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12 July 1979
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FORTY-FIRST MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 12 July 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. P. VOUTOV

(Bulgaria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENSMAIL

Argentina: Mr. A. DUMONT

Australia: Sir James PLIISOLL
Ms. M. WICKES

Belgium: Mr. P. BERG
Mr. G. VAN DUYSSE

Brazil: Mr. S. DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. C. HALACHEV
Mr. P. KAMENOV

Burma: U NGWE WIN

Canada: Mr. R. HARRY JAY
Mr. J.T. SIMARD

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. V. TYLNER
Mr. J. JIRUŠEK^{OV}

Egypt: Mr. O. EL-SHAFEI
Mr. M. EL-BARADEI
Mr. N. FAIMY

Ethiopia: Mr. G. ALULA

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. W. KOETTER
Mr. H. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. H. IÜLLER

Hungary: Mr. M. DOMOKOS
Mr. C. GYÖRFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India: Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN
Mr. S.T. DEVARE

Indonesia: Mr. D.B. SULEMAN
Mr. I.H. DAMANIK

Iran: Mr. D. AMERI

Italy: Mr. V.C. MONTAZEMOLO
Mr. C. FRATESCHI
Mr. FOLCO DE LUCA

Japan: Mr. M. OGISO
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya: Mr. S. SIITEMI
Mr. A. JET ODENDO

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
Miss A. CABRERA
Mr. M.A. CÁCERES

Mongolia: Mr. S. DAVAA

Morocco: Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
Mr. N. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. A.J. DEERBURG
Mr. J.W. SCHEFFERS

Nigeria: Mr. T.O. OLUMOKO

Pakistan: Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru:

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. H. PAĆ
Mr. M. KRUCZYK

Romania: Mr. C. ENE
Mr. L. TOADER

Sri Lanka:

Sweden: Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
Mr. N.V. PESTEREV
Mr. A.I. TIOURNENKOV
Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHLIN
Mr. N.P. SMIDOVICH
Mr. V. GANJA
Mr. V. JULESHOV
Mr. B. SURIKOV
Mr. I. TCHERBAKOV

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. B. MIKULAK
Mr. D. KOELEMAY
Mr. C. FLOWERREE
Mr. T. BARTHELEMY
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY
Mr. W. DUNLOP
Mr. M. DALEY

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mrs. R.L. DE NECER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU

Secretary:

Mr. RIKHI JAIPAL

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 41st plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. I take pleasure in extending a most cordial welcome on behalf of all members of the Committee to the new representative of Italy, Ambassador Vittorio Cordero di Montezemolo. I am sure that I reflect the feeling of the Committee in conveying to that distinguished diplomat our assurance of continuing the close co-operation that we had with his predecessor, Ambassador Nicolo Di Bernardo who leaves this Committee after a long and outstanding contribution to our work. I have also much pleasure in welcoming most cordially, on behalf of the Committee, Ambassador Dr. Luis Sola Vila of Cuba, who is well known to the members and who has now assumed his functions as Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations Office at Geneva. I would like to extend to him also assurances of our close co-operation. I would like to inform the Committee that the following documents are being circulated today in the Committee:

CD/33 of 10 July 1979: "Letter dated 6 July 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations Office at Geneva, addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament, transmitting the text of a letter from the President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic to the President of the United States of America and the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics";

CD/34 of 10 July 1979: "Letter dated 9 July 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations Office at Geneva, addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning article 34 of the rules of procedure";

CD/35 of 10 July 1979: "Letter dated 10 July 1979 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Committee on Disarmament addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament on the negotiations on the question of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons"; and

CD/36, submitted by the Group of 21, "Working paper on cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

In connexion with CD/34, containing the request of Spain to make a short statement in the Committee on the question of chemical weapons, I shall revert to that matter later during this meeting.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): It was at the very outset of the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament that my delegation expressed the view that, owing to the recent improvement of conditions in international relations, it should be possible to obtain specific results in the work of the Committee.

