

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX III

VOLUME I

List and text of documents issued by the Committee on Disarmament

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REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX III

VOLUME I

List and Text of Documents issued by the Committee on Disarmament

Document No.	Title
CD/1	Letter dated 17 January 1979 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session
CD/2	Letter dated 16 January 1979 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the proposals and suggestions listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session in accordance with General Assembly resolution 33/71L of 14 December 1978
CD/3	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Message of greeting from Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/4	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed
CD/5	Italy: Working paper on chemical disarmament negotiations
CD/6	The Netherlands: Some procedural suggestions with respect to the development of a ban on chemical weapons
CD/7	The Netherlands: On the use of short-period initial motion data for discrimination purposes
CD/8	Rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/9	Italy: Additional Protocol to the 1967 "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies" with a view to preventing an arms race in outer space: memorandum
CD/10	Pakistan: Conclusion of an international convention to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

Document No.	Title
CD/11	Group of 21:*/ Working paper on negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction
CD/12	Agenda and Programme of Work of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/13	Poland: Working paper on further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor
CD/14	Letter dated 20 April 1979 from the Ambassador (Political Affairs) of the Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning Articles 33 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/15	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Visit to Britain by chemical weapons experts (14-16 March 1979)
CD/16	Letter dated 20 April 1979 from the Head of the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning Article 34 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/17	Letter dated 28 March 1979 from the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations for Political and Security Council Affairs addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the report of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa
CD/18	Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the Seventh Session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events
CD/19	Programme of Work of the Committee on Disarmament (second part of the 1979 session)
CD/20	Hungary: Letter dated 19 June 1979 from the Permanent Representative of the Hungarian People's Republic addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the text of a communiqué adopted at the meeting of the Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States held in Budapest on 14 and 15 May 1979

*/ Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

Document No.	Title	
CD/21	Poland: Prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction: working paper	
CD/22	Mongolia: Letter dated 20 June 1979, addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament by the Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic, transmitting the Declaration by the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic, published in Ulan-Bator on the occasion of the signature of the Soviet-United States Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II)	
CD/23	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Working paper on draft international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States	
CD/24	Letter dated 21 June 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament by the Charge d'Affaires <u>ad interim</u> of the Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the United Nations Office at Geneva concerning rules 33 and 34 of the Rules of Procedure	
CD/25	Pakistan: Working paper on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	
CD/26	Compilation of material on chemical weapons from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee on Disarmament working papers and statements, 1972-1979 (prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Committee on Disarmament)	
CD/27	The United States of America: Working paper on a proposal for a CD recommendation to the United Nations General Assembly concerning the security of non-nuclear weapon States against nuclear attack	
CD/28	Letter dated 27 June 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representatives of the USA and USSR to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the Treaty and the Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of the Strategic Offensive Arms between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms and the joint United States-Soviet Communiqué	

Document No.	Title
CD/29	Letter dated 2 July 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the United States of America to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting additional documents relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of strategic offensive arms
CD/30	Letter dated 2 July 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament relating to the Decision adopted by the Committee on 15 February 1979 concerning the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Seismological Experts
CD/31	Letter dated 9 July 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitting a document entitled "Agreed joint USSR-United States proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"
CD/32	Letter dated 9 July 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the United States of America transmitting a document entitled "Agreed joint US-USSR proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"
CD/33	Italy: Letter dated 6 July 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the text of a letter from the President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic to the President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
CD/34	Letter dated 9 July 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning Article 14 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/35	Letter dated 10 July 1979 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Committee on Disarmament addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament on the negotiations on the question of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

Document No.	Title
CD/36/Rev.1	Group of 21: Working paper on cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
CD/37	Federal Republic of Germany: Working paper on some aspects of international verification of non-production of chemical weapons: experience gained in the Federal Republic of Germany
CD/38	Letter dated 10 July 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations Office at Geneva concerning rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/39*	Letter dated 16 July 1979 from the Ambassador (Political Affairs) of the Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the identification of potential organophosphorus warfare agents - an approach for the standardization of techniques and reference data
CD/40	Hungary: Working paper on the draft preambular part of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Development, Manufacture, Stockpiling and Use of Radiological Weapons
CD/41	The Netherlands: Working paper containing questions relevant to a convention prohibiting chemical weapons
CD/42	German Democratic Republic: Working paper on draft paragraph XI, subparagraph 3, and paragraph XII, subparagraph 3, of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Development, Manufacture, Stockpiling and Use of Radiological Weapons
CD/43	Letter dated 25 July 1979 from the Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the second report of the <u>ad hoc</u> group

Document No.	Title
CD/45/Add.1	Second Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (Appendices)
CD/44	Poland: Outline of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction: working paper
CD/45	Sweden: Working paper on international seismological datacenter demonstration facilities in Sweden
CD/46	Sweden: Draft CD decision for a continued mandate to the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Seismic Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events
CD/47	<u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group to Consider, and Negotiate On, Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use Or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons -- Report to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/48	Letter dated 7 August 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representatives of the USSR and the United States to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/49	The Netherlands: Chemical weapons -- Answers to questionnaire contained in CD/41
CD/50	Statement of the Group of 21 on the conclusion of the annual session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1979
CD/51	Results of the 1979 session of the Committee on Disarmament - Working paper submitted by a group of socialist States ^{**/}
CD/52	France, Italy and the Netherlands: Chemical weapons - Evaluation of the discussion in the Committee on Disarmament in 1979 with respect to prohibition of chemical weapons
CD/53 CD/53/Corr.1	Report of the Committee on Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly
CD/54	Statement by Mr. Jamsheed Marker, Leader of Pakistan delegation to the Committee on Disarmament - 14.8.79

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^{**/} Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Document No.	Title
CD/L.1	Draft Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/L.2/Rev.1	Revised Working Paper on the Provisional agenda and the Programme of Work
CD/L.3/Rev.1	<u>Ad Hoc Working Group</u> to Consider, and Negotiate On, Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons - Revised Draft Report to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/L.4	Draft Report of the Committee on Disarmament

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CD/NGC.1 List of communications from Non-Governmental Organizations

CD/1
24 January 1979
Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 JANUARY 1979 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE
UNITED NATIONS TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
TRANSMITTING THE RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT ADOPTED BY
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS THIRTY-THIRD SESSION

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith the following resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session, which entrust specific responsibilities to the Committee on Disarmament:

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| 33/59A | "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons" |
| 33/60 | "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 32/78" |
| 33/66A and B | "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons" |
| 33/71F, H and
L | Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session" |
| 33/72A and B | "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States" |
| 33/91G and H | "General and Complete disarmament" |

I would like to draw your attention, in particular, to the following specific provisions contained in those resolutions:

(a) In resolution 33/59A, operative paragraph 3 requests the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to undertake, at the beginning of its 1979 session, negotiations with a view to elaborating an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives; and operative para. 6 requests the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

(b) In resolution 33/60, operative paragraph 6 requests the Committee on Disarmament to take up immediately the agreed text resulting from the negotiations referred to in paragraph 5 of the same resolution with a view to the submission as soon as possible of a draft test-ban treaty, which will attract the widest possible adherence, to a resumed thirty-third session of the General Assembly.

