

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX IV

VOLUME II

Index of Statements by Country and Subject
and Verbatim Records of the Committee on Disarmament
in 1979

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVENTEENTH MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 8 March 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. L.D. THOMSON (Australia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENSMAIL

Argentina: Mr. F.J. DAVILA

Australia: Mr. L.D. THOMSON
Mr. A.J. BEHM
Ms. M.S. WICKES

Belgium: Mr. P. NOTERDAEME
Mr. P. BERG
Mr. G. VAN DUYSE
Mr. P. LAVALLEYE

Brazil: Mr. G.A. MACIEL
Mr. A. CELSO DE OURO PRETO

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U THAUNG HTUN

Canada: Mr. R. HARRY JAY
Mr. J.T. SIMARD

Cuba: Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RÚZEK^{OV}
Mr. V. TYLNER
Mr. L. STAVINCHA

Egypt: Mr. M. EL-BARADEI
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. G. ALULA

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE

<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. G. HENDER Mr. S. KAHN Mr. H. GRACZYNSKI
<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. G. PFEIFFER Mr. J. PÖHLMANN Mr. H. MÜLLER
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. M. DOMOKOS Mr. C. GYÖRFFY Mr. A. LAKATOS
<u>India:</u>	Mr. S.T. DEVARE
<u>Indonesia:</u>	Mr. A. KAMIL Mr. M. SIDIK Mr. J. DAMANIK
<u>Iran:</u>	Mr. M. FARTASH Mr. D. CHILATY
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. N. DI BERNARDO Mr. M. MORENO Mr. C. FRATESCHI
<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. M. OGISO Mr. T. NONOYAMA Mr. T. IWANAMI Mr. R. ISHII
<u>Kenya:</u>	Mr. G.N. MUNIU
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES Miss A. CABRERA
<u>Mongolia:</u>	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. M. RAHHALI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. K. AHMED
Mr. T. OLUMOKO

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Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. H. PAĆ
Mr. M. KRUCZYK
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania: Mr. C. ENE
Mr. V. TUDOR
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. B. FONSEKA
Miss H.L. NAGANATHAN

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. S. STRÖMBACK
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. A.M. VAVILOV
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Mr. Yu.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHIN
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Mrs. R. LISBOA DE NECER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ
Mr. B. BRANKOVIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU
Mr. MUNZA LOMPOMBO
Mr. BOLUMBU BASUMBA

Mr. MARKER (Pakistan): Permit me to express, on behalf of my delegation, our pleasure at seeing a distinguished representative of Australia preside over the deliberations of the Committee on Disarmament. We are sure that, under your able guidance, the important work which is on our schedule this month will be successfully accomplished.

Today, I would like to express Pakistan's views regarding the formulation of the agenda and programme of work of the Committee, and also to say a few words on the question of the highest priority in the field of disarmament — the need for nuclear disarmament.

Pakistan is of the view that the Committee on Disarmament is, as the Final Document of the special session stated, "the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum". As such, the negotiating mandate of this Committee covers all matters which can be negotiated in the multilateral context, including all the recommendations for specific action in various areas contained in the Programme of Action of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. We therefore believe, that, in adopting its agenda, the Committee must clearly establish this wide range of its responsibilities. At the same time we are not unaware of the need to ensure that, in our agenda and programme of work, sufficient precision is introduced so as to enable the Committee to conduct concrete negotiations at each stage of its work. These two goals can be reconciled by adopting an agenda which would, on the one hand, outline the main areas of the responsibilities of the Committee on Disarmament, and on the other, mention under each one of these main areas those specific subjects to which priority has been accorded by the United Nations General Assembly or by Member States.

Those amongst us who participated in the special session will recall that, immediately prior to its formal adoption, the programme of action of the special session was divided into various parts under a number of headings. Pakistan would suggest that the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, in order to underline its broad mandate, should enumerate these areas of responsibility of this body. I may mention that among these areas were: nuclear disarmament, non-use of nuclear weapons, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear-weapon-free zones, zones of peace, other weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, reduction of military budgets, confidence-building measures, disarmament and development, disarmament and international security, and, finally, general and complete disarmament. In the programme of the special session, and more particularly at the thirty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, this Committee has been entrusted with certain more specific responsibilities for negotiations during the current year. These

(Mr. Marker, Pakistan)

responsibilities, as I said in my previous interventions, include firstly the elaboration of a comprehensive test ban treaty, the negotiation of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the conclusion of a convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons. These tasks should be reflected under the relevant areas of the Committee's responsibility that I have mentioned, and some other subjects may be added, in response to the specific proposals put forward by Member States during the current session of the Committee.

One such area for priority consideration by the Committee is that of nuclear disarmament. The Final Document of the special session, in more than one paragraph, has reaffirmed that the goal of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race has the highest priority. This is not surprising since the very first resolution of the United Nations was for the prohibition of nuclear armaments. It would have been relatively easy then to dismantle such few nuclear weapons that had been produced, and to devise effective measures to prevent their further production and development. Proposals and counter-proposals for this purpose were put forward at the time by the Soviet Union and the United States, but, unhappily, they were not seriously pursued. Instead, in the prevailing atmosphere of mistrust and incipient conflict, attempts were intensified by one of the Powers to retain its strategic advantage and by the other not to be left behind.

Now the two Powers have attained approximate parity in nuclear arms and, as everybody knows, they have the capability not only to annihilate each other but to destroy all civilization. The world continues to live under the cloud of this balance of terror. But strategic balance will not be a durable means for ensuring the world's security. Not only is it inherently unstable, but its maintenance necessitates the consumption of an ever-increasing proportion of the world's material and human resources.

It is therefore natural that we should welcome the initiative taken by one of the major nuclear-weapon Powers to initiate the discussions of nuclear disarmament within this Committee. The task, as we all know, is complex and involves, firstly, measures to halt and reverse the arms race, secondly, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and, thirdly, prevention of the spread of these weapons.

As regards the question of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race, the international community has placed primary emphasis on the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Pakistan continues to hope that this treaty will be concluded during the current year, and effectively prevent the further testing of nuclear weapons, especially by those Powers which have reached an advanced stage of sophistication in the development of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Marker, Pakistan)

The paper submitted by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in document CD/4 addresses itself to various aspects of the question of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race. The Pakistan delegation would like to welcome this paper warmly. We are particularly interested in the acknowledgement in the proposal that the nuclear arsenals of the various Powers are not equal, and that the disparity in these arsenals would require different kinds of contributions from each of the nuclear-weapon Powers at different stages of the negotiations for nuclear disarmament. Secondly, we also welcome the practical suggestion implied in the paper that, in view of the disparity in nuclear arsenals, the initiation of negotiations for nuclear disarmament need not be prevented by the absence of one of the nuclear-weapon Powers from these negotiations. My delegation agrees with the statement made by Ambassador Issraelyan when introducing document CD/4 that such negotiations for nuclear disarmament within the Committee will not constitute an obstacle to negotiations being held outside this forum, such as the bilateral USSR-United States negotiations on strategic armaments; but that the negotiations in this Committee could very well complement and facilitate the talks being held elsewhere and vice versa.

At the same time, it is important to ensure that the discussions of nuclear disarmament within this Committee or elsewhere do not become a cover for the further controlled expansion of the arms race. Pakistan welcomes recent indications from both the Soviet Union and the United States that a SALT-II accord is in the offing. We sincerely hope this is so. At the same time, we would be remiss if we did not express the hope that the SALT-III agreement will be reached with greater dispatch and that it will include significant quantitative reductions in strategic armaments as well as call a halt to their qualitative development.

My delegation expresses the hope that concrete steps will soon be taken to reduce the balance of weaponry presently deployed in certain parts of the world, particularly in Europe. We look forward to the reactions of other parties to the important initiative of the French Government for a European security conference which could consider reductions in the immense arsenals presently deployed on this continent.

Once confidence is created that nuclear disarmament will not compromise the security of any of the five Powers concerned, it is more than likely that negotiations could be initiated on the various aspects of disarmament indicated in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the special session.

(Mr. Marker, Pakistan)

One of the essential means for creating such confidence, both among nuclear-weapon Powers and non-nuclear-weapon States, is to secure agreement for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The Final Document has called for consultations leading to an international agreement for the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war. We hope that in the near future circumstances will make it possible for this Committee to advance to this subject. My delegation also considers as relevant the idea that each of the nuclear-weapon Powers undertakes in a binding form not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. A proposal for this purpose has been made by the socialist countries in the context of Europe. We hope this concept can be applied to all nuclear-weapon Powers in all regions of the world.

However, the first step which can and should be taken in this field is the elaboration of a convention to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. I have dealt at length with this subject in my previous intervention in this Committee and I shall not repeat myself. At the same time it is relevant to underline that unless the non-nuclear-weapon States are assured, in a binding and credible fashion, that their security will not be threatened by nuclear weapons, the goal of non-proliferation and therefore of nuclear disarmament will continue to elude the world community. We hope that sufficient time will be allocated in the programme of work for the current year to enable a consideration of the draft conventions on this subject submitted by Pakistan and the Soviet Union during the last session of the General Assembly. We shall, in the near future, request formal circulation of our document in this Committee.

The goal of nuclear disarmament, as I have said, must include ways and means of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to States other than the five nuclear-weapon Powers. The danger of nuclear proliferation haunts various parts of the world. If States such as Israel and South Africa acquire a nuclear-weapon capability, it would produce significant consequences not only for peace and security in these regions but would threaten international peace as a whole. It would certainly erode the efforts of the international community to build a viable structure of non-proliferation.

(Mr. Marker, Pakistan)

The danger of nuclear proliferation, unfortunately also exists in the region of south Asia. The countries of the region, and the world community, are only too well aware of the fact that a nuclear explosion has taken place in this region. The statements made by the Indian Government, regarding the "peaceful" nature of this explosion, would carry more conviction if India was prepared to respond more positively to the many initiatives that have since been taken for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Nor is our concern allayed by the fact that significant and sensitive parts of the Indian nuclear programme remain outside any international safeguards.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, our nuclear programme is entirely peaceful, and is operated under international safeguards. If India is genuinely concerned about the danger of proliferation, as we in Pakistan are, it could accept at least some of the initiatives that we have suggested mutually to assure each other on this question.

Pakistan would suggest that India should accept the proposal, endorsed by the United Nations, to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in south Asia, involving the renunciation of the acquisition of nuclear weapons as well as the international inspection of all nuclear facilities that exist in all the countries of south Asia. Secondly, Pakistan would be prepared to accept the application of full scope safeguards to all its nuclear facilities on a reciprocal basis, if India also indicates its acceptance. Thirdly, if India were to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Pakistan will be only too happy to follow India's lead in the matter.

The Committee on Disarmament must play its part in promoting ways and means of excluding nuclear weapons from those areas where they do not exist at present. Otherwise the so-called nuclear balance will continue to be threatened from new quarters. This is one of the many reasons why Pakistan attaches so much importance to the subject of nuclear disarmament.

Mr. DOMOKOS (Hungary): I would like to take this opportunity to extend to you my congratulations on the assumption of your office and express my conviction that the work of our Committee will be as successful under your chairmanship as it was in February. This assumes a special significance, since during this month we have to consider matters of substance that are before the Committee on Disarmament.

In my present statement I would like to deal with certain aspects of a single subject, namely, nuclear disarmament, and particularly with working paper CD/4 submitted jointly by seven socialist States, and then to touch upon the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of scientific experts.

The attention of the multilateral deliberative and negotiating disarmament forums has so far been concentrated mainly on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and on limiting and completely banning nuclear explosions. This was justified in the past and will be justified in the future as well.

In our days when the most urgent task is to halt the nuclear arms race, we can not forget that making the Non-Proliferation Treaty universal in the real sense of the word has become a substantial precondition for avoiding the danger of a nuclear war. The efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and to prevent the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States, as well as the close co-operation among States parties to the NPT, have contributed a great deal to the result that there has been no case of the use of nuclear weapons during the last 34 years.

However, the danger of proliferation still exists, and States with nuclear ambitions may emerge from time to time. Growing scientific and technical knowledge and the increasing economic capability of countries make it possible in principle for more States to decide to go nuclear. All this can increase the real danger. That is why we attach special significance to the second review conference of the NPT, which offers another possibility of strengthening the non-proliferation régime. We also hope that the preparations for the conference will have the result that further States, including the so called "near-nuclear States", will accede to the Treaty.

There can be no doubt that the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty would offer another possibility of halting and eliminating the nuclear arms race. It is not by chance therefore that the successful completion of the trilateral talks is also being repeatedly urged in this Committee. Accomplishing the complex tasks of nuclear disarmament is a time-consuming exercise. Apart from the CTB treaty, which is a vital element in halting the qualitative and quantitative nuclear arms

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race, I cannot omit stating that there is an urgent need for such measures, which are able not only to stop; but also to reverse the arms race, and which can ultimately lead to nuclear disarmament. We should start without delay the preparations of negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. However, one may ask if it is worth wasting our time and energy on the preparation of such negotiations when we have not even reached a CTBT.

We earnestly hope that obstacles standing in the way of reaching a CTB treaty will soon be abolished. It therefore seems appropriate and justified to start right away laying the basis for further negotiations on nuclear disarmament by preparing a proper framework through preliminary consultations on it. After creating the preconditions, the Committee may start negotiations on its substance without losing time. That is why the proposal of the socialist States contained in working paper CD/4 is timely and logical.

Working paper CD/4 submitted by seven socialist member States is a practical reflection of the priority tasks in the field of disarmament enumerated in the Final Document of the tenth special session and reiterated in a concentrated form by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session. It is a comprehensive proposal to start consultations and negotiations on a multilateral basis on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles up to their complete destruction.

The proposal touches upon generally-recognized priorities and contains concrete ideas. It embraces in complexity the major subjects in the field of nuclear disarmament which, in our judgement, should take a central place in the future work of the Committee.

At the same time flexibility is one of the main merits of the proposal. It avoids pressing rigid ideas and considerations as to the ways and methods of conducting preliminary consultations and at a later stage negotiations on the subject. It is to be discussed and formulated by the Committee itself, together with such aspects as the degree of participation of individual nuclear-weapon States in particular measures, with due account of the quantitative and qualitative arsenals in the possession of the States concerned.

In our view, the Committee on Disarmament is the most suitable forum, since four of the five nuclear-weapon States are represented in it together with a considerable number of non-nuclear-weapon States having the possibility to contribute to progress towards nuclear disarmament. However, the participation of China will be indispensable to ensure a substantial advance.

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The proposal is by no means meant as a substitute for other on-going bilateral and multilateral negotiations, but represents a new additional initiative for disarmament efforts where wider participation is desirable and useful.

As one of the sponsors of that working paper, I was satisfied to hear the positive remarks made by several delegations, the latest being that of the distinguished representative of Sweden, on our joint initiative. My delegation would be glad to hear comments and suggestions from other delegations of the CD, representing nuclear-weapon States, and non-nuclear-weapon countries. That could help in working out the most suitable forms and framework of consultations aimed at preparing and starting negotiations on substantive issues of nuclear disarmament within the shortest possible time.

Many questions may be asked about the details and alternatives raised by the working paper. I would not like to go into them, since they have been clarified in an exhaustive manner by my distinguished colleague Ambassador Issraelyan in his statements on 6 February and at the present meeting. We are confident that the sponsors of the working paper will be ready to answer further questions which may arise and to conduct informal consultations in any required form.

At the same time it is the position of my delegation that questions of nuclear disarmament, by virtue of the importance of their implementation, should take their due place in the work of the Committee in accordance with the proposals contained in working paper CD/4. This should be given proper attention when the Committee draws up the programme of its work even for the present part of its annual session, and to reserve sufficient time for appropriate consultations, preferably in April.

As is known to all the delegates to the Committee on Disarmament, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and to Identify Seismic events has made considerable progress in the work entrusted to it by the relevant decisions of the CCD and CD.

The Ad Hoc Group continued work at its seventh session on the elaboration of the principal scientific and technical guidelines for setting up and running the international seismic data exchange system so that this global network of data exchange could be established and put into operation after the entry into force of the treaty banning nuclear explosions in all environments.

As we can see from the progress report submitted by the Ad Hoc Group to the Committee, there has been considerable progress in working out the contents of the chapters of the final report. Judging by the preparations mentioned in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the progress report, we can rightly hope that all the work of the

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Ad Hoc Group will be completed in good time. My delegation supports the idea that the Committee should approve the suggestion made by the Group in paragraph 7 of the progress report concerning the date and duration of its next and -- we hope -- final session, with a view to giving the experts sufficient time to prepare their drafts.

I would like to take this opportunity to explain the position of my delegation concerning some ideas expressed in the Group and in the Committee by certain delegations to the effect that the experimental exercise of the seismic data exchange system might be held concurrently with or before the entry into force of the CTB treaty.

My delegation, like many others, is of the opinion that the seismic data exchange system as a means of verification is subordinated to the future CTB treaty, that it is to contribute to verification of the implementation of the treaty, and can by no means be considered a precondition to the conclusion of the treaty.

We all are aware of the fact that the seismic data exchange system consists of highly complicated machinery which will comprise not only particular seismic stations but specially-equipped international data centres and a sophisticated communication network. Therefore it can be used for an experimental exercise in its final, global form, when all its elements are functioning simultaneously in a complex way, otherwise it may easily show a false picture. This global network can be set up and tested only after the entry into force of the treaty.

Testing a system not properly constituted and consisting of differently equipped national seismic stations may produce deficient and disputable data. A possible defective final product of the experimental exercise may discourage certain States or give a pretext to others to keep away from the treaty, and that would by no means serve the cause of the nuclear disarmament.

It is well-founded reasoning also, that until the conclusion and entry into force of the CTBT we would not know which countries parties to the treaty would participate in the final system and how the network has to be completed.

These are the ideas and considerations I wanted to express in connexion with the questions of nuclear disarmament and the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): A few days ago the Committee on Disarmament adopted its rules of procedure. Members of the Committee noted with great satisfaction the positive results of prolonged, intensive consultations, which had taken almost a month's work. Consultations are at present proceeding on the preparation of the Committee's agenda and programme of work. In the course of these consultations, as also during the discussion on the rules of procedure, a constructive spirit and willingness to co-operate are being displayed. All this cannot but give rise to a certain satisfaction with the Committee's activity.

But matters can be viewed from a different angle as well. Indeed, more than six weeks of work and almost one-half of the duration of the present session have already gone by, and yet the Committee has not, strictly speaking, even embarked upon its principal task-- that of conducting negotiations on questions of the limitation of the arms race and of disarmament. This fact gives rise not merely to dissatisfaction but to serious concern.

In its statement on 24 January this year, at the opening of the Committee's session, the Soviet delegation emphasized that questions of procedure and organization of the Committee's work should not be overestimated and should not take too much time; they should be solved as soon as possible, we stressed, so that the Committee might successfully start the consideration of questions of substance. The Soviet delegation is again insistently advocating that the Committee should, without losing any time, begin negotiations here and now on the substance of disarmament problems. The questions whose examination was recommended by the General Assembly to all States and, in particular, to States members of the Committee are well known, and we consider that the final settlement of organizational matters should not have the effect of further delaying consideration of these problems.

We believe that circumstances for their effective consideration are on the whole favourable. Indeed, the Soviet-United States negotiations on SALT-II, which are to set a specific limit to the further stockpiling of the most destructive and expensive types of weapons, are nearing completion. In the words of Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the entry into force of a SALT agreement "will mean that

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the process of curbing the arms race, a process embarked upon at the initiative of the USSR, is continuing". This agreement will probably also help to revive other negotiations now being conducted in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race such as those on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

It is widely recognized that the most urgent question in present conditions is that of starting negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament. As L.I. Brezhnev stressed in his pre-election speech on 2 March this year, "we consider this to be an exceptionally important matter and are prepared to start such negotiations".

Today the Soviet delegation would like to revert to working paper CD/4, submitted to the Committee on 1 February by the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, concerning negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

We are doing so, first, because delegations have manifested interest in our proposal. Specific questions have been asked about its substance. We have been requested to supply further details on a number of points contained in our proposal and, if possible, to develop them in more concrete terms.

Secondly (and this, of course, is the most important point), we are convinced that the problem of nuclear disarmament is the priority issue for the Committee, which is under a duty to revert to it again and again.

On behalf of the sponsors of working paper CD/4, the Soviet delegation would like to express thanks to the delegations of Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Sweden and others who have welcomed the proposal submitted with regard to starting negotiations on nuclear disarmament. We agree with those delegations which described it as a step towards the implementation of the relevant recommendations adopted by the General Assembly both at its special session devoted to disarmament and at its thirty-third session.

Other delegations have promised to study working paper CD/4 with care and to express their views on it at a later stage. We shall await their statements with interest and will, of course, answer the questions they may put in future.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The motives of the sponsors of working paper CD/4 were explained in sufficient detail in their statements before the Committee. Allow me to answer the questions that were put to us in connexion with the proposals contained in this document. We have answered certain questions of a more specific nature in the course of our contacts with individual delegations. Others are of more general interest. It is with these that we should like, with your permission, to deal now.

The time-frame of the proposed programme. It has been pointed out to us that working paper CD/4 says nothing about the "agreed time-frames" for the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their complete elimination, mentioned in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the special session. The view has been expressed that this might be an oversight on the part of the paper's sponsors and could be rectified.

Document CD/4 indeed says nothing about time-frames for the implementation of the programme as a whole or of its various stages. This was done deliberately. In putting forward a proposal on starting negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament (and this is precisely the purpose of the working paper), we tried to display the greatest possible flexibility and to refrain from fixing, let alone imposing, specific dates or time-limits. To take a realistic view, the conduct of appropriate negotiations and the implementation of a programme of nuclear disarmament is by no means an easy matter, as it entails prolonged efforts and concordance of positions. That is why we left the question of time-limits open, on the principle that it should be subject to agreement between the participants in the negotiations. In our paper it is stated that the cessation of the production, the reduction and the destruction of nuclear weapons "should be carried out by stages on a mutually acceptable and agreed basis", which, of course, also applies to possible time-frames. Furthermore, paragraph 50 of the Final Document refers to "agreed" time-frames. The only time-limit which we consider appropriate to propose at this stage concerns the beginning of consultations and of negotiations on the substance of the problem. We consider that the consultations could be started already in the course of the Committee's spring session and the negotiations before the end of 1979.

Degree of participation by individual nuclear-weapon States in the proposed measures. I would remind the Committee that it is emphasized in document CD/4 that the degree of participation of those States in measures at each stage should be determined "taking into account the quantitative and qualitative importance of the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and of other States concerned". The same condition is mentioned in paragraph 49 of the Final Document of the special session. We consider it to be important. Indeed, the meaning of this provision can be reduced to the principle that, as levels of nuclear strength are gradually reduced, the existing military balance should remain undisturbed. In other words, no prejudice should be caused to the safety of any State. That is why it is wise to take into account the arsenals of both nuclear-weapon States and of the other States concerned.

What would the degree of participation of individual nuclear-weapon States be in practice? Obviously it could vary according to the volume of weapons being reduced, taking into account the condition mentioned above. The volume of measures at all stages, commencing with the first, for nuclear-weapon States should be specified in the course of the forthcoming negotiations. This will certainly be one of the principal objectives of the negotiations. In any case, the need to guarantee the non-impairment of the existing balance in the field of nuclear strength is inescapable.

The question of the relationship between the proposed negotiations and the Soviet-United States negotiations on strategic arms limitation. These negotiations are unquestionably closely related in content, although there also exist substantial differences between them. The SALT negotiations are concerned with strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons. The proposed negotiations are broader in nature, covering the entire range of nuclear weapons, including the cessation of their production, the reduction and the destruction both of the weapons themselves and of the means of their delivery. It goes without saying that the preparation and conduct of these latter negotiations must not prejudice current and future SALT negotiations; they could take place in parallel.

Participation of all (or not all) nuclear-weapon States in the negotiations and in the preparatory consultations. We confirm quite definitely that all States without exception which possess nuclear weapons must participate from the very outset in the proposed negotiations, whose object is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. These negotiations will be so fundamental in nature and so broad in scope, and have such radical consequences that the non-participation of even one nuclear-weapon State would seriously undermine them by destroying the link with the actual situation in the world, would tend to maintain distrust and, in the final analysis, would affect their results.

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Furthermore, it should be remembered that our proposal presupposes the participation in the negotiations of a certain number of non-nuclear-weapon States. Such States are widely represented in the Committee on Disarmament, which seems to us to be the most appropriate forum for conducting the negotiations. These States have a direct interest in the nuclear question and have, as we know, specific proposals of their own. The participation of these countries makes the presence of all nuclear-weapon Powers at the negotiating table all the more imperative.

The preparatory consultations are another matter. In suggesting that they should be conducted within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament, we were aware that China is not as yet represented in this body and that there are no signs of its coming here in the near future. The latest events in south-east Asia have merely confirmed this. Nevertheless, in order not to delay the preparation of the negotiations, we agree to begin it without China. The preparatory work would include, above all, determination of the range of questions of substance to be considered in the negotiations, i.e. their agenda or programme, and also various organizational matters relating to the conduct of the negotiations (time-limits, procedure, etc.).

Here we come to the question of how to approach the preparation of the negotiations. Some delegations were interested in our views on that point. In our opinion, it would be necessary, for a start, to hold a discussion in the Committee on the document proposed by the group of socialist countries. It would be logical if the Committee's agenda and programme of work took this into account. A broad exchange of views would make it possible to bring to light the possibility of working out agreed proposals concerning the start of negotiations.

It would, of course, be interesting for us to hear the views of other members of the Committee regarding methods of conducting the preparation of the negotiations. We do not wish to impose our ideas in this matter; our position is open.

We have heard it argued that the question of holding negotiations on nuclear disarmament is allegedly not yet ripe, that the situation is at present unsuitable for negotiations of that kind. It is said that some of the nuclear-weapon Powers have reservations, doubts and even objections in this respect. What can be the answer to this? We have already stated more than once that we entertain no

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

illusions concerning the possibility of a quick solution being found to the whole set of nuclear disarmament problems, but consider that the start of negotiations on this matter should not be delayed any further. We foresee that these negotiations will be difficult and prolonged. But allow me to ask: what negotiations in the sphere of disarmament have not given rise to difficulties, and which of them were completed in a few days or weeks? On the contrary, it is known that many bilateral negotiations-- and multilateral ones, too-- in the sphere of disarmament fail to yield the desired results for a long time.

The conduct of negotiations on disarmament questions is itself a positive phenomenon in international politics. Only those who rattle the sabre, who seek the further aggravation of the international situation, the arms race, the unleashing of wars-- only they reject attempts to strive, in the course of political negotiations, for a mutually acceptable solution that would be in the interests of mankind. That is why arguments about the alleged non-existence of suitable conditions for the conduct of negotiations on nuclear disarmament are absolutely without foundation.

In conclusion I should like to dwell briefly on certain doubts which sometimes make themselves felt, even if they are not expressed by our interlocutors. I shall not waste your time in refuting assertions about the "insincerity" or "lack of seriousness" of document CD/4.

Apprehensions are sometimes expressed to the effect that consideration of the proposal submitted by the socialist countries might allegedly deflect the Committee's attention from such urgent problems as the banning of nuclear weapon tests or the prohibition of chemical weapons. We can say straight out that such apprehensions are without foundation. We are not in the least inclined to minimize the urgency of, for example, the conclusion of an agreement on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The solution to this problem ripened and, to a great extent, was evolved in the course of the negotiations familiar to us, and every effort should be made to complete its solution. But can the broader problem of the cessation of the production and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons be removed from the Committee's agenda? Can discussion of this vital problem be postponed indefinitely? Working paper CD/4 submitted by the group of socialist countries calls, precisely, for the starting of negotiations on this matter.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, please allow me first of all to convey to you the congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of duty as the presiding officer of the Committee. We look forward to a fruitful month under your guidance.

Please allow me also, since I was unavoidably absent from Geneva practically for all the month of February to convey, through you, my great appreciation of the work done under the Chairmanship of your predecessor, the distinguished representative of Argentina.

The progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and to Identify Seismic Events which is now before the Committee calls for no more than a procedural decision on the timing of the next session of the Group. I shall express the view of my delegation on that question shortly.

In the meantime, however, please permit me to put in its proper context the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts. When the Group was set up almost three years ago, it was in realization of the vital importance which the technical aspects of the issue of verification would have in stimulating agreement on and in the operation of a CTBT. The Ad Hoc Group has in its previous reports and, in particular, the report contained in document CCD/558, clarified many aspects of the technicalities of an international data exchange network involving several stations located around the world. My delegation is grateful for and is appreciative of the valuable contribution which the Group of Experts has thereby made to the solution of one of the problems which ostensibly are quoted as holding up the conclusion of a CTBT. Such a network of seismological stations which will permit a truly international participation in the verification procedure of a CTBT will, we hope, be appropriately located in all hemispheres. We can already foresee the necessity for the experts to give attention in their recommendations to ways and means of diffusing technical knowledge for effective participation by areas where, by their own earlier observation in document CCD/558, there exists a gap which has to be filled for an efficient network.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

The relationship between the work of the scientific experts and negotiations on a CTBT was aptly summarized by the spokesman for the three negotiating Powers when he informed the CCD last year that there was agreement among them that the guidelines for setting up and running the international seismic exchange should be laid down in an annex to the treaty and that the detailed organizational and procedural arrangements for implementing the international exchange should be worked out after the entry into force of the treaty, drawing of course on the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Group. Thus, the practical application of the data exchange network, through experimental exercises, was not immediately seen and cannot be seen now as providing a reason for holding up the conclusion of a CTBT, very useful though these exercises will be. Indeed, the whole issue of verification of which the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts is only a part, albeit an important part, has been -- in the view of my delegation -- considered to the point where we think it should no longer provide an excuse for further delay in the submission of the draft of the tripartite negotiators. A combination of the various means available -- national, international and on-site, when determined to be necessary for double assurance -- should have provided an adequately verifiable guarantee of compliance. What is lacking, we believe, is a will to conclude these negotiations. Technical solutions can be devised only for technical problems; a political decision is necessary for a political issue.

The question then arises where do we go from here? Will this part of the session of the CD end once again without its starting work on a CTBT? Here I share completely the views expressed by my distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union when he says that, important as the work which the CD has done over the last six weeks has been, we cannot escape the fact that we really have not got down to substance. It would be a pity if the Committee were to wind up at least this part of its annual session without really getting down to substance.

The answer to that question in my delegation's view no longer rests exclusively with the tripartite negotiators on a CTBT. The CD is now master of its agenda; it has within its ranks a fourth nuclear-weapon Power to whom the contents of a CTBT are of great and intimate concern. In other words, if it was believed that the old CCD could be presented with a tripartite draft to which it would then apply mere cosmetics as its sole contribution to the elaboration of the treaty, the CD -- even with its present physical composition, not to mention its

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

potential composition going by the name plates -- cannot be expected to be satisfied with such a role. My own delegation will certainly be greatly interested inter alia in the duration of a CTBT, the review procedure, the question of peaceful nuclear explosions, to mention only a few. From what we have gathered secondhand, I dare say our views on these issues are not necessarily the same as those of all or some of the tripartite negotiators. Will it therefore not be in the interest of participation by all its members on the basis of full equality, and here I am quoting rule 3 of the rules of procedure, if we were in this Committee to begin to exchange views first hand on the proposed text?

I hardly need reiterate the importance which my delegation, as party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, attaches to the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon testing as a beginning of the assumption by the nuclear-weapon States of their obligation by which they undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. We have said it often in the past, and it bears repetition, that Nigeria as party to the NPT finds it increasingly difficult to press other non-nuclear-weapon States to become parties when, despite the pleas of the international community, as expressed in the Final Document of the Special Session, the nuclear-weapon States proceed at a speedier rate to conduct tests. We believe in non-proliferation, but we do not believe in the divine right of some to remain nuclear-weapon States. The statistics on nuclear explosions conducted in 1978 which, with her characteristic clarity, were given by Mrs. Thorsson, the distinguished leader of the Swedish delegation, in her statement on 6 March, were to say the least most shocking. Will the Committee continue to be satisfied with optimistic statements on an almost completed draft when all the facts point to a certain understanding -- or so it seems to us -- to delay a CTBT while waiting for another "agreement" which, because of its own long delay, is being increasingly seen by some observers as capable of being nullified by technical advance. Can we wait until that treaty is presented to the international community with fanfare before we expect to receive a draft CTBT? This is, I think, a dilemma to which we should most seriously address ourselves, and it is not one which, judging by the statement we have just had from the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union -- it is not one which is of concern only to the non-nuclear-weapon States. I noticed with considerable interest his concern that something positive should emerge, in this respect, during the course of the work of the Committee.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

I shall conclude by reverting to the approval sought by the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on the dates for its next meeting. Several views have been expressed by members of the Committee on the timing of the second part of the annual sessions of the Committee. Even while rule 7 throws the issue open, the Secretariat should not, as I understood it did in this case, propose to the Expert Group dates which may pre-empt the Committee's decision on its own working period. My delegation believes that the Ad Hoc Group should meet and submit its report at a time when it can be reasonably expected that the CD will be able to consider the report with all the seriousness it deserves. Perhaps late June to early July should be a more realistic date in this connexion.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for his statement and for his kind remarks addressed to my predecessor and myself.

I would point out that we still have an hour at our disposal and I would wish to use this time to make a proposal for your consideration. We have, this morning, had a number of important and authoritative statements and I think that they have all, in one way or another, touched on the next stage of our work which is the drafting of the agenda and programme of work -- a stage which I indicated at our previous meeting that I myself was very anxious to see us move on to. One distinguished delegate reminded us this morning that we do not have eternity at our disposal.

If the Committee would make no objection, I would now propose that we recess to hold an informal meeting in some five minutes' time. I would then wish to put some views before you in relation to the drafting of the agenda and the programme of work.

Is there any objection?

It was so decided.

The meeting was suspended at 12.00 p.m. and resumed at 12.55 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: I would simply like to announce that we shall meet again on Tuesday morning to hear statements and to conduct other business but, with the concurrence of the Committee, I shall convene an informal meeting at 3 p.m. on Monday, 12 March 1979.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

CD/PV.18
13 March 1979
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE EIGHTEENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 13 March 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. L.D. THOMSON

(Australia)

GE.79-60504

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENSMAIL

Argentina: Mr. D.C. ORTIZ DE ROZAS
Mr. F.J. DÁVILA

Australia: Mr. L.D. THOMSON
Mr. A.J. BEHN

Belgium: Mr. P. NOTERDAEME
Mr. G. VAN DUYSSE

Brazil: Mr. A. CELSO DE OURO PRETO

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma: U SAW HLAING

Canada: Mr. J.T. SIMARD

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mrs. V.B. JACKLEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. V. TYLNER
Mr. L. STAVINOHA

Egypt: Mr. M. EL-BARADEI

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. S. KAHN
Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. J. POHLMANN
Mr. H. MÜLLER

Hungary: Mr. M. DOMOKOS
Mr. C. GYÖRFFY

India: Mr. S.T. DEVARE

Indonesia: Mr. A. KAMIL
Mr. M. SIDIK
Mr. I. DAMANIK

Iran: Mr. M. FARTASH
Mr. D. CHILATY

Italy: Mr. N. DI BERNARDO
Mr. M. MORENO
Mr. C. FRATESCHI

Japan: Mr. T. NONOYAMA
Mr. T. IWANAMI
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya:

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Miss A. CABRERA

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. M. RAHHALI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. K. AHMED
Mr. T. OLUMOKO

Pakistan: Mr. H. KHAN
Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. H. PAC
Mr. B. RUSSIN

Romania: Mr. C. INE
Mr. V. TUDOR
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. B. FONSEKA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. S. STROMBÄCK

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
Mr. A.M. VAVILOV
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHIN

United Kingdom: Mr. N.H. MARSHALL

United States of America: Mr. A. FISHER
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY
Mr. M. DALEY
Mr. L. TURNBULL
Ms. B. KILLIAN
Mr. C. BAY
Ms. E. ARENSBURGER

Venezuela: Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Ms. D. SZOKOLOCZI

Yugoslavia: Mr. D. DJOKIC

Zaire: Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU

Mr. VOUTOV (Bulgaria) (translated from Russian): First of all I should like to convey my best wishes to you as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of March and express the hope that, under your guidance, we shall in the near future be able to complete our work of drawing up the Committee's agenda and programme of work for 1979 and then proceed to take up substantive disarmament questions requiring immediate attention.

In my statement today I should like to deal with two matters, namely, to make a few preliminary comments on questions connected with the agenda and to present to the Committee some of our views on the initiative taken by seven socialist countries on matters relating to the negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

As regards the Committee's agenda, we consider that the experience acquired during the course of the consultations on and the adoption of the Committee's rules of procedure should be used as fully as possible. We hope that all delegations will show maximum realism and adopt a constructive approach to the task of reaching agreement on the Committee's agenda and programme of work. Indeed, priority questions have been reduced to one denominator by the consensus reached on the programme of action set out in the Final Document of the special session.

We feel that one of the difficulties encountered in the course of present consultations is due to the failure to adopt the proposals submitted by the socialist and certain other countries during the consideration of the Committee's rules of procedure on the general agenda, on the one hand, and the annual agenda, on the other, in which could be included problems that are ripe for consideration and on which specific negotiations could be conducted. A number of delegations are now seeking to include in the agenda all questions of primary importance in the field of disarmament despite the fact that the Committee would clearly be unable to consider all of them.

The Bulgarian delegation considers that the draft agenda submitted by the group of socialist countries was drawn up in the light of genuine priority questions and taking into account the positions of other members of the Committee with a view to reaching agreement as rapidly as possible on the agenda and programme of work for the

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

present session. Our delegation therefore proposes that the Committee should use this draft as a basis for the consideration and adoption of the final agenda for the 1979 session of the Committee on Disarmament.

We once again call upon members of the Committee to complete work as quickly as possible on the preparation of the agenda and programme of work for the current session, not overlooking the fact that we have already been working for more than six weeks. Although we have already achieved an initial result, namely, the adoption of the rules of procedure, we have not as yet touched upon a single one of the major disarmament problems before the Committee.

Permit me now to turn to the second point I wish to discuss in my statement, namely, the question of ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed (CD/4). The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is a sponsor of this new major initiative by the Soviet Union and has high hopes that a new phase is beginning in the search for a radical solution to the problem of nuclear weapons. We are convinced that this initiative will be received favourably by the Committee. It is noteworthy that so far not one delegation has expressed itself against the idea of starting negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

Our delegation notes with particular satisfaction the positive response of the delegations of Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan and Sweden to the proposal of the socialist countries. We are awaiting with great interest the statements of other delegations in the Committee which promised to study document CD/4 and express their views on it at a later date.

We believe that they will appreciate the strictly balanced nature of the proposal of the socialist countries and the realistic elements it contains, which does not disturb by even a fraction the existing relationship of forces so that, during its implementation, nobody would be the loser. The crux of the problem is to reduce the level of nuclear strength which has become too dangerous and, at the same time, to maintain the balance in this field unchanged.

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

I should once again like to draw attention to the constructive nature and the flexibility of our proposal. Particularly telling in this respect was the statement made by Ambassador Issraelyan, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, in reply to a series of questions concerning the application and practical implementation of the proposals made by the socialist countries on nuclear disarmament. This is particularly true of the time-frame of the proposed programme and also of the degree of participation by individual nuclear-weapon States in the consultations, negotiations or in the application of the measures proposed.

For these reasons our delegation is counting on the adoption of a positive attitude by all countries members of the Committee to the negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that the nuclear arms race is fraught with the principal danger of war. As we all know, in the past 10 years alone, stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the world have trebled, to say nothing of the improvement and increase in the number of delivery vehicles for strategic nuclear weapons.

The stockpiling of nuclear means of destruction in itself increases the danger of their proliferation and deployment in new areas, and multiplies the risk of their utilization. But the danger does not stop there. The point is that, as the stockpiling process continues, new and even more dangerous weapons, which are increasingly difficult to limit, are developed. The radical approach to these problems proposed in the initiative of the socialist countries will also place a serious obstacle in the way of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. A large number of delegations in our Committee have expressed concern regarding this aspect of the nuclear arms race.

We should like to believe that, side by side with the conclusion of a SALT-II agreement, the United States Government will also make its contribution to the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The world remembers President Carter's statement concerning the willingness of the United States to reduce its nuclear capability "by 10, 20, even 50 per cent". In view of the fact that, according to some calculations, the United States of America possess more than 22,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, its attitude to the proposed negotiations acquires special significance.

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

My delegation would also like to express the hope that France and the United Kingdom will adopt a positive attitude to the question of ending the production of nuclear weapons and reducing their stockpiles. The solution of a problem as important as that of the complete cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and the reduction of their stockpiles requires the participation of all the nuclear-weapon Powers. So far as is known, that was the position of France, which at the beginning of the 1970s supported the idea of negotiations between the five nuclear-weapon Powers.

As regards China, we all remember the resounding declarations made by its representatives at the special session that it allegedly stands for "the complete prohibition and genuine destruction of nuclear weapons". But unfortunately these are still nothing but words -- a fact which is all too convincingly demonstrated by China's empty place in our Committee. China's armed aggression against socialist Viet Nam has increased still further the concern of the international community regarding China's real position on questions of peace, international co-operation and disarmament.

Nevertheless, the Soviet delegation's willingness not to insist on China's participation in the first stage of the consultations on the preparation of the future negotiations is a further confirmation of the sincerity and businesslike approach of the socialist countries to the search for solutions to this important problem of our times. However, the participation of all the nuclear-weapon Powers without exception in the actual negotiations on nuclear disarmament is a sine qua non.

In conclusion, I should like to emphasize that we are counting on the co-operation of all delegations on the Committee in the elaboration of the most appropriate forms of consultations aimed at creating a basis for the future negotiations on the basic problems of nuclear disarmament. Our delegation fully supports the idea that these consultations should be conducted within the Committee itself, and considers that nuclear disarmament should be reflected as a top priority item in the Committee's agenda and programme of work for 1979.

Mr. DI BERNARDO (Italy): Mr. Chairman, I would first like to tell you how happy my delegation is to see you as Chairman of this Committee. I am sure that under your wise and able guidance the Committee will this month make the progress that all of us expect.

The Committee on Disarmament has before it for consideration and approval the progress report submitted by the Ad Hoc Group of scientific experts on seismic events at the conclusion of its seventh session.

As everybody realizes, the Ad Hoc Group has been entrusted with a task which is closely related to the problem of the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

In this connexion I should like, at this juncture, to associate myself with previous speakers in reiterating the urgency of a universal and complete nuclear test ban and in expressing the apprehension of my delegation at the continuing delay in the achievement of such an essential goal.

For many years the question of the complete prohibition of nuclear testing in all environments has been one of the priority key issues on the agenda of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which was adopted by consensus, in paragraph 51 stressed that: "the negotiations now in progress on 'a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which would be an integral part of the treaty,' should be concluded urgently and the result submitted for full consideration by the multilateral negotiating body with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date".

Our Committee was again urged by resolution 33/60, adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session: "To take up immediately the agreed text resulting from the negotiations [among the three nuclear-weapon States] with a view to the submission as soon as possible of a draft [test-ban] treaty, which will attract the widest possible adherence, to a resumed thirty-third session of the General Assembly".

Against this background of recommendations -- which reflect the increasing concern of the international community on this issue -- we cannot but share the feelings of impatience of a number of other delegations with the current pace of negotiations.

(Mr. di Bernardo, Italy)

My Government had sincerely welcomed the resumption of the trilateral talks between the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, acknowledging that the nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility in this matter. In fact we were confident that the continuation of discussions among the countries most directly concerned would make a positive contribution to the clarification of outstanding difficulties within a reasonable time.

After an interval of several months since the last progress report submitted to the CCD by the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom on behalf of the USSR and the United States as well, we however feel that it might be desirable to be provided with more detailed and up-to-date information on recent developments in the tripartite talks; this in order to make a realistic assessment of the progress made and of issues still needing exploration, also in view of the further course of action to be taken at the multilateral level, in pursuance of the United Nations General Assembly resolutions.

There is wide recognition, I submit, that the prospects for a breakthrough in this crucial area depend, to a large extent, upon the success of the tripartite discussions. This is, however, a problem of vital concern to every nation, and we share the opinion that, pending the completion of trilateral talks, the Committee should not be prevented from giving appropriate consideration to this item, thus offering to old and new member States the opportunity to express their views and to contribute to the achievement of the common goal. In the view of my delegation, parallel to the work of the three nuclear-weapon States participating in the trilateral talks, a complementary activity on specific aspects of the problem could be usefully pursued within the Committee, in a fruitful spirit of co-operation.

We therefore sincerely hope that the delegations concerned will respond affirmatively to the appeal already made by several members of the Committee and provide us very soon with a substantive report, revealing the progress of their efforts.

We are all keenly aware that one of the principal obstacles to the achievement of a CTBT is verification. In this respect it has already been demonstrated, during the extensive discussions which have taken place in the CCD, that effective monitoring of a CTBT could not be confined to so-called national means but should be based on a combination of national verification methods and international machinery and procedures.

(Mr. di Bernardo, Italy)

It is the view of many delegations -- including my own -- that adequate verification of a CTBT must embrace provisions for on-site inspection, to be carried out when a detected seismic event cannot satisfactorily be identified by other means.

At the same time, the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts established in 1976 has clearly outlined the contribution that seismological methods and capabilities of detection, location and identification of earthquakes and explosions can make to the global monitoring of a CTBT. The Group has done good work in elucidating the possibilities of seismology and has made concrete proposals, advocating the establishment of a global network of seismological stations and of an international data collection and evaluation centre.

The Italian delegation has noted with appreciation the offer by Sweden to establish and to finance a temporary data centre, which could make it possible to plan an experimental exercise of a system of international co-operation in the exchange of data collected on seismic events, for the purpose of verifying a CTBT.

We feel that a decision on the carrying out of such exercise should not be delayed. The operative performance of the seismic identification capabilities should in fact be tested in practice before the entry to force of the treaty, thus permitting such a system of international verification to become immediately operative and to respond fully to its purposes as soon as the treaty takes effect.

Everybody realizes that there are problems of technical, legal, military and political requirements which cannot be easily solved and which need timely and accurate preparation, not only from the theoretical standpoint.

Bearing this in mind, my delegation would like to urge the Group of Experts to expedite its work under its present terms of reference, in order to submit to the Committee as soon as possible a final report which would enable us to adopt appropriate decisions on further steps leading to the establishment of an effective verification system for a CTBT.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Italy for his statement and for his kind remarks addressed ~~personally~~ to the Chair. Would any other delegation like to take the floor at this meeting? As that does not seem to be the case, I would propose to close the meeting but, before doing so, I would like to draw your attention to a draft decision which I wish to submit to you for consideration, and which has been distributed to delegations.

It is a matter of which I think the Committee is aware, on which I have been consulting delegations and it is related to the machinery through which we would undertake the next stage of our work, that is, the drafting of the agenda and programme of work. I hope everybody has had a chance to read the draft decision. It has a small note on the time-table proposed to the effect that we should hold the first meeting of this ad hoc working group, which would be open to the participation of all member States, at the end of today's plenary meeting. Are there any comments on this draft decision?

Mr. MARKER (Pakistan): I believe the distinguished delegate of Egypt suggested yesterday that we might use the expression "to assist the Chairman" rather than "exchange views" on questions. We feel that this is perhaps a more precise definition of our work and may help us to go ahead with the job which you have set before us. May I therefore suggest that we use the words "to assist the Chairman on the questions relating to the preparation of the provisional agenda."

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): I understand the point which was made yesterday by the distinguished representative of Egypt and supported today by my colleague from Pakistan, but the question is whether the Committee has to assist the Chairman. Would it not denigrate the role of the Committee if it were to assist the Chairman? The Chairman has to work under the guidance of the Committee and not to assist the Committee in producing documents or other material; so perhaps we could find another formula which also takes account of the point which was made by the distinguished representatives of Egypt and Pakistan, saying, for example, "to prepare guidelines for the drawing up of the agenda and the programme of work". I think this would be a better approach.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I agree with my distinguished colleague of the German Democratic Republic. I think that his recommendation to prepare guidelines is however a little restrictive in view of chapter VIII

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

of the rules of procedure, which refers to the agenda and programme of work, giving this responsibility to the Chairman. Now we all recognize that this year is not an ordinary year for the Committee on Disarmament, and one can hardly expect the Chairman, during a recess, to have prepared a series of draft agendas based on the rules of procedure which had not yet been adopted. So, recognizing the fact that this is a different year, it would occur to me that we could handle this problem by saying: "to exchange views on questions relating to the preparation of the provisional agenda and programme of work of the Committee for the purpose of assisting the Chairman in carrying out his functions in accordance with chapter VIII of the rules of procedure". There is no doubt that the Chairman has indicated that he would like to hear what we have in mind, and the purpose of our exchanging views is to give him some ideas, so that his work as referred to in chapter VIII will reflect as closely as possible the consensus.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): I think that I share the concern of the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic on the possibility of setting up an ad hoc working group to assist the Chairman on the problem of the agenda. Perhaps not so much because I think this might denigrate the Committee but because it might, when linked specifically with the agenda, be in conflict with chapter VIII of the rules of procedure, where rule 29 says that the provisional agenda and the programme of work shall be drawn up by the Chairman of the Committee with the assistance of the Secretary. In other words, the physical assistance is to be provided by the Secretary of the Committee and not by an ad hoc working group. I also believe that to set up an ad hoc working group merely to exchange views does not suffice as a task for the ad hoc working group. The suggestion of the distinguished representative of the United States may of course provide the possibility of exchanging views with the prospect of doing something else. On the other hand, perhaps we might also consider setting up an ad hoc working group to consider questions relating to the preparation of the provisional agenda. That is to say, the setting up of a working group which would then have the task of considering questions relating to the preparation of the provisional agenda, without it necessarily impinging on the prerogative of the Chairman, whose prerogative it is to provide the basic text. In considering the questions relating to the preparation of the agenda, suggestions would be made which would guide the Chairman or assist him, without the ad hoc working group actually assuming the task itself.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): In view of the intervention of my predecessor, the distinguished representative of Nigeria, I would like to limit myself to supporting his suggestion.

Mr. DOMOKOS (Hungary): In my view the simple "exchange of views" on this question does not justify the creation of an ad hoc working group. A forum for the exchange of views could probably be offered by the unofficial plenary meetings of the Committee. Therefore, I would like to propose a very simple change in your paper, Mr. Chairman, which might help to harmonize different views, and which, I think, leaves the mandate of Chairman intact while justifying the creation of an ad hoc working group. I would like to propose the deletion of some words in the fourth line of your proposal, Mr. Chairman, that is, the words "exchange views on questions relating to" and their replacement by the following: "facilitate, in 1979". The text would thus read "to facilitate, in 1979, the preparation of the provisional agenda and programme of work of the Committee".

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): The United States suggested some changes in language, but upon hearing those of our distinguished Nigerian colleague --and this comes to me with a great deal of personal pain -- I am prepared to admit that his suggestion is better than mine. I therefore withdraw the United States proposal, and support the one made by our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Adeniji.

Mr. MARKER (Pakistan): The original idea of our delegation was to bring more precision into the task ahead of us, and I think the suggestion made by the distinguished Ambassador of Nigeria does that admirably, so we would also support his views.

Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): I feel somewhat responsible for this exchange of views, because at yesterday's informal meeting it was my delegation that brought up this point, which was subsequently very appropriately commented on by the delegation of Egypt. We have now embarked on an exchange of ideas and drafting proposals which would have been more appropriate at an informal meeting than a formal meeting. This, however, probably offers obvious and tangible proof that the Committee on Disarmament is adopting a new approach, and that many of these things have been said so that they could be included in the records. In order to make my delegation's position

(Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, Argentina)

clear, I should like to say that, when I made this suggestion yesterday, I was very much aware of the provisions of rule 29 under which the Chairman, with the assistance of the Secretary, is assigned particular responsibility for the preparation of the provisional agenda, which must then be submitted to the Committee for consideration and adoption. The rules of procedure do not say how the Chairman is to proceed, leaving him some latitude in the matter, which is logical, since the Chairman changes from month to month. There will be chairmen who, on their own initiative, will want to submit a draft provisional agenda. There will be others who will want to hold informal consultations between various delegations. There will also be chairmen who might want to set up a working group so that they can have the benefit of delegations' opinions on the contents of the agenda. This means that there is no formal limitation on the manner in which the Chairman is to proceed in preparing the provisional agenda with the Secretary's assistance which, of course, he will always have. Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the proposal you submitted to the Committee was perfectly in order, since it reflects your criterion for proceeding with preparation of the agenda. The only suggestion I made at that time was that the words "exchange of views" should be replaced, because I considered that in setting up a working group, we should give it a slightly more responsible and formal task than that of simply exchanging points of view. Having said this, I feel that the formula suggested by the distinguished representative of Nigeria allays the concern felt by my delegation when it made its suggestion at the informal meeting yesterday.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Argentina. I may say his analysis, based on vast experience, strikes me as very relevant. I think that I would be right in saying that there is no real difference between any of us on this point and, in putting forward the language we did, I really had in mind the whole process of preparation that would go on until such time as I was able to lay before the Committee, in formal plenary session, a provisional agenda and programme of work. It does, however, seem to me as if this conception has not adequately been formulated by the Chair, as can perhaps be seen from the very useful suggestion made by our distinguished colleague from Hungary. I wonder if the easiest way out has not been provided by the suggestion of the distinguished representative of Nigeria, which I understood to be the deletion of the phrase "exchange of views on" and replacing it by the words "to consider questions, etc.". Am I right in this?

Mr. DOMOKOS (Hungary). After checking the exact text of the proposal made by my distinguished colleague and friend, Ambassador Adeniji, I will also support it with great pleasure.

Mr. ENE (Romania): I certainly do not have any difficulty in accepting the change which was proposed by the distinguished representative of Nigeria and supported by others. I agree that this is what we have to do in this working group. My problem is that, at this particular moment, we are establishing a kind of precedent for the future as to the manner in which the agenda is to be prepared at the beginning of each annual session. My basic concern is that we should always keep very strictly in mind rule 29 of the rules of procedure, which allocates to the Chairman the task of drawing up the provisional agenda with the assistance of the Secretary. Now, of course, the distinguished representative of Argentina was very right in pointing out that it will be for each Chairman to suggest to the Committee a way of assisting him in this task. Whatever formula we are to establish should not depart from rule 29.

Therefore my suggestion would be that the first sentence in the decision that we are to make should contain some reference to the fact that rule 29 is to be taken into account in the preparation of the agenda. While accepting the idea that the working group should conceive the preparation of the provisional agenda and the programme of work for the Committee, which is now in the text, I would then suggest adding the words "in accordance with rule 29".

Mr. CASTILLO (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): I agree with what has been said by the representative of the United States to the effect that, at this stage, the Committee cannot be too demanding and exacting concerning the application of the rules of procedure. Paragraph 27 states that the Committee shall adopt its agenda; paragraph 29 states that the agenda shall be drawn up by the Chairman with the assistance of the Secretary. It cannot be denied that, in this initial stage, the Committee has a special interest in the preparation of the agenda because it is the first agenda to be examined by the Committee. This is proved by the existence of three draft agendas which have been specially circulated, despite the fact that nowhere do the rules of procedure speak of members of the Committee having to submit draft agendas. This fact, as I said, is the clearest proof of special interest in the matter. Now, I in fact consider that, as some

(Mr. Castillo, Venezuela)

delegations have already said, the task of the working group at this stage cannot be simply to exchange views; rather, its task must be the slightly more important one of co-operating in some way during the preparation of this first agenda. I therefore feel that, of the proposals that have been made, the one submitted by the representative of Nigeria could serve as a basis for a formula for preparing the decision. I should now like to refer more particularly to what was said by the representative of Romania, and it occurs to me that, somewhat on the lines of the decision adopted on the establishment of the working group which prepared the draft rules of procedure, a sentence of the following nature could be added to the draft decision that has been submitted: "For this purpose, the Ad Hoc Working Group shall take into account, in addition to the provisions of rule 29 of the rules of procedure, the various drafts circulated informally as well as the opinions of various delegations"... This is more or less the language of the decision establishing the Working Group on the rules of procedure, and it might be appropriate to include wording of this kind in this decision as well.

Mr. BENSMAIL (Algeria) (translated from French): I wonder whether I am not going to complicate matters somewhat.

I believe that the problem will be solved if we adopt the proposal made by the representative of Nigeria and say "The Committee decides to establish an ad hoc working group, open to the participation of any member State of the Committee, to consider questions relating to the preparation of the Committee's provisional agenda and programme of work" and if, at the end, we add "so as to enable the Chairman to draw up the draft agenda in accordance with rule 29 of the rules of procedure".

Perhaps if this phrase were added at the end, the objections of the representative of Romania would be met.

Mr. ENE (Romania): I fully agree with the proposal just made by the distinguished representative of Algeria.

The CHAIRMAN: We now have several suggestions before the Committee. I must apologise for the inadequacies of my draft which has prompted the plenary meeting to turn itself into a drafting group. It is perhaps a salutary experience for any Chairman.

(The Chairman)

I think I did discern a slight difficulty with one point made by the distinguished representative of Venezuela, in the sense that he wanted to refer to drafts that were before the Committee. These drafts are really very informal and whether one should actually refer to them in the decision setting up the Committee is a matter for consideration. I wonder whether the latest suggestion that we have just heard from the distinguished representative of Algeria would not provide satisfaction to the Committee? We have already accepted the amendment made by the distinguished representative of Nigeria and we now have an addition to the text following the words "agenda and programme of work of the Committee," which would read "in order to enable the Chairman to set up, or draw up, the draft agenda in conformity with rule 29 of the rules of procedure."

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I would agree, since I have no difficulty with the formula proposed by the distinguished representative of Algeria. As you very rightly said, I think that we should try to simplify this matter. As I understand it, everyone agrees with the idea suggested by the distinguished representative of Nigeria to the effect that the words "to exchange views on" should be replaced by the words "to consider". Thus, only one point remains to be settled, namely, the concern expressed by the distinguished representative of Romania. What the distinguished representative of Algeria said -- and, I repeat, I have no difficulty in accepting it -- may meet this point: when I asked for the floor I was considering another formula with the same objective, but I think that we must all accept what the distinguished representative of Algeria has proposed and pass to other matters. If anyone has any difficulty, what I had in mind was that we should say "the Committee", in the second line, "without prejudice to the provisions of rule 29 of its rules of procedure, decides to establish, etc.". But, I repeat, I have no difficulty with the other formula proposed to the same end by the distinguished representative of Algeria.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further observations? I wonder whether in the light of the flexibility which our Mexican colleague has shown, we could perhaps agree, having adopted the Nigerian amendment, to accept the Algerian amendment as well. If there is no objection to this we will, of course, need to have the

(The Chairman)

text redrafted, but for our own purposes at the moment I shall perhaps read it out to you. The text would now read:

"In the light of informal consultations among its members, the Committee decides to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group, open to the participation of all member States of the Committee, to consider questions relating to the preparation of the provisional agenda and programme of work of the Committee, in order to enable the Chairman to draw up the agenda in conformity with rule 29 of the rules of procedure.

"The Ad Hoc Working Group shall hold its first meeting at the end of today's plenary meeting".

Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): I think it would be more appropriate in the first part, which reads "to consider questions relating to the preparation of the agenda", to delete the word "provisional" and include it in the second part of the text proposed by Algeria, "in order to enable the Chairman to draft the provisional agenda", because rule 29 speaks of the preparation of the "provisional" agenda by the Chairman. In short, delete the word "provisional" from the first paragraph referred to and include it in the second part.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I note that in rule 29 the reference is not only to the provisional agenda but also to the programme of work, and I wondered whether the elimination of the programme of work was conscious or was not. I do not have strong feelings on this matter one way or the other, but rule 29 does apply to both and we have all recognized that while, theoretically, they should be completely sequential, in fact they will not be. I am therefore wondering whether perhaps we could insert "programme of work," along the lines of the suggestion made by our distinguished and experienced colleague from Argentina.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States. I think his suggestion is indeed an improvement and would be in line with the thinking of the Chair. I apologise for not having picked up the point earlier.

Could I take it then that this decision is acceptable to the whole Committee? That seems to be the case.

It was so decided.

I would now simply wish to state that the next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Thursday, 15 March, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.

CD/PV.19
15 March 1979
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE NINETEENTH MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 15 March 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. L.D. THOMSON

(Australia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENSMAIL

Argentina: Mr. D.C. ORTIZ DE ROZAS
Mr. F.J. DAVILA

Australia: Mr. L.D. THOMSON
Mr. A.J. BEHM

Belgium: Mr. P. NOTERDAEME
Mr. C. VAN DUYSE

Brazil: Mr. A. CELSO DE OURO PRETO

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. PETROV
Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma: U THAUNG HTUN

Canada: Mr. R. HARRY JAY
Mr. J.T. SIMARD

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. V. TYLNER
Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ

Egypt: Mr. M. EL-BARADEI
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. G. ALULA

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. B. D'ABOVILLE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. S. KAHN
Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. J. PÖHLMANN
Mr. H. MÜLLER

Hungary: Mr. M. DOMOKOS
Mr. C. GYÖRFFY

India: Mr. S.T. DEVARE

Indonesia: Mr. A. KAMIL
Mr. I. DAMANIK

Iran: Mr. M. FARTASH
Mr. D. CHILATY

Italy: Mr. N. DI BERNARDO
Mr. N. MORENO
Mr. C. FRATESCHI

Japan: Mr. M. OGISO
Mr. T. NONOYAMA
Mr. T. IWANAMI
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya:

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
Miss A. CABRERA

Mongolia: Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. M. RAHHALI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Nigeria: Mr. K. AHMED

Pakistan: Mr. M. HUMAYUN KHAN
Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO

Poland: Mr. H. PAC
Mr. M. KRUCZYK

Romania: Mr. V. TUDOR

Sri Lanka: Mr. B. FONSEKA

Sweden: Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. A.M. VAVILOV
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV
Mr. Yu.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHIN
Mr. N.P. SMIDOVICH

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. C. FLOVEREE
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY
Mr. M. DALEY
Mrs. B. KILLIAN
Mrs. J. ARENSBURGER
Mr. V.E. FALTER
Mr. C.H. BAY

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mrs. R. LISBOA DE NEGER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU

The CHAIRMAN: Before I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Belgium, I wish to extend, on behalf of the Chair and also of all members of the Committee, a very warm welcome to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador David Summerhayes, who joins the Committee today for the first time. I need not emphasize the importance I personally attach to his presence in this Committee in view of his well-known personal and professional qualities, which I valued elsewhere when we served together in another diplomatic post when we were both a little younger. Ambassador Summerhayes has been associated with disarmament questions for some time, and I am sure that he will provide this Committee with the outstanding advice and support that characterized the work of his predecessors in the negotiating body. Among those predecessors, he will perhaps allow me to include Mr. Noel Marshall.

Mr. NOTERDAEME (Belgium) (translated from French): It gives me particular pleasure to take the floor today because you are in the Chair and because Australia and Belgium are new members of the Committee. That creates special ties between our delegations, both of which would also like to see our work progress and to make constructive contributions to that end.

However, I should like to emphasize the fact that, although Belgium is a new member of the Committee on Disarmament, it is not a newcomer to a field in which it has taken several initiatives in the past. Allow me to mention the important role played by several Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, and in particular Mr. Van Zeeland, Mr. Spaak and Mr. Harmel. I would also like to mention Belgium's important contribution to the elaboration of the so-called confidence-building measures within the framework of the Helsinki Agreements. Finally, my country, along with others, is involved in the exercise concerning a mutual and balanced reduction of forces, which we hope will mark a significant step forward at the earliest possible moment.

Only very recently, in a statement he made in Brussels, Mr. Henri Simonet, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, appealed to the will and imagination of all those participating in these negotiations so that the work might break free from the lethargy into which it seems to have sunk at times.

(Mr. Noterdaeme, Belgium)

As we are to discuss our agenda and programme of work, I should like to express my country's views on some questions which we will no doubt take up as a matter of priority. I would add that my delegation hopes that we will be able to conclude our consultations on the drafting of the agenda as soon as possible and begin tackling the heart of the matter. These consultations must not become bogged down in semantic perfectionism; the spirit of the goal at which we are aiming and the will to reach that goal are more important than any excessive refinement of the texts. I feel that an approach that takes due account of the two major concerns voiced during our consultations, namely, the desire to define clearly the long-term general competence of our Committee but also the concern to determine exactly what we can reasonably tackle in the short term, should enable us to arrive at a solution acceptable to all.

My delegation is particularly interested in the rapid conclusion of an agreement on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests. The trilateral declarations made in this connexion in the past, the last one being in 1978, suggested that it would be possible to reach agreement in the near future. We therefore await with impatience the submission of the trilateral draft to the Committee for consideration, and we would like even at this early stage to express the hope that the treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests will be of long duration. Its duration will largely determine its credibility.

My delegation is also awaiting with interest the outcome of the current negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on the question of chemical weapons. In our opinion, it should be possible for this question, which is of direct interest to so many countries and in respect of which a large number of delegations have proposed initiatives, to be submitted to the Committee for consideration as rapidly as possible. The bilateral talks on chemical weapons could benefit from an exchange of views taking place simultaneously in the Committee. This exchange of views would not replace the bilateral talks, but it might throw light on the views and concerns of delegations as a whole that also deserve to be taken duly into account by the Powers negotiating bilaterally. Moreover, nothing should stop the Committee considering the views of the two Powers in return. My delegation would like to contribute to the rapid conclusion of negotiations which should not remain exclusively bilateral. It understands and shares the desire of a number of delegations that want those parts of the treaty that have already been finalized or are being finalized to be considered by

(The Netherlands, Belgium)

our Committee. In any case, it feels that it would be highly desirable for the two Powers concerned to inform the Committee of the progress made in their bilateral talks in order to identify points of agreement and pin down those areas in which difficulties remain. These negotiations concern all countries and regions of the world, and all countries are also interested in being informed of matters that have a direct bearing on their security.

