

CD/PV.39
5 July 1979
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THIRTY-NINTH MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 5 July 1979, at 10.30 a.m. and 3 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. P. VOUTOV

(Bulgaria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:Argentina:

Mr. A. DUMONT
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD
Mr. C.A. PASSALACQUA
Mr. G.N. MOLteni

Australia:

Sir James PLIMSOLL
Mr. A. BEHM

Belgium:

Mr. P. NOTERDAEME
Mr. P. BERG
Mr. G. VAN DUYSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. C. HALACHEV

Burma:

U SAW HLAING
U NCWE WIN

Canada:

Mr. R. HARRY JAY
Mr. J.T. SIMARD

Cuba:

Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. V. TYLNER
Mr. J. JIRUŠEK^{ov}

Egypt:

Mr. M. EL-BARADEI
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. G. ADJULA

France: Mr. F. BEAUCHATAUD
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. W. KOETTER
Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. H. MÜLLER

Hungary: Mr. M. DOMOKOS
Mr. C. GYÖRFFY

India: Mr. S. KUNDU
Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN
Mr. S.T. DEVARE

Indonesia: Mr. D.B. SULEMAN
Mr. I.M. DAMANIK

Iran: Mr. D. AMERI

Italy: Mr. M. MORENO
Mr. C. FRATESCHI
Mr. FOLCO DE LUCA

Japan: Mr. M. CGISO
Mr. T. NONOYAMA
Mr. T. IWANAMI
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. A. JET ODENDO

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
Miss A. CABRERA

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. T.O. OLUMOKO

Pakistan:

Peru: Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. H. PAĆ
Mr. M. KRUCZYK

Romania: Mr. C. ENE

Sri Lanka: Miss M.L. NAGANATHAN

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. S. STROMBÄCK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
Mr. N.V. PESTEREV
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV
Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHIN
Mr. A. VAVILOV
Mr. N.P. SMIDOVICH
Mr. S.B. BATSANOV

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. D. KOELMAY
Mr. T. BARTELEMY
Mr. W. DUNLOP
Mr. A. RADZIANKO

Venezuela:

Mrs. R.L. DE NEGER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU

Secretary:

Mr. RIKHI JAIPAL

Mr. KUNDU (India): I am glad to have the opportunity of sharing with this eminent gathering the views of my Government on some of the issues on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. I addressed the predecessor of this body, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, last year during its summer session. I welcome these occasions to exchange views with the distinguished members of this Committee in the hope that such an exchange will be of mutual benefit to all of us.

The Committee on Disarmament, which owes its origin to the special session devoted to disarmament held in New York last year, has the responsibility to undertake multilateral negotiations on disarmament matters. My Government hopes that it will fulfil its mandate with speed and dedication. We, on our part, continue to attach great importance to multilateral negotiations on the complex and urgent questions in the field of disarmament. We trust that the participation of the Government of France in the work of this Committee will contribute to the achievement of our common objectives. I hope that the delegation of the People's Republic of China will also occupy its rightful place in the Committee at an early date.

My Government is encouraged to find an increasing awareness in the international community of the grave dangers inherent in the ever-spiralling arms race, particularly in the nuclear field. The momentum that has been generated following the special session devoted to disarmament must be maintained and intensified, both within and outside the United Nations. The session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission which concluded in New York last month made an important contribution in this direction. My Government has taken note of the business-like atmosphere that has prevailed in the Committee since the start of its work this year. Several concrete proposals have been put forward which, I trust, will be given due and constructive consideration during the remaining part of the work of the Committee in 1979.

There is unanimity among the international community that the highest priority in the field of disarmament should be accorded to halting and reversing the nuclear arms race, and finally doing away with all forms of nuclear weaponry. My Prime Minister put forward an action programme at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament last year in which, inter alia, he proposed that nuclear disarmament should be achieved within a period of 10 years. It is nuclear weapons which pose a threat to the very survival of mankind. The special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament recognized this danger and issued a call to the nuclear-weapon Powers to begin urgent negotiations to reach

(Mr. Kundu, India)

agreement on the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, and progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time. I am aware that proposals have been submitted at the current session of the Committee on Disarmament to deal with the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. I trust that the Committee will not fail in its duty to deal with the matter with the urgency that it demands.

My Government welcomes the Agreement reached in the strategic arms limitations talks -- SALT II -- which was signed in Vienna on 18 June by President Brezhnev and President Carter. In our view, this is an important and significant step. However, I must emphasize that SALT II is only a first step. The nuclear-weapon States must move forward from arms limitation to complete disarmament, and therefore should promptly take further measures leading to actual nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. SALT II, we believe, should be seen only as the beginning of the process which must lead eventually to the total elimination of these horrible weapons from the arsenals of States.

The single most important item before the Committee relates to the long-pending question of a comprehensive test ban treaty. As I pointed out in my statement to the CCD last year, India proposed a comprehensive ban on all nuclear weapon tests a quarter of a century ago. My Government is disappointed that, despite repeated and urgent calls by the international community, a draft treaty on the subject has not yet emerged out of the negotiations among three of the five nuclear-weapon States. We appreciate that the issues involved might be complex. However, we are convinced that, given the necessary political will, it should be possible to bring the draft of a treaty to the Committee on Disarmament for early multilateral negotiation. The conclusion of the SALT II agreement might be expected to contribute to the generation of the necessary atmosphere required to overcome remaining difficulties.

While I am on the subject of CTB, I would like to recall to the members of the Committee, and particularly the nuclear-weapon States, resolution 33/71 C, adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session, on the moratorium on nuclear weapon tests. That resolution, which was co-sponsored by as many as 34 delegations, including 14 members of this Committee, and which was adopted by a majority of 130 delegations, has one simple operative paragraph which reads:

"Calls upon all States, in particular all the nuclear-weapon States, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, to refrain from conducting any testing of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices".

(Mr. Kundu, India)

We were very much encouraged that one of the two most important nuclear-weapon States voted in favour of the resolution. The very fact that the three nuclear-weapon States have been actively engaged in reaching agreement on a comprehensive test ban suggests that they have come to the conclusion that they do not need to carry out any more nuclear tests for their security. In the circumstances, the logical result should be a declaration of a moratorium on test programmes. The delay in this matter gives rise to suspicion, fear and frustration among the international community. Indeed, an immediate announcement by the nuclear-weapon States of a moratorium on their test programmes coming immediately after the SALT II agreement would help to strengthen the climate of confidence generated by this signing of the SALT II agreement and also act as a great encouragement for the work of the Committee. I should like to emphasize that the urgent appeal of the General Assembly is addressed to all the nuclear-weapon States.

Another question which the negotiating body has been discussing for the past several years and which is of a priority nature is the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and the destruction of their existing stockpiles. We are of the view that this item should be given serious consideration by the Committee during this session. Recognizing the need for urgent action on this question, I understand that the Committee decided at the end of the first part of the current session to begin consideration of various proposals so as to finalize the procedural arrangements to undertake negotiations on the subject of chemical weapons. It is my hope that the period of 16 to 27 July which has been earmarked for consideration of the question of chemical weapons will see the beginning of actual negotiations on this long overdue matter, so that a draft convention can be prepared without any undue delay.

On the agenda of the Committee for the current session there is an item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". Along with all the other non-aligned countries, my Government has consistently attached great importance to the proposal for the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any country under any circumstances. The non-aligned countries have put forward a proposal for the conclusion of an international convention on the subject in the conviction that it would give the all-important fillip in the direction of nuclear disarmament and a real and meaningful assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States. The General Assembly gave expression to this conviction in its resolution 1653 (XVI), adopted in 1961, in which it declared that the use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the aims of the United Nations, a direct violation of the Charter, and contrary to the rules of international law and the laws of humanity. The General Assembly at its thirty-third session also adopted a resolution, largely at

(Mr. Kundu, India)

India's initiative, in which it declared that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity and that, therefore, the use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited pending nuclear disarmament. The only effective and credible guarantee against nuclear weapons would be an unconditional undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to use such weapons under any circumstances.

My Government has taken note of the unilateral assurances given by nuclear-weapon States which are currently being referred to and discussed in the Committee. The difficulty with such negative security assurances, however, is that, apart from being conditional, they might divert the attention of the international community from the principal objective of nuclear disarmament. In this context, distinguished members will recall how the international community practically failed to pursue the objective of general and complete disarmament and devoted its efforts over the past two decades almost entirely to a discussion of non-armament and other collateral measures. An undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against certain regions alone could not be very helpful, since the consequences of a nuclear catastrophe would not be confined to the national boundaries of nuclear-weapon States alone for the simple reason that the air that we breathe and the environment in which we live are indivisible. The probability of nuclear missiles hitting unintended targets must be taken into account, since no mechanism devised by human beings can be foolproof. It would then be small consolation to a non-nuclear-weapon State to be told that the nuclear weapon that caused havoc to it was not really meant for it. Furthermore, the concept of negative security assurances amounts to an endorsement of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which my Government does not accept. We cannot accept the legitimate use of nuclear weapons which again is implicit in the proposals for negative guarantees. Peace and national security based on nuclear deterrence could never be lasting and genuine.