(c) In resolution 33/66A, operative paragraph 2 requests the Committee on Disarmament, while taking account of its existing priorities, to pursue its examination of the subject, with any appropriate expert assistance, with a view to reaching agreement on the prevention of the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements and the speedy preparation of specific agreements on individual types of weapons which may be identified; and operative paragraph 4 requests the Committee on Disarmament to report on its examination of the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

(d) In resolution 33/66B, operative paragraph 1 requests the Committee on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, actively to continue negotiations with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to reaching an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to expedite the preparation of specific agreements on particular types of such weapons; and operative paragraph 2 requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-fourth session.

(e) In resolution 33/71F, operative paragraph 1 takes note with satisfaction of the measures adopted, or about to be adopted, to revitalize the multilateral disarmament machinery available to the United Nations among which, in particular, the fact that the Disarmament Commission has just held its first session on organizational matters and that the Committee on Disarmament is already properly constituted in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Document embodied in its General Assembly resolution S-10/2; and operative paragraph 2 expresses the hope that all nuclear-weapon States will participate in the Committee on Disarmament, and is confident that the Committee will include in its rules of procedure provisions to ensure that it may function effectively as a multilateral negotiating disarmament body.

(f) In resolution 33/71H, operative paragraph 1 of its section IV invites the Committee on Disarmament to take into account, when determining its priorities and programme of work, the priorities established in paragraph 45 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the resolution adopted at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly; operative paragraph 2 requests the Committee on Disarmament to undertake, at its first session in January 1979, on a priority basis, negotiations on: (a) a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests; (b) a treaty or convention on the complete and

effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and on their destruction; and operative paragraph 3 requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit reports to the General Assembly annually or more frequently, as appropriate, and provide its formal and other relevant documents to Member States on a regular basis.

(g) In resolution 33/71L, operative paragraph 2 requests the Committee on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session on the state of the consideration of all the proposals and suggestions listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the tenth special session (A/RES/S-10/2).

(h) In resolution 33/72A, operative paragraph 2 requests the Committee on Disarmament, with a view to taking effective measures for the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States through appropriate international arrangements, to consider, at the earliest possible date, the drafts of an international convention on the subject submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session, as well as all proposals and suggestions on effective political and legal measures at the international level to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(i) In resolution 33/72B, operative paragraph 2 takes note of the proposals submitted and views expressed on the subject at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly and recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should consider them and submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

(j) In resolution 33/91G, operative paragraph 2 requests the Committee on Disarmament to consider modalities of the review of the membership of the Committee and to report on this subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session; and operative paragraph 3 requests the Committee on Disarmament to make arrangements for interested States, not members of the Committee, to submit to the Committee written proposals or working documents on measures of disarmament that are the subject of negotiation in the Committee and to participate in the discussion of the subject matter of such proposals or working documents; and operative paragraph 4 reaffirms that States not members of the Committee, upon their request, should be invited by it to express views in the Committee when the particular concerns of those States are under discussion.

(k) Resolution 33/91H requests the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its pursuit of proposals contained in the Programme of Action adopted by the tenth special session (A/RES/S-10/2), to consider urgently the question of an adequately verified cessation and prohibition of production of fissionable materials

for weapons purposes and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

The General Assembly, in the above-mentioned resolutions 33/59A, 33/66B and 33/72A, also requested the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all the relevant documents. They are the following:

- 33/59A - A/33/27, A/C.1/33/L.39 and 41, A/C.1/33/PV.29-50, 58 and 59, A/33/425, A/33/PV.84.
- 33/66 - A/33/27, A/C.1/33/L.22 and 24, and Rev.1, A/C.1/33/PV.29-50 and 55, A and B A/33/432 and Corr.1, A/33/PV.84.
- 33/72A - A/33/241, A/33/319, A/C.1/33/7, A/C.1/33/L.6 and Rev. 1 and 2, A/C.1/33/L.15 and Rev. 1, A/C.1/33/PV. 20-28, 59 and 60, A/33/462, A/33/PV.84.

All these documents and records were distributed during the thirty-third session of the General Assembly to all Members of the United Nations, including all Members of the Committee on Disarmament.

I also have the honour to transmit herewith, for the information of the Committee on Disarmament, the following resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session which deal with disarmament matters:

- 33/57 "Implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a preparatory committee for the second conference"
- 33/58 "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 32/76 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)"
- 33/59B "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"
- 33/61 "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 32/79 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)"
- 33/62 "Effective measures to implement the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade"
- 33/63 "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa"
- 33/64 "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East"

- 33/65 "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia"
33/67 "Reduction of military budgets"
33/68 "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a
Zone of Peace"
33/69 "World Disarmament Conference"
33/70 "United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects"
33/71 A to E "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions
G, I to K,
N and N adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session"
33/91 A to "General and complete disarmament"
F and I

I also wish to call attention to the following resolutions which are related to disarmament matters:

- 33/3 - "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency"
33/4 - "Peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development"
33/73 - "Declaration on the preparation of societies for life in peace"
33/74 - "Non-interference in the internal affairs of States"
33/75 - "Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of
International Security"
33/96 - "Report of the Special Committee on enhancing the effectiveness of
the principle of non-use of force in international relations".

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Kurt Waldheim
Secretary-General



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/33/57
10 January 1979

Thirty-third session
Agenda item 35

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/on the report of the First Committee (A/33/423)/

- 33/57. Implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a preparatory committee for the second Conference

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, the annex of which contains the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Noting the provisions of article VIII, paragraph 3, of that Treaty concerning the holding of successive review conferences,

Noting that in the Final Document of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held at Geneva from 5 to 30 May 1975, 1/ a majority of the States parties to the Treaty proposed to the depositary Governments that a second conference should be convened in 1980,

Recalling its resolution 31/75 of 10 December 1976, in which it decided to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-third session an item entitled "Implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a preparatory committee for the second Conference",

1. Notes that, following appropriate consultations, a preparatory committee has been formed of parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons serving on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency or represented on the Committee on Disarmament;

1/ A/C.1/1068, annex I.