We now take pleasure in finding that those assumptions have obviously been confirmed in the context of the banning of new types of weapons of mass destruction -- a context that is so decisive to the future of man. The German Democratic Republic appreciates, in this connexion, the proposal presented jointly by the USSR and the United States on 10 July on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

We consider this result a first step towards a comprehensive and preventive ban on any new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The text submitted will be carefully studied by the German Democratic Republic. We feel that the greatest efforts should be made to conclude negotiations in the Committee on a finalized and definite text of the treaty before the end of this year. That would provide an opportunity to submit the draft treaty to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session, and to recommend its presentation for signature and ratification by Governments.

My delegation feels that this first important partial achievement should stimulate and encourage us to discuss more concrete steps on the road leading to a ban on new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

The objective of the socialist States is well known. Their intention is to rule out, once and for ever, any misuse of scientific findings and technological potential for the invention of new means of mass destruction. That objective can be achieved by a comprehensive ban of a preventive nature that should take full effect before theoretical knowledge is translated into military applications. This is a notion which has been fully confirmed by all the experience obtained so far with the arms race. This experience has shown that, as soon as a militarily applicable research result had been achieved, certain political forces

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appeared on the scene trying to push through at any rate the development and manufacture of new weapons, in order to use them as a means of altering the military balance of forces.

It is this kind of dangerous and adventurous policy which is being pursued at present by the sponsors of the neutron weapon. Its manufacture and deployment would lower substantially the threshold of the use of nuclear weapons and, consequently, aggravate to an alarming extent the risk of nuclear war. The socialist States would then inevitably find themselves compelled to respond to the threat. That would trigger off nothing but another round of nuclear arms race.

The problem might have been resolved right at the beginning, in its initial stage, had the development of that weapon been renounced earlier and definitely, as proposed by the Soviet Union as early as in 1977. Intentions to manufacture and deploy the neutron weapon, however, have not been given up, as is borne out by the facts. This is likely to underscore the topicality of the demand for a ban on the neutron weapon. A draft treaty to that effect was submitted by the socialist States on 10 March 1978. They remain ready for straightforward negotiations without any further delay.

In our days, we are witnessing a tempestuous advance of science and technology. What is happening in the nuclear field can happen in other fields of science at any time; the danger of even more horrifying and sophisticated weapons is real.

That very point was made in the Final Document adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and an explicit call for effective steps that should be taken was made with a view to preventing the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and to forestalling the dangers concomitant with such emergence.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

The Final Document, accepted by all States as a point of departure, is complemented by resolutions 33/66 A and B of the thirty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly which actually specify concrete tasks for this Committee. The two resolutions had been adopted without any vote against and supported by 117 and 118 States respectively. There are, no doubt, fundamental differences between them as regards the approaches they adopt to the issue of banning new weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that they all have much in common. It is their common intention to forestall the advent of new weapons of mass destruction; this, in our view, is the most important point they have in common. Both resolutions, remarkably, provide for agreed approaches and for the involvement of experts.

We strongly feel, therefore, that agreement on the next steps should be obtainable, given the political will to put the resolutions in question into practice and to translate them into action.

The sophisticated nature and complexity of issues relating to the techno-scientific problems of defining and interpreting results which, when used for military purposes, will lead to the development of new types and systems of mass destruction weapons, is not denied by any one.

It therefore seems appropriate that the problem should be tackled by experts within a working party. A decision should be taken immediately by this Committee to enable that working party to embark upon its activities during this very session.

At the same time, it will be necessary to continue discussions and exchanges of views on both a comprehensive preventive agreement as well as an agreement prohibiting certain individual types of weapons of mass destruction. The German Democratic Republic undertakes to make an active and constructive contribution to this goal.

Sir James PLIMSOLL (Australia): This morning I want to talk only on the proposals that have been submitted to us on radiological warfare. The Australian delegation welcomes this initiative by two countries. It is a very good development following out of the meetings between Mr. Brezhnev and President Carter at Vienna. It is welcome for two reasons: one is that it will bring the international community into a field of arms control which has hitherto not been substantially entered by any country. It is always easier to reach an agreement in a field where a vested interest has not yet developed. Now the countries of the world, and particularly the great Powers, have not made radiological weapons part of their arsenal, and we have a real chance, I think, of preventing this happening. This is the first reason why we should welcome it. The second reason is that, although it might appear to be small in itself, it is going to fill part of the total picture that has been sketched out on the control of nuclear and related weapons and potentiality. It is going to be a contribution to the total scheme of control and ultimate disarmament that we are working for.

