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FINAL RECORD OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH MEETING  
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Tuesday, 26 June 1979 at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

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## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENSMAIL

Argentina: Mr. A. DUMOIT  
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD  
Mr. C.A. PASSALACQUA

Australia: Mr. A. BEHM  
Ms. M. WICKES

Belgium: Mr. P. NOTERDAEME  
Mr. G. VAN DUYSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. A.C. DE OURO PRETO

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV  
Mr. I. SOTIROV  
Mr. C. HALACHEV

Burma: U NGWE WIN  
U THAUNG HFUN

Canada: Mr. J.T. SIMARD

Cuba: Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. Y. RŮŽEK  
Mr. V. TYLMER  
Mr. J. JIRŮSEK

Egypt: Mr. O. EL-SHAFEI  
Mr. M. EL-BARADEI

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. W. KOETTER  
Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. J. POHLMANN  
Mr. H. MULLER

Hungary:

Mr. M. DOMOKOS  
Mr. C. GYÖRFFY

India:

Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN  
Mr. S.T. DEVARE

Indonesia:

Mr. M. SIDIK  
Mr. D.B. SULEMAN

Iran:

Mr. D. AMERI

Italy:

Mr. N. DI BERNADO  
Mr. M. MORENO  
Mr. C. FRATESCHI

Japan:

Mr. M. OGISO  
Mr. T. NONOYAMA  
Mr. T. IWANAMI  
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya:

Mr. S. SHITEMI  
Mr. JET ODENDO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES  
Miss A. CABRERA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Morocco: Mr. M. MAOULAININE

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN  
Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Nigeria: Mr. D. ADENIJI  
Mr. T.O. OLUMOKO

Pakistan: Mr. J.K.A. MARKER

Peru: Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. H. PAC  
Mr. M. KRUCZYK

Romania: Mr. C. ENE

Sri Lanka: Miss M.L. NAGANATHAN

Sweden: Mrs. I. THORSSON  
Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. N.V. PESTEREV  
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV  
Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHIN  
Mr. V.P. PERFILIEV  
Mr. N.P. SMIDOVICH  
Mr. A.M. VAVILOV  
Mr. E.D. ZAITSEV

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES  
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER  
Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE  
Mr. D. KOELEMAY  
Mr. W. DUNLOP  
Mr. K. BROWN  
Mr. R. WEEKLEY

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT  
Mrs. R.L. de NECER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC  
Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. E. MULONGINDUSU

The CHAIRMAN: We shall proceed today with our consideration of item 2 of our agenda, Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Mr. DOMOKOS (Hungary): Allow me, at the outset of my statement, to welcome you on the occasion of your having recently joined our Committee and, at the same time, assumed the duties of the Chairman during the month of June. On behalf of the delegation of Hungary I would like to wish you success in your activities as the head of the delegation of Brazil, as well as the Chairman of the Committee, and to assure you of the readiness of my delegation for our utmost co-operation. It is also a pleasure for me to take this opportunity to express my best wishes to Ambassador Alberto Dumont, the newly-arrived head of the delegation of Argentina, to Ambassador Sir James Plimsol, head of the Australian delegation, to Ambassador Dr. Luis Sola Vila, head of the delegation of Cuba, as well as to Ambassador Kazem Radjavi, the new Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I am confident that our cordial and useful relations and co-operation with their predecessors will continue with them.

My statement consists of two parts; in the first part I would like to introduce a working paper submitted by several socialist countries, while in the second I wish to explain my own delegation's views on certain subjects related to the work of the Committee.

The socialist countries have for a long time been striving to eliminate the use or threat of use of force from international relations in the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations in the form of an international convention. It is a direct consequence of this position of principle that the socialist countries actively advocate the adoption of effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. At the last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the USSR submitted a draft resolution for the conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. The draft resolution was sponsored by many States and supported by a decisive majority of the General Assembly. The same thing happened in the case of the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Pakistan on that very subject, which is identical with the draft of the socialist countries as far as its final objective is concerned.

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As I indicated at the last plenary meeting of the Committee, a draft international convention has been submitted on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States by the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the USSR in the form of a working paper under the symbol CD/23. At the same time I would like to thank the Secretariat for taking prompt action in making the document available for delegations at such short notice.

In accordance with General Assembly resolution 33/72, the Committee on Disarmament included in its agenda and its present programme of work an item on the consideration of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The resolution "Requests the Committee on Disarmament to consider, to that end, at the earliest possible date, the drafts of an international convention on the subject"; in section B of the same resolution, the Committee is urged to make efforts "to conclude effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, including consideration of an international convention and of alternative ways and means of achieving this objective". Both these appeals imply concrete negotiations on the subject -- and this is warmly welcomed by the sponsoring delegations; the working paper is meant to facilitate these negotiations, just like the one submitted by the delegation of Pakistan under symbol CD/10 on 27 March 1979. The present working paper and the readiness of the sponsoring delegations to participate in an active way in the negotiations is our contribution to the efforts of the Committee.

I would like to dwell briefly on the contents of the draft with a view to enabling delegations present here in the Committee to become acquainted with it.

The draft reiterates the wish of the socialist countries to conclude an international convention. Different views exist in this Committee concerning the form in which assurances could be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The sponsoring delegations firmly believe that the most appropriate form for a binding international arrangement would be an international convention.

The preambular part of the draft convention also clearly indicates the position of the socialist countries that only achievement of the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament, leading to the complete elimination of these weapons, can result in complete security in the

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nuclear era. However, as a partial arrangement, the taking of effective measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can be a significant step towards strengthening international security, pending the attainment of nuclear disarmament on a universal basis.

Article I of the draft calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to pledge themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the convention which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no such weapons in their territory or anywhere under their jurisdiction. This implies a general obligation for the nuclear-weapon States not to use nuclear weapons against States falling into the category described above without any further preconditions or exceptions. The draft deliberately makes no distinction between categories of non-nuclear-weapon States belonging to military alliances or outside of them. States that have renounced the production or acquisition of nuclear weapons under valid international treaties have the right to assurances against the use of nuclear weapons, regardless whether they belong to military alliances or not. The provision contained in article I -- "which have no nuclear weapons in their territory, or anywhere under their jurisdiction" -- gives sufficient assurances to nuclear-weapon States that no nuclear attack will be launched against them from the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States. Such wider assurances would meet the just demands of the non-nuclear-weapon States and also would encourage more States to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons or their possession in their territories. It would considerably strengthen the non-proliferation régime and, through it, international security in general.

Article II of the draft extends the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States not only to the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States but also to their armed forces and installations under their jurisdiction, wherever they may be.

As far as the verification of the proposed convention is concerned, article III contains adequate provisions to that effect.

Articles IV, V, VI and VII make provision respectively for the duration that the convention would remain in force, the procedure for its amendment, and its entry into force, as well as for other procedural and organizational matters.



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These are the points I wanted to explain in connexion with the working paper submitted by several socialist delegations. We do hope that it will prove a useful contribution to the negotiations to be held from now on.

In the first part of my statement I had the privilege of introducing a draft international convention sponsored by several socialist delegations. Now I would like to explain the position of my delegation on certain issues relating to the work of our Committee.

At the plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament on 19 June, Ambassador Issraelyan, the representative of the Soviet Union, and Mr. Seignious, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency presented detailed information on the Vienna summit and the signing of SALT II, and evaluated the immense significance of that Treaty which has been brought about as a result of a long and hard negotiating process.

My delegation is one of those which followed with special interest the process of negotiations and desired its early and successful outcome. It is natural, therefore, that we join those who welcome the Treaty and its signatories.

The significance of the Treaty is manifold from different points of view; its future consequences may be even more so. Regardless of its bilateral nature, the Treaty is of universal importance, since the quality of relations between the USSR and the United States has a direct and decisive influence on international security, as well as on the possibilities of developing relations among a large number of States.