For all these reasons, my country is also participating in the seminars of experts concerned with this question now being held in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom.

The importance of organizing seminars in the field of chemical weapons and, moreover, of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and to Identify Seismic Events goes beyond their immediate objective. They should also enable us to envisage a more subtle and practical approach to the difficult question of verification. We know that this question is a particularly difficult hurdle to cross on the way to finalizing the treaties at present being negotiated. However, there is no way of dispensing with a valid system of verification and control under which the parties can be assured that the commitments entered into are being fulfilled. To deny this obvious fact is to run the risk of seeing the disarmament agreements turning into instruments of distrust rather than confidence and giving rise to the danger of destabilization diametrically opposed to the desired results.

This having been said, my delegation believes that the problem of the paramount need for a credible system of verification could be resolved more easily if the technical and political aspects of verification were considered in terms of complementarity. Different delegations have proposed various approaches to this thorny question. It seems to us that these approaches should be regarded no longer as mutually exclusive but as complementary. It might therefore be possible, at different stages and in a sequence to be defined, for verification to be based both on objective methods, that is to say, for example, scientific and seismic verification mechanisms, and other methods which would include in particular the possibility of on-the-spot verification, still vital to confidence, and possibly verification by challenge, as recommended by the Swedish delegation.

With regard to the complete prohibition of nuclear tests, my delegation thinks it extremely important that the experimental exercise envisaged by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and to Identify Seismic Events should begin reasonably soon, without

(Mr. Notendaene, Belgium)

waiting for the completion of the tripartite negotiations between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. Belgium, for its part, is prepared, even now, to contribute fully to the organization of such an exercise.

My country's authorities have on many occasions declared themselves in favour of the rapid conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control for both nuclear and conventional weapons. We are pleased to see that the question of conventional weapons was selected by the General Assembly at its special session as one of the priority questions that should be dealt with at the same time as that of nuclear weapons.

We are also pleased to see the extent to which the regional aspect of security problems, beginning with disarmament, came into its own during the work of the General Assembly's special session. In this connexion, my country proposed a systematic study of all aspects of regional disarmament. The competent governmental experts will be meeting for the first time from 4 to 8 June this year. The advantage of regional measures lies mainly in the flexibility with which they can be implemented and adapted to local conditions. The study should therefore make it possible to consider all possible measures.

In other words, the purpose of this study should be the establishment of a list of rules and principles for use by States which constitute what is generally referred to as a strategically homogeneous geographical whole and which would like to reduce their expenditure in military equipment while maintaining a balance among the States comprising a single region at as low a level of armaments as possible.

My delegation would also like to take this occasion to say once again that recognition of the possibilities for the implementation of principles and suggestions emerging from the regional study must come from initiatives by the States in the region. And by that we mean all the States concerned: it is for these States, acting collectively, to be the sole judge not only of the choice of possible measures to be selected from among those recommended but also of the definition of practical methods for their implementation. It should therefore be clear that, in our opinion, no individual State and no international or other body can replace the States concerned with regard to the selection or implementation of the measures adopted by those States at the regional level.

(Mr. Noterdaeme, Belgium)

These are just a few ideas that my delegation would like to put forward at this stage in our consultations. We will, of course, have more specific proposals to make once our exchange of views is based on a more concrete programme of work, which we would like to finalize as soon as possible.

In that connexion, the relatively ~~expeditious~~ drafting of the rules of procedure would seem to us to be a good omen. I have no doubt, Mr. Chairman, that under your guidance these consultations will move forward and that we will finally be able to embark upon the actual process of negotiation which is precisely the reason for this Committee's existence.

Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, at the sixteenth meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, held under your chairmanship on 6 March, Ambassador Herder, the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic in referring to document CD/8 containing the rules of procedure stated, among other things, and I quote: "The impression is, therefore, that the Committee has discussed and indeed adopted annex I as well but, as is known, the Committee did not have enough time to deal with annex I and that question has remained open. Accordingly, I and my delegation interpret the situation as meaning that after delegations have an opportunity to study this document, at least consultations should be held and the Committee should revert to this matter in order to adopt an appropriate decision in connexion with annex I as well".

As this point has been raised in a formal meeting, my delegation would like to refer briefly to the background to this question, especially as I had the privilege of occupying the Chair during the month of February when the rules of procedure were negotiated and adopted.

To begin with, allow me to point out that my delegation has no objection whatever to the suggestion made by our distinguished colleague from the German Democratic Republic that consultations should be held on the matter so that the Committee can revert to it in due course, if it so wishes. But, as I have said, for my own part I would like to recapitulate the course of events for the record.

(Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, Argentina)

The delegations present here will perhaps remember that when the Working Group set up to prepare the draft rules of procedure met for the first time to begin consideration of the matter, it had before it five sets of draft rules. It also had a list of topics which had been drawn up by the Chairman. The first place on that list was occupied by the topic of functions and membership, as section I. The Working Group began its consideration of the draft rules of procedure in that order.

Perhaps because the topic was so important or because it was its first exchange of ideas, the Working Group made no progress at all on the question of functions and membership at its first attempt, and decided to shelve it and to take up the other topics instead.

It may also be remembered that the observations made during that first exchange of ideas were concerned exclusively with the functions of the Committee.

The topic was taken up again at a second reading, when the Chair was asked to prepare a written draft to serve as a basis for discussion, as in the case of the other sections, and a text was accordingly proposed by the Chair.

When the text was submitted to the members of the Group, it was first explained, as in the case of the other sections, how its main provisions had been arrived at. I said that the main provisions relating to functions were embodied in all the sets of draft rules submitted, and explained that there had been only two criteria with regard to membership: one, that of the Western countries, which consisted in a list indicating the five nuclear-weapon States first and then the 35 remaining members of the Committee. I also pointed out that the Group of 21 mentioned the membership of the Committee, and made a reference in brackets to annex I in which the list was to be found.

In submitting my draft, I thought it desirable to amend the draft of the Group of 21, which referred to annex I in the second sentence where it was stated that the membership of the Committee would be reviewed at regular intervals. It seemed preferable to refer to annex I in connexion with the specific mention of the membership of the Committee and not the review of its membership.

In explaining this, I pointed out that a complete list of the members of the Committee would be given in annex I. There were no observations or comments at the time and, as was only natural, the attention of the Working Group remained focused on the basic question of the Committee's functions.

(Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, Argentina)

After the second reading of this section on functions (the others had already been given a second reading), the Working Group was still in somewhat of an impasse, but the comments made dealt entirely with the question of functions and not of membership. A small drafting group met, and after inevitably arduous negotiation, agreement was reached on a text which has been embodied in the rules of procedure, and consists of the introduction and section I, as it now appears in the rules of procedure, divided into rules 1, 2 and 3.

When the text agreed upon by the small drafting group was referred back to the Working Group, I again stated clearly what the text would consist of and repeated, in connexion with the question of membership, that a complete list of the members of the Committee would be given in annex I. No comments were made on that occasion either.

Consequently, after the text was approved at its third reading in the Working Group and then in a plenary meeting of the Committee, I took the responsibility of arranging for the Secretariat to include the list of members which now forms part of the text. May I venture to tax the patience of the members of the Committee and explain why I took that step.

In the first place, I did so because no one had raised any objections on the two occasions when I had explained that the complete list of the members of the Committee would be included. Secondly, there is the question of why it should be a complete list and not, as in the case of the draft submitted by the group of Western European countries, the names of the five nuclear-weapon States followed by those of the 35 States.

The explanation of this is very simple and relates to rule 9 of the rules of procedure where it states that the chairmanship shall rotate among all members of the Committee following the English alphabetical list of membership. If there is no list in which all the members are named one by one, how would it be legally possible to determine the English alphabetical order of rotation for the members.

If we had followed the Western criterion, the results would have been rather surprising as it would have been necessary to put, for instance, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, followed by a series of dots and the explanatory note: "space reserved for a nuclear-weapon State", followed by Cuba, Czechoslovakia, etc. After reaching Ethiopia, there would again be a series of dots and the words: "space reserved for nuclear-weapon State", and so on, until the five nuclear-weapon States had spaces reserved for them in the list.

(Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, Argentina)

Frankly, it seemed rather absurd to adopt that procedure so, in accordance with the view I expressed to the Group on the need for a complete list, as specified in rule 9, I instructed the Secretariat to include such a list, as no objections had been raised earlier in the Working Groups.

I have gone into this question at some length, but I felt I would be failing in my duty as a former Chairman if I did not give the members of the Committee this explanation. I am always ready to listen to all points of view, and I realise that some Delegations, such as the distinguished delegation of the German Democratic Republic, may have misgivings or doubts in this connexion which led that delegation to raise the matter as it did. For my part, I was anxious to place on record, possibly in too much detail, a clear explanation of why the list was included in the rules of procedure.

Having said this, it seems to me that, as Ambassador Herder said, it might be advisable to hold the consultations he himself proposed.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all, I should like to draw the attention of the interpreters to the fact, confirmed by someone in the Committee, that certain passages in the statement made by the Soviet delegation on 28 February were allegedly not interpreted into Spanish.

In this connexion, I should like to remind the Committee once again of the statement made by the Soviet delegation in Russian at the fifteenth official meeting of the Committee on 28 February, when the Chairman was Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas, the distinguished representative of Argentina.

Immediately after the adoption of the rules of procedure, the Soviet delegation stated-- and I quote-- "As for the rules of procedure which have been adopted, all that the Committee still has to discuss is one minor question concerning annex I. We express the hope that the Committee will quickly succeed in adopting a decision on this matter as well".

Neither from the Chairman, nor from the delegations present at that meeting, did we hear any comments on this question, which did not surprise us. As is known, we did not manage to examine the text of the annex. Thus we noted in our statement that the annex to the rules of procedure listing the countries members of the Committee had not been examined in February. I do not intend now to engage in polemics on the subject of annex I, but merely to point out, once again, that this

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

list, as such, was not examined during the consultations. The Soviet delegation did not see it. Through the Chairman, I would like to put the following question to all members of the Committee. Did any delegation have this list in the form of an annex to the rules of procedure, now under consideration? I do not mean as an annex to the draft of the 21 States, but as an annex to the draft rules of procedure we considered. I should be very happy to hear which delegation had this list at his disposal. I can state with complete assurance that the first time the Soviet delegation saw annex I in its present form was not until after the rules of procedure had been circulated. But the rules of procedure are dated 1 March 1979. In other words, it is physically impossible that we could have seen such a list, before that date, particularly if account is taken of the time necessary to circulate the document, which in point of fact we received much later. Consequently, it is entirely natural that the delegation of the German Democratic Republic should have raised the question of annex I on 6 March. Annex I to the rules of procedure was not examined and was not approved. Our request was and remains a modest one. Since there was not enough time before, we ask that the annex should be examined in March. We maintain that request. We must not waste time in futile discussion concerning some absent or present member of the Committee, when he will appear, or when it will be his turn to be Chairman. Let us put this question on one side.

The fact remains, we did not see this annex. At least, the Soviet delegation entered an official reservation, which no one challenged. We insist on official approval of the annex and propose that the Chairman should hold consultations, after which a general understanding might be reached at the next meeting. There is a possibility that this annex may be officially approved, thereby settling the matter.

I should like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to request members of the Committee to take account of the Soviet delegation's views, as well as those of other delegations which did not see the list and only became acquainted with it in March, thereby having no possibility of expressing their views on it.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank, through you, the distinguished representative of Argentina, my colleague, Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas, for the explanation he gave with regard to the annex. I would also like to stress once again that the statement he has just made is further proof of his constructive approach and of the objective manner in which he usually acts, and in which he conducted the work of the Committee when the draft rules of

(Mr. Herder. German Democratic Republic)

procedure were partly adopted on the last day of his chairmanship. I think that we should not continue a debate or discussion on this matter, but should follow his suggestion and our own to continue consultations. I am convinced that we would be able, in a very short time, to reach a common understanding on this question.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic. I may say that I take note of the three statements that have been made here, and that the Chair certainly intends to consult delegations informally on the questions to which they have referred. However, it would be rather helpful to the Chair, which will be under some pressure over the next few days, if a little informal consultation could go on between delegations themselves on the time when he would be able to meet them. If there are no further comments on this matter, I would like to inform you that I shall shortly close the meeting, after I have given the floor to Ambassador Summerhayes. Before doing so, I would like to say that, following the plenary meeting, I would like to convene an informal meeting to consult you about something. I hope that there is no objection to my ~~proceeding~~ in that way. The next meeting of this plenary body will be on Tuesday morning at the customary time of 10.30 a.m. and now, before closing the meeting, I give the floor to Ambassador Summerhayes.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, before you close the meeting as you have proposed, I just wanted to take the opportunity to say a word of thanks for your very kind welcome to me as a member of this Committee. It is a special pleasure to be welcomed by an old colleague whose friendship I greatly valued in the past. As you have reminded the Committee, I am not a complete newcomer to the world of disarmament. It is already clear to me that much has changed in the five years during which I have been away, but it is also rather sobering to see some of the subjects now proposed for the Committee's agenda, and realise that a number of rather intractable problems are still before us. I take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to pledge my personal efforts (and those of my Government) to make progress in solving them.

As Lord Gornowy Roberts, the British Minister of State, said at the opening session of this Committee in January, my Government dedicates itself to pursuing the Committee's tasks with determination and in a spirit of co-operation.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWENTIETH MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 22 March 1979, at 11 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. L.D. THOMSON

(Australia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENSMAIL

Argentina: Mr. F.J. DÁVILA

Australia: Mr. L.D. THOMSON
Mr. A.J. BEHM

Belgium: Mr. P. NOTERDAEME
Mr. G. VAN DUYSE
Mr. G. GENOT

Brazil: Mr. A. CELSO DE OURO PRETO

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. G. PRAMOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U THAUNG HTUN

Canada: Mr. R. HARRY JAY
Mr. J.T. SIMARD

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RŮŽEK
Mr. V. TYLNER
Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ

Egypt: Mr. M. EL-BARADEI
Mr. N. FAHIY

Ethiopia: Mr. G. ALULIA

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. BENOIT D'ABOVILLE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. S. KAHN
Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. J. PÖHLMANN
Mr. H. MÜLLER

Hungary: Mr. M. DOMOKOS
Mr. C. GYÖRFFY

India: Mr. S.T. DEVARE

Indonesia: Mr. A. KAMIL
Mr. I. DAMANIK

Iran: Mr. M. FARTASH

Italy: Mr. N. DI BERNARDO
Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. C. FRATESCHI

Japan: Mr. M. OGISO
Mr. T. NONOYAMA
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya: Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
Miss A. CABRERA

Mongolia: Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. M. RAHHALI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Nigeria: Mr. K. AHMED
Mr. T. OLUMOKO

Pakistan: Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. H. PAC
Mr. M. KRUCZYK

Romania: Mr. C. ENE
Mr. G. TINCA

Sri Lanka: Mr. B. FONSEKA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
Mr. A.M. VAVILOV
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV
Mr. Yu. V. KOSTENKO
Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHIN
Mr. N.R. SMIDOVICH

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. C.K. CURWEN
Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER

Mr. C. FLOWEREE

Mr. A. AKALOVSKY

Mr. H. DALEY

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Mrs. R. LISBOA DE NEGER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. KAMANDA WA KAMANDA

Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU

Mr. RŮŽEK (Czechoslovakia): First of all, allow me to extend to you, on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation, my congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for this month.

The discussions in the Committee on Disarmament so far show clearly that member States are determined to approach the solution of important tasks of the Committee in a constructive spirit. At the beginning of this month, the Committee adopted its rules of procedure, and my delegation expects that negotiations on the agenda and programme of work of the Committee on Disarmament will also be conducted in the same spirit, in order to enable us in a very short time to proceed to our main task, namely, negotiations on important problems contained in the agenda.

Speaking of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, my delegation is convinced that the problem of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament must be regarded as having top priority. The fact that the nuclear arms race poses the greatest danger for humanity is today generally recognized, and was also underlined by special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament in its Final Document.

Allow me to refer to the speech of Bohuslav Chňoupek^V, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic at that session: "The nuclear weapons are the most destructive force of the present war arsenals which may easily turn our world into a smouldering field. This task is all the more urgent as the stockpiles of these weapons in the world have more than trebled in the past ten years alone. This is why we are convinced of the urgency of the demand that all nuclear countries should pledge to halt further production of all kinds of nuclear weapons and to go over to a gradual reduction of the stockpiles until their complete liquidation". We are therefore convinced that from the beginning our Committee should focus its full attention on matters of substance which, without any doubt, means concentrating on the problem of the prohibition of these weapons of mass destruction. I certainly do not exaggerate in expressing the view that the world community awaits from the Committee on Disarmament concrete decisions and actions which would lead to effective measures in the field of nuclear disarmament.

This significance which the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has consistently attached to achieving progress towards lessening the menace of nuclear war and towards effective nuclear disarmament led my delegation, together with the delegations of other socialist States, to sponsor document CD/4, concerning negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually

(Mr. Růžek, Czechoslovakia)

reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. The cessation of further stockpiling of nuclear arms and the gradual liquidation of all stocks of these weapons would first of all significantly improve international atmosphere and reduce the danger of nuclear disaster, to say nothing about the positive influence of this step in strengthening peace and security in the world.

At the same time, it would help to open the way to considerable progress in the whole broad field of disarmament.

The co-sponsors of document CD/4 are fully aware of the fact that the negotiations proposed in that document will not be easy or simple, but they are convinced that these negotiations cannot be delayed because they are of such importance for the whole problem of real and concrete disarmament. The Czechoslovak delegation is therefore fully convinced that the proposals contained in document CD/4 should become a priority item in the negotiations of the Committee on Disarmament even at its present session, because they represent an important departure from the concept of mere arms control towards genuine disarmament. We are also convinced that the present Committee on Disarmament is quite a suitable forum for negotiating the proposals contained in document CD/4, since four of the five nuclear-weapon States are represented in it together with a considerable number of non-nuclear-weapon States. However, as has been already stressed, the participation of China will be indispensable to ensure a substantial advance. We would like also to stress that the proposals in CD/4 are not meant as a substitute for other bilateral or multilateral negotiations, but represent a new additional initiative for disarmament efforts where wider participation is desirable.

As one of the sponsors of document CD/4, the delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was glad to hear the positive remarks made by several delegations about the proposals contained in document CD/4, and is prepared to hear the comments and suggestions of other delegations of the CD on this most important subject.

In conclusion, allow me to join other colleagues in expressing positive evaluation of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and to Identify Seismic Events, which recently presented to the Committee on Disarmament the progress report on its seventh session. The Ad Hoc Group has been making a positive contribution to the efforts to establish a generally-acceptable monitoring system, with the help of most recent scientific methods. Thus, the work of the Ad Hoc Group of seismological experts concerns the verification of a test ban and is therefore of great importance for the whole CTB problem.

(Mr. Růžek, Czechoslovakia)

The delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic therefore gives full attention to the activities of the mentioned Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. Czechoslovak experts have participated actively in its work since the beginning, and are prepared to continue this co-operation in the further process of preparing the second report, which should be presented to our Committee before the end of its session this summer. Czechoslovakia is also ready to contribute to the application of seismological methods for the verification of a CTB and, as already announced, is in favour of active participation in the special global network of seismic stations.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for his kind words addressed to me personally.

Before adjourning the meeting I have a very pleasant duty to perform, and that is to extend, on behalf of you all, a welcome to the new representative of Zaire, Ambassador Kamanda Wa Kamanda.

Ambassador Kamanda comes to us as one learned in the law and as one who has held high and influential positions in the Organization of African Unity and in his own national administration. I am sure he will make his own forceful and distinctive contribution to our work.

Mr. KAMANDA WA KAIANDA (Zaire) (translated from French): I should like to express my very sincere thanks to you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind words and for the manner in which you introduced me. I would also take this opportunity to say how gratified we are to see you presiding over the work of this Committee; we are convinced that your experience will do much to contribute to the success of our work. As you can imagine, my country, like many others, attaches very great importance to this Committee's work. We consider that the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security must be borne by all States Members of the United Nations, and we shall do our utmost to make our contribution -- modest certainly, but in our view necessary -- to ensure the successful conclusion of the work of this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: before adjourning this plenary meeting, I would like to ask delegations to kindly signify their intention to speak at plenary meetings as much in advance as possible, so that the Chair might be able to submit recommendations for our work taking into account, whenever feasible, other disarmament-related meetings going on at present in Geneva.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Thursday, 22 March 1979 at 10.30 a.m.

I intend to convene a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group to consider questions relating to the preparation of the agenda and programme of work of the Committee in five minutes' time.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

CD/PV.21
22 March 1979
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWENTY-FIRST MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 22 March 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. L.D. THOMSON

(Australia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria</u>	Mr. A. BENSMAIL
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. F. J. DÁVILA
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. L. D. THOMSON Mr. A. J. BEHI
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. P. BERG Mr. G. VAN DUYSSE
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. A. CELSO DE OURO PRETO
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. P. VOUTOV Mr. I. SOTIROV
<u>Burma:</u>	
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. J. T. SIMARD
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. L. SOLA VILA
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. V. TYLNER Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. M. EL-BARADEI Mr. N. FAHMY
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. T. TERREFE
<u>France:</u>	Mr. F. DE LA GORCE Mr. BENOIT D'ABOVILLE
<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. G. HERDIER Mr. S. KAHN Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI
<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. J. PÖHLMANN Mr. H. MÜLLER
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. M. DOMOKOS

India: Mr. C.R. GHAREKHIAN
Mr. S.T. DEVARE

Indonesia:

Iran:

Italy: Mr. N. DI BERNARDO
Mr. H. ALESSI

Japan: Mr. H. OCISO
Mr. T. NONOYAMA
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya: Mr. G.H. MUMBU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
Miss A. CADRERA

Mongolia: Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. H. RAHALLI
Mr. H. CHRAÏBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Nigeria:

Pakistan: Mr. H. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. J. AURICCH MONTERO

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. H. PAC

Romania: Mr. C. ENE
Mr. V. TUDOR
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. B. FONSEKA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. S. STRÖNBÄCK
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. A.M. VAVILOV
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV
Mr. Yu.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHIN
Mr. V.A. VERTOGRADOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. C.K. CURWEN
Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. C. FLOWEREE
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY
Mr. M. DALEY

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU

Assistant-Secretary-General
for Disarmament:

Mr. R. BJÖRNERSTEDT

The CHAIRMAN: I have no speakers on my list for today. Would any delegation like to take the floor? As this is not the case, I would like to inform the Committee that the next plenary meeting will be held on Tuesday, 27 March 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.

CD/PV.22
27 March 1979
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWENTY-SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 27 March 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. L.D. THOMSON

(Australia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. BENSMAIL
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. F.J. DÁVILA
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. L.D. THOMSON Miss M.S. WICKES
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. G. VAN DUYSE Mr. P. BERG
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. A. CELSO DE OURO PRETO
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. I. SOTIROV
<u>Burma:</u>	U THAUNG HTUN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. R. HARRY JAY Mr. J.T. SIMARD
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. L. SOLA VILA
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. V. TYLNER Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. N. FAHMY
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	
<u>France</u>	Mr. F. DE LA GORCE Mr. BENOIT D'ABOVILLE
<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. G. HERDER Mr. S. KAHN Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI
<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. J. PÖHLMANN Mr. H. MÜLLER

<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. C. GYÖRFFY
<u>India:</u>	Mr. S. SABHARWAL
<u>Indonesia:</u>	Mr. I. DIJANIK
<u>Iran:</u>	Mr. M. FARTASH Mr. D. CHILGATY
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. N. DI BERNARDO Mr. M. MORENO Mr. C. FRATESCHI
<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. H. OGISO Mr. T. NONOYAMA Mr. R. ISHII
<u>Kenya:</u>	Mr. G.N. MUNIU
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES Miss A. CABRERA
<u>Mongolia:</u>	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
<u>Morocco:</u>	Mr. M. RAHHALI
<u>Netherlands:</u>	Mr. A.J. MEERBURG
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. T. OLUMOKO
<u>Pakistan:</u>	Mr. M. AKRAM
<u>Peru:</u>	Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. H. PAC
<u>Romania:</u>	Mr. V. TUDOR Mr. T. MELESCANU
<u>Sri Lanka:</u>	Miss M.L. NAGANATHAN

Sweden:

Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
Mr. A.M. VAVILOV
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. A.I. TICURENKOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America:

Mr. A. AKALOVSKY
Mr. M. DALEY
Ms. B. KILLIAN
Ms. E. ARENSBURGER
Mr. M. SANCHES

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU

Assistant-Secretary-General
for Disarmament:

Mr. R. BJÖRNERSTEDT

Mr. CGISO (Japan): Today, I should like to express the views of my delegation on how to deal with the question of banning chemical weapons, which follows the question of a CTB in the order of priority.

I believe that the CCD has actively contributed to solving the problems of a CWB by carrying out its function as a negotiating body. That the CCD took great pains over this task is shown by the fact that three draft treaties (CCD/361, CCD/420, and CCD/512) were proposed respectively by the USSR and other socialist States, Japan and the United Kingdom, and that almost 100 working papers, including a proposal (CCD/400) expressing the common view of the non-aligned States on this matter, have been submitted to the CCD since 1970.

Yet on the other hand we have to admit that the CCD was unable to conduct negotiations because it was expecting the realization of joint initiatives by the USSR and the United States for "banning most dangerous supertoxic chemical methods of warfare", as the two States declared at summit talks in July 1974.

I am convinced that the expectations of the international community that the newly organized CD will solve the question of a CWB at an early opportunity have increased more and more.

Paragraphs 45 and 75 of the Final Document of the special session devoted to disarmament, which was adopted by consensus, state that the question of a CWB is one of the highest priority after nuclear disarmament, and urge that it should be solved as soon as possible in the forum of multilateral negotiations, namely at the CD. Further, operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution A/RES/33/59 A, which was also adopted by consensus at the thirty-third session, requests "the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to undertake, at the beginning of its 1979 session, negotiations" on this question. These documents show the ardent hopes of the entire international community for its early solution.

It is encouraging that member States repeat how important CWB is and urge the prompt solution of the problem. But it is much more important that the CD should start concrete negotiations instead of merely exchanging general views. We must particularly bear in mind the urgency of the matter when formulating the agenda and programme of work of the Committee for the current session. Only by so doing, will the CD discharge its real function as a negotiating body. We should avoid any delay in our negotiations, otherwise criticism or distrust of the CD may be incurred among non-member States.

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

As I stated at the outset of my speech, nearly 100 working papers and three draft treaties have been submitted to the CCD. A careful study of the contents of these documents shows that they are concerned mainly with outstanding problems of the scope of the ban as well as of verification, and that they contain many expert opinions which suggest possible technical solutions of these problems. Therefore I hold the view that the CD, with the assistance of the experts concerned, should start its substantive work and use these documents to find a solution to the outstanding questions of a CWB.

In this connexion, my delegation shares the views put forward in the working papers submitted by the Netherlands and Italy to the CD at this session.

For instance, working paper CD/6 submitted by the Netherlands proposes that the CD should start negotiations on drafting a convention at the current session while the USSR-United States negotiations are still in progress and, first of all, should re-examine working paper CCD/400 so as to produce a new one.

In addition, working paper CD/5 submitted by Italy proposes that, during the current session, the CD should start drafting a position paper and, further, establish an ad hoc working group to undertake an in-depth consideration of unsolved problems and then to prepare a draft international convention.

If the majority of member States of the CD, including the parties responsible for the joint initiatives, supports these proposals, my delegation is ready to support them too.

However, with a view to starting concrete negotiations in accordance with the procedures set out in the proposals by Italy and the Netherlands, it is most desirable, as my delegation stated on 24 March 1977 and on 24 April 1978, that the results of the USSR-United States negotiations, however partial they may be, should be presented to the CD as soon as possible.

In this connexion, it was a very encouraging sign when the distinguished delegate of the USSR at the 17th plenary meeting on 8 March stressed that the CD should begin negotiations here and now on the substance of disarmament problems instead of spending time on deliberating procedural matters. It would greatly contribute to expediting substantial negotiations if the USSR and the United States decided to submit the concrete agreements as achieved so far in their bilateral negotiations to the CD during the current session, or if this is not possible, at least as detailed a progress report as possible of the negotiations.

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

Therefore, I would like to propose that, in connexion with the programme of work for the current session, the Committee should decide to request the USSR and the United States to make such progress reports to the CD before the end of this part of the annual session, so that the CD will be in a position to embark upon a more substantial consideration of the question of a CWB in the second part of the session.

Finally, it was most timely programmed that the Governments of both the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom invited the experts concerned from various States to their chemical factories to inspect workshops on verification.

I should like to state that my Government highly appreciates the initiatives of both Governments, because a better understanding of on-the-spot inspection will expedite the conclusion of a CWB treaty.

Mr. DI BERNARDO (Italy) (translated from French): My delegation has just submitted to the Committee on Disarmament a working paper under the symbol CD/9 which deals with the question of further measures to be taken to prevent the danger of an arms race in space, in keeping with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies.

This working paper consists of an explanatory memorandum and a draft additional protocol to that Treaty. It is for the moment available only in its English version. We hope that the Secretariat will, however, within a few days be able to arrange for its translation into the other working languages.

As you know, further measures to prevent an arms race in outer space are expressly envisaged in paragraph 80 of the Final Document adopted by consensus at the tenth special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament.

Our Committee, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, will at an appropriate stage in its work be called upon to consider this matter, in order to undertake the negotiations called for in the Final Document.

It is not my intention at this stage to comment on and illustrate in detail the contents of the working paper and its annex. My delegation would not wish to hold up the work in which the Committee is currently engaged with a view to drawing up its agenda and programme of work. However, I reserve the right to revert to the matter later in the session.

The CHAIRMAN: The next meeting of the Committee will be held on Thursday, 29 March 1979, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWENTY-THIRD MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 29 March 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. L.D. THOMSON (Australia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENSMAIL

Argentina: Mr. F.J. DÁVILA

Australia: Mr. L.D. THOMSON
Mr. A.J. BEHM

Belgium: Mr. P. BERG
Mr. G. VAN DUYSSE

Brazil: Mr. A. CELSO DE OURO PRETO

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U THEIN AUNG
U THAUNG HTUN

Canada: Mr. R. HARRY JAY
Mr. J.T. SIMARD

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. V. TYLNER
Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ

Egypt: Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. BENOIT D'ABOVILLE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. S. KHAN
Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. J. PÖHLMANN Mr. H. MÜLLER
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. C. GYÖRFFY
<u>India:</u>	Mr. C. R. GHAREKHAN Mr. S. T. DEVARIE
<u>Indonesia:</u>	Mr. M. SIDIK Mr. I. DAMANIK
<u>Iran:</u>	Mr. M. FARTASH Mr. D. CHILATY
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. M. ALESSI Mr. M. MORENO
<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. M. OGISO Mr. T. NONOYAMA Mr. R. ISHII
<u>Kenya:</u>	
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
<u>Mongolia:</u>	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG Mr. L. BAYART
<u>Morocco:</u>	Mr. M. RAHHALI
<u>Netherlands:</u>	Mr. A. J. MEERBURG
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. T. OLUMOKO
<u>Pakistan:</u>	Mr. H. KHAN Mr. M. AKRAM
<u>Peru:</u>	Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. H. PAC

Romania:
Mr. C. ENE
Mr. V. TUDOR
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:
Mr. B. FONSEKA

Sweden:
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:
Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
Mr. A.M. VAVILOV
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV
Mr. Yu.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHIN

United Kingdom:
Mr. D.M. SUTHERHAYES
Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America:
Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. C. FLOWERREE
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY
Mr. M. DALEY

Venezuela:
Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Yugoslavia:
Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:
Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU

Assistant-Secretary-General
for Disarmament:
Mr. R. BJÖRNERSTEDT

Mr. HARRY JAY (Canada): For a number of years Canada has held steadfastly to the view that in any consideration of arms control and disarmament issues, particularly in the main international negotiating forum, high priority should be given to the matter of chemical weapons. Consonant with the importance it attaches to moving away from the danger that this mass destruction weapon might some day be employed, Canada has publicly renounced the first use of chemical weapons and has completed destruction of the stocks of mustard gas accumulated during the Second World War. Two years ago, when we informed the CCD about these policies on 29 March 1977, we also suggested that it would be useful for those countries which had not yet done so to put on record their national policies with respect to chemical weapons. We renew this suggestion today. We continue to hope that it will attract a favourable response from all members of the Committee and not the least from those newer members whose participation is so much to be welcomed.

The Final Document of the special session devoted to disarmament stated that "the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently, conclusion of a convention to this end, on which negotiations have been going on for several years, is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations". Nor did this exhaust the concern of the General Assembly. In its resolution A/RES/33/59A, the Assembly specifically requested our Committee to undertake, at the beginning of this 1979 session, negotiations with a view to elaborating an agreement on the prohibition and destruction of all chemical weapons. The priority that does and should, attach to this urgent matter is, therefore, beyond dispute.

My delegation shares with many others a sense of disappointment that effective consideration of chemical weapons in the main international negotiating forum remains stalled. We have a right to look to the United States and the USSR with increasing impatience for their assistance in opening the way to the assumption by this Committee of its responsibilities with respect to chemical weapons. That is why their bilateral discussions are important and desirable. That is also why we are expecting them to make the necessary effort to resolve the outstanding issues still dividing them in those discussions.

(Mr. Harry Jay, Canada)

A great deal of detailed work in this Committee will have to be devoted to all important aspects of an agreement, including the crucial question of verification, before the desired broad measures of support in the international community can be assured. We think it is long past the time for this Committee to address that task in order: (a) to improve our common understanding of difficulties and potential solutions; (b) to do what we can to help the Powers engaged in bilateral negotiations to resolve their remaining differences with the least possible further delay; and (c) to hasten and facilitate the process of multinational negotiation of a comprehensive convention.

Two recent papers, CD/5 and CD/6, tabled respectively by the delegations of Italy and the Netherlands, are constructive contributions to the consideration of chemical weapons. We thank those delegations for, and support their initiatives. We endorse their determination to see the Committee give priority to getting into this very important substantive area as quickly as possible.

We have long believed that there was much that an ad hoc group on chemical weapons could usefully accomplish, whether or not the bilateral negotiating Powers had reached full agreement. CD/5 and CD/6 confirm us in our conviction that the Committee ought not to put off setting up such an ad hoc group. Certainly we would wish to see it at work no later than during the summer session this year, so that at the very least some suitable section on chemical weapons could be included in the Committee's first annual report to the General Assembly.

As we see it, the initial mandate of an ad hoc group would be to determine where we are in respect of chemical weapons issues at this juncture; where we think we should seek to go; and what is the best means of marshalling our efforts in that direction. A useful first focus of attention in the ad hoc group would be a review on the areas of common ground that have emerged so far in the bilateral discussions. The group could then turn its attention to such possibilities as may exist for assisting the negotiating Powers to resolve their remaining differences.

(Mr. Harry Jay, Canada)

That process would not be productive without the co-operation of the two Powers engaged in the bilateral discussions. We have always thought that a sense of shared interest was the characteristic that has distinguished the main international negotiating forum from other related bodies, and has enabled the efforts of the principal nuclear Powers and of the rest of the members to be harnessed together in a mutually helpful partnership. We believe the USSR and the United States should take an early opportunity to inform us, much more thoroughly than in the recent past, about the areas of common ground they have found between them and, so far as possible, about the difficulties they may be encountering. It would be presumptuous to attempt to tell our American and Soviet friends in what form to provide the purposeful briefing we seek. However, it would be especially helpful to us if they could bring us up to date by means of one or more jointly tabled working papers. In one they might wish to discuss the problems in defining which chemical weapons agents need to be covered by an international agreement. In other papers the two Powers might prepare the way for a useful discussion on the relative advantages of various approaches, on the scope of a convention, etc.

The compendium prepared by the Secretariat in 1977 could be useful in helping the ad hoc group to sift through proposals that have already been put forward. This would assist in the task of finding common multilateral ground. The ad hoc group could then move on to seek specific views on questions that may lie on the periphery of the defined common ground identified in the bilateral discussions.

All members will have a part to play in the detailed, arduous and often highly technical work that cannot be avoided if we are to make progress. The quality of our commitment to the necessary tasks will be decisive in determining how well this Committee discharges its responsibilities in the priority area of chemical weapons.

The many problems associated with appropriate verification, for example, will require from all of us all that we are able to contribute in terms of industry, imagination and technical competence. Not only procedural modalities, but also

(Mr. Harry Jay, Canada)

the effectiveness of a variety of technical devices will need to be assessed with care and objectivity. We might find that the study of verification problems will help to identify technical requirements and to suggest how technological resources could be developed to meet them.

The recent workshop in the Federal Republic of Germany and the subsequent visit to the United Kingdom have helped us to see more clearly many of the practical problems and possibilities with regard to verification. We are grateful to the authorities and industries in those two countries for having given a Canadian expert, for one, an opportunity to participate. We will continue to take advantage of all opportunities to improve our insight, experience and capacities in all that concerns chemical weapons, since we are ready and anxious, now, to set to work in an ad hoc group or in any other constructive way to hasten international agreement.

It is a matter of record that Canada is strongly in favour of an international treaty on chemical weapons that will be comprehensive. It should cover research and development, production, stockpiling and destruction of weapons and facilities, so as to give effect to an eventual total ban on all lethal chemical agents and munitions. It will have to incorporate verification procedures that will satisfy the parties to the convention that their security interests were not being put in jeopardy by their agreement to renounce the right to possess, acquire or use chemical weapons. As we understand it, it would seem that the best hope of early progress would be to go in the direction of an agreement based on the concept of "excluded activities" rather than of "excluded agents". Although comprehensive in all respects, the treaty should provide for its own gradual implementation by successive stages, each subject to appropriate control. In this way confidence would be enhanced and wide acceptance of the comprehensive obligations of the agreement would be encouraged. The first stage would be to ban production, the second stage would see to the destruction of production facilities and stockpiles. As I say, each stage would be linked with carefully designed and acceptable verification techniques.

(Mr. Harry Jay, Canada)

The long and arduous work we are urging the Committee to take up as soon as possible would have as its essential objective development of an effective global instrument, widely acceptable to the international community as a whole. At the same time, we should not overlook that regional agreements might well prove to be useful supplements to the main convention. By taking into account regional differences and specific sectional concerns not easily catered for in a global treaty, these supplementary instruments could increase the prospect that the international community can be brought in one way or another, to accepting the obligations of a ban on chemical weapons. Presumably any such regional agreement that might emerge would derive its impetus from within the region concerned and should include the major military Powers of the area. Other States would be asked to undertake to respect the regional arrangement. Finally, under the regional arrangement, as under the global treaty itself, it will be necessary to ensure that no military advantage could accrue to any State as a result of the agreement.

There are so many aspects to the concerns evoked for us by chemical weapons, that it is impossible today to do more than underscore the importance and the urgency this subject has for Canada. In conclusion, therefore, let me repeat that my delegation is convinced that the Committee should not delay coming to grips with this priority area. We would have no plausible excuse in the CD if, at the end of our year's work, we were not in a position to report to the General Assembly that we had, at least, made a good start in discharging our clear responsibilities with regard to chemical weapons. To that end we believe an ad hoc group with an appropriate mandate should be at work no later than during our summer session. We would support its creation at the earliest opportunity.

Mr. ENE (Romania) (translated from French): At the stage now reached by our Committee in its work, namely, the establishment of its agenda and programme of work, I would like to refer in my statement today to one of the proposals before us concerning the start of negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

Thanks to the constructive efforts of all member States in the new spirit of the special session of the United Nations on disarmament, and to the devotion, the remarkable contribution and the perseverance of those whom we have had the honour to see preside over our work -- I refer to you, Mr. Chairman, and to your distinguished predecessor -- the Committee was able to bring its first organizational task -- the adoption of its rules of procedure -- to a successful conclusion.

The Committee then took up the question of preparing its agenda. We hope that this stage, which has already lasted for a month, will not be prolonged unnecessarily, and that the preparation of the agenda and programme of work will not become an end in itself. The Committee will then be free to turn, with all due energy, to the substantive tasks for which it was set up, namely, the negotiation of genuine measures of disarmament to halt and reverse the arms race and, above all, the nuclear arms race.

The Romanian delegation, for its part, will do all it can in this respect.

The Romanian delegation has had many opportunities in the course of our working discussions to explain its position on the nature and scope of the agenda and programme of work of the Committee. We consider that both the agenda and the programme of work should direct the Committee towards concrete action and concentrate the efforts of all on the achievement of results in the light of the present priorities for disarmament set out in the Final Document of the special session and the resolutions of the General Assembly.

We attach special importance to all contributions aimed at guiding the work of our Committee towards the substantive questions posed by the arms race and in particular the nuclear arms race. It is in this context that we should like to refer to the proposal made in working paper CD/4 of 1 February 1979, submitted by the USSR and a number of other socialist States, concerning negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

Together with the sponsoring States and the other States which have given it their support, Romania considers that this proposal to open negotiations to that end can open up new and long-awaited possibilities for disarmament negotiations in the high priority area of ending the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament. The Final Document of the special session emphasized that:

"Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons" (para. 47).

The Committee has, of course, other important topics before it relating to nuclear disarmament, namely, the cessation of all nuclear-weapon testing. The reconsideration of this question in the Committee will no doubt have a positive effect. We also have in mind security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. However, Romania has always considered that partial measures of that kind are truly meaningful only if associated with other measures of nuclear disarmament within the over-all perspective of ending the production of nuclear weapons, banning their use and, finally, eliminating nuclear weapons from military arsenals.

In our opinion, the proposal in question offers this very perspective and completes the context in which the Committee will be considering the problems of nuclear disarmament as a whole.

At this juncture, when the Committee has to take a decision on its agenda, the Romanian delegation wishes to express its support for the inclusion of the proposal made in document CD/4 in the agenda of the Committee for 1979 as well as in its programme of work, and associates itself with the proposal as a sponsor.

In the opinion of my delegation, the Committee on Disarmament, which counts among its members both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, is the most appropriate setting in which to conduct the proposed negotiations.

The difficulties visualized by certain delegations do not constitute, in our view, a sufficiently strong reason for us to cast doubt on the very idea of embarking upon such an urgent and important task as that of ending the nuclear arms race. Romania, for its part, has always considered that all international problems, however difficult, can and must be settled through discussion and negotiation, and is convinced that in the nuclear era there is no other alternative.

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

A number of problems which will have to be taken into account in the organization and conduct of the negotiations are referred to in document CD/4. Others have been drawn to our attention in the statements made. Yet others may emerge upon subsequent examination. Romania is concerned, for instance, that, in the framework of the negotiations, and concurrently with measures aimed at ending the production of nuclear arms and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed, steps should be taken to achieve the goal of a definitive ban on the use of nuclear arms and the renunciation by States of the use of force or the threat to use force in their relations.

We are confident that the difficulties inherent in such an enterprise, on which the future and indeed the survival of mankind depend, can be surmounted provided that the negotiations are properly organized and conducted in a constructive spirit, and perseverance is shown in devising solutions that take into account existing problems and the interests of all States and peoples who, for the last few decades, have repeatedly called for nuclear disarmament as a priority objective.

At the present stage, what is needed is a demonstration of the political will to negotiate. Consequently we wish to state that the Romanian delegation would find it very difficult to understand any opposition or even reservations of principle to the exploration of ways and means that could lead to negotiations on ending the nuclear arms race and moving towards nuclear disarmament.

We would like to see consultations initiated on the organization of the proposed negotiations during this very part of the Committee's session. The programme of work could provide for a limited number of official meetings to be devoted to an exchange of views on the subject, after which consultations could take place on a non-official basis in the Committee on Disarmament at the same time as other activities but without interfering with them; on the contrary they would help to create a climate of work that would be propitious for the activities of the Committee as a whole. The consultations should culminate, we believe, in the preparation of a "plan of negotiation" that would be acceptable to all States and cover: (a) the framework of the negotiations and participation; (b) the guiding principles for the negotiations; and (c) the scope of the problems to be negotiated.

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

The Romanian delegation will no doubt have an opportunity to revert to these questions in greater detail. We nevertheless thought it useful to refer to them at this preliminary stage in the belief that acceptance by the Committee of the proposal to engage in negotiations on the subject of ending the nuclear arms race would constitute a substantive contribution that would give an impetus to negotiations in the priority area of nuclear disarmament and open up new horizons for our work.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): At the outset I would like to identify the United States delegation with the expressions of appreciation given by my distinguished colleague from Canada to you for your tireless and, in effect, effective work as Chairman. We would also like to welcome our two new colleagues, the Ambassador from the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, whom I look forward to working with and also our new Ambassador from Zaire, Ambassador Kamanda Wa Kamanda, and request that his colleague extends to him our warmest regards.

The purpose of my intervention this morning is to state the views of the United States on the proposal made by a group of delegations and entitled "Negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed,"— that is, the proposal which has been given the designation CD/4. On 13 March, the distinguished representative of Bulgaria, in addressing himself to this proposal, noted that no delegation had spoken against it. I would like to remind the Committee that so far only one State possessing nuclear weapons has spoken in favour of it. The United States cannot accept this proposal and I will give the reasons why.

Let me first say that CD/4 does have some superficial attractions. Every Government represented in this room is on record as favouring elimination of nuclear weapons. The President of the United States, as noted by our Bulgarian colleague, is among those favouring a massive reduction of nuclear weapons. United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/33/91C includes a verbatim quotation of this statement by President Carter:

"The United States is willing to go as far as possible, consistent with our security interests, in limiting and reducing our nuclear weapons. On a reciprocal basis we are willing now to reduce them by 10 per cent, 20 per cent or even 50 per cent. Then we will work for further reductions with a view to a world truly free of nuclear weapons."

It is not, then, the objective of CD/4 with which we disagree, but the method by which it seeks to eliminate nuclear weapons. Is it realistic to expect that a

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

blueprint can now be agreed upon and a negotiating forum established for the eradication of all nuclear weapons from the face of the earth, when we have not yet agreed how to get rid of the delivery vehicles whose destruction can be most easily verified? In effect, this proposal starts at the end instead of the beginning. Whether we like it or not, the prevention of a nuclear holocaust has depended on the confidence of the States possessing nuclear weapons that their own and their allies' security would not be threatened in such a way as to compel them to resort to these terrible weapons in their defence. A rough equilibrium now exists and has formed the basis for the negotiation of limitations on strategic arms between the two major nuclear-weapon Powers in the form of the SALT II agreement, which we now fervently hope is about to emerge.

The experience of the SALT II negotiations demonstrates vividly the difficulty and the delicacy of the process of devising arms control agreements that will preserve the equilibrium in nuclear power while bringing the build-up in nuclear armaments under control. What is true for strategic nuclear arms limitation is equally true for efforts to limit **any** other types of nuclear armaments. For nuclear arsenals cannot be separated from the integrated defence posture of the nuclear-weapon States and those who depend on them for their security. Any changes in the structure of one element of that posture will have an impact on the entire defence structure. And this impact must be taken into account when judging whether a particular measure of nuclear disarmament will contribute to a more stable structure for peace or will, in fact, have a destabilizing effect. The necessity to preserve the security of all nations when devising disarmament measures has been specifically recognized by the international disarmament community. In this regard, let me quote from the Final Document of the tenth special session. Paragraph 29 states:

"The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces."

Another element of disarmament agreements which has been universally recognized is the need to proceed in careful stages toward the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

A third is that disarmament measures must be accompanied by effective verification arrangements.

The proposal put forward in CD/4 is deficient in each of these respects.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

It addresses the problem of nuclear disarmament with no evident consideration given to what effect the elimination of this class of weapons alone would have on the security of States. General and complete disarmament would require elimination of all kinds of weapons-- nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and conventional. Elimination of one class alone, as CD/4 envisages, cannot take place without compensating reductions in other classes; otherwise, it will give considerable advantage to States that possess large arsenals of other classes of weapons, and thereby seriously jeopardize the security of those States that do not.

CD/4, although it speaks of carrying out the reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons in agreed stages, takes no account of the stages that have already been recognized-- SALT II, SALT III, CIB and subsequent appropriate measures. Indeed, it seems to envisage the development of a timetable for complete nuclear disarmament without reference to the consequences of earlier steps. The need for a review of the implementation of measures in preceding stages before moving to subsequent stages was clearly set forth in the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations made by the United States and the USSR in the General Assembly on 20 September 1961. Here I will quote the relevant portions of that statement:

"The disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate.

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all."

The United States finds that statement as valid today as it was then. The sponsors of CD/4 evidently do not.

Finally, there is little evidence that the sponsors of CD/4 have given much thought to the verifiability of their proposal. The cessation of production and the elimination of even the smallest nuclear weapons implies a pervasive verification mechanism which would far surpass anything contemplated so far in arms control agreements. Experience thus far does not lead us to believe that

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

the world community would be ready to accept the kind of verification régime that full nuclear disarmament would entail unless the ground had been carefully prepared by the implementation of a series of agreements for staged reductions with appropriate verification régimes applied at each stage.

There is yet another major flaw in the proposal in CD/4. The sponsors have contradicted themselves in regard to the necessity for Chinese participation in the proposed negotiations on the cessation of production and elimination of nuclear weapons. On the one hand, the sponsors state that nuclear disarmament cannot take place without the co-operation of all the nuclear-weapon States. On the other, they say that we should now make plans for negotiations on such disarmament without the participation of China. Even if the other nuclear-weapon States participating in this body were able to agree on some conceptual framework for initiating new nuclear disarmament negotiations, they would hardly embark on such a radical restructuring of the international security system -- and the Soviet proposal involves just that -- if one nuclear-weapon State were not participating in the plan. It is clear that, to safeguard the security of all States the full implementation of such a plan would require participation of all nuclear-weapon States. It is equally clear that drawing up a scenario to begin negotiations designed to produce such a radical restructuring without the participation of a nuclear-weapon State is not the appropriate way to bring that State into the negotiations.

The process of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons is a long, difficult and serious task. A staged process has begun with SALT II, to be followed soon, we hope, by a comprehensive test ban treaty, SALT III and then by other appropriate measures that will ensure a stable and verifiable nuclear arms control régime at all stages. Such a programme was delineated in paragraphs 50, 51 and 52 of the Final Document of the tenth special session devoted to disarmament. Why, then, should we turn away from this serious approach to halting and then reversing the build-up of nuclear weapons which was included in the consensus document adopted by the tenth special session, in favour of a proposal whose concept is too diffuse to be workable.

In short, the United States finds CD/4 an unrealistic proposal having as its objective something other than actual progress in disarmament. Inclusion of this item in the Committee's agenda would turn this negotiating body into a forum for political polemics. Would such a development be consistent with the serious task this Committee is to perform? Clearly it would not, and the United States will oppose any steps leading in that direction.

The CHAIRMAN: I intend to convene, immediately after the plenary meeting, the Working Group established to consider questions relating to the provisional agenda and programme of work of the Committee, in order to submit a brief report on the consultations being held by the Chair. Since those consultations are still proceeding, I would like to suggest to the Committee that the next plenary meeting should be held on Tuesday, 3 April, at 10.30 a.m., on the understanding that I would convene a plenary meeting tomorrow afternoon, at a time to be confirmed, just in case that I might be in a position to submit the final report of the Working Group which is considering questions relating to the provisional agenda and programme of work of the Committee. If this is not the case, then the Committee would meet next Tuesday, as I proposed previously.

Does any delegation wish to speak?

Mr. BERG (Belgium) (translated from French): Allow me to say first of all that my delegation associates itself with those that have already taken the floor in this forum not only to congratulate you but also to thank you for the way in which you discharged your functions as Chairman during your term of office.

You unhesitatingly assumed your share of the work displaying both patience and courtesy. Your efforts were and continue to be praiseworthy, and my delegation is happy to take this opportunity to pay tribute to you for your work.

Time moves on, and it will fall to my country to succeed you next Sunday. It need hardly be said that my delegation, like those which have preceded us, will spare no effort to direct our work effectively, in the light of the example you and others have set for us.

In referring to the impending Belgian chairmanship I should inform the members of our Committee that Ambassador Paul Noterdaeme, the Permanent Representative of Belgium at Geneva, will unfortunately be unable to participate in our work between 1 and 7 April. A number of delegations present are aware that Ambassador Noterdaeme was specifically invited to act as Chairman of the Western Caucus in the Economic Commission for Europe, which has been meeting for the last week and will go on meeting for another seven days.

In view of his functions, and the personal involvement of the Chairman of the Caucus in the negotiations, he will be unable to detach himself.

(Mr. Berg, Belgium)

In the circumstances, the head of the Belgian delegation during the first week of April will be Ambassador Raoul Shcumaker, Director-General for Policy at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Brussels, who will therefore act as Chairman of our Committee, the opening of which he attended with Mr. Simonet, our Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Ambaßsador Noterdaeme will, of course, reassume the leadership of the Belgian delegation when his chairmanship of the Western Caucus has ended.

The Committee secretariat has been officially notified of this.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

CD/PV.24
3 April 1979
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 3 April 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman

Mr. J.A.R. SCHOUMAKER

(Belgium)

GE.79-60914

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. BENSMAIL
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. C. ORTIZ DE ROZAS Mr. A. N. MOLteni
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. L. D. THOMSON Mr. A. J. BEHM
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. J.A.R. SCHOUMAKER Mr. G. VAN DUYSE Mr. P. BERG
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. A. CELSO DE OURO PRETO
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. P. VOUTOV Mr. I. SOTIROV Mr. I. PETROV
<u>Burma:</u>	U SAW HLAING U THAUNG HTUN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. J.T. SIMARD
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. L. SOLA VILA
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. V. TYLNER Mr. L. STAVINCHA
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. O. EL-SHAFEI Mr. M. EL-BARADEI
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. G. ALULA
<u>France:</u>	Mr. F. DE LA GORCE Mr. BENOIT D'ABOVILLE

<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. G. HERDER Mr. S. KAHN Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI
<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. J. PÖHLMANN Mr. H. MÜLLER
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. M. DOMOKOS Mr. C. GYÖRFFY
<u>India:</u>	Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN Mr. S.T. DEVARE
<u>Indonesia:</u>	Mr. I. DAMANIK
<u>Iran:</u>	Mr. M. FARTASH Mr. D. CHILATY
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. M. MORENO Mr. M. INCISADI CAMERANA Mr. C. FRATESCHI
<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. M. OGISO Mr. T. NONOYAMA Mr. T. IWANAMI Mr. R. ISHII
<u>Kenya:</u>	Mr. G.N. MUNIU
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
<u>Mongolia:</u>	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG Mr. L. BAYART Mr. L. ERDENECHULUUN
<u>Morocco:</u>	Mr. M. RAHHALI
<u>Netherlands:</u>	Mr. R.H. FEIN

Nigeria: Mr. K. AHMED
Mr. T. OLUMOKO

Pakistan: Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. J. AURICH-MONTERO

Poland: Mr. H. PAC

Romania: Mr. V. TUDOR

Sri Lanka: Miss M.L. NAGANATHAN

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
Mr. A.M. VAVILOV
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV
Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHIN

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America: Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY
Mr. M. DALEY
Ms. B. KILLIAN
Ms. E. ARENSBURGER
Mr. M. SANCHES

Venezuela: Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Yugoslavia: Mr. M. VRHUNEC
Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire: Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU

Assistant Secretary-General
for Disarmament: Mr. R. BJÖRNERSTEDT
Mr. R. BJÖRNERSTEDT

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the twenty-fourth plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

As you were informed at the last meeting of the Committee, I am assuming the Chair today for the first week of April until Ambassador Noterdaeme is in a position to take it himself. As you know, Ambassador Noterdaeme is Chairman of the Western Caucus of the Economic Commission for Europe, which is now meeting in Geneva.

My country attaches special importance to the work of this Committee. I am therefore particularly happy that circumstances should have given me an opportunity to come to Geneva in order to take part in your deliberations. Allow me, first of all, to express the gratitude and appreciation of the Committee to Ambassador Thomson, the representative of Australia, who had presided over the Committee's work as Chairman during the month of March with intelligence, wisdom and a remarkable sense of diplomacy, thereby enabling the Committee to make considerable progress in the adoption of its agenda and programme of work.

I see that there is one speaker on my list for the meeting today, Ambassador Gharekhan, the distinguished representative of India. I give him the floor.

Mr. GHAREKHAN (India): Mr. Chairman, my delegation is very happy to take the floor under your chairmanship for the month of April, and we wish to congratulate you and your delegation on the assumption of chairmanship for this month. Belgium is one of the so-called newcomers to this international forum for disarmament negotiations and Belgium's interest in this field is too well known to be mentioned here. We are very confident that Belgium will make a very significant contribution to the work of this Committee. I would also like to take this opportunity to offer our heartiest congratulations to Ambassador Thomson for his chairmanship of this Committee during the month of March. His task was not an easy one, but he gave all his best to the arduous and difficult assignment that he had during the month of March. My delegation wishes to thank him for all his efforts and for his infinite wisdom in conducting our deliberations both formal and informal, last month. I would also like to take this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to the two newcomers to our Committee, Ambassador Summerhayes of the United Kingdom and Ambassador Kamanda wa Kamanda of Zaïre. We look forward to maintaining the tradition of co-operation which we have always had with the delegations of the United Kingdom and Zaïre.

During my statement on 8 February I expressed the views of my delegation on the items to be included in the agenda of the current session. While doing so I also outlined the position of my delegation on some of the important substantive matters

(Mr. Gharekhan, India)

with which the Committee would have to deal during 1979. We have always held the view that nuclear disarmament should have the foremost priority in disarmament negotiations. On 8 February I also presented the preliminary views of my delegation on the proposal of the socialist States contained in document CD/4. On behalf of my delegation I would like to express my appreciation to the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union for the explanations provided by him in his statement of 8 March. I welcome in particular the explanation given by Ambassador Issraelyan that the proposed negotiations would cover not only strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons but also the entire range of nuclear weapons, and thus would be broader in scope than the current SALT negotiations. My delegation believes that the proposals contained in CD/4 should be considered by the Committee and would be prepared to study the matter further and consult with other delegations with a view to determining the best possible procedure for proceeding in the matter.

In my statement on 8 February I emphasized the urgency to initiate negotiations on the question of chemical weapons. My delegation shares with a number of members of this Committee a sense of disappointment that the Committee has not yet taken up effective consideration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is imperative that we concentrate our efforts during the current year, even during the first part of the current annual session, on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. My delegation supports the view, expressed by the delegations of the Netherlands, Italy, Canada, Japan, France, Sweden and others, that the Committee should immediately start dealing with the question of chemical weapons. We support the idea of the establishment of an ad hoc working group with an appropriate mandate to go into the proposals and working papers before the Committee, and to identify the areas of common ground that have emerged so far. The ad hoc group could be set up now or early during the second part of the annual session. The work of the ad hoc group would in no way prejudice the bilateral negotiations that are under way between the United States and the USSR on this issue, but would be complementary in finding ways and means of overcoming their existing differences. My delegation agrees with the suggestion made by the Canadian delegation that the United States and the USSR should inform the Committee at an early date about the areas of common ground, perhaps by means of one or more jointly or separately tabled working papers.

I would like to make a few observations with reference to the remarks of the distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan on 8 March 1979 regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in south Asia. My delegation has consistently maintained that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone cannot be properly regarded as a disarmament measure. A treaty whereby the States of a particular region undertake

(Mr. Gharekhan, India)

not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons does not lead to any dismantling of nuclear weapons or their delivery systems unless, of course, the zone is set up in a region which already has nuclear weapons. Consequently, a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty should be more appropriately described as a non-armament or a non-proliferation measure. My delegation has serious doubts whether the subject of nuclear-weapon-free zone should be discussed at all in this Committee. It has already been studied in great detail by an expert group of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1975, and the report of the expert group was taken note of by the General Assembly the same year. As regards the establishment of such zones in different parts of the world, the position of the General Assembly of the United Nations has always been that such proposals should be initiated by the States of the appropriate regions concerned, taking into account their special features and geographical extent. Participation by the States of the regions in such zones is to be voluntary and on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at and negotiated among themselves. This is the right and only procedure to follow. It is not for this Committee or the United Nations to impose such negotiations on any State or States. While my delegation believes that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone does not guarantee lasting security and immunity from nuclear attack or threat of such attack for the States concerned, we would not wish to go against the desire of the States of a well-defined region, provided all the States concerned agreed on its establishment. If such agreement is lacking, then any attempt to bring in outside agencies, be it the United Nations General Assembly or any other body, would only be counter-productive. Indeed, persistent efforts to raise the matter in the United Nations or elsewhere in the absence of a prior common agreement among all States of the region concerned must give rise to doubts about the motivation behind such efforts. As far as the proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the so-called region of south Asia is concerned, the position of my delegation, which is one of total unacceptability, has been repeatedly stated in the General Assembly and does not need to be repeated here. As far as India is concerned, we have consistently and steadfastly stood for the policy of not producing or acquiring nuclear weapons. The Prime Minister of India reaffirmed our policy at the special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, when he said "We are the only country which has pledged not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons even if the rest of the world did so. We solemnly reiterate that pledge before this august Assembly." This has been the consistent policy of the Government of India ever since we embarked upon our programme for the utilization of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. We strongly believe in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, non-proliferation, as stated

(Mr. Gharekhan, India)

in paragraph 65 of the Final Document, involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, the former undertaking to stop the nuclear arms race and to achieve disarmament by urgent application of the measures outlined in the Final Document, and all States undertaking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. We would strongly support all non-proliferation measures based on this approach. So far, non-proliferation measures have attempted to tackle only the problem of horizontal proliferation. We would like to see the nuclear-weapon States which are ceaselessly carrying on vertical proliferation put an end, an immediate end, to their nuclear arms race and begin to reduce their nuclear arsenals.

As regards the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, my delegation fully subscribes to the principles mentioned in paragraph 68 of the Final Document, namely, that non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs. On the question of safeguards also, the Final Document has stated quite clearly that "international co-operation in this field should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons". We would not accept a system of safeguards which is not applicable equally, on a non-discriminatory basis, to the nuclear activities of both the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. The position of India on all these questions of safeguards, accession to NPT, etc., is based on principle and is not dependent on the attitude of some other country.

The CHAIRMAN: Does any delegation wish to take the floor? If not, the next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Thursday, 5 April, at 10.30 a.m.

I now propose to convene the Ad Hoc Working Group established to consider questions relating to the provisional agenda and programme of work of the Committee immediately after this meeting, that is, in five minutes.

I declare the meeting closed.

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.

CD/PV.25
5 April 1979
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 5 April 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. J.A.R. SCHOUMAKER

(Belgium)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. BENSMAIL
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. C. ORTIZ DE ROZAS Mr. A.N. MOLTENI
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. L.D. THOMSON
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. J.A.R. SCHOUMAKER Mr. G. VAN DUYSE Mr. P. BERG
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. A. CELSO DE OURO PRETO
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. P. VOUTOV Mr. I. SOTIROV
<u>Burma:</u>	U THAUNG HTUN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. J. GAUDREAU
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. VEJVODA Mr. V. TYLNER Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. O. EL-SHAFEI Mr. M. EL-BARADEI
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	
<u>France:</u>	Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. G. HERDER Mr. S. KAHN Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI
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Mr. D. CHILATY

Italy: Mr. N. DI BERNARDO
Mr. H. MORENO
Mr. C. FRATESCHI

Japan: Mr. M. OGISO
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya: Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
Miss LUZ MARÍA GARCÍA

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. ERDENECHULUUN
Mr. L. BAYARJ

Morocco: Mr. M. RAHHALI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN

Nigeria: Mr. K. AHMED
Mr. T. OLUMOKO

Pakistan: Mr. M.H. KHAN
Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO

Poland: Mr. H. PAC
Mr. M. KRUSZYK

Romania: Mr. V. TUDOR
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Miss M.L. NAGANATHAN

Sweden: Mrs. I. THORSSON
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV
Mr. V.A. VERTOGRADOV
Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHIN

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. C.K. CURWEN
Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America: Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY
Mr. M. DALEY
Ms. B. KILLIAN
Mr. M. SANCHES

Venezuela: Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Yugoslavia: Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire: Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the twenty-fifth plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The representatives of the following countries are on the list of speakers for today: Czechoslovakia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I note that we have among us today the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia, His Excellency Milos Vejvoda, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Vejvoda is well known to us all. He was the representative of his country to a number of disarmament conferences, and particularly the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. He is also a member of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies which assists the Secretary-General of the United Nations in disarmament matters. His experience with the questions that the Committee is at present examining will make an important contribution to our deliberations.

I now give the floor to the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, at the beginning of my statement I would like to greet you and all members of the reorganized Committee on Disarmament and to thank you for the opportunity offered to speak before this important forum which, as was confirmed by the United Nations General Assembly, bears the main international responsibility for the elaboration of concrete and effective measures aimed at the cessation of the feverish arm race and at the urgently needed progress in disarmament. In the past we have many times emphasized that Czechoslovakia attaches permanent significance to the work of the Committee on Disarmament and that it has a continuous interest in the increase of its effectiveness. Permit me to confirm this position of ours once more. Two years have already passed since my last statement in this forum. It is necessary to say that changes have occurred in the Committee during this period. This year the Committee has met in new conditions and embarked upon a new stage of its work. A stage which is marked by positive resolutions and recommendations of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament which now should be gradually but as speedily as possible implemented. A stage which is also marked by a number of new aspects, approaches and proposals confirming the constructive determination of most of the international community to achieve success in the field of disarmament.

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Unfortunately, it is also a stage marked by the continuation of a feverish armaments race and growing efforts to frustrate positive developments in the world. A stage in which -- in spite of the determination of nations to live in peace -- we have been witnessing even new irresponsible military adventures like the invasion of China against the peaceloving Vietnamese people that has been condemned by the whole world.

It is therefore not an exaggeration to say that the entire world expects this Committee, in the very near future, to produce real measures for the cessation of the armaments drive, for the reduction of stockpiles of weapons -- and first of all weapons of mass destruction -- and, generally, for the creation of conditions for approaching the goal of general and complete disarmament that has so far remained remote.

