

CD/PV.42
17 July 1979
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FORTY-SECOND MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 17 July 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. P. VOUTOV

(Bulgaria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. BENSMAIL
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. A. DUMONT Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD
<u>Australia:</u>	Sir James PLIMSOLL Mr. A. BEHI Mrs. M. WICKES
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. P. NOTERDAEME Mr. P. BERG Mr. G. VAN DUYSSE
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. S. DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. P. VOUTOV Mr. I. SOTIROV
<u>Burma:</u>	U SAW HLAING U NGWE VIN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. J.T. SIMARD
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. V. TYLNER Mr. J. JIRUSEK
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. M. EL-BARADEI Mr. N. FAHMY
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. T. TERRETE Mr. G. ALULA
<u>France:</u>	Mr. F. DE LA GORCE Mr. M. COUTHURES
<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. G. HERDER Mr. W. KOETTER Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER

Mr. H. MÜLLER

Hungary:

Mr. C. GYORFFY

Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:

Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN

Mr. S.T. DEVARE

Indonesia:

Mr. S. DARUSMAN

Mr. D.B. SULEMAN

Mr. SILABAN

Iran:

Mr. K. RADJAVI

Mr. D. ATERI

Italy:

Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTIZEMOLO

Mr. C. FRATESCHI

Mr. FOLCO DE LUCA

Mr. L. SALAZAR

Japan:

Mr. H. OGISO

Mr. T. NONOYAMA

Mr. T. IWANAMI

Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya:

Mr. S. SHITEMI

Mr. A. JET ODENDO

Mexico:

Mr. M.A. CÁCERES

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDENBILEG

Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco:

Mr. S.M. RAHHALI

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN

Mr. J.W. SCHEFFERS

Nigeria:

Mr. Q. ADENIJI
Mr. T.O. OLUIOKO

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru:Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. H. PAC
Mr. H. KRUCZYK

Romania:

Mr. C. ENI

Sri Lanka:

Mr. I.B. FONSEKA

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. S. STROMBACK
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. N.V. PESTEREV
Mr. A.I. TIOURETKOV
Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHIN
Mr. A.M. VAVILOV
Mr. A.V. LOUKIANOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMTERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. D. KOELIMAY
Mr. C. FLOWERRIE
Mr. J. CALVERT
Mr. W. DUNLOP
Mr. M. DALEY

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Mrs. R.L. DE NEGER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Mr. D. DJOKIC

Zaire:

Mr. MULONGANDUSU ESUK

Secretary:

Mr. RIKHI JAIPAL

NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES

Spain:^{1/}

Mr. De LAIGLESIA

Mrs. M.R. BOCEJA

^{1/} By decision of the Committee on Disarmament of 5 July 1979 (see CD/PV.39, page 47).

Mr. SIMARD (Canada) (translated from French): As many other delegations have done before me, I should like to take this opportunity to express the Canadian Government's satisfaction at the submission of the joint USSR-United States proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. Although the draft agreement concerns a ban on weapons which do not exist, in view of our concern to curb technological developments which stimulate the arms race (a concern which led to our proposal to prohibit the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes), we are gratified that the text is before the Committee on Disarmament. We also hope that the other bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR will have a similarly successful outcome.

In view of our heavy programme of work, we do not think it will be possible really to come to grips with the problem of drawing up a treaty to prohibit such weapons within the short time still at our disposal. Our respective Governments will also need time to study the text which has just been submitted to us. We would, for example, in particular like to study the implications of the verification procedure for other disarmament agreements. As regards the procedure envisaged for the review of the treaty, we wonder whether a 10-year period before the first conference is not too long. Paragraph VI on measures to prevent loss and diversion will require careful study. As other delegations have suggested, we hope that the Committee on Disarmament will take note of this development in its annual report, but we do not think it will be possible to start negotiations before our next session.

Mr. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO (Italy): As I am taking the floor for the first time, I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to convey to you, Mr. Chairman, my sincere congratulations on your assumption of the chair of the Committee for the current month.

May I also express to you and to the other distinguished colleagues who welcomed me in my new capacity of leader of the Italian delegation my gratitude and my desire to develop with all of you the most co-operative and friendly relationship.

Today it is my intention to refer specifically to the problem of the prohibition of radiological weapons, a subject on which the attention of our Committee was already focused last week.

(Mr. Cordero di Montezemolo, Italy)

On 10 July, the United States and Soviet delegations jointly presented to the Committee on Disarmament a parallel proposal "on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons".