SALT II in itself is an arms control measure of great importance in relation to the most dangerous aspect of the arms race, namely, strategic arms and their systems which determine the prevailing balance of military forces and is a basic factor in any increase or decrease in the pace of the arms race. The Treaty, by going beyond numerical limitation is also a step forward towards a limitation on the technological development of strategic arms.

The problems of disarmament are immense and complex. They cannot be solved by a single Treaty based on mutual compromise, even though it is of great importance and has been signed by the two biggest Powers. Therefore it is natural that, while we welcome SALT II and are pleased to analyse its positive impact on the limitation of the arms race and on disarmament, we should study carefully and with great expectations the possibilities of further disarmament and arms limitation measures which may be opened up by the recently signed documents after their ratification. We hope, in this respect, that negotiations will be continued on the basis of the "Joint statement of principles

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and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms". In the improving atmosphere of mutual trust characterizing the summit meeting in Vienna, we hope that the principles of equality, equal security, the sense of reality and responsibility, and the readiness to overcome any difficulties that arise, which had ensured the success of the recently concluded talks, will prevail even more extensively and that within a comparatively short period, SALT III can be achieved and bring further qualitative and quantitative limitations and restrictions. We also hope that the ratification and subsequent implementation of the provisions of the SALT II Treaty will take place without delay.

We are also looking forward to the positive impact that SALT II will have on the disarmament negotiations carried on in other international forums. In this connexion we welcome the determination expressed by the two signatories to achieve prompt results on several disarmament subjects in which the Committee is directly involved.

It gives me great pleasure to refer to another event which we hope will have also positive effect on furthering détente and international security, and will facilitate the achievement of tangible results in the field of disarmament.

The meeting of the Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was held at Budapest on 14 and 15 May 1979. The communiqué issued on the meeting has recently been made available to delegations of the Committee under symbol CD/2. Delegations may be acquainted with the communiqué, but I would nevertheless like to underline a few of its most important elements.

The Committee of Foreign Ministers at its meeting in Budapest worked out several new proposals taking due account of the position and views of the other participants in the proposed negotiations which may form a good basis for bringing the positions of different States or groups of States closer together. The proposals can be divided into two major groups; one of them concentrates on the European area, the other relates to general problems of disarmament on a world-wide basis.

The meeting considered that the most pressing task was to strengthen peace and security in Europe. It was proposed that a major step in this direction would be the conclusion, among all the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, of a treaty on the non-first use of either nuclear or conventional weapons. Such a treaty would considerably reinforce the political and international legal foundation of the principle of non-use of force and provide reliable safeguards against the unleashing of armed conflicts in Europe.

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It is beyond question that a treaty on the non-first use of either nuclear or conventional weapons would be in the interest of all States. Although the renunciation of the first use of nuclear or conventional weapons in itself would not be a measure of disarmament in the real sense of the word, it would be a major contribution to strengthening the atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence which is so much needed in any disarmament negotiations -- bilateral or multilateral.

The meeting worked out proposals for expanding measures to strengthen confidence among States, and for taking concrete steps in the field of military détente. These are proposals of great significance and have a direct impact on other areas of the world as well, since they are meant to increase confidence among States in an area with the heaviest concentration of forces and arms.

Starting from the view that urgent negotiations and practical measures are required to contribute to the building of confidence among States as well as to the easing of military confrontation and the subsequent lessening of the concentration and reduction of armed forces and armaments, the States participating in the meeting proposed the convening of a conference to this end at the political level to be attended by all European States, the United States and Canada.

The meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs paid special attention to the need for ending the arms race and ensuring a decisive transition to real disarmament measures, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament. The majority of the subjects discussed at the meeting were essentially disarmament questions of decisive importance which practically correspond to the present negotiating programme of this Committee.

The participating States unanimously declared themselves in favour of redoubling efforts with a view to the early achievement of practical disarmament agreements, among others on such subjects as:

Bringing into force the new Soviet-United States Treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive arms and transition to the next stage of negotiations on the reduction of these weapons;

Talks on ending the production of nuclear weapons of all types and on the gradual reduction of their stockpiles up to their complete elimination;

The permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the simultaneous renunciation by all States of the use or threat of use of force in their mutual relations;

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The conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests; and

Measures to strengthen the guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States.

Following my statement made just now on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, I would now like to explain some additional views of my delegation on that subject.

We welcome the fact that the Committee has included this subject in its present programme of work. The importance and timeliness of making effective international arrangements and perhaps elaborating an international convention on the subject can hardly be overestimated if we take due account of present international circumstances.

The rightful demand of the non-nuclear-weapon States for adequate guarantees against the use of nuclear weapons to be provided by the nuclear-weapon States in practice emerged and developed parallel with the preparations for and the signing and implementation of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Conclusion of such a treaty would tend to facilitate and should contribute to the efforts to bring about a further strengthening of the non-proliferation régime and ensure genuinely universal accession to that Treaty, which is one of the outstanding tasks of the Second Review Conference to be held early next year.

The urgency of this issue has been reflected in numerous United Nations documents, such as Security Council resolution 255 of 19 June 1968, and General Assembly resolutions 3261 of 1974, 31/189 of 1976, and 32/87 of 1977. Being originally a part of the resolutions passed on the question of general and complete disarmament, it emerged as a separate item first in the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and subsequently at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly which, in resolution 33/72, requested the Committee to consider the drafts submitted for an international convention to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

During the discussion of this question at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, we could witness important developments in this respect. All the five nuclear-weapon States -- although in different wording and to a different extent -- declared their readiness to provide such assurances. Analysing those declarations, we can come to the conclusion that all the nuclear-weapon States concur in the necessity and rightfulness of such guarantees, and that they are ready to consider the issue in the Committee on

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Disarmament. This fact gives our Committee a good basis for starting concrete negotiations on the subject with fairly good chances of reaching agreement.

The Committee does not embark upon the consideration of this issue with empty hands. We have before us two draft international conventions, individual declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States, recommendations made by the General Assembly in its relevant resolutions, and other materials.

The two drafts before us submitted by several socialist countries and by the delegation of Pakistan constitute, in my delegation's opinion, a solid basis for consideration of the subject. I have just now spoken in detail on the one submitted by the socialist delegations. The draft sponsored by the delegation of Pakistan is also a valuable contribution to our future work.

I should like also to say a few words about how my delegation thinks the Committee should proceed with the consideration of the subject. The delegation of Pakistan has expressed valuable ideas on this point as well. My delegation would propose and support the idea of setting up an informal open-ended working group, with carefully-established terms of reference.

As far as the contents of a possible international instrument are concerned, my delegation is of the view that the widest possible range of assurances should be accorded to the largest possible number of countries. My delegation is of the firm opinion that assurances should be accorded to all the non-nuclear-weapon States which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons under a valid international treaty and have no nuclear weapons on their territories, for they are entitled to such assurances regardless whether they belong to a military alliance or not. As to the form of the instrument, my delegation favours an international convention, as proposed in the draft submitted by the socialist delegations. The delegation of Pakistan also presented a number of convincing arguments in favour of a convention of this character.

Concluding my statement, I should like to refer again to the proposal made by the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty Member States in the communiqué issued on their meeting in Budapest, concerning the conclusion of a treaty on the non-first use of either nuclear or conventional weapons among the participants of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. My delegation is firmly convinced that this treaty and the one concerning the assurances to be given to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons are of a complementary character and, if concluded would provide a sound basis for strengthening international peace and security on a world-wide basis and rid the world of the danger of a nuclear war, thus bringing about the necessary atmosphere so much needed for achieving real and substantial disarmament.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Committee on Disarmament is taking up the next item on its agenda entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

This is one of the urgent questions connected with the limitation of the arms race and with disarmament. It is in line with the main task of our age, namely, how to avert the danger of a nuclear catastrophe. Of course, our position is that the most effective means of achieving a complete and final solution to this problem would be to halt the production of nuclear weapons of all types and gradually to reduce and subsequently completely eliminate stockpiles of these weapons, as suggested in the well-known proposals submitted by the socialist countries. However, the task of achieving progress in the field of nuclear disarmament must not overshadow or rule out efforts to deal with other issues directed at the same goal of reducing the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict and limiting the possible sphere of application of nuclear weapons. A positive solution to the question of the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States will undoubtedly also contribute to the achievement of agreement on other problems of the limitation of the nuclear arms race and of nuclear disarmament.