Mankind today is confronted with a choice which could have consequences which are even difficult to envisage fully: we must immediately halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation. The very survival of our planet, as we know it today, is at stake. To meet this historic challenge is in the political and economic interests of all nations and peoples of the world. Peace, international security and economic development are all interrelated. The arms race has become an obstacle to the achievement of the new international economic order, as well as to the solution of other problems facing us all. I am confident that this Committee is fully conscious of the heavy responsibilities that have been entrusted to it by the United Nations as well as of their hopes for early, meaningful results in the field of disarmament. I wish the Committee success in its work.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Comrade Chairman, may I join you in welcoming the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of India and in thanking him for the contribution he has just made by his statement to the work of this Committee. Taking into consideration the particularly active role which India is playing in our Committee and in the cause of disarmament as well, my delegation will make a careful study of his statement and the conclusions he drew. At the outset of my today's statement, Comrade Chairman, I should like to congratulate you as the representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, a country with which my country maintains close and friendly relations, on the assumption of the post of Chairman of this Committee. I wish you, on behalf of my delegation, much success in discharging this responsible function during the current month of July. I should also like to welcome Ambassador Jaipal in his new capacity as Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General. My delegation is convinced, Ambassador Jaipal, that your experience and your abilities will largely contribute to help the CD in achieving further progress in its work. Furthermore, I wish to express our thanks to Ambassador de Souza e Silva of Brazil, Chairman of the last month. Under his able and flexible leadership the Committee was able to make some progress, thus improving conditions for making further strides in its efforts to achieve real disarmament.

Progress on the way towards nuclear disarmament should take a central place in efforts to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament. This was underlined once again in the statements of many representatives in the course of this year's session of the Committee. In the framework of the agenda item on the strengthening of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States they rightly pointed to the fact that complete prohibition of the production of nuclear weapons and destruction of existing stockpiles offer the most effective and most reliable guarantee of preventing a nuclear war. The agenda item "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" to be dealt with now by the Committee meets this concern.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

For this reason my delegation favours the activities stimulated by the proposal made by some socialist States to start negotiations on the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed (CD/4). The conditions and prerequisites for this purpose have meanwhile been enhanced. The Committee can rely on the support of the overwhelming majority of delegations for this proposal. In the course of the discussion of this document so far valuable ideas have been put forward which should be examined and appraised in the course of future work. The question we face now is how we can reach concrete substantial progress under prevailing conditions. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic would like to present some considerations in this respect.

As to the subject -- the multifaceted problem of nuclear disarmament on the one hand, and the variety of measures conducive to the solution of this problem on the other -- the proposal made by the socialist States is of a truly comprehensive nature. In his statement on 19 April, Ambassador Fein, the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, raised objections to this proposal which seemed to him rather broad and imprecise (CD/PV.28). In our opinion, it is precisely its scope and comprehensive nature which constitute the decisive advantage of the proposal. It meets the concepts of other States, poses no preconditions and is open to every constructive idea. It would be well if as many States as possible, among them the Netherlands, continued to make active use of this possibility.

It is with interest that we have taken note of the assessment made by the delegation of Sweden when it noted that the way proposed in document CD/4 leads to the achievement of complete nuclear disarmament, as stated in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which was adopted by all States. The delegation of the

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

German Democratic Republic shares the conclusion that all the elements and measures aimed at ending the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament contained in paragraph 50 of the Final Document should be discussed together.

Many States have made concrete proposals which, in our opinion, should be taken into consideration during the discussion of document CD/4. Sweden, one year ago, elaborated a catalogue of possible partial measures in document CCD/554. As you know, various other States have also presented different ideas on partial measures and submitted proposals in this respect. The socialist States and a number of other States consider the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons to be the central issue. The immediate cessation of the production of nuclear weapons would be a radical final step, and would go to the root of the problem. The development of new types of nuclear weapons undermining the agreed stipulations on disarmament -- and thus merely diverting and not really reducing the nuclear arms race -- could be prevented in this way. At the same time, favourable conditions could be created for the subsequent reduction of nuclear weapon stockpiles.

At the tenth special session of the General Assembly, Canada referred to the "strategy of suffocation of the nuclear arms race" and introduced resolution 33/91 H at the thirty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, inviting the Committee on Disarmament to discuss the issue of halting the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Such members of the Committee as Australia, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Romania and Sweden, are, among others, sponsors of the resolution.

As Ambassador Fisher stated on 29 March this year (CD/PV.23), the United States considers the reduction of means of delivery for nuclear weapons to be a good way towards nuclear disarmament. The United States President has even declared the readiness of the United States to make far-reaching reductions -- up to 50 per cent -- and, in the communiqué of the Vienna Soviet-United States summit, reaffirmed the final goal of definitely eliminating nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

These and many other ideas and statements correspond to the issues contained in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, and are essentially accepted, in one or another form, by all States as partial steps towards nuclear disarmament. The intention to contribute to the implementation of paragraph 50 of the Final Document is also the basis of the proposals contained in document CD/4. Thus, formal consensus exists on the general approach. Now the task before us is to consolidate the different initiatives into a programme of concrete measures acceptable to all States.

My delegation is of the view that after the useful exchange of opinions at the spring session it is now time to start consultations immediately. In this respect practical preparations, dates and procedures for the negotiations should be agreed upon.

We consider the setting up of an ad hoc working group open to all members of the Committee as the most appropriate form of resolving questions of content as well as of organization. In this working group all those States that have proposed nuclear disarmament measures should at first present their intentions in a more precise way and elaborate on ideas for their implementation. A comprehensive exchange of views could follow. The goal should be to reach agreement on concerted measures in order to start a process gradually leading towards the general and complete elimination of all nuclear weapons.

All States recognize the urgent need for nuclear disarmament. At the same time, we should clearly understand that this is a very difficult, many-sided and long-term task. For this reason, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic proposes that the Committee should consider the possibility of setting up a working group as a permanent subsidiary organ which could act not only during this session of the Committee but also in the period between sessions.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): I wish to make a statement today on the second item of our agenda, namely, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". May I first say that my delegation has followed with interest the statements made on this subject during the first part of our session, and those that have been made this week. If there has been a common theme, it has been the unquestioned importance that all have attached to the need for effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. As the Final Document of the special session devoted to disarmament states, it is to such measures that the world community accords the highest priority.

It is understandable why sweeping and general proposals for nuclear disarmament should have immediate appeal. Our common objective -- general and complete disarmament under effective international control -- has been the ultimate goal to which we all strive. Proposals for the reduction of all types of nuclear weapons, and the gradual reduction of nuclear stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed would make a major contribution to that process if they could be realized. What we have to consider is whether proposals of this kind and at this time provide a serious and sensible basis for progress towards our common objective. Would they risk diminishing the security of any one nation, or group of nations? Would they be verifiable? Would they jeopardize progress which is being made in other negotiations? In short, do such proposals take account of the realities of the existing world?

As a nuclear-weapon State, the United Kingdom recognizes and accepts that it has a special responsibility to curb the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. We accept that no-one can be satisfied with the present slow rate of progress. We have welcomed the signing of SALT II by the United States and the Soviet Union. And we look forward to further steps, such as the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban, for which we are working closely with these two countries.

In parallel with these negotiations by nuclear-weapon States, it is essential to make further efforts to ensure that the growing international transfer of civil nuclear technology should not create new dangers of weapons proliferation. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons acknowledges the balance in obligations between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. We see next year's Review Conference as a means of broadening the consensus on non-proliferation.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

The concept of balance is particularly relevant to the quest for nuclear disarmament. Both in the worldwide approach to disarmament and in the regional approach, it is important that our efforts should not be concentrated solely on various aspects of nuclear arms control and disarmament. It is a fact that nuclear deterrence has helped to preserve the peace between the two major military alliances over the last 30 years. It has proved by experience to be a decisive contribution to stability. Proposals for nuclear disarmament measures which might disturb this balance have to be considered most carefully, not only in their own right, but also in the context of the conventional balance, particularly in Europe. Measures would not be acceptable to us which significantly disturbed the over-all balance in favour of those with the greater number of troops and conventional weapons. It is of fundamental importance that negotiations on nuclear disarmament must go hand in hand with the maintenance of the security of all the States concerned, by the negotiation of appropriate collateral measures to curb and reduce conventional weapons and forces. As the Final Document states clearly:

"The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage".