As we have already said, we highly appreciate the fact that the delegation of France has also taken its place at the negotiation table of the Committee. We believe that this step represents a significant contribution to the increase of the international authority of the Committee and to the successful solution of the tasks confronting it. However, especially in the field of nuclear disarmament, the participation of all five States possessing nuclear weapons in deliberations and in the measures to be adopted is a sine qua non of success. Therefore, the only one remaining nuclear-weapon Power which, guided by its erroneous policy, still stands aside from the matter-of-fact deliberations and limits itself to statements which do not say anything and do not bind anything, should express its own responsibility for the preservation of peace, and also change its negative position on questions of disarmament and participate in the common endeavour.

The present course of the deliberations of the Committee, its rich and general discussion which has brought out a number of significant ideas, and the fact that the Committee has successfully managed to solve the basic organizational questions of its work in a new composition prove that its members are fully aware of this responsibility. The complicated discussion which led to the elaboration of new rules of procedure can serve as evidence of a serious approach and the deep interest of all delegations in a generally-acceptable result. It is also an

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example of goodwill and constructiveness characterizing the first weeks of the deliberations. I would like to express the conviction that this constructive and working spirit will also prevail in the future period just as it prevailed in the past. The rules of procedure adopted represent a good instrument to that effect.

We think that today it is important that the Committee should focus its main attention to the subject-matter on the agenda, in order to confirm in practice the effectiveness of the changes that have been carried out. We all know that time here does not work for us but against the objectives set in the Declaration and in the Programme of Action unanimously adopted at the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The planned increase in the armaments of some countries is continuing according to information we receive every day and threatens the foundations of world peace and international détente that have been laid down. This is why it is so urgently necessary to find, through our joint endeavours, speedy and effective means for the termination of this senseless, harmful and extremely dangerous waste of human and material resources.

Permit me to explain briefly the position of my Government on several major questions which, I sincerely hope, will be on the agenda of the Committee.

As has been confirmed by the conclusions of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and by the discussion held during the thirty-third regular session, the task that has undisputable priority not only in the work of this Committee, but in all international endeavours and deliberations devoted to disarmament as a whole, is that of slowing down and halting the build-up of armaments in the field of nuclear weapons -- nuclear disarmament. The well-known proposals of the socialist countries, covering practically all questions relating to this range of problems, continue to be topical and are on the agenda of this Committee as well. I would like to point out several aspects which, in our opinion, are decisive if we are to accomplish the task of achieving tangible progress in this field.

We all know very well what is the present extent of nuclear arsenals. Czechoslovakia has therefore joined other socialist countries in sponsoring the proposal submitted in this Committee on steps to be taken in deliberations on the termination of the production of all kinds of nuclear weapons and on the gradual reduction of their stockpiles up to their complete liquidation. It was a matter of pleasure for us to see the positive response with which the proposal was

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received by some delegations in the Committee. It is a simple and, assuming good political will in particular on the part of all nuclear-weapon States, also a fully realistic proposal showing a suitable road towards an effective solution of this complicated and urgent question. On the basis of the common objective of halting production and liquidating stocks of nuclear weapons, it calls upon all the States concerned to find methods for its concrete implementation and at the same time provides concrete ways for its realization. Most of these ways are known to us and, for the most part, enjoy general support. The value of this proposal fully corresponds to the fact that it is the first official proposal in the reorganized Committee on Disarmament, and I hope that it will produce positive results. Czechoslovakia, though not a nuclear-weapon State, is prepared, as one of its sponsors, to consider with attention and with every seriousness all further proposals, suggestions and comments in this connexion.

The highly responsible, constructive and compromise approach of the Soviet Union has facilitated progress in the preparation of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Tripartite negotiations between the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom on the preparation of the joint draft of the text of the treaty are, as we firmly believe, in an advanced stage. We sincerely hope, as do all members of the Committee, that this draft will be submitted for consideration to the Committee at the earliest possible time. Therefore, we call upon all the nuclear-weapon States without exception to follow the constructive attitude of the Soviet Union and thus contribute, in a concrete manner, to a situation in which this treaty is not only worked out and submitted, but that it becomes, in an agreed and shortest possible period, universal as well.

As has been emphasized on many occasions, measures in the field of nuclear disarmament must be accompanied by political as well as by international legal measures for strengthening the security of States. The Soviet Union, in co-operation with other countries, including the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, responding to the relevant appeal of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly, therefore submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session a significant proposal for the strengthening of guarantees of non-nuclear-weapon States and for the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where they are not stationed so far. The support which was given to these proposals proves that they correspond to the broad endeavour for the

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lessening and elimination of the risk of a nuclear conflict. We firmly believe that the Committee on Disarmament will use all its weight in bringing about the necessary conditions for the elaboration of this treaty in which all nuclear-weapon Powers would provide jointly-agreed guarantees of security to all non-nuclear-weapon States on a non-discriminatory basis. We also hope that the Committee will use all its influence to bring about the implementation of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly prohibiting deployment of nuclear weapons in new territories.

In the recent period we have often seen how quickly new types of weapons are developed and put into production. We consider as particularly dangerous the development of the new generation of nuclear weapons -- the so-called neutron weapons. There can be no doubt that introduction of these weapons will substantially increase the danger of a nuclear conflict. One of the main tasks of the Committee in the nearest future should be a matter-of-fact consideration of the joint proposal of the socialist countries of March 1978 and preparation of the concrete text of a treaty on the prohibition of neutron weapons.

The development of nuclear neutron weapons is a clear example of where the world is being led by the reluctance and lack of political will of those who are refusing to agree to the prohibition of the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of these weapons. There is no room for any further delay. An opinion has been expressed in various forums -- and we fully agree with this opinion -- that a further increase in the military potential, both qualitatively and quantitatively, leads to the point beyond which it will be objectively too difficult to agree upon generally-acceptable measures for its limitation, reduction and elimination, including control measures. But the initiative of the socialist countries proves that we are not sceptical.

We are of the opinion that the question of the complete prohibition and liquidation of stockpiles of all types of chemical weapons has already been sufficiently and broadly discussed. We have been dealing with this question for a number of years now with the assistance of scientific experts. There exists a whole range of proposals, including constructive and comprehensive proposals submitted by the socialist countries. I would like to express the conviction that, after the submission of the new joint proposal in the treaty prepared by the delegations of the USSR and the United States, the Committee will be able, on the basis of its past experience, to consider this proposal in a constructive manner and to express general agreement with it.

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At the last meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty the socialist States declared, among other things, that they "are prepared to hold negotiations on all aspects of the problem of the termination of the feverish armaments race, including those on which no negotiations are so far being held, both on the European and world-wide scale, in relation to individual regions or to the whole planet. There does not exist any type of armament which the socialist countries represented at the meeting would not be prepared to limit or reduce on the basis of strict observance of the principle of undiminished security of any side."

The socialist countries do not relax in their initiative. After reservations had been made regarding their proposal of 1976 -- calling upon the signatory States of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other -- because it was claimed that this would allegedly increase the probability of the use of conventional weapons, the Soviet Union, as it is well known to the members of this Committee, recently came out with another initiative, which the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic fully supports, and which takes into consideration these concerns. The proposed commitment not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons would, in fact, amount to the conclusion of an all-European non-aggression pact. We firmly believe that this proposal will not only provide an impulse to the search for new reasons how to refuse it, but that it will bring concrete positive results.

The socialist countries, including the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, will never give up efforts to strengthen peace and safeguard the equal security of all, based on the systematic reduction of armaments, accumulated military arsenals and on the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. This is an objective which from day to day gains more and more supporters, and therefore its achievement is and should be possible. The Committee on Disarmament will undoubtedly be proceeding along a complicated and demanding road. The atmosphere here assures me that all members of the Committee, and above all the four nuclear-weapon Powers who participate in its work, will do their best to attain this objective. I wish you much success in your endeavour.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Permit me, Mr. Chairman, to take advantage of this opportunity to express to you my best wishes. Although Belgium is a new member of the Committee on Disarmament, its role in disarmament questions is well known. We hope that under your chairmanship the Committee will make considerable progress in the solution of the questions before it. Allow me to wish you every success in your work as Chairman.

At the same time I should like to express a few words of thanks to Ambassador Thomson, the representative of Australia, under whose guidance we worked during the past month. We note with satisfaction his considerable efforts and the valuable contribution he made to the work of the Committee.

The Soviet delegation would also like to associate itself with the welcome addressed to Ambassador Summerhayes of the United Kingdom who is new among us and to Kamanda Wa Kamanda, the distinguished Ambassador of Zaire. I should similarly like to welcome our good friend Milos Vejvoda, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, whose statement we have just heard with great interest.

Today the Soviet delegation intends to dwell once again on the proposal of the socialist States concerning negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed (document CD/4 of 1 February 1979). There is no need to repeat that this is a problem of the highest priority in the contemporary world. We are therefore satisfied that it has taken the place which befits it on the Committee's agenda and hope that it will also be suitably reflected in the Committee's programme of work.

Even at this point there is every reason to affirm that document CD/4 submitted by the Soviet delegation jointly with the delegations of other socialist States has met with considerable interest in the Committee.

A number of delegations have welcomed our proposal, rightly pointing out that it represents the practical implementation of decisions of both the special session devoted to disarmament and the thirty-third regular session of the General Assembly.

We thank the delegations of Cuba, Romania, Ethiopia, India, Sweden, Pakistan and other countries for supporting our proposals.

Unfortunately, however, not all delegations have adopted a positive attitude to document CD/4. At one of the Committee's previous meetings on 29 March, the delegation of the United States made a statement whose meaning boils down to a

complete denial of the necessity for negotiations on nuclear disarmament. It also contains a series of judgements concerning document CD/4 with which we cannot in any way agree. Allow me therefore to discuss this statement in somewhat greater detail.

Although the United States representative recognized in his statement that the socialist countries' proposal has "some superficial attractions", he also asserted that it fails to take into account a number of important factors, and in particular, the question of the security interests of the participants in the negotiations. In the United States delegation's view, document CD/4 "addresses the problem of nuclear disarmament with no evident consideration given to what effect the elimination of this class of weapons alone [nuclear weapons] would have on the security of States".

In his statement, Ambassador Fisher emphasized that to give (as a result of nuclear disarmament) "considerable advantage to States that possess large arsenals of other classes of weapons" is absolutely inadmissible. We can fully agree with this statement. We regard the principle of non-impairment of the security interests of the parties as one of the fundamentals of negotiations on arms reduction and disarmament and, of course, questions of nuclear disarmament. What has document CD/4 to say on this subject? Allow me to refer first of all to its preamble, which states that "Agreement on this important problem can be reached only provided there is strict observance of the principle of the inviolability of the security of States".

Furthermore, the socialist countries emphasize in their document that: "The elaboration and implementation of measures in the field of nuclear disarmament should be buttressed by the parallel strengthening of political and international legal guarantees of the security of States". In what manner, by what concrete measures, to what extent? All these questions, of course, can be solved only in the course of the negotiations themselves, taking into account the interests of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

Lastly, in the "Stages of negotiations" section of document CD/4, it is pointed out that "The degree of participation of individual nuclear States in measures at each stage should be determined taking into account the quantitative and qualitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and of other States concerned". I would emphasize the word "arsenals" in this connexion. The point at issue is not only nuclear arsenals but total military arsenals, including conventional weapons, whose importance -- as was rightly noted by the United States representative in his statement -- is indeed of considerable significance in guaranteeing security.

Thus our proposals are based entirely on the need to take into account the existing balance of forces in the world today and on the principle of non-impairment of the security of the parties.

Another element which, in the United States delegation's view, is allegedly insufficiently reflected in the proposal of the socialist countries is "the need to proceed in careful stages towards the ultimate goal". This assertion, too, is inapplicable to document CD/4. Indeed, this document states: "The cessation of the production, the reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons should be carried out by stages on a mutually acceptable and agreed basis. The content of measures at each stage may be decided by agreement among the participants in the negotiations". Thereby it is emphasized that every measure and every stage must be carried out within established time-limits and that the transition to the next stage must follow the implementation of the measures provided for in the previous stage.

The United States delegation's third point concerning questions of verification is also, in our view, unfounded. Ambassador Fisher stated that "there is little evidence that the sponsors of CD/4 have given much thought to the verifiability of their proposal". The sponsors of the document had no intention of proposing any specific verification systems at the present stage, but simply indicated that "agreement should also be reached on the necessary verification measures". I should like to state once again that ending the production of nuclear weapons and completely destroying them will unquestionably call for an effective verification system. Questions of verification are an extremely important element of any agreement in the sphere of disarmament. Experience of negotiations on disarmament in recent years shows that obstacles connected with the verification of the fulfilment of obligations which previously appeared to be insurmountable can be overcome, given the goodwill of the participants in negotiations. Sufficient experience has been accumulated in this respect -- and here I cannot refrain from mentioning the Soviet-United States negotiations on various disarmament questions -- and there can be no doubt that it will be developed further.

Thus the United States representative's assertion that the socialist countries are allegedly moving away from the agreed principles of 1961 does not, therefore -- as I believe I have been able to demonstrate -- correspond to reality.

The United States representative further asserted that document CD/4 "takes no account of the stages that have already been recognized", in particular, the Soviet-United States SALT negotiations, the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, and so forth. Yet in the "Other negotiations" section of the document it is stated in black and white that "The preparation and conduct of the negotiations on

ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them should not be to the detriment of the current bilateral and multilateral negotiations on various aspects of the limitation of nuclear armaments, including strategic armaments".

A few words on yet another so-called "flaw" which the United States representative detected in the proposal of the socialist countries, and I am referring to China's participation in the proposed negotiations.

Ambassador Fisher said that the sponsors of document CD/4 "contradicted themselves in regard to the necessity for Chinese participation in the proposed negotiations". Allegedly, "they say that we should now make plans for negotiations on disarmament without the participation of China".

We should like to explain our position once more in connexion with this allegation. We consider that there cannot be nuclear disarmament without the participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers, including, of course, China. All the nuclear-weapon Powers without exception must participate in the future negotiations, otherwise such negotiations lose their meaning. It is desirable, and I emphasize the word desirable, that all the nuclear-weapon States as well as a certain number of non-nuclear-weapon States should participate in the preparatory consultations as well. But, in view of the fact that China is not yet represented in the Committee on Disarmament, we see no grounds for postponing the consultations solely for this reason. In order to create more favourable conditions for the solution of organizational problems, we have shown a certain amount of flexibility and have stated, as is known, that although the Committee on Disarmament is, in our view, the most suitable forum for the preparation and conduct of negotiations, we are prepared to examine alternative methods which might ensure the participation in the preparatory consultations as well of all the nuclear-weapon Powers, including China, from the very outset. We are prepared to examine this point. Thus document CD/4 did not envisage -- as was affirmed by the United States representative in his statement -- "making plans for negotiations without the participation of China".

And, lastly, the idea which the United States representative developed throughout his statement, to the effect that the socialist countries' proposal is "unrealistic". What can be said concerning this point? The proposal of the socialist countries corresponds strictly to the provisions of the Final Document of the special session devoted to disarmament and to resolution 32/71 II of the United Nations General Assembly. Is it the United States delegation's view that those documents, too, can be called "unrealistic"?

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The sponsors of document CD/4 proceeded from the premise that the time has come to translate the appeals of the United Nations into the language of practical solutions, failing which these appeals will remain empty words.

In this connexion I should like to draw attention once again to the declaration made by the President of the United States of America which is included in resolution 33/91 C. In it, the President of the United States said, in particular: "On a reciprocal basis we are willing now to reduce them [he was referring to nuclear weapons] by 10 per cent, 20 per cent or even 50 per cent". I should like to draw attention to the word "now". The question arises for us at least: how else can the goal of which President Carter spoke be attained if negotiations are not started?

In our opinion, the United States representative's statement demonstrates the need for active discussion of the question of nuclear disarmament, as only a broad exchange of views can resolve the doubts and questions which arose, say, for the United States delegation, and clarify the position of States and, first and foremost, that of the nuclear-weapon States, in respect of nuclear disarmament.

We call for a businesslike discussion of the proposal for the ending of the production of nuclear weapons and their complete destruction, and we count upon the active and well-intentioned co-operation of all delegations in the Committee on Disarmament, without exception, in this matter.

We shall continue to listen with interest to any observations and any comments likely to bring us closer to the goal which has been proclaimed in the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly that we unanimously welcomed.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union for his statement.

I also wish to thank him for the very kind words he addressed to my country and also for the good wishes he extended to Belgium in assuming the chairmanship and our place in this Committee. We are simply trying to make a modest contribution to the work of the Committee.

Does any delegation wish to take the floor?

If not, I now propose to convene the Ad hoc Working Group established to consider questions relating to the provisional agenda and programme of work of the Committee immediately after this meeting.

I suggest that the plenary meeting should be suspended and that it should be resumed after the meeting of the Working Group.

If there is no objection, I therefore declare the plenary meeting suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 11.45 a.m. and resumed at 12.10 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the plenary meeting of the Committee.

I would inform you that the following decisions have been recommended by the Working Group for adoption by the Committee.

1. The closure of the first part of the Committee's annual session will be scheduled for 27 April 1979.
2. It is decided to cancel the plenary meeting of the Committee that was to be held on 12 April 1979.

If there is no objection I declare these decisions adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): As you all know I am leaving Geneva this week-end. Ambassador Noterdaeme will assume the chairmanship as from next week.

I should like to take this opportunity to thank you for your valuable co-operation during my very brief stay in Geneva. It was of particular interest to me as I was able to see former colleagues again and to follow your deliberations on a question as important as that of disarmament.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Tuesday, 10 April, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 10 April 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. P. NOTERDAEME

(Belgium)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENSMAIL

Argentina: Mr. A.N. MOLTENI

Australia: Mr. L.D. THOMSON
Mr. A.J. BEHM

Belgium: Mr. P. NOTERDAEME
Mr. P. BERG
Mr. G. VAN DUYSE

Brazil: Mr. A. CELSO DE OURO PRETO

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. PETROV
Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U THAUNG HTUN

Canada: Mr. J.T. SIMARD

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RÚZEK^{OV}
Mr. V. TYLNER
Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ

Egypt: Mr. O. EL-SHAPEI
Mr. M. EL-BARADEI
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. BENOIT D'ABOVILLE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. S. KAHN
Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER

Hungary: Mr. M. DOIKOS
Mr. C. GYÖRFFY

India: Mr. C.R. GHARUKHAN
Mr. S.T. DEVARE
Mr. S. SABHARVAL

Indonesia: Mr. C. ANWAR SANI
Mr. I. DAJANIK

Iran: Mr. M. FARTASH
Mr. D. CHILATY

Italy: Mr. N. DI BERNARDO
Mr. M. MORENO
Mr. C. FRATESCHI

Japan: Mr. M. OGISO
Mr. T. NONOYAMA
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya: Mr. G.N. IUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDETBILEG
Mr. L. ERDENECHULUUN

Morocco: Mr. H. RAHHALI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. K. AHMED
Mr. T. OLUFOKO

Pakistan: Mr. H. KHAN

Peru:

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. B. RUSSIN

Romania: Mr. C. ENE
Mr. V. TUDOR
Mr. T. IELLESCANU

Sri Lanka: Miss M.L. NAGANATHAN

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELLYAN
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV
Mr. Yu.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHIN

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. C. FLOVERILLE
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY
Mr. H. DALEY
Mr. H.L. SANCHES
Ms. B. KILLIAN
Mrs. E. ARENSBURGER
Mr. G. CROCKER

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. KANIANDA WA KANIANDA
Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): My dear colleagues, before we proceed with our agenda I should like to say a few words in my personal capacity. You know that last week I was detained by other duties here in Geneva, and I wish to tell you that I am most happy to be among you once again and intend to do everything within my modest means to help advance the work of our Committee as much as possible. That being said, the list of speakers for today includes the representatives of Mongolia, Brazil and Nigeria.

I now give the floor to Ambassador Erdembileg, the distinguished representative of Mongolia.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): The Mongolian delegation congratulates you, Mr. Chairman, on assuming the office of Chairman of our Committee for the month of April, and expresses the hope that under your chairmanship the Committee will, during the time remaining for the first part of the work of the current session, accomplish useful work in examining the specific issues before it. We also wish to express our thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Thomson of Australia, who exerted maximum efforts in connexion with the adoption of an agreed agenda for this year's session of the Committee.

In my statement today I should like once more to refer to the question of negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

As is known, this question was submitted for inclusion in the Committee's agenda on the initiative of the socialist countries, including Mongolia, and is contained in document CD/4 of 1 February 1979.

In my previous statement I had the opportunity briefly to describe the motives by which Mongolia was guided in submitting that document jointly with other socialist countries.

It is generally recognized that, in the context of disarmament problems as a whole, primary importance is attached to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. And this is perfectly natural. The nuclear weapon, as a weapon of mass destruction which, from the time of its first appearance, has been considerably developed from both a qualitative and quantitative standpoint, today represents the greatest threat to mankind, since it has the capacity to destroy all life on earth many times over.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The efforts of peoples directed towards the achievement of real measures in the disarmament sphere are meeting with opposition from those who are creating significant obstacles on the path of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Negotiations on this question are still not fully under way. The deferment of this issue seriously affects the interests of all peoples.

Precisely because they are guided by the noble objectives of strengthening universal peace, the socialist countries have come forward with a new initiative to begin negotiations on ending the production of nuclear weapons and on their complete destruction. We are fully aware that this process will not take place all at once and cannot have a rigid time-frame, and that it must take place in stages, with consideration being given at particular stages of the negotiations to various aspects connected with qualitative and quantitative limitations until all types of nuclear weapons, as well as the means of their delivery, have been completely destroyed.

The sponsors of document CD/4 take full account of this important element. In the special section entitled "Stages of negotiations" it is clearly and explicitly stated that the cessation of the production, the reduction and the destruction of nuclear weapons should be carried out by stages on a mutually acceptable and agreed basis. The extent to which such reduction will be carried out should be decided by agreement among the participants in the negotiations.

The socialist countries have always been and still are in favour of agreed and mutually-acceptable measures in the disarmament sphere. They have never sought and do not seek unilateral advantages. After all, almost all the treaties and agreements which have been concluded so far in the field of disarmament, as well as the constructive proposals submitted in the past which now form the subject of bilateral and multilateral negotiations, are on the whole initiatives of the countries of the socialist community.

We have always proceeded from the view that the principle of non-impairment of the security of all the parties should be the fundamental principle of negotiations at all stages. Only the strict observance of this principle, reinforced by political will, can contribute to a businesslike examination of the problem and to guaranteeing the success of negotiations in so complex and arduous an area of disarmament as that of nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

In this connexion I should like, directly and frankly, to express our disagreement with the argument of the representative of the United States who, speaking in the Committee recently, said that the proposal presented in document CD/4 addresses the problem of nuclear disarmament with no consideration given to what effect the elimination of this class of weapons alone would have on the security of States.

As one of the sponsors of document CD/4, the Mongolian delegation would like to emphasize that this document in no way precludes other bilateral and multilateral negotiations on various aspects of the limitation of nuclear armaments, including strategic armaments, and also does not impede the achievement of bilateral or multilateral agreements on the limitation or destruction of any nuclear armaments on a mutually agreed basis. Nor does our document preclude conducting negotiations on various other types of weapons.

Due attention is also given in document CD/4 to the necessary verification measures, which should be agreed at a specific stage of the negotiations.

Another important element contained in document CD/4 is that of the indispensable participation in the negotiations of all nuclear-weapon States without exception.

In admitting the possibility of embarking upon an exchange of views on the matter under consideration in this Committee without the participation of China, the sponsors of document CD/4 do not in the least depart from their firm position and do not contradict themselves, as certain persons in this Committee would like to suggest. We are saying quite unambiguously that the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, including China, in negotiations on nuclear disarmament is essential from the outset.

As we understand it, an exchange of views on the question contained in document CD/4 has, in effect, already begun in the Committee on Disarmament, from which China is still absent although a working place on the Committee has been set aside for its representatives from the very beginning of the Committee's current session.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The Mongolian delegation is in favour of continuing, in an effective manner, preparatory consultations so as to facilitate the start of practical negotiations on this urgent issue.

At the same time we are, however, obliged to voice our concern in connexion with the new actions being undertaken by the opponents of disarmament. China's ruling circles, who recently provoked an aggressive war against their southern neighbour, socialist Viet Nam, have recently committed an unfriendly act against their northern neighbour, the Soviet Union, by unilaterally deciding to denounce the Treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance between the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The attitude of the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic to this decision by Peking is quite clearly stated in the declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia dated 5 April 1979. The Mongolian People's Republic, as an Asian socialist State and immediate neighbour of China, the chauvinistic policy of whose Government in respect of our country is well known to world public opinion, considers that cessation of the validity of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty on the initiative of the Chinese side runs counter to the interests of strengthening peace and security in Asia and the Far East. China's present leadership bears the full weight of the consequences of this act and has full responsibility for it before its own people.

In our view, the negative attitude of some, not so much to participation in the work of the Committee on Disarmament as, in general, to problems of disarmament and the attempts by others to block efforts in the Committee aimed at achieving general agreement to begin negotiations on ending the production of nuclear weapons and completely destroying them cannot in any way promote progress in the cause of disarmament.

The sponsors of document CD/4, duly taking into account differences in the level of the arsenals of some nuclear-weapon Powers, provide for a different degree of participation of nuclear-weapon States in measures at each stage, which will be determined taking into account the quantitative and qualitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and of other States concerned. It is, of course, most important to make sure that the existing balance in the field of nuclear strength should remain undisturbed at all stages, with the levels of nuclear strength being constantly reduced.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

In conclusion, I should like to observe once more that the Committee on Disarmament is the most suitable forum for conducting such negotiations. It has both the competence and sufficient experience in this vitally important sphere.

Such are some of the Mongolian delegation's considerations in connexion with the examination in the Committee of the document submitted jointly by the group of socialist countries.

We fully associate ourselves with the statement by Ambassador Issraelyan of the Soviet Union in which he appealed to the Committee to give businesslike consideration to the proposal for negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Mongolia for his kind remarks.

I now give the floor to Mr. Celso de Ouro Preto, the distinguished representative of Brazil.

Mr. CELSO DE OURO PRETO (Brazil) (translated from French): I wish first of all, Mr. Chairman, to congratulate you on your chairmanship. We are all aware of Belgium's interest in disarmament issues and we are sure that, during your term of office, our Committee will again be able to make appreciable progress in carrying out its programme of work. I should also like, through you, to address a few words to the Ambassador of Australia. His dedication to the task entrusted to him and the skill and diplomacy he displayed in the course of the delicate negotiations which took place during his term of office aroused our profound admiration.

The group of non-aligned and neutral countries known as the Group of 21 has always felt that the Committee on Disarmament should give high priority to the question of chemical weapons. Three draft conventions on this subject have already been submitted to the old CCD. Bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union have been held on this question since 1976. The United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the problem of chemical weapons. The Final Document of the tenth special session and resolutions 33/59 and 33/71, to cite only the most recent ones, are 'very clear.' We note, however, that

(Mr. Celso de Ouro Preto, Brazil)

multilateral negotiations on the question of chemical weapons have not yet begun. That is why I have the honour to introduce, on behalf of the Group of 21, a proposal to establish an ad hoc working group, open to the participation of all member States of the Committee, with a view to elaborating a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction. The Group of 21 believes that negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament may proceed in parallel with the bilateral contacts which have already taken place on the chemical weapons issue. The most recent resolutions adopted by the General Assembly affirm that the Committee need not await the conclusion of these bilateral contacts before it embarks upon negotiations itself. The ad hoc group proposed would have as basic texts for its work the draft treaties and working papers already presented both to the CCD and the Committee. A text containing the proposal of the Group of 21 has been distributed. The Group of 21 is prepared to hold consultations with other delegations in order to set up as soon as possible, the ad hoc working group whose establishment would demonstrate in a concrete manner the Committee's desire to embark upon the disarmament negotiations which the international community expects from it.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil for his kind remarks addressed to the Chair.

I now wish to give the floor to Ambassador Adeniji, the distinguished representative of Nigeria.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Before I share the immediate thoughts of my delegation on the important proposal contained in document CD/4, allow me first of all to express our congratulations to you and to your country, since this is the first time I am speaking under your chairmanship. We are conscious of the important contribution which Belgium can make to our negotiations, and we remain confident that the Committee on Disarmament will make significant progress under your leadership.

My delegation recognizes the proposal in the working paper CD/4 as a positive proposal. There is universal consensus on the importance and urgent necessity for nuclear disarmament. Paragraph 45 of the programme of action of the Final Document

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

of the tenth special session clearly allotted the highest priority to nuclear disarmament. That paragraph, taken together with the paragraphs that immediately follow it, underline the views of the world community with regard to the urgency of nuclear disarmament. This was not a new-found view inspired by the solemnity of the first special session devoted to disarmament.

We can all, including those of us who were not members of the United Nations at the time, recall that the unanimous first resolution of the United Nations General Assembly was that atomic, namely, nuclear, weapons should be eliminated from national arsenals; and more important at this juncture, the reasons which motivated that unanimous first resolution are still valid and even more urgent today. Thus for thirty-four years international opinion has remained consistent in its demand for urgent action on nuclear disarmament. We also believe that the possession of nuclear arsenals, whatever else it might have done to those who possess them, has continuously engendered a sense of insecurity, not only in the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves, as direct potential targets of nuclear attack, but in mankind as a whole about its very existence.

When looked at in the proper context, the proposal in document CD/4 can provide a timely basis for starting negotiations. The proposal has not ignored the need to maintain credible security of all States during the stage-by-stage process of cessation of production and gradual elimination of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the proposal should not, in the eyes of my delegation, preclude proper consideration, in the course of detailed negotiation, of related disarmament measures or agreements which may be found necessary for the implementation of any stage of the proposed nuclear disarmament. In fact this may be done either in this Committee or in another forum, bilaterally or multilaterally.

I should like to stress that we fully accept as vital and essential the need to preserve the security of all nations at all stages. Given the recognition of the rather extreme urgency of nuclear disarmament, for the sake of the survival of mankind, and given the importance of the political will to negotiate, the issue of the undiminished security of nations becomes a very important point in the negotiations that will follow. In this context, we understand the preoccupation

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

of those delegations who stressed the importance of paragraph 29 of the Final Document of the tenth special session. Indeed it is essential, if the means are not to defeat the end, that disarmament measures should not confer advantage on any State or group of States. Precarious as the balance of terror is, an imbalance of terror may whet the appetite for world domination.

Negotiations on nuclear disarmament should have as their goal the total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons such that undiminished security for all countries -- nuclear-weapon as well as non-nuclear-weapon -- is dissociated from this terrible weapon. The stages of such negotiations have been indicated in the Final Document of the special session as follows:

Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

My delegation would hope that commencement of negotiations on this important problem will therefore not be unduly delayed by protracted discussions of what to negotiate. It is the view of my delegation that the identification of the issues made in the special session can form a useful beginning. We shall soon, in addition, begin the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament which, in the view of Nigeria should be so comprehensive as to provide negotiators in whatever forum with a basis for their negotiations, with the added advantage of the inter-relatedness of the entire process. In other words, the universal interest in nuclear disarmament should find expression in the comprehensive programme as it has to some extent in the Final Document of the special session, while the specific interests and responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States will assert itself in the negotiations.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

If nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization, then it is obvious that realistic negotiations for effective measures should involve all nuclear-weapon States. We believe that everything possible should be done, and all opportunities given, to encourage and ease the way for China to participate in the negotiations. One such way is to have the basis for the negotiations set out in a document that is approved by all; another is the pertinent acknowledgement, contained in document CD/4, that the levels of arsenals of individual nuclear-weapon Powers are not the same and that the degree of participation of individual nuclear-weapon States in each stage should be determined accordingly. This is a realistic recognition of the special responsibility of the Superpowers for nuclear disarmament.

This Committee should not, and cannot afford to ignore an important working paper on nuclear disarmament negotiations simply because there are other dimensions to the problem. There will always be dimensions in negotiations. We have received the progress report of the Working Group of seismological experts concerning areas of co-operation in detecting and identifying seismic events. The report is an important contribution in settling a technical aspect of a CTBT. Similarly, whenever it is considered essential, the Committee could, and probably would, take steps to clarify issues regarding nuclear weapons disarmament, either through experts or by special parallel negotiations. The Committee should, at the appropriate stage in its work, take up the proposal in CD/4 given its pertinence to the mandate of the Committee on Disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Thank you, Ambassador Adeniji, for the kind words you addressed to me. I also wish to thank most particularly the three last speakers for the words of appreciation addressed to my predecessor, Ambassador Thomson. I personally associate myself fully with what they said.

(The Chairman)

Is there any other delegation that wishes to take the floor? If not, I should like to draw the attention of distinguished delegates to a document which is before us -- document CD/8, and specifically the draft annex I to the rules of procedure proposed by the group of socialist countries.

Does any delegation wish to comment on this document?

Have all delegations had sufficient time to acquaint themselves with the document?

If so, I would propose that the Committee should now adopt this draft annex I to the rules of procedure proposed by the group of socialist countries. I believe that the Committee can adopt this draft of annex I.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I now propose to convene, in a few minutes, the Ad Hoc Working Group established to consider questions relating to the preparation of the provisional agenda and programme of work of the Committee; it would meet immediately after this meeting.

If you agree, I suggest that the plenary meeting should be suspended and that it should resume after the meeting of the Working Group.

I accordingly declare this plenary meeting suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 11.30 a.m. and resumed at 5.40 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I now propose to resume the twenty-sixth plenary meeting of the Committee.

I wish to inform the Committee that several draft decisions have been recommended by the Working Group with a view to their adoption by the Committee.

In accordance with rule 29 of the rules of procedure, I submit to the Committee document CD/L.2/Rev.1 on the provisional agenda and programme of work of the Committee.

In this connexion, I should also like to read to you the text of the following arrangement. I am reading it in English because this arrangement has so far been drafted only in English.

(The Chairman)

I quote:

"In submitting the provisional agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, it is the understanding of all members of the Committee that heading IX, dealing inter alia with 'collateral measures', includes the following questions, to be considered by the Committee at appropriate stages of its work:

1. Further prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques;
2. Further measures in the field of disarmament to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the sub-soil thereof;
3. Further measures to prevent an arms race in outer space."

Does any delegation wish to take the floor?

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by extending to you my delegation's warm congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament. We feel sure that, under your wise guidance, we shall be able to bring our work to a successful conclusion at this final stage of the first part of the first session of the Committee.

I should also like to express our appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Thomson, the distinguished representative of Australia, for the way in which he presided over our work. We owe it to his moderation, patience, perseverance, skill and impartiality — in short, to his unusual wisdom — that our deliberations were fruitful.

With regard to the provisional agenda of the Committee, which is reproduced in document CD/L.2/Rev.1, my delegation considers that the title of section IX of what we are accustomed to call "the decalogue" is unnecessarily long. We would have preferred more concise wording more in line with the titles of the other nine sections. We are making this comment quite incidentally, since the main reason why my delegation asked for the floor is to state that it interprets the words "acceptable to all parties concerned" as applying equally to the "effective verification methods" and the "appropriate disarmament measures" which are referred to. Our approval of the title of section IX, — whose wording, as we have said, leaves much to be desired in our opinion — should therefore be understood as being contingent on this interpretation, which is the only one we consider to be compatible with the provisions of paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I very much appreciate the kind words you addressed to me.

Mr. DE LA GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, I would like to convey to you again, this time in a public meeting, my delegation's congratulations and good wishes to you personally and for the accomplishment of the important task which falls to you during the month of your chairmanship. I am particularly happy to see in the Chair the representative of a country which, as I have said, is especially close to mine and with which we maintain truly fraternal relations. May I also take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to extend my congratulations and good wishes to our new colleagues, the distinguished representatives of the United Kingdom and Zaire.

The adoption of our agenda has entailed extensive discussions and consultations. Making a start is always difficult, and it was no doubt inevitable that our new Committee should take time to chart its own course rather than to follow that of the bodies which preceded it. It has done so responsibly in an atmosphere of co-operation and courtesy, and the interest it has shown in the concerns of each member augurs well for the future of our work. May I refer in this respect to the part played in these results by Ambassador Thomson, as our Chairman during the month of March. His wisdom, patience and talents as a conciliator have earned him the gratitude of us all, and I would like to take this opportunity to pay him today the tribute he so amply deserves.

The French delegation has done its utmost to contribute to the general effort to find the necessary consensus. In this spirit, it has refrained from expressing objections to or reservations on the inclusion in the agenda of the question of a treaty on a nuclear test ban. I must make it clear, however, that this does not mean that there has been any change in the well-known position of my Government on this matter and the negotiations concerning it. But its position does not, of course, affect the determination of the French delegation to co-operate as fully as possible in the work of the Committee in order to further the noble task of disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I should like to thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for the cordial words you addressed to me, and I must add that I also appreciate the tribute you paid to my predecessor, Ambassador Thomson.

(The Chairman)

After these two statements, which will of course be included in the records of this session, I would like to know if there are other speakers who wish to take the floor.

If not, I shall now formally invite our Committee to adopt document CD/L.2/Rev.1.

It is so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I would now like to put before you other draft decisions prepared by the Working Group.

The first is that the opening date for the second part of the Committee's annual session should be 12 June 1979.

Are there any observations or comments on this proposal?

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): In our informal sessions the question of the date of the Preparatory Committee meeting for the Biological Weapons Review Conference was raised. There seems to be some doubt as to what the date will be, at least in the minds of the Secretariat, but there is no doubt in the minds of those who participated in the meeting at the General Assembly last autumn, or in fact in the minds of the depositories who are just about to issue the invitation for that meeting to begin on 12 June. There is a practical aspect of this opening date for the BW Review Conference which I think is analogous to that facing us next Tuesday in regard to the Preparatory Committee for the NPT. It seems to me that the opening of two important meetings on the same date would put some delegations under strain. I think that there are important statements that are usually made at the beginning of meetings of this nature, and it seems to me that it might be carefully considered whether one or the other might not be changed, perhaps by a day or two; for example, the opening session of the Committee on Disarmament could be on the following Thursday, which is the 14 June, or possibly there could be some slippage in the date of the opening of the BW Preparatory Committee. In any case I think this matter is something that we should look into and certainly for the convenience of some delegations, and I think it might be important that we should not take a firm decision at this time. We have no objection from the United States point of view to the opening date that has been suggested. We have the ability to cover both these meetings at the same time, but I think that, as a matter of principle, it is not a good idea, and I think I would prefer that we should not cast in concrete the decision on the date, but that we agree provisionally now, subject to a review of the situation by the Secretariat and to any other developments that may occur in the next few days or before the end of this particular session.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): May I suggest to you that we should simply take note of this suggestion without going any further, that is to say, we would not take a formal decision but revert to the question in the light of the information which the Secretariat will no doubt give us. It would be useful, in my view, if we were to take up this question again between now and the end of April. I would just like us to take note of the suggestion and to keep open the possibility of re-examinin~~g~~ the matter before the end of the month when we shall be considering the question of coincidence or non-coincidence. May I simply ask distinguished delegates to note that the date of 12 June was suggested during the meeting of the Working Group, but that the suggestion will be reconsidered later.

In the circumstances, I would now like to turn to the second draft decision suggested by our Working Group, namely, that the plenary meeting of the Committee scheduled for 17 April should be cancelled and that a plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Wednesday, 25 April, in addition to those scheduled for Tuesday, 24 April, and Thursday, 26 April. (Now, therefore, we are envisaging the possibility of including another plenary meeting on Wednesday, 25 April 1979, between the plenary meetings of Tuesday, 24 April, and Thursday, 26 April).

Is the Committee prepared to adopt this draft decision?

If so, I shall take it that the draft decision is adopted by the Committee.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I would also remind the Committee that document CD/11, submitted by the Group of 21, on the question of chemical weapons, has been circulated and submitted to the Committee during the present session by the distinguished representative of Brazil.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Brazil.

Mr. CELSO DE OURO PRETO (Brazil) (translated from French): A draft decision was distributed a few minutes ago to the members of the Committee. This draft decision is sponsored by the Group of 21, and concerns their proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on chemical weapons. The draft decision has been distributed unofficially, and the Group of 21 hopes that it will be used as a basis for future negotiations on the establishment of such a committee.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I would now like to inform you that our Working Group has begun to consider the programme of work of our Committee between now and the end of the month. With your consent, I propose to convene another meeting of the Working Group tomorrow to continue its consideration of this matter. We could meet tomorrow at 3 p.m. If the Working Group draws up specific proposals and reaches firm conclusions on the programme of work, I reserve the right to call another plenary meeting after the meeting of the Working Group to present the Working Group's proposals with a view to their adoption.

Mr. THOMSON (Australia): Mr. Chairman, I have been deeply touched by the kind comments made about my chairmanship last month, but I am sure that no one will understand better than you, with your vast experience, why I think those comments are much too generous. A Chairman is no more than the instrument of the Committee he serves. If any praise is due at this moment I think it is owed to the members of this Committee, to their good sense, cordiality, inventiveness and sustained will to reach a consensus, even though doing so always required us to forego something of our own national positions. We saw that will to consensus actively at work this morning in the drafting group. I thought that sight was a very hopeful one, looking to our future work.

Mr. Chairman, I hope you will permit me now -- at this penultimate moment almost as it is the end of the beginning, when all of us, I think, are feeling a tiny glow of satisfaction -- to express my gratitude to those distinguished gentlemen over whose work I had the honour to preside during the month of March. I would add to that an expression of deep personal obligation to the Secretariat which helped to guide me through a time not wholly lacking in perplexity.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

It is 6 p.m., and I think we can now conclude our work for today. There is no plenary meeting scheduled for tomorrow, although there is a possibility that we shall have one -- and I very much hope we do -- to complete our deliberations on the programme of work. The next meeting will be Thursday, 19 April, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.

CD/PV.27
11 April 1979
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 11 April 1979, at 5 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. P. NOTERDAEME

(Belgium)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENSMAIL

Argentina: Mr. A.N. MOLTENI

Australia: Mr. L.D. THOMSON
Mr. A.J. BEHM

Belgium: Mr. P. NOTERDAEME
Mr. P. BERG
Mr. G. VAN DUYSE

Brazil: Mr. A. CELSO DE OURO PRETO

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma: U SAU HLAING
U THAUNG HPUN

Canada: Mr. J.T. SIMARD

Cuba: Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. V. TYLNER

Egypt: Mr. M. EL-BARADEI
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. BENOIT D'ABOVILLE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. S. KAHN
Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. G. PFEIFFER
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. H. DOMOKOS Mr. C. GYÖRFFY
<u>India:</u>	Mr. S.T. DEVARE
<u>Indonesia:</u>	Mr. I. DAMANIK
<u>Iran:</u>	Mr. D. CHILATY
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. N. DI BERNARDO Mr. M. MORENO
<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. H. OGISO Mr. T. NONOYAMA Mr. R. ISHII
<u>Kenya:</u>	Mr. G.N. MUMBU
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
<u>Mongolia:</u>	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG Mr. L. ERDENECHULUUN Mr. L. BAYART
<u>Morocco:</u>	Mr. M. RAHHALI Mr. M. CHRAÏBI
<u>Netherlands:</u>	Mr. R.H. FEIN Mr. A.J. MEERBURG
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. M.K. AHMED Mr. T. OLUNOKO
<u>Pakistan:</u>	Mr. M. AKRAM
<u>Peru:</u>	

<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. B. SUJKA Mr. H. KRUCZYK
<u>Romania:</u>	Mr. C. ENE
<u>Sri Lanka:</u>	
<u>Sweden:</u>	Mr. C. LIDGARD Mr. L. NORBERG
<u>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:</u>	Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHIN
<u>United Kingdom:</u>	Mr. D.M. SUMTERHAYES Mr. P.H.V. FRANCIS
<u>United States of America:</u>	Mr. A.S. FISHER Mr. C. FLOWERREE Mr. A. AKALOVSKY Mr. H. DALEY
<u>Venezuela:</u>	Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
<u>Yugoslavia:</u>	Mr. D. DJOKIĆ
<u>Zaire:</u>	Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the twenty-seventh plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

You all know that we have yet to complete our programme of work. I would now like to submit to our Committee the draft decision prepared by the Working Group.

I would ask you to refer to document CD/L.2/Rev.1. The Working Group proposes that this document should be completed by replacing the dots in the section entitled "Programme of Work" by the following:

"19-20 and possibly 23 April: Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

"24-27 April: Chemical weapons."

The section concerning the programme of work would conclude as follows:

"In adopting its agenda and programme of work, the Committee has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure."

Before this proposal is formally adopted, I would like to remind you that it was the understanding of all the members of the Working Group and all the members of the Committee as well that, under the two topics referred to in document CD/L.2/Rev.1, as supplemented, delegations may take up any proposal which has already been made or which may be made in future on these topics.

Mr. ISSRAELLYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): As far as I can remember, Mr. Chairman, you did not use the word "possibly" in referring to the date of 23 April during the discussion of the Committee's programme of work relating to the item on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Now -- as I understand from the interpretation -- it seems that you said 19-20 and possibly 23 April. The word "possibly" was not used at the meetings of the Working Group either. This word is probably unnecessary, because the Committee might not hold a meeting on 20 April or on 27 April. For this reason, the delegation of the USSR proposes the deletion of the word "possibly" in the text of the Committee's programme of work we are adopting.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I think I did say "possibly" in the Working Group, but I agree with Ambassador Issraelyan that perhaps this word is not indispensable. If the Committee agrees, I will delete it from the text. The dates we would adopt for the first topic would therefore be 19 to 23 April.

Are you in agreement with this proposal?

(The Chairman)

It concerns the following two consecutive periods:

- "19-23 April: Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
"24-27 April: Chemical weapons."

If there are no further comments, I would formally submit this wording to you for adoption.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): With your permission, I shall comment on a point raised at our last plenary meeting.

We envisaged the possibility of opening the second part of this session on 12 June, but did not take a final decision as we were not very clear about the date on which the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention is scheduled to meet. The Secretariat has just informed me that, for technical reasons, the dates fixed originally were not adopted. The new date now suggested for the beginning of that meeting will be 9 July. Consequently, it will not clash with our date of 12 June 1979.

In view of this, does the Committee wish to take a decision on the opening date for the second part of its annual session?

Mr. DE LA GORCE (France) (translated from French): I have listened with great interest to these points relating to our time-table, but it seems to me that we are very largely absolved from the need to examine them, first because, as you have just said, the practical aspect of the problem does not exist or no longer exists, and, above all, for a political reason which in my view is of paramount importance.

We are the main body for multilateral negotiations on disarmament. I am rather disturbed when questions of scheduling are brought up in which, or because of which, it is always a matter of amending the order of our work in the light of other meetings. This does not seem to me to be quite compatible either with the importance of the task entrusted to us or, I would almost say, with the standing of this Committee. I am glad that the problem which undoubtedly existed for certain delegations has been solved, and I would add that we have every respect for the concerned expressed in connexion with the availability of experts or specialists who are to attend this or that meeting. However, I must make it quite clear that the task entrusted to us by our Governments in accordance with the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly should lead us to regard our work as being

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

of fundamental importance, and we should not, in my opinion, yield in certain circumstances to the requirements of such and such a meeting connected with disarmament. Practical requirements must, of course, be taken into account, and efforts made to find the most suitable solutions, but my delegation would find it difficult, regardless of the circumstances, to agree that the time-table of the work of the Committee on Disarmament should be determined a priori in relation to the dates of other meetings and on the assumption that, in a sense, such other meetings have priority.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Is the Committee now prepared to take a decision on the date for the resumption of its work in the second part of its session?

May I take it that we are prepared to decide to resume our work in the second part of the session on 12 June 1979?

I hear no objections.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): It merely remains for me to thank you and, with your permission, to close the meeting.

The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.

CD/PV.28
19 April 1979
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWENTY EIGHTH MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 19 April 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. P. Noterdaeme

(Belgium)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENSMAIL

Argentina: Mr. F.J. DAVILA

Australia: Mr. L.D. THOMSON
Mr. A.J. BEHM
Ms. M.S. WICKES

Belgium: Mr. P. NOTERDAEME
Mr. G. VAN DUYSE
Mr. P. BERG

Brazil: Mr. A. CELSO DE OURO PRETO
Mr. C.A. SIMAS MAGALHÃES

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. I. PETROV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U THAUNG HTUN

Canada: Mr. R. HARRY JAY
Mr. J.T. SIMARD

Cuba: Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. V. TYLNER
Mr. L. STAVINCHA

Egypt: Mr. O. EL-SHAFEI
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. BENOIT D'ABOVILLE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDIER
Mr. S. KAHN
Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. J. PÖHLMANN

Hungary: Mr. M. DOMOKOS
Mr. C. GYÖRFFY

India: Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN

Indonesia: Mr. M. SIDIK
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Iran: Mr. M. FARTASH
Mr. D. CHILATY

Italy: Mr. N. DI BERNARDO
Mr. M. MORENO
Mr. C. FRATESCHI
Mr. FOLCO DE LUCA

Japan: Mr. M. OGISO
Mr. T. NONOYAMA
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya: Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
Miss L.M. GARCÍA

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. ERDENECHULUUN
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. M. RAHHALI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Nigeria: Mr. K. AHMED
Mr. T. OLUMOKO

Pakistan: Mr. J.K.A. MARKER
Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru:

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. H. PAC
Mr. M. KRUCZYK

Romania: Mr. C. ENE
Mr. V. TUDOR
Mr. T. MELESCANU
Mr. VASILE GLIGA

Sri Lanka: Mr. I.B. FONSEKA
Miss M.L. NAGANATHAN

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. A.M. VAVILOV
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHIN

United Kingdom: Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mr. C.K. CURWEN
Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER

Mr. C. FLOWERREE

Mr. A. AKALOVSKY

Mr. M. DALEY

Mr. M. SANCHES

Mrs. E. ARENSBURGER

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I have the honour to declare open the twenty-eighth plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Distinguished delegates and dear colleagues, before we make a start on our agenda, I would like to say a few words on behalf of all the delegates gathered here and also on my own behalf to the distinguished delegate of Sweden. I am sure that Ambassador Lidgard will agree to act as spokesman for all of us in conveying to Minister Thorsson our most sincere condolences on her recent bereavement, which has prevented her from being with us today. We regret her absence and would like to express to her our deepest sympathy.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): I would like to express, to you, Mr. Chairman my deep appreciation for your warm words and I shall certainly convey them to Mrs. Thorsson.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I would now like to invite you to take up our agenda. May I remind you, first of all, that we shall be considering today the second item on the Committee's agenda, which reads: "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

May I also remind you that it was agreed among all the members of the Committee that delegations may speak on any proposals which have been made or will be made on this topic.

It was also agreed that, in adopting the programme of work of the Committee, we would bear in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of the rules of procedure.

I would now like to open the list of speakers by giving the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico.

Ambassador Garcia Robles, you have the floor.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, both my delegation and I associate ourselves with the profound regret and sympathy you have expressed to Mrs. Thorsson on her bereavement.

In the statement I made on 24 January, that is, the day on which the Committee on Disarmament began its work, I said how important we thought it that this multilateral negotiating body should possess rules of procedure and an agenda in keeping with the momentous task entrusted to it.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Accordingly, as this is the first occasion on which my delegation is taking the floor since the successful completion of the lengthy deliberations and negotiations -- conducted in informal meetings that are not reported in our records -- which led to the preparation of the two documents I have just mentioned, we thought it fitting to begin this statement by making some comments on them.

With regard to the rules of procedure, my delegation was pleased to see that the introduction mentions expressly that they were adopted "taking into account the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament". Our satisfaction is in no way lessened by the fact that some delegations considered it necessary that the document refers also to "the agreement reached following appropriate consultations among the Member States during that Session", since we have always maintained that the membership and functions of a negotiating body like this one must be satisfactory, as the United Nations General Assembly emphasized as early as 1961 in resolution 1660 (XVI), to both nuclear-weapon States and the rest of the world.

Another provision which we consider worthy of special mention concerns the rotation of the Chairmanship among all the members of the Committee. Although this has been in effect for less than three months, it has been demonstrably beneficial in contributing to the realization of the provisions laid down in the rules, which specify in rule 3 that "All Member States of the Committee shall take part in its work in conditions of full equality as independent States".

We believe that if rules 21 and 23 are correctly interpreted, they may prevent the Committee on Disarmament from becoming paralysed whenever the nuclear-weapon Powers fail to submit to it a preliminary draft treaty or convention on which they have succeeded in reaching an agreement. In fact, in accordance with the first of the two rules mentioned, "If the Committee is unable to take a decision on the substance of an item under negotiation, it will consider the subsequent examination of that item", while, under the terms of rule 23, the Committee may not only establish subsidiary bodies open to all its Member States but may also make exceptions to this general rule and set up ad hoc sub-committees or working groups with a limited membership. This would enable the nuclear Powers, whenever it is deemed essential, to conduct preliminary negotiations among themselves,

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as has been happening for more than two years in the tripartite talks on a nuclear test ban. The form of the negotiations would be the same, but there would nevertheless be a difference which to our mind is fundamental -- the nuclear Powers would be acting as a subsidiary body of the Committee on Disarmament, which would be entitled, among other things, to establish appropriate procedures to keep itself duly informed of the progress of the negotiations.

In this connexion, I would like to reiterate that, as we have said repeatedly in the most diverse forums, we are convinced that it should not be an essential requirement for the nuclear Powers to transmit to the multilateral negotiating body an absolutely complete text of a preliminary draft treaty or convention which they have been negotiating among themselves. The proper application of the rules to which I have alluded could solve this problem in a way that would be universally acceptable.

As regards the section of the rules entitled "Agenda and programme of work", the main point to be emphasized is the admirable flexibility introduced by the provisions of rules 31 and 30, without prejudice to the necessary precise delimitation of the subject. Under the first of these rules Member States may, while the work of the Committee is in progress, request the inclusion of an urgent item in the agenda. Under the second rule, although the subject of statements made in plenary meetings will normally correspond to the topic then under discussion in accordance with the agreed programme of work, any Member State will be entitled to present "its views on any subject which it may consider to merit attention", as my delegation is doing at this very moment, and to raise any subject relevant to the work of the Committee at a plenary meeting if it has not been specifically included in the programme of work.

Rules 32 to 36 succeed, in our opinion, in establishing a procedural system that will guarantee the exercise of the rights conferred on States not members of the Committee by the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in paragraph 120 of its Final Document, with respect to their possible participation in the negotiating body.

The public nature of plenary meetings, which is dealt with in rule 20; the provision that verbatim records and other official documents of the Committee will be made available to the public, as stated in rule 40, and the contribution

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

which non-governmental organizations can make under rule 42 will undoubtedly result in a beneficial symbiosis from which both world public opinion and what the General Assembly has called the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum" will derive mutual profit.

The final rule 47, entitled "Amendments", is a useful reminder of the need to be constantly aware that, if laws and constitutions are not immutable, regulations are even less so, and that whenever necessary, they should be adjusted to the demands of a constantly evolving situation.

With regard to the Committee's agenda and programme of work, the drafting of which took up most of our time in March and early April, my delegation is pleased to note, first, that the relevant document opens with the blunt statement that "the Committee on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating forum, shall promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control". Accordingly, we hope that the Committee will endeavour to revive the activities directed to this noble aim which, since the first few years of the 1960s, has been invoked for rhetorical purposes only.

A second motive for satisfaction is the emphasis given in the introductory paragraphs to the fact that the Committee, in dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament, will do so "taking into account, inter alia, the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament".

We are particularly glad to note, furthermore, that, once the initial doubts which might have caused a negative reaction were dispelled, the Committee agreed to the suggestion, which the delegation of Mexico ventured to put forward from the beginning, that it was desirable to define the competence of the Committee in very general terms so as to avoid unnecessary discussion, on the lines of those eventually adopted, which constitute a virtually exhaustive decalogue encompassing all the principles, objectives, measures and procedures contemplated in the Final Document of the special Assembly session.

On the other hand, our attitude is different with regard to the agenda adopted for 1979. We would have liked the agenda, unlike the ten previous section titles, to include very concrete and specific topics, for our primary objective must be to avoid a repetition of what happened in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Every effort will have to be made to achieve what has so often been

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called in our informal meetings "an action-oriented agenda". Although we participated in the consensus which led to the adoption of the agenda for the current year, we still hope that in the years to come the annual agenda and programmes of work corresponding to the two parts of each session may conform to the system I have just outlined.

I come now to the second part of my statement in which, in relation to the first topic in our programme of work, namely, the "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", I would like to make some general comments of a preliminary nature on a specific question: the proposal submitted to the Committee by seven socialist countries in working paper CD/4 of 1 February 1979, which was officially presented to us, on behalf of all the co-sponsors, on 6 February by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan. As I found his introduction more explicit and detailed than the proposal itself, our comments will mainly refer to his explanatory statement.

I also wish to add, by way of introduction, that Mexico takes very seriously the multilateral instruments to which it gives its approval in international bodies, even if they are simply resolutions and not what are known as solemn instruments such as treaties, conventions or protocols. That is why, for the purpose of the correct understudying of our position on the matter I am going to discuss, it ought to be appreciated that we not only approved but took an active part in the preparation of such texts as the introduction to resolution S-10/2 of the special General Assembly session on disarmament; paragraphs 11 and 13, forming part of the Declaration, and paragraphs 47 and 48 -- which form part of the Programme of Action -- in the Final Document of that special session.

In the resolution which I have cited, the most representative organ of the international community vigorously expressed its alarm at "the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race".

The paragraphs of the Declaration to which I have just alluded state that "mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

produced" and that "existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth", and add:

"Removing the threat of a world war -- a nuclear war -- is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation".

In the Programme of Action, the Assembly was equally or more explicit when it proclaimed:

"Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

"In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility."

Furthermore, we well recall the eloquent statements delivered by the Heads of State of the two main nuclear-weapon Powers, whose significance is attested by the fact that the General Assembly considered it advisable to reproduce them in full in two successive resolutions, 32/87 G of 12 December 1977 and 33/91 C of 16 December 1978.

The address referred to at the beginning of these two resolutions of the Assembly, includes the following solemn pronouncement made by the President of the United States of America, on 4 October 1977.

"The United States is willing to go as far as possible, consistent with our security interests, in limiting and reducing our nuclear weapons. On a reciprocal basis we are willing now to reduce them by 10 per cent, 20 per cent or even 50 per cent. Then we will work for further reductions with a view to a world truly free of nuclear weapons."

The other address reproduced in the resolutions I have mentioned is that delivered on 2 November 1977 by the President of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which was in the following terms:

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"Today we are proposing a radical step: that agreement be reached on a simultaneous halt in the production of nuclear weapons by all States. This would apply to all such weapons -- whether atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or missiles. At the same time, the nuclear Powers could undertake to start the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of such weapons and move towards their complete, total destruction."

In the light of these statements, it will be appreciated, I hope, that we consider that the proposals submitted in working paper CD/4 should receive in our Committee serious and dispassionate study which should make it possible to arrive at constructive conclusions and should help us to identify the positive elements they undoubtedly contain and, in addition, to point out the shortcomings from which they also suffer.

Simply as an illustration and without in any way claiming to exhaust the subject, I shall confine myself to drawing attention, as an example of the former -- that is, positive factors -- to the following five aspects:

(1) We fully endorse the view of the sponsors of working paper CD/4 that the Committee on Disarmament is the most suitable forum for conducting negotiations on nuclear disarmament. On the one hand, the Committee is open to the participation of all nuclear Powers: four of them are already taking part in its work and it is to be hoped that the fifth, China, will soon occupy the seat specifically reserved for it by name. On the other hand, it has a substantial participation of 35 members which may be considered to be adequately representative of all the non-nuclear-weapon States. In addition, as I have said before -- but I think it does no harm to say so again -- the General Assembly of the United Nations itself has solemnly declared the Committee to be "the" multilateral forum for negotiations on disarmament. It seems obvious, therefore, that it would be difficult to find a more suitable organ than this one to deal with a matter which, as has been emphasized in many international documents, is of "vital" importance for all peoples.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

(2) Another aspect on which we hold the same view as the States sponsoring the working document of which I am speaking is that the nuclear-weapon States cannot all be placed on the same footing or treated in the same way. As their spokesman stated very aptly, "the levels of the arsenals of the individual nuclear Powers are not the same, however, and it would be wrong to turn a blind eye to this".

(3) We are likewise fully in agreement with the statement made in this forum by the spokesman to whom I have just referred concerning the need "both at the negotiations and in the implementation of concrete measures, strictly to respect the principle of the inviolability of the security of States".

(4) We believe, similarly, that the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament which are taking place in this Committee should not preclude the possibility of conducting bilateral negotiations provided, we would add, that the Committee is kept duly informed of the progress and results of such negotiations.

(5) We find the approach which, we understand, is advocated by the socialist States to be very judicious, namely the avoidance of any undue haste, in conformity with the wise Latin saying festina lente or "make haste slowly", which will mean, as their spokesman explained, that "by way of preparation, consultations should be conducted within the framework of our Committee to determine the set of questions to be considered and decided, and to reach agreement on organizational aspects of the conduct of the negotiations".

In the light of the various comments which have been heard in this forum on the socialist proposals, it would appear that the two main criticisms to which they have given rise are the following:

(1) They do not take sufficient account of the provision in paragraph 29 of the Final Document that the adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such a manner as to ensure that "no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage"; and

(2) The proposals do not recognize the primary role which ought to be played by the measures of verification and control, and do not concern themselves with the practical possibilities for their application.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

I do not think that this is the right time for trying to determine whether or not these are valid criticisms. We would venture to suggest that for that purpose, when the second part of our current session opens next June, we might take as our point of departure the provisions of paragraphs 49 and 50 of the Final Document which, it will be recalled, are drafted in these terms:

"The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

"The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(c) A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

Consideration can be given in the course of the negotiations to mutual and agreed limitation or prohibition, without prejudice to the security of any State, of any types of nuclear armaments."

The provisions in the paragraphs which I have just quoted and which, as we all know, were adopted by consensus, might provide us with a sound basis for constructive consultations and negotiations. The proposals by the socialist States might be compared with those paragraphs in order to determine in which respects they are in full agreement with them and in which respects and to what extent they differ from them.

We believe that this may be a suitable procedure if, as we venture to hope, it is genuinely desired that the Committee on Disarmament should fulfil its duty concerning what has been said and repeated over and over again, that the disarmament which should have top priority is nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

There may be many other possible approaches for considering the proposals in working paper CD/4, and the same might be said about the General Assembly's recommendations in its resolution 33/91 H aiming at the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, but what my delegation would find unthinkable is that an attempt might be made merely to shelve them, especially if it is remembered that in the coming twelve months we shall have to begin working out a comprehensive disarmament programme designed, as stated in paragraph 10 of the decalogue already adopted "to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control", in which nuclear disarmament will unquestionably figure prominently.

Surely, it cannot have been in vain that the special General Assembly devoted to disarmament unanimously adopted statements as categorical and forceful as that in paragraph 42 of the Final Document in which Member States "declare that they will respect the objectives and principles stated above" and that they will "make every effort faithfully to carry out the Programme of Action", and that appearing at the end of paragraph 17 of the same document, which reads as follows:

"The pressing need now is to translate into practical terms the provisions of this Final Document and to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament."

My delegation refuses to believe that, having proclaimed such truths urbi et orbi, we might be reluctant to deal with nuclear weapons, whose mere existence threatens, as the Assembly said "the very survival of mankind" and the accumulation of which — to quote again from the Final Document — "today constitutes much more of a threat than a protection for the future" of mankind.

Mr. THOMSON (Australia): I would also like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for conveying to the Swedish delegation the profound condolences of my delegation, among other members of the Committee, to Mrs. Thorsson in her time of sorrow.

In resolution A/33/91H, the United Nations General Assembly in 1978 requested the Committee on Disarmament "to consider urgently the question of an adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices".

The Australian delegation believes that the Committee on Disarmament could not claim to have really begun consideration of "cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" unless it also drew attention to the need for an adequately verified international convention on "the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes" as a necessary and inevitable preliminary step.

(Mr. Thomson, Australia)

In his statement at the Special Session on Disarmament on 5 June 1978, the Australian Prime Minister pointed to the need for an international agreement to halt the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and suggested that this agreement should be the subject of early discussion among nuclear weapon States and included in the Programme of Action of the Final Document. It was included. Paragraph 50 of the Final Document states:

"The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapon systems;

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(c) A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time."

More recently, this same point was taken up in this Committee by the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Peacock, in his opening statement on 27 January 1979.

"... As part of the effort to enhance further the restraints on both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Committee could profitably turn its attention to the proposal for an agreement halting the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons purposes. Such an agreement would be a further barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries by preventing the development of untested nuclear weapons. It would also place a limit on the quantity of fissionable material available to the nuclear-weapon States for weapons production and thus be an effective measure towards scaling down the nuclear arms race.

Australia does not underestimate the difficulties of implementing and verifying an international agreement of this kind. We acknowledge that it would involve the development of an adequate system of full-scope safeguards accepted by both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States."

(Mr. Thomson, Australia)

The Australian delegation does not believe that the Committee on Disarmament can undertake any serious consideration of item 2 of the 1979 agenda -- "cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" -- without examining the possibility of an international convention halting the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons purposes. The Australian delegation considers that "the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament" can only take place as the result of a step-by-step process of negotiation. It is quite unrealistic to consider the final goal of the Committee's work -- cessation of the nuclear-arms race and disarmament -- without first considering the means by which this goal is to be achieved. Such a step-by-step process would include a number of very important elements:

- a continuing pattern of bilateral limitation and reduction of nuclear arsenals by the super Powers under the umbrella of SALT
- a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty
- the strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and
- as an intrinsic aspect of controls on both horizontal and vertical proliferation, an international treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons purposes.

