. We had hoped that such a report could be developed by the beginning of our current deliberations. As you know, however, the bilateral negotiations were resumed only last Monday. Some of the experts required for the preparation of the report were not, therefore, available earlier. The drafting of a joint progress report is by no means a simple matter, but we are making our best efforts to complete it as expeditiously as possible.

The Committee has been preoccupied this year with the question of how best to organize its work in the chemical weapons field. Unfortunately, during the discussion of procedure, we have tended to lose sight of substance. For after all, progress on substance is what will determine progress towards a widely acceptable convention. If we are far apart on substance, then no procedural arrangements will be able to move us forward.

My delegation was encouraged, therefore, by the informal suggestion of the Netherlands delegation that, during the two weeks devoted to CW discussions, delegations might wish to state their views on a series of questions dealing with the major aspects of a CW convention. We believe that this approach is a constructive one, and offers a possible way for the Committee to facilitate progress toward a convention. In our view, the list of topics in the informal Polish paper could also be a useful tool in our dealing with the various aspects of a prohibition of chemical weapons.

For its part, the United States intends to participate actively in the current discussions on chemical weapons. At a later meeting, we plan to deal with substantive questions, such as those listed in the informal paper of the Netherlands delegation. We would encourage others to do the same. At the end of next week, it might be appropriate to take stock and see how to proceed further.

Mr. RAJAKOSKI (Finland): I would like to start my statement by congratulating you on assuming the chairmanship of the Committee during the month of July. I am confident that under your very experienced guidance the CD is going to achieve the best possible results in its important task.

(Mr. Rajakoski, Finland)

My congratulations go also to Ambassador Rikhi Jaipal, who has been appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as his Personal Representative and Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation is especially happy that, after lengthy consultations, this important post has finally been filled by such an experienced and talented diplomat; this will certainly increase the efficiency of the work of this Committee still further.

The Finnish delegation feels great satisfaction in participating, in this Committee, in the deliberations concerning chemical weapons. We are confident that a certain momentum is being created for fruitful discussions on this item which has been so long on the agenda of the CCD and the CD. As is well known, the Finnish Government has been taking a special interest in this field over many years and has been able to make some practical contributions from as early as 1972. We are therefore grateful to the Committee on Disarmament for the opportunity to participate further in the work of this Committee aiming at concrete results banning the use of chemical warfare. Our initiatives are based on the firm belief that all nations, whether parties to multilateral negotiations or not, have a vital interest in promoting progress in disarmament. This is particularly true in the case of chemical weapons, which are widely recognized as a question of high priority.

On 26 April this year I had the opportunity of informing this Committee about a research project which had been initiated in Finland more than six years previously on the role of the instrumental analysis of chemical weapons agents in their verification. The goal of this project is the creation of a national chemical weapons verification capacity which could eventually be put to international use. We are, of course, fully aware of the complexity of the problems encountered in the negotiations on the treaty banning chemical weapons. We understand that such a treaty is not yet within immediate reach. Nevertheless, the Finnish project on verification has been pursued with undiminished vigour and interest because the creation of a national chemical weapons verification capacity needs a continuing effort to keep verification techniques abreast of the

(Mr. Rajakoski, Finland)

galloping development of chemical warfare technology. We also fully understand that verification is not the only problem to be solved and agreed upon before a chemical weapons ban can be concluded. Important as it is, it is still just one of the issues.

You will recall that the Finnish delegation last April distributed to the members of this Committee a working document (CD/14) which explains various research studies carried out in Finland in the field of CW verification. At that time I stated that the Finnish Government was to continue the project and to make available subsequent results to the Committee on Disarmament in a form of a further progress report. I am happy to inform you now that this report has recently been completed and distributed to members of the CD in working document CD/39.

The present Finnish working paper, entitled "Identification of potential organophosphorus warfare agents - An approach for the standardization of techniques and reference data", is a continuation of our previous reports. In 1977 a variety of techniques suitable for the verification of the presence or absence of organophosphorus warfare agents were generally reviewed, based on chemical literature and experimental work. In 1978 a special technique -- high resolution glass capillary gas chromatography combined with selective detectors and mass spectrometry -- was developed. This technique was considered to be the most sensitive and generally useful method for the trace analysis of chemicals revealing different types of CW agents.

The present report describes the progress made by the experimental study towards the more systematic use of more effective but relatively simple techniques.

The present Finnish working paper is mainly intended to give a general picture of the possibilities and difficulties involved in a systematic verification analysis and has been submitted for criticism and comments by the specialized laboratories of other nations working in this field. Experiments of several laboratories have to be compared when adopting internationally standardized procedures.

(Mr. Rajakoski, Finland)

This is, very briefly, the purpose of the present study. I hope that there will be another occasion in the next few days when our chemical expert will be able to explain further details of the study. He will also be happy to answer any questions related to the study.