My delegation therefore welcomed the importance which the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union attached in his statement on 3 July to the principle of undiminished security for all States. As on previous occasions, he argued that the degree of participation in each stage of possible negotiations on nuclear disarmament should be dependent in some way on the qualitative and quantitative significance of aggregate military arsenals, that is, conventional and nuclear taken together. He suggested that this would guarantee a balance in any negotiations. I would like for a moment to examine this proposition. The implication is that there would be some trade-off between the nuclear and conventional arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States. But this is not clear: does the reference to participation according to the size of aggregate arsenals mean that reductions in nuclear stockpiles would be accompanied by corresponding measures to redress a conventional imbalance?

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

A relationship between proposals for nuclear disarmament and negotiations on conventional arms, including the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Vienna, needs in our view to be explicitly recognized. My delegation does not believe that such a relationship has been effectively recognized.

We believe that progress can best be made by continuing further along the path already embarked on. The nuclear-weapon Powers are already engaged in several complex and related negotiations. As we move from SALT II to consider the next stage, we would be concerned that more sweeping proposals, which sought to impose a new framework, might jeopardize the progress which is already being made. One set of negotiations could run the risk of damaging another.

In this context, we noted with interest the comments of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union on 26 April, when speaking on the proposal to establish a working group on chemical weapons. He said then:

"But we cannot simply share the optimism of those who consider that some kind of 'parallel' conduct of negotiations in the Committee will be a simple and easy matter and will in itself have a beneficial effect upon the solution of the problem as a whole".

My delegation took note of these words. If one of the negotiating States takes this view of the bilateral negotiations, we acknowledge the case for not establishing a working group on chemical weapons. But we wonder why, in the context of negotiations, inevitably more complex, on nuclear measures this concept of "parallelism" would operate usefully. It is not difficult to claim that one set of negotiations should be "mutually supplementary" to another. But if there could be disadvantage in conducting other negotiations in parallel in the case of chemical weapons, are not the problems and risks equally apparent for negotiations on nuclear disarmament? We should welcome further clarification on this point.

I wish to turn finally to the question of verification. It is no secret that the ability of one party to have the necessary confidence that another party is complying with an agreement has been the question

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

which has often slowed progress towards disarmament agreements. We have welcomed the assertion that agreement in any nuclear disarmament negotiations should be based on agreement on the necessary verification measures. This is common ground. I am sure it is also recognized that proposals for nuclear disarmament would need to be accompanied by more far-reaching measures of verification than the world community has ever experienced. But could such measures be acceptable to all the nuclear-weapon States concerned? As the distinguished representative of the Netherlands pointed out in his statement on 19 April, the main sponsor of one of the proposals before us has not yet accepted the elementary degree of inspection devised in the nuclear field so far. I am referring to IAEA inspection of civil nuclear facilities now accepted by more than 100 States, including a majority of nuclear-weapon-States.

I have tried to present my delegation's views on some of the ideas which have been put forward so far in our discussion on this important item. We have also raised some questions on which clarifications would be welcome to us. It seems evident to my delegation that the elementary preconditions for making progress are that all of us should be prepared to accept the implication of such questions as I have raised. These are real questions vital to the security of individual nations.

Mr. HARRY JAY (Canada): This is the first occasion that has seemed appropriate for a formal Canadian statement in this second part of our annual session. May I take advantage of it to congratulate you Mr. Chairman on your assumption of the Chair. The sense of service which you and your distinguished predecessor have brought to your heavy responsibilities of leadership has excited the admiration of my delegation and earned out loyal co-operation. May I also join others who have welcomed among us the very distinguished Minister of State for External Affairs of India, our new colleagues from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Peru and Iran, and our new Secretary, Ambassador Jaipal, the distinguished Personal Representative of the Secretary General. Finally, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to record that my delegation has noted and applauded the faithful attendance of representatives of those Observer countries who so obviously share our determination to see the Committee on Disarmament make a solid and substantive contribution to the disarmament and arms control field.

(Mr. Harry Jay, Canada)

There is no doubt that item II of our annual agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", is a high priority. The strategic nuclear arms race is continuing, although agreements like SALT II will help to limit it. Other nuclear-weapon Powers are actively developing their own systems. At the same time there are few, if any, indications that other current negotiations on arms control are achieving significant success. In these circumstances, it is difficult to be optimistic about efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. It is clear that, unless we take further measures to stop the nuclear arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament, the survival of our civilization is at stake.

It is therefore with special pleasure that I take this occasion to reiterate our welcome of the formal signing of the SALT II agreement. As my Prime Minister noted to both leaders who have taken this historic step, "this agreement is clearly the most important arms control achievement of our time". Canada believes that SALT II will contribute to world security by strengthening the stability of the strategic balance between East and West. In so doing it will increase confidence and improve the atmosphere in which other arms control measures can be negotiated. We note that the agreement provides for the continuation of the SALT process, including further reductions in and qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms. It is the fervent wish of Canada that the remaining procedures for the agreement's entry into force will soon be completed.

The Committee on Disarmament is certainly an appropriate forum to tackle certain aspects of the problem of nuclear disarmament. At the beginning of our 1979 session, we received a proposal for "Negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed" (CD/4). On 5 and 19 April, Ambassador Issraelyan gave a detailed elaboration of its main features.

We share the view that, in dealing with this issue, consideration must be given to what effect the reduction and limitation of this class of weapons will have on the security of States. We agree that the "elaboration and implementation of measures in the field of nuclear disarmament should be buttressed by the parallel strengthening of political and international legal guarantees of the security of States",

(Mr. Harry Jay, Canada)

and we also believe that measures in the field of nuclear disarmament cannot be divorced entirely from measures of conventional disarmament. As Ambassador Issraelyan himself explained, not only nuclear arsenals, but also total military arsenals including conventional weapons are of significance to international security.

Ambassador Issraelyan has underlined that it would be necessary to proceed in careful stages towards the ultimate goal of limitation of nuclear weapons. We were happy to note that he insisted that the implementation of every measure and every stage must be carried out within established time limits and that transition to the next stage must follow implementation of measures provided for in the previous stage.

It has also been recognized that an effective system of verification would have to be implemented. It is obvious, in view of the complexity of the matter, that this system would have to be quite intrusive compared with anything which has been agreed in the field of arms control and disarmament up to now. We would certainly welcome any indication from the USSR, even in a preliminary way, on the sort of systems they would be willing to consider. Naturally these matters would have to be explored further by negotiation, but in view of the history of past negotiations it would be immensely helpful to know soon whether we may have reason to hope for agreement.

Once we agree that the Committee on Disarmament has a role to play in regard to nuclear disarmament, we have to define what role is appropriate and how it can best be fulfilled. Certain measures of nuclear disarmament, obviously, have to be negotiated between the Superpowers since, as document CD/4 states, "the degree of participation of individual nuclear States in measures at each stage should be determined taking into account quantitative and qualitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and of other States concerned". It is also specifically stated that this proposal should not be to the detriment of the current bilateral negotiations on strategic armament. It is generally agreed that the two major nuclear-weapon Powers have a particular responsibility to reduce their arsenals.

There are other measures which, as a follow-up or in parallel to the SALT process, would probably be best negotiated among the nuclear-weapon Powers. For

(Mr. Harry Jay, Canada)

example, one could imagine that at a certain stage all nuclear-weapon Powers would have to be involved in a process similar to the SALT negotiations. It may be necessary for the nuclear-weapon Powers in a given geographical area to discuss together ways to limit and reduce "theatre nuclear forces". We assume that the negotiations leading to the total elimination of these weapons should also include, at a certain stage, all the interested military Powers. There are also agreements which could involve only the nuclear-weapon States. An agreement for the destruction and elimination of existing stockpiles of fissionable material for weapons purposes, for example, would fall into that category.

Therefore, what kind of role can be envisaged for our Committee relating to nuclear disarmament? The Canadian delegation believes that this Committee should continue to concentrate on multilateral measures of disarmament. For example, it was quite appropriate that the NPT emerged as a result of negotiations in the ENDC. In our view, it should also be the task of this Committee to negotiate an agreement on the cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and other nuclear explosive devices. As a matter of fact, resolution 33/91 II requests our Committee to do so at an appropriate stage in its pursuit of proposals contained in the Programme of Action of the special session devoted to disarmament.

My delegation continues to hope that the CD will give due attention to this subject at the appropriate time. We recognize that consensus does not exist for the time being on when that time may be. I want to take this opportunity, however, to make some further comment on the proposal, as well as to thank those delegations which have already offered their preliminary views.

We fully recognize that a ban on the proliferation of fissionable materials for weapons purposes is a partial measure. It was put forward by Canada at the UNSSOD last year as part of a package, the whole of which was designed to stop the strategic nuclear arms race. The four measures we then proposed were:

First, a comprehensive test ban to impede the further development of nuclear explosive devices;

Secondly, an agreement to stop the flight testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles. This would complement the ban on the testing of warheads;

(Mr. Harry Jay, Canada)

Thirdly, an agreement to prohibit all production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The effect of this would be to set a finite limit on the availability of nuclear weapons material; and

Fourthly, an agreement to limit and then progressively to reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear-weapon systems. These measures would not result, strictly speaking, in the reduction of nuclear weapons. Rather they would pave the way for such reductions. We believe that this preparatory stage is important, and do not accept the view that the process of disarmament must begin with actual measures of disarmament. But we do admit that a ban on the proliferation of fissionable materials for weapons purposes would have less value if it were not to be accompanied or followed by agreements to stop testing nuclear weapons and strategic delivery vehicles and to limit spending on such weapons.