The Australian delegation is under no illusions concerning the sensitivity and complexity of an international convention to halt the production of fissionable material for nuclear-weapon purposes. Such a convention would clearly involve the development of a comprehensive system of full-scope safeguards to be administered by the IAEA, and the application of such a safeguards regime to all peaceful nuclear facilities in both non-nuclear weapon States and nuclear-weapon States. It would also entail the conversion to peaceful purposes or closing down of all military enrichment and reprocessing plants in nuclear-weapon States, together with adequate verification measures.

Verification procedures would be an integral part of such an international convention. The leader of the United Kingdom delegation at the opening meeting of this Committee, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, drew the Committee's attention to this aspect when he pointed out that an agreement prohibiting the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes would require stringent inspection to ensure that States were not producing or diverting such materials for nuclear weapons. In this context, the Australian delegation particularly welcomes the intention of Canada, announced by Mr. G.A.H. Pearson during the inaugural meetings of the Committee on Disarmament, to explore various aspects and methods of verification, and we look forward to seeing the papers relating to these issues which Canada hopes to table here at an appropriate stage.

(Mr. Thomson, Australia)

My delegation is not recommending that, in the context of item 2 of the 1979 agenda, the Committee on Disarmament should immediately begin negotiating an international convention to prohibit the production of fissionable material for nuclear-weapons purposes. We concede that, before the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test-Ban agreement and further progress in the SALT process, such an attempt would be premature. What we do recommend is that, if the Committee is to give adequate consideration to agenda item 2, it must examine the measures through which the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament are to be achieved. A convention prohibiting the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes would be a significant practical measure towards this end.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, may I take this opportunity of my first intervention in a plenary meeting of the Committee since relinquishing the Chair, to express my warmest congratulations to you in assuming what I know personally to be the onerous responsibilities of the Chair. We all recognize Belgium's significant contributions in the field of disarmament and arms control, and I believe that it is fitting that a Belgian representative should have presided over the Committee in the adoption of its first agenda and programme of work.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for his statement.

I would also like to say to Ambassador Thomson that I appreciate his kind words about my country and myself.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): First of all I should like to associate myself with the preceding speakers who have expressed their sympathy and condolences to Mrs. Thorsson on the bereavement she has suffered.

Today our Committee is turning to its programme of work; this is an important occasion, since it gives us an opportunity to assess what has been accomplished so far and to think about what we can contribute in the few days left before the closure of this first part of our annual session.

We have spent almost three months on the drafting of our rules of procedure and the adoption of our agenda and programme of work. These discussions seemed long and we were often tempted to think that it would have been preferable to begin to deal with substantive questions sooner. However, the weeks we have devoted to this preparatory phase have not been wasted. The serious tone of our discussions, their detailed nature and sometimes even the difficulties encountered have shown

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the desire of all participants to create on a firm basis the conditions and framework for our future work, taking full account of the Committee's essential assignment as a negotiating body.

For practical reasons, which are bound up with the constraints of the timetable, we have chosen two agenda items for our programme of work -- chemical weapons, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament -- with no illusions as to our limitations.

First of all, time and circumstances allow us to deal with these two questions in only a partial, preliminary and, as it were, exploratory fashion. Moreover, these questions are not the same in terms of the contribution that our Committee can make.

Chemical weapons have been the subject of many studies and of very elaborate proposals, particularly in the body that preceded this one. Specific proposals have been submitted at this session of the Committee. In short, this question is one that is ripe for discussion, and the General Assembly has asked the Committee to take it up at its first session.

The question is then -- as everyone here realizes -- whether such a negotiation, which is regarded as desirable and a matter of priority from the point of view of this Committee's function, should be postponed any further and, as it were, left in cold storage pending the outcome of the joint initiative announced in 1974 by two of the Member States.

We are not, of course, doubting the firm desire to make progress and the extreme seriousness with which these two friendly countries have continued their efforts to fulfil their self-imposed task.

However, the two negotiating parties should also realize that this bilateral undertaking cannot indefinitely pre-empt all multilateral discussions on the question and thus suspend the Committee's competence in the matter.

This is why the French delegation has received with interest the various contributions submitted at this session by several members of this Committee with the object of organizing the discussions and guiding them to concrete negotiations.

In this context, it also welcomed the recent initiatives taken by the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany with a view to organizing seminars on certain aspects of the verification problems linked with such

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negotiations. These exercises were themselves most instructive and will therefore be useful for future discussions on the substance of a convention. The exchange of views in this Committee next week on the conclusions that can be drawn from these visits should, therefore, be regarded as a preface to the more searching discussions on the negotiation of a convention on chemical weapons that are to take place when we resume our work in June.

The nuclear issue is quite different, and the specific proposal submitted to us by the delegations of several socialist countries itself reflects this difference, in that it is concerned not with the substance of the problem but with the modalities of negotiation, with "negotiation about a negotiation". The question is under what conditions the negotiation might start, and whether these conditions are fulfilled.

This brings us to a brief review of the features that now characterize the nuclear problem.

My country's views on the subject were stated by the President of the French Republic, in his address to the General Assembly at its special session, and by our Minister for Foreign Affairs when he addressed this Committee. What I am about to say reflects largely their statements.

The first of these features, and one that is fully recognized by the sponsors of document CD/4, is the vastness and complexity of the problem.

The problem has been with us for a third of a century. Owing to the stockpiling of weapons and their growing sophistication, and to the diversity of strategic situations, the problem has become a good deal more difficult. The consequence is that approaches differ, as we saw once again during the discussions at the special session. The actual terms of the Final Document are testimony of the complexity and diversity of the factors to be taken into account.

At the same time, it is common knowledge that in the vast area that stretches over most of the northern hemisphere the nuclear weapon has become an integral part of the over-all military balance. The generous but unrealistic attempt to ensure security through the abolition of the nuclear weapon alone, regardless of the broader political and military context, would compromise this balance and so jeopardize security.

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That being so, the size and constant technical improvement of the arsenals at the disposal of the two principal nuclear Powers are at the heart of the problem. And because they have recognized this fundamental reality and the dangers it implies, these two Powers, by dint of efforts which we have acknowledged, have developed their own approach. My country welcomed this, while realizing that the results in terms of effective reductions of nuclear armaments will materialize only in stages and after long and complex negotiations.

Against such a background, what might be France's possible contribution? Our answer is unequivocal. If, as a result of substantial reductions in these arsenals, the disproportion between the nuclear forces of these Powers and the force that we intend to maintain to guarantee security and ensure the credibility of our deterrent should change radically, we might consider drawing the appropriate conclusions.

We know that, as things stand at present, nuclear weapons cannot be isolated from the general process of disarmament, which must take account of all military resources, the diversity of regional situations and the right of all to security.

Last year, when the General Assembly considered the recommendations adopted at the special session, it drew a most relevant conclusion by recommending that the agenda of the Disarmament Commission should include, in addition to the priority consideration of the constituent parts of a global disarmament programme, the consideration of various aspects of the arms race, and in particular nuclear disarmament.

Under these circumstances, is it desirable for our Committee, whose real *raison d'être* is negotiation, to carry on a discussion that will normally take place in the Disarmament Commission, whose deliberative function has been affirmed by the Assembly? It is in the light of that discussion in the Commission that it might appear advisable for this Committee to take up, at the appropriate time and under the appropriate circumstances, the one or other aspect of the problem we are discussing.

Mr. BENSMAIL (Algeria) (translated from French): As this is the first time I am taking the floor under your chairmanship, I should like first of all to express my satisfaction at seeing you occupy this high office at a crucial stage of our Committee's work and to wish you every success in your task. I should also like to take this occasion to express once more to your predecessor, Ambassador Thomson of Australia, my appreciation of the patience and perseverance which he displayed throughout the laborious and intensive negotiations that led to the adoption of the Disarmament Committee's agenda.

Allow me, Mr. Chairman, also to express to the Yugoslav delegation the deep grief and sympathy we feel with regard to the tragic events that have just taken place in Yugoslavia.

I would also like to ask the Swedish delegation to transmit our sincere condolences to Mrs. Thorsson on her recent bereavement.

The Disarmament Committee will have devoted practically the entire first part of its annual session to the examination and adoption of its rules of procedure and its agenda. This betokens the importance which all Member States attach to the elaboration of a set of rules to govern the Committee's work and to the adoption of a general framework for its activities and of an agenda listing the matters selected for consideration during this year. It is also a token of the general interest shown in our Committee's work by all its member States after the democratization of all organs dealing with disarmament since the holding of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The Disarmament Committee has decided to devote the few days remaining at its disposal before the end of the first part of its session to the consideration of two important issues, namely: chemical weapons and nuclear disarmament.

We are pleased that the Committee has chosen the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament as a topic for reflection. The priority nature of this issue was duly recognized in the Final Document of the tenth special session and we feel bound to express our gratitude to the delegations of the States of Eastern Europe for having taken the initiative of submitting for our Committee's consideration a document concerning negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles

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until they have been completely destroyed. Owing to the constant enlargement and sophistication of nuclear arsenals this problem is becoming more and more urgent, for, as the United Nations General Assembly emphasized in the Final Document of its special session, on disarmament, existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth. It is therefore more than ever necessary to avert forever the risk of a war involving the use of nuclear weapons, to halt the nuclear arms race and to proceed to the implementation of concrete measures of nuclear disarmament. The goal of ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed will, of course, be difficult to achieve all at once. This is why appropriate measures, such as the cessation of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and gradual reduction of the accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, should be implemented by stages. It goes without saying that all these measures will necessitate the elaboration of mutually acceptable verification measures. The initiative of a group of socialist States therefore deserves special attention on the part of members of our Committee, which should show itself to be capable of fully playing its role as a multilateral organ for negotiating disarmament measures.

Among the other items on the agenda for this year there is one matter to which my Government attaches special importance.

I refer to the preparation of an international convention on guarantees to be given to non-nuclear States. In this connexion we wish to reaffirm that non-nuclear-weapon States, and particularly the non-aligned countries which deliberately hold themselves aloof from the military alliances formed round the principal nuclear Powers, are entitled, since they have of their own accord forsworn the acquisition of nuclear weapons, to formulate demands with regard to the establishment of an adequate system of security guarantees.

At its special session the United Nations General Assembly recognized that nuclear-weapon States should take measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, while noting the unilateral declarations made by certain nuclear Powers at that special session,

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the General Assembly urgently requested them to make "effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States". Algeria has always maintained that such assurances should be given in a multilateral context and should have legal force. Furthermore, at its thirty-third regular session the General Assembly adopted two resolutions submitted by the USSR and Pakistan, respectively. Although different in certain respects, both resolutions have the same objective, that of ensuring on an international scale that guarantees which are effective and have legal force are given to non-nuclear-weapon States. Under the terms of those two resolutions, our Committee is requested to consider the draft conventions submitted by Pakistan and the USSR and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session. My delegation is grateful to the delegation of Pakistan for submitting document CD/10, which constitutes a sound basis for commencing discussions on this issue, and will comment upon the document when it is considered by the Committee during the second part of the session.

According to the programme of work we have adopted, we shall have to deal with the question of chemical weapons -- universally recognized as a priority issue, for in the Final Document adopted by the tenth special session the General Assembly itself affirmed that "The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently, the conclusion of a convention to this end, on which negotiations have been going on for several years, is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations". The General Assembly's concern was not exhausted by this affirmation, since in its resolution 33/59 A, adopted by consensus at the thirty-third session, it expressly requested the Committee on Disarmament to undertake, at the beginning of its 1979 session, negotiations with a view to elaborating an agreement on the prohibition and destruction of all chemical weapons. Hence the priority status of this issue cannot be challenged,

My delegation shares the disappointment of many other delegations at the absence of progress in the consideration of the question of chemical weapons within the principal international negotiating forum. Yet, since 1972, there has been no shortage of initiatives, for three draft conventions on chemical weapons have been presented in the CCD by the socialist countries, Japan, and the United Kingdom.

(Mr. Bensmail, Algeria)

In addition, in 1974 the United States and the Soviet Union announced their intention to present to the CCD a joint initiative on the subject, and since 1976 these two States have held bilateral talks for this purpose. Lastly, a substantial amount of work was accomplished in the CCD with regard to the chemical weapons question, and a group of non-aligned and neutral countries members of the CCD stated their position in that respect in working paper CCD/400.

The Group of 21 recently took a further step in the desired direction by submitting to the Disarmament Committee document CD/11 of 9 April 1979. The object of this initiative is to set in motion the process of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction by the establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group, open to the participation of all States members of the Committee, with a view to elaborating a draft convention on that question. In discharging its responsibility the Ad Hoc Working Group would have as a basic text for its work the proposals and working papers on a convention on chemical weapons presented to the Committee and its predecessor. As regards the bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Ad Hoc Working Group should be kept fully informed of their progress and a report indicating areas in which agreement has been reached as well as issues which are still outstanding should be submitted to the Committee as soon as possible. In my delegation's view, negotiations in the Committee do not have to be preceded by the conclusion of the bilateral talks; it considers, on the contrary, that they may proceed parallel with the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The principal task of the Ad Hoc Working Group whose establishment we are proposing will be to identify areas of agreement and possible new elements of importance for the formulation of the scope and verification of a chemical weapons convention. We hope, therefore, that the Committee will give all due attention to the proposal submitted by the Group of 21 and that it will entrust to the Ad Hoc Working Group the task of elaborating a draft convention on chemical weapons, thus demonstrating the importance to be attached to the General Assembly's recommendations.

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The slowness which has characterized the progress of our work to date has perhaps been necessary. Efforts to achieve disarmament have had to be resumed in a new, more democratic, more representative setting and in the fresh spirit infused by the tenth special session. Now that the general structure of our activities has been defined with all necessary care we should, with equal care, get down to the real work of negotiating disarmament measures. The spirit of dialogue and understanding which we have witnessed in our Committee so far leads us to believe that the task entrusted to us is not an impossible one and that we shall succeed in fulfilling the international community's expectations.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Algeria for his statement, and for his appreciative words about myself and my predecessor, Ambassador Thomson.

Mr. MARKER (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, my delegation would also like to thank you for associating it with the condolences which you have so eloquently expressed to Mrs. Thorsson on her sad bereavement.

Permit me to associate my delegation with the several other delegations which have already expressed their congratulations to you on your assumption of the Chairmanship of the Committee. The substantial progress that we have achieved under your guidance is both a tribute to your skill and an assurance of success in the remaining sessions of this Committee. At the same time, I should like to place on record the deep admiration felt by my delegation for the skill and patience with which your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Thomson of Australia, brought to a successful conclusion the complicated and important task to which the Committee addressed itself last month. Perhaps distinguished members of the Committee are not aware of the fact that during Ambassador Thomson's tenure, Pakistan and Australia were locked in bloody battles on the cricket fields of Melbourne and Perth, and I can pay no greater tribute to Ambassador Thomson's impartiality and equanimity as Chairman than to report that he was neither rough with my delegation when Pakistan won the first match nor indulgent when we lost the second.

The Pakistan delegation is most gratified that the Committee on Disarmament has finally concluded its consideration of organizational matters and has today initiated substantive examination of the item on the "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". My purpose today is not to speak directly to this item since I have had a previous opportunity in the Committee to express my

(Mr. Marker, Pakistan)

country's views on the question of nuclear disarmament and on the proposal presented by the socialist countries in document CD/4. Today, the Pakistan delegation would like to introduce the paper it has submitted on the question of security assurances to non-nuclear countries against the nuclear threat, contained in document CD/10, and to make some observations on items related to the subject.

The question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States has been on the disarmament agenda for more than a decade. Despite this, and despite the numerous proposals submitted by the non-nuclear-weapon States, in various forums, no effective and concrete solution has been evolved so far to provide credible assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States against exposure to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

But there have been encouraging developments. Resolution 31/189-C of the General Assembly, which was reaffirmed a year later at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, has by overwhelming majorities, endorsed a specific formula for the kind of security assurances to be provided by the nuclear Powers to the non-nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, at the tenth special session, the unilateral declarations of some of the nuclear Powers were clearly serious attempts to respond to the pre-occupations of the non-nuclear States. But, with one exception, these declarations were not considered as sufficiently credible by the non-nuclear-weapon States. Therefore, in paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Special Session, the nuclear Powers were called on to conclude -- and I repeat, to conclude -- effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan believes that such "effective arrangements" to assure non-nuclear-weapon States can best be provided in an international instrument with binding legal effect. The question of security assurances is not bilateral in its scope and effect; it has global implications impinging on the security of all States. Secondly, to be at all credible, such assurances must be extended in legally binding form. Any other modality would fall short of the test of credibility. Unilateral declarations, however positive they may sound, are statements of governmental policy, and, as I have said before, policies, like Governments, are apt to change. Such unilateral declarations are even less satisfactory when they are hedged by various reservations and limitations.

We are gratified that this point of view is endorsed by the Soviet Union, which already took a concrete initiative for the adoption of an international convention

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on the subject of security guarantees at the last session of the General Assembly. The two resolutions on this subject adopted by the General Assembly, resolution 33/72 A and resolution 33/72 B, while confirming the decision of the special session, have called upon this Committee to consider the draft conventions circulated by Pakistan and the Soviet Union in the General Assembly together with other proposals and suggestions designed to achieve the same objective of providing non-nuclear-weapon States with effective assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The paper circulated as document CD/10 reflects Pakistan's current thinking on the subject of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. The draft convention annexed to this document is identical to the one circulated by Pakistan at the last General Assembly. The main features of its preamble and seven articles are: first, it starts from the premise that the best assurances of security against the nuclear threat is the total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the achievement of nuclear disarmament; secondly, that the extension of legal and international assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States is an obligation on the nuclear Powers arising from their claim, at least for the time being, to retain nuclear weapons, and thirdly, that the existence of the opposing global alliance systems under which the option to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States is kept open, must not form an insuperable obstacle to the extension of security assurances to those non-nuclear States which are not parties to these alliances. The Pakistan delegation believes that this draft Convention not only reflects the aspirations of the non-nuclear-weapon States to enhance their security against the nuclear menace but also deals in a balanced and realistic manner with the problem of reconciling the existence of nuclear armaments and the need to make a first move towards the prohibition of their use. It, therefore, provides a sound basis on which to begin negotiations on the question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

The Pakistan delegation is very much encouraged by the unanimous inclusion on the agenda of the Committee for 1979 of the item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". The very formulation of the item upholds the view, which is shared by the vast majority of the membership of this Committee and of the General Assembly, that a binding international instrument should be negotiated on this subject. My delegation is, therefore, prepared to consider all ideas and proposals on the subject, and to enter into negotiations with other delegations, especially the delegation of the Soviet Union, in the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Marker, Pakistan)

We believe that the consideration of this subject in our Committee should begin on the basis of the agreement reached at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, i.e. in paragraph 59 of the Final Document, as supplemented by the two resolutions of the thirty-third General Assembly session. Therefore, our deliberations and subsequent negotiations could usefully focus on two points: firstly, the scope and nature of the guarantee to be provided to the non-nuclear-weapon States, and secondly, the precise "effective" and "international" form in which it could be extended. My delegation would suggest that the Committee should begin its consideration of these points in a general debate for a week or two, when it reconvenes in June. Thereafter, an ad hoc working group, or some other informal mechanism could be set up to begin consideration of specific approaches and concrete texts proposed on this subject.

I should now like to make a few observations on the related subject of nuclear non-proliferation. My delegation has followed with the greatest interest the statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of India before this Committee on 3 April 1979. At the outset, I wish to emphasize that my delegation's reply to Ambassador Garekhan's remarks are not in any way intended to be polemical but, on the contrary, is a response and a continuation of what is already beginning to constitute a sober and serious dialogue, worthy of the dignity of this Committee and the important purpose for which it was constituted. It is, therefore, the hope of my delegation that the debate will continue to be guided by these objectives and that it will attract the interest and participation of other delegations.

There are many points in the statement made by Ambassador Garekhan which I can endorse. Pakistan agrees that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons involves both the reversal of the nuclear-arms race and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. But we would desist from drawing the rather drastic, if not purposeless, conclusion that unless nuclear disarmament is instantaneously and universally achieved, nothing can or should be done to check the spread of nuclear weapons. Indeed, further pursuits of such a line of argument could render infructuous almost all the work of our Committee. Secondly, Pakistan also endorses, and will continue to uphold staunchly, the principles contained in the Final Document for the exercise of the inalienable right of all countries freely to develop and acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. As is perhaps known to the distinguished

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members of the Committee, Pakistan was the first to propose the adoption of these principles at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly. Thirdly, we also subscribe to the concept, contained in the Final Document, that international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities should be applied through the IAEA on a non-discriminatory basis. The primary danger of proliferation today arises from the selective application or non-application of safeguards.

My delegation has noted with gratification that the statement of Ambassador Garekhan contained a reiteration of pledge of the distinguished Prime Minister of India not to manufacture nuclear weapons. My Government has already expressed appreciation of this statement, but unilateral declarations, no matter how solemnly they may be made, cannot form a credible basis for a non-proliferation policy, either at the international or at the regional level. Such commitments must be undertaken in a legally binding and verifiable form. Pakistan is prepared to give such commitments simultaneously with India. For this purpose, Pakistan has suggested that India and Pakistan accept international or bilateral inspection of their nuclear facilities on a reciprocal basis; or that both simultaneously accept the application of full-scope safeguards to all their nuclear activities, or that both jointly ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We would be most happy if India would respond positively to any of these initiatives and suggestions.

My delegation makes no apology for once again bringing to the notice of this Committee in general and of the distinguished Indian delegation in particular the request that it should seriously consider the proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, we feel, provides the best means of assuring against nuclear proliferation at the present time. This regional concept possesses none of the discriminatory features of international non-proliferation efforts and treats each participating State equally and without distinction.

I am aware that Ambassador Garekhan, in his statement, expressed doubts on whether the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was a disarmament measure, since it does not involve the actual dismantling of any nuclear weapons. I would submit, with respect, that while the value of the argument is doubtful even in semantic terms, it possesses for our Committee implications of serious consequence, for it attempts to remove from the purview of our consideration one of the most

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effective instruments and methods of nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, as we understand it, the SALT II accord may also not entail any actual dismantling of nuclear weapons; yet surely, no one doubts the importance of this accord for the objective of disarmament. Nor can we exclude the consideration of nuclear-weapon-free zones in this Committee merely because they have been the subject of a prior study by the previous negotiating body. Chemical weapons too have been the subject of numerous studies. No-one can seriously argue thereby that chemical weapons should not be considered in this Committee.

It is obvious that for the effective as well as juridical creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the voluntary consent and participation of all the significant regional States is necessary. But in our view, the absence of prior unanimity among all the States in a region does not preclude the international community from examining and encouraging the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Indeed, it is incumbent upon us to take note of the reality of the dangers of proliferation as they exist today, especially in such regions as Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. Should the African countries give up their endeavour to keep their continent free of nuclear weapons merely because South Africa entertains nuclear ambitions? Or should the intransigence of Israel constitute a veto on the search for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East?

In South Asia, the danger is perhaps even more acute, especially as the region has already witnessed and felt the impact of a nuclear explosion. I would submit, therefore, that it is not the "persistent efforts" made for the creation of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia which should give rise to doubts, but it is rather the persistent opposition to the universally endorsed imperative of preventing the spread of nuclear armaments, that constitute matters of so much concern.

My delegation was surprised to note the remark of Ambassador Garekhan that it is not for this Committee or for the United Nations to impose negotiations for a nuclear-weapon-free zone. I may mention in passing that in the case of the African and Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zones, a role has been envisaged for the Security Council. But in the case of South Asia, there is, in our view, no question of imposition, because a nuclear-weapon-free zone will fit precisely into the unilaterally declared intentions of all the States in the region. As you are aware, the leaders of all the States in the region have unequivocally declared

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their intention not to produce nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia would accordingly provide a regional and binding instrument to give collective expression to these policies.

Therefore, it remains our hope that the Government of India will reconsider its position on the proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. At the very least, we hope that India will respond positively to the proposal recently made by the President of Pakistan to the Prime Minister of India that the countries of South Asia adopt a joint declaration, having international status and a binding character, which would renounce the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

The goal of nuclear non-proliferation can be achieved through a global response, promoted within the United Nations on the basis of universality, non-discrimination and the sovereign equality of States. To approach the problem on a subjective or selective basis and to apply different standards to different States, to submit to expediency rather than principle, will promote regional imbalances, imperil peace and security in many regions of the world and thereby subvert the goal of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. In this context my delegation takes an extremely serious view of the discriminatory practice of some major Powers in their treatment of various non-nuclear weapon States. It seems incomprehensible to us that a country which has exploded a nuclear device, possesses a clear capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, and has rejected the application of international safeguards to its nuclear fuel cycle facilities, including plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment plants, continues to receive nuclear and other form of assistance; whilst on the other hand, a country which has subjected its nuclear facilities to international inspection, and has expressed its willingness to extend concrete mutual pledges for non-proliferation, is to be denied even economic development assistance. It is heartening to note some reassuring signs that public opinion is not unappreciative of this vital aspect and the imperative of adopting a non-discriminatory approach to deal with the issue of non-proliferation in South Asia. Pakistan, for its part, has offered many alternative ways and means of ensuring against the spread of nuclear weapons in South Asia and we would be happy to receive a positive response to these initiatives.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for his statement and for his kind words about me and my predecessor, Ambassador Thomson.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I would first like to express the thanks of the delegation of the United States to you for conveying, on behalf of all of us, your expressions of condolence to Mme Thorsson in her recent sad bereavement. We, of course, want to do this in our own right as well, as we all feel the burden of it.

Today marks the very first day that this Committee will officially devote to the subject of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. This is not a new concern for the nations of the world. Indeed, our distinguished colleague from Nigeria reminded us on 10 April that the first resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, a resolution which was adopted by consensus, urged the elimination of atomic weapons from national arsenals. This objective has been restated and reaffirmed by leaders of all States in many fora, and the United States, for its part, is well aware of the special responsibility carried by the major nuclear-weapon States for nuclear disarmament. The experience of the last decade, however, demonstrates that reaching agreement on ultimate objectives is a far simpler task than negotiating the accords which in fact will bring us closer to those objectives.

Too often our statements of ultimate objectives, with which we all agree, have been interpreted as predictions that these objectives can be obtained in the immediate future. When this fails to happen, we all share a sense of disappointment. For some, this disappointment is perhaps tinged with suspicion about the motives of the negotiating parties.

It is in this context that the United States delegation would refer to the process which, it is hoped, will soon lead to the second agreement generally referred to as SALT II, a comprehensive agreement on limiting strategic offensive nuclear arms.

SALT II has provided an excellent example of the inherent difficulties in nuclear-arms control and how by patient, painstaking work, these difficulties can be overcome. In the United States and elsewhere, it has been attacked by some because of the limits it will impose. SALT II has been criticized by others because the limits and constraints it will impose are deemed insufficient, not worth the effort it has taken to achieve what has been accomplished thus far. Still others have belittled the agreement, asserting that technological advances have rendered its provisions irrelevant. One might comment that an agreement with such a variety of distinguished critics cannot be all bad. I wish to speak to each of these criticisms, and in the process of doing this, to provide some insights into United States perceptions and objectives regarding nuclear-arms control.

(Mr. Fisher, United States of America)

The SALT negotiations symbolize the recognition by the United States and the Soviet Union that unrestrained nuclear-arms competition carries with it the danger of increased risk of nuclear holocaust. It recognizes also the technological revolution created by nuclear weapons. In the pre-nuclear era, the military forces of a country -- whether regarded as offensive or defensive -- served not only to deter attack, but if deterrence failed, to defend the homeland. Today; it is difficult to envisage the results of an exchange of nuclear weapons. We know that it would be an unprecedented catastrophe for mankind, and many have asked the question: "Would the survivors envy the dead?" Deterrence of nuclear war has thus become the foremost national security objective of the United States.

To make our deterrent credible, and to ensure that others do not derive political advantages from perceived disparities in military forces, the United States has established essential equivalence in strategic forces as a second objective. We speak of essential equivalence because we realize that the strategic forces of our country and of the Soviet Union will never be absolutely identical. Each has developed its own forces in a different geographic, political, historical and technological environment. Each side has advantages in certain areas which are offset by advantages of the other side in different areas. Thus, when examined using only one type of static criteria, the disparity between the two forces may appear markedly different when one looks at the entire picture. Nevertheless, the concerns of those who worry about possible imbalances between the two forces are real and are an undeniable factor in the problem of achieving a SALT agreement.

I should now like to speak to the criticisms of those who think the limits contained in SALT II are inadequate. Many have reminded us of the remarks made by President Carter on 7 October 1977, at the United Nations: "The United States is willing to go as far as possible, consistent with our security interests, in limiting and reducing nuclear weapons. On a reciprocal basis we are willing now to reduce them by 10 per cent, by 20 per cent, even by 50 per cent. Then we will work for further reductions to a world truly free of nuclear weapons." I should like to recall that the United States expressed its willingness in March 1977 to accept reductions greater than those we expect to be incorporated in SALT II.

Specifically we proposed, among other things, at that time that:

-- the authorized number of strategic delivery vehicles (heavy bombers, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers) drop from 2,400 down to 1,800-2,000;

-- the authorized MIRV launchers be reduced from 1,320 to 1,100-1,200;

-- the authorized number of MIRV launchers of ICBMs, not limited in the Vladivostok understandings, be restricted to no more than 550;

-- modifications to existing ICBMs be prohibited and the introduction of new ones be banned.

(Mr. Fisher, United States of America)

When we compare these specific United States proposals to the proposed Vladivostok limits and to the emerging SALT II accord, we find that progress was not as great as we had wished, but that it was nevertheless real. Was this degree of progress worth the effort? I think the answer is clearly yes, and when we think of SALT as a process which will not end with SALT II, the answer must be yes.

Finally, I wish to speak to the concerns of those who fear that technological advances will render meaningless the quantitative limits imposed under SALT II. I would begin by noting that the danger to an arms control regime posed by technological advance can be severe. Those of us who remember the naval limitations of the 1920s also remember that the aircraft carrier dealt more effectively with the capital ship than any arms control agreement could have done. On the ground and in the air, the internal combustion engine combined with wireless communications, accomplished a revolution in military strategy and tactics in only two decades. The United States is aware of the dangers posed by technological advances. Last year, for example, we had proposed that SALT II prohibit modifications to existing ICBMs and bar the introductions of new ones. While this particular aspect of the United States position did not prove negotiable in its entirety, the SALT II agreement will, in fact contain very significant qualitative restraints. It will establish restrictions on the degree to which the two parties will be permitted to exploit technological advances to load additional warheads on a given type of missile, whether ICBM or SLBM. Further, it will allow each side to develop only one new type of ICBM. Each of these constraints is significant in itself. Together, they constitute an important contribution to strategic stability and to slowing the qualitative arms race. Moreover, the United States hopes these qualitative restraints will act to strengthen the significance of the quantitative limits in SALT.

My remarks today have been limited and, I trust, reasonably brief. I have offered no new sweeping proposals. I have spoken to only a few aspects of the SALT negotiations. I have left for a future date observations regarding other essential steps toward nuclear disarmament such as a comprehensive test ban, and SALT III. And if I have disappointed some, I trust I have misled none. The process of nuclear disarmament is and will remain difficult. It is perhaps all too easy to underestimate these difficulties. Therefore, I would conclude my remarks today with one request addressed to each representative here.

Before making any judgments as to how to proceed toward nuclear disarmament, before becoming committed to sweeping schemes which articulate desirable objectives without addressing the hard, practical problems that must be faced, I ask you to

(Mr. Fisher, United States of America)

reflect on the considerations I have just outlined. At the same time I would ask you to recognize that a process is at work, and that, as imperfect as it may be, the process leading to SALT II and to further agreements can result in achievements of major importance and, even more significantly, can lay the foundation for practical and rational progress toward the goal all of us share -- complete nuclear disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Before giving the floor to the next speaker, I would like to mention that I still have five speakers on my list, and it will obviously not be possible to hear them all before 1 p.m.

May I suggest therefore that we hear the next speaker, Ambassador Fein, and then break off and resume this afternoon.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): Mr. Chairman, we are grateful to you for having conveyed, through Ambassador Lidgard, our condolences to Mrs. Thorsson, with which we are most sincerely associated. Sir, since this is the first time that I take the floor in a formal meeting of our Committee this month, may I therefore express to you, Ambassador Noterdaeme, my greatest personal and official satisfaction at seeing you, a most worthy representative of your country, with which my own is closely related in so many respects, occupying the presidency of this Committee. You have our warmest wishes for success in the difficult task that the presidency entails. We also have a debt of gratitude to Ambassador Thomson of Australia for his tremendous and successful efforts as your predecessor. I also take pleasure in welcoming in our midst the new representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, and the representative of Zaire, Ambassador Kamanda wa Kamanda.

Today I wish to make a few, preliminary, remarks concerning nuclear disarmament on which subject we have agreed to concentrate during this period of our session.

Of course, these remarks are not preliminary in the sense that my Government has not already made known its views concerning nuclear disarmament on previous occasions. My remarks are preliminary in the sense of our Committee now starting to deal with this subject under agenda item 2.

I intend to discuss very briefly working document CD/4, presented by a number of members of this Committee, but I also intend to make some additional comments. It is evident that not all aspects of this highly complicated matter can be dealt with in detail because of the regrettably short time available to prepare this part of the session of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

First of all, my delegation does not consider that it is beyond the scope of this Committee to deal with matters related to halting the nuclear-arms race and to work for nuclear disarmament. Indeed, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament developed several treaties dealing with different aspects of the nuclear arms race and we hope to conclude in the near future a treaty banning all nuclear-weapons tests. However, as I said in my first statement this year (CD/PV.6), we must carefully select which questions can better be discussed bilaterally, which regionally and which in a world-wide forum. In the nuclear field, important matters are discussed elsewhere, e.g. in SALT. It would seem ill advised to disturb such processes with parallel and overlapping talks in this Committee. We must carefully select our topics. One of these has been, of course, the comprehensive test ban, although also in this case we are waiting -- rather impatiently I might add -- for the conclusion of the trilateral talks.

I also would like to remark that nuclear disarmament matters cannot be separated from other disarmament discussions. Indeed, security considerations of different regions have to be recognized in that respect. I noted that the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union on 5 April stressed that total military arsenals, including conventional weapons, have to be taken into account.

It is in particular on the question of selection that my delegation is somewhat puzzled by the proposal contained in CD/4 and the explanation given to it by its sponsors. The proposal seems rather broad and imprecise, which raises questions as to its usefulness. Document CD/4 mentions the cessation of the production of all nuclear weapons and their destruction without indicating in what stages this should happen, who would participate in the different stages, how this process can be reconciled with SALT and other forums and, last but not least, how all this could be verified.

Now, it seems possible that the co-sponsors of document CD/4 have an open mind as to how to solve these problems and only want to stimulate discussions in this Committee on how to tackle the nuclear disarmament problem. In that spirit, my delegation is willing to make a modest contribution.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

In particular with respect to the important verification question it is perhaps worthwhile, even at this early stage, to consider the implications of verifying a halt in the production of nuclear warheads and the destruction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons. A full-scope safeguards system is in any case necessary to ensure that no nuclear materials are diverted from peaceful uses. But that would not be enough. The matter is, of course, of such importance that one would have to make absolutely certain that no nuclear weapons are produced any more and that existing nuclear weapons are destroyed. This would mean, inter alia, that one would need to know where all nuclear-weapons production facilities are and that these are dismantled or in any case have stopped production. It would also mean that possibilities have to be created to trace all stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and this would require a rather intrusive kind of verification. Considering our discussions until now on the verification question, I do not entertain great hopes that all countries involved would accept such kind of verification.

A more indirect, but in the end probably effective, way of halting the production of nuclear weapons would be the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. This proposal was made a long time ago and has always been supported by my Government. Canada has recently pursued this idea again. The great advantage of the proposal is that an internationally accepted system to verify the measure is already in existence: the nuclear safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Indeed, application of this system to the whole peaceful nuclear fuel cycle of the nuclear-weapon States and transfer of all military enrichment and reprocessing plants to the peaceful cycle would make it possible to verify the halting of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, at least in theory.

There are a number of practical problems, such as the question of military propulsion reactors, but these problems are, if the political will exists, probably solvable. An important advantage of the proposal is that all countries, nuclear-weapons States and non-nuclear-weapons States, would accept the same type of verification, removing a discriminatory feature of present safeguards application.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

Unfortunately, document CD/4 does not give any hint of how to tackle the basic verification problem. The main sponsor has not given any practical indication that it is willing to accept nuclear safeguards on its peaceful nuclear facilities, safeguards which are applied all over the world. Perhaps I may mention that in the first NPT Review Conference some hope was raised that the Soviet Union was changing its mind: it accepted in the final document of that Conference the following sentence: "The Conference emphasises the necessity for the States party to the Treaty that have not yet done so to conclude as soon as possible safeguards agreements with the IAEA." You may note that no distinction is made between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in this sentence. Since that time, however, our expectations in this field have not been fulfilled, although in the meantime three other nuclear-weapon States have accepted IAEA safeguards.

Now, if one is not even willing to consider the application of well defined verification measures on peaceful nuclear activities, how can we undertake negotiations on disarmament measures which require even more intrusive verification? I would very much hope we can find a solution, but we would need some more information from the sponsors of CD/4 to create the necessary confidence that success in the end can be achieved.

I will not say much about the question of participation of all nuclear-weapon States in possible discussions on nuclear disarmament: that is for them to decide. It would seem strange, however, to prepare negotiations between all nuclear-weapon States without the participation of all.

We were happy to note that document CD/4 clearly recognizes that the nuclear-weapon States would participate in diverse ways in the different stages of the nuclear disarmament process. Indeed, participation of all nuclear-weapon States in discussions on nuclear disarmament -- certainly a worthwhile goal -- must not imply that the two main Powers have less responsibility for effective measures in the field of nuclear disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of the Netherlands for his statement, and I would like to assure him that I greatly appreciate the cordial words he had to say about me and about Belgium. I would add that I also appreciate the tribute he paid to my predecessor, Ambassador Thomson.

In the interests of our work it seems to me that we should suspend our debate at this point. I would suggest that we resume this afternoon, at whatever time you think convenient.

Would you be ready to resume the work this afternoon at 3 or 3.30 p.m. if this suggestion meets with your approval?

I am of course at the disposal of the members of the Committee.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, since we have just been informed that there will be consultations in our group at 3 o'clock, would it be possible to hold the meeting at 3.45?

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Could we recommence this afternoon at 3.45 p.m.?

Mr. Simard suggests 4 p.m. That being so, I would like to suggest that, to give delegations wishing to hold consultations sufficient time to do so, we should resume our work at 4 p.m.

If there are no comments, I shall suspend the meeting now. It will resume this afternoon at 4 p.m., as agreed.

I declare the plenary meeting suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed at 4 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I now invite the distinguished delegates to resume the work of our twenty-eighth plenary meeting.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): At the outset of my statement I should like to associate myself with the words of condolences which you yourself, Mr. Chairman, and other speakers have expressed to the leader of the delegation of Sweden.

It gives me great pleasure to take the floor under the chairmanship of a distinguished representative of Belgium -- a country with which Poland has traditionally enjoyed fruitful co-operation, especially in the field of European security and disarmament. I would also like to take this opportunity to express to our chairman for the month of March, Ambassador Thomson of Australia, the appreciation of my delegation for the wisdom, skill and courtesy with which he approached the difficult assignments of his office last month.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

May I also take this occasion to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Summerhayes of the United Kingdom and Ambassador Kamanda Wa Kamanda of Zaire. I look forward to fruitful co-operation with both of them in the pursuit of our common objectives.

In my brief intervention today I should like to address some problems relative to item 2 of the Committee's agenda for 1979 — the question of cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. In fact, as one of the co-sponsors of document CD/4, I have already had the occasion to comment on various aspects of nuclear disarmament and on specific issues raised in the proposal of the socialist countries.

However, I believe that in the light of the broad interest in and the considerable support of many delegations for the ideas advanced in that document, further comments would be quite in order. Such comments would appear to us fully justified also in view of opinions which were on the more sceptical side.

The international community has long recognized the pre-eminence of measures of nuclear disarmament by according highest priority to efforts in that regard. The most authoritative statements in that respect have been formulated, of course, at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. As it will be recalled, paragraph 20 of the Final Document states in part:

"... effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. To this end, it is imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved, and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons".

In the considered view of the Polish delegation, the initiative concerning negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed fully responds to the recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly made at the special session and the thirty-third regular session. Failure to examine that proposal would be entirely unwarranted. The Committee on Disarmament would be unable to explain or to justify at the United Nations and to public opinion at large its inaction on a proposal of that scope. Consequently, we must not accept arguments that there is no need to examine the proposal of the socialist countries, that it can be dismissed, in fact, as a concept with only "superficial attractions".

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

Indeed, in the opinion of the co-sponsors of CD/4, the Committee is duty bound to make an honest and constructive effort to explore all aspects of that proposal. That means, first of all, going beyond superficial or hasty judgements. Unless we do just that, we will not be able to say whether the proposed course of action is or is not realistic. At this moment the empty chair on the other side of this negotiating table reminds me of the saying that "even the longest march must commence with the first step".

The first step -- as we see it -- would be to start a process of consultations between the co-sponsors on one hand and individual interested States or groups of States, members of the Committee, on the other. In his interesting statement earlier this morning, the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Fein, formulated precisely this sort of question which can and should clarify the course of consultations we have in mind. Obviously, one would be hard put to provide clarifications and answers without first knowing what doubts our partners might have, and what questions they may want to ask. Therefore, we suggest, let us think what terms of reference should we adopt for our consultations and how we could most effectively pursue them. We might usefully apply our minds, for instance, to consider what should be the form and scope of such future negotiations, who and at what stages, apart from the nuclear-weapon Powers, should be involved in them in the first place. Obviously, there are important States whose conventional military potential will need to be taken into account in such negotiations if the principles of undiminished security and of balance of power are to be respected.

The argument that the absence of the representatives of the People's Republic of China from this Committee somehow detracts from the practical value of the measures proposed in document CD/4 does not quite hold. For one thing, the special session has recognized the right of China to participate in the work of the Committee. This right has been acknowledged by that country which, as a matter of fact, reserved its seat at the conference table. The nameplate on the table and the fact that the People's Republic of China has requested to be listed among members of the Committee would indicate that its representatives are not far away, that they can be easily contacted and that the position of that country can be easily established on any matter, including the problem of nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

During the current session of the Committee, which regrettably focused its attention primarily on matters of procedure, there were many delegations, including those of Algeria, Mexico and Sweden, which placed considerable emphasis on effective measures of nuclear disarmament. Sharing fully their concern about the course of the nuclear-arms race and about the prospects of nuclear disarmament, the socialist countries have submitted a document which seeks to translate those pre-occupations and concerns into practical and workable proposals. The Polish delegation is confident that the summer session of the Committee will provide a better climate and more opportunity to turn the debate which we have just initiated into concrete and constructive consultations on how to promote the objectives of document CD/4. It is the view of my delegation that the extent to which we shall succeed in this task will be a measure of the efficacy of our Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Poland for his statement. I would also like to thank him for his kind remarks about me and my country, and also about my predecessor, Ambassador Thomson.

Mr. ENE (Romania) (translated from French): I would like to associate myself, first of all, with the deep sympathy and condolences which you, Mr. Chairman, and other speakers expressed earlier today to Mrs. Thorsson, the distinguished representative of Sweden, and which we all share on this day of mourning.

Mr. Chairman, before beginning my statement, allow me to say that the Romanian delegation is particularly happy to be participating in the work of this Committee under your chairmanship, as an eminent diplomat and the distinguished representative of a friendly country.

I should also like to take this opportunity to express to Ambassador Thomson of Australia our profound appreciation of the manner in which he guided the preparation of our Committee's agenda up to its final conclusion, an operation which will greatly facilitate our work in the years to come. We thank him very specially for the democratic spirit in which he conducted the proceedings. On this basis, the Committee can now start to consider the substantive problems it has to solve.

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

In my statement today I should like to offer some preliminary thoughts on the item of our agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament".

The inclusion of this item in the agenda of the present session constitutes, in the opinion of the Romanian delegation, encouraging guidance for our Committee's activities. We like to think that the acceptance of this item reflects the Committee's decision to tackle firmly the crucial area of disarmament, namely nuclear disarmament.

Romania has always and methodically supported the banning of nuclear weapons, the halting of their production and their eventual destruction as a fundamental requirement of international life and has always held that negotiations on disarmament should accord top priority to nuclear disarmament.

The urgency of such measures was highlighted by the recent special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament. The Final Document states that "nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization" (para. 47) and that "in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility" (para.48).

Accordingly, the Romanian delegation, together with many other delegations, welcomed the proposal submitted by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in document CD/4 concerning the start of negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed, and associated itself with that proposal.

We consider, that the prompt commencement of such negotiations would provide evidence of the sense of responsibility with which the Committee intends to carry out its mandate and would, at the same time, testify to the political will of all Member States to respect and to transform into reality the moral and political commitments they have assumed through the Final Document of the special session. In paragraph 42 Member States declare "that they will respect the objectives and principles (of the Final Document) and make every effort faithfully to carry out the Programme of Action".

The further point to be stressed is that nuclear disarmament represents a legal obligation for States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which have pledged themselves to continue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to ending the nuclear armaments race at an early date and to

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

nuclear disarmament. The second Conference to examine the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, scheduled for 1980, preparations for which have already started in another room in this very building, will deal in detail with this aspect of the problem.

We do not, of course, fail to appreciate, nor do we in any way simplify, the complexity of achieving this objective. At the same time, however, we think that the existing situation in the field of nuclear disarmament is wholly unjustifiable. Since the time when the United Nations took its first decision, to which the distinguished representative of Nigeria referred a few days ago -- resolution No. 1 (I) of 24 January 1946, envisaging the elimination of atomic weapons from State arsenals -- there have been at least 100 other resolutions making every sort of appeal for ending the nuclear armaments race, but so far there has been no genuine negotiation on nuclear disarmament. As we have already emphasized, although we are fully aware of their importance, neither the ending of nuclear experiments, nor the safety guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States, nor other measures which are being negotiated in other forums, including the SALT Agreements -- to which Romania attaches special significance -- constitute measures of nuclear disarmament.

For all these reasons we consider that our Committee is faced with a particularly important duty. If it wishes to discharge that duty, it cannot limit itself to formal discussions but should pass, without further delay, to specific action.

In our view, such action aimed at ending the production of nuclear weapons and their complete destruction should proceed by stages, graduating from the simple to the complex and taking into consideration, at each stage, the viewpoints of all Parties, without prejudicing the security of any State. Apprehensions as to the complexity of the subject should not lead us to immobility. To affirm willingness to negotiate in the field of disarmament and taking action in that direction in no way affect the military equilibrium. Quite the contrary, that approach would tend to enhance mutual political and military trust.

The Romanian delegation endorses the proposal that, at this first stage, the Committee should organize a broad exchange of views and consultations on

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

ways and means of starting the negotiations. For this purpose, we think that at least four stages would have to be envisaged:

First, draw up an inventory of the problems and concerns which might arise for the various States concerning the commencement of concrete action aimed at ending and reversing the nuclear-arms race. This inventory might be the outcome of the informal discussions to be organized, in the course of which each State will have the opportunity to present its points of view, provided that it is motivated by the sincere desire to identify what it considers as real obstacles in the way of such negotiations.

Secondly, it would be necessary to arrange the problems thus identified in a systematic sequence, so that they may be dealt with in a logical, gradual order. This operation might be carried out by means of a constructive effort to translate the conclusions resulting from the free exchange of views into an action plan. Some of these problems might be found to touch on related fields that might even facilitate the negotiation process. Such proposals might be entrusted, for implementation, to the United Nations or other international forums. We are thinking, in this connexion, of pre-occupations such as that referred to by my own delegation, namely, that pari passu with negotiations on the ending of nuclear weapon production action should be taken with a view to the definitive banning of the use of nuclear weapons and the renunciation by all States of the use or threat of force. There are still other measures achievement of which could be facilitated by an approach in a broader international framework.

Thirdly, it will be necessary to establish the modalities and the framework for the negotiations.

Lastly, in the following stage, a programme of negotiation should be drawn up.

All these ideas are of a preliminary nature. The Romanian delegation will be ready to consider any other method of work conducive to the mobilization of constructive efforts within our Committee. It is nevertheless obvious that all we might achieve in the few days left of this part of the session will be, at most, the beginning of an exchange of views. We consider, therefore, that our discussions and consultations should be continued formally or informally in the Committee during the second part of the session.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Romania for his statement, and for the kind words he said about me as well as the tribute he paid to my predecessor, Ambassador Thomson.

Mrs. BORODOWSKY (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, you have already expressed our condolences to Mrs. Thorsson on behalf of the Committee. On behalf of my delegation I would like to ask the distinguished Ambassador to Sweden to convey our sympathy to her.

On behalf of my delegation, I wish you, Mr. Chairman, well in the responsible task of presiding over the work of the Committee during the month of April. Your country, like mine, is a new member of this disarmament negotiating body, which means that its work is for us a matter of learning and gaining experience. We are sure that the fruits of its labour will benefit us in our future work. We should like to take this opportunity to express our thanks to Ambassador Thomson, the distinguished representative of Australia, which is also one of the "new countries" on the Committee; thanks to his dedication during the month of March, we now have an agenda which will enable us to accomplish the complicated and delicate task facing us.

We wish to request our sister delegation, the delegation of Yugoslavia, to transmit to its people and Government our country's sympathy on the tragic natural disasters which have caused irreparable losses of human life and material damage in Yugoslavia. Events such as these oblige us to reflect on the work we should carry out here. The international community expects us to achieve measures which will prevent events which -- unlike the others -- can and should be controlled by man, namely disarmament measures.

Our work programme for this first session includes two important items, namely questions connected with nuclear disarmament and chemical weapons. In his statement on 6 February 1979, Dr. Pelegrín Torras, our Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, set forth Cuba's opinion on the first item, supporting the proposal of the socialist countries in document CD/4 and stressing the importance of that document for the Committee's consideration.

Because these working meetings will be devoted to the nuclear issue, my delegation wishes to emphasize the urgency and priority nature of this matter in negotiations on disarmament. In the Final Document of the special session devoted to disarmament it is clearly stated that top priority in the negotiations on disarmament must be given to nuclear disarmament.

(Mrs. Borodowsky, Cuba)

In that document, paragraphs 47, 48, 49 and 50 indicate the guidelines to be followed on the question of nuclear disarmament; these guidelines should not be interpreted to suit a particular convenience but should be taken to reflect the universal interest.

In this connexion, the proposal in document CD/4 may provide an appropriate basis for the Committee to deal with the nuclear problem. We do not believe that this question will convert this body into a forum of political polemics, as has been suggested; in any case, it is difficult and impracticable to draw the line of demarcation between the field of negotiations and the political debate: at times, the two merge and are one and the same thing. We consider -- as other delegations have stated -- that the proposal in question contains specific points for initiating substantive disarmament negotiations on this matter. On analysing document CD/4 in greater detail, my delegation considers that the fundamental point, that is to say, the item on the nuclear problem, is quite explicit: "Negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed".

We agree with the statements made by Comrade Issraelyan, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, that not all nuclear disarmament questions can be solved rapidly but that the main thing is to make a start. If we drop the subject, if we do not begin because it is difficult, complicated, etc., then no results will ever be achieved. We repeat: what matters is to make a start and surely there is no more auspicious way -- now that this Committee, under agenda item 2 "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", has adopted the Programme of Work for the first part of this year's session -- than to begin by looking at a precise and specific document.

This document refers to various stages of questions connected with the central item, all of which were mentioned in one way or another in the course of negotiations on the Committee's agenda, such as the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, etc. The document is, therefore, in keeping with interests expressed here by various delegations in specific points connected with the nuclear issue.

(Mrs. Borodowsky, Cuba)

The document also has the advantage of not being a restricted proposal, since in referring to the stages of the negotiations it takes into account so important a problem as the security of all States. The very wording of the paragraph determines which should be the appropriate measures at each stage of the negotiations and, above all, it emphasizes the quantitative and qualitative importance of existing arsenals of nuclear States and the degree of participation of those States.

As to the need for the participation of all nuclear States in the process of nuclear disarmament, this is obvious, but we cannot wait indefinitely, that is to say, until China sees fit to join in this process. Its negative policy of not participating in the disarmament negotiations cannot stop all those countries which respond positively to the demands of the international community that we should work towards general and complete disarmament.

My delegation is prepared to collaborate on this question as on others that will be dealt with by the Committee, because it considers that they are all important and central to our present great concern, namely to halt the intensification of the arms race. In connexion with this specific question my delegation does not forget that paragraph 18 of the Final Document of the special session devoted to disarmament emphasizes that the most urgent objective of disarmament is to remove the threat of nuclear war.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for her statement. May I say how much I appreciated the cordial words she had to say about me, and the tribute she paid to my predecessor, Ambassador Thomson.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, the Soviet delegation has already had the opportunity to congratulate Belgium on the assumption by its representative of the post of Chairman of the Committee throughout this month. I reiterate these words of welcome to you personally. Sir, Mr. Ambassador. We have also had occasion to thank Ambassador Thomson for his skilful chairmanship in March. First of all, allow me to express my deep sympathy to the peoples of Yugoslavia in connexion with the tragic event, the earthquake in their country. We would like to thank you, Sir, for expressing on behalf of all of us our condolences to Mrs. Thorsson in connexion with her tragic family loss.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Mr. Chairman, today, the Committee on Disarmament has taken up the item "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", in accordance with the programme of work it has adopted. In this connexion, the Soviet delegation intends once again to refer to the proposal submitted by the group of socialist countries concerning negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed (document CD/4 of 1 February 1979).

First of all, we are pleased that the members of the Committee considered it necessary to include this question in the programme of work for the current part of the Committee's session and to take it as the first substantive item for discussion this year. In our view, this approach is fully justified. The problem of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is indeed of the highest priority; on this point, all members of the Committee are basically agreed. It is no accident that nuclear questions have been given first place on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament.

We have already had occasion to express satisfaction at the fact that many delegations, and in particular those of India, Ethiopia, Sweden, Pakistan, Romania, Nigeria and others, have made a positive assessment of document CD/4. Today we have heard very interesting statements by the delegations of Mexico, Algeria, Cuba, the Netherlands and several others. We welcome the fact that the number of sponsors of document CD/4 has increased.

Particular attention should be drawn to the fact that a number of delegations have not only noted the importance of document CD/4 and of the problem of nuclear disarmament in general in the context of the Committee's agenda, but have also put forward constructive ideas. Other delegations have so far confined themselves to raising questions. One or two delegations, including delegations that have spoken today, have raised objections and expressed doubts regarding a number of the provisions in the socialist countries' proposals. The Soviet delegation and the other sponsors of document CD/4 have had an opportunity to comment on individual statements by members of the Committee and to answer certain questions.

Today I would like to refer briefly to the latest statements made in the Committee.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In his statement on 29 March last, Ambassador Ene, the representative of Romania, proposed that informal consultations be held within the framework of this Committee with a view to organizing negotiations on questions of nuclear disarmament. The purpose of these consultations would be to prepare a special "plan of negotiation". This, as he said, "would help to create a climate of work that would be propitious for the activities of the Committee as a whole". In my opinion, these ideas are correct. With regard to his proposal to the effect that, concurrently with measures aimed at ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them, steps should be taken to achieve the goal of a definitive ban on the use of nuclear weapons and the renunciation of the use of force, we agree with this as well. This approach to the question is fully in line with paragraph 54 of the Final Document of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which states that significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States.

We listened with interest to the analysis of certain provisions of document CD/4 which was made by Ambassador Adenijī, the representative of Nigeria, in his statement on 10 April, and we are pleased that this analysis corresponds with the ideas that the sponsors of the document were trying to incorporate in it. We hope that many delegations agree with the Nigerian Ambassador that document CD/4 represents "a timely basis for starting negotiations".

We intend to study carefully Ambassador Adenijī's proposal that the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly concerning the stages for negotiations on nuclear disarmament should be used as a starting point in the proposed negotiations for the purpose of determining the range of questions to be discussed. We would like to hear more details on this proposal.

In his statement today, Ambassador Robles, the representative of Mexico, gave a positive assessment of the socialist countries' initiative and made a number of comments and proposals relating to this initiative. He suggested, in particular, that the Committee on Disarmament, in its future discussions on this question, should compare document CD/4 with the corresponding provisions of the Final Document of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I would like to emphasize once again that, in drafting their document, the socialist countries were guided by the provisions of the Final Document. Of course, we are ready to consider constructively both these and other proposals of the Mexican delegation.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Doubts have been expressed today concerning the possibility and necessity of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The Soviet delegation reserves the right to revert to these statements in due course. But there is one comment that we would like to answer straight away. Everyone knows that nuclear disarmament is an extremely complex issue. It is precisely for this reason that a majority is in favour of beginning negotiations without delay. However, there is another argument to the effect that since the problem is complex, there is no point in tackling it. With this point of view, of course, we cannot agree at all.

We hope that other delegations that have not yet expressed their views on the socialist countries' proposal will make a positive contribution to the discussion on the proposal to start negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

In general, speaking of the results of the discussion this spring, we can say that it has been useful. Practical discussions on document CD/4 began even before the adoption of the agenda. Now, after the adoption of the agenda, the discussion will clearly develop further. As we see it, our task is to ensure that, in the course of the present discussions, the ground is prepared for a more practical consideration of document CD/4 this summer. I have in mind a discussion on the question of the practical organization of the negotiations, and of the manner in which consultations are to be conducted within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Soviet delegation will carefully study all ideas expressed here this spring. It will proceed from the assumption that during the summer part of the Committee's session serious discussion of document CD/4 will continue and useful ideas will be put forward, both on the organizational forms of the preparations for the talks and on the substance of the issues raised in the document.

The problem of nuclear disarmament is complex, and it will not be easy to solve it. We realize that much time will be needed. However, we express the hope that discussions on document CD/4 will lead to concrete results, i.e. to the beginning, without delay, of consultations in preparation for the negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union for his statement, and for the tribute he paid to my predecessor, Ambassador Thomson.

I note that the distinguished delegate of Yugoslavia wishes to take the floor.

Mr. DJOKIC (Yugoslavia): On behalf of my delegation, may I be permitted to express our most profound thanks and gratitude to the distinguished representatives of Algeria, Cuba and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as to the other members of the Committee for their warm authentic condolences addressed to my delegation in connexion with the great human and material losses that my country has suffered during the last few days following an extremely devastating earthquake. I would like to assure all distinguished representatives in the Committee, that my delegation appreciates very much the expressions of their sympathy and solidarity in this sad time that my country is facing now.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Distinguished delegates, I think that we have now come to the end of the list of speakers for the debate at today's plenary meeting. Are there any other delegations that wish to take the floor?

If not, may I ask you to turn your attention to the question of how we are to arrange the continuation of these discussions.

In this respect, I would mention that, when we drew up our agenda and programme of work, it was agreed to set aside several days for consideration of the first item on the programme of work, namely, nuclear disarmament. We allowed for the possibility of holding informal meetings, as is clearly the wish of the Committee. I would now like to ask the members of the Committee if this is their intention and if we should envisage the possibility of arranging informal meetings in the next few days -- in practical terms, tomorrow and Monday -- to continue the discussion we began in plenary.

May I have the views of the Committee on this question?

As I hear nothing, I would like to make the following suggestion, as it is difficult to ask delegates to decide here and now whether we are going to hold informal meetings or not.

Could we not, with your consent, adopt the following method, namely, to leave it to the delegations of the Committee, and possibly those which assume certain responsibilities within groups, to decide through informal consultations among them whether we should hold one or more informal meetings. When a consensus has emerged among the members of the Committee, I am entirely at your disposal for the organization of informal meetings. Those meetings would naturally have to be approved by all the members of the Committee.

Are you in agreement with this procedure?

I am of course at your disposal to make the necessary arrangements with regard to the convening of these meetings.

(The Chairman)

In the absence of objections to my suggestion, I take it that I may recommend it to you. If it should appear later that delegates, after holding consultations, unanimously wish to convene informal meetings, I am at the disposal of the Committee.

In the circumstances, it merely remains for me to remind you that the next plenary meeting of the Committee will be on Tuesday, 24 April, at 10.30 a.m., when we shall begin consideration of the fourth item on the year's agenda entitled "Chemical weapons".

May I also remind you that the arrangements mentioned this morning at the beginning of our discussion on the second agenda item also apply to our deliberations next week.

In addition, I would like to draw your attention to the paper submitted by the distinguished representative of Pakistan, document CD/10 entitled: "Conclusion of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". This document has been circulated to all members of the Committee.

The secretariat has asked me to inform you that documents CD/8 "Rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament" and CD/12 "Agenda and programme of work of the Committee on Disarmament" have now been circulated in the official working languages used at present by the Committee.

If no other delegations wish to take the floor, I have the honour to declare this plenary meeting closed.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.

CD/PV.29
24 April 1979
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE TWENTY-NINTH MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Tuesday, 24 April 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. P. NOTERDAEME

(Belgium)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENSMAIL

Argentina: Mr. F.J. DAVILA

Australia: Mr. A.J. BEHM
Ms. M.S. WICKES

Belgium: Mr. P. NOTERDAEME
Mr. G. VAN DUYSSE
Mr. P. BERG

Brazil: Mr. A. CELSO DE OURO PRETO

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U THAUNG HTUN

Canada: Mr. R. HARRY JAY
Mr. J.T. SIMARD

Cuba: Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. V. TYLNER
Mr. L. STAVINOHAI

Egypt: Mr. O. EL-SHAFAEI
Mr. M. EL-BARADEI
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. BENOIT D'ABOVILLE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. S. KAHN
Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. FEIFFER
Mr. J. PÖHLMANN
Mr. H. MÜLLER

Hungary: Mr. M. DOMOKOS
Mr. C. GYÖRFFY

India: Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN

Indonesia: Mr. I. DAMANIK

Iran: Mr. M. FARTASH
Mr. D. CHILATY

Italy: Mr. N. DI BERNARDO
Mr. M. MORENO
Mr. C. FRATESCHI
Mr. FOLCO DE LUCA

Japan: Mr. M. OGISO
Mr. T. NONOYAMA
Mr. T. IWANAMI
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya: Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
Miss LUZ MARÍA GARCÍA

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. ERDENECHULUUN

Morocco: Mr. M. RAHHALI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Nigeria: Mr. K. AHMED
Mr. T. OLUMOKO

Pakistan: Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru:

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. H. PAC
Mr. M. KRUSZYK

Romania: Mr. C. ENE
Mr. V. TUDOR
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. I.B. FONSEKA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
Mr. A.M. VAVILOV
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV
Mr. SOKOLYSKY

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America: Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. C. FLOWERREE
Mr. M. DALEY
Mr. M. SANCHES

Venezuela: Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Yugoslavia: Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire: Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU
Mr. ANYA LUBUNGU

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I have the honour to declare open the penultimate plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. As we agreed last week, we shall consider today the fourth topic of the Committee's agenda, 'Chemical Weapons'.

I would like to remind you that it was the understanding of all the members of the Committee that delegations may speak on any proposal which has already been made or may be made in the future on this topic. It was also understood that in adopting the Committee's programme of work we should keep in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of the rules of procedure.

I would now like to open the list of speakers for today by giving the floor to the distinguished representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Taylhardat.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Since we only have a few days left before concluding this first part of this year's session, it is not perhaps the right time to congratulate you on your chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of April.

I should like, however, to express my delegation's appreciation of the intelligent, patient and sensible way in which you have directed our discussions. I should like to add a personal note and assure you that it has been an honour for me to work under the distinguished direction of an eminent diplomat from a country for which I have a deep affection and admiration.

Since my duties make me a resident of Belgium, living together with the people of your great though small country, I have been able directly to appreciate the constant concern of the Belgian people and authorities for international problems. This concern is not only manifest in the efforts to promote a united Europe, it also embraces all questions affecting the international community, particularly those relating to the important matters coming within the competence of this Committee on Disarmament, of which your country and my own have recently become members.

I should also like to take this opportunity of expressing our admiration and appreciation of your predecessor, Ambassador Thomson of Australia, for the skilful way in which he guided our work last month and for the excellent statesmanship he displayed in the delicate negotiations he had to conduct during his chairmanship.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

The question of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction has been the subject of specific consideration in the various United Nations bodies which have been dealing with disarmament since 1971, when the work relating to the Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons was concluded.

During the period which has elapsed since then, the question may be said to have been sufficiently debated, both within the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), in which practically all the political and technical aspects of the question have been discussed, and in the General Assembly itself, where the question has been given special attention and has been the subject of numerous resolutions.

If we should try to sum up the present status of the consideration of the question of chemical weapons, we might say that the subject has been practically exhausted at the level of the deliberative bodies.

The thorough debates held in the political and technical bodies have served to clarify almost all the fundamental aspects of the question and prepared the ground for beginning to envisage actual agreements. Evidence of this is the very fact that there are now three draft conventions, each of which reflects serious efforts by their several sponsors to concentrate attention on the task of giving tangible shape in a codified text, to the substantive provisions that have gained general acceptance.

In addition, negotiations are now proceeding between the United States and the Soviet Union with a view to working out a joint initiative.

The General Assembly has made numerous appeals for the conclusion of the necessary agreements leading to the drafting of a convention on chemical weapons. Both at its regular sessions and at the special session devoted to disarmament, the Assembly has assigned top priority to the subject, regarding it as one of the most urgent measures of disarmament.

All these facts demonstrate that the question of chemical weapons has attained an appropriate degree of development and is sufficiently ripe to become the subject of specific negotiations aimed at the drafting of an international instrument of a binding nature.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

Five years have elapsed since the United States and the Soviet Union announced in CCD that they had agreed to initiate bilateral negotiations with the object of preparing a joint initiative. Since that time, although the work on chemical weapons has continued to make progress within the ambit of the United Nations, it has been awaiting the outcome of those negotiations.