2. Requests the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its preparation.

84th plenary meeting
14 December 1978



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/33/58
10 January 1979

Thirty-third session
Agenda item 36

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/on the report of the First Committee (A/33/424)/

- 33/58. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 32/76 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 3262 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3473 (XXX) of 11 December 1975 and 32/76 of 12 December 1977 concerning the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 1/ and its Additional Protocol I,

Taking into account that certain territories lying within the zone of application of that Treaty which are not sovereign political entities are nevertheless in a position to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I, to which the States that de jure or de facto are internationally responsible for those territories may become parties,

Recalling with satisfaction that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands became parties to Additional Protocol I in 1969 and 1971, respectively,

Recalling also with satisfaction that the United States of America signed Additional Protocol I in 1977 and that the Government of that country has decided to take the necessary steps for its ratification,

Taking note of the declaration made on 25 May 1978 by the President of the

1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 326.

French Republic before the General Assembly at its tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, 2/ regarding the adherence of his country to Additional Protocol I,

1. Invites the United States of America to make every effort to ratify as soon as possible Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco);

2. Welcomes with satisfaction the declaration made by the President of the French Republic on 25 May 1978 regarding the adherence of his country to Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and invites the Government of that country to make every effort to adhere as soon as possible to that Protocol;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 33/58 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

84th plenary meeting
14 December 1978

2/ A/S-10/PV.3, pp. 2-30.



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/33/59
10 January 1979

Thirty-third session
Agenda item 37

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/on the report of the First Committee (A/33/425)/

33/59. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

A

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolutions 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, 2603 B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2827 A (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2933 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3077 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3256 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3465 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/65 of 10 December 1976, 32/77 of 12 December 1977 and S-10/2 of 30 June 1978,

Recalling that in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session it affirmed that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represented one of the most urgent measures of disarmament, which should be accorded high priority in disarmament negotiations, 1/

Regretting that agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons has not been reached despite its numerous appeals,

Convinced that the continuing arms race calls for urgent disarmament measures and that the process of international détente is conducive to the achievement of progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

1/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 75.

Reaffirming the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, 2/

Convinced that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction 3/ constitutes an important step towards early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their elimination from the arsenals of all States,

Recalling in that connexion the undertaking contained in article IX of the Convention to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction,

Stressing the importance of early agreement on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which would contribute to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Noting the risk of continued development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons in the absence of such agreement,

Having considered the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 4/

Noting that drafts of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, 5/ as well as other working documents, proposals and suggestions, have been submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and constitute valuable contributions to reaching agreement,

Taking into account the comments made on this item and relevant documents submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session,

Noting also that sustained and intensive efforts in the Conference of the

2/ League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138, p. 65.

3/ General Assembly resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.

4/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27).

5/ See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1972, document DC/235, annex B, document CCD/361; Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/9627), annex II, document CCD/420; ibid., Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/10027), annex II, document CCD/452; and ibid., Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/31/27), annex III, document CCD/512.

Committee on Disarmament have led to increased understanding in identifying practical approaches towards the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and towards their destruction,

Believing that future agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons should meet the objective of complete, effective and verifiable prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, as well as providing adequate methods of verification for the destruction of the stockpiles of chemical weapons, and recognizing that arrangements for verification should be based on a combination of national and international arrangements,

Having in mind that agreement on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction should not impede the utilization of science and technology for the economic development of States,

Desiring to contribute to an early and successful conclusion of the negotiations on effective and strict measures for the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction,

1. Urges all States to reach early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

2. Urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to submit their joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament in order to assist it in achieving early agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

3. Requests the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to undertake, at the beginning of its 1979 session, negotiations with a view to elaborating an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives;

4. Invites all States that have not yet done so to accede to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, as well as to accede to or ratify the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and calls again for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of those instruments;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly relating to chemical weapons and to chemical means of warfare;

6. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

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/...

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2826 (XXVI) of 16 December 1972, in which it commended the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction 6/ and expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to that Convention,

Noting that article XII of the Convention provides as follows:

"Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a Conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention",

Believing that the availability of information as appropriate on any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention could contribute to the work of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention,

Bearing in mind that the Convention will have been in force for five years on 26 March 1980 and expecting that the Review Conference called for in the Convention will take place near that date,

1. Notes that, after appropriate consultations, a preparatory committee of parties to the Convention is to be arranged;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the Review Conference and its preparation.

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6/ Resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.



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A/RES/33/60
10 January 1979

Thirty-third session
Agenda item 38

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/on the report of the First Committee (A/33/426)/

33/60. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 32/78

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its conviction that the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States in all environments would be in the interest of all mankind, both as a major step towards ending the qualitative improvement, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and as a means of relieving the deep apprehension concerning the harmful consequences of radioactive contamination for the health of present and future generations,

Recalling the determination of the parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water 1/ and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 2/ expressed in those Treaties to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions for all time,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject, in particular resolution 32/78 of 12 December 1977 and paragraph 51 of resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978,

Recognizing the importance to a treaty prohibiting nuclear testing of the study being carried out by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events on a global network of stations for the exchange of seismological data,

1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

2/ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

Taking note of that part of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament 3/ relating to the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty,

1. Reiterates its grave concern over the fact that nuclear-weapon testing has continued unabated against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States;
2. Reaffirms its conviction that a treaty on the subject of the present resolution is a matter of the highest priority;
3. Regrets that a draft treaty has not been concluded during the past year;
4. Notes that the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States acknowledge the need to bring their negotiations to a speedy and successful conclusion;
5. Urges those three States to expedite their negotiations with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as a matter of urgency and to use their utmost endeavours to transmit the results to the Committee on Disarmament before the beginning of its 1979 session for full consideration;
6. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to take up immediately the agreed text resulting from the negotiations referred to in paragraph 5 above with a view to the submission as soon as possible of a draft treaty, which will attract the widest possible adherence, to a resumed thirty-third session of the General Assembly;
7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item relating to the implementation of the present resolution.

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3/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27), vol. I, paras. 54-115.



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A/RES/33/61
10 January 1979

Thirty-third session
Agenda item 39

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/on the report of the First Committee (A/33/427)/

- 33/61. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 32/79 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 2456 B (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, 2666 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2830 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2935 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3079 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3258 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3467 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/67 of 10 December 1976 and 32/79 of 12 December 1977, ten of which contain appeals to the nuclear-weapon States regarding the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), 1/

Reiterating its firm conviction that, for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary and that such co-operation should take the form of commitments likewise undertaken in a formal international instrument which is legally binding, such as a treaty, convention or protocol,

Recalling with satisfaction that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, France and the People's Republic of China are already parties to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 326.