I would also like to welcome the way in which the two countries have introduced this initiative. They have submitted to the Committee a series of proposals which they had worked out carefully, and put them to us for our consideration. Now this is a very good spirit on their part. They are two countries which, though they have the exclusive competence or interest in this field, have a very particular range of expertise and resources, and so it has been very useful that two of our members in this special position have taken this initiative. Though different forms of disarmament will have to be handled differently, it is in a sense going to be a pattern for the future of some things and, similarly, will be the response of this Committee. We must not approach it in a niggling spirit. We must not approach it in a spirit of wanting to make some amendments just for the sake of making amendments, or asserting the competence or the right of this Committee to do certain things. There has got to be a matching on both sides, and that is the spirit in which the Australian delegation will approach this matter. But we do have to give it careful consideration.

There are several broad points that will need examination by our Governments. One is the definition of the agreement -- whether it is too wide, in the sense of permitting things which should be controlled; or, alternatively, whether it is too narrow in the sense of not allowing things that States would normally want to engage in. That is one thing we shall all have to look at. Another thing is going to be the

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peaceful applications of some of these elements and manufactures. Both the representative of the Soviet Union and the representative of the United States in their speeches made it clear that they had recognized the need for peaceful applications. They have recognized the need for the treaty to allow that and not to impede it. So that is the second point that we will all have to bear in mind. And then the third one, of course, which is the most difficult one in many respects, is verification. And here we have to look at it in a way that satisfies us, that we match the requirements with the needs -- which means that we do not necessarily need in this convention enforcement machinery, inspection machinery, verification machinery generally, which is identical with that in other treaties. We have to take account in each of these treaties of the nature of the threat, the likelihood of it becoming a threat.

So these are the sorts of things we have to bear in mind in our considerations and, as I have said, we do not do it in a niggling spirit or with any feeling that we have got to make amendments for the sake of amendments. But we have to do it seriously. We have to remember that this Committee is in a sense a trustee for all the members of the United Nations. They rely on us to make the detailed examination of proposals on their behalf. That means that it cannot be a perfunctory examination. It means that it would not be, I believe, consonant with our duties if we were to refer this matter quickly and without adequate consideration to the First Committee of the General Assembly. We are not here to dump things in the lap of the First Committee. We are here to carry out the preliminary and exhaustive examination so that the First Committee will have some confidence that when something comes before it, it has already been submitted to scrutiny by the major Powers, by a group of other countries representing the broad spectrum geographically and politically of the world. And we will want to take advantage, I think, of any views that may be expressed in the next few months by Members of the United Nations which are not members of this Committee, so that it would be desirable for us to ensure that this draft document is in the hands of other Members of the United Nations.

And if we do do our work responsibly, carefully, it will increase the chances not simply of adoption by the General Assembly -- which is only one step -- but also the chances of wide accession to the treaty by the countries of the world. And that is very necessary because any country which has a developed

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peaceful nuclear industry might very well thereby acquire some capacity to manufacture, acquire and employ radiological weapons. And so we need, if possible, to get the entire world community to accede to this treaty, and in order to do this, as I say, this Committee has to play a responsible part.

Now as far as the Australian delegation is concerned, I must say quite frankly that we are not in a position this week or next week or indeed before this session of the Committee finishes, to give it that scrutiny. I have, naturally, like other representatives here, sent the text to my Government. It will have to be looked at by our experts, not only our scientific experts, but experts who may wish to ensure that peaceful uses, for example, in the medical field, are not being infringed or that dangers are not being left open. There will have to be not simply expert examination; there will have to be a certain amount of consideration and co-ordination between interested parts of our Government, and this will take some time. And I do not believe that it is realistic to expect that this can be done by this Committee before the General Assembly meets this year.