We envisage that a number of preparatory steps would have to be taken before a ban on production came into effect. These steps would include the collection of accurate information on the total production of fissionable material and related production facilities; the declaration by nuclear-weapon States of ceilings on stocks of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and the expansion of existing verification procedures, specifically the administration of full-scope safeguards. These procedures would have to provide adequate assurance that the total production of fissionable material is accounted for, or at least that any production of such material outside the régime would run a high risk of early discovery. Only after this stage was achieved could the régime be expected to enter into force with any reasonable assurances of success. There would have to be constant adjustments to the régime to take into account changes in fissionable material production requirements and improvements in verification technology. The key to the operation of the régime is of course confidence -- confidence in full disclosure and confidence in accurate verification. Once these and related conditions pertain however, it may be possible to envisage actual disarmament measures, including the reduction of ceilings on inventories of fissionable materials held for weapons purposes.

(Mr. Harry Jay, Canada)

There is other work to pursue in the area of nuclear disarmament. We expect to discuss at a future date one of the key but complementary elements necessary in establishing a régime of confidence leading to more significant measures of arms control -- a comprehensive test ban, subject to adequate verification. We have listened with interest to the recent debate on the subject of the negative security assurances. We were particularly impressed by the constructive contribution of Ambassador Fein of the Netherlands. We believe it would be useful for the Soviet Union to clarify some confusion that remains, at least in our own minds, since we have noted what we consider to be important differences in formulations they have put forward over the past 12 months or so. We believe we are justified in hoping that common ground can be found, and we look forward to working towards this end in the ad hoc group we have all along thought would be necessary to carry forward the unilateral declarations related to security guarantees which have been made by the nuclear-weapon States. But even if a common formula cannot readily be found, we should at least look into ways to give such guarantees greater binding force. In this connexion Ambassador Fisher's proposal for the incorporation of the various pledges in a General Assembly resolution deserves careful consideration as a possible first step. Moreover, we believe that the achievement of these measures would form the basis of a strong non-proliferation régime which would limit vertical as well as horizontal proliferation and would help to give confidence that real disarmament is more than a distant goal.

Sir James PLIMSOLL (Australia): The item before us today -- the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament -- is a very important subject indeed; it gets to the very heart of the work for which this Committee was set up. Up till now most of the measures that we have considered here and that have been taken by the international community have been measures of arms control or measures designed to prevent the emergence of new means of warfare. But what is before us today in this item is the consideration of actually reducing the arms that already exist, and specifically nuclear arms. And it is important on this occasion because it is mentioned so clearly in the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- mentioned twice, once in the preamble and again in article VI. So it requires more than perfunctory attention by the Committee on Disarmament.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is to be reviewed at a Conference next May, and many of the representatives there will be looking to see what progress has been made on some of the provisions of the Treaty that refer so specifically to the

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reduction of nuclear armaments. They will be asking what has been done on that subject. Now, as we know, more than one country has asserted that nuclear-weapon States enjoy a privileged position and that, therefore, that third country will not accede to the Treaty. That is an attitude which the Australian Government does not agree with -- we believe that the menace to the future of humanity and to human welfare is so great that no further States should become nuclear. I say that without qualification at all -- we do not want to see any other nuclear-weapon State emerge. But in holding the line we have to keep the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in effect, we have to make it as broadly acceptable as possible, and as part of that process we need to push on, if we can, with the subject covered by this item before us on the agenda. We hope that it will be possible to say at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference that certain things have been done, that there is a Treaty to end nuclear tests -- the comprehensive test ban treaty. We hope we will be able to point to SALT II as having been ratified and in force, for that will impose new controls and limits for the further development and use of military power by the two strongest nuclear-weapon States. And I think it will be useful and appropriate to say that the Committee on Disarmament has taken up the question of nuclear disarmament. It was, I think, particularly valuable that, at our meeting on 18 June, General Seignious for the United States and Mr. Issraelyan for the Soviet Union specifically referred to article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which does provide for action on nuclear disarmament. It was good that in substance these things were said but it was also good that those two Powers recognized the need to say them, and I welcome that very much.

But much remains to be done. SALT II is a big step forward and has been welcomed by the Prime Minister of Australia and by the Australian Government. The United States and the Soviet Union deserve great credit for reaching that agreement, and for envisaging further steps flowing from it. But it is only a step. It is a measure of arms control -- it is not a measure of disarmament. Moreover, SALT II covers only two of the nuclear-weapon States. There are

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three other States with nuclear weapons, and of course one of them -- the United Kingdom -- is involved in quite a number of international negotiations and measures, such as the comprehensive test ban treaty and some other things. But furthermore there are some States, not nuclear-weapon States today -- but there are some other States that are improving their technological infrastructure in ways that bring them closer to having a nuclear explosive capacity. That is something which should give us concern, and is an additional reason for this Committee paying some attention now to nuclear disarmament.

In considering the substance of this item we should, I believe, base ourselves on paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. It is the guiding statement for this Committee; it was worked out as a result of long discussion among countries, and provides a basis on which we should stick. The basic principles which Australia would adhere to, and which I gather so many other members around here would adhere to, are that there must be effective verification which has the confidence of all those participating; there must be a balance both in the composition of measures and in their effects on the security of individual States; and it must be carried out by stages.

Now we have before us a proposal by the group of socialist countries, document CD/4. I think that is a very significant document. It is significant for at least three reasons. One is that it sets out the objectives of a powerful group of nations, including one of the two great Powers, one of the two major nuclear-weapon States. It also demonstrates that there are many common elements on all sides in this chamber. It is important, furthermore, because it specifically recognizes that there is a role in all this for the Committee on Disarmament and for the non-nuclear-weapon States. It is not a programme of action -- it does not claim to be -- it is a proposal for negotiation. But of course when you look at it you see immediately that it is in many ways a statement of a major segment of the work ahead of this Committee. It is a very broad proposal indeed on what is to be the subject of negotiation. And I think the best way for us to proceed here at the moment is to express opinions,

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if we have them, on some of the items in this proposal or to raise questions about them. I think that is all we can do at this stage. But it is not a negative thing. It will be a step forward if, in this Committee during the debates on this item, we expose for consideration -- now or between sessions in our individual governments -- some of the preoccupations of representatives around this table, some of the interests which we have in connexion with our own security or in pursuing international co-operation. To raise questions is not being obstructive, it is the beginning of the process of reaching agreement on this item. Therefore I am going to raise some questions of substance, and some questions of timing.

First perhaps I should say something on the substance of the proposal. It is of course a statement of subjects for negotiation at different stages. They are in fact given under the subheading "Subject of negotiations" as examples, and the list is presumably not intended to be exhaustive. There may be other things that should be added to it as part of a broad programme of action and consideration that will last many years. That is one thing we will have to ask ourselves: how comprehensive is this in our approach to arms control and nuclear disarmament and the arms race? Are the various items all to be taken as a whole or can some of them be taken separately? Now this is not quite the same question as proceeding by stages or in accordance with a time-table, because I think it is very probable that the stages in nuclear disarmament are not going to be one item at a time or steps within one item at a time, but there is going to be a bit of a mixture, and the mixture may be all the more necessary if we are going to preserve the relative strengths of different countries as disarmament gets under way. So is it to be regarded as a single package? Or can we perhaps approach it one item at a time, or perhaps make a little progress on one item and then pause while we try to make some progress on another? This is a complicated question that I think will need a great deal of thought and may take a long time before we resolve it.

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The second question, or the second category of question, is: how does all this fit in with other forms of disarmament -- disarmament as regards conventional weapons, and measures to control mass armies. How does it fit in with, perhaps, measures on conventional weapons in regional arrangements, or within a region? That is a second group of questions that will have to be thought about.

The third group of questions will be: how does it fit in with other bilateral and multilateral discussions, here or in other parts of the world? There are quite a lot of them. There is the work being done by the International Atomic Energy Agency on nuclear safeguards, some of the work being done by that Agency on inspection, international machinery being established under the aegis of that Agency. There are discussions that are proceeding on the concept of international management of plutonium, which I think is very relevant to the discussions in this Committee. There is the work being done on international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation. And there will be the work being done on mutual and balanced force reductions. We cannot in our discussions ignore the fact that these other talks are going on. We may sometimes wish to take advantage of what is being achieved there, or alternatively we might sometimes want to draw these other agencies' or discussions' attention to certain problems that we think perhaps can be more properly pursued in those directions -- we may want to avoid duplication.