1. Takes note with satisfaction that Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was signed in 1978 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and that the Government of that country has officially announced that it intends to ratify that Protocol in the nearest future;

2. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 33/61 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

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A/RES/33/62
10 January 1979

Thirty-third session
Agenda item 40

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/33/428)]

33/62. Effective measures to implement the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, in which it declared the decade of the 1970s the Disarmament Decade,

Reaffirming the purposes and objectives of the Decade,

Recalling its assessment in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly that the objectives established for the Decade appeared to be as far away as they had been or even further because the arms race was not diminishing but increasing and outstripping efforts to curb it, 1/

Deeply concerned at the continued wastage of resources on armaments and the consequent detrimental effect on international security and the achievement of the new international economic order,

Recalling the decision taken at its tenth special session concerning a comprehensive programme of disarmament, 2/

Recalling also its decision that the Secretary-General should, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, initiate an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development in view of the relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development and the need

1/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 4

2/ Ibid., sect. III.

to release real resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development in the world, particularly of the developing countries, 3/

Affirming the urgent need for the promotion of negotiations on effective measures for the cessation of the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, for the reduction of military expenditures and for general and complete disarmament,

1. Calls upon the Disarmament Commission to give priority consideration to the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament in its session to be held in 1979 and to exert its best endeavours to transmit its recommendations thereon, through the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session, to the Committee on Disarmament;

2. Expresses its satisfaction that the Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development has been convened by the Secretary-General to commence its study and looks forward to receiving an interim report on the study at its thirty-fourth session;

3. Takes note of the preparations for the strategy for the third United Nations development decade and stresses the need to continue to promote the link between the strategy for disarmament and the strategy for development in view of the close relationship between disarmament and development affirmed by the General Assembly at its tenth special session:

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled "Consideration of the declaration of the 1980s as a disarmament decade".

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3/ Ibid, para. 94.



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Distr.
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A/RES/33/63
10 January 1979

Thirty-third session
Agenda item 41

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/33/429)]

33/63. Implementation of the Declaration on the
Denuclearization of Africa

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 32/81 of 12 December 1977, in which it requested all States to refrain from co-operation with South Africa in the nuclear field so as not to enable the aggressive and racist régime of that country to acquire nuclear weapons,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa 1/ adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling its resolutions 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965, 3261 E (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3471 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/69 of 10 December 1976 and 32/81 of 12 December 1977, in which it called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, comprising the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Taking note of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977, in which the Council, inter alia, decided that all States should refrain from any co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons,

Gravely concerned that South Africa has not renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons and therefore may still detonate a nuclear explosion and acquire nuclear-weapon capability in contravention of the Declaration on the

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 105, document A/5975.

Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Organization of African Unity and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council,

Convinced that this situation constitutes a grave danger to international peace and security and a permanent challenge to the efforts of the international community to establish Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Reiterating its decision, taken at the tenth special session, that the Security Council should take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of the decision of the Organization of African Unity for the denuclearization of Africa, 2/

1. Strongly reiterates its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, comprising the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

2. Vigorously condemns any attempt by South Africa to introduce in any way whatsoever nuclear weapons into the African continent;

3. Demands that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent of Africa or elsewhere;

4. Requests the Security Council to exercise a close watch on South Africa and to take appropriate effective steps to prevent South Africa from developing and acquiring nuclear weapons, thereby endangering international peace and security.

5. Condemns any nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime which could frustrate the objective of the Organization of African Unity to keep Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

6. Demands that South Africa submit all its nuclear facilities for inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

7. Appeals to all States to refrain from all co-operation with South Africa in the nuclear field so as not to enable the racist régime to acquire nuclear weapons, and to dissuade corporations, institutions and individuals within their jurisdiction from any co-operation with South Africa in this field;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance to the Organization of African Unity towards the realization of its solemn Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa;

9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa".

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A/RES/33/64
11 January 1979

Thirty-third session
Agenda item 42

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/on the report of the First Committee (A/33/430)/
33/64. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone
in the region of the Middle East

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, in which it overwhelmingly commended the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also its resolution 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, in which it recognized that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East enjoyed wide support in the region,

Bearing in mind its resolution 31/71 of 10 December 1976, in which it expressed the conviction that progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance the cause of peace in the region and in the world,

Considering its resolution 32/82 of 12 December 1977, in which it expressed conviction that the development of nuclear capability would further complicate the situation and immensely damage the efforts to create an atmosphere of confidence in the Middle East,

Guided by its relevant recommendations in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, dealing with the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, 1/

Recognizing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

1/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 63 d.

1. Urges all parties directly concerned seriously to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; 2/

2. Invites these countries, pending the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East and during the process of its establishment, to declare solemnly that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices;

3. Calls upon these countries to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, and to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

4. Further invites these countries, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and during the process of its establishment, to declare, consistent with paragraph 63 d of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, their support for the establishing of such a zone in the region and to deposit these declarations with the Security Council;

5. Reaffirms again its recommendation to the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any action contrary to the spirit and purpose of the present resolution and the objective of establishing in the region of the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards, and to extend their co-operation to the States of the region in their efforts to promote these objectives;

6. Renews its invitation to the Secretary-General to continue to explore the possibilities of making progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

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2/ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.



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A/RES/33/65
11 January 1979

Thirty-third session
Agenda item 43

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/on the report of the First Committee (A/33/431)/

33/65. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3476 B (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/73 of 10 December 1976 and 32/83 of 12 December 1977 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Reiterating its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament,

Believing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in other regions, will strengthen the security of the States of the region against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the declarations issued at the highest level by Governments of South Asian States reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples,

Recalling that in the above-mentioned resolutions it called upon the States of the South Asian region and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be interested to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to this objective,

Further recalling that, in its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX), 31/73 and 32/83, it requested the Secretary-General to convene a meeting for the purpose of the consultations mentioned therein and to render such assistance as might be required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session 1/ regarding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the region of South Asia,

Noting the report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, 2/

1. Reaffirms its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

2. Urges once again the States of South Asia and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as may be interested to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to this objective;

3. Calls upon those nuclear-weapon States which have not done so to respond positively to this proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to render such assistance as may be required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session;

5. Decides to consider this item at its thirty-fourth session.

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1/ Resolution S-10/2.

2/ A/33/360.