I welcome the fact that the representative of the Soviet Union and the representative of the United States have said that they and their delegations will be available for consultation by any members of this Committee if we have any questions to raise. As I have said, I doubt whether the Australian delegation will be in a position to raise any questions during this session, but I take it that these two Governments are also extending the invitation to us through our respective embassies to raise any questions or to pursue any consultations in Moscow and Washington. And, therefore, if we do not take the ultimate action at this session of the Committee, it does not mean that we are going to be inactive or doing no work. Work will be done in our capitals, it will be done in consultations, and I would suggest that the best line for the Committee at this stage would be to recommend to the General Assembly for adoption a resolution somewhat along these lines. I say along these lines; I am not putting forward a form of words -- "the General Assembly, believing that a treaty on radiological weapons would be a valuable contribution to world peace and security, welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have submitted to the Committee on Disarmament for its consideration draft proposals for a treaty on radiological weapons; notes that the Committee on Disarmament has begun consideration of the question of radiological weapons and specifically of this proposal; requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly for its consideration, at the thirty-fifth session, (namely, next year's session) a draft treaty on

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radiological weapons". Now that would ensure first that, through our report, the countries of the world, Members of the United Nations, had before them the text of this draft proposal and some account of any discussions we have had, and secondly it would also enable the General Assembly to record its consensus of what we are doing to welcome the United States/Soviet proposal and to give us a firm deadline for coming up with a treaty. I do not think it would be wise to say that it has to be completed at our next session, but at this stage I think that would be a good objective. However, it may well be that further questions will arise for clarification or that we might have another priority early next year, particularly with the Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty coming up.

Now what I am suggesting is not in any way disparaging the importance of this subject or the need for haste; quite the contrary, it is because we think it is important that we believe this Committee should approach it with a full sense of the importance of the matter, with a full sense of the significance of what has been proposed to us, and by doing so help to ensure that the widest possible range of countries will accede to the treaty when it is approved by the United Nations General Assembly.

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Comrade Chairman, it is a pleasure for my delegation to see you presiding over the deliberations of the Committee on Disarmament during the month of July; you come from a brother country -- Bulgaria -- with which Cuba maintains the most profound and fraternal relations of friendship and co-operation. We are sure that, under your able leadership, the Committee will make progress in the task before it during this final stage of its work for this year. You may count on the support and co-operation of my delegation to that end.

I also take this opportunity to express to your predecessor, Ambassador Celso Antonio de Souza e Silva of Brazil, our most sincere appreciation for the work accomplished during the month of June. I should also like to extend the warmest welcome to our colleagues, Ambassador Alberto Dumont of Argentina, Ambassador Sir James Plimsoll of Australia, Ambassador Kasem Radjavi of Iran, and Ambassador Felipe Valdivieso of Peru, and to express the greatest satisfaction at the designation of Mr. Jaipal, of India, as Secretary of this Committee. We are well acquainted with his experience and wisdom, which will surely make a valuable contribution to the success of the work of this multilateral disarmament negotiating body.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

In accordance with the timetable adopted for our summer session, the Committee on Disarmament is now considering item 5 entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". My delegation welcomes the joint proposal submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, contained in documents CD/31 and CD/32; this joint initiative is consistent with paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which states: "76. A convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons."

My delegation has taken note not only of this draft treaty, but also of the statements made by the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States, and will carefully consider all the elements in question, so that it may collaborate in ensuring that the treaty will constitute a further contribution to general and complete disarmament.

For my country, as for those countries at present engaged in a stubborn struggle for economic, social and other forms of development, this question is of special importance. It is alarming to note the figures of current expenditure for military purposes -- approximately \$410 billion a year, about \$1 million per minute on the arms race -- while the vital needs of most of the world -- health, education and nutrition -- remain unsatisfied. Today, the countries of the so-called third world have increased their military expenditures from 4 to 14 per cent, unquestionably as a result of the prevailing world situation, a subject which we do not intend to go into here, in this negotiating body, the task of which is to arrive at concrete measures for disarmament.

It is the developed countries that stand out because of their use of their scientific and technological resources for military purposes. It is in these countries that a large proportion of the labour force works in industries specializing in the production of military goods; the developing countries, in

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many cases with extreme difficulty, are using science and technology to solve problems of their very survival. It is vital, therefore, that the Committee on Disarmament should ~~make~~ progress in that regard. The international community is awaiting from us measures which will contribute to the improvement and final solution -- of the problem of halting the arms race.