My delegation, at this juncture, would like to place on record its appreciation for the positive conclusion of the bilateral talks on this matter. The joint initiative is considered by the Italian Government as a meaningful expression of the renewed dedication and commitment of the two major military Powers to the search for concrete measures aimed at controlling the various aspects of the arms race.

As Ambassador Fisher, the distinguished representative of the United States, pertinently recalled in introducing this proposal, radiological weapons "have long been identified as potential weapons capable of mass destruction".

As early as 1948, the first resolution adopted by the Commission of the United Nations for Conventional Armaments stated that weapons of mass destruction had to be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future with characteristics comparable in destructive effects to those of the atomic bomb or the other weapons noted above.

More than 30 years have passed. However, the 1948 definition has never been challenged in its substance and continues to maintain, in our view, its full validity. Bearing this in mind, my delegation considers the prohibition of radiological weapons a commendable and responsible step forward in efforts to bring about real disarmament under effective international control.

In welcoming the joint United States/USSR proposal, we all realize that the implications of the prohibition of radiological weapons clearly extend beyond the bilateral relations of two States.

As a number of previous speakers have noted, and I should like in particular to quote Ambassador Issraelyan, the distinguished representative of the USSR:

"The importance of preventing the emergence of this type of weapon of mass destruction is also connected with the fact that the rapid development of nuclear energy and technology in many countries of the world creates objective conditions for the large-scale proliferation of radioactive materials which, being what they are, may be used in radiological weapons. Such use of radiological materials may become technically accessible for a very large number of States".

(Mr. Cordero di Montezemolo, Italy)

In this light we feel that the Committee on Disarmament has the duty to give careful and in-depth consideration to the elements agreed upon by the parties to the bilateral negotiations with a view to working out the text of a multilateral agreement acceptable to all members of the Committee.

My delegation will give the draft proposal before us serious consideration, and is certainly willing to participate actively in the negotiations which are to be opened on this matter in our Committee. However, we need a reasonable period of time to study it and to make clear our mind.

I understand that other delegations are in the same position and will need some time to consult their Governments and get instructions for a constructive discussion.

Furthermore, we should not forget that our Committee has already a heavy schedule for the few weeks preceding the closure of the present session. This schedule includes consideration of high-priority problems such as the prohibition of chemical weapons and the nuclear test ban and, in addition, the preparation of a report which will require special attention, being the first report of the Committee on Disarmament since its enlargement and renovation.

The assessment of the elements proposed by the United States and the USSR and the elaboration of a final draft agreement will possibly require the establishment of a drafting group, which would have difficulties in holding its meetings at this stage concurrently with other working parties already set up for other, more urgent purposes.

As I have indicated, it is too early, at least for my delegation, to comment in detail on the elements of the joint proposal.

Permit me, however, to refer briefly to two questions of great importance to my Government on which sensible remarks have already been made by Ambassador Pfeiffer in his statement of 12 July 1979.

The first one is the question of the use of radiation from radioactive decay for peaceful purposes. In this connexion, I would like to stress that it is the understanding of the Italian Government that no obligation assumed under the projected treaty on radiological weapons can be interpreted as limiting or hindering the right of all States to peaceful applications of radiation from radioactive decay.

The second problem is verification. My delegation has taken due note of the treatment given to this key issue in the draft proposal. The approach envisaged is closely modelled on a pattern already adopted for the ENMOD convention

(Mr. Cordero di Montezemolo, Italy)

and my delegation has no major difficulties with it. It is our interpretation, however, that such an approach does not constitute a precedent for other disarmament agreements, each disarmament agreement demanding, in our view, specific verification provisions corresponding to the nature and scope of the prohibition.

Having said this, I can assure the Committee that my delegation intends to participate fully in the consideration of the United States/USSR joint proposal, in the co-operative and constructive spirit we think should inspire the attitude of all delegations toward serious proposals put forward in this multilateral negotiating body.

And this is, in our view, not only a serious proposal but an important contribution to the achievement on an ad hoc basis of specific and adequately verified agreements aimed at preventing or limiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of clearly-identified categories of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): The Federal Republic of Germany noted with satisfaction that the CW complex was among the first items to be discussed in the spring session of the CD. Working papers CD/5, CD/6 and CD/11, introduced by Italy, the Netherlands and the Group of 21 respectively, as well as the two verification workshops held in Great Britain and in my own country, have provided us with additional substantial information for further discussion at the summer session of the CD.

My country feels that high priority should be given to the elaboration of a convention providing for an effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction. The reasons are manifold: first, and generally speaking, because chemical weapons are an already existing and particularly insidious means of mass destruction; secondly, because as early as 1954 my country unilaterally renounced the manufacture of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons -- the only State having done so to date; and thirdly, the Federal Republic of Germany has every interest in a CW convention in view of its geostrategic position.