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A/RES/33/66
11 January 1979

Thirty-third session
Agenda item 44

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/on the report of the First Committee (A/33/432)/

- 33/66. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3479 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/74 of 10 December 1976 and 32/84 A and B of 12 December 1977 on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Recalling also paragraph 77 of its resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, by which it decided that, in order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements might ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements,

Concerned that the development of modern science and technology should not lead to the emergence of new, still more destructive types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, comparable in effect to those particular weapons identified in the 1948 definition of weapons of mass destruction, 1/

Restating its view that specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified, and that this question should be kept under continuing review,

1/ See S/C.3/32/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Corr.1.

Taking into account the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with regard to this question, 2/

1. Welcomes the active continuation of negotiations relating to the prohibition and limitation of identified weapons of mass destruction;
2. Requests the Committee on Disarmament, while taking account of its existing priorities, to pursue its examination of the subject, with any appropriate expert assistance, with a view to reaching agreement on the prevention of the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements and to the speedy preparation of specific agreements on individual types of weapons which may be identified;
3. Urges all States to refrain from actions which might adversely affect the efforts referred to in paragraph 2 above;
4. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to report on its consideration of the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

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B

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3479 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/74 of 10 December 1976 and 32/84 A of 12 December 1977 on the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction,

Bearing in mind the provision contained in paragraph 39 of its resolution S-10/12 of 30 June 1978 to the effect that qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race and that efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare,

Recalling the decision contained in paragraph 77 of the same resolution to the effect that in order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements might ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements, and that efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction,

2/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27), vol. I, paras. 188-217.

Expressing once again, in the light of the decisions adopted at its tenth special session, its firm belief in the importance of concluding an agreement or agreements to prevent the use of scientific and technological progress for the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Noting, in this connexion, that in the negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America the sides have made headway in reaching agreement on some basic provisions of the convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons which is being prepared,

Taking note of the discussion at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament of the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, 3/

Taking into account the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with regard to this question,

1. Requests the Committee on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, actively to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to agreeing on the text of an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to expedite the preparation of specific agreements on particular types of such weapons;
2. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-fourth session;
3. Once again urges all States to refrain from any action which could adversely affect the talks aimed at working out an agreement or agreements to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion of this item by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session;
5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament".

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3/ Ibid.



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GENERAL

A/RES/33/67
16 January 1979

Thirty-third session
Agenda item 45

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/on the report of the First Committee (A/33/433)/

33/67. Reduction of military budgets

The General Assembly,

Noting that, according to the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, it should continue to consider what concrete steps should be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets, bearing in mind the relevant proposals and documents of the United Nations on this question, 1/

Reaffirming its conviction that there is an urgent need for the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States to carry out reductions in their military budgets and that this would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries,

Convinced that a reduction of military budgets could be carried out without affecting the military balance to the detriment of the national security of any country,

Conscious that the attainment of the ultimate objectives will require the co-operation of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States,

Convinced that the systematic measurement and reporting of military expenditure is an important first objective in the move towards agreed and balanced reductions in military expenditure,

Recognizing the need for the availability of a satisfactory instrument for standardized reporting on the military expenditure of Member States,

1/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 90.

Recognizing also the value of such an instrument as a means of increasing confidence between States by improving the information on military expenditure,

Recalling that in its resolution 32/85 of 12 December 1977 it requested the Secretary-General to ascertain those States which would be prepared to participate in a pilot test of the reporting instrument and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament,

Noting with appreciation the report of the Secretary-General 2/ submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session in response to paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 32/85,

Recognizing that the work set in motion by the General Assembly on the reduction of military budgets has reached a decisive stage and that successive reports of groups of experts, in particular the latest report issued on 14 September 1977, 3/ have moved the whole exercise to a position where practical steps for testing and refining the proposed reporting instrument could now be taken.

1. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of an ad hoc panel of experienced practitioners in the field of military budgeting:

(a) To carry out a practical test of the proposed reporting instrument with the voluntary co-operation of States from different regions and representing different budgeting and accounting systems;

(b) To assess the results of the practical test;

(c) To develop recommendations for further refinement and implementation of the reporting instrument;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Ad Hoc Panel on Military Budgeting with the assistance that may be deemed necessary;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets".

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2/ A/S-10/6 and Corr.1 and Add.1.

3/ A/32/194 and Add.1.



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Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/33/68
16 January 1979

Thirty-third session
Agenda item 46

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/on the report of the First Committee (A/33/434)/

33/68. Implementation of the Declaration of the
Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also its resolutions 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3259 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3468 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/88 of 14 December 1976, 32/86 of 12 December 1977 and S-10/2 of 30 June 1978,

Encouraged by the continued support extended to the Declaration by the Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 15 to 20 May 1978, 1/ and by the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 25 to 30 July 1978, 2/

Reaffirming its conviction that concrete action in furtherance of the objectives of the Declaration would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Deeply concerned at the intensification of great Power military presence, conceived in the context of great Power rivalry, leading to an increase of tension in the area,

Considering that the continued military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean, conceived in the context of great Power rivalry, with the danger of a competitive escalation of such a military presence, gives greater urgency to the need to take practical steps for the early implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,

1/ See A/33/118.

2/ See A/33/206.

Considering also that the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean requires co-operation among the regional States to ensure conditions of peace and security within the region, as envisaged in the Declaration, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States,

Further considering that, at its tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, it noted the proposal for establishing the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, taking into account its deliberations and its relevant resolutions, as well as the need to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the region, 3/

Noting that talks were initiated between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America regarding their military presence in the Indian Ocean, and that the two countries have kept the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean informed of the current situation concerning these talks,

Regretting, however, that the talks are suspended,

Recalling its resolution 32/86, in which it decided that a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean should be convened in New York on a suitable date,

1. Urges that the talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America regarding their military presence in the Indian Ocean be resumed without delay;

2. Renews its invitation to the great Powers and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean that have not so far seen their way to co-operating effectively with the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to enter with the least possible delay into consultations with the Committee regarding the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace;

3. Takes note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee 4/ and in particular section III concerning the steps taken towards making the necessary preparations for holding a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean;

4. Decides to convene a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in New York from 2 to 13 July 1979, as the next step towards the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace as contained in General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), such States being listed in the reports of the Ad Hoc Committee to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth, 5/ thirtieth, 6/ and

3/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 64 b.

4/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/33/29 and Corr.1).

5/ Ibid., Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/9029), annex I, para. 5.

6/ Ibid., Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/10029), para. 29.

thirty-third sessions, 7/ and decides that other States not falling within this category, but which have participated or have expressed their willingness to participate in the work of the Committee, could attend upon the invitation of the Committee;

5. Decides that the Ad Hoc Committee, performing the functions of a preparatory committee, will make the necessary preparations for convening the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and that the Committee will set up informal working groups for this purpose when necessary;

6. Requests the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to submit its report to the General Assembly at the thirty-fourth session;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary provision for the Meeting, including the essential background information, relevant documentation and summary records, and to continue to render all necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Committee, including the provision of summary records;

8. Renews the general mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee as defined in the relevant resolutions;

9. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session a full report on its work.