Present conditions are conducive to the adoption by the Committee on Disarmament of practical and concrete measures to strengthen guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon countries. These favourable conditions are the result of such factors as, on the one hand, the efforts of non-nuclear-weapon countries to obtain additional guarantees of their security from the nuclear-weapon States and, on the other, the willingness of the nuclear-weapon States to take further steps towards that end. Moreover, as you know, all the nuclear-weapon States currently participating in the work of the Committee have, in recent years, made important statements in which this willingness has taken the form of a definite obligation.

The existence of these favourable conditions made it possible, in the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly, to adopt special provisions (paragraphs 32 and 59) in which the General Assembly noted that "effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security", and called upon

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nuclear-weapon States "to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons".

In accordance with its consistent policy in the field of disarmament, and in an effort to arrive at practical agreements on this question, the Soviet Union made a specific proposal at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly aimed at strengthening guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. This proposal was fully consistent with the above-mentioned provisions of the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

As you know, two resolutions dealing with this question were adopted at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly. One of these resolutions was sponsored by a large group of States which included the Soviet Union, while the other was sponsored by Pakistan. Both resolutions were supported by the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations. This is quite natural, since both resolutions are basically directed towards the same goal.

It should be recalled that, at its thirty-third session, the General Assembly specifically requested the Committee on Disarmament to "consider ... at the earliest possible date the drafts of an international convention on the subject, submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session, as well as all proposals and suggestions concerning effective political and legal measures at the international level to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" (General Assembly resolution 33/72 A). Although the corresponding paragraph of resolution 33/72 B sponsored by Pakistan differs somewhat from the wording of that part of resolution 33/72 A referred to, it addresses approximately the same request of the Committee.

The task of the Committee is to conduct business-like discussions and to work out concrete arrangements. This has been said often by all members of the Committee. Is it possible to conduct such discussions on the agenda item before us? In the view of the Soviet delegation, it definitely is possible.

The most important factor is the favourable international climate created by the recently concluded Soviet-United States summit meeting; there are also, as we have already noted, the decisions of the General Assembly, the important statements made by the nuclear-weapon States and, finally, something that is

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particularly important to us -- the members of this Committee -- the concrete proposals and documents submitted on the question of the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

What, then, does the Committee on Disarmament have before it under this agenda item? First of all, there is the draft international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States, contained in the working paper (CD/23) submitted by the group of socialist countries, which includes the Soviet Union, a draft international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons set out in document CD/10, submitted by Pakistan, and the various proposals and comments put forward by a large number of States during the discussion of this question at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly.

In our view, the task of the Committee is also made easier by the fact that the nuclear-weapon States, including those that did not support the idea of concluding a multilateral agreement, have expressed their willingness to participate in discussions on the strengthening of negative guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon countries, particularly in the Committee on Disarmament. This was the line taken in 1978 by the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom when he said that "the United Kingdom will be prepared itself to take part with other nuclear Powers in firm, far-reaching and permanent assurances to the non-nuclear States" (A/S-10/PV.14).

Permit me also to refer to the letter from Ambassador J. Fisher, the representative of the United States in the First Committee at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, the annex to which states, in the name of the United States, that "there may be other forums, such as the Committee on Disarmament, in which the question of negative security assurances could be treated, so long as all views and all ways of treating this subject are open for consideration" (A/C.1/33/7).

The representative of France spoke along the same lines.

The position of the Soviet Union with regard to the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States is, we hope, sufficiently well known to the members of this Committee. We spoke in favour of the granting



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of additional guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States as early as 1966 during discussions on the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We have also, in the recent past, firmly and unambiguously reiterated our willingness to grant such guarantees. The Soviet Union announced that it would never use nuclear weapons against States which refrained from producing or acquiring such weapons and which did not have such weapons on their territory. Our position is that, by acting in this way, such countries are making a substantive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, thereby making it possible to reduce and, in the final analysis, eliminate the threat of the outbreak of nuclear war; they are therefore entitled to the necessary assurances that nuclear weapons will never be used against them.

Moreover, our country suggests going beyond mere solemn declarations on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which do not have nuclear weapons on their territories. For its part, the USSR has expressed its willingness -- and this still applies in full -- to conclude special agreements to this effect with any such country, and it has called upon all the other nuclear-weapon Powers to follow suit and assume the appropriate obligations.

It is quite obvious that the most complete and effective solution to the problem of protecting non-nuclear-weapon States from the use of nuclear weapons against them might be the adoption by the nuclear-weapon Powers of agreed universal international legal guarantees. For this reason, the Soviet Union is a firm supporter of the idea of concluding an international convention with the participation, on the one hand, of nuclear-weapon States that are prepared to provide appropriate guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and, on the other, interested non-nuclear-weapon States which renounce the production or acquisition of nuclear weapons and which do not have nuclear weapons on their territory. As you know, the Soviet Union submitted a draft for a convention on this matter.

We note with satisfaction that a significant majority of countries -- socialist and non-aligned -- also favour the conclusion of a multilateral international agreement on this question. The Soviet delegation hopes that the Committee will embark upon the preparation of the text of such a convention without delay, and is ready to make every possible contribution to this work.

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In the course of these discussions, we will have an opportunity of setting out our views in greater detail on all the main provisions of the draft convention submitted by the group of socialist countries. At this stage, I would like to dwell only on the idea underlying the convention, namely, the basic obligation to be assumed by nuclear-weapon States to guarantee the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. We are convinced that the formula proposed in the socialist countries' draft offers the most effective solution to this question and covers the largest number of non-nuclear-weapon countries.

As you know, under one of the suggested formulas, it is intended to guarantee the security only of those non-nuclear-weapon countries that are situated within a nuclear-free zone. At present, the only nuclear-free zone established in international law -- and even so not yet fully -- is in Latin America. This means that all the other non-nuclear-weapon countries of the world are outside this region and will not enjoy such guarantees. However, the formula used in the socialist countries' draft does of course provide for the extension of these guarantees to countries comprising a nuclear-free zone as well.

Or to take another formula, according to which a nuclear-weapon State retains the right to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State, even if there are no nuclear weapons on the latter's territory, simply if it is the ally of a nuclear-weapon State. According to this formula, it will be enough for the nuclear-weapon Power in question to determine that an attack has been made against it, its territory, its armed forces or its allies, for a non-nuclear-weapon State merely suspected of being involved in these acts to become the target of a nuclear strike. The draft convention submitted by the socialist countries contains no such provision, which in essence deprives of much of its meaning the undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and not to allow the use of nuclear weapons against countries and territories from which there is no threat of a nuclear attack.

Lastly, there is the formula according to which the obligations of nuclear-weapon States would extend only to non-nuclear-weapon countries not parties to agreements on nuclear security concluded with nuclear-weapon States. This formula also considerably reduces the number of non-nuclear-weapon countries

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to which guarantees could be extended. The socialist countries propose that guarantees should be given both to non-nuclear-weapon countries not members of military or political alliances and to those non-nuclear-weapon countries which, although tied to nuclear-weapon States by the obligations of an alliance, nevertheless do not possess or produce nuclear weapons and do not have nuclear weapons on their territory.

It is clear from the above that the formula used in the draft submitted by the socialist countries is fair and effective, as it takes account of the interests of a large number of States. The merit of this formula is that, firstly, it covers the largest possible number of States that, in view of the actual state of affairs in the world, could be given guarantees against the use of nuclear weapons, and secondly, it encourages States to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons and their deployment in their territory, thereby helping to narrow down the possible sphere of the use of nuclear weapons and strengthening the non-proliferation régime, and as a result, it reduces the risk of nuclear war.