Such a convention requires above all, however, a verification arrangement commensurate with the military significance of chemical weapons. Verification is the basis of confidence in compliance with the prohibition. It is the most important and, at the same time, the most difficult of the problems to be

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

resolved. This is one of the reasons why so little progress has been made so far. My Government, therefore, has emphasized time and again the priority which should be given to finding a satisfactory solution of the verification problem. We are convinced that an international verification system, including on-site inspections, can be designed so as to rule out the disclosure of commercial and industrial secrets. This has been proven by the experience gained from IAEA safeguards in the nuclear field and by our own particular experience with specific international controls in the chemical field. This was also confirmed by the outcome of the Pugwash workshop, which was held at a major chemical production plant in the Federal Republic of Germany in August 1977, and which was attended by representatives from East and West.

The urgency of a solution, on the one hand, and the lack of any decisive progress despite considerable efforts, on the other, led to my Government's invitation to attend a verification workshop in the Federal Republic of Germany in March 1979. Based on our own experience gained from the international verification of our pledge not to manufacture chemical weapons, we are in a position to contribute to the discussion on how to verify the non-production of chemical weapons.

In the working paper (CD/37) I am introducing today, reference is made, therefore, in greater detail not only to the results of the workshop in the Federal Republic of Germany, but also to the verification role of the Western European Union's Armaments Control Agency. The experience of more than 20 years shows clearly that it is possible to verify adequately, by means of on-site inspections, compliance with a chemical weapons production ban, and that this verification procedure is technically practicable without disclosing and jeopardizing certain production techniques or other company-specific technologies. Using this as our point of departure, we have, in the last part of our paper, submitted for discussion and further consideration possible principles which can be used as a basis for the verification of a chemical weapons production ban.

No reference is made in our working paper to verification problems concerning the destruction of existing stocks or the destruction of CW facilities.

We do not expect our paper to be the model for future on-site inspections in the verification of a production ban. We hope, however, that it will be a useful contribution to the discussion of the verification problems.

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

It is my Government's view that a CW convention, which would be the first real step towards world-wide disarmament, has to be linked with an adequate verification system assuring beyond any doubt compliance by all States parties to the convention with the stipulations of the treaty. The BW convention, as we see it, offers no model in this respect. An effective and verifiable CW convention would be a break-through of historical significance. A solution of the verification problem able to meet the security requirement of all States ought to be within our reach, if we approach it with imagination and patience.

We know that agreement between the two major Powers, which are already engaged in bilateral negotiations on this item, is essential for achieving a universal and comprehensive CW convention. We hope that a basis will be found soon on which the CD will be able to take up the task of negotiating and drafting a comprehensive CW convention.

Mr. De LAIGLESIA (Spain) (translated from Spanish): In the first place I should like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and all the members of the Committee on Disarmament, for the opportunity you have given me to express my Government's views on the important subject of chemical weapons.

This question has always interested us and I therefore take the liberty of reminding members that Spain is a party to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

We have also recently ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, which entered into force on 26 March 1975. As is well known, this agreement is closely linked to the problem of chemical weapons and contains various clauses which refer to them.

We played an active part in the preparation of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and we are very pleased to see that the new negotiating body in the field of disarmament established at that session is initiating its work in an effective manner. Among the items on its agenda, the prohibition of chemical weapons stands out because it is an important subject that is being dealt with at the present time. The Spanish Government therefore wishes to make a number of observations on specific aspects of that question.

(Mr. De Laiglesia, Spain)

In our view, although the major responsibility for nuclear weapons control lies with the countries which possess such weapons, it may be said that chemical weapons are within the reach of almost the entire international community. That is why it is important that a treaty should be drawn up prohibiting the production, development and stockpiling of these weapons, and providing for their destruction, since we all agree that they may be called weapons of mass destruction.

Intensive negotiations have taken place since the 1925 Protocol entered into force, but unfortunately they have not so far achieved adequate results. We all know that weapons of this type exist in the arsenals of various countries and therefore the potential danger of their utilization is latent. At the same time, we have carefully followed the work being carried out both within the United Nations and in the negotiating body which has functioned in Geneva under various names. We are also following with attention the bilateral efforts being made by certain countries to propose to the international community a text which could possibly be acceptable to a substantial proportion of its members. However, at the present time we have very little information on that work to which we attach great importance. We do not know the reasons for this stagnation and hope that the negotiations on chemical weapons in this Committee will clarify the situation. The importance of the subject is such that we cannot remain indifferent to it.