In this context I would once again like to stress that the Finnish project has been conceived as a multipurpose one, both substantively and functionally. Substantively, the planned control capacity could be used in three different verification activities: 1. verification of the destruction of stocks, 2. verification of non-production of chemical weapons, and 3. verification of alleged use. Functionally, the capacity could be of service in the modalities of verification to be agreed upon: 1. it could be used for national verification or any combination of national and international inspection, 2. it could be used in connexion with an investigation ordered by an international authority, and 3. it could meet some of the concern expressed by certain developing countries about possible difficulties in carrying out verification by their national means alone.

Before concluding my statement this morning I should like to pay a tribute to the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany for its efforts in preparing a most useful working paper (CD/37) on some aspects of international verification of non-production of chemical weapons. The general outline of that working paper coincides with certain basic ideas according to which the Finnish, more specific, project is being developed. Equally useful, in our view, is the Netherlands delegation's rather systematic approach of presenting some crucial questions which has been summarized in an unofficial working paper placed at the disposal of other delegations participating in the discussions on chemical weapons. I am confident that all these efforts will be most useful in achieving the concrete and positive results in the field of chemical disarmament which are awaited by the international community.

Mr. DE LA GORCE (France) (Translated from French): Since the beginning of our work, the French delegation has on each occasion emphasized the importance it attaches to the question of chemical disarmament. This does not mean that it considers other aspects of disarmament less important. However, we are anxious to embark on this most difficult undertaking with due consideration for all the realities: the political and strategic situations, the dictates of balance and security, and the technical facts. In the light of these realities, it seemed to us that chemical disarmament might, in present circumstances, offer the best change of progress and we found that this opinion was shared by many here.

Moreover, the question of chemical disarmament is of direct, or virtually direct, concern to many States: the chemical weapon is accessible to all those with a suitable industrial capability, and there are many today; this weapon is neither very costly nor very difficult to manufacture; its use does not require very sophisticated technology; it is easy to conceal.

In the opinion of all the experts, the chemical weapon can cause appalling ravages and therefore deserves to be classed among the weapons of mass destruction. Its deadly efficiency might well tempt those without it to acquire it. Its very nature should lead us not only to prohibit its use, but to exclude it entirely from all arsenals.

The prohibition of its use is already embodied in the Geneva Protocol, of which France is the depositary. We hope that all States which have not acceded to it will sign it without delay to give that prohibition universal effect. Obviously chemical disarmament itself should be equally universal in effect. The negotiations in progress for the past three years between the United States and the Soviet Union have also been directed towards a universal commitment. The two Powers have often emphasized this. That self-evident objective is basic to this Committee's competence. As this is a matter which concerns the entire international community, the Committee has the right and the duty to discuss it fully and to negotiate on all its aspects. It cannot play a supporting or subordinate role.

The delegations of the two Powers have indicated, in slightly different terms, that they are prepared at this stage to hold discussions on points of substance and even negotiations on certain preliminary aspects. We welcome these more open attitudes; we are well aware of the inherent difficulties of this undertaking and of the problems which may arise out of the interaction between bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the same subject. We are convinced that these problems and difficulties will be solved if all parties show the will to do so.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

We have seen a token of this will in the many useful contributions already circulated by several delegations and in the statements made during this debate. We earnestly hope that the two negotiating Powers will justify our confidence here and now by making a very substantial contribution to this debate.

I should now like to outline the preliminary views of my delegation on the principles, objectives and provisions of a convention on chemical disarmament.

The convention should obviously reaffirm the aims on which there is already a broad consensus: general prohibition of the use, manufacture and transfer of chemical weapons, destruction of existing stocks, and the destruction or conversion of factories producing them.

I would make a distinction between the following five points.

1. Use:

The cornerstone of the operative part of the text will obviously be general and absolute prohibition of the use of all toxic substances for military purposes. The prohibition of use should be based on a combination of two criteria: the toxicity threshold (the minimum dose producing a toxic effect in the organism) would be the first criterion; the second would be a safety factor, which might be defined as the ratio between the effect threshold and the lethal dose (the effect threshold would be defined as the minimum dose producing transient physiological effects without consequences for the organism); this criterion would be the basis for adjusting the toxicity threshold adopted to the properties of each toxic substance.

2. Manufacture:

Toxic substances clearly fall into three categories:

- (a) Toxic substances with specifically military uses;
- (b) Dual-purpose substances in widespread civilian use which readily lend themselves to military applications;
- (c) Toxic substances of no military interest, that is, substances which cannot be turned into a weapon of any kind.