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7/ Ibid., Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/33/29), para. 27.



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/33/69
11 January 1979

Thirty-third session
Agenda item 48

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/on the report of the First Committee (A/33/436)/

33/69. World Disarmament Conference

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2833 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2930 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3183 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3260 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3469 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/190 of 21 December 1976 and 32/89 of 12 December 1977,

Reiterating its conviction that all peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations and that all States should be in a position to contribute to the adoption of measures for the achievement of this goal,

Stressing anew its belief that a world disarmament conference, adequately prepared and convened at an appropriate time, could promote the realization of such an aim and that the co-operation of all nuclear-weapon Powers would considerably facilitate its attainment,

Taking note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, 1/

Recalling that, in paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, 2/ it decided that, at the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation,

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/33/28).

2/ Resolution S-10/2.

1. Renews the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference;

2. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to maintain close contact with the representatives of the States possessing nuclear weapons in order to remain currently informed of their attitudes as well as with all other States, and to consider any relevant comments and observations which might be made to the Committee, especially having in mind paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session;

3. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session the item entitled "World Disarmament Conference".

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UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/33/70
11 January 1979

Thirty-third session
Agenda item 49

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/33/437)]

33/70. United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

The General Assembly,

Convinced that the suffering of civilian populations and combatants could be significantly reduced if general agreement could be attained on the prohibition or restriction for humanitarian reasons of the use of specific conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects,

Mindful that positive results as regards the non-use or restriction of use for humanitarian reasons of specific conventional weapons would serve, in addition, as encouragement in the broader field of disarmament,

Recalling its resolution 32/152 of 19 December 1977, in which it decided to convene in 1979 a United Nations Conference on Prohibitions of Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Reiterating the task entrusted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session to the Conference, namely, that it should consider specific categories of such weapons, including those which had been the subject-matter of previously conducted discussions, as well as the appeal addressed by the Assembly at its special session to all States to contribute towards carrying out this task, 1/

Recalling its decision to convene a Preparatory Conference for the United Nations Conference with the task of establishing the best possible substantive

1/ Resolution S-10/2, paras. 86 and 87.

basis for the achievement at the United Nations Conference of agreements on prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons and of considering organizational matters relating to the holding of the United Nations Conference, 2/

1. Takes note of the report of the Preparatory Conference for the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 3/ on its first session and of the progress made with regard to organizational aspects;

2. Notes that a number of proposals on the substantive work of the United Nations Conference were introduced and views exchanged on them;

3. Reaffirms its belief that the United Nations Conference should strive to reach agreement on specific instruments in the field of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects;

4. Endorses the decision of the Preparatory Conference to hold another session from 19 March to 12 April 1979 with a view to continuing its preparatory work in respect of both the organizational and the substantive aspects of the United Nations Conference;

5. Reaffirms its decision that the United Nations Conference should be held in 1979 and endorses the recommendation of the Preparatory Conference that it should be held at Geneva from 10 to 28 September 1979;

6. Invites States to participate actively in the further work of the Preparatory Conference and in the United Nations Conference itself and to be represented, in so far as possible, by the required legal, military and medical expertise;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to provide continued assistance to the Preparatory Conference in its work and to undertake the necessary preparations for the holding of the United Nations Conference;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled "United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects: report of the Conference".

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2/ Resolution 32/152, paras. 3 and 4.

3/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 44 (A/33/44).



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/33/71
18 January 1979

Thirty-third session
Agenda item 125

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/33/461)]

- 33/71. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

A

Military and nuclear collaboration with Israel

The General Assembly,

Gravely concerned over the continued and rapid Israeli military build-up,

Alarmed by the increasing evidence regarding Israeli attempts to acquire nuclear weapons,

Expressing its alarm over the use by Israel of cluster bombs against refugee camps and civilian targets in southern Lebanon,

Recalling its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976 and 32/82 of 12 December 1977 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recognizing that the continued escalation of Israeli armament constitutes a threat to international peace and security and underlies Israel's persistent defiance of General Assembly resolutions and its policy of expansion, occupation and denial of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people,

Further recalling its repeated condemnations of the intensification of military collaboration between Israel and South Africa and its resolution 32/105 F of 14 December 1977, entitled "Military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa",

1. Calls upon all States to co-operate fully in effective international action, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to avert this grave menace to international peace and security;
2. Requests the Security Council, in particular, to call upon all States, under Chapter VII of the Charter and irrespective of any existing contracts:
 - (a) To refrain from any supply of arms, ammunition, military equipment or vehicles, or spare parts therefor, to Israel, without any exception;
 - (b) To ensure that such supplies do not reach Israel through other parties;
 - (c) To end all transfer of nuclear equipment or fissionable material or technology to Israel;
3. Further requests the Security Council to establish machinery for supervising the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 2 above;
4. Invites all Governments and organizations to take all appropriate actions to promote the purposes of the present resolution.

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B

Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind and to the life-sustaining system posed by nuclear weapons and by their use inherent in concepts of deterrence,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of nuclear war and for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Recalling its declaration contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session that "all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", 1/

1/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 58.

1. Declares that:

(a) The use of nuclear weapons will be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity;

(b) The use of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited, pending nuclear disarmament;

2. Requests all States, particularly nuclear-weapon States, to submit to the Secretary-General, before the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, proposals concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons, avoidance of nuclear war and related matters, in order that the question of an international convention or some other agreement on the subject may be discussed at that session.