As has already been emphasized, the Soviet Union is a firm and convinced supporter of the idea of concluding a multilateral convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. At the same time, we are also prepared to consider other proposals, and we are trying in particular to co-operate with other nuclear-weapon States with a view to working out an approach acceptable to all. It would probably not be superfluous to recall that, in 1968, three nuclear-weapon States succeeded in agreeing on a commitment concerning guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon countries, a commitment which was subsequently formalized in Security Council resolution 255.

The Soviet delegation considers that, since the Committee has before it two working papers containing draft international agreements on this question, as well as the comments and suggestions of States made at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, the Committee should begin practical negotiations without delay. Of course, such negotiations need not take place only at meetings of the Committee, and use could be made of the other possibilities provided for in rule 23 of the Committee's rules of procedure. The Soviet delegation is prepared to be flexible in this matter and to take account of the views of other delegations.

A constructive approach on the part of all delegations to the question of the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States will enable the Committee to make significant progress on this question and to submit a concrete proposal to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): The start of the second part of the CD's 1979 session provides an opportunity to review the situation in which we find ourselves in relation to the most important disarmament issues. This is particularly so as, for obvious reasons, so much time had to be given to procedural matters at the first part of the session.

I should like to begin by making some general observations on our present predicament.

One year ago we were assembled in New York for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, an event which was anticipated with expectations. The Final Document which was then adopted forms the basis for our continuous efforts to reach, at long last, something more than the modest and meagre results hitherto achieved in our work.

An old deliberative disarmament body was revived and new negotiating machinery was established. Our institutions have certainly been improved.

However, what difference has the year that has passed since the special session meant for our work of today compared with the many years of endless rhetoric and debates, and in some few cases actual negotiations, in the ENDC and CCD?

I must express doubt that there is very much of a difference. The substance with which we work is the same, and I cannot see anything very new in the way in which we are dealing with it.

Let us face the hard fact that, for 17 years, statesmen of the world have not been able to take one step towards creating a disarmament situation, to abolish one single weapons system and to reduce the ghastly number of unimaginably effective warheads threatening the survival of mankind.

The situation is the opposite. Irrespective of solemn pledges and commitments to disarmament in the United Nations and elsewhere, the leading military Powers pour out new, increasingly sophisticated and deadly weapons and weapon systems in an arms race which gives the impression that they have lost all sense of proportion.

All this has been said before, but the arms race has progressed, and is progressing, by leaps and bounds while we proceed at snail's pace, if even that. As, therefore, the gap between the arms race and our work is widening and might all too soon be impossible to bridge, some intrusive questions must be asked. Why have Governments, over the years, been so unsuccessful in responding to the sensible requests, from concerned men and women everywhere, for genuine disarmament leading to lasting peace?

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

In my view, one reason is that the multilateral disarmament negotiations have been turned into a sanctuary distant from the military realities of the present international situation. The priorities of our efforts in this body -- which is of decisive importance for small States in their legitimate endeavours towards security and peace -- are set by resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. But resolutions of the General Assembly, however well conceived, however well voted -- even in some important cases with the affirmative votes of the leading Powers -- do not determine the success or failure of disarmament talks. These are determined by the big Powers' perception of the security problems of the world outside the four walls of this Committee's Conference Room.

It is difficult to choose a proper term to characterize our present predicament. But I think I am on the safe side if I join my predecessor who, almost six years ago -- and the situation today is unchanged if not worsened -- talked about the new barbarism.

Mankind has the right to request a drastic change in our work. It will not do for the CD to continue along the path of the past 17 years. Rhetoric will not suffice any more. What we need is a frank and realistic discussion of the wide discrepancies between what happens in the real world and in our disarmament talks here. Because all human beings are affected, disarmament talks will have to be much more closely linked with what is at the very heart of the matter, i.e. the perceived security situation of the nations of the world and, particularly, the concept of national security as perceived by the two military blocs. The problems to be tackled are how to build confidence among the nations of the world, how to face the new threats to global security that have emerged through the crises of our generation, the spread of mass poverty, insufficient access to energy, the world economic disorder and threats to the human environment.

It should be self-evident -- but I am afraid it is not -- that, in a world of growing interdependence and concomitantly increasing vulnerability of nations and national economies, these new global security threats must be met by world-wide solidarity and co-operation. Instead the most powerful nations speak, in clear terms, of meeting them by confrontation and military means. If this attitude is not changed, I am afraid that there is a fairly imminent danger of a clash of interests that might result in armed conflict.

The member States of the CD can certainly not be indifferent to this kind of danger.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

I shall now turn to some comments on recent events -- and non-events -- in the disarmament field.

As the Swedish Prime Minister recently declared, we greet with satisfaction that the negotiations on SALT II between the United States and the USSR have now been concluded and that the Treaty was signed by President Brezhnev and President Carter at the Vienna summit meeting about a week ago. Several years of negotiating efforts have now come to fruition. We have, of course, frequently been reminded of the fact that signing the Treaty is not enough to put it into force; this requires a ratification process which might be both lengthy and painful.

It is a matter of some urgency to point out fairly strongly, particularly in this multilateral negotiating body, that even if the Treaty will not by itself imply any significant reduction of arms or qualitative restraints, it represents a step in a gradual process which is of great importance, not only to the United States and the USSR and the general relations between them, but to all of us.

Sweden is not excessively concerned by the shortcomings of SALT II, provided that it is proved that this agreement will be regarded merely as a step in a process, as a preliminary stage to rapidly continued negotiations aimed at bolder arms reduction measures. We are also aware of the fact that it is necessary to pass through SALT II, as ratified, as a stage towards successful results in other fields of disarmament.

The United Nations General Assembly's special session devoted to disarmament stated the special responsibility of the leading military Powers in respect of a genuine disarmament process. It is now imperative that these Powers embark without delay upon the next stage in that process, i.e. further limitations of nuclear armaments. In Sweden we shall follow with great attention the negotiations on SALT III, which possibly will include weapons particularly intended for targets in Europe. Those nuclear weapons which have so far fallen outside SALT, and largely also outside the Vienna talks, represent a broad sector of weapons, the role of which is closely interrelated with the role of both conventional and strategic nuclear weapons, medium-range and intermediate-range missiles, etc. The arms race in the latter weapons -- what is euphemistically called the "modernization process" -- seems to continue totally unhindered. These weapons therefore present a constant and growing threat to détente and disarmament efforts in Europe. This development, which takes place within both military blocs, might well trigger a new round of the qualitative nuclear arms race in this part of the world, further raising the level of mutual destruction capability. We are dealing with a process where there undoubtedly

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

exists a strong element of action-reaction. The international strategic debate of the past year is a telling example of political and military perceptions in this context. To the extent that lack of restraint -- on one side or the other -- in the past few years as regards production and deployment of grey-area systems has given rise to new preoccupations, the responsibility to prevent the situation from deteriorating is indeed shared among the main actors. This responsibility must now be channelled into tangible efforts to prevent an undermining of the efforts in this and other negotiating forums to create a situation of balance and détente which will be conducive to real progress towards nuclear disarmament. In view of this, the Swedish Government urges the leading military Powers to demonstrate restraint and to co-operate between themselves and with other relevant Powers in efforts to negotiate real nuclear disarmament in Europe as well as in other regions. For this purpose it is essential that grey-area systems should also be included in the next phase of negotiations.

In my statement to the CCD in July last year I put five questions to the nuclear-weapon Powers regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons for possible use against targets in Europe. They reflected the grave concern of my country over the unimpeded nuclear arms race in our vicinity. We have noted with appreciation the response given to these questions by the United Kingdom. I am concerned, however, that so far no answers have come from the United States and the USSR. In order to recall the questions I am now going to repeat them. They are still entirely topical:

1. Are preparations made for further development of systems of nuclear weapons of sub-kiloton yield within existing modernization plans? And would such preparations if undertaken, substantially contribute towards abolishing the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons?
2. Does the Soviet Union possess or even deploy nuclear weapons of sub-kiloton yield, or their means of delivery?
3. Is production or deployment foreseen of nuclear weapon systems with another balance of characteristics than those now deployed, and with the purpose of reducing collateral damage by such changed or new characteristics?
4. Do present modernization plans foresee further deployment of intermediate range ballistic missiles and medium range ballistic missiles, in substitution for older versions of such weapons, or in addition to the total yield so far deployed?
5. Against that background, will nuclear weapons also be deployed in areas of Europe where they have so far not been present?