Venezuela naturally attaches unquestionable importance to these negotiations. Yet, like many other States members of this Committee which have expressed a similar opinion, it also considers that the achievement of the controlled and total elimination of chemical weapons cannot remain indefinitely contingent on the future results which the two Powers achieve in their negotiations. Moreover, although the General Assembly has recognized the usefulness and advantages of this process of bilateral negotiation, rather than considering it as a condition or prerequisite for an agreement, the Assembly regards it as an element which will contribute to the achievement of a solution within the Committee on Disarmament.

My delegation hopes that the two negotiating Powers will very shortly report to the Committee on the status of their negotiations.

In the conviction that the time and circumstances are favourable for initiating the multilateral negotiation process which should shortly culminate in the preparation of a preliminary draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, Venezuela, as a member country of the Group of 21, is one of the sponsors of the working paper circulated as document CD/11, the purpose of which is precisely to start the Committee on Disarmament on the course it ought to follow as a negotiating body and to guide it along the path that is bound to lead to the formulation of the draft convention which we all desire.

With regard to the convention, or rather the component elements of an instrument on this subject, the countries which formerly participated in the CCD have had occasion fully to express their opinions and to state their positions on the political and technical problems arising in connexion with the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Venezuela, which has recently joined this negotiating body, would like to take this opportunity to state its views on some of the basic questions arising in relation to the proposed convention on chemical weapons, even at the risk of repeating ideas expressed before.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

First, my delegation endorses the views on four aspects of a treaty banning chemical weapons which were submitted in 1973 by a group of 10 neutral and non-aligned countries members of CCD. These views are set out in document CCD/400 and their essential substance remains fully valid.

More specifically, inasmuch as the use of chemical weapons was prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, my delegation considers that the object of a convention on chemical weapons should be to prohibit all the activities, other than the actual use of such weapons, ranging from the development of new agents or new weapons to the production of new stocks of these weapons to be added to existing stocks, and including the prohibition of the stockpiling of such weapons, and should also provide for the destruction of existing arsenals and installations engaging in any of the prohibited activities.

In this connexion, my delegation further considers that the convention ought in no way to weaken, limit or affect the obligations prescribed in the 1925 Protocol.

So far as the scope of the convention is concerned, my delegation considers that it should provide for a general and universal prohibition of all methods of chemical warfare, covering not only the weapons themselves but also the substances or agents used for producing them and the munitions, means of delivery or other methods employed in using, carrying or launching the weapons. The prohibition, as I have said, should cover all the activities -- other than the use -- that might enable States to acquire a chemical military capacity.

My delegation does not, however, exclude the possibility that, in addition to the prohibition of the activities already mentioned, a ban may also be imposed on other related or similar activities which are intended to facilitate or make possible the use of chemical weapons. My delegation accordingly considers it very important that the ad hoc working group proposed by the Group of 21 should, as indicated in document CD/11, be able to evaluate possible new elements of importance which should come within the scope of the convention.

Venezuela does not rule out the possibility that the application or implementation of this comprehensive prohibition may take place in a gradual manner, by successive stages or phases, provided that they are seen as parts of an indivisible process and observe a previously agreed schedule.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

With regard to the chemical substances or agents which should be covered by the prohibition, my delegation considers that the convention cannot be limited to a single criterion of identification or delimitation, for that might lead to the inclusion of some chemical agents of warfare and the exclusion of others. The convention should use a combination of the different applicable criteria, such as purpose, quantity, intention, toxic properties, chemical structure and any other appropriate criterion, so that the prohibition may cover the whole existing or foreseeable range of materials capable of being used as chemical weapons or in the manufacture of such weapons.

The question of verification is undoubtedly the most complex and delicate one which arises in connexion with the prohibition of chemical weapons. In this respect, my delegation considers that the convention should make use of a combination of the various possible alternatives. National control methods alone are not sufficient, since they do not offer adequate guarantees of compliance with the prohibitions or against the breach of these prohibitions. As indicated in document CD/400 which I have cited, the purpose of the verification system is to give every party the assurance that the prohibition is being complied with, and this could be achieved only through a combination of national and international measures, which would complement and supplement each other. My delegation agrees with the statement in that document that at least the following elements should be included in the verification system: the self-control of States, national methods of verification, and international measures to supervise and monitor compliance with the contractual obligations.

Within the problem of verification, the most difficult question has been that relating to on-site inspections. Venezuela is not unaware of the importance of this kind of inspection and would like a system of on-site inspection to be devised at the earliest opportunity which, in addition to being adequately effective, does not impair the sovereign rights of the parties or lead to undue or unnecessary interference in the internal affairs of the countries. My delegation considers nevertheless that the work on the designing of an on-site control system should not delay or impede the multilateral negotiations on the other aspects of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Perhaps the same convention might refer to the desirability, advisability, necessity or obligation of establishing such a system and entrust to the international control body to be established the task of designing an on-site verification system whose purpose would be to ensure observance of the prohibitions laid down and avert

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

violations of the convention, subject always to due respect for the legitimate economic interests of States and adequate safeguards for progress in scientific research. This machinery might form the subject of an additional protocol to the convention.

My delegation also shares the view expressed in document CD/400 that the convention should include recognition of the principle that a substantial portion of the savings and resources derived from the measures provided for in the convention should be devoted to promoting economic and social well-being, particularly in the developing countries.

The significance of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons would be, in Venezuela's opinion, that the abolition of these means of warfare by the countries which possess them would represent the first genuine and effective disarmament measure to be adopted ever since the United Nations began to deal with this field. It would be the first "sacrifice", as it were, that the military Powers would make in ridding themselves of one of the most loathsome and barbaric means of warfare ever devised -- of weapons which, together with nuclear weapons, are classed among those known as weapons of mass destruction. And for the first time, the military Powers would be relinquishing a weapon which they possess in alarming quantities in their arsenals. In addition, the convention would, as the General Assembly of the United Nations has stated, constitute an important contribution to efforts to halt the arms race and to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament.

In the opinion of my delegation, the negotiations relating to a convention on chemical weapons are also very significant in that they represent an opportunity for the major military Powers to demonstrate their political will and to prove that they are indeed prepared, in good faith, to take an important step along the road towards disarmament.

My delegation considers it very significant that, in addition to the three draft conventions submitted earlier by Japan, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in CCD, the Netherlands and Italy should each have submitted for consideration by the Committee on Disarmament documents containing interesting proposals which represent important contributions intended to ensure that substantive work on the prohibition of chemical weapons will begin as soon as possible.

To these initiatives has been added that of the Group of 21, whose fundamental virtue is that it places the problem in the context of what constitutes the actual competence of the Committee on Disarmament as a strictly negotiating, not a deliberative, body.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

In this document machinery is proposed to enable the Committee, without having to await the results of the bilateral talks, to begin immediately the process of multilateral negotiations which the General Assembly has requested it to undertake on a priority basis. These negotiations, as stated in the document, may be held parallel with those being conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union since, in our opinion, there is no reason why either of the two negotiating processes should exclude or interfere with the other; the two processes are in fact complementary. As stated by the Group of 21 in its document, the negotiations in the Committee cannot hamper or hinder the bilateral talks. On the contrary, they will be of assistance to each other.

The proposed machinery is very straightforward: the idea is simply to establish an ad hoc working group which, taking into account the existing draft conventions and all the proposals and working papers submitted in the past or to be submitted in the future, will promptly begin the task of identifying the questions on which agreement exists and incorporate in a preliminary draft convention all the elements to be included in the convention intended to proclaim the prohibition of chemical weapons.

This is the only possible approach to this question in view of the degree of maturity which it has attained, and the only way of fulfilling the mandate of the General Assembly which, in resolution 33/59 A, requested the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to undertake, at the beginning of its 1979 session, negotiations with a view to elaborating an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction.

My delegation trusts that this approach will be endorsed by all the other members of the Committee and that action will be taken, before the end of this first part of the session, to establish the ad hoc working group proposed by the Group of 21.

I thank you, Sir, and the delegations of the members of the Committee for listening to my statement so attentively.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Venezuela for his statement. Allow me to say, Sir, that I was particularly appreciative of your kind words about me and of the praise which you gave to Belgium and the Belgian people, a country which you know so well and to which I know you are deeply attached.

I would like also, speaking as Chairman, to express my particular appreciation of the tribute you paid to my predecessor, Ambassador Thomson.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): My delegation has been looking forward to this opportunity of speaking on the question of chemical disarmament. Actually, we would have preferred to take the floor on this important subject much earlier had the Committee's preoccupation with matters of procedure taken less of its precious time.

Since I had the privilege of addressing the question of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament when I spoke last week on agenda item 2, I will now try to be very brief in my comments on agenda item 4, that is chemical disarmament. I would like to stress in passing that this is one issue in whose solution my country has taken an active interest over the past years, sparing no effort both in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the United Nations General Assembly sessions to promote the early attainment of that goal.

The Committee on Disarmament placed the question of "chemical weapons" on its agenda for 1979 only a few days ago. However, the problem of the total elimination of chemical weapons is anything but new. It has, in fact, a long history. Within a multilateral context it has been under active consideration for well over a decade. For most of that time it was rightly considered to constitute one of the most pressing issues of disarmament negotiations.

The years of deliberations and negotiations on chemical disarmament, both here and in the United Nations, often with the benefit of expert advice, have helped to identify most, if not all, of the important problems which need to be dealt with and resolved to the satisfaction of all parties if these weapons are to be effectively banned. In the process, positions of States have been formulated in over 100 working papers. Besides, specific approaches to outlawing chemical weapons have been proposed in three formally tabled draft conventions on chemical weapons, the first of them submitted by the socialist countries, among them Poland. Thanks to the Secretariat, the positions of States have been compiled in the very useful informal paper of March 1978.

As we know only too well, there was and is good reason for the importance which the community of nations attaches to early and meaningful progress in the field of chemical disarmament. For one thing, there is the ever-present threat to international peace and security from the increasingly sophisticated arsenals of chemical weapons. It is no secret that a technological breakthrough is possible

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

in that field at any moment, thus leading to further threats to man and to his environment. For another thing, chemical weapons are indiscriminate weapons of mass annihilation which, if ever used, would take a devastating toll in the first place of the innocent and totally unprepared civilian populations.

It is, therefore, by no means an overstatement to say that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction brook no further delay.

The socialist States, Poland included, have for years persevered both at the United Nations and in the Committee on Disarmament, even though it was then known as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, to bring closer an agreement in that respect. Public opinion in my country shared in the general gratification at the opening and the pursuit of the bilateral Soviet-American efforts with a view to proscribing that class of weapons. At the time we were, and we still are, convinced that the stated objective of these bilateral negotiations -- a joint initiative on the prohibition of chemical weapons for its subsequent presentation to and finalization within a multilateral framework -- was a critically important and realistic approach to an effective ban on chemical weapons.

We believed then, as we do now, that in the long run an agreement in that respect would have to gain universal acceptance and support in order to endure as a meaningful measure of disarmament. Indeed, the chemical weapons convention which we are all seeking must, in our considered view, become a universally respected instrument, if only because this category of weapons of mass annihilation, unlike nuclear weapons, can be found in the arsenals of dozens of States and can be acquired by still more.

We welcomed with considerable gratification the announcement of the two negotiating parties last year to the effect that there emerged a considerable measure of agreement between them on a number of issues, while several other questions of importance still remained to be resolved. At the same time, we had no doubt in our minds that parallel multilateral efforts, and that means efforts within this body, should continue with a view to facilitating and accelerating the attainment of that goal.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

The basic correctness of our view in that respect has been established and confirmed by the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It has also been confirmed in operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of General Assembly resolution 33/59 which -- as it is well known -- the Polish delegation helped to draft with the co-operation of many other delegations participating in the work of the First Committee during the Assembly's last session.

As we see it, the central issue at present is to find the most appropriate course of action which would judiciously reconcile the exigencies of the continued bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States of America on the one hand, and the concerns of the members of the Committee on Disarmament, on the other. These concerns boil down, of course, to making a constructive contribution to the early attainment of our common goal -- a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

The overriding consideration which, I believe, we all share is to take such an approach which, without in any way hampering the delicate bilateral negotiations, would, at the same time, effectively facilitate the negotiating process and expedite the conclusion of a widely acceptable international instrument. In this connexion I want to observe that we have studied with great interest the valuable working papers contained in documents CD/5, CD/6 and CD/11. We fully share their desire and determination to revive the Committee's work in the field of chemical disarmament which would not interfere with or hamper the bilateral negotiations but, on the contrary, which would promote their objectives.

Towards that end, the Polish delegation for its part deems it advisable to suggest that the multilateral negotiating endeavours in the Committee on Disarmament should proceed primarily on the basis of the three formally tabled draft agreements, working documents and such substantive proposals as may be offered in the future.

Taking into account the various proposals with respect to further discussions on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament and in view of the existence of certain differences on the substance, reflected -- as they are -- in the three draft conventions and other

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

documents tabled in this Committee, the Polish delegation considers it desirable to suggest the establishment of an informal contact group. Its mandate would call on the members of the group to define further the methods and forms of the Committee's work with a view to reaching an early agreement on matters related to a convention on chemical weapons. To that end, such a group would hold consultations with the authors of the existing documents as well as with the representatives of the States participating in the bilateral negotiations.

The group would then be expected to submit its suggestions for their consideration as early as possible at the second part of the current session of the Committee on Disarmament.

Needless to say, my delegation is prepared to participate in the work of such an informal contact group.

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, since it is my first intervention this month, I should like to congratulate you on the assumption of the chairmanship. It is a particular pleasure for us to see the distinguished representative of Belgium in the Chair, representing a country whose relations with my country are particularly friendly. At the same time, I would like to express to Ambassador Thomson, chairman of last month, our gratitude and appreciation for his endeavours and patience, which enabled the Committee to conclude successfully the difficult task in elaborating the agenda. I take the opportunity to extend our warm welcome to Ambassador Summerhayes of the United Kingdom and to Ambassador Kamanda wa Kamanda of Zaire. We are looking forward to a good and fruitful co-operation with them in this Committee.

Mr. Chairman, it was with deep regret that we heard of the great loss that Mrs. Thorsson has suffered. You have already expressed the condolences of all delegations, and on behalf of my delegation may I be allowed to offer, again, our sincerest sympathy. We would also like to extend to the distinguished delegate of Yugoslavia, our deep sympathy for the tragic losses his country has suffered during the earthquakes that occurred last week.

Mr. Chairman, you said, at the beginning of our meeting this morning, that the remaining days of this Committee's plenary meetings will be devoted to chemical weapons. I shall now concentrate on this point of our Programme of Work

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

We all share the concern about the dangers emanating from chemical weapons, and we all consider a convention on a verifiable, effective and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons to be a matter of urgency, not least because these weapons represent one of the most insidious means of destruction in existence.

The Federal Republic of Germany is a contracting party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 concerning the prohibition of the use in war of bacteriological and chemical weapons. The general consensus is, however, that the Geneva Protocol merely prevents the first use of chemical weapons. If they are used despite the agreements, retaliation with the same weapons cannot be excluded.

The Federal Republic of Germany therefore considers the conclusion of a convention concerning an effective and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons a matter of urgent priority. It appreciates the efforts being made by the United States of America and the Soviet Union in bilateral talks for a joint initiative in this context.

A convention prohibiting the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons and providing for the destruction of existing stocks requires above all a verification arrangement commensurate with the military significance of chemical weapons. Verification is the basis for confidence in complying with such a prohibition.

The Federal Republic of Germany has committed itself under the Brussels Treaty as revised on 23 October 1954, not to manufacture certain types of weapons, including chemical weapons, and to allow a special treaty agency to verify that this commitment is being complied with. Checks at chemical plants in our country are being carried out every year in the form of on-site inspections to verify that these plants are not manufacturing substances which are classified as chemical weapons.

The companies concerned are selected and advised in writing at six weeks notice by the Western European Union's Armaments Control Agency. The experience of over twenty years shows that it is in fact possible to verify adequately the observance of a chemical weapons production ban, and that this verification procedure is technically practicable without certain production techniques or other company-specific technologies having to be disclosed.

In past years several countries have submitted working papers in which they have stated their position on aspects of verification. The need for verification is generally accepted in principle, but views differ above all as to whether it should be implemented by national or international institutions. Moreover,

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

different technical means have been proposed in the efforts to find suitable methods of verification. Valuable scientific contributions have been made on the basis, in particular, of efficient modern instrumental analysis.

These efforts continue to be hampered by the fact that no agreement has yet been reached on the question of defining the agents which would be subject to prohibition. Certainly, the character and scope of suitable verification measures also depend on the nature and the number of the prohibited agents. Obviously, the technical implications of verification measures become simpler if the number of agents, the non-manufacture of which has to be controlled, is reduced.

In its Working Paper of 22 July 1975 (CCD/458) the Federal Republic of Germany, therefore, drafted a definition of chemical warfare agents to the effect that a prohibition would cover only agents which, according to their character, are to be deemed militarily relevant warfare agents. The Federal Republic of Germany, together with a number of other countries, considers that such an objective definition would greatly facilitate on-site inspections.

On-site inspections as a means of verification have been objected to on the ground that they imply the danger of intellectual property rights being infringed which concern know-how regarding chemical processes to be kept secret. The Federal Republic of Germany attaches great importance to the protection of intellectual property as a fundamental principle of law and has therefore studied in depth the question whether verification of the non-production of chemical weapon agents is possible without violating such rights.

Since this involves matters which principally concern the owners of intellectual property rights, it launched an opinion survey among representative companies in the chemical industry, the detailed results of which will be made known in due course. But even in the early stage of the survey it became apparent that, provided they are properly implemented, control measures can certainly be carried out in production establishments so as to verify to a degree of certainty not attainable by other means the non-production of warfare agents without the disclosure of production secrets.

In our opinion, effective verification of the compliance with a chemical weapons ban can only be accomplished by the application of international control measures. The representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany at the United Nations and the Geneva Committee on Disarmament have repeatedly emphasized this conviction. International measures can, of course, be supplemented by national ones.

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

As a result of our discussions with national and international experts, we are convinced that regular on-site inspections arranged by an international control agency should form an indispensable component of international control measures designed to ensure the contractually agreed non-production of chemical weapons.

Other international control measures, such as near-site inspections (emission analyses), satellite monitoring, statistical checks of production figures and of the consumption of raw materials and basic chemicals do not suffice by themselves to replace on-site inspections. Off-site inspections (remote environmental monitoring) and opto-electronic seals for shut-down factories are also inadequate by themselves to replace on-site inspections.

While fully acknowledging the need to protect production secrets, the Federal Republic of Germany feels that verification of the non-production of chemical warfare agents can be accomplished by way of on-site inspections without the disclosure of production procedures and data which need to be protected.

This type of verification procedure is based on technological features geared to specific properties of the warfare agents: chemical agents differ, on account of their toxicity, which is several orders of magnitude higher, from compounds used for peaceful purposes.

Consequently, safety measures are required for the manufacture of warfare agents, which are reflected in the design of the production plants. The absence of such safety measures can easily be detected during a tour of the plant and thus provide proof that highly toxic compounds are not being manufactured. Production secrets which require protection do not have to be disclosed by this type of verification procedure.

There is, however, a small number of chemical compounds which, though only of low acute toxicity, require extensive safety devices. This applies to substances where permanent exposure to only a very small concentration may cause chronic harm to the operating personnel.

In order to be able to operate efficiently, plants producing these substances require structural measures which adapt them to both the toxicological and chemical characteristics of the manufactured product as well as the production method used. Highly specialized plants of this type cannot, or can only with considerable efforts in terms of time and expense, be converted so as to manufacture

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

other substances or substance ranges. Here, too, it will generally be possible for the manufacturer to provide convincing proof that the plant is unsuitable for the production of warfare agents.

In view of the large number of agents manufactured and processes used, not all aspects of the question of non-intrusive on-site inspections can be resolved by theoretical discussion. The examination of concrete examples by groups of experts is a more convincing means. The Federal Republic of Germany, therefore, invited all United Nations Member States to send experts to visit factories producing organic phosphorus compounds in order to demonstrate the non-intrusive control of such super toxic agents. The main objective of these tours of production plants was to show that it is possible to verify, even during a walk-about, whether such an establishment has the facilities for manufacturing super-toxic agents or not.

In response to this invitation to send experts to visit chemical factories, representatives of 25 nations took part in a Workshop in my country from 12 to 14 March 1979. In each case the experts toured a plant of three large chemical enterprises. The production facilities belonged to the three German companies BAYER AG, HOECHST AG, and BASF AG. During their visits the experts also had an opportunity to discuss verification possibilities with leading representatives of the industry.

We realize that it was not possible during the first Workshop of this kind to discuss all aspects of verification of the non-production of chemical weapons in civilian production plants. Nor would we suggest that these visits to factories could be regarded as a model for future on-site inspections. Nevertheless, we believe that this exercise justifies the hope that a system of on-site inspections can be found which will meet the security requirements of those implementing the controls without violating the legitimate interests of a plant subject to control.

We think it particularly useful that the Workshop in the Federal Republic of Germany was immediately followed by a meeting of experts in the United Kingdom with similar demonstrations. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany hopes that these and other demonstrations which may be held in the future will have a positive effect which will make it easier for other countries to reappraise their position on the question of an adequate verification of a production ban.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and I would like to express to him also my special appreciation for the kind words he said about me and about my country.

I also appreciated the tribute that he paid to my predecessor in the Chair, Ambassador Thomson.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): As this is the first occasion on which I have spoken in a plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, I should like, at the outset, to thank those distinguished delegates and colleagues who have so kindly welcomed me here to Geneva. I look forward to continuing to play a full and active role in the work of the Committee. In my turn, may I now extend a warm welcome to the distinguished representative of Zaire, Ambassador Kamanda wa Kamanda.

I should like to say a few words this morning about the visit of chemical weapons experts to Britain, which took place between 14 and 16 March.

By way of introduction, I should point out that the United Kingdom has no chemical weapons and has long been committed to achieving a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and on their destruction. In August 1976 we put forward in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament a draft convention on chemical weapons (CCD/512) which contributed much to subsequent discussion of this question.

It is because we attach high priority to the achievement of a chemical weapons convention that we strongly support the efforts which are being made by the United States and the Soviet Union to reach agreement on a joint initiative to present to the Committee on Disarmament in this field. We wish them speedy success and we look forward to negotiations being undertaken in this Committee.

In the meantime we have been considering in the United Kingdom ways in which confidence-building measures might contribute to progress on a chemical weapons convention, and in particular to a better understanding of the question of verification. The main task of a verification procedure is to provide adequate confidence that production of chemical weapons has ceased, that existing stocks have been destroyed and that new production does not take place clandestinely.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

It was with this in mind that my Government invited chemical weapons experts from Member States of the Committee on Disarmament and other interested States to visit Britain in March this year. Nineteen governments sent representatives, four of whom were from States not members of this Committee. The visitors came from a wide geographical and political spread of countries. The visit was designed to complement the verification workshop in the Federal Republic of Germany which preceded it and of which our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Pfeiffer, has just given an interesting account.

On the first day of the visit to Britain the visiting party went to the site of a former Ministry of Defence pilot plant for producing nerve agent at Nancekuke in Cornwall on the South-West coast of England. The purpose of their visit was to examine the use of on-site inspection to verify the demolition of plants that have previously produced chemical weapons and to learn at first hand about some of the problems likely to be encountered in dismantling such a plant. The party first heard an account of the small-scale production of Sarin nerve agent at Nancekuke between 1951 and 1955 and a description of the decontamination and demolition of the nerve agent production facilities. The physical dismantling of the plant began in 1976 and is now two-thirds complete. My delegation is circulating a paper, CD/15, giving some background to the visit, which includes a detailed description of the technical requirements for the work of dismantling a plant used in the production of a highly toxic substance. The party then toured the site to see for themselves what was going on.

This tour was followed by a demonstration of United Kingdom chemical defence equipment now available or in production including protective clothing, prophylaxis and detection equipment.

The final session at Nancekuke took the form of a discussion about on-site inspection for the verification of any future chemical weapons ban. A Foreign Office research paper on the question of verification was distributed to participants. Since this paper was not a formal document it would be inappropriate to present it as a Committee paper. But if there are delegations who have not seen the paper and would like to do so, we should be glad to make copies available informally.

The second day of the visit to Britain was taken up by a visit to the factory of a civil chemical company, Messrs Albright and Wilson Ltd., at Oldbury near Birmingham, in the industrial area of central England. The party were given a full description of the works and then split into groups which between them visited the whole factory, seeing different aspects of the handling of phosphorus and phosphoric chemicals. Further details of the visit to this plant are given in the working paper CD/15.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

No attempt has been made to derive any formal conclusions from the two-day visit, but at the end of the second day a round-table discussion was held and I should like to mention some of the points which emerged. It seemed to be the general view that initiatives of this type could make a major contribution to the understanding of the problems involved in verifying a chemical weapons ban. Such visits may also be seen as a valuable confidence-building measure in themselves. The visit to the United Kingdom was considered complementary to that to the Federal Republic of Germany since it had a somewhat different accent and it included a former nerve agent plant as well as a civil chemical factory.

The specific ideas to emerge from the discussion among participants include the following:

- (i) More such visits, ideally involving both diplomats and technical experts, could produce a valuable interchange of ideas and serve to introduce non-specialist officials to the realities of the subject. Some delegations volunteered that informal discussions during the visit had caused them to reconsider some of their own assumptions.
- (ii) Specific training about chemical weapons should be given to those involved in negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament outside the confines of such visits. The possibility was mentioned of Committee representatives availing themselves of United Nations disarmament fellowships for this purpose.
- (iii) A number of visitors commented that the visit to the United Kingdom had shown that inspection of civil chemical factories could take place without any risk to commercial security.
- (iv) The presentation of British chemical defence equipment was thought to be the first of its kind and raised a good deal of interest.
- (v) Thought should be given to other forms of confidence-building measures in the chemical weapons field.

That is all I wish to say now by way of impressions of the visit of chemical weapon experts, as seen by my Government which organized it. I hope in the first place that these comments may have been of interest to distinguished delegates, not all of whom were represented on the visit. I hope also that other delegations, whether they were represented on the tour or not, will feel able to comment on the visit and its implications. My delegation looks forward to further discussion on the subject.

Mr. DI BERNARDO (Italy): Mr. Chairman, on the occasion of my taking the floor in this formal meeting, I should first of all like to associate myself with other delegations who have already congratulated you on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee. The presence in the Chair of a diplomat with your experience, your distinction and your skill is to all of us, highly gratifying, as is our consideration of the important role your country has always assumed in the disarmament field. At the same time I also wish to pay tribute to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Thomson of Australia, for the significant contribution he made, during last month, to the success of our deliberations on the question of the agenda. We sincerely admire Ambassador Thomson's dedication and confidence in dealing with this sensitive issue.

Finally, I would like to extend my personal warm welcome to Ambassador Summerhayes from the United Kingdom and Ambassador Kamanda wa Kamanda of Zaire. I wish each of them success in their new mission, and I look forward to working with them in the same spirit and with the same co-operation, as their predecessors.

The renewed Committee on Disarmament is speedily reaching the conclusion of the first part of its annual session.

Unfortunately, we are not able to record and to show significant achievements or major advances in our efforts to negotiate effective disarmament measures. Most of our time has been in fact dedicated to the drafting and to the adoption of the rules of procedure and of the agenda.

Nevertheless, our meetings have not been fruitless. The exercise in which we have been engaged in the past weeks has proved not to be a mere procedural formality. The intensive and constructive consultations and discussions which have taken place on procedural arrangements and on the agenda, far from being empty rhetoric, have made a useful and substantive contribution in clarifying positions and approaches to a number of important issues and have succeeded in establishing a balanced framework for our future work. The Committee has now before it a clear-cut agenda, which outlines the different items that could be considered or could be the subject of negotiations at appropriate stages of the disarmament process.

The agenda on which agreement has been reached a few days ago does not take into account, of course, all the wishes and the proposals put forward by members of the Committee. Yet, it realizes a fair compromise between differing options and points of views, giving the Committee the needed flexibility in dealing with

(Mr. Di Bernardo, Italy)

the numerous and complex issues which fall within its mandate. Moreover it should be recalled that the rules of procedure formally recognize the right of any Member State to raise at a plenary meeting any subject relevant to the work of the Committee and to have a full opportunity of presenting its views on any subject which it may consider to merit attention.

In this connexion, I should like to note that, besides drawing up its agenda and rules of procedure, the Committee has listened during this first period of session to important statements -- including statements by countries having for the first time joined our forum -- giving evidence of a new, genuine, commitment to the achievement of our endeavours.

Furthermore, the Committee has received for consideration a number of working papers, dealing both with the substance and the procedure of our work, which deserve careful study and examination.

The active participation in our preliminary work of so many delegations and the business-like atmosphere which prevailed encourage us to hope for positive developments in carrying forward successful negotiations on priority issues in the near future.

Today's meeting being mainly devoted to the consideration of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons, I would like, in the first place, to refer to this matter.

The strong interest of the Italian Government in chemical disarmament is well known and has been repeatedly voiced here and in the General Assembly of the United Nations. I do not need therefore to reiterate in detail our position and our approach.

I should like, however, to address some specific aspects of the problem which, in our view, are of particular significance in order to make meaningful progress.

First of all, the object of negotiations. Resolution 33/59 A, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its thirty-third session,

"Requests the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to undertake, at the beginning of its 1979 session, negotiations with a view to elaborating an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives".

In this light, our task is, clearly, to pursue -- with the greatest sense of urgency -- a comprehensive ban, covering the whole range of chemical warfare agents and providing for the total elimination of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Di Bernardo, Italy)

Another key issue -- which is common to all disarmament agreements, because of its close relevance to vital national security interests -- is verification.

The problem of verification is not simply a technical one. It is a problem presenting an evident political dimension and demanding a thorough understanding.

In this connexion, I would like to emphasize that, if in our "decatalogue" verification methods are listed under the same heading with confidence-building measures and collateral measures, the concept of verification goes far beyond the notions of confidence, or confidence-building. They are in fact different concepts and it is important to keep them separate.

Admittedly, verification can also have a confidence-building effect, in so far as it gives States Parties to a treaty confidence in the general intentions and in the good faith of other Parties in the fulfilment of mutual obligations. This is not, however, the more important and fundamental function of verification in the arms limitation and disarmament field. The essential purpose of a verification system is to deter and to detect violations, by establishing an adequate framework of technical, juridical and political safeguards within which a treaty can operate, giving to the Parties reliable assurances that the treaty is fully and correctly implemented by all the Parties.

Under these circumstances, it is self-evident that there is a close interrelationship between the scope of each agreement and the type of verification.

In envisaging a verification system for a convention banning all chemical weapons and prescribing their removal from the military arsenals, the following requirements should be met:

- (a) To ensure that prohibited agents are not being manufactured neither in previous production facilities, nor in new factories;
- (b) To provide proof that prohibited agents are not being obtained from outside sources;
- (c) To ascertain that existing stocks of prohibited agents are eliminated;
- (d) To detect and observe suspicious activities.

Bearing in mind such requirements, it is the view of the Italian delegation that a certain degree of internationalization is indispensable to any effective verification pattern of a chemical weapons ban. We should, in other words, adopt a mixed solution based on the combination of national verification means with international control procedures, including some forms of physical access to the territory of the State being verified, when the circumstances require it.

(Mr. Di Bernardo, Italy)

The Italian delegation is well aware of the objections of a group of members of our Committee to systems of verification of an "intrusive" nature. The argument has been often advanced that such forms of control would entail an encroachment on a State's affairs and would be prejudicial to the protection of national industrial and commercial secrets.

We are, however, persuaded that such concerns might be overcome through a careful assessment and a better knowledge of the implications of different types of verifications, in a spirit of mutual co-operation and goodwill.

In this light, my Government has highly appreciated the initiative taken by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom in organizing two workshops with a view to providing evidence that "on-site" inspections for the purpose of verifying the non-production of chemical weapons can be carried out without the disclosure of production data and technologies which need to be protected. Italian experts have been happy to participate in this significant exercise, the results of which deserve to be considered with the greatest attention by all the members of the Committee, including those who, for various reasons, were not able to respond affirmatively to the invitation.

This morning we have listened with sincere interest to the statements of the distinguished representatives of the United Kingdom and of the Federal Republic of Germany.

It is our hope that the valuable work begun in their two countries can be further expanded and that experts from other countries would be prepared in the near future to take part in similar technical investigations, with a view to developing a common understanding of the various aspects of the problem of verification of a chemical weapons ban.

I would like now to turn briefly to the question of procedures and methods of conducting negotiations that our Committee is requested to undertake, at a multilateral level, on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

My delegation has expressed its views on this subject since 6 February in a working paper which calls for the establishment, not later than the beginning of our next period of session, of an ad hoc working group, open to the participation of all members and, upon invitation, of other interested States for an in-depth consideration of the unresolved issues standing in the way of an agreement.

Thoughtful suggestions on the same subject have been developed at the same time by the Netherlands delegation. Both the Dutch and the Italian contributions have been favourably greeted and positively commented by a number of delegations in recent meetings.

(Mr. Di Bernardo, Italy)

The Group of 21, for its part, in a document officially introduced on 9 April 1979, concurred in the opinion that there is a need to establish an ad hoc working group, with a view to elaborating a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction.

Against this background, it seems to my delegation that the time is coming for seeking a more effective approach to this crucial problem, and for establishing an ad hoc working group, operating on a more informal basis and with needed expertise, to deal with this problem.

I now should like to address another subject, on which the Italian delegation recently submitted to our Committee a working paper: that is the problem of the complete cessation of the arms race in outer space.

As you will remember, in submitting to the Committee on 26 March document CD/9, I refrained from illustrating it in detail, in order not to delay our deliberations on the agenda. Now, before the conclusion of this period of session, I should like to take the opportunity to briefly illustrate it to the members of the Committee.

Paragraph 80 of the "Programme of Action" contained in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament states:

"In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held, in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies".

The Italian delegation was particularly gratified to contribute to the elaboration of such a paragraph, which reflected a proposal set forth in a working paper entitled "Suggestions for a disarmament programme" presented by Italy to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD/54B) and to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session (A/AC.137/97).

In the opinion of my Government, although recent rapid developments in military space technologies have increased the perception of the danger of an extension of the arms race to outer space, this problem has not been given sufficient consideration in the context of international debates on arms control and disarmament.

(Mr. Di Bernardo, Italy)

In this connexion, it may be recalled that article IV of the "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies", provides that:

"States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station weapons in outer space in any other manner.

The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited".

It should be acknowledged that the Outer Space Treaty has, for more than a decade, made a significant contribution to the limitation of military competition in outer space.

After twelve years it might however seem appropriate to give new thought to the various aspects of space activities, in the light of ongoing developments in science and technology.

Notwithstanding the great degree of secrecy covering space programmes of Powers engaged in such activities, there is a general awareness that advancements in space technology are of such a nature that timely action should be envisaged to prevent the possibility of any development prejudicial to the use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes.

We assume that nobody has difficulties in recognizing the desirability of enhancing peaceful co-operation in space and avoiding that the space might be transformed into a new arena for military hostilities. Satellites play nowadays an essential role in different areas, including communications, meteorology, navigation, cartography and other civilian applications. All such peaceful uses of space are of vital importance and should be preserved and protected in the interest of all mankind.

(Mr. Di Bernardo, Italy)

There are similarly other uses which, although of a military nature in a literal sense, should continue to be recognized not only as licit, but also as desirable. I refer to the use of reconnaissance and observation satellites, which have a particularly important role to play -- among others -- in verifying compliance with disarmament and arms limitation agreements.

We are, however, all aware of the potential advent of other categories of satellites and devices whose function seems to be mainly hostile and may have a tremendous impact on security and stability. The reported possible development of devices, such as interceptor-destroyer satellites or hunter-killer satellites designed to damage or destroy other satellites in space represents an alarming threat to which we should give careful thought, in order to prevent the emergence of a new dimension in the arms race.

Bearing this in mind, we believe that measures concerning the control of activities in space should be reviewed from time to time in relation to new developments in technologies which might have adverse effects on the disarmament process. In this connexion the desirability might be considered to extend the present international agreed prohibition of the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit, on celestial bodies or elsewhere in space, to include all weapons or any other device designed for hostile uses, by means of an additional protocol to the Outer Space Treaty of 1966.

For this purpose my delegation has circulated, as an annex to the working paper submitted on 26 March, a draft additional protocol which sets forth a number of possible provisions intended to supplement the rules of the Outer Space Treaty.

My delegation is well aware that the issue I am referring to is not on the agenda of the current session, which is already heavily burdened with other priority tasks.

I should take this opportunity, however, to note that the problem of the cessation of the arms race in outer space clearly lies within the attributions of our Committee, under heading (IX) of the document adopted at our 26th plenary meeting on 10 April. As stated by the Chairman on that occasion, it is in fact our understanding that "collateral measures" include "further measures to prevent an arms race in outer space".

Given the complexity of the problem, my delegation -- in submitting to the attention of our Committee working paper CD/9 -- looks forward to hearing from other delegations comments and suggestions that could pave the way to the beginning of effective negotiations on further measures to limit the arms race in outer space at an appropriate time.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Italy for his statement.

I would like to tell you, Sir, how sincerely I value your friendly and appreciative words concerning myself. As Chairman, I also keenly appreciated the tribute that you paid to my predecessor, Ambassador Thomson.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): I should first like to say that Mrs. Thorsson very much deploras that she cannot participate in our meeting today as she had planned. She has also asked me to convey to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the other members of the Committee her sincere thanks for the kind expressions of sympathy which were made at our last meeting on 20 April because of the decease of her husband.

Since this is the first time I am taking the floor this month in the official part of our proceedings, at least for a substantive statement, I wish to express our appreciation to see you, Mr. Chairman, leading us in our negotiations. I should like to congratulate you on what you have already achieved in the form of very fair and skilful chairmanship so far and I wish you continued success during the few remaining days of the present part of our session. Let me add that we are glad that your country is now in a position to contribute actively and directly to our efforts in this Committee. We all know that your Government has devoted a good deal of thought to the regional aspects of disarmament and we look forward to hearing more from you on this, as we regard it, very important issue.

I should likewise pay my respect to your predecessor, Ambassador Thomson, for the never flagging patience and steadfast pursuit he showed in dealing with the difficult task of negotiating an agenda for our Committee. May the wisdom we acquired from the long discussions on that subject be of benefit so that our future annual agenda debates can be so much shorter!

I am further pleased to welcome in this Committee our new colleagues from Zaire, Dr. Kamanda Wa Kamanda, and from the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes; we look forward to a fruitful and pleasant co-operation with them.

We have decided to devote this week to the question of a convention on chemical weapons. My delegation considers this to be one of the most important items on our agenda. I am today going to deal with it in the light of some facts and recent developments which must be taken into account when considering this serious matter.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

The first development is an ominous one. There is increasing concern that a substantial chemical warfare capability has been built up in some countries, which may lead to a dangerous action-reaction pattern, especially in Europe. The use of chemical weapons was prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925. Warfare techniques and planning have, however, undergone revolutionary developments in the past five decades. Present-day doctrines, forces and weapons involve a much more rapid process in foreseeable situations of military conflict. It can be argued that the deployment of chemical weapons is incompatible with the spirit of the Geneva Protocol, as deployment entails in fact far greater risks that these weapons actually will be used in situations of crisis or war.

This concern is particularly well-founded in view of such fast crisis processes as I just referred to. Thus, as has long been agreed, it is not enough to outlaw the use of these weapons. Also their development, production and stockpiling must be prohibited.

Secondly, the United States and the Soviet Union have been conducting bilateral talks since 1976 with a view to producing a joint initiative on chemical weapons to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The initiative has still failed to materialize, which is deeply regrettable, in fact a cause for great concern.

Thirdly, the question of chemical weapons concerns all countries, not only because these weapons may be used against them in the event of war but also because a large number of countries are in a position to manufacture them.

Fourthly, the Committee on Disarmament has been urged by the thirty-third session of the General Assembly to start real negotiations on a convention on chemical weapons without awaiting the outcome of the bilateral talks on the subject between the United States and the USSR.

The Swedish Government strongly feels that we have now come to the point where we should start such negotiations in a concrete way here in this Committee. We cannot see that negotiations in the Committee must have a hampering effect on the ongoing bilateral negotiations. On the contrary, impetus may be given to both by their parallel efforts. There must of course be a link between them to secure the most effective conduct of the negotiations. The two leading military Powers may argue that it will be more difficult for them to achieve results by negotiating on

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

this matter in an international forum like the Committee on Disarmament. We cannot, however, as a matter of principle, accept this argument. If it were to be accepted, it would imply that it should be left to the discretion of the two super-Powers to decide if and when matters of legitimate universal concern should be submitted to relevant international fora. In the world of today this is unacceptable. Besides, in this particular case the terms of reference for the ad hoc working group and the procedures proposed by the Group of 21 have been specifically designed to facilitate parallel negotiations in the Committee and between the two leading military Powers. For this purpose, the two States participating in the bilateral negotiations should inform the ad hoc working group on the state of negotiations and indicate the areas in which agreement has been reached as well as issues which are still outstanding. The ad hoc working group could then initially concentrate its work on areas where agreement has been identified. It should, however, also in an open way consider possible new elements of importance for this convention, basing itself both on proposals and suggestions which have been presented to the Committee and its predecessors in the past and such as may be submitted to it during the course of its work by members as well as non-members of the Committee.

The time has thus come to make a new start, bearing in mind the steps taken previously in this matter, such as the draft convention of 1972 submitted by nine socialist countries, and the Japanese and British draft conventions of 1974 and 1976 respectively. A group of non-aligned and neutral countries, members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, have stated their position in a working paper (CCD/400). Also all other working papers and statements on chemical weapons made in the CCD, as well as material from informal meetings with experts should be taken into account. One example of the latter materials is the "Compilation of materials on chemical weapons from CCD working papers and statements 1972-76" dated 11 March 1977, which seems particularly apt to facilitate our future work. Due consideration should also be given to experience gained through such special arrangements as the recent visits to chemical plants in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. I wish to take this opportunity to express our appreciation for these invitations. The visits seem to have been most valuable both from the political and technical points of view. The experience gained at these and possible future visits needs to be shared and discussed further. We assume that records of these visits will be kept by our Secretariat.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

As far as the structure of the coming negotiations is concerned I wish to make the following suggestions.

As I said a few minutes ago, one of the first negotiating tasks should be to identify areas of agreement on the possible scope of the convention, including its verification.

Regrettably, areas of agreement do not seem to be as many as one might have expected after so many years of discussion. However, it is important to be aware of the difficulties involved. It would be premature indeed to exclude that areas of agreement may emerge where progress has not been far-reaching enough or only gradual in the past years of discussion.

I may point to one important area of agreement, namely the chemical warfare agents which should be covered by a ban. It seems that most participants in the discussions are in agreement that virtually all such agents should be prohibited.

Items clearly agreed upon include the recognition of dual and single purpose chemical warfare agents, and the methods of coping with them in a convention. The elaboration of such methods includes the formulation of a purpose criterion, in some cases combined with a quantity criterion and the application of toxicity limits for different kinds of substances. As regards the few possible exemptions from a general prohibition, it seems to be more or less generally agreed that tear gases should be partly exempted from a ban. It must be recognized, however, that the means through which this should be done is still far from agreed upon. I have noted with interest the suggestions by the Canadian delegation that such exemptions might preferably be identified by specifically allowing certain activities (CD/PV.23). In this context, I wish, however, to recall that launching attacks with incapacitating agents and irritants in war is by most countries considered to be prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

New elements of possible importance for the scope of a treaty have also been discussed. Sweden, like some other countries, has in the past few years presented ideas in this field. One of the many problems is that chemical warfare agents can be acquired fairly quickly. However, adequate organization, planning and training, which are equally indispensable for a militarily important offensive chemical

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

warfare capability, take much longer. Were these activities to be prohibited, the time lag from violating the convention to an actual attack with chemical weapons would increase considerably. Also in the long-term perspective this will diminish the risks connected with possibly hidden stockpiles and thus diminish the need for intrusive verification measures. These facts must also be taken into account if a convention is to be made credible. We have so far had very little discussion on the implications of these facts. Such discussion should start now.

Further, it is important to be aware of the fact that the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons is a time-consuming procedure, probably taking many years. Consequently, a chemical warfare capability can be retained by a country having large stockpiles for a considerable period after destruction has started. Circumstances like this must as well be considered when negotiating a convention.

Another important matter is the possible development of new chemical agents, which may also lead to new forms of chemical warfare. This means that the scientific and technical developments in the chemical field must be kept under review in order to identify possible new applications for military purposes based upon new scientific discoveries. We have already been studying the problem of methods for such surveillance (CCD/569). Work in this field should be continued on a broader basis, which incidentally seems to have been recognized also in the Italian working paper CD/5.

The problem of verification is still far from solved, even if some steps appear to have been taken towards a common understanding in the bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus agreement seems to have been reached between them that verification activities should be performed by both national and international means. However, as was explicitly stated in the joint USA-USSR communiqué a year ago (CCD/PV.788), the specific methods of verification, especially of the destruction of production facilities and stockpiles, have not been agreed upon.

Past work in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has provided a sound technical basis for negotiations on verification measures. It should also be noted that not only have ingenious measures for different types of on-site verification been worked out, e.g. chemical analytical methods, toxicity tests, satellite monitored seals, etc., but serious attempts have also been made to find complementary

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

non-intrusive methods, like the phosphorus-accounting system and remote-sensing systems, including the use of satellites. Particular attention has also been paid to the problem of applying verification methods without revealing legitimate production secrets of the chemical industry.

The readiness of chemical industries in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom to permit visits of the kind recently arranged seems to indicate that industrial secrets need not be revealed by such inspections. As the necessary political steps have not been taken, it is difficult to evaluate or advocate any particular method. Furthermore, it may not be possible to verify, for instance, hidden production facilities or stockpiles.

With respect to mechanisms for complaint procedures a consultative committee should be established. In the opinion of the Swedish Government this is particularly important. From our side we have deplored the lack in the Convention on Biological Weapons of practically useful mechanisms for such complaint procedures. This problem must be solved in connexion with a chemical weapons convention.

I just referred to the tremendous problems related to the verification of hidden production facilities and stockpiles and to the fact that chemical warfare agents can be produced relatively quickly, whereas it often takes many years to destroy the stockpiles. Also in view of these facts it is necessary that a convention should allow for protective measures against chemical weapons.

It has long been agreed that mutual trust is of fundamental importance for reaching disarmament agreements. However, confidence-building measures were first considered explicitly with regard to chemical weapons in the summer of 1976 when the United Kingdom presented its draft on a chemical weapons convention. It was then suggested that States, as soon as they signed the convention, should give information regarding their possession of chemical weapons as a confidence-building measure, thus before the convention was actually ratified and had come into force. This suggestion provoked some criticism at the time, mainly because it was considered improper to request States to give information with respect to their chemical warfare capacity before the convention was in force. Confidence-building measures should, however, be discussed in a broad context. It is essential, given the specific characteristics

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

of the chemical weapons field, that confidence between States should be further strengthened already in the negotiation phase of a chemical weapons convention. This might be achieved by exchanging information on different subjects to be covered by the convention. Such an exchange must be voluntary, and need not necessarily be directly linked to the provisions of the convention. However, it must have a practical bearing on its substance and intent.

It is also conceivable, of course, that a convention will prescribe that such information should be provided, although such a provision would not be binding until the convention was in force.

Other examples of confidence-building measures that would facilitate verification could be information on stockpiles of chemical weapons and facilities for their destruction and the time required for this, technical visits to such destruction facilities, possibilities of attending military manoeuvres in order to permit the observation of elements of interest with regard to chemical warfare potential, demonstration of chemical protection, and offers of co-operation in this area. I am sure that also other confidence-building measures could be discussed, and I would therefore suggest that sufficient time be devoted to identifying such measures.

No further delay in starting multilateral negotiations on a chemical weapons convention should be accepted in the Committee on Disarmament. I have mentioned some reasons why such negotiations are more urgent today than ever. They may be long and difficult, as the issues involved are extremely complex, but it should be possible to achieve results as long as the political will is there. In accordance with the proposal by the Group of 21 (CD/11) an ad hoc working group should be established with the task of systematically reviewing the substances and activities to be covered by a chemical weapons convention, identifying areas of agreement and disagreement and working on proposals for resolving the latter. This would pave the way for agreement on a convention so much discussed and so long awaited. It is undeniable that the question of a chemical weapons convention concerns all countries, and that many countries possess the expert knowledge to bring it into being. The ability of the Committee on Disarmament to deal with this matter in a serious and constructive way will be somewhat of a test case of what can be expected of this body in the years to come.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for his kind words about me and for the tribute he paid to my predecessor, Ambassador Thomson.

Mr. MUNIU (Kenya): The Kenya delegation wishes to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, and your delegation on the assumption of the chairmanship for the month of April. Under your chairmanship this Committee was able to adopt its programme of work for the annual session. We are equally hopeful that under your able leadership the Committee will make significant progress in the remaining days of the first part of the annual session. I would also like to take this opportunity to convey, through you Mr. Chairman, my delegation's warmest congratulations to Ambassador Thomson of Australia whose skill and ability were clearly demonstrated during his chairmanship for the month of March.

I will now make brief remarks on the subject of chemical weapons. My remarks will be very brief as I do not believe that we should utilize the remaining days making statements but instead we should concentrate our efforts on concrete issues, on the question of chemical weapons.

When the Committee adopted its work programme it decided that the week of 24 to 27 April should be devoted to the consideration of the item dealing with chemical weapons. This was in accordance with the General Assembly's resolution 33/59 in which the Committee on Disarmament is requested, as a matter of high priority, to undertake, at the beginning of its 1979 session, negotiations with a view to elaborating an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction. Also in the same resolution, the Assembly urged the Soviet Union and the United States to submit their joint initiative to the Committee in order to assist it in achieving early agreement on the question of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Muniu, Kenya)

This resolution, together with several others that the General Assembly has adopted since 1971, clearly reflects the desire of the international community to achieve an **agreement** on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The fact that the Committee decided to devote this week to the consideration of the item is a clear indication of the high priority that the Committee attaches to the question of chemical weapons.

My delegation is well aware of the substantial amount of work that has been done on the subject of chemical weapons. In the past several years this item has been the subject of many debates in the First Committee of the General Assembly and at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and as a result numerous working papers and expert reports are now available to the interested parties.

In view of the foregoing and aware of the expectation by the international community to see progress in this area, the Group of 21 has prepared a working paper on chemical weapons which has been produced as CD/11. The working paper proposes the creation of an ad hoc working group, open to the participation of all Member States of the Committee, with a view to elaborating a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction. It is the hope of my delegation that this proposal will receive a warm reception from all members of this Committee. My delegation believes that while we may differ on the details, our main objective remains the same -- to achieve a total ban on chemical weapons.

The creation of an ad hoc working group and its task of elaborating the draft convention would not, in the view of my delegation, hinder or interfere in any way with the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union

(Mr. Muniu, Kenya)

and the United States. In this respect Kenya supports views expressed by the delegation of the Netherlands in document CD/6 submitted to this Committee on 6 February 1979.

The drafters of CD/11 acknowledge the importance of the bilateral talks between the two Powers and that is why they have felt that the Committee should request the States participating in the bilateral negotiations to inform the ad hoc working group fully on the state of their negotiations, indicating areas in which agreement has been reached as well as issues which still are outstanding.

Kenya is fully aware that this would not be the first time that the two Powers would be requested to provide information on the state of their negotiations. In its resolution 32/77 of 12 December 1977 on the subject of chemical weapons, the General Assembly stressed the need for early submission of the joint initiative of the United States and the Soviet Union to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in order to assist it in achieving early agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We note with satisfaction that, following the General Assembly's request, the representative of the Soviet Union on 9 May 1978 read a joint USSR-United States statement to the Committee on the state of their negotiations. This was a positive action and we hope that the two States would once again find it possible to inform the ad hoc working group on chemical weapons on the state of their negotiations.

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation to the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom for their being kind enough to invite Member States to participate in chemical weapons verification workshops. Kenya hopes that others would find it possible to extend similar invitations.

In conclusion, I would like to thank Ambassador Summerhayes for his briefing this Committee on the visit to Britain by chemical weapons experts and in particular, for the announcement that his country no longer possesses chemical weapons. My delegation also welcomes the paper circulated this morning (CD/15) in the hope that it will contribute to the Committee's negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Kenya for his statement. I wish to assure him that I was particularly appreciative of his remarks about me and about my predecessor, Ambassador Thomson.

U SAW HLAING (Burma): Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to express to you the warmest congratulations of my delegation in assuming the responsibilities of the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation appreciates very much that the Committee has moved forward in its work under your Chairmanship, benefiting from your wisdom, tact and courtesy. May I also take this occasion to extend my welcome to Ambassador Summerhayes of the United Kingdom and Ambassador Kamanda Wa Kamanda of Zaire.

Mr. Chairman, I take the floor to put forward, as the co-ordinator of the Group of 21, two points on agenda item 4--- Chemical Weapons.

The first point I would like to make is that CD/11 was submitted by the Group of 21 on 9 April. Subsequently, members of the Committee had about two weeks to consider the paper. We feel that this priority item should be dealt with promptly without further loss of time, by establishing an Ad Hoc Working Group, open to the participation of all member States of the Committee, with a view to elaborating a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction. We strongly feel that the Committee should give its decision on the proposal cited in CD/11 before the end of this session in order that the Ad Hoc Group will be able to commence its work at the outset of the coming summer session.

Secondly, in order that a free exchange of views take place among the members of the Committee on the proposal contained in CD/11, and to facilitate arriving at a decision by the Committee, we should like to propose that informal meetings-- as many as may be deemed necessary-- be held during the time we have at hand before the end of this session.

We therefore suggest that, if all agree, we meet this afternoon at 3 o'clock for an informal meeting

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Burma. I wish to tell him that I was most appreciative of his kind words and of the tribute he paid my predecessor, Ambassador Thomson.

I would like to invite you now to consider the future organization of our work.

You have all heard the proposal of the distinguished delegate of Burma that we should meet this afternoon to continue our work, but informally. I should also tell you that I am expected to deal with two or three questions which concern the application of rules 11, 33 and 34 of our Rules of Procedure. I think that in an informal meeting we could usefully have an exchange of views on these questions.

In the circumstances, would the Committee agree that we should meet informally this afternoon, say at 3 p.m.?

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): Mr. Chairman, I should like to put a question. What do you intend to discuss at the informal meeting regarding rules 11, 33 and 34? Could you perhaps explain exactly what you are going to deal with, quite apart from the continuation of the discussions on chemical weapons.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Two delegations, that of Switzerland and that of Finland, have asked for the floor, the first to speak in the debate on chemical weapons, and the latter to submit a working document and to speak in the debate.

I think we may usefully discuss these requests during an informal meeting.

Mr. DOMOKOS (Hungary) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, I too would like to ask a question before taking a position on this afternoon's informal meeting. If I remember correctly, the Committee has decided to hold a plenary meeting tomorrow. What I wish to ask is whether you intend to hold that meeting also?

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The possibility of holding a meeting has been provided for. As yet no speakers have put down their names for that meeting, but there may be some speakers by tomorrow morning. I think, therefore, that the possibility of holding a meeting should be left open. If there are no speakers, the meeting can be closed immediately. That is how I see the continuation of our work in plenary.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): We could perhaps hold a plenary meeting tomorrow morning; if there are no speakers we could immediately pass on to an informal meeting, especially since I have a question cropping up in my mind-- again, I would like to have some explanations-- the question of the invitation of a State to speak at a meeting of the Committee. The matter has already arisen in connexion with the request of the delegation of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, in March. At that time, not the Soviet delegation, but a number of other delegations, expressed the wish that appropriate documents (in connexion with such requests) be distributed well in advance. The Soviet delegation had not received any documents concerning this particular question, perhaps there is some misunderstanding, or perhaps these documents will in fact be distributed later. I am anxious to have some explanations on this question.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union. I wish simply to repeat that I have received two letters, one from the Swiss delegation asking to speak in the debate on chemical weapons, and another from the Finnish delegation to much the same effect together with a working document to be submitted to the Committee. I think that it would be useful to have some consultations concerning these two letters.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I was one of the delegations, in a prior context, that said it would be nice to have these things in writing and I am glad to hear that they are in writing. I wonder if I could request any information the Chairman may feel he can give out as to his intention to make these written documents available to other members of the Committee, if he proposes to do so, and if so, when.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): If such is the wish of the delegations, I shall arrange for copies of the letters to be at the disposal of all delegations at the secretariat from 5 p.m. onwards this afternoon.

Mr. HARRY JAY (Canada): Mr. Chairman, I think a proposal was made on behalf of a number of countries that we should meet this afternoon in an informal meeting, and I understood from one of your earlier interventions that you supported this view, that there was work that we could usefully do this afternoon in an informal meeting. I would endorse that suggestion and would hope that it finds support in the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Thank you, Sir. May I make the following suggestion?

Let us make a distinction between the two questions. One question is that of the letters that I have just received; these letters will be at the disposal of delegates at the secretariat from 3 p.m. onwards this afternoon. Delegates will thus be able to acquaint themselves with these letters and we shall be able to have a useful discussion on them tomorrow at an informal meeting after the plenary.

The other question is when we shall continue our discussions on the topic of chemical weapons; shall we accept the request of the Group of 21 to continue these discussions this afternoon at 3 p.m. in an informal meeting?

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, I think that you have put two questions very clearly to the members of the Committee and I did not notice any dissent from the two propositions that have been made. Therefore, I think we could meet at 3 o'clock this afternoon and take up the questions that you have submitted, for our consideration.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for his proposal to deal with both questions this afternoon at 3 p.m.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): I could agree with the proposal to discuss both these questions together, because I certainly do not see the necessity of holding one informal meeting to discuss the problem you mentioned concerning the request of certain delegations to take the floor, and a second informal meeting to discuss the other question. In order to save time and to be

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

more effective, I would like to suggest that we have one informal meeting tomorrow, immediately after the official meeting. All delegations will then have a possibility to study the papers which will be ready this afternoon and we could then start our work effectively on both questions tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): We now have a third proposal, that we should not meet this afternoon but should begin consideration of both questions in an informal meeting.

U SAW HLAING (Burma): As I said, Mr. Chairman, all delegates agree with my proposal to hold an informal meeting at 3 p.m. I did say this, but if there is any difficulty for other delegates, I have no strong feeling that we meet this afternoon at 3 o'clock, and agree that the informal meeting could be held tomorrow morning.

Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): All the members of the Committee are aware of the importance attached by the Group of 21 to the question of chemical weapons.

When we discussed last week what time should be given to the two subjects on the programme of work, we agreed that priority should be given to the cessation of nuclear weapons and to nuclear disarmament, on the understanding, however, that enough time would also be allotted to the question of the elimination of chemical weapons. It was then said that the time for discussing chemical weapons would be from Tuesday till the end of business. If some delegations would prefer to meet again this afternoon, my delegation would have no objection, provided it was understood, however, that we should work again on Friday if necessary, that is to say, until the closing date for our work, which is set for Friday, the 27th.

That is the only observation I have to make.

Mr. DE LA GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, two very short remarks. First, my delegation is ready to meet in this Committee, with our colleagues, this afternoon, if that is the general wish. We do not have much time left, and we must make use of it.

(Mr. De La Gorce, France)

My second remark, Mr. Chairman, is rather a request. Would it not be possible to circulate the two letters that you have received? Perhaps they are not very long, and it would be more practical and more satisfactory to have them circulated in the form of a document than to line up in an office of the secretariat this afternoon to obtain copies.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the delegate of France. Please allow me to consult the secretariat about your last request, for I fear that the circulation may take some time.

I assume that the distinguished delegate of France is not requesting that the documents should be officially circulated this afternoon. It would obviously take quite a while to circulate them as official documents. What might be possible and what the secretariat could do would be to arrange for the documents to be circulated in the language in which they were received, and to place them in the delegations' boxes. That seems to me to be the most efficient and the shortest procedure. This afternoon, then, delegations would be able to acquaint themselves with these documents. Is this way of proceeding satisfactory to the distinguished delegates on the Committee?

I give the floor to Ambassador Ene.

Mr. ENE (Romania): I will be open to any formula that you may wish to propose that could be convenient to the Secretariat, but I am a little bit confused with the procedure and, in fact, with the exchange of views we had with regard to these two very legitimate requests. It was my understanding that at the moment we approved the Rules of Procedure this Committee would be quite liberal in accepting requests of this kind. This was the spirit, and in fact, the letter of the Final Document of the Special Session, and the way in which articles 33 and 34 are written are quite clear in this respect; that, whenever the Committee receives such requests they should be dealt with as rapidly as possible without additional requests for the circulation of letters. We should enable whoever expresses interest in our work, to come here. My delegation would appreciate that such requests be treated as quickly as possible.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the Ambassador for his remarks.

As Chairman, I do not wish at this time to prejudge the results of our consultations. It think it is right that we should confer among ourselves about the way of dealing with this kind of request, and as your Chairman I consider it my duty to see to it that the consultations on this request should take place under optimum conditions. In the circumstances, would the delegations be satisfied with the method of informal circulation that I have suggested? Are delegations agreeable to consider this problem tomorrow after our official meeting?

If such is the case, I believe that we have made the necessary arrangements for fruitful consultations. I would suggest also that tomorrow, after the official meeting, we should continue the informal consultations on the topic of chemical weapons. If that is agreeable to you, it will be so decided.

Before closing the meeting, I would like to make some announcements. Document CD/13 "Further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor" and document CD/15 "Visit to Britain by chemical weapons experts" have been circulated to the members of the Committee.

I wish also to tell you that I have received the following communication from Mr. Mikhael Sytenko, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs. I shall read out the communication; it is in English: "At its 412th meeting, on 7 March 1979, the Special Committee Against Apartheid decided that the report of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa should be transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament.

In pursuance of that decision, I have the honour to transmit herewith, on behalf of the Secretary-General, a copy of the report."

The document mentioned in this communication has already been circulated as an official United Nations document. It is available to delegations who wish to consult it at the Committee's secretariat.

Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, I should just like to ask that, if there are sufficient copies, the same procedure should be followed with regard to this document as you suggested for the letters of Switzerland and Finland, that is to say, that a copy should be placed in each of the delegation boxes.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mexico. If the delegations agree, we shall follow the same procedure as that we recommended in the case of the other communications.

Mr. DJOKIĆ (Yugoslavia): Since we are dealing with official documents sent to the Committee on Disarmament by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, may I suggest that the document be circulated as an official document of the Committee to all members.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): I should like to support what has been said by the representative of Yugoslavia. In my opinion, since an official communication is being transmitted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations through his Under-Secretary to the Committee, and since there is a specific request that an official United Nations document be transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament, I consider that both the letter addressed to yourself as Chairman and the document itself should be distributed as official documents.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished delegate of Venezuela. On the last point I would like to make the following suggestion: I have very conscientiously read our rules of procedure. I would very much like to have the advice of delegates as to how this kind of communication should be dealt with. I have not yet found any rule which lays down a specific procedure for dealing with communications of this kind. I therefore suggest the following procedure.

We shall circulate the document and the letter informally. We might then consult together in an informal meeting on the way of dealing with communications of this kind. Speaking as Chairman, I think that the best opportunity for obtaining your advice would be in the course of discussions among ourselves in an informal meeting. This seems all the more advisable since I do not see at this time what rule would be applicable to communications of this kind.

Mr. ESUK (Zaire) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, since tomorrow is not far away and since, as you suggest, we ought to make up our minds how communications of this kind should be dealt with, would it not be possible, without prejudging what we will decide tomorrow, to postpone the circulation of these documents until tomorrow? We shall see whether documents of this kind are to be circulated as official documents rather than having an informal circulation this afternoon, for by tomorrow we may decide to have them circulated as official documents. I wish to propose therefore, if there are no objections, that this circulation should be postponed until tomorrow, immediately after we have decided how documents of this kind should be treated.

Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): When my delegation engages in a discussion, it wants to know exactly what the subject is. I should therefore prefer to have this document, instead of being obliged to go and consult it in the office of the secretariat.

I should like to say now that probably, and almost certainly, my delegation will tomorrow request, or will associate itself with the request made here by the representatives of Yugoslavia and Venezuela, that the document be distributed as an official document, together with the letter from the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations.

At present, the choice is between our going to the office of the secretariat and consulting a single document, or our each having that document in his box in the informal way you have mentioned.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): It seems to me that if we are going to have informal consultations, we should undertake them advisedly. Therefore, and without wishing to set a precedent, it is my intention to follow the procedure which I have suggested. This document will be circulated informally this afternoon so that tomorrow we shall be able to have useful consultations on the question how this Committee should deal with documents of this kind.

If the delegations are in agreement with this procedure, I would suggest that we should now continue this meeting and hear the distinguished delegate of Egypt.

Mr. EL-BARADEI (Egypt): Just a point of clarification, I recall that the Secretary-General, at the beginning of this part of the session, addressed a communiqué to the Committee, one which was in the form of a message transmitting General Assembly resolutions to this Committee. I would like to know what was the procedure in the case of his message to this Committee. Was it reproduced as an official document or circulated in an informal manner?

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): That communication from the Secretary-General was reproduced as an official document.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): As you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, perhaps there is indeed no specific rule applying to cases like this in the rules of procedure. Nevertheless, there are two concrete precedents: documents CD/1 and CD/2 of our Committee, both of which contain letters addressed by the Secretary-General to the Committee as annexes. I do not think therefore that there is any difference between these two cases and the case now arising, and consequently I do not think there will be any need for a dual distribution, one informal and the other formal: it would be enough to distribute the document as an official document once only.