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C

Urgent need for cessation of further testing of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Gravely concerned that continued testing of nuclear weapons exacerbates the arms race and constitutes a serious hazard to the environment and the health of present and future generations of mankind,

Reiterating its conviction that the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing in all environments would be a major step towards controlling the development of nuclear weapons and an important contribution to the prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation,

Recalling the determination of the parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 2/ expressed in that Treaty, to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,

Recalling its resolutions on the question of nuclear-weapon testing adopted each year since 1958 by very large majorities and, in particular, resolution 32/78 of 12 December 1977,

Reaffirming that a comprehensive test ban is a matter of the highest priority,

Recalling the various views expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States during the tenth special session of the General Assembly that, pending the conclusion of a

2/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

/...

comprehensive test-ban treaty, the world community would be encouraged if all the nuclear-weapon States refrained from testing nuclear weapons,

Regretting that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has not been able to commence negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty owing to the non-submission of the joint draft treaty expected from the three nuclear-weapon States involved,

Calls upon all States, in particular all the nuclear-weapon States, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, to refrain from conducting any testing of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

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D

Disarmament Week

The General Assembly,

Gravely concerned over the continued arms race,

Emphasizing the urgent need for and the importance of wide and continued mobilization of world public opinion in support of halting and reversing the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race in all its aspects,

Recalling that, in paragraph 102 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, 3/ it proclaimed the week starting on 24 October, the day of the founding of the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament,

Desirous of promoting broad measures on the mobilization of world public opinion in the celebration of such a week in order to create an international atmosphere conducive to the implementation of further practical measures with regard to the cessation of the arms race and disarmament,

1. Invites all States to carry out, through dissemination of information and organization of symposiums, meetings, conferences and other national and international forums, effective measures to expose the danger of the arms race, propagate the need for its cessation and increase public understanding of the urgent tasks in the field of disarmament and in particular of the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

3/ Resolution S-10/2.

/...

2. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare a model programme which may assist States that so desire in developing their local programmes for Disarmament Week;

3. Invites governmental as well as non-governmental organizations to undertake annual activities to promote the objectives of Disarmament Week and invites Governments to inform the Secretary-General of such activities not later than 30 April of each following year;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth and subsequent sessions on the information obtained by him in accordance with paragraph 3 above.

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E

United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision at the tenth special session to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament, 4/

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the guidelines for the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament, 5/

1. Approves the guidelines prepared by the Secretary-General;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to make adequate arrangements in order that the programme of fellowships on disarmament may be commenced during the first half of 1979;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session a report on the implementation of the fellowships programme.

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4/ Ibid., para. 108.

5/ A/33/305.

F

Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the
tenth special session

The General Assembly,

Having considered its resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978 and the Final Document embodied therein, with a view to examining the present status of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted at its tenth special session, the first which the United Nations has devoted entirely to disarmament,

Reaffirming the alarm expressed in that resolution regarding the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race, and recalling the devastation inflicted by all wars,

Convinced that the provisions of the Final Document constitute a consistent and articulated whole which provides a solid basis to set in motion an international disarmament strategy that makes it possible at the same time:

(a) To carry out what is the most acute and urgent task of the present day, namely, the removal of the threat of a world war, which would inevitably be a nuclear war,

(b) To channel the negotiations among States towards the final goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, on the understanding that such negotiations shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament,

(c) To strengthen international peace and security and to promote the economic and social advancement of all peoples, thus facilitating the achievement of the new international economic order,

Noting that the recommendations and decisions adopted at its tenth special session regarding the multilateral disarmament machinery, both negotiating as well as deliberative, have already resulted, or will do so soon, in a considerable revitalization of that machinery,

Noting also that various measures have been or are about to be adopted which will turn into reality several recommendations and decisions regarding studies, information, teaching and training on disarmament included in the Final Document,

Having concluded that the situation is quite different with regard to the numerous other recommendations and decisions contained in the Programme of Action of the Final Document,

/...

Recalling the consensus that, in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, which has maximum priority, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility, 6/

Bearing in mind that, in adopting the Final Document, Member States solemnly proclaimed in the Declaration contained therein that they would respect the objectives and principles stated in it and would make every effort faithfully to carry out the Programme of Action, 7/

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the measures adopted, or about to be adopted, to revitalize the multilateral disarmament machinery available to the United Nations, in particular the fact that the Disarmament Commission has just held its first session on organizational matters and that the Committee on Disarmament is already properly constituted in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Document embodied in General Assembly resolution S-10/2;

2. Expresses the hope that all nuclear-weapon States will participate in the Committee on Disarmament, and is confident that the Committee will include in its rules of procedure provisions to ensure that it may function effectively as a multilateral negotiating disarmament body;

3. Notes with satisfaction that progress has been, or is being, made in the adoption of measures aimed at promoting studies, information, teaching and training on disarmament;

4. Regrets, however, that with regard to the Programme of Action it has not yet been possible to achieve any of the priority agreements mentioned therein, in particular the agreement for a comprehensive test ban and the agreement pursued in the second series of the strategic arms limitation talks;

5. Urgently calls upon all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to make every effort to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament, in accordance with what was approved at the tenth special session, 8/ in order to translate into practical terms the measures called for in the Programme of Action;

6. Invites all States to communicate, as appropriate, to the Secretary-General all those measures adopted outside the aegis of the United Nations regarding the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral;

6/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 48.

7/ Ibid., para. 42.

8/ Ibid., para. 17.

7. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit periodically the above information, together with any reports he may prepare on similar measures taken within the framework of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, to the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission.

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G

Dissemination of information on the arms race and disarmament

The General Assembly,

Aware of the grave dangers inherent in the arms race,

Convinced that it is essential that both the Governments and the peoples of the world should be better informed of the dangers of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and of the efforts made to contain it,

Recalling that, in paragraph 99 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, 9/ it recognized that, in order to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament, concrete measures must be taken to increase the dissemination of information on the arms race and disarmament,

1. Urges Member States, the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as non-governmental organizations and concerned research institutes, to promote education and information programmes relating to the arms race and disarmament;

2. Requests Member States to report to the General Assembly, through the Secretary-General, on their activities in the field of dissemination of information on the arms race and disarmament;

3. Welcomes the initiative of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in planning to hold a world congress on disarmament education and, in that connexion, invites the Director-General of that organization to report to the General Assembly, at its thirty-fourth session, on the preparations for that event;

4. Requests the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, in preparing the United Nations Yearbook on Disarmament and the disarmament periodical, to take account of the recommendations of the General Assembly regarding the form and content of such publications;

9/ Resolution S-10/2.

5. Further requests the United Nations Centre for Disarmament to increase contacts with non-governmental organizations and research institutions, in accordance with paragraph 123 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session and, after appropriate consultations, to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session on other ways of encouraging the role of such organizations and institutions in the field of disarmament;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to include in any studies on arms limitation and disarmament prepared under the auspices of the United Nations a summary of those studies, drafted in easily understood language, to facilitate their dissemination among the general public;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to explore the possibilities of co-ordinating the public information activities relating to disarmament of all specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

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H

Nuclear disarmament negotiations and disarmament machinery

The General Assembly,

Having reviewed the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted at its tenth special session,

Having in mind the contribution of its tenth special session towards highlighting the gravity of the problems facing the international community in the field of disarmament and identifying the steps conducive to their solution,

Convinced of the need to broaden and deepen the degree of agreement reached and to preserve the momentum initiated at its tenth special session,

Conscious of the widely expressed interest of Member States in an urgent implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session, which found expression in the course of the consideration of this item at the thirty-third session,

Determined to encourage the taking of urgent measures in order to secure the implementation of the recommendations and decisions endorsed by Member States in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session and aimed at halting the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and to proceed to disarmament,

/...