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

Let us hope that what the leaders of the United States and the USSR expressed at their meeting in Vienna reflects a readiness to act so as to clear the way for speedy and successful negotiations on a SALT III.

I had one more specific and very legitimate desire for the outcome of the summit meeting in Vienna, namely, that it would result in an agreement to give priority to negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, now resumed here at Geneva. The reason is obvious. The three negotiators must not let the world community wait with increasing and highly justified frustration for this measure, to which these three nuclear-weapon Powers already many years ago gave their solemn pledges and commitments, not least in the preamble of the NPT. We are rapidly approaching the Second Review Conference of that Treaty. There should rest no doubt that the comprehensive test ban is a very important prerequisite for the successful outcome of that Conference, and consequently also for the future consolidation of the NPT régime. Those in the nuclear weapon States who speak about the value of continued testing should be made fully aware of the binding pledges and commitments to a CTB which have been made by their Governments, and also of what, in the continued absence of such a treaty, is actually at stake. The perfectionist ambitions of those employed in the technical development of nuclear weapons should not be allowed to over-shadow the interests of the millions of people around the world who want to live free from threats or fears arising from further qualitative developments in nuclear weapons; from the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new countries.

It is commendable that, in the joint communiqué of the Vienna meeting, note was taken of the fact that there has been definite progress in the preliminary trilateral negotiations on a CTBT. However, it is remarkable that there is no mention at all of the role of this Committee in the conclusion of a CTB treaty. We find this ominous. We were once led to believe that a draft CTB treaty would be submitted to the multilateral negotiating body before the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I would like to recall the importance of a CTBT in curbing a further nuclear arms race. I would also like to recall that, in order to make a CTBT effective -- and if the Committee should be taken seriously as the multilateral negotiating body on disarmament -- it is absolutely necessary that it should play a substantial role in the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty.



(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

In this context I should also like to say a few words about the role of our Committee in the nuclear disarmament negotiations. As we well know, seven socialist States have presented a proposal for negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. This proposal, contained in CD/4, has met with general support of the Group of 21. The United States delegation has, however, expressed a number of reservations to the proposal. In addition, the Netherlands delegation has formulated a few questions which we consider highly relevant. We hope that answers to them from the sponsors of CD/4 will be helpful for the continued consideration of the matter.

We should recall that this Committee has also been requested by the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, in resolution 33/91 H to consider urgently, at an appropriate stage of its implementation of the proposals set forth in the Programme of Action adopted at the tenth special session, the question of an adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

As is well known, both this request and CD/4 are taken almost word for word from paragraph 50 of the Programme of Action in the Final Document. My delegation would therefore suggest that, instead of dealing with these two matters separately, we should, in a proper context during this part of the session, consider the entire paragraph 50, which also contains an important subparagraph regarding the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapon systems; the purpose of such consideration would be to find out whether a generally acceptable division of work can be found between this Committee and other disarmament forums, in particular the bilateral SALT negotiations, to deal with the subjects contained in paragraph 50.

Progress towards a comprehensive disarmament programme was achieved during the recent session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The elements of a comprehensive programme will in due course be transmitted by the General Assembly to this body for multilateral negotiation. But I trust that, without pre-empting future consideration of the programme, it will also be possible, already now, to have a fruitful -- although preliminary -- exchange of views on appropriate stages of nuclear disarmament, including its phasing and time frame.

Turning to yet another topic, we know that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts will meet again next month. Before their meeting, the Swedish Government has invited the members of this Committee to attend the demonstration of temporary

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

data facilities for seismic events. As was stated in the invitation, the purpose of this is to give an idea of how one part of the international co-operative measures for the monitoring of a comprehensive test ban treaty could be carried out. We do not, of course, claim to present the definite solution to this very difficult problem. The demonstration should be seen as an exercise which will commit nobody and prejudice nothing of what will later have to be negotiated. We believe, however, that it will offer profitable experience, and we should also like it to be seen as a manifestation of the strong interest my country takes in this matter. If it can promote the discussion of the problems involved, it may also contribute not only to added knowledge and insight, but also to greater mutual understanding and confidence.

As regards the forthcoming session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, I think we should be aware that it may be the last one under its present mandate, because the experts will probably then complete the task which had been assigned to them by the CCD last year and confirmed by the CD. We shall therefore, during this part of the session, have to devote our thoughts also to the question whether there is sufficient basis for the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to continue with a renewed mandate.

Let me now turn to another urgent matter on the agenda of this session of the CD. At the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, we agreed that priority attention should be given to the question of appropriate ways of giving effective assurance to non-nuclear weapon States (NNWS) against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Such assurances, if co-ordinated and binding for all nuclear weapon Powers, and if accommodating the interests and needs of all countries, could indeed strengthen international security. They would be of great value as a stage in the process of nuclear disarmament, and in strengthening the NPT régime.

The five nuclear-weapon Powers have formulated such assurances separately, before and during the United Nations General Assembly special session devoted to disarmament, and concrete proposals have been referred to the negotiating table of this Committee by the thirty-third session of the General Assembly. In this context, we made essential qualifications to our support of the resolutions dealing with this matter. It may, therefore be useful to elaborate on some of the principles which, in the view of the Swedish Government, should be included in any scheme of "security guarantees".

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

A fundamental starting point for us is that Sweden's well-established policy of neutrality cannot possibly accommodate the concept of so-called positive security guarantees. The Swedish Government has repeatedly put on record its view that, should assistance to a country be contemplated, that country must have the exclusive sovereign right to decide whether and in what conditions assistance might be granted. I am pleased to take note of the fact that these types of security guarantees are not under discussion in the context of this item on the CD's agenda. On the other hand, Sweden in principle favours assurances by the nuclear-weapon Powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear arms against NNWS or nuclear-weapon-free zones. To become credible and effective, such pledges must be given by all nuclear-weapon Powers in a co-ordinated and binding manner. The wording of existing offers of guarantee vary in form and scope, owing to the perceived differences in the security situation of the nuclear-weapon States, their relations with each other and with allies. The main responsibility for achieving the co-ordination necessary to avoid any ambiguity among them -- something which could undermine the whole concept -- must of course in the first stage rest with these Powers themselves.

It is still too early to give preference to any specific model of co-ordination, although some delegations have proposed a conventional international convention. This format, however, raises several questions for us. Not least must it be kept in mind that more than 100 States, including Sweden, have already made firm commitments in the NPT not to acquire nuclear weapons.

Another possibility might be for the nuclear-weapon Powers to make a joint manifestation in the Security Council. Parallel to such endeavours, pledges by nuclear-weapon Powers might also be included in special agreements with States members of nuclear-weapon-free zones, such as in Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Assurances must furthermore be without reservations. It is quite obvious that the security of NNWS cannot be effectively strengthened if a nuclear-weapon Power could itself unilaterally determine whether it is bound by such a commitment. It is precisely when a military conflict is imminent or has developed that barriers towards escalation would serve their most vital purpose.

A logical and important consequence of non-use of pledges to certain NNWS would, of course, be the withdrawal or dismantling of such nuclear-weapon systems which could be used against such NNWS.