The fourth question is really very much related to some of what I have already said, that is: where do other countries fit in and how? On some points the initial responsibility for negotiations will have to lie with the nuclear-weapon States -- they have the arms, they have information that nobody else has or can have, and the vital security of each of them is at stake -- and that is something that we realistically have to recognize. What is being discussed today is the very existence of countries, and we cannot expect any country to take a great risk until it has had a full opportunity to assess what is at stake and to weigh up the facts -- that it is going to be asked to accept certain restraints, and that they can be accepted only if it can see that others are also accepting restraint, effectively verified in good faith. And so I think very often we have to recognize that progress will not be as quick as one might like, and that rapid agreement on words in this Committee or elsewhere might be an indication that it is not being taken seriously.

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As I have said before, to ask questions is not obstructive. To urge that we should not go too fast is not being obstructive. Australia has no wish to put the United States or the Soviet Union in the dock. It is not the role of the Committee on Disarmament to take the two great nuclear-weapon Powers, or the five nuclear-weapon Powers for that matter, and treat them as though they are witnesses accused in a court. Indeed I think we not only have to recognize realities, but also to welcome the fact that the great nuclear-weapon Powers have acted responsibly, and that the United States and the Soviet Union have taken the steps they have in SALT. But there is a role for other countries inside the Committee on Disarmament and perhaps out of it. We all have a common interest in preventing a nuclear war which might destroy the whole of humanity, and would certainly cause great death and destruction. Other States have a part to play in helping to reach effective agreements, sometimes even in bilateral agreements, because many of us will have to play a part in world-wide verification measures and also in preventing the spread of dangerous weapons and materials, through uranium and radioactive manufacture. And I think we all have a part to play -- all our Governments -- in spreading an understanding of what is involved in disarmament. I hope that the nuclear-weapon Powers will recognize that a contribution can be made by outlining in this Committee from time to time perhaps questions that they are not in agreement on yet -- some of the issues involved. Because if there is a wider recognition among the general public as well as in Governments that what is causing delays are real questions of substance, that it is not ill-will that is preventing an agreement but just the sheer difficulty of solving some of these complicated problems -- if this knowledge can be expanded in the world, I think that will be a contribution in the long run to disarmament. This Committee on Disarmament could be used more for it.

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I said that one of the questions that is raised by the socialist group's paper CD/4 -- and is raised in considering it -- is whether the elements for negotiation can be taken separately. I can see the reasons why we have to have a broad conception, a broad idea in our minds. We agree with that. But there may be some elements in it that can be tackled -- initially at any rate -- and Australia believes that the prohibition of production of fissionable material is such an element. It is mentioned in the Soviet proposal, and we believe that some progress could be attempted now without waiting for agreement on other measures. This was stated by Mr. Peacock, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, when he addressed the opening meeting of the Committee. Such a measure, commonly called the "cut-off", would limit existing arsenals to approximately the present size and, by preventing further production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes, it would prevent the appearance of new States with nuclear explosive capacity. That is a practical objective and it is worth exploring the possibility of making progress on it. And it would be non-discriminatory between the nuclear-weapon States and others. It would require the adoption of common safeguards applicable to all States -- nuclear-weapon States and other States. I am not going to go into any detail on this now because we have just heard a statement by the representative of Canada, with which I found myself very much in agreement. I shall merely say, without taking up the time of the Committee by repeating it, that I associate Australia with the detailed remarks that the representative of Canada made on this subject.

I do not underrate the difficulties of getting some agreement on this. There was a resolution of the General Assembly -- 33/91 H -- which calls for some action; two of the nuclear-weapon States voted for it, one voted against, one abstained, and one did not participate in the vote. So we must not underestimate the difficulties -- we must recognize that there are considerable differences between the nuclear-weapon States on it. But our approach is a gradual one, we hope to prevent production of material from which nuclear weapons are manufactured, and we prefer this as an initial step to the more ambitious -- but I think less attainable -- early objective of the cessation

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of the production of nuclear weapons. I hope that those who at present have reservations on attempting it -- and I say on attempting it because we may find when we go into it that the difficulties are so great that progress is going to have to be seen as a long-term thing -- but I hope that those who have so far been opposed to even attempting to make a start might reconsider it. Let us put our toe in the water. If the water is too cold or too hot, we can pull it out again. But it would be worth while exploring the possibilities of doing something on it and opening up at least an exploration of the implications of it. Let us see what the objections are, let us see if they are insuperable. Perhaps we might agree on something which will not be put into effect immediately but which might be an initial part of the building up of the whole structure of nuclear disarmament.

Those are some comments on substance. Let me say something about the timing. In the first place, I think before we are going to get anywhere on this, SALT II must be ratified and brought into force. Until we have that as a base -- when I say we have it, I mean all of us, but particularly of course the United States and the Soviet Union -- until it has been ratified and brought into force it is not going to be possible, I think, to get into the substance of the arms race and nuclear disarmament. Secondly, on timing, at least one of the nuclear-weapon Powers has said that all five must in some way be involved. Perhaps that, not just now, but later on, needs to be explored. Does it apply to all the elements, or are some susceptible at least to preliminary treatment? Can we discuss some of it without all the nuclear-weapon Powers being present? I am not expressing a view on that at the moment, but it is something on timing that we have to take into account. A further element on timing, and one that is of direct concern to us, is the state of work of this Committee. Can we, with the best will in the world, take our consideration of this item much further than a debate here in these meetings? Look at where we stand today, and I don't think we should be too modest about what has been achieved. I think, looking back over 30 years, that a great deal has been

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achieved in disarmament, and a lot of it has been achieved in recent years. In this session we will have something on the comprehensive test ban treaty. We don't know yet what the three negotiating Powers are going to report -- they will make some report. I hope that if we don't have a treaty, at least there will be an indication that we can have something fairly soon. We will have draft proposals on radiological weapons -- and that is something. It is valuable to stop the entry of the world into weapons which do not exist at present. There will be a beginning on chemical warfare. Now again, we don't know what the negotiating countries are going to come up with, but there will be a beginning and I hope that we can show that it is a beginning pointing to something within a reasonable time. There may be something on guarantees by nuclear-weapon Powers not to use nuclear weapons against States which do not possess them, or that are not allied with countries possessing them, or do not have them stationed on their soil. That I think is as much as the Committee can do in one session. If we try to do too many things at once, there is going to be such a dispersion of our energies that we are not going to come up with enough real solid progress.

And so, what we should be doing on this item is to recognize that, as I have already said, the raising of these questions in this plenary session and in the other plenary sessions, and the statement of positions, is itself the beginning of the process of reaching agreement. I do not think we need to have a special working group. The proposal of the Soviet Union is so broad and raises so many difficult questions that I don't think it can be adequately settled in a working group in the time available, and I don't think it is any compliment to the Soviet Union for us to think that it can be done in that short time: it is such a big and wide-ranging proposal. In fact, what we are doing is having here, in these formal sessions, the discussions that would otherwise have to take place in a working group. Here it is on the record for the world to see and to help it understand the issues involved. What I would favour is perhaps something in our report to the General Assembly, including in it the fact that we have begun this item, that we have taken up this question, that we are going to be pursuing it next year, and some account of the questions and views that have been expressed. That is what is required on this occasion.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Allow me, on behalf of the Mongolian delegation, to congratulate you warmly on assuming the office of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament and sincerely to wish you, as the representative of socialist Bulgaria with which Mongolia and its people have relations of fraternal friendship and of the closest co-operation, every success in that responsible post.

I should also like to associate myself with those speakers who have addressed to your predecessor, Mr. de Souza e Silva, the Ambassador of Brazil, words of gratitude for his valuable work as Chairman of our Committee.

The Mongolian delegation sincerely welcomes Ambassador Jaipal as Secretary of the Committee and wishes him every success.

We are happy to greet Ambassador Luis Sola Vila, the new head of delegation from fraternal Cuba, and are ready to co-operate with him in the closest manner in our joint work within this Committee.

Before embarking upon a statement of the Mongolian delegation's position on the question under discussion, I should like to say that we are speaking in the Committee today with a sense of satisfaction.

Exactly 10 years ago, the Mongolian People's Republic first began to take part in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. During those years of participation in the Committee's efforts, the Mongolian delegation always attached great significance to the effective functioning of this multilateral negotiating body, which is called upon to make a substantial contribution to the cause of achieving the aims of real disarmament.

It has not only fully supported all constructive and practical proposals in the Committee aimed at solving current disarmament problems, but has also, together with other socialist countries, spoken out consistently for the adoption of practical measures in the complex and arduous sphere of disarmament, and is continuing to make efforts to contribute to the effective work of the Committee in its search for positive solutions to the problems facing it.

In speaking about this I have no intention of taking up much of the Committee's time. Our modest efforts within the Committee are based on Mongolia's determination to continue acting along these lines so as to make what contribution it can to the

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common cause of disarmament. In this connexion I should like to stress once again that the achievement of real disarmament will continue to be one of the fundamental objectives of socialist Mongolia's peace-loving foreign policy.