One need only ask what would happen if the expenditure on research and advances in science and technology were used not for military purposes but for scientific purposes. The answer is not difficult; the utmost efforts must be made towards that end; we must prevent advances in science and technology from being used for military purposes; we must prevent such new weapons of mass destruction from coming into being. It is not logical, nor is it in keeping with the aspirations of mankind, that we should wait until such new weapons have been developed, until they come into being, before "calmly" beginning to consider how to prohibit them. What we must do is to ensure that they are not produced in the first place.

Paragraph 77 of the Final Document of the special session devoted to disarmament states:

"In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. Specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. This question should be kept under continuing review".

From a careful examination of this paragraph, we reach the conclusion that the most appropriate and most effective approach is to put into practice the part which states: "Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction".

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

In that regard, my delegation believes that the consideration of this topic is clearly consistent with resolution 3479 (XXX) and resolution 33/66 B, paragraph 1 of which states:

"Requests the Committee on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, actively to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to agreeing on the text of an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to expedite the preparation of specific agreements on particular types of such weapons".

We support this proposal. If, for example, an agreement of this type had existed, perhaps it would have prevented the manufacture of the neutron bomb, which was utterly rejected by the whole international community.

We do not share the view that agreements can be concluded when it becomes possible to identify different types of weapons. That approach leaves the door open for the continued use of scientific and technological advances for the development and manufacture of new weapons, even more lethal and refined than those already in existence.

We also base our position on the conviction that the text of any agreement that might be arrived at by a group of governmental experts would be paralleled by objective studies of the question. That would constitute a further contribution to the valuable reports on disarmament already prepared, and consequently a further step towards general and complete disarmament.

We believe that, if, in its report to the thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly, in addition to submitting the draft treaty on radiological weapons, the Committee also reports its agreement that the group of experts in question should work on negotiating the text of a treaty prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, this would be welcomed wholeheartedly by the majority of members of the supreme world organization.

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): It is my privilege and my pleasure to welcome the Italian Ambassador, Marquis Vittorio Cordero di Montezemolo, as head of his delegation in the Committee on Disarmament. I am very confident that we shall enjoy with him the same cordial and friendly co-operation we had with his predecessor, Ambassador Nicolo Di Bernardo. Please convey to Ambassador Di Bernardo our best wishes.

This week's discussions in the Committee on Disarmament are devoted to "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons".

We are glad to note that, at our last meeting the two negotiating parties, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, introduced to the Committee in two separate letters an "Agreed joint US-USSR proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons". I congratulate the two parties on the success of their joint efforts. I take it as a good omen for the future endeavours of the two parties to work out other joint proposals, perhaps covering even more important issues of disarmament.

My delegation neither overestimates nor underestimates the importance of the issue at stake. We regard it being important that a possible new means of warfare is covered by the proposal with the aim of excluding its development and application once and for all.

What is termed "elements" in the draft before us is a rather complete text already formulated in treaty language. Only the preamble is missing. But I think the Committee will not only concentrate on the missing preambular part, but also deal with the other elements of the treaty text.

My delegation is prepared to contribute actively and constructively to the deliberations in the Committee on Disarmament in order to give the joint proposal its final structure and shape. We share the views of those speakers who expressed their support for the proposal, but made it clear at the same time that the Committee does not feel it is under a particular time pressure to finalize its deliberations.

Full use should be made of the capacity and capability of Committee members to work out a treaty which will receive, upon its presentation, the unanimous support of the United Nations. The Committee should set an example by tabling a comprehensive treaty to which the overwhelming majority of States will accede. The Committee should therefore consider carefully how it can best organize the negotiation of the treaty.

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

My delegation feels that there will be a more appropriate opportunity at a later stage to deal more specifically with the elements of the joint proposal before us. We listened carefully to the explanations given to us by the two authors of the proposal during our last plenary.

I may, nevertheless, be allowed to touch briefly on two aspects which, for my delegation, are of particular importance. First, it must be made clear beyond any doubt that the treaty does not apply to -- as stated by United States Ambassador Fisher in presenting the proposal -- "any of the myriad uses of radiation from radioactive decay for peaceful purposes". The peaceful use of radiation must remain fully assured.