As regards prospects of achieving results in negotiations on chemical weapons, I hope that a more hopeful note is now justified on account of the outcome of our consultations at the very end of the first part of this session. I do not deny that we regard it an important test of the willingness of all the members of this Committee

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

to enter into substantive negotiations on such an important subject. We have been urged by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session to start real negotiations on a convention on chemical weapons without awaiting the outcome of the preliminary bilateral talks on the subject between the United States and the USSR. The members of the Group of 21 have made it clear that it is not their intention to hamper these negotiations. On the contrary, impetus may be given to both by parallel efforts in the CD. We are now resuming our consultations in that spirit, and we naturally expect the two Powers to reciprocate by co-operating in these negotiations in order to create the necessary link between the bilateral and multilateral negotiations. We therefore assume that an ad hoc working group (with appropriate and realistic terms of reference) will be set up in the next few weeks so that the negotiations can start soon and in the most effective way.

In my statement I have wanted to give expression to our particular and growing concern at the gap between our disarmament talks and the arms race realities of the world outside the walls of the Palais des Nations. U Thant, the late United Nations Secretary-General, predicted in 1969 that the Member States of the United Nations might have perhaps 10 years left in which to subordinate their ancient quarrels and launch a global partnership to curb the arms race, to improve the human environment, to defuse the population explosion and to supply the required momentum to world development efforts.

The 10-year period that U Thant referred to in those sombre words has now almost passed. Not only have we been unable to find solutions to any of the problems he mentioned, but they have become even more serious, threatening and world-wide.

It is my belief that if, in the decade now to come, we do not achieve a dramatic break-through in our disarmament negotiations, the prospects of our surviving this century without a nuclear war are bleak indeed.

And even the probability of such a ghastly event is of course enough to determine the direction of our efforts. Our talks and negotiations must, in my view, be conducted within a wider framework shaped by the political realities of life outside these walls. They will have to be, as it were, politicized.

M. KOTERDALLE (Belgium) (translated from French): My delegation is gratified by the opportunity offered this week to the Committee on Disarmament to proceed to an exchange of views on an important item in our programme of work entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons".

At the outset, I should like to express my satisfaction at finding that this item is worded as it is. It is in fact a very complex question, for which countries envisage approaches that are often different. Previous discussions, which among other things were concerned with resolutions aimed at the conclusion of a specific convention, failed to result in an agreement, and my delegation does not think that it will be possible to arrive at a uniform formula now. Consequently, prevailing differences of opinion on this question are only to be expected and it is therefore natural that our present mandate should not prejudge the direction to be followed in our work. I should like, in this connexion, to pay tribute to the intellectual and political honesty of the authors of proposals -- which in their most fundamental aspects are in any case unacceptable to my country -- who have, on several occasions, themselves recognized the complexity of this question.

My delegation intends to follow actively and with an open mind the exchange of views which has begun, and would like at this point to make a few preliminary comments which, in its view, are relevant and on which it would be very interested to learn the opinion of all the other delegations. Recognizing that the subject of negative security guarantees is of basic importance, it is not surprised that major efforts yet have to be made to find elements of a reply to the very many questions still outstanding. I used the word "elements" deliberately, because it would be superficial, to say the least, to attempt to give ex abrupto a hasty and concise reply to so complex a problem.

Several nuclear-weapon States made unilateral declarations on the occasion of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly. My country considers that these declarations are in themselves highly significant political acts. It might even be possible to envisage a complementary procedure under which the Security Council would be invited formally to take note of them.

(Mr. Noterdaeme, Belgium)

That is one of the appropriate formulas to which States might choose to have recourse. That formula also has the advantage of obtaining the agreement of countries which are not in a position to accept alternatives. I should also like to remind you, in this context, of the tripartite proposal contained in resolution 255 adopted by the Security Council on 19 June 1968 on assurances provided to non-nuclear States in the event of aggression, or threat of aggression, with nuclear weapons. That resolution also represented a significant step.

My delegation is aware that other formulas have been put forward -- I am thinking more particularly of the documents emanating from the delegation of Pakistan and from a number of socialist countries -- which also attempt to define the conditions in which the guarantees could be spelt out in greater detail. May I, in the context of the consideration of these formulas, expound a few ideas:

For Belgium, the differences in the situation and interests of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States justify provision for the necessary adjustment and adaptation to different conditions.

This general consideration automatically poses the prior condition of the specific characteristics of certain regions. In this respect, I venture to remind you of the specific nature of the European region. Without wishing to prejudge the future and the outcome of a number of negotiations whose successful and speedy conclusion could bring about an improved and changed situation, my delegation wonders whether, in present circumstances, a convention guaranteeing the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States in that region would necessarily constitute a strengthening of security. Might it not, on the contrary, tend to upset the existing political and military balance?

I venture once again to recall that, in the view of my delegation, disarmament is also a regional responsibility. The link between disarmament and security is a reality which has been recognized, but security situations vary with the regions concerned.

Guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States must again be considered in the context of the rights and duties resulting from accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(Mr. Noterdaeme, Belgium)

The question whether the State which is to benefit from the guarantee has renounced the production of nuclear weapons and their acquisition cannot be ignored. In what way has it renounced their production and acquisition? The Non-Proliferation Treaty provides such renunciation with an important framework, which is credible because it has been internationally agreed. In the context of our discussion and in connexion with accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Belgium also wonders whether one should not speak of a preliminary rather than a corollary.

Moreover, just as within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in which the International Atomic Energy Agency and the system of guarantees of that Agency are particularly effective examples of verification, any measure must provide for specific control procedures. Countries which have renounced nuclear weapons on the basis of a formula which may vary must be protected against any danger of the abuse of a situation of relative inferiority in which they are inevitably placed. Ideally, in the spirit of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, such measures should even provide for extensions aimed at more general disarmament, including conventional weapons.

These are some of the questions which my delegation wished to raise and on which it would be glad to hear the reactions and contributions made during the discussion on this item of our programme of work.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): Today I wish to attempt a modest analysis of the issue before us -- the question of how to develop "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". Our interest in this question is not new. Several times in the past we supported, albeit with some reservations, Pakistan resolutions in this field in the United Nations General Assembly. We also welcomed the unilateral statements made by some nuclear-weapon States last year. We consider the question of nuclear security guarantees as a highly important one, also in the context of an effective non-proliferation régime.

The problem is, basically, how to safeguard a State which has given up the nuclear option, against nuclear attack.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

This question presents itself differently for different States. Countries that have joined a military alliance with one or more nuclear-weapon States could obtain a credible commitment that they will be supported by the nuclear-weapon State or States in their alliance against an attack by another nuclear-weapon State. Such an arrangement has an important deterrent function, but is of course only or mostly relevant for those countries that have joined such a military alliance.

It seems difficult to envisage that such a credible positive guarantee could be given to non-nuclear-weapon States that have chosen to be neutral or non-aligned. It may be assumed that nuclear-weapon States are not prepared to give the assurance that they would assist all non-nuclear-weapon States automatically should they be attacked with nuclear weapons, since this could lead to a further spread of conflicts. It is therefore doubtful that much can be done in this context beyond Security Council resolution 255 of 19 June 1968.

For this reason, one has concentrated now on the possibility of so-called negative security guarantees, that is, a commitment or promise by nuclear-weapon States not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, under certain conditions or without such conditions.

All nuclear-weapon States have more or less clarified their position in this field. Some of them last year made formal unilateral declarations which go beyond their earlier statements. I shall discuss these positions later.

Both Pakistan and the Soviet Union have now proposed the conclusion of an international convention on negative security guarantees. Such an international convention -- the sponsors claim -- would provide the commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States with a stronger standing as compared to the unilateral declarations on nuclear policy. I do not believe any country is against an international instrument in principle if, in fact, such a common formula for guarantees could be found.

Since some countries apparently doubt the possibility of achieving a common formula within the near future, the idea has been put forward of



(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

enshrining the unilateral declarations in a Security Council resolution. This is, in the view of my Government, certainly a possibility which would reinforce the present declarations and enhance their international status.