Mr. EL-BARADEI (Egypt): In the light of that answer I wonder what would be the difference between the communiqué which the Secretary-General addressed in the form of a message and his communication transmitting an official decision of the Committee on Apartheid. As a matter of style, I do not think we need to sift through the rules of procedure in order to reproduce as an official document a message transmitted to the Committee by the Secretary-General or one of his deputies.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The procedure which I have suggested should give every delegation enough evidence to make up its mind. I agree that later we might also change this informal communication into an official communication.

Mr. BENSMAIL (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, I rather fear that we are about to establish a precedent, for by agreeing that the document in question should be placed in the boxes we would in a sense be prejudging the Committee's future decision. I think that in the case of communications transmitted to the Committee by the Secretary-General the procedure should be almost automatic. For that reason, I wish to associate myself with the remarks made by the representatives of Egypt and of Venezuela.

Mr. OLUMOKO (Nigeria): My delegation wishes to express support of the view expressed by the distinguished representatives of Yugoslavia, Venezuela, Egypt and Algeria that this paper be distributed in the official manner.

Mr. TERREFE (Ethiopia): I would like to add my own voice to the suggestions that have already been made formally, that this paper should be distributed in the official manner, because of the reasons that have been put forward. There is nothing that prevents us from doing so.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I would like, with the greatest respect, to express a slight difference with my distinguished Algerian colleague — we are not really setting a precedent here. All we are doing is taking a look at it. I have perhaps a traditional view of not liking to make a decision on a document which I have not read. And this is completely without prejudice, moreover, to the position described by my two neighbours that it should be made an official document, but I see nothing wrong in having it distributed if we decide it is an official document; we can so decide tomorrow. And then we set the precedent, and we follow that precedent in this type of document. There is, with the greatest respect, a little difference between this and CD/1 and the documents that were transmitted earlier. They were documents all of which we participated in. We did not participate in the description of them, but there is nothing attached to CD/1 that we did not either vote for — yes, no, abstain or absent. It reflected the work of the General Assembly, all of which we worked on. I am not saying this with any prejudice to the decision of tomorrow. I rather feel that I shall end up along the lines of treating it as an official document, but I do suggest that we might well do it tomorrow morning at an unofficial meeting.

Mr. RAHHALI (Morocco): My delegation would like to support the proposal made by the delegations of Egypt, Yugoslavia and Venezuela for distributing the document in an official manner. I would like to ask you, Mr. Chairman, if it is possible to ask the members of the Committee if there is any objection to following the traditions we have already followed here before taking a decision on the question of the distribution of documents we have received from the Secretariat of the United Nations. Since we already have an established tradition, I would like to ask you to ask the members of the Committee whether there is an objection to following this tradition.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Several speakers are urging me to take a decision forthwith. Several delegations have requested that the document should be circulated officially to the members of the Committee. Other delegations would prefer the document to be first transmitted informally and a decision to be taken tomorrow.

Gentlemen, I think it is getting rather late. I find it impossible to give a ruling one way or the other.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): Very quickly, Mr. Chairman, all I ask for is an opportunity to read the document before we make a decision and I would like to ask my distinguished colleagues if there is any objection to my being permitted to read it before we make a decision.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): My delegation has of course no objection to allowing anybody to read documents, but here I think that our colleague from Algeria and others also had a point, that the document is to be circulated unofficially, and that would establish some sort of a precedent. Of course, this might not be a very serious matter, but nevertheless, it is worth further consideration. What I would suggest is that at the present moment we decide not to take a decision on this question and that those of our colleagues who wish to read this letter may obtain it from the Secretariat, without the Secretariat circulating it. So, we can get unofficial copies from the Secretariat. Tomorrow morning when we have our formal meeting, one of the first things we should do, besides listening to the speakers and before we go into an informal session, is to decide on the circulation of this document. In conclusion, I may add that it is the understanding of my delegation that in future any such communications from the Secretary-General and from other organs of the United Nations system should be circulated automatically by the Secretariat.

Mr. DJOKIĆ (Yugoslavia): I am really sorry, Mr. Chairman, to be taking the floor a second time, but for my delegation this is a matter of principle. The Secretary-General has sent to the Committee, through his Under-Secretary, an official document of the United Nations to the Committee on Disarmament. I heard now for the first time that such a communication of the Secretary-General exists.

(Mr. Djokić, Yugoslavia)

Regardless of the content of the document, it seems to me that it is absolutely normal and logical, not only in this particular case, but in all similar cases in the future, that all official documents sent to the Committee by the Secretary-General and the organs of the United Nations should be automatically circulated to the members of the Committee as an official document.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): My delegation agrees with the representative of Yugoslavia, that we should try to take a general decision.

I hope, however, that he agrees with me that at 1.45 p.m. on a day when the meeting should have ended at 1 p.m., it is not the best time for such a decision. I therefore support the suggestion of the representative of Pakistan, and wish to add now, for the information of the Secretariat, that I would like to have a copy of the document.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Distinguished delegates, I wish to take all your remarks into account, and it is not easy at this time to reach a firm conclusion. I appreciate that some delegations do not wish this document to be circulated informally, for that might be regarded as a precedent. I have the impression, also, that the time is not yet ripe to take a decision. That being so, perhaps we could agree on the following compromise. The document may be consulted by delegates forthwith. Tomorrow we shall take a decision at our next official meeting, after the delegations have had time to read the document.

The decision will therefore be taken tomorrow at our official meeting. It is my wish to accommodate everyone's susceptibilities and to take every precaution to ensure that the Committee is able to take a decision tomorrow. I hope that delegates are in agreement with this procedure and, before closing the meeting, I would apologise for keeping you so late.

I therefore close the meeting. The next official meeting will be tomorrow at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.

CD/PV.30
25 April 1979
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THIRTIETH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Wednesday, 25 April 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. P. NOTERDAEME (Belgium)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. BENSMAIL
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. F.J. DAVILA
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. A.J. BEHM Ms. M.S. WICKES
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. P. NOTERDAEME Mr. P. BERG Mr. G. VAN DUYSSE
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. A. CELSO DE OURO PRETO
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. P. VOUTOV Mr. I. PETROV Mr. I. SOTIROV
<u>Burma:</u>	U SAW HLAING U THAUNG HTUN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. R. HARRY JAY Mr. J.T. SIMARD
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. V. TYLNER Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. O. EL-SHAFEI Mr. M. EL-BARADEI Mr. N. FAHMY
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. G. ALULA
<u>France:</u>	Mr. F. DE LA GORCE Mr. BENOIT D'ABOVILLE Mr. GESBERT

German Democratic Republic:
Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. S. KAHN
Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:
Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. J. POHLMANN
Mr. H. MULLER

Hungary:
Mr. M. DOMOKOS
Mr. C. GYÖRFFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:
Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN
Mr. S.T. DEVARE
Mr. S. SABHARWAL

Indonesia:
Mr. C. ANWAR SANI
Mr. I. DAMANIK

Iran:
Mr. M. FARTASH
Mr. D. CHILATY

Italy:
Mr. M. MORENO
Mr. C. FRATESCHI
Mr. FOLCO DE LUCA

Japan:
Mr. M. OGISO
Mr. T. NONOYAMA
Mr. T. IWANAMI
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya:
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico:
Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES

Mongolia:
Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. ERDENECHULUUN

Morocco: Mr. M. RAHHALI
Mr. M. CHARIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Nigeria: Mr. K. AHMED
Mr. T. OLUMOKO

Pakistan: Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru:

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. H. PAĆ
Mr. B. RUSSIN

Romania: Mr. C. ENE
Mr. V. TUDOR
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. I.B. FONSEKA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. Yu. V. KOSTENKO
Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHLIN
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America:

Mr. A. S. FISHER

Mr. C. FLOWEREE

Mr. A. AKALOVSKY

Mr. M. DALEY

Mr. M.L. SANCHES

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Miss D. SZOKOLOCZI

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): First, I would like to apologize to the distinguished delegates for having delayed the opening of this thirtieth meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. I thought it useful to carry out some consultations on minor matters before declaring this plenary meeting open.

The speakers on the list for today on the item "chemical weapons" of our agenda are the Netherlands and Romania. With your permission I now call on Ambassador Fein, the distinguished representative of the Netherlands.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): I intend to make only a very few and general remarks on the item under discussion, item 4 of our agenda, taking into account that the Netherlands has already said one or two things on the chemical weapons problem earlier in this spring session. In informal talks this week, my delegation might give some further, more detailed views on a number of specific issues.

This spring we encountered five activities and proposals with respect to a ban on chemical weapons.

First of all, the all-important bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union have continued. The last round was concluded, we understood, a short while ago. We had hoped that these two countries would submit, jointly or separately, a report on these talks to this Committee, but apparently we shall have to do without for the time being; in the meantime we wish them success.

Secondly, my Delegation submitted a working paper (CD/6) proposing to start negotiations, as a first step towards a chemical weapons treaty, on a general outline of such a treaty.

Thirdly, Italy submitted a paper containing somewhat similar proposals.

Fourthly, a group of 21 countries proposed the establishment of an ad hoc working group to negotiate on a chemical weapons ban.

And in the fifth place, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom organized workshops, particularly on verification matters.

In my opinion, these five issues are not incompatible, as I shall endeavour to demonstrate.

The bilateral talks are of course potentially vital to our discussions in this Committee. Indeed, solutions found on complicated and sensitive issues between the main chemical weapons Powers are, of course, of overriding importance to our deliberations. But this in no way detracts from the fact that a chemical weapons ban, once agreed upon and to be enforced, is just as directly relevant to other

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

countries as well. Restrictions on and verification of chemical industries of all countries in the world, at least in theory, will be involved. Specific regional situations in which chemical weapons could play a military role are not unthinkable, including in developing areas of the world. That is one more reason why many of us feel that this multilateral body should handle the chemical weapons question.

In document CD/6, my delegation offered some suggestions on how to make a start with this process. We suggested trying to develop, as a first step, a general outline of a chemical weapons treaty. Much preliminary work on the chemical weapons question has already been done in the past in the CCD. As indicated in a statement of my predecessor, on 2 August 1977,^{1/} there seems to be agreement on quite a number of issues -- at least in general terms -- which have, however, never been "formalized". Other problems, of course, will not be solved easily. Using such a paper as a basis, the Committee on Disarmament could lay down guidelines on how to proceed with more detailed work, in working groups, expert groups, etc. Some of this detailed work could perhaps also be done in the bilateral talks, for example on questions which are of particular relevance to the two countries involved. Thus I could imagine that preliminary work by the two Powers on sensitive issues such as the destruction of stockpiles and the dismantling of production plants could be very helpful for the future work of the Committee. On other matters, such as the scope, certain confidence-building measures, some legal questions and the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons could perhaps be handled by the Committee on Disarmament itself. Since the United States and the USSR would, of course, also be involved in these talks, there would not appear to be much danger that the bilateral talks would be hampered. On the other hand, members of the Committee could provide valuable contributions to the discussions and the bilateral talks would only have to concentrate on particularly complex -- more or less bilateral -- matters.

The question has been raised whether we need to establish an ad hoc working group for the first step, which, in our view, is the development of a general paper. It would seem logical to set up such a working group since this would clearly be more efficient than working in plenary meetings, whether formal or informal of the

^{1/} .CCD/PV.758

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

Committee as a whole. My delegation is therefore, in principle, in favour of such a move. However, we do not consider the establishment of an ad hoc working group indispensable; for us starting serious discussions and negotiations is more important than the form in which this happens and we certainly would not want to waste any time on fruitless debates on the terms of reference of such an ad hoc working group if we were given to understand that -- in the end -- there might be no consensus to set one up in any case.

We have therefore also noted with interest the proposal of the distinguished representative of Poland for establishing an informal contact group, which is to report as early as possible during the summer session; that would be by mid-June. We would like to explore this possibility further in the informal meetings which we shall have later to-day or later this week. Is it the intention of Poland that the contact group would meet during the spring recess, i.e. during the month of May? That would seem to follow logically from the timing indicated by the distinguished representative of Poland in his statement yesterday.

In any case it would be desirable to decide already now on what dates the Committee on Disarmament will resume its discussions on chemical weapons this summer. By agreeing now to such a period reserved for chemical weapons, we could make arrangements for our experts on such weapons to be with us at that time. We would suggest a period of two weeks during the late part of June and/or early July.

Finally, a few words on the very interesting workshops in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, a subject to which we shall revert in more detail in informal meetings. We are very grateful for the great hospitality tendered by these two countries and we were even more impressed by the excellent programme which they organized. Verification of a chemical weapons ban is a most thorny question. We have discussed this issue, in the abstract, for a long time. The practical workshops have demonstrated in a much more convincing way what possibilities there are for on-site inspection and which problems it raises. It has convinced us again that practical and not unacceptably intrusive verification of important elements of a chemical weapons ban is possible, although we realize that much more work still needs to be done. It was a pity that some members of this Committee did not see their way clear to sending their experts, countries which have at times stated that on-site inspection is not possible. They could have seen for themselves that it is indeed possible, even in countries with a free, competitive market economy. Hopefully, there will be more workshops in the future to demonstrate to experts and negotiators how to find practical solutions for our future chemical weapons ban.

Mr. ENE (Romania) (translated from French): In my statement today I should like to make a few very brief comments on the second item on our Committee's programme of work, namely, chemical weapons.

I should like to say, at the outset, that the importance which the Romanian delegation attaches to the prohibition of chemical weapons is a consequence of our broader concern with the outlawing of weapons of mass destruction, and the concern that the Committee's work should be firmly oriented towards the crucial problems of disarmament, in full accord with the Final Document and very spirit of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The intense activity carried on since 1972 on the preparations for the adoption of effective measures aimed at prohibiting the production of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stocks has been referred to in many emphatic statements. The presentation of the three draft conventions, the many documents which throw light on important aspects of the prohibition of chemical weapons, the contribution of the technical experts in that respect, the positive proposals submitted concerning the organization of the negotiations -- all these represent a considerable amount of work. This fact was acknowledged by the General Assembly of the United Nations which, in its resolution 33/59 of 14 December 1978 specifically requested the Committee on Disarmament "as a matter of high priority, to undertake, at the beginning of its 1979 session, negotiations with a view to elaborating an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives."

It is in this spirit that we agree with the views which have been expressed that our Committee is not only bound to consider, as a matter of priority, the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, but that it also has at its disposal the results of intense activity which has been undertaken and which justifies the proposal to pass on to a specific phase of work.

For years it has been the Romanian delegation's opinion that for the purpose of the effective conduct of negotiations in the field of disarmament effective machinery has to be employed. We start from the idea that such machinery would constitute a virtual laboratory within which it would be possible to carry on a dialogue between the Parties with a view to identifying possible areas for agreement and exploring the possibilities for overcoming existing differences.

Accordingly, and in conformity with the line of action consistently followed by Romania with regard to the working machinery of our Committee, we endorse the proposal put forward by the countries of the Group of 21 concerning the establishment of an ad hoc working group on chemical weapons, open to the participation of all Member

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

States of the Committee, and other proposals submitted on this question by the delegations of Italy and the Netherlands at the beginning of the session. We particularly welcome these proposals since Romania, as a co-sponsor of one of the draft conventions on chemical weapons, itself put forward in the past the idea of forming such a working group.

At the same time, because the topic of chemical weapons is of broad interest and because the Member States of the Committee have made a prominent contribution to the work done so far, the full participation in the ad hoc group's work also by non-member States is justified. We are thinking of all the rights provided for non-member States by the rules of procedure, including rule 35 under which interested non-member States may be present during the deliberations.

In the course of our discussions, some opinions have been expressed also concerning the possible implications of the beginning of the specific negotiations within the Committee for efforts undertaken at other levels in the area of chemical weapons.

As far as we are concerned, we have welcomed and shall continue to welcome in the future any initiative in any setting, provided that it contributes to the advancement of our common objective of general disarmament. Such a result can be achieved only by concentrating all efforts and by utilizing all the instruments and possibilities available to the international community. Thus, we were appreciative of the study visits organized by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom which also enabled a Romanian expert to become acquainted with certain technical aspects involved in the prohibition of chemical weapons.

However, we must realize that all these initiatives cannot be dissociated from the multilateral framework of the negotiations, particularly in the case of chemical weapons which are, pre-eminently, weapons of mass destruction and might be available to quite a large number of States. The problem of principle which consequently arises is, in our opinion, how the framework of the new Committee -- which is founded on the principle that disarmament is of general concern -- may be used for devising the modalities of pooling the efforts of all so that they may contribute to the achievement of progress in the interests of all. In any case, the Committee on Disarmament, as the sole multinational negotiating body in the field of disarmament, should not be excluded from the initiatives that contemplate the prohibition of chemical weapons.

These are the practical considerations which my delegation felt it appropriate to bring to the Committee's attention at this phase in our deliberations.

It is our belief that, through the constructive approach of all members of the Committee, we shall be able to decide to establish an ad hoc working group on chemical weapons and so to move, during the second part of the session, towards the elaboration of a draft convention in the area of chemical weapons.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Are there any other speakers wishing to take the floor?

If that is not the case, I should now like to suggest that we should resume consideration of the question we began to discuss yesterday at the end of the twenty-ninth meeting. As we agreed, the Secretariat has made available to delegations the communication received by the Chairman from the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the document attached to it. Some delegations asked for time to acquaint themselves with that document; other delegations, I must say a large number of delegations, urged that the Committee should decide without delay to circulate the communication and the document attached to it as an official document of our Committee. Before inviting comment on this point, I should like to make just one observation. I should like to say to you that I consider that the consultations we hold on this matter fall within the scope of rule 11 of our rules of procedure, which clearly provides that, apart from exercising the normal functions of a presiding officer and in addition to the powers conferred upon him elsewhere by those rules, the Chairman shall, in full consultation with the Committee and under its authority, represent it in its relations with States, the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations and with other international organizations. I consider, therefore, that this type of consultation comes within the scope of rule 11 of the rules of procedure.

I should now like to ask delegations whether they still have comments to make on this particular question.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I think for those of us that have at least 24 hour memories it is no secret any more that I requested that this decision be deferred to this morning. I have now, thanks to the courtesy of the Committee, had the opportunity to read, although I find a little confusion as to the documents which are there, a letter from the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs. I have seen elsewhere a letter from Mr. Lesley Harman to the Secretary-General and I have seen in a couple of printings the document of the Committee Against Apartheid, reporting the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa. I feel that under rule 11, the Committee does not automatically make a decision that a Secretary-General's document is before us. On the other hand, I find this particular document is

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

germane to the work of this Committee, and, having had a chance to read it I have no objection to its being circulated. Clearly what we can argue is whether or not the Seminar report is an annex or a document. Frankly, I do not care. The United States does not care. It will all be circulated anyhow. However, and I do not expect to have agreement on this, I would hope in the limited time at our disposal we could agree on a result, not on a theory, as with 39 delegates here, if we had to agree on a whole rationale it might well take us until 12 June. I would be perfectly prepared to agree that the letter should be circulated and the attachments, as part of the document, officially. I have no objection to it. I would, however, state the position of the United States, and I am not expecting unanimous agreement on this, that under the rules of procedure, if there is any question as to the relevance of a document to the work of this Committee, the Chairman is not only authorized, but obligated by rule 11, which every one of us in this room agreed to, to consult the Committee, and I assume that consultation of the Committee involves giving the Committee a chance to figure out what they are talking about. It does not involve consultation one minute and decision the next. We all agreed to rule 11. I am not quite sure why we are so worried about it right now. Having said that, and not expecting complete agreement on my rationale, the United States has no objection at all to the circulation of the letter from the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs as a document of the Committee on Disarmament, precisely how the Secretariat decides to stamp the various attachments -- and I would assume you would have at least the attachments that Mr. Harman sent to the Secretary-General as well as the document itself; I have not found that in the document before us at present -- how we designate those, I would leave to the full discretion of the Secretariat on the grounds that the application of a stamp, whether "Committee on Disarmament" or something else, on the attachment, as well as on the document itself, is not a matter that really affects the national security of any of the countries sitting in this room.

Mr. AKRAH (Pakistan): I would at the moment confine my remarks to the document which is before us, that is the letter addressed to you, Mr. Chairman, by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs, and also, I am afraid, I must comment on the statement just made by the distinguished representative of the United States.

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

First of all, I would like to say that we are glad there is no objection to the circulation of this document. As far as my delegation is concerned, we believe that as soon as this letter had been received by you, it was incumbent on you, as Chairman of this Committee, to have it officially circulated, because there are no grounds, we feel, for holding up the circulation of an official transmission from the United Nations for any reason whatsoever. The distinguished Ambassador of the United States argued that this falls under the functions of the Chairman under rule 11. Most respectfully I would beg to disagree with that contention. Rule 11 relates to the functions of the Chairman and his relationship, as the representative of this Committee, in our relations with the General Assembly and with other States and organizations. It does not relate to the matter of the documentation which the Committee is authorized to receive. I would like to recall that when the Secretary-General of the United Nations sent a message to this Committee, when we opened our session, it was not put to this Committee whether that message should be circulated as an official Committee document. Secondly, we have before us resolutions of the General Assembly which have been circulated as official documents and that were not put before the Committee for consideration as to whether those resolutions should be circulated to us, nor was a specific decision required to circulate those decisions in the Committee. Lastly, we have in this Committee the services of the Secretariat, which is nominated by the United Nations Secretary-General, which is paid for by the United Nations, and this is an integral and essential link between this Committee and the United Nations and something without which we cannot function. Is it our intention, whenever we have the services of staff from the United Nations Secretariat, to have this Committee decide whether we shall receive that staff or the work conducted by that staff? I think that the point which Ambassador Fisher has alluded to could lead us into very, very difficult straits. I would therefore appeal to you, Mr. Chairman, that first of all, of course, this document be circulated. A decision is not required, and I do not think that the Committee should take any decision to circulate this document -- it should be done automatically. Secondly, I think we must, as a general rule, make it clear that in future, official transmissions from the United Nations Secretariat and from the intergovernmental organs of the United Nations system must be circulated within this Committee as a matter of course, and not require any specific decision or consultation by the Chairman. I think this is a logical, reasonable stand. Anything else, Sir, would create immense difficulties for our work.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I do not wish to engage in a personal controversy with my good friend whose suggestion yesterday made this resolution possible, and I can only express my gratitude to him for that. I think we do have a difference between knowing what the document is, and having it circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament. I am perfectly prepared to agree that there is a substantial amount of discretion vested in the Chair as to whether to circulate a document that is given to him by the Secretariat. I do think, however, that the Secretariat does fall under the distinction of rule 11, which says "other organs of the United Nations". As I read my Charter, the Secretariat is an organ of the United Nations and I would think that I am perfectly prepared to agree to this being circulated as an official document, leaving to the Secretariat of this Committee its wise discretion as to what stamp it puts on the attachments and whether or not it has any attachments. For example, the letter from Chairman Harman to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which I do not find in the material that was circulated, but which I know in fact exists. But I will not agree that it is automatically a Committee document if the Secretary-General says that it is. We, our Committee, have our own right. Now, if we are going to debate this as a matter of principle we may last until 12 June, thereby making our plans for the UNDC rather theoretical. I would suggest that the thing be circulated and I am perfectly prepared to finesse whether or not it be circulated pursuant to a decision to which I agree, as long as it is circulated. I am perfectly prepared to agree with that and have no objection. However, I do want to make the position of the United States clear on the relationship between this body and the United Nations, and the responsibilities placed on the Chairman by rule 11, which does not require every document to be circulated for prior consideration by the Committee, because there are some which should obviously be automatically circulated. Document CD/1 was one of them; it contained things dealing with this Committee. Now, it is a little bit hard for me to argue that as a precedent in interpreting rule 11, because what happened in the case of CD/1, as one with any chronological identity would recognize, was that it was circulated before rule 11 was adopted. On the other hand, even with rule 11 as it now appears, I would have no objection to this document being automatically circulated.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

I do think, however, that if there is any question of doubt, the Chairman has the right, and the duty, to consult the Committee and not to announce that the Secretary-General has said this is relevant to your work, therefore it is. Therefore this is a document and the United States will stand by that position hoping that debates on that position will not hinder this report being circulated as an official document.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): To all those who took part in the discussions which made possible the adoption of the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament, I think it is clear that the statement just made by Ambassador Fisher contains a large element of truth. If we insist on taking a decision generally applicable to such cases, his warning, I repeat, seems to be well-founded, and we might still be here discussing the matter in June.

Since, on the other hand, what counts here, so far as this document is concerned, is that it should be distributed; and since, in this connexion, the representative of the United States has told us that he has no objection, I would suggest that the decision be taken to distribute it, there being general agreement as to this, and that we should leave outstanding the question whether a general decision should be taken. Perhaps we shall find time in June to consider the various aspects of this question and be able to reach a consensus.

That would be my concrete suggestion as regards this point. Since I have the floor, I should like to refer to the other matter: the question of the two letters which have also been distributed to us, or rather, to be more exact, which were deposited in our boxes. I mean the letters from Finland and Switzerland.

On this point, I think we could now already take a decision of a general nature. And I venture to hope that there will be no objection as regards this. The general decision which I would suggest for communications coming under rules 33 and 34 of the rules of procedure is that when communications of this kind, or documents attached to them, are received, they should also be distributed as Committee documents automatically. This will save time and enable us to familiarize ourselves with the contents; and to my way of thinking such a procedure could not be objectionable to any member of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Are there any other comments on this question?

If there are no further comments, I should like to make the following suggestion: first, I would not like the Committee to continue now with the debate on the interpretation of rule 11. I do not think it is necessary to carry on the debate. But I wish to be very clear. I consider it my duty as Chairman to be clear on this point. I would not wish there to be the slightest misunderstanding. As Chairman, I am inclined to believe that this type of question comes within the scope of application of rule 11. I tell you this in all honesty and sincerity. As Chairman, I maintain that this question comes within the scope of application of rule 11; I think it my duty to bring this interpretation to your knowledge, but it should not become the subject of another debate. I feel that I am entitled to tell you the substance of my thinking. That being said, I should like to address myself to the decision which we have to take, and I wish to suggest to you that the communication I have received, together with its annex, should be transformed without delay into an official document of our Committee.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, since there is no question of anybody objecting to the circulation of the document I believe it should be done. It does not require a decision of the Committee. I think we can put that discussion to rest. I do not think it was a discussion that was necessary. I do not think we should discuss that point any longer, especially since there is no objection. As for the application of rule 11, you, Mr. Chairman, have no doubt your own personal point of view; my own delegation has its own position. At the moment, we do not coincide in these points of view. Perhaps it might be best not to discuss that matter any further, because it is not necessary, either. Therefore, I think we should now turn to the other subject which we have before us.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): If there is no objection to the decision which I have just suggested, it is decided that the communication shall be distributed as an official document of the Committee.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, my delegation would have an objection to the Committee deciding to circulate it; we do not think the decision is necessary. We think that documents should be circulated per se, there is no need to take a decision in this Committee. We think that a decision to circulate a document could create a precedent which is contrary to our understanding of the rules of procedure and the way in which this Committee should work. Since there is no objection to the circulation of the document, there is no question of the Committee needing to take a decision. The document should be circulated, there is no need for a formal decision on the matter. I would submit therefore, that we leave that matter aside for the moment, and turn to the other question, and the document will be circulated by your authority.

Mr. HARRY JAY (Canada): I apologise to you Mr. Chairman for having been late for this meeting, because of participation in another meeting in the building. However, on the subject under discussion, I would like to dissociate myself from the interpretation of rule 11 advanced by the delegation of Pakistan. I would also dissociate myself from the implications of what he has been saying with regard to your conduct of the chairmanship, Mr. Chairman, and I would associate my delegation with the consensus to circulate the documents in question.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): The Soviet delegation believes that your actions are entirely correct, Mr. Chairman, and your interpretation of rule 11 likewise correct. Inasmuch as there is consensus on the question which is now before us, we feel that it is possible to associate ourselves with it, and we are in favour of the publication of the document.

Mr. PONSEKA (Sri Lanka): It was really not my intention to get into this, but I am one who has not been a member of this Committee for long. Notwithstanding the very worthwhile suggestion made by the distinguished representative of Mexico that we postpone a decision on this question for the very good reason that we may not get an answer, it occurs to me to ask two questions: one, may I ask, because of my ignorance of past practice in the CCD, when a document was transmitted by the Secretary-General or an official acting on his behalf -- how was it handled? two, now I am not quite clear in my mind whether the point of view expressed by the delegate of Pakistan has been taken into account. Nevertheless, I ask whether, in the light of how this document has now been treated, hereafter if we get any document from the United Nations Secretary-General, and I expressly refer to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, is it going to be the duty of the Chairman under rule 11 to have to come before this Committee and consult us as to whether that document is to be circulated? I ask these two questions Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to get into controversy, but I do wish to place this before the Committee and you, Mr. Chairman, because exercising the office of Chairman is going to involve somebody else next sitting in that Chair and he might have to make up his mind on this. What is the position?

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished delegate of Sri Lanka.

If there are no more comments, I should like to sum up as follows: in the absence of objections, the communication and the document attached to it will be circulated as official documents of the Committee. The question of the interpretation of rule 11 is a matter which remains open and concerning which I should not like to draw any conclusion at the present stage.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): I am sorry to take the floor again, but I do believe that the matter at hand is of some importance for the future work of

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

our Committee, and that we should not take a decision which would bind us one way or another. My delegation is very clear in its own view of the nature and character of this Committee's relations with the United Nations and so forth. We do not wish to impose this point of view on anyone, but at the same time we do not wish either, by implication, to accept the point of view of the other side about the nature of this body. Therefore, my delegation would not be prepared to take any decision, consensus or other form of taking a decision, on the circulation of this document. We would not, however, object if you, Mr. Chairman, wish to make a statement to this Committee that under the authority that has been given to you, you would be circulating the document you have received. But there is no question of any reference to there being no objection, or other form of consultation that you have referred to. We would not object if you wish to make a statement that under the authority entrusted to you, you would be circulating this document, and I think that would not compromise the position of anybody.

Mr. HARRY JAY (Canada): I wonder if I could make a suggestion which may or may not be helpful, but it intends to be helpful. Would it be possible for the Chair to say that on this occasion, having consulted the Committee, you, Mr. Chairman, have decided to circulate the document?

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I think that one of our problems is that we start to discuss the question of who has authority, to do what. I found our distinguished Pakistan colleague's presentation just a statement that the document is to be circulated as an **official** document. I am not saying who has the authority to decide, but we should reserve our respective positions, continue with our work and circulate the document. I think that the constructive spirit which gave me the opportunity to read this document should be carried through, and I would accept his formulation completely without reservation.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Allow me to address myself to the distinguished delegate of Pakistan.

I fully understand that we are faced with a delicate problem. I made a point of saying, in the second part of my statement, that I did not wish to draw any conclusion whatsoever from the exchange of views on the application or interpretation of rule 11. In the first part of my statement I carefully avoided using the word "decision". I spoke of a communication which I was making to members of the Committee. If I make a communication to members of the Committee, I think I am entitled to formulate that communication myself. I formulated it in the following manner: since there are no objections, the document will be circulated as an official document. In the context of a communication I have a right to say this to the Committee. I was careful not to use the word "decision" because I do not wish to prejudge the possible outcome of a discussion on the interpretation of the application or non-application of rule 11. But I think that, in a communication to the distinguished delegates on the Committee, I can say that, in the absence of objections, the document will be circulated as an official document of the Committee. When the Chairman makes a communication to the Committee, I think he should have some latitude in phrasing it, inasmuch as he has no intention of prejudging the interpretation of rule 11 in any way.

A few moments ago I told you the essence of my thinking. I made a point of saying that I was not asking the Committee's views on my interpretation; however, I believe that when I close a debate by making a communication, I have the right to formulate that communication myself. In this particular case I do not need to seek the Committee's views. That is what I should like to say to the distinguished delegate of Pakistan.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, first of all let me say that neither my delegation nor myself have or would have the temerity to question in any way the prerogatives of the Chair. Of course, when you convey anything to the Committee you have full right to do so in the manner that you feel is the most appropriate. What my delegation is concerned about is that the communication from the Chairman can have certain implications, because as you know, you are acting as the Chairman, as our guide and as the collective representation of this Committee, and when you say that the document will be circulated, since there is no objection, the implication is clear, that is that if there was objection, the document would not be circulated, and that is an implication which my delegation is, as I have stated before, not in a position to accept. Therefore, and especially since the

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distinguished Ambassador of the United States has voiced no difficulty with the sort of communication which I had very humbly suggested, which would not contain this implication of objections or no objections from various delegations, I would again suggest whether you, Mr. Chairman, might not find it possible to make a communication which would not contain any reference to the question of objections to the circulation of the document, but merely state that you are circulating the document. I do not think anybody would object to that or could read any implications into that.

Mr. GARCIA ROBIES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I shall begin by saying, Mr. Chairman, that my delegation would have no difficulty with the formula you have just explained to us. We believe it is a formula which in no way prejudges the question of the interpretation of rule 11 of the rules of procedure; a formula moreover, which you, Mr. Chairman, are fully authorized to use in the exercise of your rights and duties.

If, however, there are representatives, or even a representative, to whom this formula presents difficulties, a communication of the following kind might be used: a descriptive communication, for whatever position on the substance a delegation might take, it cannot deny that what has happened has happened. And what is it that has happened? What has happened is that, rightly or wrongly -- there is no reason for us to form a judgement on this at this moment -- the Chairman decided to consider this matter; the Chairman thought and still thinks that it is his duty to apply rule 11. No one can deny this. It is a fact. The Chairman thought it was his duty to apply rule 11 and resort to full consultation with the Committee.

As a result of this full consultation, the Chairman has found either that there are no objections, or that there is a consensus. Here, too, it is a question of describing a fact. There is consensus, and there are no objections. Consequently, the Chairman decides, or resolves, as we say here, to issue under his authority instructions that this document be distributed as an official document.

I believe that such a formula, while maintaining the Chairman's prerogatives to the full, may set the Pakistan representative's misgivings at rest.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Distinguished delegates, I should now like to close this discussion and to make the following communication. In the light of the exchange of views which has taken place so far, I decide, as Chairman, that the document under consideration will be circulated as an official document of the Committee. If there are no objections, we can proceed to another item of business. I had gathered that we would have informal discussions on the other communications submitted to the Chairman of the Committee which involve the application of rule 11 and rules 13, 34 and, possibly, 35. We had also decided to

(The Chairman)

hold formal discussions today on the topic of chemical weapons. That being so, I should like to make the following procedural suggestion: we might recess and suspend our plenary meeting to consider the question of the other communications received by the Chairman.

Secondly, after we have finished our consultations, we could meet in plenary session to take decisions. After that we could continue our informal consultations on the subject of chemical weapons. Do you agree to this procedure?

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I would have no difficulty with the procedures you suggest, Mr. Chairman, but it seems to me that, among the different matters you mentioned, there is one, which I pointed out a few moments ago, which could perhaps here and now be resolved by a question from the chair. This question could be as follows: You have all heard the suggestion by the representative of Mexico. (It was the one I made a few moments ago and which I am now going to repeat.) If there are no objections, could we regard it as adopted? And then we would proceed to the informal meeting, on the understanding that if there is a single objection to this proposal by the Mexican delegation, this matter also would be referred to the informal meeting.

The reason why I venture to hope there will be no objection, however, is that this is the usual procedure followed in all United Nations bodies, whether it be the Assembly, the Security Council or the Economic and Social Council; and it is also the one which was followed here in the CCD.

I shall mention as an example what I believe was the last working paper of the CCD: unless I am mistaken, it was a communication from Finland, reproduced as document CCD/577, of 22 August 1978. A communication which, like the annex, was a very long, technical annex. This annex was not reproduced, but a note was added to the effect that since the number of copies was limited, only one copy would be given to each delegation.

But there were several like this in the CCD. Consequently, communications coming under rules 33 or 34 of the rules of procedure, documents which either, like the communication from Finland of 20 April, transmit a working paper, or which express the wish that the representative of the country in question should be heard by the Committee, should in my opinion automatically be reproduced as documents of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Delegations have all heard the proposal made by the distinguished representative of Mexico, namely, that the documents and communications which we have received should be circulated immediately as official documents of the Committee.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I have no objection to what our distinguished colleague from Mexico has said. On the other hand, I do not think we ought to postpone action on these questions until that circulation takes place. After all, the calendar is moving and I think we ought to take action on them and it should be done seriatim. I hope that we could have an informal meeting of 40 minutes and then resume the formal meeting to take action on both of these documents. It could be done in fairness to the people concerned; therefore we really ought to take action now and I think that this is possible. I have a different view as to the two respective requests and so I think we ought to discuss them seriatim, but my recommendation would be that we follow your action and, in the informal session, deal with the two things separately, and then I think we could resolve it very simply.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The United States representative's reply to my question is the one which I hoped for and which I would hope to receive from everyone: i.e. that there is a consensus in favour of automatic distribution.

I only ask for the floor, Mr. Chairman, to say that my suggestion in no way rules out what you suggested, for right from the start I said I was in agreement to our proceeding to the informal meeting immediately afterwards. And I will add that I agree with the United States representative that at the informal meeting we need not wait until the document appears with the CD symbol, and that we could take a decision on the substance immediately.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished delegate of Mexico. Accordingly, if there are no further observations or comments, I suggest that both of these communications should become official documents of the Committee. But before taking that decision I give the floor to the distinguished delegate of Pakistan.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, here again I am taking the floor not so much because of the contents of the two communications which are addressed to you, Sir, and which we have received informally, but because of the implications which our action may have for the future. We all know the relevant rule of procedure concerning the intervention by non-member States of the Committee in our work, both as regards statements that they can make and the circulation of documents. As you will recall, the relevant rule of procedure, not only the rules of procedure, but also the decision of the 10th special session of the General Assembly, states that this Committee will invite -- the words are "will invite" -- non-member States of the Committee to participate in matters which are of particular concern to them. Now, my delegation has previously stated the point of view that we believe that the participation of non-member States of the Committee in our work should be more or less automatic. That is, that all that would be required is a request to be made, after which the Chairman could convey to them the concurrence of the Committee after some informal consultations. We do not believe that the sort of consultations which we are holding today on these two communications are necessary for the future. We understand, of course, that this is the first occasion and therefore caution has been the better part of valour and that you, Mr. Chairman, have deemed it necessary to consult us in this formal way, but in future we do not think it is necessary that the Chairman should call a meeting of the Committee especially to inform us that he has received a communication from such-and-such a State. If it is a Member State, if it is a State, -- in fact, the General Assembly document speaks of States -- if it is a State, and if the communication clearly establishes that it has a particular interest in some item on the agenda of the Committee and it indicates in the communication that it would like to address itself to that item, I think the decision should be quite automatic to invite that State to participate in our work. There is no implication in our rules of procedure whereby the Committee or the Chairman could refuse participation to any State which expresses a desire to participate in our work. Therefore, from what I have said

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

the other implication which arises is whether it would be necessary in the future for us to circulate requests made by non-member States as formal documents of this Committee, because to us it would be quite simple: a formal communication would be received by the Chairman, he would consult informally with other members and the State would be invited to participate. We do not think it would be strictly necessary to circulate as an official document of this Committee any request that may be made to the Chairman. Because our rules of procedure do not speak of written requests and they do not speak of circulation of these written requests to the Committee. These are the questions that are raised in the mind of my delegation and we would like to share our views with other colleagues before we proceed to take any decision on this question.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Are there any other comments? You have all heard the proposal made by the distinguished delegate of Mexico. That being so, the proposal of the distinguished delegate of Mexico is accepted.

I should now like to suspend this formal meeting.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): I thought I had expressed myself clearly: apparently I had not. My delegation would not for the moment like to take a decision on the proposal made by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico to circulate these documents formally. We would like, first, to discuss the full implications arising from the circulation of and consultations on these documents and thereafter we could decide whether it is at all necessary to circulate these documents formally to the Committee.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I should like to reassure the representative of Pakistan. My suggestion is "crystal clear", as the saying goes in English. There are no mysterious proposals; it is the procedure which is followed in all United Nations bodies, and which, on various occasions, was followed by the CCD.

The effect is not to render more difficult but on the contrary to facilitate and speed up document submission and distribution and hearings for those requesting them.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

I shall merely recall, for the sake of clarity, that when the desire of Viet Nam to be heard was transmitted to us by one of your predecessors, there were delegations here which expressed the wish to see the request of Viet Nam in writing.

This will perhaps set the Pakistan representative's mind at rest. My suggestion seeks, not to render more difficult, but on the contrary to facilitate, the application of the relevant rules of procedure.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): If there are no further comments, I suggest that the formal meeting be suspended and that we resume our work at an informal meeting in ten minutes or so.

It was so decided.

The meeting was suspended at 12.30 p.m. and resumed at 1.15 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I now wish to propose the following:

First, the communications which we have received, respectively, from the distinguished representative of Finland and from the distinguished representative of Switzerland will be circulated officially as documents of our Committee.

Secondly, by virtue of rules 33 and 35 of our rules of procedure, we shall invite the distinguished representative of Finland to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament on chemical weapons, until 27 April 1979, at both formal and informal meetings.

Thirdly, I suggest that, under rules 33 and 35 of the rules of procedure, in response to his request the distinguished representative of Finland should be invited to participate also in the formal or informal meetings which will be held on the question of chemical weapons later during this session of the Committee.

Fourthly, as regards the request by the distinguished delegate of Switzerland to address the Committee, we shall invite the distinguished delegate of Switzerland, under rule 34 of the rules of procedure, to make his statement in the Committee.

If there are no objections, it is so decided.

It was so decided.

(The Chairman)

With apologies to the interpreters and members of the Secretariat, I should now like to close the meeting. Before I close the meeting, may I ask you at what time it would suit you to meet informally to continue our debate on the question of chemical weapons.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I would recommend 4 o'clock this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The distinguished representative of the United States proposes that we should meet informally at 4 o'clock this afternoon; is that convenient to members of the Committee?

We are therefore going to meet at 4 o'clock this afternoon to continue consideration of the question of chemical weapons at an informal meeting. Before closing the meeting, I should like to announce that the next formal meeting of the Committee will take place tomorrow at 10.30 a.m.

I should now like, with your permission, to declare the meeting closed.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE THIRTY-FIRST MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 26 April 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. P. NOTERDAEME

(Belgium)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENSMAIL

Argentina: Mr. F.J. DAVILA

Australia: Mr. L.D. THOMSON
Mr. A.J. BEHM
Ms. M.S. WICKES

Belgium: Mr. P. NOTERDAEME
Mr. P. BERG
Mr. G. VAN DUYSE

Brazil: Mr. A. CELSO DE OURO PRETO

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. PETROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U THEIN AUNG
U THAUNG HTUN

Canada: Mr. R. HARRY JAY
Mr. J.T. SIMARD

Cuba: Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. V. TYLNER
Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ

Egypt: Mr. O. EL-SHAFEI
Mr. M. EL-BARADEI
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE

France:
Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. BENOIT D'ABOVILLE
Mr. GESBERT

German Democratic Republic:
Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. S. KHAN
Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of:
Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. J. PÖHLMANN
Mr. H. MÜLLER

Hungary:
Mr. M. DOMOKOS
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:
Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN
Mr. S.T. DEVARE

Indonesia:
Mr. C. ANWAR SANI

Iran:
Mr. M. FARTASH
Mr. D. CHILATY

Italy:
Mr. N. DI BERNARDO
Mr. M. MORENO
Mr. C. FRATESCHI
Mr. FOLCO DE LUCA

Japan:
Mr. M. OGISO
Mr. T. NONOYAMA
Mr. T. IWANAMI
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya:
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico:
Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
Miss LUZ MARIA GARCIA

Mongolia:
Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. ERDENECHULUUN
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco:
Mr. M. RAHHALI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:
Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Nigeria:
Mr. K. AHMED
Mr. T. OLUMOKO

Pakistan:
Mr. J.K.A. MARKER
Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru:
Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO

Poland:
Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. A. OLSZWOKA
Mr. H. PAC
Mr. B. RUSSIN

Romania:
Mr. C. ENE
Mr. V. TUDOR
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka
Mr. I.B. FONSEKA

Sweden:
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:
Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
Mr. A.M. VAVILOV
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHIN
Mr. SOKOLSKY

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES

Mr. N. MARSHALL

Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER

Mr. C. FLOWERREE

Mr. A. AKALOVSKY

Mr. M. DALEY

Mr. M.L. SANCHES

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. KAMANDA WA KAMANDA

Mr. MULONGANDUSU ESUK

NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES

Finland: 1/

Mr. E. RAJAKOWSKI

Mr. G. CASTREN

Mr. F. EDMAN

Switzerland: 2/

Mr. O. EXCHAQUET

Mr. M. JEANRENAUD

1/ By decision of the Committee on Disarmament of 25 April 1979
(see CD/PV.30, page 26).

2/ By decision of the Committee on Disarmament of 25 April 1979
(see CD/PV.30, page 26).

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Gentlemen, I have the honour to open the thirty-first meeting on disarmament. Today we shall continue consideration of the fourth topic on the Committee's agenda "Chemical Weapons". Before starting on the list of speakers, I wish to say that, after consulting the delegations, I am now in a position to propose the dates for the next session of the Group of Seismic experts. As a result of these consultations, I find that the delegations would be able to accept the following dates: the next session of the seismic Group would be held from 16 to 27 July. If there are no objections to this proposal, I would ask you to take note of the seventh report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. The Ad Hoc Group will hold its next session at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, from 16 to 27 July 1979.

It was so decided.

Mr. THOMSON (Australia): My delegation welcomes the opportunity to take the floor during this initial discussion on item 4 of the Committee's agenda -- Chemical Weapons.

We are glad that the Committee was able to conclude the prolonged discussions on procedural matters preoccupying it since January last, in time to begin considering important questions of substance before the conclusion of this first spring session.

We are particularly glad that it has been possible to open the consideration of chemical weapons because doing so enables us to begin to fulfil the request, in United Nations General Assembly resolution 33/59A, of which Australia was a co-sponsor, which inter alia called upon the Committee on Disarmament "as a matter of high priority, to undertake, at the beginning of its 1979 session, negotiations with a view to elaborating an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives".

Paragraph 75 of the Programme of Action of the Final Document of the United Nations special session devoted to disarmament notes that:

"The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently, the conclusion of a convention to this end, on which negotiations have been going on for

(Mr. Thomson, Australia)

several years, is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations. After its conclusion, all States should contribute to ensuring the broadest possible application of the convention through its early signature and ratification."

Australia attaches a great deal of importance to the early conclusion of an effective chemical weapons convention. In his statement to the Committee on Disarmament on its opening day, on 24 January this year, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Andrew Peacock, said that a chemical weapons convention presented an immediate and urgent task for the Committee. He noted that chemical weapons were a complex issue; one which would take up a considerable amount of the Committee's time. That is why the Australian delegation supported the early consideration of this matter by the Committee on Disarmament.

The forthcoming preparatory conference for the Biological Weapons Review Conference is a timely reminder to all Committee members parties to the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention, that they have undertaken, in terms of Article IX of that Convention, to reach early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for the destruction of present stocks. That Convention also enjoins parties to negotiate appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes.

As we are all aware, the United States and the Soviet Union have been conducting bilateral negotiations since August 1976 with a view to developing a joint initiative on the prohibition of chemical weapons and introducing it to the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation has read with interest past joint progress reports on the status of the discussions submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) by the United States and the Soviet Union. We would welcome any further elaboration by those two parties on progress that has been made recently. In this connexion, we noted with interest the suggestion put forward in this Committee by the distinguished representative of Canada, Ambassador Jay, on 29 March, that this briefing might usefully take the form of one or more jointly tabled working papers. We express the hope that further progress will be made in the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, so that these two parties can present their long awaited joint initiative. The early tabling of that initiative would greatly assist progress towards the conclusion of an internationally acceptable chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. Thomson, Australia)

But my delegation shares the view, already expressed here by a number of other delegations, that it is not necessary to await the tabling of such a joint initiative before the Committee on Disarmament itself can make a constructive contribution to the elaboration of a chemical weapons convention. As has been noted by others, a chemical weapons convention is of concern to all countries, not just to a few. My delegation believes that discussions within the Committee need not have a harmful effect on the bilateral discussions between the United States and the USSR. On the contrary, we believe that they could have the opposite effect, imparting a helpful impetus to progress in those talks.

I would like now to turn to the two chemical weapons workshops conducted recently by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. My delegation takes this opportunity to express its warm thanks to those two countries for the opportunity offered by them to Australia to participate in their workshops.

The representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom have already given this Committee details of the activities that took place during the workshops, including

- (1) visits to industrial chemical plants manufacturing phosphorus-based products;
- (2) an inspection of the dismantling and destruction of the former chemical weapons pilot production plant at Nancekuke in the United Kingdom; and
- (3) a demonstration and discussion of protective equipment as a defence against chemical weapons.

The distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, also referred, in his statement to the Committee on Tuesday 24 April, to the informal round table discussions that took place during the visits, and to some of the views emerging during those discussions.

(Mr. Thomson, Australia)

The Australian delegation found experience of both workshops to be of real assistance in developing our own thinking on some of the important matters before this Committee. It is still a little too early for us to make a thorough assessment of the experience gained through our participation in the workshops; we are still giving thought to some of the very significant issues raised in discussions at the workshops.

But we are in no doubt about the high value of one aspect of the workshops.

This was the fact that they brought together an international group of scientists, defence personnel and diplomatic officials in an informal setting which enabled a very valuable flow of information and views to take place on the subject of chemical warfare, with a breadth and ease which was certainly new, in our experience.

I believe that the result of such an intermingling and exchange was both an increased understanding of the issues and complexities involved in preparing a chemical weapons convention and an enhanced appreciation of the different perspectives which would be brought to bear by the different groups involved in drafting the convention.

My delegation feels that, if there were to be similar workshops in the future -- and they would seem to us to be of value as confidence-building measures -- they might usefully be opened to as broad a range of participants as were these first two workshops. We would also hope that a wider range of countries might feel able to accept an invitation to attend any such future workshops.

Turning back to our current discussions, which we hope will help to promote a constructive and positive international approach to the elaboration of a chemical weapons convention, I would like to make some brief concluding comments.

First, while being well aware of the severe constraints on the Committee's time in discussing matters of substance at this spring session, and appreciating

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that it was not feasible, on this occasion and at this late stage, to devote more than one week to agenda item 4, my delegation would not wish this allocation to be taken in any way as a precedent for the length of time to be devoted to this agenda item or any other in the future. Indeed, my delegation would welcome a continued discussion of chemical weapons during this year's summer session of the Committee scheduled to commence in June. In this regard we have looked with considerable interest and sympathy at the proposals put forward by the delegations of Italy (in CD/5), the Netherlands (in CD/6) and the Group of 21 (CD/11). In particular, I would wish to associate my delegation with the remarks made here yesterday by the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Fein. In his statement Ambassador Fein noted that it would be desirable for the Committee to decide, before the close of this session, on the dates on which it would resume its chemical weapons discussions in the summer, and proposed a period of two weeks in the later part of June and/or early July.

Secondly, my delegation is of the view that it might be valuable for the Committee to give further consideration to confidence-building measures in the chemical weapons field. I have mentioned earlier that the exchange of information that took place during the workshops in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, and the dialogue which commenced at Nancekuke in the United Kingdom on protective defence against chemical weapons, seem to us to be useful examples of such measures.

Thirdly and finally, as this Committee will, I hope, soon be faced with detailed negotiations on the complexities of a chemical weapons convention, I wonder if it might not be possible for our Secretariat to investigate the feasibility of arranging, here in Geneva at an appropriate time, perhaps under the auspices of the Centre for Disarmament and UNITAR, a seminar on chemical weapons for interested delegations. I have in mind something along the lines of seminars which I understand have been organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna for permanent representatives there, on nuclear non-proliferation issues. I believe these have been found helpful.

Mr. EL-SHAFEI (Egypt): This being the first time I take the floor during the month of April, I would like to associate myself with the previous speakers who have congratulated you, Mr. Chairman, on the assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee. Your leadership and guidance have preempted any attempt by me to laud your proven wisdom and talents. :

Allow me, Mr. Chairman, to avail myself of this opportunity to express my sincere admiration, and that of my delegation, also to your predecessor, Ambassador Thomson of Australia, for his patience, perseverance and impeccable leadership during the month of March, which enabled us to conclude successfully our discussion on the Agenda, and finally to initiate a discussion on substantive issues.

The Committee on Disarmament has decided to consider the item entitled "Chemical Weapons" in the first part of its first session. This priority decision is a faithful reflection of the sense of urgency and importance attached to this question by the international community, a matter which cannot be over-emphasized.

Since its 26th session in 1971, the General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted numerous successive resolutions on this subject, which inter alia requested the CCD to continue negotiations, as a matter of high priority, with a view to reaching an early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction.

As recently as its 33rd session the General Assembly adopted two resolutions on chemical weapons. In resolution 33/59 A the Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to undertake, at the beginning of its 1979 session, negotiations with a view to elaborating an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives.

In resolution 33/71 H the Committee is further requested to undertake, on a priority basis at its first session in January 1979, negotiations concerning a treaty or convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

(Mr. El-Shafei, Egypt)

In its Final Document, the first special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament specifies that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently, the conclusion of a convention to this end, on which negotiations **have** been going on for several years, is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations.

So much for the moral exhortations and legal imperatives to act, and to act immediately. In this respect we regard the Committee's decisions to consider the subject of chemical weapons on a priority basis as an indication on its part to be more responsive to these exhortations. However, we believe that this Committee cannot and should not limit itself to the general exchange of views if it purports to achieve a concrete agreement.

This brings me to some of the procedural questions which have a direct bearing on the question of substance. The first question is one of methodology. In this respect three papers have been submitted during this part of the session. I am referring of course to the papers presented by Italy, contained in document CD/5, the Netherlands contained in document CD/6, and the Group of 21 document CD/11. One can safely conclude that they all share the same basic approach, namely, that multilateral negotiations should start in earnest; that they should not and need not be preceded by, or await the ongoing bilateral talks between the United States and the USSR; and that multilateral negotiations should be conducted in a systematic and structured manner.

Enough time has elapsed since the United States and USSR issued their joint communiqué of 3 July 1971, in which they proclaimed that they had agreed to consider a joint initiative "with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international Convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical weapons". There is unfortunately no indication up till now that this initiative is going to materialize in the form of an agreement in the near future.

The last report the CCD received on this subject was similar to earlier reports, namely a brief declaration limiting itself to some general propositions; that the political and technical problems involved are interrelated and complex; that some

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progress on the scope of the agreement and its verification has been achieved; and that important questions still remained to be resolved. This kind of report inevitably left the Committee almost totally in the dark, unable either to assess or measure progress in these bilateral negotiations, or to proceed beyond the general exchange of views.

My country would like to believe that we have embarked on a new era of multilateral disarmament negotiations with the conceptual and institutional change brought about by the adoption of the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We no longer expect the previous state of affairs, and hope to receive at the earliest possible date a detailed report on the state of the bilateral negotiations, a report which would enhance the negotiating process. Equally we believe that multilateral negotiations should start as soon as possible.

This brings me to the question of the negotiating mechanism. My country's views in this regard are adequately reflected in the proposal of the Group of 21. We believe that the establishment of an ad hoc working group entrusted with the task of elaborating a draft convention on a chemical weapons ban is a step which has long been overdue.

Naturally, we are aware that the task is complex and time-consuming, but this is an added reason to accept the challenge and to start immediately rather than protract the multilateral negotiations.

The working group will have to negotiate on the basis of draft treaties, working papers and proposals previously submitted to the CCD or those submitted to this Committee or its ad hoc group. This necessarily will include any agreement that will, it is hoped, be reached between the two negotiating Powers. Moreover, in CD/11, special care was taken, that the ad hoc group's modus operandi would not hinder or impede the bilateral negotiations but rather foster and complement it. In the draft decision presented by the members of the Group of 21, this Committee would request the States participating in the bilateral negotiations to inform the ad hoc working group fully on the state of their negotiations, indicating areas in which agreement has been reached, as well as issues which still are outstanding. This exchange of information could develop into an efficient negotiating process where

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different levels of negotiations can proceed concurrently, with the aim of being consolidated into an integral whole at the end of the process. In this respect we note with gratification, that the concept of parallelism has also been adopted by a group of socialist countries in their proposal contained in document CD/4 where it is stated that the preparation and conduct of negotiations on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them should not be to the detriment of the current bilateral and multilateral negotiations on various aspects of the limitation of nuclear armaments, including strategic armaments, nor should they impede the achievement of bilateral or multilateral agreement on the limitation or destruction of any nuclear armaments on a mutually agreed basis.

With that understanding, namely that multilateral and bilateral negotiations will complement rather than contradict each other, and that the aim of any bilateral or trilateral talks is to facilitate and enhance multilateral negotiations and not to preempt or impede such a process, my delegation strongly urges that the draft decisions presented by the Group of 21 be well received and accepted.

Turning now to the question of substance, I would like to recall that my country made its position clear when it subscribed to the paper presented in 1973 to the CCD by a group of non-aligned and neutral countries. I am referring to working paper tabled as document CCD/400, which set down, in no ambiguous terms, the basic broad principles for a chemical weapons ban. In our view the propositions included in that paper remain valid. The paper states that negotiations should aim at reaching a comprehensive ban covering the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons, their equipment and means of delivery as well as the destruction of existing stocks. It further states that the degree of danger represented by the use of chemical agents for military purposes depends, besides their toxicity, to a high degree on the protection available, as well as on the means of delivery. It goes on to state that it is essential that the prohibition of chemical weapons should be coupled with adequate verification, and on this issue it affirms that the question of verification has both technical and political aspects which should be reconciled and therefore it is connected with the scope of the prohibition, and that solutions to the problem of scope and verification should not be discriminatory and should maintain an acceptable balance of obligations and responsibilities for all States.

The compliance with any convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction, whether

(Mr. El-Shafei, Egypt)

comprehensive or gradual in approach, is largely dependent on the verification methods it encompasses. The convention must provide, if it is to be of value, at the very least, a limited degree of satisfaction and assurance to all parties concerned, that their compliance with it will not lead to diminished security, and that the other parties to the convention are complying with it with an equal degree of righteousness and exactitude.

Some countries have apprehensions about the exclusive reliance on national technical measures for verification. Others believe that compliance with the convention should be based on such national measures. We fully comprehend, and appreciate, these divergent opinions.

However, while not attempting to belittle the significant added value of national verification measures, we sincerely believe that such measures would be inadequate to provide the necessary assurances for all concerned parties, and should be complemented by international measures.

We encourage national verification measures, such as unilateral declarations related to the prohibition of production and development of chemical weapons and agents, particularly those concerning the destruction of existing stockpiles. National legislation and regulations aimed at implementing the prohibition could be beneficial and necessary. The establishment of a national verification system, to co-ordinate its activities with an equivalent international body, is another valuable and foreseeable measure.

The absolute necessity for tangible assurances for States on issues of national security makes it imperative that verification means be universally non-discriminatory in nature, and international in application. With these requirements in mind, and giving high and justly warranted emphasis to the security requirements of sovereign States, we believe that only a qualified international verification organ can co-ordinate national and international verification measures. Only such an organ, with the necessary degree of independence, can be universal and non-discriminate in nature; by definition its axis of operation will span the continents of our globe, and its findings should be made available to all.

The pace of technological advancement in the world has had multifaceted effects, occasionally with conflicting vices and virtues. Technological advancement has allowed us to foresee the use of extra-territorial monitoring techniques, including

(Mr. El-Shafei, Egypt)

satellites, as means for objective and tangible assurances for compliance with disarmament measures. On the other hand, the same technological progress has rendered these measures less effective and allowed clandestine concealment of arms potential capability. A very simple illustration of the dilemma is that while the effectiveness of extra-territorial monitoring in verifying the destruction of known stockpiles of chemical weapons and the dismantling of known chemical warfare plants is not challenged, these techniques alone cannot guarantee that a prohibition of the development of chemical weapons and agents is being complied with, or that concealed chemical weapons plants have not been, and are not being, established. In other words the effectiveness of such techniques is restricted to verifying declared intentions related to known chemical plants or unclassified stockpiles or capabilities.

Without prejudice to the other verification measures, we believe that on-site inspection remains the most effective and applicable verification measure capable of adequately providing the assurances required by the concerned parties. The recent workshops, which the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom so graciously hosted, have shed light on the feasibility of applying on-site verification measures without sacrificing industrial secrets. Future workshops should encourage the development of techniques that allow inspectors the liberty of taking samples and photographs, when necessary.

Verification measures should not be restricted to organophosphorous agents but should encompass non-organophosphorous agents which are also used in chemical warfare. Scientific advancement has widened the range of chemical agents with arms potential. For verification measures to be effective they would also have to cover binary chemical weapons. These binary agents provide the more military and technologically advanced countries with an enormous military capability in chemical weapons, without having to face the often obtuse and complex problems of their storage or stockpiling. There is no need to mention all, for that would be a long list of sophisticated weapons which could not be verified except through on-site inspection.

These are my delegation's preliminary thoughts and reflections on the subject under discussion. My delegation would be prepared at a later stage of the negotiations to make an in-depth contribution towards the elaboration of the different elements of the desired convention.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished delegate of Egypt, Ambassador El-Shafei, for his statement. I was deeply touched by your kind words concerning myself and my predecessor, Ambassador Thomson.

Mr. DOMOKOS (Hungary) (translated from French): We are almost at the end of your term of office as Chairman, but nevertheless I cannot miss this opportunity of expressing to you my own and my delegation's satisfaction that you assumed the chairmanship of our Committee for this period.

I wish also to congratulate you and your predecessor in the Chair, Ambassador Thomson, for your efficient performance of the difficult and sometimes arduous duties connected with the elaboration of our Committee's agenda and programme of work.

I am most happy to have the opportunity of congratulating the new representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, and the permanent representative of Zaïre, Ambassador Kamanda Wa Kamanda. I wish them every success in their missions and I assure them of my delegation's collaboration.

[The speaker continues in English]

My delegation shares the views expressed by many other delegations that it was wise and timely to put the subject of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons on the agenda and programme of work of the Committee on Disarmament. It is one of the most urgent priority tasks before us, not only because these weapons of mass destruction gain an increasing role in the military arsenals, but also because these weapons can be produced relatively easily by any industrially developed country; thus they are a potential factor in the continuing arms race.

For these reasons, among others, the Hungarian representatives supported any step which seemed likely to promote advance in this field of disarmament in this Committee, by co-sponsoring the first draft convention submitted by the socialist States in 1972, as well as supporting draft resolutions submitted to the various sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

We are of the opinion that in view of the urgency of the subject, the Committee should as soon as possible proceed to the elaboration of an international agreement providing for the complete and comprehensive prohibition of the development and production of chemical weapons and for the destruction of their stockpiles.

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

My delegation has carefully studied the working papers CD/5, CD/6, CD/11 submitted respectively by Italy, the Netherlands and the Group of 21 earlier during the present session of the Committee on Disarmament. I would like to express my appreciation to these delegations for their contribution to our common aim to prohibit the development and production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. In our view the working papers referred to contain interesting suggestions and ideas on how the Committee should deal with the subject in its future work.

For instance working paper CD/5 correctly suggests that "the multilateral negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament, without hindering current bilateral consultation between the United States and the USSR, should, as a first step, review existing proposals and options". A resolution of the General Assembly also attaches due significance to the idea that the USSR and the United States should submit their joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament to facilitate an early agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Similar ideas may be found in other working papers as well.

The majority of the statements and all the working papers emphasized that what the Committee should do is not to overtake but to help the ongoing bilateral negotiations. We think this is the key question of the problem. In this respect we entirely share the view expressed by the distinguished representative of the Netherlands in his statement yesterday that "the bilateral talks are of course potentially vital to our discussion in this Committee".

The Committee -- in our opinion -- should under no circumstances undertake an enterprise which may have a disadvantageous influence on the bilateral negotiations. My delegation, like many others, is not convinced at this stage without further consideration that the setting up of an ad hoc working group would facilitate an advance in the bilateral talks.

There is no common agreement in the Committee on several questions of substance. This fact is well reflected in the statements made during the consideration of the issue, and in the more than a hundred working papers referred to several times during the debate. Obviously, before the Committee could start to draft a convention we have to come to an understanding on how to select concrete subjects to be negotiated, what could be the most effective methods to be applied. In other words, that is the natural logical order of things that we have to define first precise tasks -- the immediate ones --, and then to find the most suitable ways, methods, as well as the most convenient organizational framework for the fulfilment of these tasks. Another

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

indispensable requirement to accommodate negotiations in the Committee with the bilateral talks in order to reach the objective expressed and emphasized by many delegations is that they should mutually help each other and advance the negotiations aimed at the elaboration of the convention.

I would like to be very clear. We are not against the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. But we consider it an absolute necessity to prepare the negotiations well, to see clearly the tasks of the following months or sessions in this respect and also the possibilities and limits of the negotiations. It is also important to clarify and to agree upon that the negotiations do not necessarily, not in each phase and in a direct way, mean the drafting of the convention. There could also be some preparatory work, as an organic part of a negotiating process on the convention in question. We are convinced that there could be several issues to be negotiated in the Committee. The distinguished representatives of Sweden and the Netherlands have mentioned some possible subjects of negotiation in their recent statements. The Committee, after consultation, could well define them.

My delegation therefore, together with many others, is of the opinion that during the very short time left for us in the present session of the Committee we should not take a final decision on this subject. Further examination is required, in order that the Committee may formulate its final position on the basis of a thorough analysis of the circumstances and preconditions. We might return to this later, during the summer session.

The distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka, in his statement of 24 April suggested that an informal contact group should be set up with the mandate that after appropriate consultations, it should submit its suggestions for the consideration of the Committee as early as possible at the second part of the current session.

This proposal is in conformity with our position, and therefore we fully support it.

Several delegations made reference to the "Compilation of Material on Chemical Weapons from CCD Working Papers and Statements, 1972-76" prepared and circulated by the Secretariat on 11 March 1977. I would like to associate myself with those delegations which expressed their appreciation of that work. I think it would be useful -- and I would like to propose it -- to update that material perhaps by the beginning of the Committee's summer session, to add to it the substance of those working papers and other contributions which have been submitted to the Committee since 1976.