The second point I would like to touch upon is the verification system as envisaged in the joint proposal. It is identical with the system included in the Convention of the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD). We may go along with it, but it is our understanding that the verification system provided for in the treaty prohibiting radiological weapons is completely without prejudice to and not binding for any other real disarmament agreement which will be negotiated in the future. Agreements which require, inter alia, actual weapons destruction need a very different verification system.

Returning briefly to the item under discussion, namely, "New weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons", I should like to reiterate my delegation's well-known position that these weapons have to be dealt with not in a general agreement, but on a case-by-case basis. We believe that a meaningful prohibition of weapons of mass destruction can be achieved only by defining these weapons in separate agreements and at the same time by defining an adequate verification system which guarantees the observance of all parties of their commitments.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): In accordance with the programme of work we have approved, the Committee on Disarmament has begun consideration of the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Inasraelyan, USSR)

In the context of the present scientific and technical revolution, unprecedented scientific progress is inevitably accompanied by an increasing danger that scientific and technical achievements will be used to develop new weapons, and in particular new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. It is well known that the press and scientific and military circles in a number of countries are discussing in depth the question of using -- for the purpose of causing destruction, damage or injury -- various physical phenomena which were previously not employed for such purposes and which can be used to develop new types of weapons of mass destruction.

In taking the initiative on this question in the United Nations, the Soviet Union drew the attention of the international community to the danger threatening it. Discussion of the matter in the United Nations and in the Committee on Disarmament has quite clearly revealed that an overwhelming number of States in the world understand the need to prevent the achievements of scientific and technological progress from being used for the purpose of developing new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The manifestation of that understanding is already an important result of the discussion of the question. The determination to prevent the dangerous evolution of events is reflected in a number of General Assembly resolutions, including the Final Document adopted by the special session of the General Assembly in 1978. However, there is still no unanimity on specific ways of solving the problem.

The Soviet Union is making considerable efforts to put into practice the idea of prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

As is well known, as long ago as 1975, the Soviet Union submitted a draft international agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. The General Assembly recommended that the Disarmament Committee should work out the text of such an agreement. The Soviet Union, taking into

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account the comments and wishes expressed by a number of States during the subsequent discussion of the problem, submitted an expanded draft agreement to the Disarmament Committee in August 1977. This document envisaged (a) the comprehensive prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, with a list of examples of the specific types to be prohibited; (b) the possibility of supplementing the initial list in the future; and (c) the possibility of concluding separate agreements on specific new types of weapons of mass destruction.

In the view of the Soviet Union, the road to a comprehensive solution of this problem is the most straightforward and reliable. Naturally, in proceeding towards the objective, not only main highways but also byways can be used. However, it is important that all these ways and paths should meet at the same point.

As is known, the bilateral negotiations conducted with the United States since 1977 on the preparation of a joint proposal on the prohibition of radiological weapons led to the achievement of an understanding on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. The joint Soviet-United States proposal on this question was submitted to the Committee at its last meeting.

The Soviet Union is also prepared to adopt the same constructive approach in future to the search for measures to prevent the emergence of separate new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, we should like once more to emphasize that the conclusion of separate agreements, notwithstanding their importance, does not offer a solution to the problem of completely sealing off specific avenues of the arms race, but rather increases the need for it.

In the Committee on Disarmament, as in official and informal meetings with the participation of government experts, a positive exchange of views has already taken place on the question of the preparation of a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. A number of delegations, including the representatives of the socialist countries, as well as of India, Pakistan and Egypt, actively supported the proposal for the conclusion of precisely such an agreement.

(Mr. Israelian, USSR)

I would like to dwell on one more point. In view of the fact that a number of countries participating in the negotiations attach great importance to the detection or identification of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, the USSR in 1978 proposed the establishment, under the auspices of the Committee on Disarmament of an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts to consider the question of possible areas of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The establishment of such a group would ensure an even more thorough study of the possibility of the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction, and would undoubtedly bring views closer together among members of the Committee on questions connected with the concrete definition of the subject of the prohibition. A group of this kind could, in the view of the USSR delegation, continuously observe developments in this field and, at the very earliest stage of the possible emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction, make appropriate recommendations to the Committee on Disarmament concerning their prohibition.