However, my delegation feels that we must not give up too soon our endeavours to achieve a common formula or to take other steps in this field. From a political and legal point of view, an internationally binding instrument is certainly to be preferred to unilateral policy declarations. In this connexion we were rather struck by the forceful arguments in support of an international instrument put forward by the distinguished delegate of Pakistan on 25 January. With this in mind, I should like to explore whether, in the various declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States, enough common elements may be found to form a basis for a meaningful common negative nuclear security guarantee.

As is generally recognized, the problem lies in the different conditions which have been indicated by some nuclear-weapon States.

The most far-reaching declaration has been made repeatedly by China. China has declared, point blank, that it will never use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

For other nuclear-weapon States such a blanket guarantee would be difficult to give without important security implications. Situations are imaginable in which a military attack by a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State is directed against another nuclear-weapon State or its allies. It would seem unlikely that the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State, engaged in an attack together with a nuclear-weapon State, would remain a sanctuary. A condition which has to be demanded, therefore, from a non-nuclear-weapon State is that it must not be engaged in an attack in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

The second condition would be the following.

If nuclear-weapon States assume a binding commitment not to attack non-nuclear-weapon States, the non-nuclear-weapon State involved must give a binding commitment that it is indeed a non-nuclear-weapon State, which means that

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

it has undertaken not to receive or manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The State could make this commitment by becoming a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by becoming a member of a properly established nuclear-weapon-free zone, or, as a minimum, accept full scope safeguards on its nuclear activities.

These are the only two conditions, it seems to me, which would have to be asked of a non-nuclear-weapon State to qualify for a negative security guarantee.

Let us now review the different statements by the nuclear-weapon States, to see whether they contain these two elements.

Let us look first at the United States declaration of 1978. The following was stated:

"The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack."

The statement on behalf of the United Kingdom seems basically the same, and reads as follows:

"..... I accordingly give the following assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the NPT or to other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices:

Britain undertakes not to use nuclear weapons against such States except in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State."

Although one could perhaps discuss the exact wording of these statements, it is clear that they follow closely the two basic conditions I have mentioned before.

The Soviet Union made a somewhat different declaration in one respect. It reads as follows:

"The Soviet Union states that it would never use nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territories."

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

We find this same approach in article I of the working paper (CD/23) introduced this morning by the distinguished representative of Hungary on behalf of seven socialist States; we listened with interest to that introduction and we will study that proposal.

We must, however, also take into account some other relevant Soviet statements in this field. President Brezhnev declared on 25 April 1978 that:

"The Soviet Union, for its part, wishes to state as emphatically as it can that we are against the use of nuclear weapons, that only extraordinary circumstances, only aggression against our country or its allies by another nuclear Power, could compel us to have recourse to that extreme means of self-defence."

This is clearly a different statement, since the emphasis is on the element which is missing in the formal Soviet declaration, namely, the question of an attack against the Soviet Union or its allies.

In this connexion one should also consider the declaration made by the Soviet Union when it signed Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It reads as follows:

"Any action taken by a State or States party to the Tlatelolco Treaty that are inconsistent with their non-nuclear status, as well as the commission by one or several States party to the Treaty of an act of aggression with the backing of a State possessing nuclear weapons or jointly with such a State will be regarded by the Soviet Union as incompatible with the relevant obligations of these countries under the Treaty. In such instances the Soviet Union reserves the right to reconsider its commitments arising from the Additional Protocol II."

Taking into account these last two declarations, it would appear that the position of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the positions of the United States and the United Kingdom, on the other, are in fact not basically different.

To be complete, I must also mention the press conference held by the French President on 24 October 1974, in which Monsieur Giscard d'Estaing stated:

"Personally I can only speak of the exercise of my own mandate as President of the Republic. I consider that the French nuclear dissuasive force can be

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

used only against Powers which themselves are nuclear Powers or against Powers -- and I would hasten to add that this is a very unlikely hypothesis, but we must cover all possibilities -- which threaten our own soil. The purpose of our nuclear dissuasive force, which would then have to be used, would be to oppose a nuclear threat to our own soil on the part of a nuclear Power or to respond to a threat to invade our territory. On the other hand, with respect to non-nuclear Powers I consider that France should neither utilize nor even threaten to utilize its nuclear capabilities, and it is my hope that this attitude will progressively be adopted by others so that the means of nuclear dissuasion will only be used against nuclear threats and not in any other type of conflict."

Although this statement seems to be of a less formal character than the declarations made by the other nuclear Powers, it is in general not very different from the earlier-mentioned statements.

It would appear clear from what I ventured to suggest that there seems to be a common denominator between at least three nuclear-weapon States: that nuclear weapons will not be used against (a) States which have formally renounced the nuclear explosive option, and (b) States which are not engaged in an attack against nuclear-weapon States or their allies together with a nuclear-weapon State. This would be a very important conclusion, because it would mean that a common approach can theoretically be found.

Now I realize, of course, that other conditions have been mentioned. I hope, however, that on the basis of the earlier-mentioned two conditions a solution is possible, especially when we realize that we are trying in particular to strengthen the security of those non-nuclear-weapon States which are neutral or non-aligned.

We all realize that credible nuclear security guarantees could play a significant role in strengthening the non-proliferation régime and in enhancing security and peace. With the Second NPT Review Conference before us, we hope that the nuclear-weapon States can soon find a common approach to this complicated and important question.

Mr. R<sup>o</sup>UZEK (Czechoslovakia): Permit me, first of all, to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on your election to the chair of our Committee for the present month. I wish you every success in performing this important task and welcome you as the representative of Brazil to our Committee.

I should also like to welcome in our Committee other new colleagues: the distinguished delegates of Argentina -- Ambassador Alberto Dumont, of Australia -- Ambassador Sir James Plimsoll and Iran -- Ambassador Kazem Rajjavi.

At the very beginning of my statement I should like to point out the importance of the fact that the Treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, together with the accompanying documents, was signed in Vienna. There is no doubt whatsoever that all the documents signed in Vienna will have a positive influence on the international climate and that they will be of particular significance for disarmament negotiations, including those of our Committee.

As we have already stressed at the last United Nations General Assembly, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is convinced that as long as nuclear weapons have not been eliminated, effective and feasible means should be sought in order to limit the risk which such weapons carry. We should, indeed, adopt measures capable of strengthening international security, stability and confidence among States and creating a favourable situation for the implementation of decisive steps towards nuclear disarmament.

The special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament confirmed the rightness of this trend when it stressed that substantial progress in the field of disarmament would be promoted by the simultaneous adoption of political and legal measures aimed at strengthening the security of States and at a general improvement of the international situation.

We hold the view that measures of this kind -- feasible and attainable at the present time -- should also comprise a reliable undertaking by nuclear-weapon States not to use nuclear weapons against those countries who have renounced them. This fully corresponds to the conclusions of the special session, which addressed an urgent appeal to all States to make maximum efforts with a view to the conclusion of relevant international agreements to this end. The Soviet Union, in co-operation with other countries, including the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, responding to this appeal of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly, submitted at the thirty-third regular session of the General Assembly a significant proposal for the strengthening of guarantees of non-nuclear States and for the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory

(Mr. Růžek, Czechoslovakia)

of States where they are not stationed so far. The support received by these proposals proves that they correspond to the broad endeavour aimed at lessening and eliminating the risk of a nuclear conflict.

The conclusion of a treaty on the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear States would be an important step on the road to the establishment of a comprehensive political and legal system of relations among States in conditions of détente and peaceful coexistence. It would undoubtedly have an important bearing on the establishment of a positive climate, indispensable for the attainment of further concrete disarmament measures, above all in the field of nuclear disarmament. No doubt the adoption of such a treaty would have a positive influence on relations among nuclear-weapon States themselves, particularly with regard to the limitation of the risk of a nuclear conflict on a global scale.

In view of the fact that the conclusion of such a treaty would call for the assumption of obligations by the nuclear-weapon States in the first place, we deem it necessary to underline that it would be of equal importance -- in order to guarantee its full efficiency -- that non-nuclear States observe their status as non-nuclear States. This means that they should neither manufacture nor possess or station on their territory nuclear weapons of any type. There is no doubt that this fact will be of substantial significance for the maintenance of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in conformity with the principle contained in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968.