The Mongolian delegation deems it necessary to emphasize once again the tremendous importance that Mongolia attaches to the role of the Committee on Disarmament. In this connexion I wish to note that the vitally important interests of the Mongolian people and its profound attachment to the cause of peace and disarmament find new expression in the proposal -- submitted to the Committee jointly with other socialist countries -- to start negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

In my statement in the Committee on 10 April 1979 I already had the opportunity to expound the Mongolian delegation's thoughts on this matter in detail. Therefore, as a sponsor of document CD/4, I should like today merely to confirm the Mongolian Government's position of principle in the matter of nuclear disarmament and to comment briefly upon some of its main aspects.

The problem of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament occupies a rightful place in the agenda and programme of work of both the spring and the summer sessions of the Committee on Disarmament.

Paragraph 47 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament stresses the need "to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons". Further in the Final Document it is stated that the achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages, and that consideration can be given in the course of the negotiations to mutual and agreed limitation or prohibition, without prejudice to the security of any State, of any type of nuclear armaments. It is our profound conviction that the proposal by the socialist countries, including Mongolia, contained in document CD/4, which represents, in essence, the first realistic response to the appeals of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly as reflected in its Final Document, is aimed precisely at solving this problem of primary importance.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

In the Mongolian delegation's view, a useful discussion on document CD/4 took place during the first part of the Committee's session. We note with satisfaction that many of the members of our Committee showed considerable interest in the proposal by the socialist countries, put many questions to the document's sponsors and presented some extremely valuable ideas which deserve careful study. As is known, the sponsors of document CD/4 took an active part in the discussion and endeavoured to contribute to a clearer elucidation of the full significance and meaning of the important proposal advanced by them.

We consider that the exchange of views on this question, which is still continuing today, confirms the correctness and timeliness of raising the issue.

It seems to us that there is in the Committee a considerable measure of agreement concerning the paramount importance of continuing the work already begun, taking account of the fact that the time has come to prepare the necessary conditions for conducting practical negotiations on the substance of the question.

An important statement was made at the last plenary meeting by Ambassador V.L. Issraelyan, the distinguished representative of the USSR, who once again specified the position of the sponsors of document CD/4 and, in response to the wishes of some members of the Committee, gave detailed explanations of certain aspects of the question we are discussing. The Mongolian delegation fully shares the views and considerations expressed in that statement by the Soviet delegation. In this connexion I should like to stress once more that all nuclear-weapon States without exception, including China -- which stubbornly persists in its refusal to take part in the work of this authoritative forum -- must participate in the proposed negotiations. As we understand it, China's turn to take the chair in this body will come during the period of the Committee's spring session in 1980. That is not the heart of the matter. What is important is that China should fully realise the special responsibility it bears before the United Nations as a permanent member of the Security Council.

The socialist countries sponsors of document CD/4 are fully aware that the finding of a comprehensive solution to the problem of elimination of nuclear weapons is a complex matter which calls for the manifestation of a spirit of realism, political will and determination, and for the mobilization of maximum effort by all participants in the negotiations. Bearing this in mind, the socialist countries express their readiness not to delay the solution of the entire problem of

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destruction of nuclear weapons and to discuss, in the negotiations, any partial measures aimed ultimately at the genuine prohibition or limitation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery on a mutually acceptable agreed basis.

As for questions of the verification of compliance with agreements on nuclear disarmament, the non-disturbance of the existing balance in the field of nuclear strength and the non-impairment of the security of States, the Mongolian delegation has already stated its views on these matters on previous occasions and I therefore see no need to repeat them.

The interests of the cause demand that the Committee on Disarmament should give the most serious consideration to the socialist countries' proposal and embark without delay on the consideration of concrete organizational measures for the preparation of negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

The most suitable organizational form for holding such a discussion would, in the opinion of the sponsors of document CD/4, be an open-ended ad hoc working group set up within the framework of the Committee. On this point a formal proposal has already been submitted to the Committee on behalf of the sponsors by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic. The Mongolian delegation, together with many others, appeals to the Committee to adopt a positive decision on this proposal without delay.

Recent major events in the world will undoubtedly have a favourable impact on the course of disarmament negotiations. Here I have in mind, above all, the signing of the Soviet-United States Treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive arms (SALT II).

In paragraph 52 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament it is emphasized that agreement between the USSR and the United States of America on strategic arms limitations should constitute an important step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and, ultimately, of establishment of a world free of such weapons.

In the joint Soviet-United States communiqué published after the Vienna summit meeting, it is emphasized that "President Brezhnev and President Carter committed themselves to take major steps to limit nuclear weapons with the objective of ultimately eliminating them ...". Furthermore, President Carter of the United States,

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in his statement after the signing of the Soviet-United States document, said that:

"Negotiations on strategic arms limitations, which have been going on uninterruptedly for almost 10 years, reflect an understanding of the fact that the nuclear arms race without agreed rules, without verifiable limitations and without a continuous dialogue leads straight to disaster".

All this gives us reason to expect that the results of the Vienna meeting will serve as a fresh impulse in advancing the cause of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament.

What matters most at this stage, in our view, is that this first session of the Committee on Disarmament with an enlarged membership should respond positively to the insistent appeal and request of the United Nations General Assembly, contained in resolution 33/71 H to proceed, in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the tenth special session, to consultations regarding an early initiation of urgent negotiations on nuclear disarmament and to inform the General Assembly, at its thirty-fourth session, of the results and eventual negotiations. In its efforts to implement this important decision by the General Assembly, the Committee has before it the concrete proposal put forward in document CD/4, which corresponds fully to the objectives defined in the Final Document of the tenth special session. Now it is important to put this proposal into effect, for this will undoubtedly represent an appreciable step forward in the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

Such are some of the comments of a general nature which the Mongolian delegation wished to make at the present stage of our work.

Mr. OGISO (Japan): Mr. Chairman, I should like to join previous speakers in congratulating you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for this month. I am confident that, under your able leadership, the Committee will make substantial progress in the work before us.

The Japanese delegation has appealed, on every possible occasion, for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament, which have been the subject of discussion under the present agenda item. But the fact that nuclear disarmament has not progressed very far shows the complexity of the problems involved.

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

My delegation believes that, in order to achieve the ultimate goal of the abolition of nuclear weapons, we should take various measures to arrest the nuclear arms race while strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation régime, and take steps gradually to reduce nuclear armaments. I believe this is the most realistic way if we recognize the fact that the regional framework for the maintenance of security is based on the principle of mutual deterrence which is derived from a balance between the sums of the nuclear and conventional weapons held by the parties concerned, and that such a framework has contributed to the maintenance of peace and security of the present world.

The Japanese delegation has, therefore, repeatedly urged progress in the strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, the early realization of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and the cut-off of the production of nuclear fissionable materials for weapons purposes. We have also emphasized the need for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation régime. My delegation, therefore welcomes the conclusion of SALT II as a first step towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and would like to express our appreciation for the efforts made by the United States and the Soviet Union that led to the conclusion of SALT II. I believe that SALT II will contribute to the stability and peace of the world, and will provide an impetus to the negotiations on nuclear and other disarmament measures, and in particular the comprehensive nuclear test ban. We strongly hope that SALT III, which is to be aimed at further quantitative reductions -- as well as qualitative restrictions -- of strategic nuclear arms, will start without delay.

Paragraph 50 (b) of the Final Document of the United Nations General Assembly special session devoted to disarmament refers to the negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

Japan has urged since 1969 that a cut-off is an important nuclear disarmament measure as a first step towards the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, and that it will also play an important role in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation régime. My delegation believes that realization of the cut-off, together with effective safeguards and means of verification, is a substantial measure crucial for freezing the quantitative expansion of nuclear weapons. In this connexion, I would like to take note of the statement of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union at the previous plenary meeting on 3 July, in which he referred to verification based on national means "supplemented by well-thought-out international procedures". My delegation considers that, as one of the international means to facilitate the verification of the cut-off, all the nuclear-weapon States should give serious consideration to the possibility of accepting the IAEA safeguards which are applied to non-nuclear-weapon States under the nuclear non-proliferation régime.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed at 3 p.m.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, please permit me to say how happy I am to see you presiding over the deliberations of the Committee for the month of July. My delegation's association with yours has been a long and happy one both within the old Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and now the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation is confident that your wide experience and long association with disarmament matters will certainly facilitate the work of the Committee for this month. In the same vein, my delegation wishes to place on record its gratitude for the important contribution your predecessor, Ambassador Antonio de Souza e Silva, made to the work of the Committee.