In its efforts to render the work of the Committee on Disarmament on this problem even more concrete and purposeful, the USSR delegation submitted working document CD/35 to the Committee for consideration; that document summarizes the principal results of the discussion of the problem considered by the Committee. In the informal meeting, Soviet experts will present further information on the scientific and technical aspects of the problem of the comprehensive prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

In conclusion, the Soviet delegation considers it essential once again to draw the attention of the Committee on Disarmament to the situation taking shape around the question of the neutron weapon.

The Soviet Union has already indicated that the neutron weapon -- a particularly inhuman means of mass annihilation of human beings -- will inevitably lower the threshold of nuclear war and consequently make its outbreak more likely. The addition of the neutron bomb to the arsenals of one group of States will inevitably bring about its inclusion in the arsenals of the other group of countries, and this will open up a new dimension in the nuclear arms race.

(Mr. Isomiryan, USSR)

The peoples of the world have quite distinctly and unequivocally expressed their attitude to plans for the development and deployment of the neutron weapon; they have given a resounding "no" to this weapon. The Governments of many countries have also spoken out against the neutron weapon.

The Soviet Union, clearly understanding the full danger of the emergence and deployment of this new type of weapon of mass destruction, announced that it would not embark upon the development of the neutron weapon if the United States refrained from doing so.

In its efforts to halt an irreversible course of events before it was too late and to remove a new threat to the peoples of the world, the Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, submitted a draft international convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons to the Disarmament Committee in the spring of 1978.

This draft is on the negotiating table. We urge the members of the Committee to set about solving this urgent problem.

Speaking at a press conference recently, A.A. Gromyko, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, remarked that those types and systems of weapons which had not previously been manufactured could now be produced. In that connexion, the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs asked a question: "Can mankind really reconcile itself to the idea that the danger of a destructive war using these or similar weapons will always be hanging over people's heads?" The Soviet delegation takes the liberty of addressing that question to the members of the Committee on Disarmament. The Soviet Government, for its part, has already given a lucid and unequivocal answer: no! All types of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction, must be forbidden and their production prohibited.

Our delegation proceeds from this clear position in the Committee on Disarmament during the discussion of all the items on the agenda.

Mr. EL-SHAFEI (Egypt): In your opening statement this morning, Mr. Chairman, you referred to the distribution of document CD/36 dated 11 July 1979 under the heading of "Group of 21 -- Working paper on cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and you may recall that at our last plenary meeting on Tuesday, 10 July 1979, I informed this Committee of the intention of the Group of 21 to submit a working paper on the question of cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The issue of nuclear disarmament and the cessation of the nuclear arms race is one of the most pressing and important issues on the agenda of our committee for this session and has been accorded the highest priority by the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly. The Group of 21, which I have the honour to co-ordinate, has considered and actively discussed the item, and has reached some conclusions which have been incorporated in a working paper which I have just referred to and which has already been circulated as document CD/36. We hope that this working paper will contribute constructively to the prompt initiation of negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

At this stage of our consideration of this item, the Group of 21 has concentrated on the procedural aspect of the negotiations, and in this connexion it has noted with satisfaction the initiative taken by the seven socialist States contained in document CD/4. In this connexion, the Group of 21 has reached the following conclusions:

1. The most important prerequisite for the initiation of the process of nuclear disarmament is the political will of the nuclear-weapon States.

2. The Committee on Disarmament is the most suitable forum for the preparation and conduct of such negotiations.

3. The question of the scope and areas of negotiations has to be solved in preliminary negotiations on organizational matters. Informal meetings and consultations should serve to identify the prerequisites and elements for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament; depending on the progress that may be achieved, the establishment of a working group could then be envisaged.

4. Negotiations conducted outside the CD should not hinder negotiations agreed upon to be conducted within this Committee; rather they should go in parallel, with multilateral negotiations complementing and reinforcing each other. Paragraph 50 of the Final Document is a key paragraph of the programme of action and should serve as a basis for such negotiations which should take into account the principle of undiminished security of States.

(Mr. El-Shafei, Egypt)

The Group stands ready to provide any clarification and to answer any question which pertains to its working paper.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): May I take this opportunity to extend a most cordial welcome from my delegation to our new colleagues, the distinguished representative of Italy, His Excellency Marquis Vittorio Cordero di Montezemolo, and of Cuba, His Excellency Dr. Luis Sola Vila. We shall look forward to working with them in furthering the aims of this Committee.