On the other hand, we consider it our duty to stress that non-nuclear States -- parties to the Treaty -- should not be limited in any way as regards the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. On the contrary, the adoption of this treaty would effectively strengthen the general system of international security guarantees, including those applied within the framework of IAEA. It would create new favourable prerequisites for the more intensive utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

All these facts lead us to the conclusion that the elaboration and implementation of an international treaty which effectively prevents the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States would be an important contribution to the cause of peace, to the security of States and to the strengthening of confidence among them. We firmly believe that the Committee on Disarmament will use all its influence in bringing about the

(Mr. Ružek, Czechoslovakia)

necessary conditions for the elaboration of this treaty in which all nuclear-weapon Powers would provide jointly agreed guarantees of security to non-nuclear States.

The Czechoslovak delegation is ready to contribute as much as possible to the speedy fulfilment of this important task.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic extends its congratulations to you on assuming the responsible post of Chairman and as new representative of your country in the Committee on Disarmament. We are convinced that, under your guidance, the work of the Committee will be effective and successful.

I also avail myself of this opportunity to welcome the new representatives of Argentina, Australia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic will co-operate constructively with you in solving the complex items the Committee is facing.

My delegation expects that, in the course of this year's summer session, the Committee on Disarmament will be able to make real progress on the important questions on its agenda. This expectation of ours is based on certain positive aspects of recent events which, in our opinion, will have a beneficial influence on the Committee's work.

Only a few days ago the Committee on Disarmament heard statements by the representatives of the USSR and the United States concerning the successful conclusion of the strategic arms limitation talks and the signing of the documents at the Soviet-United States summit in Vienna. It is natural that this historic event has already been highly appraised by some representatives in the Committee. The conclusion drawn in this connexion -- that it is now urgently necessary to take further steps towards the cessation of the arms race and towards disarmament -- is of particular importance.

In his telegram addressed to Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on the occasion of the signing of the SALT II Treaty, Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, and President of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, emphasized that:

"The signing of the Treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive arms is an important step to guarantee lasting peace and security of the peoples and to reduce the danger of nuclear war. The people of the German Democratic Republic appraise the agreements concluded as real progress on the way towards broadening and promoting political détente by acts of arms limitation and disarmament."

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Permit me to stress the statement made on the same occasion in a telegram addressed to James Carter, the President of the United States, that the SALT II Treaty demonstrates the possibility of solving complex international problems by negotiations when a realistic approach and goodwill prevail. These factors are also imperative, without doubt, for achieving further progress in the work of our Committee.

We regard the present results of the efforts of many years aimed at the limitation of strategic offensive arms as an encouraging sign for the solution of other -- sometimes very complex -- tasks facing the Committee.

In view of the fundamental importance of the SALT II Treaty for the safeguarding of peace and the strengthening of international security, everything should be done to ensure that the Treaty is ratified at an early date and put into force.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic also considers that the communiqué adopted at the meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States held on 14 and 15 May this year, and presented to the Committee as document CD/20, constitutes an important contribution to the implementation of the extensive programme of work.

For the German Democratic Republic, whose Western border is also the dividing line between the two most powerful military blocs in the world, such measures lessening the danger of a military conflict in Europe are of especially vital significance. This is not the only reason why the delegation of the German Democratic Republic intends expressly to emphasize the proposal contained in the communiqué which envisages the conclusion of an agreement among the States participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, stipulating that the parties to the agreement would not be first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against each other. The conclusion of such an agreement, like the all-European conference on questions of military détente proposed by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, would contribute to strengthening confidence between States and reducing military confrontation in Europe.

We think it is quite reasonable to state that opportunities for concrete progress in the Committee's work have been enhanced since its spring session. Now the question is to translate those opportunities into practical results. We consider it to be encouraging for our future activity that we reached agreement on the Committee's programme of work quite rapidly. It is a good basis for dealing with questions of substance.



(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

At present the Committee is focusing its efforts on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic is of the view that the strengthening of the guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States constitutes an important and topical task. We see a connexion between this question, the strengthening of the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. There is a close interrelationship between these three complex topics. The prevention of the emergence of other nuclear-weapon States is an important precondition for success in nuclear disarmament. In this connexion the demand expressed by the non-nuclear-weapon States that they be given reliable assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is quite understandable. An international convention to strengthen the guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States would be the most appropriate means of protecting those States.

Of course, the conclusion of such a convention would not yet mean nuclear disarmament. In no case could it replace the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. For this reason, the German Democratic Republic fully shares the opinion that ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons, and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed would be the most effective measure to prevent a nuclear war.

Yet nuclear disarmament is a long and contradictory process. So it is all the more necessary to use every appropriate opportunity to halt the nuclear arms race and to promote nuclear disarmament. For this reason, the German Democratic Republic considers as highly important and timely an international agreement for the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

Most of the States of the world do not possess nuclear weapons. That means that the majority of peoples could be legally assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by obligations to be assumed by the nuclear-weapon Powers under an international convention. Peoples would live in greater security, and the danger of nuclear war would be reduced.

The non-nuclear-weapon States, as parties to such a convention, would be offered a real equivalent for their renunciation of nuclear weapons. This would encourage those States in their decision not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons, and not to allow their deployment on their territory. The régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons could be perceptibly strengthened. Having regard in particular to the Second Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, this aspect will have an impact which, in the view of the German Democratic Republic, should not be underestimated.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

We believe that it would be appropriate to request no other precondition than the obligation to be truly nuclear-weapon-free in order to enable as many States as possible to participate in a convention of that kind. For this reason the German Democratic Republic supports the draft convention introduced as document CD/23, which meets this concern and is already supported by a number of delegations.

The conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States would be a constructive measure that would build confidence between States. This would not only influence relations between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in a positive manner, but would also bring about more stable and secure relations between nuclear-weapon States. It is self-evident that a convention of that kind would be fully effective only when all nuclear-weapon powers are parties to it.

Concrete documents and proposals have been submitted to the Committee. Resolutions 33/72 A and B and the two draft conventions CD/10 and CD/23 will in particular facilitate the search for an effective solution. Furthermore, the nuclear-weapon States have made corresponding statements of principle which, we are convinced, could bring about an understanding on this question which is so important for the non-nuclear-weapon States. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic would welcome a prompt beginning of the elaboration by the Committee of a draft convention acceptable to all parties.

We also support the idea expressed by some delegations that this task should be entrusted to an ad hoc working group which could, by intensive work, bring different ideas closer to each other. We should aim at reaching, even at this session, tangible progress towards strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic expresses the hope that, in the weeks to come, the Committee will achieve good progress on the other items of its programme of work as well.

The Committee again faces the task of presenting a report on its work to the thirty-fourth General Assembly of the United Nations. Experience proves that it is better to reach basic agreement on the structure and content of the report as soon as possible so as to allow the Chairman to submit in time a proposal based on a broad measure of support within the Committee. This would facilitate the work of the Chairman and of the Secretariat as well, as it would make it possible to have prompt agreement on the final wording of the report.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic will do its utmost to contribute to the constructive and fruitful work of the Committee.

Mr. MARKER (Pakistan): At this late stage of the Committee's work I do not propose to make a long statement; I would just like to make two points.

The first is to say that my delegation has taken very careful note of all the valuable suggestions and opinions expressed during the course of this morning's debate on the subject of security guarantees, and is deeply grateful for these views. We shall take very careful note of them and we hope to be able to respond to some of the very important points raised in a formal statement at our next plenary meeting.

The second point is once again to lend support to the idea -- which I think has been reflected by members of the Committee -- of setting up a working group to consider this item.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed at 1.15 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will hold an informal meeting this afternoon at 4 p.m. in this room to discuss the question of procedures to be followed in the consideration of the item on chemical weapons and the item currently under discussion.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Thursday, 28 June 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.