Spain considers that a draft on the prohibition of chemical weapons should be as broad as possible, in other words, it should cover the development, production, stockpiling and destruction of substances that could be used as weapons of a chemical nature, as well as means of delivery and equipment designed for use with this type of weapon.

However, we are well aware of the obstacles encountered in drawing up a treaty of this kind, since verification of compliance is an extremely difficult matter. While this problem has on numerous occasions been the major stumbling block to the adoption of disarmament measures, the difficulties are even greater in the case of chemical weapons. However, exercises carried out in certain countries, such as the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America, suggest that it is not impossible to find a solution and that, with the means available through modern technology, positive results can be achieved.

(Mr. De Laiglesia, Spain)

My Government feels that verification, in the case of chemical weapons, requires the establishment of machinery to monitor compliance with the provisions contained in the treaties in such a way that neither the security of States nor their legitimate right to economic development would be jeopardized. We therefore think that the proposals made by various delegations for the establishment of international verification bodies are extremely positive. Similarly, we believe that, independently of the bodies of a political nature which it may be considered useful to establish, extensive technical advice should be available which could be provided by groups of highly qualified experts. In this way, any report addressed to the international body by countries which felt that others were not complying with the provisions of the treaty in question could be examined with the maximum assurance of objectivity. Similarly all States should have access to that body without any discrimination, and there should be no special régime enabling some States to block measures designed to ensure prompt verification.

It should be borne in mind that, of all the weapons of mass destruction at present in existence, the most easily available in any armed conflict would be weapons of this nature. Therefore any efforts aimed at their total elimination will contribute to the consolidation of peace. If, unfortunately, this does not prove possible, the overkill capacity on our planet will be increased by a vast amount of lethal substances which, unlike nuclear weapons, are cheap, easy to produce and difficult to detect. Thus a point which will have to be watched and carefully taken into account in any draft on the prohibition of chemical weapons is that of technological development. Indeed, substances which are at present used only for peaceful purposes can, in the future, by means of relatively simple operations, be converted into dangerous chemical weapons. Obviously this further complicates the problem of verification, because a large proportion of the world's production of chemicals could be used for military purposes. In this connexion it may be noted that preparations which are considered harmless are frequently found to have unsuspected harmful properties.

Although when we speak of the arms race -- which we all hope to be able to slow down -- reference is seldom made to chemical weapons, they undoubtedly occupy an important place in that race. In this context we cannot refrain from mentioning the tremendous importance of devoting the resources released to the promotion of development in the countries which need it most.

(Mr. De Laiglesia, Spain)

Lastly, an interesting point which it is appropriate to mention in this respect is that of civil defence, which has two aspects -- protection against attacks involving chemical weapons and the use of equipment which makes it possible to handle these weapons with relative safety.

While no objection can be made to the first of the two, the second could imply that countries using such equipment have intentions contrary to the spirit of the struggle against chemical weapons. However, the boundaries between these two cases are vague, and their definition should be left to experts in such matters.

In conclusion, I should like once more to stress the importance that my Government attaches to these negotiations and its desire to contribute as much as possible to them to the extent permitted by the Committee's rules of procedure.

We are fully aware that the task is an arduous one, and that it is not easy to be optimistic about the results in the short or even the medium term; however, if the political will to reach an agreement can be strengthened, we believe that one day the elimination of these weapons of mass destruction can be achieved.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (USSR) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like today to touch on an important organizational matter. Clearly the time has come for the Committee on Disarmament to decide on the date for the closure of the second part of its 1979 session.

Under rule 7 of the rules of procedure, the date for the closure of the session has to be determined, taking into account the requirements of the Committee's work. At the present time, the Committee on Disarmament is faced with a number of questions that must be considered extremely carefully. They include, first of all, the draft treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. We think that the Committee on Disarmament should do all it can to ensure that, at this very session, everything possible is done to take the draft treaty further. Naturally, a study of the joint Soviet/United States initiative will need a certain amount of time, and we hope that delegations will soon receive the necessary instructions. A number of delegations, in particular, those of the Netherlands, Canada and Italy, have already asked us for explanations, and have, in an informal way, expressed some preliminary views. More time must obviously be allotted, therefore, for the consideration of the joint Soviet/United States draft.

(Mr. Israelyan, USSR)

The Committee also has a great deal of work to do on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The working group set up to consider this question and conduct negotiations on it has just started its work. We are all awaiting the results of that work. For that, too, a certain amount of time will be needed.

The Committee is continuing its consideration of the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. A few days ago the Group of 21 submitted a working paper on the subject. We highly appreciate the non-aligned countries' working paper, which in our view provides additional material for further discussion of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament at the current session of the Committee.