Concluding my statement I would like to express my hope that the Committee, after careful consideration and consultations, will be in a position during the summer session to find the forms and means facilitating in the most effective way the early prohibition of chemical weapons.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished delegate of Hungary, Ambassador Domokos, for his statement. I wish also to thank him for his kind words to me personally and to my distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Thomson.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I wish to begin my remarks today by noting that I am speaking on behalf of the United States of America, one party to the current bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons. The delegation of the United States has listened to, and studied, with great interest and attention proposals put forward by the Group of 21, as well as those of Italy and the Netherlands concerning the subject of a ban on chemical weapons and the best way to reach that goal. These proposals are still further evidence of the importance which the international community attaches to this question, an importance which for our part is symbolized by the negotiations currently underway. Furthermore, the delegation of the United States understands and, indeed, sympathizes with the concerns which led to the introduction of these proposals. At the same time, we would hope that others would be equally understanding of our concern that the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR, which we see as the essential path to a multilateral convention, proceed to the resolution of key outstanding issues between our two countries.

As we understand the present situation, there are basically three proposals before the Committee on Disarmament:

(1) That there now be established an ad hoc working group to elaborate a draft convention;

(2) That the United States and the USSR now make a report to the Committee on Disarmament on the areas in which agreement has been reached in the field of chemical weapons as well as the outstanding issues on which agreement has eluded us;

(3) An informal contact group to "define further the methods and forms of the Committee's work."

All the representatives in this Committee are experienced negotiators. As such, we recognize that there are times when a thorough airing of issues and national positions can provide an opportunity for creative diplomacy leading the way to agreement. However, we also recognize that there are moments when a public elaboration of such national positions can make the task of diplomacy more difficult,

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

by reducing flexibility and concentrating efforts on defence of national positions. Clearly, the determination of which of these two stages obtains at this moment is a question of judgement, not of right or wrong.

In reaching our judgements, we are aware of the special responsibilities incumbent upon the United States and the USSR. After careful consideration, we have arrived at the view that the proposal to create an ad hoc working group which would elaborate a draft convention as well as the request fully to inform such a group of the areas in which agreement had been reached and of the issues which are still outstanding would hinder rather than assist the bilateral process. We recognize that others, whose sincerity we do not in any way question, are of a different opinion. In such a situation, we must remain faithful to our own judgements, with a heightened sense of responsibility for the positions we take. Nonetheless, we have listened with care to the expositions made by our colleagues. While we think a report on the status of the bilateral negotiations might not be helpful at this time, we will now undertake to present such a report at the appropriate time during the second part of our annual session. Further, beyond whatever action the Committee may take at this time, the United States will carefully review the proposals introduced recently in this body with a view to identifying those areas in which essential multilateral activity to reach our objective of a ban on chemical weapons might begin without, at the same time, rendering the bilateral negotiations even more difficult.

It is with some caution that the United States delegation now conveys this decision, for we cannot be at all certain of the outcome of our review and we have no desire to mislead the Committee or to create somehow the impression that we have an acceptable approach to this legitimate concern in hand. We have listened, and we will make a serious effort to respond to what we have heard.

One common theme in our discussions of the last two days was the need for more extensive informal consultations. Another appears to be that, whatever decision we should take at this time, we could not really begin to implement such a

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

decision until this summer. In this context, the delegation of the United States wonders if our common purpose would best be served by creating a group to "define further the methods and forms of the Committee's work." I thought we were in the process of doing precisely that, and somehow, I doubt that placing a new chapeau on our efforts will lead to a substantively different outcome. I certainly would not wish my remarks to be interpreted as an unwillingness to engage in consultations, since the delegation of the United States has never insisted on a formal structure to consult with colleagues and we do not so insist at this time. Given the differing perceptions as to the area of substantive accord and difference between the proposal of the Group of 21 and that of my distinguished colleague from Poland, I think that a further exposition of the import of each proposal would be advisable so we all share a common understanding and frame of reference when we return to this subject during the second half of our 1979 session.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation takes a highly positive view of the fact that the Committee on Disarmament has decided to devote part of its spring session to the consideration of the question of prohibition of chemical weapons. This is a token of the great importance which the States members of the Committee attach to that question. And indeed, in terms of urgency it has come to occupy one of the foremost places among the principal problems of disarmament.

In the past few years the Committee on Disarmament has had before it more than a few concrete and interesting proposals concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons. All of them provide a good deal of material for further work. But, at the same time, they demonstrate the complexity of the problem of prohibiting chemical weapons because they reflect essential differences in the approaches of different States to certain questions.

At the present session of the Committee, too, the latest working documents on chemical weapons were submitted for our attention. The Soviet delegation fully understands the interest shown in this matter by many States members of the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Committee, their concern, their desire to achieve constructive results as soon as possible. Indeed, one of the particular features of the problem we are considering this week is its universality. It touches upon the interests of the widest range of countries, inasmuch as there is a chemical industry practically everywhere and, at the same time, the possibility of creating and developing a chemical military potential.

Quite naturally the question arises as to the most expedient manner of organizing the Committee's work on the prohibition of chemical weapons. That is, in substance, as we understand, the principal object of the proposals most recently submitted to the Committee. I have in mind the working papers by Italy, the Netherlands and the Group of 21 and also the ideas expressed in statements by the representatives of India, Canada, Japan and a number of other countries. As I have already said, we view the motives for the above-mentioned proposals with great sympathy.

At the same time, a number of questions arise in connexion with these proposals. These questions should be taken duly into account with a view to finding the most efficient forms of work which will facilitate progress in this important matter.

For example, it would hardly be proper if we failed to give attention to the circumstance that two members of the Committee -- the Soviet Union and the United States of America -- have for a number of years past been conducting detailed bilateral negotiations on the question of prohibition of chemical weapons, at which, albeit slowly, some progress is being achieved.

In the course of these bilateral negotiations, which we regard as an important step towards the conclusion of an international convention, we are endeavouring to take full account of the international community's legitimate concern to obtain prohibition of chemical weapons as early as possible. But we cannot simply share the optimism of those who consider that some kind of "parallel" conduct of negotiations in the Committee will be a simple and easy matter and will in itself have a beneficial effect upon the solution of the problem as a whole.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Thus, we have serious doubts concerning the proposal to establish an ad hoc working group for the elaboration of a draft convention. It seems to us that conditions for this are not yet ripe. As for the proposal that the participants in the bilateral negotiations should fully inform the Committee on matters in which agreement has been reached as well as issues still outstanding, it seems to us that putting this proposal into effect may harm the bilateral negotiations rather than facilitate them. This does not, of course, preclude the possibility of presenting to the Committee an agreed report on the progress of the bilateral negotiations at an appropriate time, e.g. in the course of the second part of the current session of the Committee.

It would also be wrong to ignore the general state of the matter and, in particular, the fact that the positions of different States diverge seriously on many aspects.

In such circumstances it is necessary to work out a balanced approach towards organizing the further consideration of the problem of chemical weapons in the Committee and, in particular, to reflect on other possible approaches. In this connexion, the views of our Polish colleagues concerning an unofficial contact group seem to us to be of interest. The most efficacious and generally acceptable approaches could be defined with its help.

We understand, of course, that some other delegations have a different opinion, which we by no means intend to ignore. On the contrary, we propose to study with full attention the proposals put forward in the course of the Committee's current session. This also applies, in particular, to the question connected with defining the problems which could be considered at the multilateral level without detriment to the progress of the bilateral negotiations.

Naturally, our position on these questions will be determined in the light of various circumstances in the future. We shall, as in the past, seek the most efficient and efficacious methods of work of the Committee which might ensure the solving of one of the urgent problems of disarmament -- the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Mr. VOUTQV (Bulgaria): Since this is my first statement in a plenary meeting of the Committee this month, permit me to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on the high office of presiding over the Committee on Disarmament during the month of April. As a result of your efforts and the contribution by your distinguished predecessors, the distinguished representatives of Algeria, Argentina and Australia, the Committee has accomplished several important tasks, thus laying the ground for fruitful and purposeful negotiations.

Though we were left with little time for the detailed consideration of particular disarmament problems on the agenda of the Committee, we managed to concentrate our attention on two important questions in the disarmament field, that is item 2 of the agenda -- Cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and item 4 -- Prohibition of chemical weapons.

My delegation notes with satisfaction the interest demonstrated by the Committee in the discussion of the problems of nuclear disarmament and particularly the attention paid to the joint initiative of the socialist countries contained in document CD/4 on the negotiations for the cessation of production of all types of nuclear weapons and for the gradual reduction of their stockpiles until their total destruction.

As to the second question in the programme of work for the first part of the annual session for 1979, namely the question of the ban on chemical weapons which is now under discussion, our delegation would like to express at this meeting certain considerations.

The Bulgarian delegation is fully aware of the importance of the chemical weapons problem. As has been noted by many of the preceding speakers, the socialist countries members of the CCD had initiated the discussion on this question and had introduced the first draft convention for the total elimination of this kind of weapons of mass destruction. Since then more than 100 different ideas in the form of comprehensive drafts or working papers dealing with certain specific problems have been presented to the Committee.

It is our deep conviction, however, that the bilateral United States-USSR negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons remain of paramount importance in the efforts to proscribe this kind of weapon. This is why, while sharing the common

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fervent wish for a speedy solution to the problem of chemical weapons, we are inclined to appreciate their warnings on the complexities involved. To quote from the Joint United States-USSR Statement of 22 August 1978: "the issues involved in complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons are extremely complex. The political and technical issues involved are directly linked and thus must be dealt with at the same time. Developing an adequately verifiable disarmament measure which is designed to eliminate an entire class of weapons from the arsenals of States and which also affects one of the major industries in many countries is a task which requires great care".

The remarks of the distinguished representatives of the United States and the USSR yesterday, and the statements we have just listened to, are further confirmation of the adequate and precise description of the problem of chemical weapons in the above-mentioned quotation.

There has been a pronounced tendency in this Committee in recent months to intensify the search for new ideas and efforts in the field of chemical weapons ban. This is an understandable and positive tendency. We appreciate and understand the sincere aspirations of many delegations for timely and concrete results in the chemical weapons negotiations.

But as to the idea of creating a working group, we do not believe that the time has come for such a step to be taken. What we have heard from the distinguished representatives of the USSR and the United States clearly indicates to us that at this particular stage we are not in a position to contribute to their bilateral talks. I think that the Committee can ignore neither the importance of the negotiations between the two Powers nor the advice of their representatives who are deeply aware of the complications and difficulties of these important negotiations.

Before setting up a working group we have to agree upon the methods of work of such a group and of the mandate we are supposed to give to such a subsidiary body.

Taking all this into consideration, we fully support the proposal of the Polish delegation to create an informal contact group which, on the basis of all the

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

documents presented to the Committee, could carry out consultations as to the future methods and forms of work in the field of chemical weapons. Such consultations definitely could lead to more successful overcoming of the existing differences in the approach to the elaboration of a convention outlawing chemical weapons.

Having all this in mind, the Bulgarian delegation expresses its willingness and readiness to participate in such an informal contact group.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished delegate of Bulgaria for his statement and for his kind words about myself and about my predecessor, Ambassador Thomson.

Mr. KAMANDA WA KAMANDA (Zaire) (translated from French): My first duty is a pleasant one, to address to you, Mr. Chairman, my sincere good wishes on your appointment to the Chair of this Committee on Disarmament. In more than one respect we are happy that the proceedings of this Committee are being guided by the representative of the Kingdom of Belgium, a country with which we are linked by a long tradition of friendship and co-operation, and we are convinced that your vast experience and your great qualities as a diplomat and your sensitive touch are a sure guarantee for the efficient conduct and happy outcome of our proceedings.

Nor should I fail to address my congratulations likewise to the Ambassador of Australia, your predecessor in the Chair of this Committee, and to tell him how greatly we appreciate the sense of responsibility and negotiating skill which he displayed in that office, thanks to which the Committee has succeeded in adopting an agenda and programme of work. All this is a tribute to Ambassador Thomson's great experience and his proved merits; we are most grateful to him.

My country wishes furthermore to express its sympathy to the delegation of Yugoslavia and through it to the Government and people of that country for the sad events which have recently struck them.

Lastly, I would like to express to Mrs. Inga Thorsson, leader of the Swedish delegation, our very sincere condolence on the death of her husband -- a tragic loss to his family.

(Mr. Kamanda Wa Kamanda, Zaire)

The Government and people of the Republic of Zaire are profoundly concerned by the general and world-wide problem of disarmament. Zaire is a developing country, and consequently its social, economic and geo-political circumstances constitute a sufficient reason for its priority concern with development and security, in view of the calculations and designs of power, if not the will of power.

Our first concern is with development, because we have to deploy all necessary efforts to achieve the release of the vast financial resources used for military and warlike purposes to cope with the burden of poverty, distress, ignorance, disease and all kinds of inequality from which the populations of the developing countries in general and ours in particular suffer. We consider that the huge financial resources at present devoted to the arms race, to the manufacturer of ever-more sophisticated weapons and to the invention of weapons of mass destruction might assuredly be applied to the achievement of great and noble objectives and to the construction of a world at peace in which co-operation in trust, equality and harmony would prevail on the basis of the recognized principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Our second concern is security, because on it depends the harmonious planning of the progress and greater welfare of our populations in peace, whereas the unchecked armaments race, the excessive stock-piling and increase of the arsenals of war, the cynical improvement of certain weapons and missiles that cause massive and indiscriminate destruction, the invention and improvement of chemical bacteriological incendiary and so many other weapons threaten both peace and international security, the future and the survival of mankind.

These are the reasons why Zaire supported the terms of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations which define the framework and priorities for the negotiations on disarmament.

The ban on the use of chemical weapons was the subject of a Protocol which was adopted and signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925. Since then, however, the manufacture of these weapons -- because the manufacture was not expressly prohibited -- has not stopped. Because of the toxicity of these weapons, a distinctive characteristic of which is their special atrocity, and the risk -- increasing from year to year -- of their generalized use, fresh efforts have been undertaken to achieve by complementary international agreements the prohibition of the development, manufacture and stock-piling of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Kamanda Wa Kamanda, Zaire)

Naturally, we associate ourselves wholeheartedly with this approach, because throughout their long history and their national liberation struggle the peoples of our continent, in various places and at various times, have had the bitter experience of being victims of the use of these weapons of indiscriminate mass destruction which caused immeasurable damage both to the physical integrity of innocent populations and to their natural environment and resources, spreading destruction and desolation in territories that in any case suffer from underdevelopment, poverty and misery and so delaying for a long time their social and economic advancement.

Accordingly, in the same spirit we should welcome the bilateral negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on chemical weapons which have been going on since 1976 and we hope that, thanks to the political will expressed on both sides, these negotiations will be crowned with success for the benefit of mankind. In the same spirit we are willing to support all constructive initiatives, whatever their source. In that spirit, too, we consider that the workshops organized by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom have made a valuable contribution.

To supplement these bilateral efforts, however, we favour the approach which caused the General Assembly of the United Nations at its thirty-third session to recommend that the Committee on Disarmament should begin at the earliest possible opportunity negotiations on chemical weapons, and we are convinced that the negotiations in this Committee can in no way hamper the bilateral talks now proceeding.

While appreciating that in the general field of disarmament the Powers which manufacture and possess nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction have a special responsibility in the context of our deliberations, we consider that disarmament and a ban on the development, manufacture and stock-piling of certain weapons, notably chemical weapons, should be matters for all because they are of universal concern.

That is why in our opinion the new Committee on Disarmament, whose members include countries that are producers and countries that are not producers of weapons, both developed industrialized and developing countries, is the most appropriate forum for the conduct of the negotiations in conformity with the guidelines of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

(Mr. Kamanda Wa Kamanda, Zaire)

The problem is one of universal concern because it affects man as a whole, and it would be neither right nor appropriate to exclude steps and initiatives supplementing the discussions between free nations which rightly consider themselves concerned about the future of mankind, in so far as these initiatives have the same object as the bilateral negotiations.

Accordingly, we support document CD/11 of the Group of 21 which makes the sensible suggestion that a working group should be appointed to prepare a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, because we think that this is the most suitable method of initiating or starting these important negotiations.

In the light of the progress made in the bilateral talks and on the basis of the existing documentary material, the working group should identify the elements to be embodied in a convention and consider the important question of effective verification based on an appropriate combination of national and international measures that would be mutually complementary and capable of ensuring the effective respect of the ban.

After the entry into force in 1975 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stock-piling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, all the objective conditions are fulfilled, in our opinion, for the purpose of starting negotiations on a convention prohibiting chemical weapons which would be the natural and indispensable counterpart of the other convention.

Convinced that we are all aware of the need to safeguard our culture and civilization in their purest form, we hope that, thanks to a general momentum of human solidarity, the negotiations on chemical weapons will not be impeded by delay and procedural debate which often are the thin disguise for selfish interests and that they will move promptly in the direction we all desire.

This will be proof of our common determination to serve mankind and to confront the many complex challenges of the closing years of this century.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished delegate of Zaire for his statement. On more than one score, I can assure you, I was appreciative of the congratulations that you addressed to me as Chairman. I thank you also for the tribute that you paid to my predecessor, Ambassador Thomson.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I am not proposing in my statement today to add anything new to the abundant documentary material concerning the item of the elimination of chemical weapons that is at the Committee's disposal, for under rule 39 of the rules of procedure all the documents of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament may be referred to as though they were part of the Committee's own documentation.

All we would like to do is to draw attention to some facts which, owing to their special significance, ought at all times to be present in our minds as we discuss the subject.

I would mention first that a little more than 10 years ago, as is stated in the report for 1978 of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament approved on 28 August of that year, that Committee "agreed to recommend to the General Assembly that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare".

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, for his part, made the following statement in the Introduction to his annual report dated 24 September 1968:

"The question of chemical and biological weapons has been overshadowed by the question of nuclear weapons, which have a destructive power several orders of magnitude greater than that of chemical and biological weapons. Nevertheless, these too are weapons of mass destruction regarded with universal horror. In some respects they may be even more dangerous than nuclear weapons because they do not require the enormous expenditure of financial and scientific resources that are required for nuclear weapons ... I therefore welcome the recommendation of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. I believe that such a study, which would explore and weigh the dangers of chemical and biological weapons, would prove to be a most useful undertaking at the present time."

On 20 December 1968 the General Assembly, echoing the foregoing statements, adopted its resolution 2454 A (XXIII) by which it requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, a report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use.

In conformity with that decision, 14 experts appointed by the Secretary-General, nationals of as many countries in four different continents, prepared the report

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

asked for which received a most favourable welcome in the Assembly and whose conclusions include the following three:

"Because chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons are unpredictable, in varying degree, either in the scale or duration of their effects and because no certain defence can be planned against them, their universal elimination would not detract from any nation's security. Once any chemical or bacteriological (biological) weapon had been used in warfare, there would be a serious risk of escalation, both in the use of more dangerous weapons belonging to the same class and in the use of other weapons of mass destruction. In short, the development of a chemical or bacteriological (biological) armoury, and a defence, implies an economic burden without necessarily imparting any proportionate compensatory advantage to security. And, at the same time, it imposes a new and continuing threat to future international security.

The general conclusion of the report can thus be summed up in a few lines. Were these weapons ever to be used on a large scale in war, no one could predict how enduring the effects would be and how they would affect the structure of society and the environment in which we live. This overriding danger would apply as much to the country which initiated the use of these weapons as to the one which had been attacked, regardless of what protective measures it might have taken in parallel with its development of an offensive capability. A particular danger also derives from the fact that any country could develop or acquire, in one way or another, a capability in this type of warfare, despite the fact that this could prove costly. The danger of the proliferation of this class of weapons applies as much to the developing as it does to developed countries.

"The momentum of the arms race would clearly decrease if the production of these weapons were effectively and unconditionally banned. Their use, which could cause an enormous loss of human life, has already been condemned and prohibited by international agreements, in particular the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and, more recently, in resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The prospects for general and complete disarmament under effective international control and hence for peace throughout the world, would brighten significantly if the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents intended for purposes of war were to end and if they were eliminated from all military arsenals."

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

Since the time when this report by the group of experts, which was approved unanimously, was transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 30 June 1969 about 10 years have elapsed in the course of which the following developments have occurred:

(1) The General Assembly approved another 14 resolutions in which it stressed regularly the urgency of reaching early agreement on effective means for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction, purposes which my delegation usually sums up in the words "elimination of chemical weapons".

(2) The annex to one of these resolutions -- resolution 2826 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971 -- reproduced the text of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction which, as you know, entered into force on 26 March 1975 and the preamble to which expressly recognized that the Convention should be regarded as "a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons" and which further expressed the determination of the States parties "to continue negotiations to that end".

(3) A classified index of hundreds of specific references to the various elements of the elimination of chemical weapons considered in the CCD during its deliberations in the five years that elapsed between 1972 and 1976 was prepared by the secretariat in a most useful working paper dated 11 March 1977. A similar wealth of analogous references is given in the verbatim records of the plenary meetings and above all of the meetings of the First Committee of the General Assembly.

(4) Between 16 March 1970 and 31 August 1978 -- the date on which it held its last meeting -- altogether 79 documents were submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; the titles of the first 78 of these documents are given in the secretariat's "tabulation of documents of the CCD classified according to subjects 1962-1978"; and the last of these documents, i.e. CCD/577 dated 22 August 1978, is reproduced in volume III of the report of the CCD for 1978.

(5) Among these many working papers there are no fewer than three full draft conventions: that sponsored by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the USSR dated 28 March 1972 (CCD/361); the draft submitted by Japan dated 30 April 1974 (CCD/420); and the draft submitted by the United Kingdom dated 6 August 1976 (CCD/512).

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

(6) In the Final Document which was approved by consensus on 30 June 1978 and which sums up the conclusions of the first special session devoted to disarmament the General Assembly has made the following emphatic statement:

"The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently, the conclusion of a convention to this end, on which negotiations have been going on for several years, is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations. After its conclusion, all States should contribute to ensuring the broadest possible application of the convention through its early signature and ratification."

(7) The Committee on Disarmament, which started its deliberations less than three months ago, has already received three working papers dealing with the elimination of chemical weapons: that submitted on 6 February 1979 by the delegation of Italy (CD/5), in which it was suggested that not later than the beginning of its summer session the Committee should appoint an ad hoc working group to deal with the topic with which we are concerned; a paper submitted on the same date by the delegation of the Netherlands (CD/6); and the paper submitted by all the members of the Group of 21 (CD/11) which, like the one I mentioned first, proposes the establishment of an ad hoc working group.

My short recapitulation makes it unnecessary, I think, to explain further why the delegation of Mexico -- which in 1973 was one of the 10 delegations of what was then called the Group of 15 to co-sponsor working paper CCD/400 -- has been supporting from the beginning the Swedish delegation's initiative which culminated in the submission of working paper CD/11 by the Group of 21. Hence, I shall do no more than re-emphasize our belief that the establishment of an ad hoc working group open to the participation of all States members of the Committee as proposed in that document would not -- as the paper itself says -- hamper or hinder in any way whatsoever the bilateral talks which have been going on for so long between the United States and the Soviet Union. On the contrary, we firmly believe that the parallel negotiations would be of assistance to each other. In addition to recovering in this way, in connexion with a subject of manifest universal interest, the functions expressly entrusted to it by the Final Document of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament as "a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum", the Committee would, we are sure, make an invaluable contribution to the happy culmination of such negotiations.

Mr. OGISO (Japan): Since this is the first time I take the floor during the month of April I wish to associate myself, first of all, with all the previous speakers in congratulating you on your assumption of the Chair. The Committee has already achieved a great deal under your able leadership. I also wish to express my appreciation to Ambassador Thomson who presided the Committee last month in his usual able manner.

It was not my original intention to take the floor at today's meeting, but having heard the statements made by the United States and the Soviet Union, I am bound to make a brief intervention.

First of all, I would like to express my appreciation to the distinguished delegates of the United States and the Soviet Union for giving due regard to the proposal I made in my statement of 27 March this year concerning the progress report to be made by two negotiating Powers on the present status of their bilateral negotiation on a chemical weapons ban.

Having listened with careful attention to their respective statements I must confess that I was very much disappointed by the lack of understanding on the part of the two delegations for the progress report on the bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons.

As has been pointed out by a number of delegations in the plenary as well as in informal meetings, we are now facing the situation where the CCD and this Committee have not been able to enter into negotiations on the chemical weapons ban treaty, since the joint initiatives were declared by the United States and the Soviet Union at their summit talks in July 1974.

In our deliberations we have never maintained that the bilateral negotiations should be replaced by the multilateral negotiations in this Committee. What we have been convinced of, however, is that in the light of the little progress made in the bilateral negotiations since 1974, it is high time for us to explore the ways and means that would contribute to progress in the multilateral negotiations on the chemical weapons ban treaty, taking fully into account the progress and the difficulties involved in the bilateral talks. It was in this conviction that my delegation made the proposal on 27 March that the Committee should decide to request the United States and the USSR to make a progress report to the Committee before the end of this part of its annual session, so that the Committee may be in a position to enter into more substantial considerations in the summer session.

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

The working paper presented by the Group of 21 (CD/11) also requests that the States participating in the bilateral negotiations should inform the proposed ad hoc working group on the state of negotiations, indicating the areas in which agreements have been reached as well as the issues which are still outstanding.

My delegation, as I have stated before, fully realizes the importance of the bilateral negotiations for the eventual successful conclusion of the chemical weapons ban treaty and has no intention whatsoever to replace the bilateral negotiations by a different form of negotiation. We can appreciate, too, that final agreement on those areas where provisional agreement has been reached at present between the two Powers may sometimes be dependent on the outcome of the negotiations on still-unsolved outstanding issues, and we are ready to accept certain agreed provisions as provisional without taking them as their final commitment. If the present status of negotiation is reported, even in a provisional or conditional manner, it will be a great encouragement to the other delegations in the Committee to put forward new views in order to help to solve the outstanding problems.

My delegation still believes that it is possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to make a progress report to the Committee without interfering with the progress of their bilateral negotiations.

Repeating this proposal today I am also taking into account the slightest difference between the status of the bilateral negotiations on a chemical weapons ban and the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban (CTB). In the case of CTB the number of countries which are capable of test explosions is rather limited, but in the case of chemical weapons, there are a number of countries, including not only all developed countries but also developing countries, which are capable of developing such weapons.

If a chemical weapons ban should be negotiated, it is to the benefit of the world community, including the two super-Powers, to secure as wide a participation as possible.

My delegation would therefore like to renew its request to the United States and the Soviet Union to give further consideration to this question of a progress report and make best efforts to present a progress report on the bilateral negotiations to the Committee at the earliest possible opportunity in the second part of this annual session.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished delegate of Japan, Ambassador Ogiso, for his statement.

Distinguished delegates, I have four more speakers on my list. In view of the late hour and because several delegates have asked me not to prolong our meeting this morning, I wish to propose that we interrupt our work and resume this afternoon. May I then suggest that we should resume our work in plenary meeting this afternoon at 3 p.m.?

If there are no objections, I suggest that we should suspend the meeting now and resume at 3 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed at 3 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Distinguished delegates, we shall now resume the work of the thirty-first plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. AHMED (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, you have already conveyed condolences on behalf of all of us to Mrs. Inga Thorsson, through the Swedish delegation, on her irreparable loss. However, I would like to take this opportunity to convey personally our delegation's condolences, through the Swedish delegation to Mrs. Thorsson.

I also wish to express our sympathy to the delegation of Yugoslavia for the loss of human life and property caused by the recent earthquake in that country.

As recommended in resolution 33/59A of the General Assembly, the Committee has at last begun consideration of the two substantive priority issues. We have now before us the fourth item on the agenda, which is also the second item on our programme of work for the first part of the current session. The Committee must not relent or merely content itself with general debate and the production of more routine working papers.

It is now virtually impossible to embark on any consideration of the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons without reiterating what has been said before. Hardly any new approach can be suggested that is not a modification or adaptation of a previous one. As has already been pointed out in various working papers and in various statements, there is tremendous background material available. Our efforts should therefore be fully geared towards serious and deep consideration of this item, with a view to the preparation of a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

(Mr. Ahmed, Nigeria)

The binding commitments contained in the eighth paragraph of the Preamble and in articles VII and VIII of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons of 1971 are unambiguous. It is our good faith which is ambiguous and which remains to be tested. We do not therefore, need to go into the detailed historical analysis of efforts to achieve the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is sufficient to recall the high hopes of the CCD during 1977 and early 1978. In 1977 there were indications that the CCD was registering substantive progress by providing a comprehensive elaboration of technical matters involved in banning of chemical weapons. Furthermore, the bilateral negotiations of the United States and the USSR were a focus of much attention. Great hopes were expressed at the time of the 32nd General Assembly that a draft convention would be forthcoming in time for consideration by the special session on disarmament, and this was reflected in the resolution which was adopted at the time. Those high hopes were not fulfilled.

My delegation is of the firm view that the Committee on Disarmament should adopt the necessary organizational machinery to begin elaboration of a draft convention, during this session, on the prohibition of chemical weapons. As a party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 1971 Convention, and as a co-sponsor of document CD/11 we are committed to working in that direction, and we think there is justification to believe that most other members of the Committee at least recognize that the time is ripe, that a draft convention is within reach.

There are more similarities than divergencies in the three proposed working documents on prohibition of chemical weapons recently placed before the Committee. Broadly speaking all agree on the following elements:-

First, the setting up of an informal subsidiary organ of the Committee, open to all members and with participation by non-members;

Secondly, the elaboration by the subsidiary organ of a comprehensive document the end result of which will be a draft convention;

Thirdly, the subsidiary organ should be set up during the course of the current session and should commence its work this session;

(Mr. Ahmed, Nigeria)

Fourthly, the subsidiary organ would benefit from information regarding the state of bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers or their individual or joint views;

Fifthly, it should take into account existing proposals (including those submitted to the CCD) and future proposals;

Sixthly, it should identify areas of agreement and areas where disagreement still exists (and possible new elements for the formulation of scope and verification on a convention) or undertake "an in-depth consideration of the unresolved problems standing in the way of an agreement." Furthermore, all the working papers explicitly or implicitly recognize that the bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers could continue at the same time as the multilateral negotiations.

These elements certainly provide a basis for the Committee to take a decision which will make possible the proper and detailed consideration, with or without experts, of the technical aspects of a draft convention. The material available in the three draft conventions submitted to the CCD since 1972, as well as in the working paper CCD/400 submitted by the group of 15, and in the "compilation of material on chemical weapons from CCD working papers and statements 1972-76", would, along with any new documents to be submitted, allow the ad hoc working group proposed by the Group of 21 to start negotiating and drafting.

Due consideration will have to be given to the issue of verification and control; possibly a combination of both national and international measures would be needed -- and suitable common ground might be found. In this regard, we would like to register our appreciation to the Governments of the United Kingdom and Federal Republic of Germany for arranging visits to chemical plants in their respective countries. We also recognize the value of the visits as confidence-building measures. The issue of the scope of prohibition

(Mr. Ahmed, Nigeria)

is equally a vital and important aspect which has to be settled. It would probably be necessary to prohibit not only chemical weapons themselves but also specific chemical agents and means of delivery. Another issue will be whether to adopt a comprehensive or gradual approach. The question of criteria would be very significant in settling all these technical matters. Should the criteria be based on purpose or intention or on quantity? Should the basis be verifiability or the effect and chemical property? The basis will probably be a combination of all these. We are convinced that nothing short of a working group can be properly seized with all these issues, because what the Committee needs now is not another working paper, there are already enough of them, but a draft convention based on common agreements.

We have heard predictions about the development of new technology which could overtake efforts at chemical weapons disarmament. Thus any time lost without a convention moves us closer to an avoidable but potentially catastrophic and escalating impasse of a chemical weapons balance of terror. Worse, because of the ability of so many countries to acquire chemical weapons the balance will be a very delicate one. It is common knowledge as well as on record from experts' study that it is impossible to limit the effect of chemical weapons within any border once hostilities start. The area of effect of chemical weapons is said to be less predictable than that of conventional high explosives weapons. They are thus less amenable to limited or controlled use. The risk of escalation entailed is much higher with chemical weapons leading to "less controlled and less controllable" hostilities. The conclusion is that "uncontrollable hostilities cannot be reconciled with the concept of military security." In addition, being a major threat to civilian populations and their sources of food and water, the use of chemical weapons cannot be reconciled with national and international security.

Mr. GHAREKHAN (India): Mr. Chairman, I hope you and this very august Committee will forgive me if I do not read out a prepared statement. I believe it is not improper to intervene from time to time and express ones views and react to the evolving situation, particularly when one does not have the time to prepare a statement since today is most probably going to be the final plenary of the Committee before it adjourns.

We are told that the delegations of Finland and Switzerland are going to make statements in our debate today, and I would like to express the satisfaction of my delegation that two countries outside of the membership of this Committee have decided to make their own contributions to our work. I hope that their example will be followed by other members, or other countries, so that the collective wisdom and the collective force of the international opinions could be brought to bear on our work.

The subject of chemical weapons was dealt with by me during my earlier intervention. As early as last year, I had in my statement declared that India does not have chemical weapons in its stocks and that we do not have any intention of going in for such stocks. In my statement on 8 February this year, I said that my delegation had the feeling that the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union had for some reason or other slowed down as from the middle of last year. I am sad to note that my feeling was not unjustified. In fact it was more or less confirmed by the statements that we heard from the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union this morning. The distinguished Ambassador from the United States, Ambassador Fisher, said that he, or his delegation, was aware of the special responsibility incumbent on the United States and the USSR. I am happy to note this awareness, which in any case we never doubted. But I hope Ambassador Fisher would agree with me that it would have been more appropriate if the representatives of the United States and the USSR, in discharge of their special and heavy responsibilities, had chosen to intervene at an earlier occasion in our debate so that the rest of us could have benefited or profited from their statements.

(Mr. Gharekhan, India)

I think it was the distinguished Foreign Minister of France who had said at the inaugural session of our Committee that one must distrust words. One must judge by actions and not by words. I think it was a statement made in great seriousness by the distinguished Foreign Minister of France, and my delegation, in great appreciation of the seriousness of the approach of the French delegation, would like to remind our distinguished colleagues from the United States and the USSR that the rest of us are expecting some action, some concrete progress in the field of chemical disarmament. Statements of course are extremely important because they reflect the point of view and the clear positions of Governments, but we hope that the words would be followed up without any further delay with concrete action.

Now, the main purpose I have asked for the floor today is to address myself to some procedural questions which have been raised during our discussion on chemical weapons. It is generally agreed, I think, that the time is more than ripe for our Committee to take some decision of a procedural nature as to how to proceed on the substantive issues of chemical disarmament. The Group of 21 has put forward a proposal recommending the setting up of an ad hoc working group. The delegation of Poland has, I think, put forward a suggestion for the setting up of an informal contact group. The distinguished representative of Hungary made a suggestion this morning whereby the comprehensive paper produced by the Secretariat in March 1977 would be updated. I think it was the distinguished Ambassador of the Netherlands who suggested that this Committee before it adjourns for this part of the session, should fix two weeks in June or July for the consideration of the question of chemical disarmament. My delegation is glad that different kinds of proposals have been put forward, and we appreciate the spirit in which all these proposals have been made. Our regret is that all these proposals, except that made by the Group of 21, have been made somewhat late in the day, so that we do not have the necessary time for informal consultations, etc., to take a concrete decision at

(Mr. Gharekhan, India)

this session. The Indian delegation had suggested some time ago, quite some time ago, that the Committee could decide to take up the question of chemical weapons before it agreed on the agenda and programme of work. If our suggestion had been accepted -- and we could not understand the reluctance of some delegations to accept our suggestion -- we would have had more time to consider all the questions in detail and perhaps by now, Mr. Chairman, under your leadership, we might have been able to come to some fruition of our work. I might straight away say, in regard to the various suggestions put forward by delegations, that we support the suggestion made by Ambassador Domokos this morning, namely that the Secretariat bring out an updated version of the March 1977 paper. It will be of use to us in our future work in the ad hoc working group which we hope will be set up before too long.

I was encouraged by what the distinguished representative of the United States said this morning and he will note that I am speaking of the positive element from his statement, instead of the negative one. He did say that the United States will "carefully review the proposal introduced recently in this body with a view to identifying those areas in which essential multilateral activity to reach our objective of a ban on chemical weapons might begin". Of course, he goes on to say "without, at the same time, rendering the bilateral negotiations even more difficult", but I think that is not an operative part of the statement. As far as I am concerned, the operative part is that the United States is prepared to look into the proposals with a view to identifying those areas in which multilateral activity could begin on the question of chemical disarmament. I think this is a helpful and perhaps a hopeful indication from one of the two negotiating partners. The distinguished representative of the USSR unfortunately decided not to circulate the text of his statement, so I am somewhat handicapped in responding to his intervention. But if I am not mistaken, he said that his delegation had serious doubts, and that the time was not ripe enough to set up an ad hoc working group of the Committee to look into the question of chemical weapons. Here again I would like to look at the positive aspects rather than the negative ones, and note

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that the Soviet delegation is not opposed to the proposal to set up an ad hoc working group of the Committee. It seems that the Soviet delegation has some doubts about the timing or the ripeness of the setting up of an ad hoc group at this time, and naturally my delegation would respect the views of the Soviet delegation, as indeed of any other delegation, on any question before the Committee. I had said in my statement earlier during the session that the ad hoc group could be set up now, or early during the second part of the annual session for this year. While naturally we would prefer that such a working group be set up now, my delegation would not object to postponing the setting up of a group until early in the second part of our annual session. But I sincerely hope that postponing the setting up of the working group until a later date would not necessarily prevent the United States and the Soviet delegations from agreeing in principle now to the setting up of such a group at a later date. Certainly the mandate, the terms of reference, of the working group would have to be gone into, that would need some time, and we could do so profitably either this afternoon or tomorrow morning and again very early in June, when we resume our work. But I trust and I would appeal to all the members -- and there are very few of them in this Committee who have reservations -- to consider the possibility of taking a decision at this session in principle to set up a working group very early during the second part of our session.

I would like to support also the suggestion which was made by Ambassador Fein, that we fix two weeks during the second part of our annual session to consider the question of chemical weapons. I am of course aware that we have to draw up our programme of work for each part of our annual session, and presumably this will have to be done when we resume our work on 12 June. But I understand that some delegations would wish our Committee to decide as to when the question of chemical weapons would be taken up. My delegation is not really enthusiastic about having the kind of informal meetings that we used to have last year and the year before -- informal meetings of the Committee with the participation of experts. I think there is no need really to invite experts en bloc from all the delegations for the purposes of our work, but if some delegation or delegations wish to bring experts

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with them when the question is considered, certainly it is their right to do so and we would certainly support their desire to do so. For this purpose, if it is the general view that we fix right now specific dates in June or July for the consideration of the question of chemical weapons, my delegation would certainly have no objection to it.

I would like to say a few words about the Polish proposal about the informal contact group. I appreciate the spirit in which the suggestion has been made and welcome the motivation behind this suggestion. Certainly the suggestion has been made with a view to finding some common ground, I suppose, between two points of view which appear to be divergent from each other, but which are not, perhaps, all that much apart from each other.

We have some difficulty with the Polish suggestion. First of all, our rules of procedure do not mention anything about informal contact groups. Our rules of procedure speak of working groups, or informal meetings and private meetings, etc., but there is no reference in the rules of procedure to informal contact groups. There is a reference in the rules of procedure to such additional arrangements which the Committee might wish to agree upon, but there is no specific reference to informal contact groups in the rules of procedure. Now, my delegation would be the last to stand in the way of the proposal on procedural grounds. The Committee is the master of its own business. Anyway, the chapeau in our rules of procedure is "unless the Committee decides otherwise". So if the Committee decides to have an informal contact group, certainly it could be done, but if it is going to be an informal contact group, then there is no need for a decision by the Committee. It is always open to delegations, including my delegation, to set up an informal contact group of our own any time we want to and we could meet throughout the inter-session period to see how we can make progress in our work. But the setting up of an informal contact group does not need any decision from the Committee. The second difficulty that we have in clearly understanding the utility of the proposal, is a substantive one. We feel -- when I say "we", I should perhaps make it clear that I am not applying "we" in the regal sense to myself, but that "we" refers also to several other

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delegations who have the same point of view and whom I have consulted on this question -- that the difficulty which some delegations have about an ad hoc working group should logically apply also to an informal contact group, because if the delegations, specifically the negotiating partners, are not willing to share with us their difficulties, or the progress they have made, then the difficulty would or should apply also to the forum of an informal contact group. This, for one simple reason, that the ad hoc working group also would be informal in the sense that no records would be kept of the proceedings of ad hoc working group, and it would be an open and very informal forum for any States, including in particular the representatives of the United States and the USSR, to talk to us and, so to speak, to take us into some confidence about the state of their negotiations. I note that Ambassador Fisher said this morning that he did not think that a report on the status of the bilateral negotiations would be helpful at this stage, or at this time. Nevertheless, he went on to say they would undertake now to present such a report at the appropriate time during the second part of our annual session, and I welcome this part of Ambassador Fisher's statement. So if an ad hoc working group is set up, it should be possible for the United States delegation and also the delegation of the USSR, to present a suitable report or progress report to the working group during the second part of our annual session. In summary, we believe that the ad hoc working group which we have proposed is the appropriate forum for taking up the question of chemical weapons, and not really the proposed informal contact group. As I said earlier, we have not found any real opposition to the proposal for setting up an ad hoc working group. We hope that a decision will be taken now to set up an ad hoc working group, and that the timing of the actual setting up of the group could be left till the very early part of our second part of our annual session.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): It gives me great pleasure as Chairman to note that two representatives of countries that are not members of the Committee are to have the opportunity of addressing the Committee.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Finland, Ambassador Rajakowski.

Mr. RAJAKOWSKI (Finland) (translated from French): Allow me to say, first, how pleased I am to be taking the floor under the chairmanship of the distinguished representative of Belgium, a country with which Finland has traditionally maintained good and close relations and whose efforts in the field of disarmament have often coincided with my own country's.

[The speaker continues in English]

I would like to express my gratitude through you, Mr. Chairman, to all members of the Committee on Disarmament who have been good enough to allow my delegation to make a statement as a first delegation not a member of this Committee. As is well known, my Government has over the past years emphasized, on many occasions, the importance to preserve the negotiating character of the predecessor of this Committee, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as well as the Committee on Disarmament itself. When the structure and modalities of the negotiating forum in Geneva were changed in the Final Document of the special session of the Assembly on disarmament my Government took a very restrictive position as far as the participation of the non-members is concerned. The Committee should not be yet another forum where delegations can explain their own national policies of disarmament; its nature should be strictly preserved as a negotiating body. My Government felt furthermore that delegations in Geneva not members of the Committee should participate in its work only when they felt that they could be of help and assistance to the Committee.

One of the fields where my delegation thinks Finland could contribute to common endeavours is that of chemical weapons which is now under discussion in this Committee in accordance with the programme of work adopted on 12 April 1979. This is a field in which the Government of Finland has taken a special interest over many years. As early as 1972 the Finnish Government made a first practical contribution to the negotiations on a chemical weapons treaty. This initiative was taken in the firm belief that all nations, whether parties to multilateral negotiations or not, have a vital interest in promoting progress in disarmament. This is, we felt, particularly

(Mr. Rajakowski, Finland)

the case of chemical weapons, a question which has been on the agenda of multilateral disarmament negotiations for almost two decades and which is widely recognized as of high priority. It is commonplace to recall that, unlike nuclear weapons, chemical weapons are in the possession or in the reach of a vast number of countries and concern important national industries in many countries.

Finland thus initiated a research project on the role of instrumental analysis of chemical weapons agents in their verification. The goal of this project was, and still is, the creation of a national chemical weapons verification capacity, which could be put eventually to international use. We felt that such an instrumental and factual project could best suit a neutral country deeply concerned about the situation in the arms race. Verification though was, to our mind, not the only problem to be solved and agreed upon before the conclusion of a chemical weapons ban. Important as it is, it is still just one of the issues.

I have asked for the opportunity to make a statement here today mainly to explain what are the results so far of the research project. A working document (CD/14) has been distributed to members of this Committee which will further explain the stage of the Finnish study under way.

The working document is to a large extent self-explanatory. It gives inter alia a list of the working papers submitted by Finland to the CCD ever since 1972, starting with the definition of chemical warfare agents and technical possibilities for verification and control of chemical weapons and going gradually to the methodology of the chemical identification of such agents. In 1977 a general view of the most useful techniques for the organophosphorus warfare agents was presented to the CCD in the form of a booklet which was distributed to the delegations of the CCD as an annex to document CCD/544. I might mention that the booklet is still available and obtainable through the Permanent Mission of Finland in Geneva. Later, in August 1978, another working document entitled "An Analytical Technique for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament -- Trace Analysis by Glass Capillary Gas Chromatography with Specific Detectors" was distributed to the delegations members of the CCD in document CCD/577.

My intention today is to explain to the members of the Committee what the results gained so far mean in more practical and, let us say, political terms.

(Mr. Rajakowski, Finland)

First, the Finnish project covers only one aspect of the verification issue, that is, the development of the analytical methods for the detection in samples of agents to be prohibited by a chemical weapons ban and thus creating capacity for verifying compliance with the treaty. The project does not address itself to the recommendation of the actual collection of samples, which would depend on the provisions of the treaty. Secondly, the Finnish project is focused on the verification of organophosphorus nerve agents which are generally considered to be the most potent chemical warfare agents.

Thirdly, the Finnish project has been conceived as a multipurpose one, both substantively and functionally. Substantively, the planned control capacity could be used in three different verification activities: (1) verification of the destruction of stocks, (2) verification of the non-production of chemical weapons, and (3) verification of their alleged use.

Functionally then, the capacity could be of service regardless of the modalities of verification to be agreed upon: (1) It could be used for national verification or any combination of national and international inspection; (2) it could be used in connexion with an investigation ordered by an international authority, say for example the Security Council of the United Nations pursuant to a complaint; and (3) it could meet some of the concern expressed by some developing countries about possible difficulties in carrying out verification by their national means only.

These are the considerations I wanted to offer to the Committee concerning the practical significance of the Finnish project, which is still under way. My delegation is ready to give more details and scientific data when this Committee is going to discuss, hopefully, the subject matter more thoroughly during its resumed session in June. My delegation would be happy to participate in the form the Committee itself deems most appropriate, be it in an ad hoc group established for the purpose or in official meetings of the Committee itself. We shall be able to provide more scientific expertise by inviting, if that were the wish of the Committee, a Finnish expert in the said chemical weapons verification project.

It is furthermore the intention of the Finnish Government to continue the project and to make available its subsequent results to the Committee on Disarmament; a further progress report is expected to be ready by next June. The work is at

(Mr. Rajakowski, Finland)

present concentrated on the following: (1) The development of reliable and standardizable verification procedures which have maximum sensitivity to detect even the slightest traces of chemicals to be prohibited (at the moment the detection limit is that of 1 nanogram per litre); (2) the preparation of suggestions for standardization of these techniques and procedures; and (3) the preparation of an extensive data bank and a handbook for rapid identification of potential chemical weapons agents and related chemicals in various samples.

As I stated earlier in this statement, the verification is only one of the issues that has to be solved and agreed upon before the conclusion of a chemical weapons ban treaty. We are fully aware of that fact. Nevertheless, we felt it appropriate to remind the distinguished members of this Committee of the efforts of a purely scientific nature which are being made in Finland by several laboratories, in particular in the department of chemistry of the University of Helsinki, under the direction of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland and supervised by the Ministry's Advisory Board for Disarmament.

We are fully aware of the complexity of the problems arising in the negotiations on the treaty banning chemical weapons. That explains also, we understand, the very slow progress reported from the bilateral negotiations between the delegations of the USSR and the United States here in Geneva. We nevertheless hope that the joint initiative we have been awaiting for many years will soon appear, which would be an important step towards an agreement banning chemical weapons. This would be the first real disarmament agreement decreasing the stockpiles of existing weaponry.

I would like to conclude my statement by saying that my delegation has been strongly encouraged by the discussion on the question of chemical weapons which has taken place in this room during the last couple of days. It also shows the considerable efforts many countries have made and the deep interest all delegations in the Committee have shown in this problem. I have in mind, in particular, the three draft conventions which have been on the table for many years and a good number of working papers presented during this first session of the Committee. I have also in mind the initiatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom in inviting experts and diplomats to participate in a chemical weapons workshop. Both these visits were most useful and I would like to take this opportunity to thank the organizers of the workshop in the Federal Republic of Germany in which I had the pleasure to participate personally, together with a Finnish expert. May I be allowed to formulate a most earnest hope that the time will have come to unite all these efforts in order to achieve at last some tangible results in the field of chemical disarmament.

Mr. EXCHAQUET (Switzerland) (translated from French): The Swiss authorities wish to thank the Committee on Disarmament for giving them an opportunity to make a brief statement setting out their point of view on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

They are all the more grateful for this opportunity as Switzerland, not being a Member of the United Nations, is unable to take an active part in all the international negotiations on disarmament, and is often present merely as an observer of the immense and laudable efforts which are being made in this domain.

It was at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, last year in New York, that my country was last given an opportunity, thanks to the kindness of the delegations of Finland, Yugoslavia, Austria and Sweden, to inform the Members of the United Nations of its position and views on the question of disarmament (document A/S-10/AC.1/2 of 24 May 1978).

Allow me to recall here that the Geneva Protocol of 19 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was signed by Switzerland on the selfsame day, and the Protocol was later ratified by my country on 12 July 1932. Similarly, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and **Toxin** Weapons and of Their Destruction of 10 April 1972 was signed by Switzerland on the Day of its adoption and then ratified on 4 May 1976.

It is common knowledge that my country possesses a very highly developed chemical industry, but it does not manufacture or stockpile any chemical weapons whatsoever. Our army is consequently equipped and trained solely to give protection against such weapons.

If, as the result of an attack on its independence, my country should be drawn into a war and if chemical weapons were used in such a conflict, the chief victim of those weapons would undoubtedly be the civilian population, because of its density. This apocalyptic vision looms over many other peoples as well, and would have consequences which would be not only contrary to all humanitarian considerations but to the dictates of common sense as well.

(Mr. Exchaquet, Switzerland)

In view of the suffering caused by poison gases in the First World War, the international community decided to prohibit them. The subsequent convention on the prohibition of biological weapons was the logical sequel to that step. The present status and future possibilities of chemistry and chemical technology hold out such dangers in the event of their use in wartime that the only way to avoid them is to prohibit chemical weapons altogether.

The Swiss authorities are fully aware of the extreme complexity of the problems which such a ban would imply. They have consequently given close consideration to the contributions already made on the subject by a number of delegations in your Committee to which they wish to express their gratitude.

My country realizes that the enforcement of a prohibition of chemical weapons would involve, in particular, extensive supervision, of the agreements which might be concluded. That is why Switzerland participated with great interest, last month, in the workshop organized in the Federal Republic of Germany on the subject of verification techniques.

In conclusion I would say that the federal authorities have every hope that the work of your Committee in this field will be brought to a successful conclusion in the near future. To the extent of its ability, the Swiss Government will collaborate fully in the implementation of a total prohibition of chemical weapons.

The meeting was suspended at 4.45 p.m.
and reconvened on Friday, 27 April 1979, at 5 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Distinguished delegates, I have the honour of re-opening the thirty-first official meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

We have come to the end of our deliberations and our discussions on the second topic of our programme of work, chemical weapons. We have had a fruitful exchange of views. As Chairman, I followed your discussions and debates with the greatest interest.

Still speaking as your Chairman, I wish to inform you of certain conclusions I have reached and of my own feelings in the light of the consultations I have had with the members of the Committee. About two weeks of the second part of this session should be devoted to the negotiation on chemical weapons on dates to be fixed as part of the programme of work that will be drawn up for the second part of the session. It is also my feeling as Chairman that, as from the beginning of the second part of the session, the Committee should continue

(The Chairman)

its consideration of all the proposals made to the Committee. These proposals deal principally with the methods and procedures to be adopted with a view to negotiating a Convention on the prohibition of the development, Production and Stockpiling of all Chemical weapons and their destruction.

Does any delegation wish to take the floor?

If not, I have to inform you that I would like to suggest that the Committee should request the Secretariat to bring up to date the informal document "Compilation of material on chemical weapons from CCD working papers and statements 1972-1976" of 11 March 1977, and to circulate it as an official document of the Committee.

If there are no objections it will be so decided.

It was so decided.

Allow me to inform you also of the following. The distinguished members of the Committee will recall that at the beginning of this plenary meeting the Committee took note of the seventh interim report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. In accordance with that decision, the Secretariat will circulate that interim report as an official Committee document; it has so far been circulated under the symbol "Conference room paper 57/Revision I".

Do any delegations wish to take the floor?

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): I shall be very brief. I merely wish to have it placed on record that my delegation is really disappointed, and deplores the inability to reach agreement at least on a decision within the Committee as to how the subject of chemical weapons should continue to be dealt with.

I find truly lamentable the fact that it has not even been possible to establish machinery for use by the Committee in undertaking one of the most urgent tasks, a task for which it has received an express and precise mandate from the Assembly, and concerning which there is a general feeling that the question is sufficiently ripe for substantive negotiations.

I believe that, although we are just concluding the first part of our first session, all this is a hard blow to the Committee's credibility.

I think it will prove difficult to explain why or how, after four months of meetings, we have not even been able to reach agreement on the way in which this subject should be approached in future, a subject in relation to which, as I have said, the circumstances are the most favourable for advancing towards concrete

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

agreements, and a subject, moreover, which relates to a type of weapons which the few countries possessing them would never venture to employ; first, because they are prohibited, and second, because their utility would not stand up against the repudiation which the use of this type of weapon would encounter in world public opinion.

All this, from my delegation's point of view, is really lamentable; and we keenly deplore the fact that it has not been possible at least to adopt a decision establishing machinery: **the** machinery which the Committee would have to employ for the purpose of carrying out the express, precise and concrete mandate conferred upon it by the General Assembly in its resolution 3359A.

Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I have asked for the floor for two reasons: first, to express my delegation's opinion -- an opinion which, I am sure, is shared by a very considerable number of the Committee's members -- that the report which, as was promised to us yesterday, is to be presented to the Committee by the representatives of the two States which have been conducting bilateral talks on chemical weapons since 1974, should be submitted to us by a date as close as possible to that of the opening of the second part of the 1979 session. The reasons for this are of a practical nature, and they seem so obvious that there is no need for me to mention them.

The second reason for my asking for the floor is to express my delegation's view that the representatives of the three new members who have assumed the chairmanship of the Committee since January have displayed great proficiency in presiding over the Committee's deliberations. Their in all respects exemplary conduct of the proceedings demonstrates the valuable contribution which the injection of new blood, in this case that of Algeria, Australia and Belgium, has brought to this multilateral negotiating body. It also shows how wise have been the efforts of those delegations which, like that of Mexico, have for so many years proposed the establishment of a rotating chairmanship reflecting the principle of the sovereign equality of all the Committee's members.

To you in particular, Mr. Chairman, we express our gratitude and sincerest congratulations.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Thank you, Ambassador García Robles. I was most appreciative of the words that you addressed to the new members of the Committee and to myself.

Mr. THOMSON (Australia): Mr. Chairman, I intervened very briefly a little while ago to suggest that some more time might be left for consultations on a proposal that we made yesterday. I have received a very positive response to that proposal but we have not really had quite enough time to complete these and would hope, Sir, that it would be possible for my delegation to return to this matter very early in the new session.

Since I have the floor, Sir, may I also first of all express my deep appreciation for the remarks made by our elder statesman about the three new members of the Committee and secondly to express to you, Sir, my admiration and deep fellow feeling.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The spring part of the session of the Committee on Disarmament is coming to an end. The Committee has taken its first steps. It has prepared and adopted its rules of procedure, which will form the basis of its future work. It has prepared an agenda which, besides the tasks for this year, also includes those areas in the matter of restricting the arms race and of disarmament with which the Committee will deal in the future.

Unfortunately we are bound to note that practically for the whole of the present session the Committee was occupied with organizational questions which, important as they are, nevertheless cannot take the place of work on matters of substance.

In accordance with the agenda, as adopted, the Committee has before it important tasks in the sphere of disarmament with which it will have to deal this year. We have had time to deal in the most provisional manner with only two questions -- cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and the question of chemical weapons. Both these issues will evidently occupy an important place in the work of the summer part of the session.

No less important a place in the course of future work should also be occupied by such problems as guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. A draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stock-piling, deployment and use of neutron weapons has been on the Committee's files for a long time. We think it is time progress was made in this matter as well.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

As for the question of cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the majority of delegations, as the first discussion has shown, recognize the extreme importance and urgency of this issue. We express satisfaction with the constructive and businesslike nature of the discussion which has taken place. Nuclear disarmament must occupy an appropriate place in the programme of work of the summer part of the session as well. We hope that the discussion of this question will lead to concrete results, i.e. to the early start of consultations for the preparation of negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

In conclusion, allow me to express the hope that, convening in June for the continuation of its session, the Committee will be able successfully to fulfil the tasks before it.

I should also like to express our gratitude to the Secretariat, the interpreters and all those who made a contribution to the work of this part of the session of the Committee on Disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): Gentlemen, now that we are nearly at the end of the first part of our session, I would like to say a few words to the distinguished delegates of the Committee and to tell them of my impressions and my feelings at the end of our work. I would have some hesitation in attempting to evaluate the results of the discussions we have had during the last three months. Most of the delegates around this table have such great and long experience in the field of multilateral disarmament that I cannot fail to trust their ability to make a fair appraisal of the few steps that we have made up to now.

Allow me to say first of all that it was a great honour for Belgium to become a member of this Committee. It was the accident of the alphabetical order, rather than my country's or my own merits, which caused Belgium to take the Chair early on. This was an opportunity to show right from the beginning our solidarity with the members of the Committee and our desire to perform a useful service in the cause of disarmament. I wish specially to express my deep gratitude for the effective collaboration that you have all without exception given me as Chairman. I am saying

(The Chairman)

this on my own behalf, but I am sure that my distinguished predecessors, Ambassador Thomson, Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas and Ambassador Boudjakdji entirely share my appreciation and my feelings of gratitude.

Distinguished delegates, the first part of the 1979 session was obviously of a somewhat special nature. It was not possible for our Committee to enter immediately into the substance of the many problems that arise in the disarmament field. First, we had to adopt our rules of conduct, to draft our agenda, and to draw up our programme of work. Those are exercises which, by their very nature, often fail to attract the kind of public attention we would like. And yet, when dealing with subjects as vast, complex and difficult as those of disarmament, it is indispensable to lay down lines of conduct and to fix methods of work. Without a code of conduct and without a method of work, no progress is possible. The fact that we succeeded in establishing rules of procedure and fixing the order of our work is itself auspicious for our Committee's future. In this connexion, I would like to express once again, on behalf of all of you, our most sincere thanks to Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas and to Ambassador Thomson for their respective contributions which can only be described as outstanding and most valuable.

Distinguished delegates, although during this first period we concentrated primarily on matters of procedure and the organization of work, we were nevertheless able to consider the substance of a number of problems of the first importance. Not by chance, no doubt, did you select two topics, nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of chemical weapons. In the short time at our disposal, we were not able to progress as far and in as positive a manner in these two fields as we wished, but to me the progress made gives a clear and important political indication of the role that our Committee should play in the second part of its session and in the years to come.

Distinguished delegates, allow me one last time to thank you most sincerely for the kindness that you showed towards me. I wish also to thank the members of the Secretariat for their effective assistance. Please allow me to add an expression of my personal esteem and appreciation to Mr. Berasategui for his daily, and I might say almost hourly, support and help.

My thanks go also to the interpreters to whom I wish once again to apologize for the sometimes excessive demands that we have made on them.

(The Chairman)

It is with confidence that I turn to the delegation of Brazil which in June will take up the burden, and also the torch. I am confident that its long experience in disarmament matters and the exceptional quality of its diplomats will make their mark on the second part of the session right from the beginning.

I shall, of course, remain at the Committee's disposal in the period between now and the time when the distinguished delegate of Brazil will take the Chair.

I thank you all.

Do any delegations wish to speak?

If not, I wish to announce that the next official meeting of the Committee will take place on 12 June at 10.30 a.m.

With your permission, I declare the meeting closed.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.

CD/PV.32
14 June 1979
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THIRTY-SECOND MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 14 June 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman

Mr. C.A. de SOUZA E SILVA

(Brazil)

GE.79-61987

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Nigeria: Mr. A. BENSMAIL

Argentina: Mr. A. DUMONT
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Sir J. PLIMSOLL
Mr. A. BEHM
Ms. M. WICKES

Belgium: Mr. P. NOTERDAEME
Mr. G. VAN DUYSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. A.C. DE OURO PRETO

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U THEIN AUNG
U THAUNG HTUN

Canada: Mr. R.H. JAY
Mr. J.T. SIMARD

Cuba: Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK^{OV}
Mr. V. TYLNER

Egypt: Mr. O. EL-SHAFEI
Mr. F. EL-IBRASHI
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F.M. TSEHAI

<u>France:</u>	Mr. F. DE LA GORCE Mr. M. COUTHURES
<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. G. HERDER Mr. W. KOETTER Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI
<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. J. PÖHLMANN
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. C. GYÖRFFY
<u>India:</u>	Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN Mr. S.T. DEVARE
<u>Indonesia:</u>	Mr. Ch. A. SANI Mr. D.B. SULEMAN Mr. I.M. DAMANIK
<u>Iran:</u>	Mr. K. RADJAVI Mr. D. AMERI
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. N. DI BERNARDO Mr. M. MORENO
<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. M. OGISO Mr. T. IWANAMI Mr. R. ISHII
<u>Kenya:</u>	Mr. S. SHITEMI Mr. A. JET
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES Miss A. CABRERA
<u>Mongolia:</u>	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG Mr. L. BAYART
<u>Morocco:</u>	Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Nigeria:

Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. K. AHMED
Mr. T.O. OLUMOKO

Pakistan:

Mr. J.K.A. MARKER
Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru:

Mr. A. DE SOTO

Poland:

Mr. H. PAĆ
Mr. M. KRUCZYK

Romania:

Mr. C. ENE
Mr. V. TUDOR
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. I.B. FONSEKA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK
Mr. S. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. N.V. PESTEREV
Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHIN
Mr. M.M. BELOUSOV
Mr. E.D. ZAITSEV
Mr. A.V. LOUKIANOV
Mr. V.P. PERFILIEV
Mr. N.P. SMIDOVICH
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES

Mr. C.K. CURWEN

Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE

Mr. T. BARTHELEMY

Mr. D. KOELEMAY

Venezuela:

Mrs. R. LISBOA DE NECER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. M. ESUK

Assistant Secretary-General:

Mr. R. BJÖRNERSTEDT

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, it is a great honour for my country and for me to preside over the deliberations of this most important forum. My Government, aware of the growing importance and complexity of disarmament negotiations, has decided to appoint a Special Representative to all multilateral organs to which we belong dealing with disarmament questions. Accordingly we are establishing a special delegation to the Committee on Disarmament. By mere alphabetical coincidence the first Brazilian Special Representative starts his work on this honorable chair. The task is made somehow easier by the high standards of the performances of my predecessors, the distinguished representatives of Algeria, Argentina, Australia and Belgium. I am particularly grateful to Ambassador Høstordæne for the kind words he addressed to my delegation during his closing statement, passing on, as he said, "le fardeau et aussi le flambeau". For the burden we had to abide by the rules of the English alphabet, and for the torch I can only say that no effort shall I spare to raise it as high as he was able to.

May I extend to all delegations a warm welcome at this moment, when we are starting the second part of the 1979 session of the Committee. In particular, I would like to greet the new representatives who are participating for the first time in the work of the Committee. Ambassador Alberto Dumont of Argentina already served on the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament between 1969 and 1971 as alternate representative of his country. I had the pleasure of working with him at that time and I am sure that his contribution to this Committee will be as effective as it was before. Sir James Plimsoll, the new representative of Australia, will certainly provide us with his advice and diplomatic experience, which include positions as Permanent Representative to the United Nations and senior ambassadorial posts in Washington, where I had the pleasure of working with him as my colleague, Moscow and now Brussels. Ambassador Kazen Radjari, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, brings to the Committee an outstanding academic background in the field of law and political science which will be valuable for our negotiations.

I would like now to give the floor to the Assistant Secretary-General for Disarmament, Mr. Rolf Björnerstedt, who has an important announcement to make to the Committee on behalf of the Secretary-General.

Mr. BJÖRNERSTEDT (Assistant Secretary-General for Disarmament): On behalf of the Secretary-General I take pleasure in informing the Committee on Disarmament that the Secretary-General has appointed Mr. Rikhi Jaipal as Secretary of the Committee, who will also act as his Personal Representative, in accordance with paragraph 120 (c) of the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Mr. Jaipal, whose high personal and professional qualities are well known to the members of the Committee, will assume his functions in those capacities in the very near future.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Assistant Secretary-General for Disarmament for his statement. On behalf of the members of the Committee, I would ask him to convey to the Secretary-General our appreciation for his decision in appointing the Secretary of the Committee, who will also act as his Personal Representative.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, we congratulate you on your new appointment as Special Representative of Brazil to the Committee on Disarmament. We know you for your activities as Ambassador of Brazil to the USSR. At the very outset of your work in the Committee, you face the task of guiding its work by discharging the honourable and responsible duties of its Chairman. Permit me to wish you success in your efforts in that post.

In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, the second part of the current session of the Committee on Disarmament will take place in a favourable context. We intend, as before, actively to plead the case for the achievement of tangible results in the performance of the tasks facing the Committee and to advance its work for the purpose of contributing to the halting of the arms race and to disarmament.