I should like to revert to item 4 of our agenda and very briefly follow several of my colleagues who have welcomed the proposal on major elements of a treaty on radiological material weapons, which was introduced to this Committee on 10 July with useful explanatory statements by the distinguished delegates of the Soviet Union and the United States.

The achievement of an agreement on these lines would be a modest but concrete step in the control of arms. By it we would hope to exclude permanently the employment of a particularly unpleasant potential form of warfare.

My Government is examining the text as expeditiously as possible. I therefore have no comments of substance to offer at this stage, but we shall be ready to take part in the necessary detailed examination of the draft in this Committee in the near future, with a view to reaching agreement on a text to be forwarded to the United Nations General Assembly as soon as that is possible.

Mr. MONTEZEMOLO (Italy) (translated from French): In 1961, I took part in the work of this Committee for a few weeks, and today, after 18 years, I am once again among you as head of the Italian delegation at Geneva. For all that, unfortunately -- and it is not Italy's fault -- although some results have been achieved in the search for peace, what has been done still falls short of the wishes of all the peoples of our nations.

Peace is our hope, peace is security; Italy, as always, assures everyone of its wholehearted willingness to co-operate in any initiative that may be taken.

Mr. Chairman, heads of delegations, thank you for your cordial welcome and the feelings that you have expressed for my country, my predecessor and myself; thank you for your good wishes, which will be valuable in my future work.

Mr. TYLNER (Czechoslovakia): Before I begin my short intervention, allow me to welcome, on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation, Ambassador Luis Sola Vila as the head of the Cuban delegation to the

(Mr. Tylner, Czechoslovakia)

Committee on Disarmament. I should like also to welcome Ambassador Vittorio Cordero di Montezemolo, as head of the Italian delegation to our Committee.

The Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as well as the resolutions adopted by the thirty-second and thirty-third sessions of the General Assembly invite the Committee on Disarmament to take appropriate measures to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and to continue negotiations in order to prepare the text of an agreement prohibiting the development and production of such weapons. In the recent period, we have witnessed how rapidly new types of weapons of this kind are being developed and prepared for action. Particularly dangerous, in our view, is the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons -- the so-called neutron weapons. The task of our Committee should be the matter-of-fact consideration of the joint proposal by the socialist countries of March 1978 and the working-out of a concrete draft treaty on the prohibition of neutron weapons. We have here a clear example of how the reluctance of those who refuse to agree to the prohibition of the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of how new systems of such weapons can threaten the security of the world. My delegation is therefore convinced that there is no place for further delay.

With regard to the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons, my delegation is convinced that we should start, without delay, negotiations with a view to working out a draft treaty. Any possibility of achieving an agreement banning new kinds of weapons of mass destruction should be welcomed and fully supported. We are therefore glad to hear that the bilateral negotiations on the banning of radiological weapons have been led to a successful conclusion. We welcome the joint USSR/United States proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons presented to our Committee on 10 July. Like others in our Committee, the Czechoslovak delegation is studying this initiative and has reported it to its Government for further study and instructions. We consider this joint USSR/United States proposal to be a positive first step on the road to prohibiting new types of weapons of mass destruction, and we hope that it will lead as soon as possible to a final disarmament treaty.

The meeting was suspended at 12.15 p.m. and resumed at 12.40 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: In connexion with the request made by the Permanent Representative of Spain, contained in document CD/34, I suggest that the Committee should decide to invite Spain to make a statement when the question of chemical weapons is discussed in accordance with rule 34 of the rules of procedure.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: You will recall that, at our 39th plenary meeting, the Committee decided to establish, for the duration of its present session, an Ad Hoc Working Group open to all member States of the Committee to consider, and negotiate on, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

You will also recall that informal consultations have been proceeding on the question of the chairmanship of that Ad Hoc Working Group. I am glad to inform the Committee that a consensus has emerged to request the delegation of Egypt to fill that post.

I suggest that the Committee should now take a formal decision to appoint Egypt to the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I have been notified by the secretariat that it is for the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group to make the necessary arrangements for its convening and work.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.