Since this is the first occasion on which my delegation has taken the floor at a plenary meeting during this part of our work it would be appropriate for me to express words of welcome to the new heads of delegations: Ambassador Alberto Dumont

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

of Argentina, Ambassador Sir James Plimsoll of Australia; Ambassador Radjavi of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Ambassador Valdivieso of Peru. I assure them of the close co-operation of my delegation.

Allow me also to express words of welcome to Ambassador Rikhi Jaipal, the Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General. We look forward to working with him and take this opportunity to wish him a successful tenure of office.

The item which we are dealing with this week, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, represents a very, very important question which rightly should attract the utmost attention of this Committee. Nuclear weapons, as we have all agreed, pose the greatest danger to mankind and to international peace and security. Unfortunately of course, the realization of the total destructive power of the nuclear arsenals in the possession of the nuclear-weapon States, and particularly the two major nuclear-weapon States -- the realization of this capacity has not been borne out by measures to facilitate nuclear disarmament. As a matter of fact, in spite of the nature of the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States, it is still painfully clear that the race for the development and deployment of ever more sophisticated nuclear weapons proceeds unabated. Contrary to the belief, of course, that nuclear weapons act as deterrents to war, it is arguable -- and many have argued convincingly -- that, in fact, the more nuclear-weapon Powers there are, the greater is the probability of war. This belief underlines the anxiety and exertion of the present nuclear-weapon Powers, especially the two most advanced, in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

My delegation, of course, shares the belief that prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is of importance for world security. In the same vein, however, we believe that the cessation of the ever-growing competition among the present nuclear-weapons States, particularly among the two most advanced, is more immediately crucial to world security. I say this because the immediate danger to mankind is posed by the deployment of 14,000 nuclear warheads with a total explosive power equivalent to that of about 9,500 million tons of high explosives between the two Superpowers alone -- and this is only in the area of strategic nuclear weapons. In the tactical nuclear arsenal of these two Powers, it is also estimated that there are 10,000 nuclear warheads, each of at least four times the power of the Hiroshima bomb. It has been estimated that the combined strategic, as well as tactical, nuclear arsenal of the two Superpowers represents the equivalent of about three tons of high explosives for every man, woman and child on earth.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

Now I have referred to this situation not merely for purposes of giving statistics but also because, in spite of the enormity of these arsenals, the race for quantitative and qualitative improvement is still going on. Negotiations undertaken with a view to reducing the threat of nuclear weapons proceed at a rather slow pace, and are overtaken by significant developments in military technology. Efforts at achieving and perfecting first-strike capability brings closer the possibility of nuclear war which, of course, will result in the destruction of mankind.

My delegation firmly believes that the only way to avoid nuclear war lies not in a strategic balance but in the destruction of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, it does not seem that there is an end to the quest for perfection of these weapons. The most basic step towards preventing the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons -- and preventing proliferation as well -- through the cessation of nuclear weapons test has so far not been realized. We know, again according to available statistics, that the number of tests carried out last year was 48 in all: 27 by the USSR, 10 by the United States, six by France, three by China and two by the United Kingdom. This was the same year -- 1978 -- of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, an event of major proportions which it was hoped would arouse the awareness, not only of the generality of people but also of policy-makers throughout the world, of the need to stop the arms race. This was the same year -- 1978 -- in which the international community affirmed that the cessation of nuclear weapons testing would be in the supreme interest of mankind and would lay a solid foundation for the renewed vigour with which the international community intended to tackle the question of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament.

If the spectre of the threat of nuclear weapons to those States that at present do not possess such weapons is frightening, then the thought of the perfection of existing overkill capacity should indeed give this Committee very, very grave food for thought. Sometimes my delegation cannot help feeling that the priority attention which we are sometimes asked to accord to non-proliferation -- and as I said we believe fervently that measures of non-proliferation should be taken -- and to the consideration of measures concerning non-proliferation, might represent to some extent a misplaced priority, because, if mankind is to extricate itself from the unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of nuclear weapons, I think our priority should equally be devoted to how we should begin actively to engage in nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

My delegation of course believes that the Committee on Disarmament, which is composed -- and I say composed -- of the five nuclear-weapon States and of 35 non-nuclear-weapon States, provides the best forum for considering at least the means of negotiating and indeed for commencing negotiations on nuclear disarmament. We hope that the one nuclear-weapon State which has not up till now found it possible to participate in the work of the Committee will soon choose to do so. Nevertheless, the mere absence of that nuclear-weapon-State should not prevent efforts to commence negotiations on concrete aspects of nuclear disarmament. Indeed, the initiative taken in this Committee by seven members, as reflected in document CD/4, has confirmed the view that the level of participation of an individual nuclear-weapon State in the stages ought to be determined by the level of the arsenal of that particular State.

May I add also, of course, that my delegation shares the belief that negotiations can and perhaps also should be undertaken on aspects of nuclear disarmament outside the Committee on Disarmament provided, of course, that the negotiations carried out outside do not inhibit the work of the Committee and do not prevent the Committee from effectively discharging its mandate, particularly in such areas where members of the Committee have agreed to pursue negotiations.

Certain basic factors have already been accepted by all as a prerequisite for any effective nuclear disarmament negotiations. Among these factors are the undiminished security of all States at a progressively lower level of armaments; account to be taken of the relative quantitative and qualitative level of existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States; adequate verification measures to be part of each agreement; negotiations to be carried out in stages; and special responsibility devolving on the two nuclear-weapon States with the largest arsenals. These basic factors have been accepted and are reflected in the consensus document that emanated from the special session devoted to disarmament. We think that these should not be used again as excuses for not wanting to commence negotiations.

In my statement in this Committee on 10 April 1979 -- a statement in which I commented on document CD/4 -- I observed that it is essential, if the means are not to defeat the end, for disarmament measures not to confer advantage on any State or any group of States. I said that precarious as the balance of terror is, an imbalance of terror may pose a greater danger as it may whet the appetite for world domination. In speaking, therefore, of nuclear disarmament we are proceeding from the standpoint that no sinister attempt is being made to put any State or a group of States at a disadvantage. The Committee on Disarmament cannot, if it is not to

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

betray its mandate, be party to this. I hope therefore that members of the Committee will bear in mind that we cannot continue, and should not in fact continue, to invoke arguments which have been accepted as a sine qua non, as explanations or excuses for not beginning to consider the implementation of a programme of action which is the product of consensus and which recognized these basic factors.

My delegation believes that, in determining subjects for negotiations on nuclear disarmament, we should bear in mind that the goal of these negotiations is the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons such that undiminished security for all countries -- nuclear and non-nuclear alike -- will be disassociated from nuclear weapons. Paragraphs 50 to 52 of the Final Document provide a general framework which ought to guide us, and paragraph 50 in particular is most pertinent to the present item of our agenda. It is for the Committee on Disarmament to draw from these paragraphs issues which, at successive stages, it believes can form the subject of concrete negotiations. In doing so, the Committee should take full account of any areas in this broad field which the most representative organ for international deliberations -- the General Assembly of the United Nations -- may specifically charge the Committee to tackle.

It is clear that, as long as the qualitative and quantitative improvement of nuclear arsenals continues, efforts on nuclear disarmament will constantly prove ineffective, if not irrelevant. Not only will such efforts be overtaken by technical advances, but they will entrench in the nuclear-weapon States that sense of insecurity which is the excuse for the continued possession of these weapons, and will make efforts at horizontal proliferation so much harder if not totally unconvincing.

In his statement at our meeting on 19 April 1979, Ambassador De la Gorce, the distinguished representative of France, said inter alia

".... the size and constant technical improvement of the arsenals at the disposal of the two principal nuclear Powers are at the heart of the problem. And because they have recognized this fundamental reality and the dangers it implies, these two Powers, by dint of efforts which we have acknowledged, have developed their own approach. My country welcomed this, while realizing that the results in terms of effective reductions of nuclear armaments will materialize only in stages and after long and complex negotiations.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

"Against such a background, what might be France's possible contribution? Our answer is unequivocal. If, as a result of substantial reductions in these arsenals, the disproportion between the nuclear forces of these Powers and the force that we intend to maintain to guarantee security and ensure the credibility of our deterrent should change radically, we might consider drawing the appropriate conclusions."

While my delegation may see these matters from a different standpoint from the distinguished representative of France, we agree with him in one respect that an important, some may even say, primary condition for effective measures of nuclear disarmament should be the cessation of the qualitative and quantitative improvement of the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States. I should perhaps emphasize that here there should also be a freezing of these arsenals. Unless these arsenals are frozen at a particular time, it is doubtful whether the horse will not always escape before the stable doors are bolted. Such an agreement for freezing nuclear weapons at the present stage should, given the distribution of nuclear weapons among the alliances, and given the counterbalance in other areas of armaments, should not confer an undue advantage on either side. I believe that such an agreement should also imply the implementation of two specific issues on which the General Assembly has specifically charged the Committee to undertake negotiations. I am here referring to General Assembly resolution 33/60 on the conclusion of the comprehensive test ban treaty and General Assembly resolution 33/91 H on the cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. These two concrete steps, if combined with the agreement to freeze arsenals at their present stage, would not disturb the relative balance or the relative credibility of deterrence as of now. These steps will make more credible consideration of other measures for commencing the process of progressively dismantling existing arsenals of all nuclear-weapon States.