The Soviet delegation also assumes that the discussion of the question of chemical weapons, too, will need quite a lot of time. The Committee is now, in fact, conducting negotiations on the organizational framework and modalities of the impending discussion on this question. If the Committee gets down to discussing the substance of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons, not two weeks, but considerably more time, will presumably be needed for that work. A number of informal documents have been submitted to give point to the discussion.

And there are a number of other items on the agenda, the consideration of which is still far from complete. I would like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to the fact that, actually, we have not completed our consideration of a single item.

Still another point is that a few days ago the representatives of India and Yugoslavia, together with those of some other countries, said that the small size of their delegations did not permit them to attend more than one meeting at once. We understand their position, which must obviously be taken into account in planning our meetings, but if meetings cannot be held simultaneously, more time will be needed.

A further problem, for our delegation as well as for others, is the time needed to prepare for frequent meetings (they are now taking place at the rate of two a day), and to align delegations' positions with the capital.

(Mr. Issraclyan, USSR)

In this connexion, the Soviet delegation, aware of the need to ensure that the Committee's work takes place in an orderly fashion, so that we do not have to bungle things and conduct our proceedings with undue haste, proposes that the programme of work should allow enough time for the successful and constructive completion of our consideration of the various items on the agenda.

In accordance with the views expressed above, we propose that 24 August should be set as the date for the end of the session. The Committee could then continue its consideration of the items on the prohibition of chemical weapons and on security guarantees; and before the conclusion of the session, it would discuss the Soviet/United States proposal on the prohibition of radiological weapons and establish an agreed text of the Committee's report to the General Assembly. The first draft of the Committee's report to the General Assembly of the United Nations would in that case have to be submitted to the Committee by 5 August.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): I should like to give a very brief and preliminary reaction to the most interesting statement made just now by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, in which he proposed that this Committee should continue its work under 24 August in order to allow us to deal with a few of the issues before the Committee which, in one way or the other, seem promising. I entirely agree with the Soviet representative that if there is a possibility for this Committee to make progress, we should spare no effort to do so. Other considerations which there might be, become, if not irrelevant, at least secondary. My delegation, too, is not, of course, one of the largest delegations, but we are willing to do the best we can and I would therefore agree with the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union that this Committee continue its work until, say, 24 August. We would be particularly interested in continuing the discussion on chemical weapons and on the security guarantees. We believe that in the field of chemical weapons, there is a very definite possibility of making some progress during this session, and if this is the case we should do everything that is possible to explore this possibility. If we should do this we may have some results to present to the General Assembly at its next session. Therefore, Sir, I support the proposal that we continue our work until about 24 August and that we concentrate particularly on chemical weapons and on negative security guarantees.

The CHAIRMAN: I now propose the suspension of this formal meeting in order to hold an informal meeting of the Committee to discuss the request received from the Permanent Representative of Denmark, contained in document CD/38, to participate in discussions on the subject of chemical weapons, and secondly, to discuss organizational matters in connexion with the question raised by the Soviet delegate and supported by the delegation of the Netherlands.

Mr. FONSEKA (Sri Lanka): Mr. Chairman, I would merely like some clarification as to whether you have reached a decision on the proposal that the work of this Committee continue until 24 August, or if it is still to be considered.

The CHAIRMAN: It is not the intention of the Chairman to introduce this question for discussion during the informal meeting. Later, after discussion of this matter with several delegations, the Chairman will propose a special meeting, this week, to consider the question of the closing date of this session and the annual report.

The meeting was suspended at 11.40 a.m. and reconvened at 12.35 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: With regard to the request made by the Permanent Representative of Denmark contained in document CD/38, I propose that we adopt the following decision:

"By virtue of rules 33-35 of our Rules of Procedure, we shall invite the representative of Denmark to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament for the consideration of the fifth item of its programme of work (Chemical weapons) between 17 and 27 July both at its formal and at its informal meetings as well as in any subsidiary body that the Committee may establish on that item. In accordance with the above-mentioned request, the representative of Denmark will also be invited to participate in the work of the Committee on this item during the remainder of this current second part of the 1979 session of the Committee."

I see no objection.

It was so decided.

(The Chairman)

Before closing the plenary meeting, I would like to inform the Committee that the ad hoc working group on security assurances will hold a meeting tomorrow, Wednesday, 18 July, at 3 p.m. in this room. I have also been requested to announce that there will be a meeting of the contact group of this ad hoc working group at 3.30 p.m. today in room C.108.

. The next plenary meeting of the Committee will take place on Thursday, 19 July 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.