New evidence of the consistent struggle of the USSR and other socialist countries for disarmament is provided by the results of the meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Pact which was held on 14 and 15 May 1979 in Budapest. The Ministers of the socialist countries represented at the meeting put forward a whole set of proposals for the elimination of the threat of war and for a transition to military détente. We hope that those proposals will promote progress in disarmament negotiations.

There is no doubt that the forthcoming meeting in Vienna between L.I. Brezhnev, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and J. Carter, the President of the United States of America, will be a major step forward in the matter of curbing the nuclear arms race. It is envisaged that, during this meeting, a treaty will be signed between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons. We are convinced that the conclusion of a SALT-II agreement will help to stimulate the other negotiations now in progress on the limitation of the arms race and on disarmament, including those within the framework of our Committee.

Real changes in the direction of disarmament have long been an urgent necessity. In his message of greeting to the Committee on Disarmament in connexion with the beginning of its work, L.I. Brezhnev emphasized that "the efforts to bring about a

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

decisive turn in the struggle to stop the arms race must be doubled, trebled, increased ten-fold. A major role in this great undertaking belongs to the Committee on Disarmament".

The Committee's agenda includes such key problems as the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, effective international agreements on security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States, the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and the banning of chemical weapons and of the testing of nuclear weapons. All these questions require solution without delay.

The Committee on Disarmament must adopt its programme of work for the second part of the session. This part of the session will be short, and the approach to the composition of the programme must, therefore be well thought out.

A central place in the work of this part of the session must be accorded to the question of the adoption of concrete measures to curb the nuclear arms race. The Committee has before it for its consideration a proposal by the socialist States for negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. The Committee began discussion of this proposal during the spring part of its session. Members of the Committee showed great interest in the proposal, and a number of them put forward constructive ideas. It is now for the Committee to continue the work it has embarked upon.

An important area of the Committee's work is the consideration of measures to strengthen security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. There exists a basis for a transition to concrete negotiations, namely, the proposals and views of a number of countries, and particularly the draft conventions which have been submitted. This question should occupy an important place in the work of the Committee's current session.

The problem of banning new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction remains an important task for the Committee on Disarmament. We consider that the Committee on Disarmament should actively pursue negotiations with the participation of qualified governmental experts with a view to reaching agreement on the text of an international treaty on this question. Within the next few days, bilateral talks will resume on the question of prohibiting new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and, within that context, of prohibiting radiological weapons. There are grounds for hoping that the participants in those talks will be able to submit to the Committee during this session an agreed text of an appropriate international agreement on the prohibition of radiological weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The world situation shows that the problem of prohibiting neutron nuclear weapons is losing nothing of its urgency. The socialist countries submitted a draft convention on this question to the Committee as long ago as 1978, and it is high time that progress was made in examining it.

The Soviet Union continues to be a consistent supporter of the complete and universal cessation of nuclear weapons testing and of the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. Those questions will no doubt also be discussed at this session of the Committee.

The consideration within the Committee of the problem of chemical weapons must contribute to the speediest possible attainment of the goal of eliminating such weapons from the arsenals of States. We express our readiness for constructive discussion of this matter within the framework of the Committee. At the same time, we intend to continue bilateral talks with the United States of America aimed at the elaboration of a joint proposal on this problem.

It is incumbent upon the Committee on Disarmament to do a good deal of important work at this session in connexion with the consideration of the items on its agenda. The countries members of the Committee must strive, by joint efforts, to achieve appreciable results in the Committee's work for 1979. The Soviet delegation is willing to this end to develop active co-operation with the other delegations of States members of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. DUMONT (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): I should like to express my deep appreciation for the words of welcome you addressed to me, Mr. Chairman, and for your kindness in recalling the time when we worked together in this Committee. I do not know whether the experience I acquired in those far-off days will suffice me in the performance of my duties, but I can assure you that the Argentine delegation will continue to participate in the Committee as actively as in the past, and that all its members can count on our co-operation in the solution of any problem. I should also like to congratulate you on your designation as Chairman and to wish you every success in your post.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to thank the distinguished representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me.

I would now like to refer to the question of the conduct of work of the Committee. As you know, rule 28 of the rules of procedure states that "On the basis of its agenda, the Committee, at the beginning of each part of its annual session, shall establish its programme of work, which will include a schedule of its activities for that part of the session, taking also into account the recommendations, proposals and decisions referred to in rule 27".

(The Chairman)

May I also recall that rule 29 provides that "The provisional agenda and the programme of work shall be drawn up by the Chairman of the Committee with the assistance of the Secretary and presented to the Committee for consideration and adoption." Based mainly on these rules of procedure I have tried to contact as many delegations as I could during my brief stay in Geneva before the opening of the session. Unfortunately, I was not able to get in touch with all delegations present here but, fortunately, I was able to meet delegations from all different areas and from all different groups. These contacts proved, in a certain way, to be quite encouraging for the launching of our deliberations.

For the organization of our work I understand that we should have to take decisions on four questions, the first being a decision relating to the items that shall be included in the programme of our work. The second is the order in which we shall discuss those items; the third would be the time that we should allocate to the discussion of each of those items, and the fourth would be an agreement on the closing date of our work. I am aware that these four items are related, and that each one has a certain effect on the others. At the same time, while we do not have to take immediate decisions on those four questions, a decision is required on the organization of work.

Following consultations held during the last three days, I had the feeling that we could reach a conclusion regarding the selection of items which should be included in the programme of work. Because, of all the substantive items of the programme of work contained in document CD/12, as well as the ex-officio item of the CD report to the General Assembly, all five substantive items were subject to suggestions by some, or all, delegations, and there were no objections in their regard by any delegations. When I say this, I should like to point out that, as I was unable to consult all delegations, I have consulted those delegations that, for various reasons, were aware of the positions of colleagues belonging to the same geographic areas or other groups. For this reason I am in a position to say that I did not find any objection to any of the five substantive items included in the agenda of the Committee. Secondly, concerning the question of the order in which they will be discussed, I would like to emphasize that the order does not mean in any way that we are prejudging priorities or any other criteria; we are just focusing on the practical convenience of the deliberations of the Committee. Therefore, concerning the order, time allocation and the closing date, I did not feel the same response as that received in respect of the selection of the items. So, to speed up our work, it is my intention to propose the following procedure to the Committee.

(The Chairman)

There being no objections to the inclusion of the five substantive items in our programme of work, we shall take this decision at this formal meeting and discuss the other three questions, that is, the sequence of items, time allocation and closing date, informally, after closing the formal meeting.

I should like to know if any delegation has suggestions or observations to make concerning the proposal I have just indicated. If this is not the case, it is decided by the Committee that the five items of the annual agenda, plus the report, are to be included in, and adopted as our programme of work.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Before closing this plenary meeting, I should like to recall that, during the thirty-first plenary meeting of the Committee, Ambassador Noterdaeme, in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee, expressed his feeling that, as from the beginning of the second part of the session, the Committee should continue its consideration of all the proposals made to the Committee, dealing principally with methods and procedures to be adopted with a view to negotiating a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction. I intend, therefore, to continue the consultations undertaken by Ambassador Noterdaeme in that connexion during the next days.

So, distinguished delegates, as we have decided to have an informal meeting in which we shall discuss the rest of the organization of our work, I should like to know if there is a preference to hold the meeting either immediately after this formal meeting or in the afternoon. If there is no preference, I would suggest that we adjourn and reconvene in an informal meeting of the Committee in five minutes.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Concerning our next formal meeting, I understand that the Committee will proceed to work as it did in the first part of its session, that is with meetings on Tuesday and Thursday morning. Does any delegation have any comments on this schedule?

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): Mr. George Seignious, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, would like to address the Committee. He is on our list as ex officio leader of the delegation when he is here, and he unfortunately cannot be here until Tuesday afternoon. We would clearly have no objection to a meeting on Tuesday morning but would like to request a meeting in the

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

afternoon, on what will not be a topic of little interest, but a topic of great interest. Therefore, without objection to a meeting Tuesday morning, I would like to request a meeting Tuesday afternoon as well, or Tuesday afternoon only, depending on the wishes of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States of America for his statement. Members of the Committee have heard his suggestion -- I wonder whether any delegation would like to comment. If this is not the case, we realize the importance of the statement to be made by the distinguished representative of the United States and I do not think that there will be any objection to convening a plenary meeting on Tuesday afternoon.

As I understand that, to organize our work, informal consultations should be held until our next and -- hopefully -- last plenary meeting on organizational matters, my suggestion would be that on Tuesday we hold just one plenary meeting in the afternoon and that, after hearing the statement of the representative of the United States, we might decide whether or not to proceed with the questions of organization, according to the wishes of the Committee.

Therefore, the next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Tuesday, 19 June, at 3 p.m. in this room.

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.

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18 June 1979
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THIRTY-THIRD MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 18 June 1979

Chairman: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENSMAIL

Argentina: Mr. A. DUMONT
Miss N. FRYRE PENABAD
Mr. C.A. PASSALACQUA

Australia: Sir J. PLIMSOLL
Mr. L.D. THOMSON
Mr. A. BEHM
Ms. M. WICKES
Ms. B. ALLAN

Belgium: Mr. P. NOTERDAEME
Mr. G. VAN DUYSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. A.C. DE OURO PRETO

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. C. HALACHEV

Burma: U Saw HLAING
U Thein AUNG
U Thaung HPUN

Canada: Mr. R. HARRY JAY
Mr. J.T. SIMARD

Cuba: Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKLEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. V. TYLNER

Egypt: Mr. O. EL-SHAFFI
Mr. M. EL-BARADEI
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F.H. TSEHAI

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. IBERDER
Mr. W. KOETTER
Mr. H. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. J. PÖHLMANN
Mr. H. IÜLLER

Hungary: Mr. H. DOMOKOS
Mr. C. GYÖRFFY

India: Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN
Mr. S.T. DEVARE

Indonesia: Mr. A. SANI
Mr. D.B. SULEMAN
Mr. I.M. DAMANIK

Iran: Mr. K. RADJAVI
Mr. D. AMERI

Italy: Mr. N. DI BERNARDO
Mr. M. MORENO
Mr. C. FRATESCHI

Japan: Mr. M. OGISO
Mr. T. NONOYAMA
Mr. T. IWANAMI
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya: Mr. SHITEMI
Mr. A. JEP ODENDO

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
Miss A. CABRERA

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDENBILLEG
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Nigeria: Mr. T.O. OLUJOKO

Pakistan: Mr. J.K.A. HARKER
Mr. H. AKRAM

Peru: -

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. H. PAC
Mr. H. KRUCZYK

Romania: Mr. C. EIGE
Mr. V. TUDOR
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. I.B. FONSEKA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. S. STROMBACK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. N.V. PESTEREV
Mr. M.G. AMTIUKHIM
Mr. M.H. BELOUSOV
Mr. E.D. ZAITSEV
Mr. V.P. PERFILIEV
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV

United Kingdom: Mr. D.M. SUMTERHAYES
Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. G.M. SEIGNIOUS
Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. T. BARTHELEMY
Mr. D. KOELEMY

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mrs. R.L. DE NEGER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. H. VRHUNEC
Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU

Assistant Secretary-General:

Mr. R. BJORNERSTEDT

The CHAIRMAN: Before giving the floor to the first speaker on my list I would like, on behalf of the Committee, to extend a warm welcome to Mr. George Seignious, the head of the delegation of the United States of America, who joins the Committee today as representative of his country.

It being the first time that Mr. Seignious is among us, I am sure that the Committee welcomes him as warmly as I said and that the members will pay great attention to what he is going to say to the Committee today.

Mr. SEIGNIOUS (United States of America): I am pleased and honoured to be able to address the principal multilateral disarmament negotiating body at this special moment in the history of our efforts to halt the buildup of nuclear armaments. I had hoped to speak at the Committee's inaugural session, in what would have been my first appearance before an international audience following my assumption of responsibilities as Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Unfortunately, my confirmation hearing before the United States Senate prevented me from meeting you then.

But I can imagine no more propitious time to come before you than now, with the events of the Vienna Summit fresh in my mind. I was personally moved as I witnessed the signing of the SALT II agreements. It is indeed an act of statesmanship, and a momentous occasion for the entire world, when the leaders of two nations which have the capacity to destroy each other, and in doing so to contaminate much of this planet, choose instead to work together to limit the nuclear arsenals they have within their power.

This is no small accomplishment, and it has not been an easy task.

SALT II took over six years to complete. I can appreciate the impatience many of you have felt with the pace of the negotiations. But the agreement we have achieved is one of enormous complexity -- the text, with agreed statements and common understandings, is 78 pages long; and the issues involve the basic security, indeed the survival, of our two nations. Moreover, we have reached agreement on a complex package of restrictions and obligations which not only are mutually acceptable but also meet the critical test of adequate verifiability. Having participated in the negotiations and in the deliberations of my Government in Washington, I can testify personally to the sense of determination and responsibility

(Mr. Seignious, United States)

with which both sides have carried out this momentous task, and I can testify that this determination and responsibility will continue as we seek deeper reductions and increased restraints in SALT III.

Although a great amount of attention has been devoted to SALT by the public media, I believe it would be worthwhile to say a few words about the major provisions of the new agreement. SALT II consists of three basic parts -- a Treaty that runs until 1985, a Protocol that lasts through 1981, and a Statement of Principles for further negotiations.

As you know, the Treaty sets an over-all limitation of 2,400 for each party on its strategic forces, reductions to reach this over-all ceiling must be carried out within six months of the agreement's entry into force, with further reductions to a ceiling of 2,250 to be completed by the end of 1981. The Treaty also imposes subceilings affecting heavy bombers equipped for long-range cruise missiles and launchers of missiles carrying multiple independently targetable warheads, or MIRV.

The Treaty limits the qualitative race in weapons technology by banning the flight-testing or deployment of more than one new type of intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM; it prohibits the development of a rapid-reload capability for launchers for this type of missile; and it bans certain new nuclear weapons systems which now are feasible technologically, but which have not yet been developed or deployed. An example is ballistic missiles on surface ships. The Treaty bans any increase in the number of warheads on existing types of intercontinental ballistic missiles while setting a ceiling of 10 warheads on the one permitted new type of these missiles.

The Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty. It lasts, as I noted earlier, until the end of 1981. Basically, the Protocol places temporary limits on certain weapons systems. It prohibits the flight-testing and deployment of air-to-surface ballistic missiles; it bans the deployment of mobile intercontinental ballistic missile launchers and flight-testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles from such launchers. It also bans the deployment of sea-launched and ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges of over 600 kilometres.

The Statement of Principles charts the course for the next phase of SALT, in which we are committed to seek further numerical reductions and qualitative limits. Resolution of the temporary limits in the Protocol will be an agenda item for SALT III.

(Mr. Seignious, United States)

No description of SALT II would be complete without giving some indication of the complexity and pervasiveness of its verification provisions. These are an essential part of the obligations established by the Treaty and the Protocol. Let me mention a few of them.

As in SALT I, interference with national technical means of verification is prohibited, as is deliberate concealment that impedes verification of compliance. Precise definitions and counting rules have been incorporated to solve such problems as determining which missiles are to be counted as MIRV and which are not. For the first time in the history of negotiations on strategic offensive arms, the United States and the Soviet Union have exchanged information setting forth the numbers, by category, of their respective strategic offensive nuclear forces limited by SALT. This basic data, to be exchanged twice a year, will ensure that each nation has confidence that the other is applying the provisions of the agreement in the same manner. It will also provide a clear agreed baseline from which further reductions can be made. The United States-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission, established in SALT I, has been maintained as a mechanism for working out procedures for implementation of the agreements and for resolving questions of compliance.

These are the main provisions of the agreement signed yesterday at the Hofburg in Vienna. I would like now to share with you my thoughts about the significance of the SALT II agreement, looking first at its more specific consequences and then considering some of the broader implications.

First, SALT II places a firm ceiling on United States and Soviet strategic force levels, thereby setting an upper limit to the competition in strategic forces and precluding an unconstrained race for superiority. It begins the process of reductions -- also a first in the history of strategic offensive arms negotiations.

Second, an important start has been made at curbing the qualitative race in strategic weaponry. This aspect of the arms race is the most intractable. Restraining it is a task for which we must constantly redouble our efforts, lest technology escape our ability to devise policies and methods to set rational limits. I believe that we have an opportunity to arrest the high-speed technological advances that are being made in weapons systems. For the sake of all of us, we must not let this opportunity pass. We do not intend to.

(Mr. Seignious, United States)

I will make no claim today that SALT II brings this part of the arms race to a halt, but it does take some very important first steps.

Third -- and this is a direct consequence of the first two points -- SALT II strengthens strategic stability and reduces the risk of nuclear war. It does this by providing a framework for preservation of essential equivalence in strategic offensive forces, while at the same time reducing the area of uncertainty, and thus the potential for miscalculation, about what the other nation is doing. Force planning on both sides will be able to proceed with the knowledge, for example, that the other party will have no more than a given number of strategic missile launchers, or no more than a given total of strategic warheads, between now and 1985. Without SALT II, this would not be the case. In a broader sense, the very achievement of SALT II contributes to stability by demonstrating the continued will and ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to negotiate limits to their military competition.

This brings me to the fourth point. The agreements signed in Vienna specifically commit the United States and the Soviet Union to continuing the ten-year SALT process -- without interruption and with the aim of achieving significant reductions in strategic offensive arms, as well as further qualitative limitations.

We take this obligation with the utmost seriousness.

The achievement of agreement in SALT II, with a commitment to continuing the process in SALT III -- and this is my fifth point -- is a measure of the determination of the United States and the Soviet Union to fulfil their obligation under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a Treaty which a predecessor of this Committee, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, played a central role in shaping. As you know, article VI commits the parties to good-faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. My Government is deeply conscious of its obligation to the more than 100 nations parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which have forsworn nuclear weapons. Their continued restraint, and that of other non-nuclear-weapon States, is essential to preventing a dangerous multiplication of the risk that conflict or miscalculation could lead to nuclear war. We are hopeful that SALT II, and the commitment to continued pursuit of nuclear disarmament which it embodies, will encourage those States which have not yet acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to do so.

(Mr. Seignious, United States)

~~My sixth-point has to do with verification.~~ The SALT II Treaty and Protocol and their negotiating history demonstrate that any agreement which substantially affects the military security of a nation must contain provisions which give the parties full confidence in their ability to know whether other parties to the agreement are meeting their obligations. SALT II meets this test.

Finally, it is my ardent hope and firm belief that SALT will provide a powerful stimulus to other efforts to enhance the security of all nations through the limitation and reduction of arms, rather than through their continued accumulation. The links between the process of SALT and other disarmament efforts are neither rigid nor always clear. Disarmament is not an interlocking puzzle, in which pieces must be put in place one at a time in a fixed sequence to complete the whole. I see it as a mosaic -- each piece contributes to completion of the total design, further enhancing our perception of what remains to be done. SALT is a major piece of the mosaic. Its placement sharpens our vision of the pieces still needed and strengthens our resolve to complete the design.

My Government is determined to pursue with renewed vigour efforts to achieve agreement on the full range of arms control issues which are the subject of current negotiations. As announced in the Summit Communiqué yesterday, President Carter and President Brezhnev have agreed to active continuation of the search for mutually-acceptable agreement in the negotiations on anti-satellite systems. The two Presidents also reached agreement at Vienna that United States and Soviet representatives will meet promptly to discuss resumption of the talks on questions concerning arms limitation measures in the Indian Ocean and to discuss questions related to the next round of negotiations on limiting conventional arms transfers.

In the multilateral area, I would hope particularly that the achievement of SALT II will be a spur to progress towards agreement on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe and to fresh thinking about how to achieve mutual restraint in the deployment of theatre nuclear weapons. As you are aware, my Government, in concert with its NATO allies, is already giving careful consideration to the latter problem.

(Mr. Seignious, United States)

Three of the arms control negotiations in which my Government is now engaged are aimed at producing the basis for international conventions, open to signature by all nations. For that reason and because of their intrinsic importance, these negotiations are of special interest to this Committee.

First, in the comprehensive test ban talks, the United States and its British and Soviet negotiating partners are persevering in their efforts to achieve agreement on a treaty which will prohibit all nuclear weapons tests in all environments, with an integrally related protocol prohibiting peaceful nuclear explosions. A number of difficult issues remain to be resolved in the critical area of verification. Here in Geneva, the delegations are continuing their work at this very moment, but much difficult negotiating remains before them. My Government is conscious of the impatience of the international community with the pace of negotiations. It shares with all of you a sense of urgency about achieving a comprehensive and durable ban, with effective verification, which attracts the broadest possible international support.

Second, United States and Soviet negotiators will meet here in Geneva next month to resume their work on a complete, effective, and adequately verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons. Their objective is agreement on a joint initiative for presentation to this Committee. Much has been accomplished, but serious difficulties remain, again principally in the crucial area of verification. My Government considers it imperative that efforts for greater progress should be intensified. We understand the sense of urgency which the Committee on Disarmament and the rest of the international community attach to these negotiations, and we intend to do everything possible on our part to move them forward. We also understand the desire of many members of this Committee to involve the CD more directly in work on a CW convention, and we are giving careful thought to this question.

Finally, as you know from the Summit Communiqué, bilateral agreement has been reached on all major elements of a treaty banning the development, production, stockpiling, and use of radiological weapons. We hope to be able to present a joint initiative to this Committee for its consideration in the near future. This ban will fill a gap in the set of multilateral agreements dealing with those weapons

(Mr. Seignious, United States)

which are defined as weapons of mass destruction. It will be a significant achievement, and one further step along the road to ensuring a more secure international environment.

Ladies and gentlemen, last night when the President arrived back in Washington, he reported promptly to the Congress. I would like to share with you part of his thoughts as presented in that address. President Carter said:

"I come in a spirit of patience, of hope, and of reason and responsibility.

Patience -- because the way is long and hard, and the obstacles ahead are at least as great as those which have been overcome in the last 30 years of diligent and dedicated work.

Hope -- because I am able to report to you tonight that real progress has been made.

Reason and responsibility -- because both will be needed in full measure if the promise awakened in Vienna is to be fulfilled, and the way opened for the next phase in the struggle for a safe and sane world."

All of us share a common goal -- peace with security. If each of us uses the talent, the imagination, the intelligence and the perseverance that we individually may have and that you, the major nations of the world, have as a resource, then surely you share the views of both President Carter and President Brezhnev when they agreed that there is a common bond for survival, a common bond for the reduction in the arms race and a search for the ability -- for the sake of our children and grandchildren -- to live in a secure world.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): An event of great political significance took place yesterday at Vienna: the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was signed during the course of the meeting between L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and J. Carter, President of the United States.

The Treaty which was signed in Vienna is the result of long and strenuous efforts by both sides. The new treaty is realistic and concrete. The Treaty in essence establishes quantitative limitations on arms and curbs their qualitative improvement. It should be noted in particular that the Treaty is based on the principle of parity and equal security. Provision is made for the reliable verification of the fulfilment of all obligations under the Treaty by both sides.

Speaking in Vienna, L.I. Brezhnev stressed that "Each provision -- I would even say, each word of the Treaty -- has been weighed and thought over dozens of times. Naturally, it is a compromise; it could not be otherwise. Each side would like the text of the Treaty to be somewhat different, more suitable for its interests, but each side had to give ground on some points, taking into account the partner's legitimate interests".

The SALT II Treaty was not built up from scratch, for it is the logical continuation of such most important agreements concluded in recent years as the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and others. The SALT II Treaty is the outgrowth of the first important Soviet-United States agreements in the field of strategic arms -- the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive weapons (SALT I) which were signed on 26 May 1972. It is based on the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War which is a most important agreement in the history of Soviet-United States relations.

In 1972 a first step was made towards ending the race involving the most destructive weapons -- the race which threatened to reach a quantitative and qualitative level where "guns fire by themselves". Agreements aimed at slowing down the arms race in the nuclear missile field entered into force for the first time in the post-war period.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Even at that time, in 1972, it was agreed that the USSR and the United States would continue negotiations with a view to deepening and expanding the agreements that had been signed.

In the course of the Soviet-United States summit negotiations in 1972 and 1973 it was noted that the SALT I agreement, which was to expire in five years, should be followed by a SALT II agreement. What was meant was a comprehensive treaty which would bring about both a reduction in the levels of strategic offensive weapons and a further limitation of their qualitative sophistication. The outlines of the SALT II agreement were defined in the course of the summit negotiations at Vladivostok in November 1974.

In the long run the efforts made for many years have yielded results. A detailed and carefully balanced agreement has been elaborated. The document signed at Vienna represents the most significant step that has ever been taken to curb the arms race. For several years -- on a number of important aspects through 1985 -- it creates specific obstacles to the stockpiling of the most terrible and costly types of weapons.

The Treaty signed yesterday and other joint documents have been published in the press and are already being commented upon widely throughout the world. In this connexion there is probably no need to dwell on particular details of the documents which were signed. I should only like to emphasize that the SALT II agreement establishes for each side an equal total number of strategic weapon delivery vehicles of 2400 and the obligation to reduce this number to 2250 within the period of validity of the Treaty. The Treaty also introduces other limitations for various types of strategic offensive weapons. The limitations on these weapons are not only quantitative but also qualitative. The Treaty provides for effective control over compliance with all its provisions based on unhampered verification by national technical methods.

The agreement drawn up is significant for a number of reasons. It is undoubtedly an important stage in the process of developing relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, which itself contributes to improving the international climate.

At the same time the Treaty is not only in the interests of the two States. The conclusion of the Treaty is in the interest of the peoples of the entire world, for the achievement of this agreement leads to the strengthening of international security in general. The threat of a nuclear war will diminish. Mutual trust will grow.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

It is important that SALT II is not an end but another significant step towards further curbing the strategic arms race. Taking into account their obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons -- to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament --- and also having as their goal the achievement of general and complete disarmament, the USSR and the United States have agreed to begin -- immediately after the entry into force of the SALT II Treaty -- active negotiations on further measures for the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons. In the course of their meeting in Vienna, the leaders of the USSR and the United States signed a joint statement on the principles and basic guidelines of further negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms.

The universal interest in and support for the efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States aimed at achieving this historic agreement are well reflected in the documents of the most authoritative international organization of the world today -- the United Nations. The Final Document of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly which was held in summer 1978 urges that a SALT II agreement should be concluded at the earliest possible date and that it should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations. The session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission that has just completed its work in New York also stressed the importance of the strategic arms limitation negotiations.

In their discussion of other questions connected with the solution of problems of curbing the arms race and of disarmament, the leaders of the USSR and the United States expressed their support for the Final Document adopted at the United Nations General Assembly special session devoted to disarmament. The sides expressed their support for the convening of a second United Nations General Assembly special session on disarmament, and for that session to be followed by the convocation of a world disarmament conference, with universal participation, adequately prepared and at an appropriate time.

We proceed from the premise that both the Treaty which was signed yesterday and the discussions which took place between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States will also help to stimulate other negotiations which are being conducted on questions of curbing the arms race and on disarmament, including those in the framework of the Committee on Disarmament.

This refers above all to the negotiations on the most topical problem of disarmament -- nuclear disarmament. The joint Soviet-United States communiqué stresses that the leaders of the USSR and United States "committed themselves

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

to take major steps to limit nuclear weapons with the objective of ultimately eliminating them, and to complete successfully other arms limitation and disarmament negotiations'.

In particular the examination in the Committee on Disarmament of the question of ending the nuclear arms race and of nuclear disarmament, including specific proposals submitted on the question, will, in our view, promote the solution of this problem.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons poses a serious threat to international security. The States which are already in possession of nuclear weapons bear a special responsibility in the matter of displaying restraint. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is an exceptionally important problem. The participants in the Vienna meeting stressed that the USSR and the United States are in favour of the further strengthening of the régime of **non-proliferation** of nuclear weapons and confirmed their resolve to continue to comply strictly with the obligations they have assumed under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The two sides expressed their intention to co-operate closely with other countries with a view to the successful conclusion of the 1980 Review Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and called upon all the States which had not yet done so, to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Measures such as the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States also contribute to the limitation of the nuclear arms race. As is known, this question is also on the agenda of the Committee. In our view, the specific proposals made to this end by a number of States, including the Soviet Union, offer a sound basis for the elaboration of appropriate international agreements even at this session of the Committee on Disarmament.

The conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general cessation of nuclear-weapon tests will be an important step towards limiting the nuclear arms race. The urgency of this question has been repeatedly emphasized in the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly, as well as in the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

It was noted at the meeting in Vienna that some progress had been achieved in the trilateral negotiations on the elaboration of an international treaty providing for a complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests in any environment and an associated protocol. The sides reaffirmed the intention of the Soviet Union and the United States to work jointly with the United Kingdom for the early completion of this treaty.

The development of new types and systems of weapons and, above all, of weapons of mass destruction greatly threatens peace and universal security. That is why

(Mr. Israelyan, USSR)

progress in the negotiations on this question is of special importance. As is known, some progress in this direction has been made in the past. These were but first steps. The Soviet delegation believes that the Committee on Disarmament has good possibilities to achieve now, at the current session, tangible results in this field. As is known, in the final document of the Vienna meeting the Heads of State of the USSR and the United States confirmed with satisfaction the achievement of bilateral agreement on the basic elements of a treaty on the prohibition of the development, manufacture, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. 'An agreed joint proposal' -- says the Final Document -- 'will be presented to the Committee on Disarmament this year'. After considering this joint proposal, the Committee could submit to the United Nations General Assembly a specific text of an agreement on the prohibition of radiological weapons. This will be no small contribution to the limitation of the arms race in new dangerous areas and will demonstrate the effectiveness of the work of the Committee on Disarmament in 1979.

We further hope that the favourable climate created by the successful conclusion of the Soviet-United States Summit will also contribute to progress in such an important field as the prohibition of chemical weapons. The leaders of the USSR and the United States reaffirmed the importance of a general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons, and agreed to activate their efforts with a view to the preparation of an agreed joint proposal for submission to the Committee on Disarmament.

We have mentioned but some questions of disarmament, and particularly those which are on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament and which will undoubtedly be influenced positively by the Vienna meeting. The positive impetus of the Vienna meeting will, of course, affect other negotiations on the limitation of the arms race which are being conducted through other channels and in other forums.

The Soviet delegation which has come out in the Committee with a large number of proposals was prepared, together with other countries members of the Committee, to proceed without delay to the elaboration of specific agreements on this and other aspects of the vital question of ending the arms race and on disarmament. This would be our concrete response to what we consider to be the fully justified expectations which have been generated in the world by the historic meeting in Vienna and its results.

Mr. PÖHLMANN (Federal Republic of Germany): First of all, Mr. Chairman, I would like to welcome you personally as head of the Brazilian delegation to the Committee on Disarmament and to congratulate you on the assumption of the chair of the Committee for this month. On behalf of my delegation I wish you the best success.

I also take this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to the new heads of delegations: Ambassador Dumont of Argentina, Sir J. Plimsoll of Australia, and Ambassador Radjavi of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We look forward to co-operating closely with them.

At the outset of my short intervention, I wish to thank Mr. Seignious, head of the United States delegation, and Ambassador Issraelyan, head of the Soviet delegation, for informing this Committee about the summit meeting held in Vienna a few days ago.

On behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany I would like to welcome the signing of the SALT II agreement and express my congratulations to the representatives of the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany considers this agreement a major step towards nuclear disarmament and an important contribution to stabilizing East-West relations. We have heard with satisfaction that the two countries are going to pursue their negotiations with the aim of preparing the ground for further agreements, thereby complying with the recommendations of the Final Document of the United Nations special session devoted to disarmament.

We are convinced that the signing of this agreement will contribute to a climate favourable to further progress in arms control and disarmament. SALT II is thus of great relevance in enhancing our work here in the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): I wish to thank the distinguished representative of the United States for his statement. We have listened with great interest to his report of the meeting between President Carter and President Brezhnev, which resulted in the signing of the SALT II agreement.

The British Government welcomes the conclusion of negotiations and the signing of the SALT II agreement. My Government has long supported efforts to achieve strategic arms limitation. It hopes that the Treaty will now be ratified. My Government attaches particular significance to this Treaty in the context of the

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to be reviewed in 1980. The signing of this agreement is evidence of the desire of the two major nuclear-weapon Powers to curb the vertical proliferation of strategic nuclear weapons.

We have also studied with interest the contents of joint communiqué issued at the Vienna summit. We have noted that several items of direct relevance to the work of this Committee were discussed at this meeting. My delegation hopes that the signing of the SALT II agreement, and the discussions which took place in Vienna, will give an impetus to this Committee in its attempt to resolve many other pressing problems in the field of arms control and disarmament.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): The Committee on Disarmament has just heard two important statements by the distinguished representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States announcing the conclusion and signature of another strategic arms limitation agreement -- SALT II.

Thus one more step has been made to avert a nuclear catastrophe and to consolidate international security and mutual confidence between the two great Powers. After a difficult negotiating process lasting seven years, a sense of responsibility for the peaceful development of the world has led the USSR and the United States to put their signatures to an important agreement --- an agreement which, for the first time in the history of mutual relations of the two Powers, seeks not only to raise a barrier to the arms race but also to lead to significant cut-backs in inventories of nuclear weapons.

On behalf of the Polish delegation I should like to extend to the delegations of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America our warm congratulations. In its statement of 18 June, the Government of the Polish People's Republic placed on record the satisfaction and gratification of the entire Polish people over that historic act which we could all follow on television.

The signature of SALT II -- I am sure -- has been welcomed by public opinion everywhere, for it strikingly coincides with the universal aspiration to secure for this and for future generations life in a peaceful and disarming world. Indeed, we look forward with anticipation that the SALT II provisions relating to future disarmament measures will be followed up with a sense of responsibility and political goodwill. By advancing the cause of general and complete disarmament they will safeguard the security of all States and of all political groupings.

I am sure that, we all are going to study carefully the documents which were signed in Vienna yesterday by the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States. In my preliminary remarks, however, I should like to refer briefly to some conclusions which, in the view of my delegation, can be drawn from that momentous event.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

First, the two great Powers have confirmed in Vienna that they are fully aware of their responsibility for the peaceful development of the world and that they are determined to take a creative and active part in that development;

Second, the SALT II negotiating process has confirmed that the security of States can be assured without sustained military rivalry and an arms race. This has its obvious and important implications for the prospects of peace and of the socio-economic development of all States;

Third, the SALT II provisions relating to verification indicate that one can work out effective solutions which enhance the sense of security without compromising the other interests of States;

Fourth, the agreed guidelines for the next stage of the nuclear disarmament process, which are contained in the Statement of Principles to govern the SALT III negotiations, have major implications for the opening-up of new possibilities for the multilateral disarmament efforts pursued here, in the Committee on Disarmament, and elsewhere; and

Fifth, the new political climate generated by the signature of the SALT II agreement augurs well for prospects of important progress in the bilateral talks concerning chemical weapons, as well as the trilateral negotiations concerned with nuclear test ban.

I am sure that these conclusions will not be lost on the Committee on Disarmament as well. Indeed, the new momentum of disarmament negotiations must find its distinct reflection in the work pursued in this body. In the view of my delegation, the Committee is now more than ever duty-bound to accelerate its work in areas which have direct relevance to the Vienna agreement. That includes, in the first place, the question of negotiations to halt the production of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament. That also includes the question of the negative guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. Last but not least -- it includes our priority items: prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the elimination of chemical weapons.

My delegation is confident that the Committee on Disarmament will not miss the opportunity which has been opened up by the SALT II agreement, and which will be reinforced by its early ratification. We are confident that the cause of general and complete disarmament will be significantly advanced. My delegation is prepared to co-operate with all members of the Committee in facilitating that objective.

Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I should like first of all to express my delegation's gratitude to Mr. George H. Seignious II, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, for the valuable information he presented to us in the statement he has just made concerning the immediate background and content of the Treaty which, as the fortuitous culmination of the long cycle of negotiations which have become known as SALT II, was signed yesterday at Vienna by the Chiefs of State of his country and of the Soviet Union -- a historical event at which President Brezhnev and President Carter were the principals and which Mr. Seignious had the honour of witnessing.

Our gratitude also goes to the distinguished representative of the other State party to the Treaty which I have just mentioned, Ambassador Issraelyan, who in his statement made a number of supplementary points that are certainly valuable for the correct evaluation of the Treaty.

The importance of the statements we have just heard is all the greater in the light of what has been said to the effect that the Treaty in question is regarded not as an end in itself but as a point of departure for the third round of negotiations, namely, SALT III which should lead the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals to effect reductions and qualitative limitations of those arsenals that are truly meaningful in the disarmament context.

My delegation considers that bilateral negotiations like these and multilateral negotiations such as those we are endeavouring to engage in here are not competitive and even less incompatible and that, on the contrary, they should be regarded as complementary and mutually beneficial. For this reason we are convinced that, in accordance with the spirit of the Final Document approved by the first General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, and particularly paragraphs 27 and 114 of that Document, it would be highly desirable and of mutual advantage if -- just as the two Superpowers are kept fully and appropriately informed of any points on which agreement may be reached here -- the Committee on Disarmament, which it has been agreed by consensus constitutes the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum", should similarly be regarded as the rightful recipient of all documents of the type that have just been signed at Vienna.

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

We consider that the Committee on Disarmament and its States members have the right -- not only with a view to facilitating their task but also placing them in a position to make a more useful contribution to the common cause -- to take note officially of any documentation of this nature in its entirety.

In view of what I have said above, my delegation expresses the hope that the delegations of the two States engaged in the SALT negotiations will be able to transmit to the Secretariat of the Committee the text of the Vienna documents, the Treaty and its annexes, with a view to their reproduction for information purposes as official documents of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): the Mongolian delegation has the honour to inform the members of the Committee on Disarmament that the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic has today, 19 June 1979, made a statement expressing wholehearted support for the new Soviet-United States agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, signed yesterday at Vienna by L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and by J. Carter, President of the United States of America.

In accordance with the instructions received from the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic I would request you, Mr. Chairman, to arrange for the distribution of the above-mentioned statement by the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Mongolian delegation will submit this document immediately to the Secretariat of the Committee for distribution, and will take advantage of the opportunity of making a statement at one of the Committee's next meetings.

As I am taking the floor for the first time at the very beginning of the Committee's summer session I should like to congratulate you on your assumption of the post of Chairman of the Committee and wish you success in the discharge of your responsibilities.

The Mongolian delegation has today listened with great attention to the very important statements made by the USSR and United States delegations, and would take this opportunity of sincerely welcoming in the Committee and congratulating the USSR delegation as well as the United States delegation, which at this meeting is being represented with distinction by Mr. G. Scignious II, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, on the successful results of the Vienna summit meeting whose significance extends well beyond the framework of bilateral Soviet-United States relations.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): My delegation would like to express its support of the appeal just made by the distinguished representative of Mexico to the United States and to the Soviet Union, to make available to this Committee any documentation pertaining to SALT II. I should also like to use this occasion to state that the Swedish Government has already expressed its appreciation and satisfaction of the conclusion of the important agreement on SALT II.

We share the hope which has been expressed here that this agreement will also give impetus to other disarmament negotiations, and I am thinking there, in particular, of the comprehensive test ban treaty.

I should also like to express our sincere gratitude to Mr. Seignious, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and to Ambassador Issraelyan, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union in our Committee, for having given us this very interesting report of the conclusion of the SALT II agreement. We consider it very essential, with regard to this Committee's important task to negotiate disarmament agreements, that it is kept fully informed of negotiations going on in other fora.

As I have said, we fully support the appeal by the distinguished representative of Mexico.

Mr. SEIGNIOUS (United States of America): I pledge that I will dispatch to this Committee copies of the United States version of the SALT Treaty tomorrow.

Mr. ISSRAELIYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): I am taking the floor on the understanding that the list of speakers on this question is exhausted. If that is so, I would like cordially to thank the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Poland, Mongolia, Sweden and Mexico for their kind words about the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Soviet delegation. I wish to assure you, my dear colleagues, yet again, that the Soviet delegation will spare no effort to co-operate closely with you in difficult and perhaps even lengthy quests, with each passing day, for the achievement of agreements designed to consolidate peace and security and co-operation among all the delegations represented here in this Committee and in the whole world.

The CHAIRMAN: As there are no more speakers on my list I should like to propose to members of the Committee, as we have a few procedural questions pending, that we suspend this meeting and reconvene, in approximately ten minutes, in an informal meeting of the Committee.

The meeting was suspended at 4.50 p.m. and resumed at 5.40 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: According to the rules of procedure of this Committee, the Chairman of the Committee, in consultation with delegations should present a proposal on the organization of our work. After holding consultations with different groups and different delegations, and also in informal meetings, the Chairman came to the conclusion that a consensus has emerged concerning the organization of our work as it is presented in the informal paper circulated to all delegations of the Committee.

This being the case I shall read out the decision of the Committee, taken by consensus and related to the organization of our work.

"In compliance with rule 28 of its rules of procedure, the Committee on Disarmament adopts the following programme of work for the second part of its 1979 session;

21-22 June	Nuclear test ban
25-29 June	Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
2-6 July	Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
10-13 July	New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons
16-27 July	Chemical weapons
30 July-3 Aug.	Nuclear test ban
	Consideration and adoption of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In adopting its programme of work, the Committee has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its rules of procedure".

In adopting this programme of work the Committee has decided to split one of its items into two parts, namely, the item concerning the nuclear test ban. It was agreed that the first part would be devoted to an exchange of views and (formal or informal) proposals that delegations wish to present to the Committee. During the second part of the consideration of the item, among other things, the Committee will receive, take note, and comment on the report of the experts on seismic events.

In addition, bearing in mind the understanding reached during the first part of the 1979 session, negotiations should proceed informally, to help the Committee reach an agreement concerning the procedure to be applied when dealing with the item on chemical weapons. Those negotiations, requested during the first part of this session, have already started; they are proceeding and it is my hope that, in the very near future, we can come to a conclusion concerning these aspects of the item on chemical weapons.

(The Chairman)

If no other delegation desires to take the floor I take it that it is the wish to the Committee to adopt the programme of work as has been established, with both the understandings indicated previously.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Thursday, 21 June 1979, at 10.30 a.m. During this time consultations will be continuing and, as I stated before, if there is a possibility of convening an informal meeting this week on the procedural aspects of dealing with chemical weapons I shall propose to members of the Committee to do so.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 21 June 1979 at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C.A. de Souza e Silva

(Brazil)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENSMAIL

Argentina: Mr. A. DUHONT
Miss H. FREYRE PENABAD
Mr. C.A. PASSALACQUA

Australia: Mr. A. BIEHM
Ms. N. WICKES

Belgium: Mr. P. NOTERDAEME
Mr. G. VAN DUYSSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. A.C. DE OURO PRETO

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. C. HALACHEV

Burma: U Thein AUNG
U Thaung HTUN

Canada: Mr. R. HARRY JAY
Mr. J.T. SHIARD

Cuba: Mrs. V.B. JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. V. TYLNER

Egypt: Mr. M. EL-BARADEI
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFFE

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. J. PÖHLMANN
Mr. H. MÜLLER

Hungary: Mr. H. DOIKOS
Mr. C. GYÖFFY

India: Mr. S.T. DEVARE

Indonesia: Mr. D.B. SULEMAN

Iran: Mr. D. AMERI

Italy: Mr. C. FRATESCHI

Japan: Mr. M. OGISO
Mr. T. NONOYAMA
Mr. T. IWANAMI
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITENI
Mr. A. JET ODENDO

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
Miss A. CABRERA
Miss L.M. GARCÍA

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDETBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAÏBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIJU
Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Nigeria: Mr. K. AHMED
Mr. T.O. OLUMOKO

Pakistan:

Peru: Mr. A. DE SOTO

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. H. PAC
Mr. M. KRUCZYK

Romania: Mr. C. ENE
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. I.B. FONSEKA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. N.V. PESTEREV
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV
Mr. M.G. ANTIUKHIN
Mr. V.P. PERFILIEV
Mr. N.P. SMIDOVICH

United Kingdom: Mr. N.H. MARSHALL

United States of America: Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. D. KOELEMAY

Venezuela: Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Yugoslavia: Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire: Mr. E. MULONGANDUSU

Assistant Secretary-General: Mr. R. BJÖRNERSTEDT

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): The start of the work of the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament coincides in a pleasant way this year with an event of international historical significance.

It was literally only a few days ago that a Soviet-United States meeting at the highest level was successfully concluded in Vienna. The main outcome of this meeting was the signing by L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and by J. Carter, President of the United States, of a new Treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive arms (SALT II), and of a number of other important documents, the significance of which extends far beyond the framework of bilateral relations between the USSR and the United States.

As is stressed in the joint Soviet-United States communiqué, the new Treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive arms and its Protocol make a substantial contribution to the prevention of nuclear war and the deepening of détente, and thus serve the interests not only of the Soviet and American peoples, but the aspirations of mankind for peace.

In the past few days, the general public in countries throughout the world has indicated that it thoroughly approves of the conclusion of the SALT II Treaty, and regards it as an important factor capable of having a favourable influence on the international climate as a whole.

The Governments of the Soviet Union and of the United States have reached agreements of vital importance to mankind for the adoption of practical measures on the quantitative limitation of offensive strategic arms and on curbing their qualitative refinement. Both sides have assumed the obligation to enter into active negotiations, after this Treaty comes into force, on further steps for the limitation and reduction of strategic arms.

These fundamental provisions of the new Soviet-United States instruments have been warmly approved by the Mongolian people and their Government, and the conclusion of the SALT II Treaty is regarded as a major step towards curbing the arms race and achieving the aims of disarmament.

In a Declaration made by the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic on 19 June 1979 it is stressed that the SALT II Treaty "is above all the result of the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union and its repeated and persistent efforts directed towards the control of the arms race, the adoption of effective measures on disarmament and the strengthening of universal peace and security. Due recognition should be given to the fact that the prevailing good sense and realism of Washington's policy was of major significance in the conclusion of the Treaty".

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

In our opinion, the experience of the lengthy negotiations aimed at the conclusion of the SALT II Treaty, the main lines of which were defined as a result of the understanding reached at Vladivostok, and also the history of the SALT I negotiations, confirm that, however difficult and complicated the problems of curbing the arms race and of disarmament may be, mutually acceptable solutions can be found only if the parties are prepared to show the political will and determination to observe the principle of equality and of equal security as an essential condition.

It should be noted that there are certain circles that fight to obtain a unilateral advantage in the sphere of nuclear weapons, that stir up a war psychosis by their expansionist and hegemonistic aspirations, and that attempt in every possible way to hinder positive developments in disarmament matters.

In these conditions, it is essential that the signing of the new Soviet-United States SALT II Treaty, which is a well-balanced and reliably verifiable instrument, should be followed by its prompt implementation, which would promote further progress in the limitation of offensive strategic arms. Each new step in this matter will indeed little by little help to reduce the level of military confrontation in the world and to strengthen international security. It seems to us that the entry into force of the SALT II Treaty will signify the strict fulfilment by the parties of all obligations under the Treaty, which will permit creation of the material basis for the preparation of subsequent stage-by-stage measures in the sphere not only of further limitations on the expansion of armaments, but also of their reduction.

In this context, I should like to note the enormous importance of the signing in Vienna by the leaders of the USSR and the United States of a joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms.

We are of the view that the SALT II Treaty will create preconditions favourable to the solution of such topical disarmament problems as the further strengthening of the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons, and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

In our opinion, the fruitful outcome of the Vienna meeting will also provide a new impulse to other important negotiations, currently under way, on the total banning of nuclear-weapon tests, bilateral negotiations on a joint initiative for the

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

prohibition of chemical weapons, and also negotiations on the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, etc.

In this connexion the Mongolian delegation would like to express the full support of the Mongolian People's Republic for the important proposal made by the Budapest meeting of the Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States for the convening, before the end of 1979, of a conference at the political level to be attended by all the European countries, the United States and Canada, to reach agreement on the dates and procedures for holding talks on ending the production of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of their use, the renunciation by all States of the use or threat of force, and the adoption of measures to strengthen guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States.

It is our profound conviction that the favourable atmosphere being created as a result of the Soviet-United States summit meeting in Vienna should be used in the most effective manner by all States, and above all by the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, for the purpose of achieving real measures in the sphere of disarmament. We consider that everyone should make constructive efforts in this direction, both in the United Nations and in other international forums, and particularly in such an authoritative multilateral negotiating body as the Committee on Disarmament.

As is known, the Committee approved its programme of work for the summer session at the previous plenary meeting. We are to continue the examination in the Committee of a number of important questions on the agenda for 1979, including the item on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Specific proposals have been tabled on this question by a number of delegations from the socialist countries in the Committee. I have in mind document CD/4. We are convinced that useful consultations will be continued in this sphere, with a view to paving the way for practical negotiations.

Next week the Committee will embark upon an examination of the question of effective international agreements to strengthen guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States. In this connexion there are also relevant documents before the Committee, including the draft convention which was submitted by the Soviet delegation to the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, and which could serve as a basis for negotiations.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

As regards the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, further progress in the bilateral negotiations on the preparation of a joint proposal will be greatly facilitated by the detailed consideration in this Committee of the numerous proposals already submitted by a number of delegations.

The Mongolian People's Republic continues to attach particular importance to the achievement of real progress in the trilateral negotiations on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. It welcomes the willingness shown by the USSR and the United States, together with the United Kingdom, to continue their efforts in the search for a positive solution aimed at completing the preparatory work for an appropriate agreement, as is emphasized in the well-known Soviet-United States document.

The Mongolian delegation has repeatedly come out in favour of the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We call on all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons before the opening in 1980 of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty.

In the first half of July of this year the Committee will take up consideration of the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. In our view, this Committee has reason to expect concrete results from the discussion of this important question. The Mongolian delegation, together with other members of the Committee, expresses deep satisfaction at the joint Soviet-United States decision to submit to the Committee on Disarmament this year their agreed proposal on the question of prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. The future examination of the draft of this treaty, on whose basic elements, as has already become known, bilateral agreement has been reached, and its submission to the United Nations General Assembly for approval would be a concrete result of the activity of the Committee during the recent period.

These are the few comments that the Mongolian delegation wished to make at this stage in the work of the Committee.

Mr. VOUTOV (Bulgaria): It is a pleasure for me to congratulate you once again, Mr. Chairman, on your appointment as the new representative of Brazil in the Committee on Disarmament and to extend at the same time my congratulations to the new leaders of the delegations of Argentina, Australia and Iran, with whom we shall carry on, as we have done so far, active and fruitful co-operation.

I should also like to express the satisfaction of my delegation with the appointment of Mr. Riki Jaipal, the representative of friendly India, as Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The speedy elaboration of the programme of work for the summer session under your wise guidance is a good omen for a businesslike approach to our tasks which seem to be of growing importance against the background of recent developments in the field of international security and disarmament.

The second part of the annual session of the Committee begins its work in a more favourable international situation, the symbol of which is the summit meeting in Vienna between Leonid Brezhnev, the President of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and James Carter, the President of the United States of America, that led to the signing of the SALT II agreements. The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, in a special declaration published yesterday, welcomed this most significant act in the efforts of humanity during the past several decades to curb the arms race and clear the road to disarmament. While congratulating both sides on this historic achievement, I cannot fail to stress the consistent peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union and personally of Leonid Brezhnev, whose dedicated and untiring efforts in the cause of peace and international understanding are universally admired.

Based upon the solid foundations of the principles of equality and equal security of both sides, the SALT II agreements are a convincing example that there are no questions in contemporary international relations that cannot be solved through negotiations. The results of SALT II and their ratification in the near future will strengthen the hope of all peace-loving peoples on our planet that a world nuclear holocaust may be prevented.

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

We are glad to note as well that the SALT II agreements will exert a positive influence upon the mutual increase of confidence and co-operation between the two greatest Powers of this world, and thus upon the international climate. This will be another proof that it is through arms control and disarmament measures, rather than by way of an incessant arms race, that international security can be realistically enhanced.

To us, the members of the Committee on Disarmament, the reflection of the Vienna summit upon the problems discussed in this body will be of significant importance. In this connexion I would like to express our gratitude to both the Soviet and the United States delegations for their very informative statements which confirmed that we could realistically expect an activation of disarmament negotiations in a number of directions. We listened with great interest to the statement of Ambassador Issraelyan, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, at the last meeting of the CD on the prospects which are being opened up after the Vienna summit for negotiations on all the disarmament problems, and especially nuclear disarmament, the complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests, new weapons of mass destruction and particularly radiological weapons, chemical weapons, etc.

As we see it, this pledge of the invigoration of current disarmament negotiations applies as well to the question which is at the top of the list of our tasks for this part of the session, namely, the nuclear test ban. Our delegation understands fully the major importance of a treaty to ban completely nuclear-weapon tests with a view to curbing the nuclear arms race - especially its qualitative aspects. We attach particular importance to obtaining the support of all nuclear-weapon States for such a treaty, thus making the ban not only complete but general as well. Waiting for early results of the trilateral negotiations, we note with satisfaction the statement of General Seignious, the distinguished Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who underlined that the United States Government "is conscious of the impatience of the international community with the pace of negotiations". Let us hope that this realization will produce concrete and practical results in the near future. Thus, in the opinion of our delegation, the Western partners will demonstrate a

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

corresponding constructive approach in response to the radical steps taken by the Soviet Union in relation to the tripartite negotiations, announced by President Brezhnev back in November 1977, concerning a moratorium on peaceful nuclear tests and other elements of the future agreement.

In this connexion, may I express the optimism with which the Bulgarian delegation is looking forward to the possibilities of speedy headway towards a complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests. The problem has reached a stage where, in our view, a number of major obstacles to an agreement have been overcome. We are looking forward to the forthcoming final session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on the identification of seismic events, which we hope will reach a successful conclusion in its work. This would be a contribution to the final solution of the problem of the nuclear-weapon tests.

The Bulgarian delegation reserves the right to express its views on this problem later on when the Committee returns to consider it again.

Mrs. JACKIEWICH (Cuba): In speaking on behalf of the Group of 21, my delegation which is co-ordinator of the Group of 21 wishes, on behalf of both the Group and the Cuban delegation, to extend a hearty welcome to you, Mr. Chairman, and to say that you may count on our full co-operation. Also on behalf of the Group and my own delegation we would like to bid welcome to the distinguished Ambassadors of Argentina, Australia and Iran who have joined the ranks of the Committee and have come to help us in our work.

In beginning today the examination of the substantive subjects of this, the second part of the session of the Committee, the subject of a nuclear test ban has been included in the agenda, and as my country is at this moment co-ordinator of the Group of 21 I have the honour to communicate to you a statement on behalf of that Group.

The General Assembly has for several years accorded the highest priority to the issue of a comprehensive test ban treaty. At its first special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly stressed that such a treaty, and I quote: "should be concluded urgently and the result submitted for full consideration by the multilateral negotiating body with a view to the submission

(Mrs. Jackiewich, Cuba)

of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date". At its thirty-third session, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to undertake, on a priority basis, at its first session in January 1979, negotiations on a treaty. Furthermore, the General Assembly expressed regret that a draft treaty had not been concluded during the past year, and urged the three negotiating States to expedite their negotiations with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as a matter of urgency and to use their utmost endeavours to transmit the results to the Committee on Disarmament before the beginning of its 1979 session for full consideration. The Committee has not been able to discharge the mandate entrusted to it by the international community so far because the draft of a treaty on CTB has not yet been presented to it by the three negotiating States despite repeated appeals by the General Assembly.

The Group is of the firm view that the Committee should devote full attention to this priority question in its work during the current session. In this context the Group records its disappointment that, at the first part of the session of the Committee, the three negotiating States engaged in trilateral talks did not even furnish the Committee with a report on the progress of their negotiations. The Group would therefore urge the negotiating States to present to the Committee a comprehensive report on the state of their negotiations at the beginning of the current part of this annual session in order to facilitate the Committee's negotiations on this important issue in compliance with its mandate.

Mr. SHITEMI (Kenya): On behalf of the Kenyan delegation, I would like to say how delighted we are to see you chairing this very important session of the Committee on Disarmament. Your experienced hand, a clear cool head, have already proved a collective asset to this meeting. You can count on our support.

The question of disarmament is one of the most serious questions that remain unanswered to the satisfaction of all humanity. Little efforts here and there in the field of disarmament can be regarded only as pointers towards total and complete disarmament. As long as these little efforts are being made, the temptation to be overoptimistic that the end results will be good for all humanity is extremely deceptive. Because the hard realities facing the world, mistrust, imperialistic designs, greed -- that are insensitive to the plight of the victims -- selfish and short-sighted political and economic interests remain. We are aware

(Mr. Shitemi, Kenya)

that not all world problems can be solved overnight, but at least if a proper and honest diagnosis is made we can start treating the problems at the root cause and not the symptoms. Malaria as a disease in a patient is removed when it has been identified and treated as such; no amount of aspirin would cure it unless the appropriate treatment is given. Permit me to address myself to some of these realities:

For many years the world economy has been organized and in fact monopolized by certain Powers in the world who have consistently resisted any change in the status quo that has been for many years in their favour. A call for a just and fairer distribution of world resources has fallen on deaf ears. No wonder UNCTAD V ended the way it did. This will mean continued suffering for millions of people in the developing world who must have looked to UNCTAD V with hope that at last they could get a fairer price for their raw materials. The mistrust that this misunderstanding between the rich and the developing world engenders will in turn create international tension that could lead to more serious problems linked with encouraging armament rather than disarmament.

Minority régimes in southern Africa have continued to defy world opinion that has consistently called upon them to make way peacefully for the majority to participate fully in determining their own destiny. Not only have these minority white régimes become stubborn and intransigent, they have also become very aggressive and arrogant. They pose one of the most serious threats in Africa. Our topic this week is to debate the banning of all nuclear weapons; this is a laudable objective but while we are debating this, we have been presented with evidence that reveals that South Africa may well be the first nuclear Power in Africa thanks to the scientific and technical knowledge it continues to receive from its friends in the West. In fact at one stage South Africa was about to explode a nuclear device and, had it not been for one country which revealed that South Africa was about to explode a nuclear device, we would have known about it after the event. Certain countries in the West have the same facilities for verifying the goings-on in the nuclear field, and yet at this material time they choose to remain silent, a deep and unsettling silence. South Africa, with

(Mr. Shitemi, Kenya)

nuclear technical know-how, is easily the greatest threat facing Africa. That country has shown that it cannot be trusted on any issue. It is not enough for us in Africa to demand total economic sanctions against South Africa, we must, and we do insist that Africa should be declared a nuclear-free zone.

The introduction of nuclear technology into the world, including the explosion of nuclear devices, has seriously undermined the delicate environmental balance — so much so that in certain parts of the world, certain fauna and flora are facing a real threat of extinction. Man does not know enough to tinker with nuclear material as weapons or as nuclear reactors for peaceful uses. The likelihood of upsetting the delicate balance of the environment could make planet earth an inhospitable planet. We have already received the danger signal after the experience of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in the United States. The world has been forewarned.

The moral impact of being our brother's keeper must be re-examined if man is to survive; we cannot afford the reckless philosophy of the survival of the fittest. We welcome the initiative to limit any further development of weapons of mass destruction even within the limited scope of SALT II, but we must urge those concerned not to be content with reaching parity in the field of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. A balance of terror does not necessarily mean a safer world. These countries must be encouraged to move quickly to a stage where all nuclear weapons, wherever they are stored, and such other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and radiological weapons, are completely destroyed. This will usher in a new age of mutual trust. No one stands to lose if this is done. But we must insist that an effort must be made to remove all causes of mistrust and injustices brought about by unfair economic systems and short-sighted political gains. As long as we have Palestinians living in refugee camps, and minority Governments in southern Africa denying the majority their inalienable rights to self-rule, we shall continue to have tensions which, in turn, lead to Superpower rivalry.

All is not lost but we have not got much time. The goal is set before us and the vision of a peaceful world where we shall beat our swords into ploughshares and our spears into pruning hooks is also clear before us. It is the best vision to live for and, if need be, die for.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): It would be naive and pretentious to try to adduce new facts aimed at making more obvious the urgent and compelling need to bring about what in our agenda is called a "nuclear test ban". The discussions which have been taking place for so many years on the subject, not only in the First Committee and at the plenary meetings of the United Nations General Assembly, but also in multilateral disarmament negotiating bodies, have already provided incontrovertible proof of this pressing need.

I shall therefore confine myself in these extremely brief remarks to quoting from a statement which unfortunately apparently tends to be forgotten and which was made here at the European Office of the United Nations by the Secretary-General of the Organization himself over seven years ago, on 29 February 1972.

On that occasion, Mr. Waldheim drew the following unequivocal conclusions:

"No other question in the field of disarmament has been the subject of so much study and discussion as the question of stopping nuclear-weapon tests. I believe that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement. There is an increasing conviction among the nations of the world that an underground test ban is the single most important measure, and perhaps the only feasible one in the near future, to halt the nuclear arms race, at least with regard to its qualitative aspects. There is a growing belief that an agreement to halt all underground testing would facilitate the achievement of agreements at SALT and might also have a beneficial effect on the possibilities of halting all tests in all environments by everyone. It is my firm belief that the sorry tale of lost opportunities that have existed in the past should not be repeated and that the question can and should be solved now.

"While I recognize that differences of views still remain concerning the effectiveness of seismic methods of detection and identification of underground nuclear tests, experts of the highest standing believe that it is possible to identify all such explosions down to the level of a few kilotons. Even if a few such tests could be conducted clandestinely, it is most unlikely that a series of such tests could escape detection. Moreover, it may be questioned whether there are any important strategic reasons for continuing such tests or, indeed, whether there would be much military significance to tests of such small magnitude.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"When one takes into account the existing means of verification by seismic and other methods, and the possibilities provided by international procedures of verification such as consultation, inquiry and what has become to be known as 'verification by challenge' or 'inspection by invitation', it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban.

"In the light of all these considerations, I share the inescapable conclusion that the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests.....

"A comprehensive test-ban treaty would be a major step towards halting what has been called 'vertical proliferation', that is, the further sophistication and deployment of nuclear weapons, and would also strengthen the resolve of potential nuclear-weapon States not to acquire nuclear weapons and thereby help to prevent the 'horizontal proliferation' of such weapons. On the other hand, if nuclear-weapon tests by the nuclear Powers continue, the future credibility and perhaps even the viability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty achieved after such painstaking effort may be jeopardized. I need not describe the greatly increased dangers that would confront the world in such event."

I venture to hope that the three nuclear-weapon Powers which have been engaged in such lengthy negotiations on this issue will reflect upon the Secretary-General's well-founded arguments -- which are of special relevance in view of the fact that the outstanding problems, so we are told, are problems of verification -- and that, bearing in mind that the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is to be held in the coming year, they will be in a position to submit to us, before the end of this session of the Committee on Disarmament, the preliminary draft of the comprehensive test-ban Treaty which we have so long awaited.

Mr. DOMOKOS (Hungary): I would like to make an announcement, or rather a declaration. According to the programme of work of the Committee for the second part of its 1979 session, we are going to devote the period 25 to 29 June to the consideration of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. I would like to inform the Committee that the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, the USSR and my own country are going to table a draft international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

I would like to request the Secretariat, through you, Mr. Chairman, to make the necessary arrangements to circulate that document in the working languages of the Committee as soon as possible so that it will be available to the delegations of the Committee before we commence consideration of the subject early next week.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished delegate of Hungary. The necessary arrangements will be made with the Secretariat to comply with the request made by the delegation of Hungary.

Is there any other speaker who wishes to take the floor at this stage? If not, there are two procedural questions that I would like to put to the Committee for its consideration.

The first one concerns our meeting tomorrow, for which there are not yet any speakers inscribed on my list. We might therefore decide to hold either a formal meeting or an informal meeting. In any case, as the meeting tomorrow has already been approved in our programme of work, I should like to know whether delegates have any opinion as to whether we should hold a formal or an informal meeting. My suggestion is that, if there are speakers with statements already prepared who would like to have them put on the record, then we should have a formal meeting tomorrow. Otherwise, if no delegation is yet prepared, we might have an informal meeting on the subject on our agenda. So, if there are no suggestions, we will convene an informal meeting tomorrow at 10.30 a.m. in this room, and our next formal meeting will be held on Tuesday, 26 June at 10.30 a.m. in this room.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): You announced, Mr. Chairman, that if there is no formal meeting tomorrow, the next plenary meeting will be held on Tuesday. As the programme of work says that we intend to start our consideration of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons on Monday, 25 June, is it intended to start work on this item on our agenda on Monday, or are we deciding to postpone it to Tuesday. Do we intend to do nothing on Monday?

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union for calling attention to this point. The idea, which I was going to put forward later on, is that, as we have had formal meetings on Tuesdays and Thursdays, on 25 June we start the consideration of the item approved in our programme of work in an informal meeting. I would therefore like the Committee to consider whether it agrees to start with consideration of this item at a meeting on Monday, at 10.30 a.m. If no suggestions are made in this respect, I will take it that it is the wish of the Committee to convene here on Monday.

Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, we generally follow the procedure of beginning with the more formal statements and then proceeding to informal meetings once statements had been made by delegations, as a basis for ensuing deliberations. In this specific case we have heard the distinguished representative of Hungary tell us that his delegation, along with others, intends to submit a draft convention on this subject. If this draft were prepared for distribution on Monday it would perhaps be a good idea if we were to have a formal meeting in order to listen to the presentations that will doubtless be forthcoming from the co-sponsors and then, once we have heard these statements we could immediately transform ourselves, as has been done before, into an informal meeting. We might save time if we were to proceed in this fashion.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished delegate of Mexico for his suggestion. It is for the Committee to decide. If there are no other views on the suggestion, then I take it that it is the wish of the Committee that we meet formally on Monday, at 10.30 a.m., in this room for the consideration of the item on our programme of work.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to ask the members of the Committee for some orientation and guidance concerning the procedural aspect of the negotiations on chemical weapons. If the Committee agrees, I will now close this meeting and call a brief informal meeting immediately.

If there is no other suggestion I shall proceed accordingly.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.

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