The French delegation considers that it would be unrealistic to seek to prohibit the manufacture of the dual-purpose substances, but that there should be a complete ban on toxic substances with specifically military uses and on their means of delivery.

We believe, however, that such a prohibition should be accommodated to the retention of a protection capability and a passive deterrent against the use of chemical weapons, not only temporarily for security pending the destruction of stocks and the conversion of manufacturing plant, but also permanently to safeguard



(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

defence potential in the event of a breach of the convention by an adversary. Such a derogation should permit the maintenance of an adequate level of research on passive defence against chemical weapons.

The problem raised by herbicides, incapacitants and irritants is quite specific, in the French delegation's opinion, and should be the subject of a special study.

3. Transfers of weapons, know-how and technology:

In our opinion, a distinction should be made between transfers of weapons and manufacturing and delivery technology, which would be strictly prohibited, and transfers of know-how for purposes of protection, which would only be authorized between countries which have signed the convention, to the exclusion of all others.

4. Destruction of stocks and manufacturing plant:

One of the provisions of the convention should require each signatory country to furnish a detailed qualitative and quantitative inventory of toxic substances in its possession and a provisional time-table for the destruction of stocks. It would be desirable for weapons containing highly toxic substances to be destroyed first. A similar detailed inventory should be required for the destruction or conversion of plant manufacturing such toxic substances.

5. Verification:

The effective verification of chemical disarmament is, in our opinion, a crucial aspect of the convention. It also raises the most difficult problems. Various proposals made and experiments carried out so far give us reason to believe that effective on-site verification of chemical disarmament measures is technically feasible.

It is indispensable, in our opinion, for any verification to be of an international character.

On-site verification should, in particular, ensure:

Observance of the clause prohibiting the manufacture of toxic substances with specifically military uses and their means of delivery;

Observance of time-tables for the destruction and conversion of stocks and manufacturing plant;

Control of the products of laboratories still authorized to carry out pure research and research required for maintaining a protection capability.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

Verification of the basic chemicals used for the manufacture of toxic substances with military uses and verification of the non-diversion of dual-purpose substances to military ends are problems which raise immense difficulties, and are substantially different from the problem of verification of substances with specifically military uses. An answer to that problem has been found within the Western European Union. This precedent might perhaps be studied if a regional type of solution seems appropriate.

In conclusion, the French delegation wishes to emphasize again the grave, if not solemn, character of our discussion here. At this session we can, of course, only take the first step in what will be a long-term undertaking. But it is the first disarmament undertaking on a world-wide scale. It is therefore important to make this step and to have something to show for it. The credibility of the Committee and the international community's confidence in it are at stake.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): Forgive me for intervening in this precipitous way, but as I understand it, we are about to go into informal session, and we have in mind that a good deal of the subject matter now under discussion is going to be discussed in these informal sessions.

Under our rules it is perfectly possible to permit the observers or participants of non-member States to be present in our informal sessions. It is expressly provided for and we can do so if we wish, but it does require a decision. In view of the relatively high proportion of intellectual content that is going to be considered at the informal as opposed to the formal sessions, I would like to submit, with the guidance of the Chairman, the suggestion that we, operating under the authority which we have reserved for ourselves under rule 35, invite the countries we have requested to participate in the formal sessions, to be available in the informal sessions. We are I suspect going to do most of our work in informal sessions and there is really no reason for the countries that have expressed such an interest to be excluded from those sessions. This is, therefore, my suggestion, made at the last minute admittedly, but it is better to make it at the last minute than not to make it at all. I therefore present it for the consideration of the Chair.

If I have stated my proposal a little bit narrowly I do think that under rule 32, representatives of non-member States, whether they are qualified under rule 33 or 34, can also be permitted to be here, if we wish, and I see no reason for excluding them. I would therefore enlarge my proposal to say that the representatives of non-member States can continue to be here in an informal session so that they can have some idea of precisely what it is we are talking about.

The CHAIRMAN: As the Committee will recall, when the decision was taken to invite the delegations of Finland and Denmark, it was decided that they be able to participate in both the formal and the informal meetings, so in accordance with our decision they are already invited to participate. Now a proposal has been made by the distinguished Ambassador of the United States which is quite correct and in accordance with rule 32 of the rules of procedure, and I would therefore ask the Committee if there is any objection to the suggestion that the distinguished observers present here be invited to participate in our informal meetings on the subject of chemical weapons.

It was so decided.

I now intend to adjourn today's plenary meeting of the Committee, but before closing I would like to make one announcement.

The Depositary Governments will hold a meeting at 10.30 a.m. on Friday, 20 July 1979, in room H.3 (third floor) to discuss topics which might be covered in their paper on new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Biological Weapons Convention. Experts and others from States Parties are invited to attend.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee will take place on Tuesday, 24 July 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12 p.m.