What should be the nature of our consultation on this item?

It should, in the view of my delegation, as a beginning be to identify and agree on the stage or stages at which we can, at a later date, set up ad hoc working groups for the negotiations of: 1. Possible agreement on freezing of the level of arsenals; 2. Agreement on cessation of further tests; 3. Agreement on cessation of further production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons and explosive devices; 4. Agreement to place existing stockpiles of fissionable materials under international safeguards; and later on, of course, agreement on measures for the concrete dismantling of present arsenals.

Mr. PFELFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): Permit me to extend to you, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my delegation, our congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for this month. We wish you all success. May I also associate myself with the words of welcome you extended this morning to His Excellency the Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. Kundu, who was with us and who addressed the Committee. I also wish to express the thanks of my delegation to the outgoing Chairman for the month of June, Ambassador Souza e Silva of Brazil, who conducted so successfully the work of the Committee.

Since this is the first time I am taking the floor at this session I should like to take this opportunity to welcome our distinguished new colleagues, Ambassador Alberto Dumont of Argentina, Ambassador Sir James Plimsoll of Australia, Ambassador Kazem Radjavi of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Ambassador Felipe Valdivicso of Peru. My delegation looks forward to working with them in the same constructive and friendly spirit which we were privileged to enjoy with their predecessors.

A warm welcome also goes to the Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ambassador Rikhi Jaipal. I am happy to continue the friendly co-operation I enjoyed with him in New York at the United Nations. I am sure that we all will benefit from his skill and experience.

The item under discussion on the agenda today is the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. My delegation supported the inclusion of this item in the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. We are sure that it will remain a prominent and a dominating one on the agenda of the Committee for some time to come.

It is the second item on the agenda, the first being the nuclear test ban and the third "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

In point of fact, all these three agenda items are very much interlinked. They demonstrate not only the importance of the control, reduction and final abolition of nuclear weapons, but are also an indication of the wide field covered by the issue. Taking into account the efforts made during the last years internationally, regionally and bilaterally to bring the nuclear arms race to a halt and to reverse it, it is obvious that no quick or easy solution can be expected.

It has repeatedly been stated that disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament, can be achieved only within a carefully-phased programme. Undiminished

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

security of all States and their sovereignty are to be assured during this process. At the same time no side should be allowed to obtain any military advantage. It must be possible to strengthen world peace and the security of the States at a substantially reduced level of military armaments.

I may repeat my Government's conviction that all agreements on nuclear disarmament need to be verifiable. Fortunately there is already an internationally-accepted verification system in existence -- the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It should be used for the verification requirements of agreements on nuclear disarmament.

The Federal Government will continue to support all serious efforts to pave the way for and to bring about nuclear disarmament. Our positive attitude to the successful conclusion of the United States-Soviet negotiations on the SALT II agreement is well known.

But, frankly, we are not convinced that the proposals contained in document CD/4 have the quality to be used as the basis for further consideration in the Committee. Even the additional explanations which we have received during the last plenary could not change our impression that the proposal as it is formulated seems to be too broad, too imprecise.

The way to nuclear disarmament will be a long and a difficult one. The approach to be taken should be the one formulated by Mr. Helmut Schmidt, the Federal Chancellor, when he addressed the special session devoted to disarmament in New York on 26 May 1978:

"It has been the general experience that all-embracing, new, dramatic concepts for global disarmament hold out no prospect of success. What we need instead are many individual advances, progress step by step, each step taken with the determination to harmonize conflicting interests."

It is obvious that this process will take time. It will be facilitated by the maintenance and further strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. My delegation regards this as essential to create the conditions for effective agreements among the parties concerned to limit and reduce their nuclear weapons arsenals.

Experience has shown -- and I would refer to the negotiations on a complete test ban and on SALT II -- how difficult it is to bring about concrete agreements, even among the two or three parties directly involved in the negotiations. All we can do and should do in the Committee is to see to it that these highly complicated negotiations are continued and that the Committee is kept informed regularly of their development. This, together with the comments by the members of the Committee on Disarmament will be helpful in keeping up the momentum.

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

By and large, the discussions of this issue should be guided by the appropriate formulations as contained in paragraphs 50, 51 and 52 of the Final Document of the special session devoted to disarmament. The formulations reflect the consensus reached during that session.

We wonder, in this connexion, whether the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in the initial phase itself, is regarded as essential, or whether it will suffice that their participation should be assured when the first concrete steps have to be taken. The interventions of some delegations with regard to this question did not give a clear picture to my delegation.

Summing up, my delegation is not convinced of the usefulness of setting up an ad hoc working group of the Committee on Disarmament at this stage of international discussions and contacts. We fail to see how such a group can, under existing conditions, prepare negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament as proposed.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now proceed to the other item of today's plenary meeting which is the draft decision -- already considered by the Committee in informal session, and now circulated in all working languages -- relating to the establishment of an ad hoc working group for negotiations concerning negative security guarantees. The text of the draft decision reads as follows:

"The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its present session, an ad hoc working group open to all member States of the Committee to consider, and negotiate on, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

"The ad hoc working group will present a report to the Committee on Disarmament before the conclusion of the 1979 session.

"The Committee further decides, in accordance with rule 32 of the rules of procedure, that representatives of non-member States shall have reserved seats in the conference room during the meetings of the ad hoc working group."

Mr. BEAUCHATAUD (France) (translated from French): First, on behalf of my delegation, I should like to associate myself with those who expressed gratification at your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee during the month of July. We are certain that, under your guidance, our work will be conducted with maximum efficiency. I should also like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to your predecessor, the Ambassador of Brazil, for his contribution to the work of the

(Mr. Beauchataud, France)

Committee. Finally, my delegation welcomes Ambassador Rikhi Jaipal, Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, and wishes him well in the performance of his duties.

Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to question the agreement reached on the mandate of the group which will be responsible for considering the problem of guarantees. On the contrary, my delegation welcomes agreement on the mandate, which will enable the Committee to continue its work on that important question in a constructive manner. I should just like to make an observation concerning the French version of the draft before us. As you will remember, it was agreed during our previous discussions to use the words "and negotiate on" in the third line of the English text, and I myself took the floor to indicate my delegation's support of this wording. It should have been translated in French by the words "négociier sur" but in the paper I have before me in French, this wording has become "chargé d'examiner et de négocier les arrangements". I would like to suggest that the wording should be brought into line with the English text as follows "examiner, et négocier sur, des arrangements internationaux efficaces". In my view this wording should not present difficulties in French, for while it is indeed possible to negotiate something, it is, in any case, also possible -- the expression seems to me to be correct in French -- to negotiate on something. If there is no objection to the suggestion I have made concerning the French version, my delegation could support the recommendation submitted to us.

Mr. BERG (Belgium) (translated from French): Very briefly, my delegation would like to say that it agrees with and supports the point just made by the French delegation on the substance of the matter. It is true that what we have here is a discrepancy between the English and French texts, and that it would be appropriate to remedy the situation as regards the French text as it now stands in order to bring it fully into line with the English text, which in fact expresses what we wish to say and the view we endorse.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Russian translation also contains an error in that it says "to consider and discuss effective international arrangements" whereas it should be "to consider and negotiate on".

The CHAIRMAN: I think that the remarks and suggestions made by the delegations of France, Belgium and the Soviet Union are very useful, and would ask them to submit their suggestions to the Secretariat for inclusion in the respective language versions of the text.

If there is no other comment, may I consider that it is the wish of the Committee to adopt this decision.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: In adopting the decision under rule 32 of the rules of procedure, it is the understanding of the Committee that it will not constitute a precedent, and that each such case will be decided in the future on its own merits.

I now propose to suspend the plenary meeting in order to continue our consideration of item 3 of our programme of work which is "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". We will also discuss the communication contained in document CD/30 and then resume the plenary meeting, during which I can put before the Committee any questions which may have arisen during the informal meeting.

The meeting was suspended at 4.10 p.m. and resumed at 5.15 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to announce to the Committee that the Secretariat is circulating today document CD/26 containing the compilation of material on chemical weapons requested by the Committee at its 31st plenary meeting. The Secretariat was assisted in the preparation of that compilation by a consultant expert, Dr. Johan Lundin of Sweden, who is well known to the members of the Committee because of his knowledge on the subject of chemical weapons.

I put now before the Committee document CD/30, containing the request by the Permanent Representative of Spain to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of seismological experts. If there are no objections, I suggest that we accept the request and invite Spain to participate in that Ad Hoc Group.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Tuesday, 10 July 1979, at 10.30 a.m., followed immediately by an informal meeting on item 3 of our programme of work.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.