I

Reaffirming that nuclear weapons pose the most serious threat to mankind and its survival and that it is therefore essential to proceed to nuclear disarmament and to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming also that all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility for the fulfilment of the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament,

Expressing the deep concern and disappointment of the international community over the fact that the ongoing negotiations have not yet been successfully concluded and that urgent negotiations among the nuclear-weapon States have not yet been initiated,

1. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States involved in the negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests to submit to the Committee on Disarmament a draft treaty at the beginning of its 1979 session;

2. Calls upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to speed up their negotiations on the second series of the strategic arms limitation talks and to transmit the text of their agreement to the General Assembly in accordance with resolution 33/91 C;

3. Urges all nuclear-weapon States to proceed, in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, 10/ to consultations regarding an early initiation of urgent negotiations on the halting of the nuclear arms race and on a progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery within a comprehensive phased programme with agreed time-frames, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination;

4. Requests the nuclear-weapon States to inform the General Assembly, at its thirty-fourth session, of the results of their consultations and eventual negotiations;

II

Recalling with satisfaction the decision adopted at its tenth special session on the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, 11/

Recalling also with satisfaction its decision to establish the Disarmament Commission as a deliberative body of the General Assembly with the function of considering, in addition to the specific tasks deriving from the decisions and recommendations adopted at the tenth special session of the Assembly, various problems in the field of disarmament and to make recommendations thereon, 12/

10/ Ibid.

11/ Ibid., para. 14.

12/ Ibid., para. 118.

1. Invites the Disarmament Commission, taking into account General Assembly resolution 33/91 A, to consider on a regular basis the reports and other documents of the Committee on Disarmament submitted by the Secretary-General through the General Assembly;

2. Recommends the inclusion in the agenda of the forthcoming session of the Disarmament Commission, apart from the consideration of elements of a comprehensive programme on disarmament as a priority item, the following questions related to disarmament:

(a) Consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war;

(b) Harmonization of views on concrete steps to be undertaken by States regarding a gradual, agreed reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, noting the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

III

Bearing in mind the decision adopted at its tenth special session to fix, during its thirty-third session, the date of the second special session devoted to disarmament, 13/

Desiring to contribute to the furthering and broadening of positive processes initiated through the laying down of the foundations of an international disarmament strategy at its tenth special session,

1. Decides to convene a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1982 at United Nations Headquarters in New York;

2. Decides also to set up, at its thirty-fifth session, a preparatory committee for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

IV

Welcoming the agreement reached at its tenth special session on the constitution of the Committee on Disarmament, 14/

Bearing in mind that the Committee on Disarmament will meet at Geneva in January 1979,

1. Invites the Committee on Disarmament to take into account, when determining its priorities and programme of work, the priorities established in

13/ Ibid., para. 119.

14/ Ibid., para. 120.

paragraph 45 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the present resolution;

2. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to undertake on a priority basis, at its first session in January 1979, negotiations concerning:

(a) A treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests;

(b) A treaty or convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and on their destruction;

3. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit reports to the General Assembly annually or more frequently, as appropriate, and provide its formal and other relevant documents to Member States on a regular basis;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled "Consideration of the report of the Committee on Disarmament".

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I

Disarmament and development

The General Assembly,

Aware of the disproportion existing between the resources allocated to expenditure on armaments and those devoted to development assistance,

Convinced of the need to take concrete measures reflecting the desire of Member States to encourage the allocation to development assistance of the resources released by reductions in expenditure on armaments,

Recalling the concerns expressed in that regard by it at its tenth special session, in particular concerning the harmful economic and social consequences of pursuing the arms race, 15/

Noting that a study on the relationship between disarmament and development has been initiated by the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 94 and 95 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, contained in resolution S-10/2,

15/ Ibid., para. 16.

Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, for its consideration, the proposal to establish an international disarmament fund for development which was submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session. 16/

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J

Monitoring of disarmament agreements and strengthening of
international security

The General Assembly,

Aware of the essential role to be played by appropriate international monitoring measures, satisfactory to all interested parties, in establishing and implementing disarmament agreements, and in strengthening international security and confidence,

Considering the progress made in the field of earth observation satellite technology,

Convinced of the important contribution which such technology can make to the solution of monitoring problems, taking into account, in particular, the need to provide for international measures which are non-discriminatory and do not constitute interference in the internal affairs of States,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to obtain, not later than 31 March 1979, the views of Member States on the proposal to establish an international satellite monitoring agency, as explained in a memorandum dated 30 May 1978 submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session; 17/

2. Requests the Secretary-General to undertake, as from 1 May 1979, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, a study on the technical, legal and financial implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session on the replies received from Governments and the preliminary conclusions of the group of experts.

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16/ See A/S-10/AC.1/28.

17/ A/S-10/AC.1/7.

K

Programme of research and studies on disarmament

The General Assembly,

Convinced that negotiations on disarmament and the continuing effort to ensure greater security must be based on objective in-depth technical studies,

Convinced also that sustained research and study activity by the United Nations in the field of disarmament would promote informed participation by all States in disarmament efforts,

Considering that, in addition to the work being done in this field by the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, with a view to gathering basic data on disarmament problems and, in particular, facilitating the negotiations currently in progress, it is advisable to undertake more forward-looking research, within the framework of the United Nations,

Noting that various proposals that studies of this type should be carried out have been put forward at the tenth special session and the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, thus reflecting the need of the international community to be provided with more diversified and complete information on problems relating to disarmament,

Aware of the importance of ensuring that such studies should be conducted in accordance with the criteria of scientific independence,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session on possible ways of establishing, operating and financing an international institute for disarmament research, 18/ under the auspices of the United Nations;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to seek in this regard, inter alia, the advice of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, established in implementation of paragraph 124 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 19/ in view of the competence to be assigned to that body in respect of a programme of studies on disarmament.

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18/ See A/S-10/AC.1/8.

19/ Resolution S-10/2.

L

Paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision, contained in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, 20/ to request the Secretary-General to transmit to the appropriate deliberative and negotiating organs dealing with the questions of disarmament all the official records of the special session devoted to disarmament, in accordance with the recommendations which the General Assembly may adopt at its thirty-third session,

Commending the active participation of Member States in the consideration of the agenda items of its tenth special session and the proposals and suggestions which they submitted,

Noting the valuable contribution such proposals and suggestions have made to the work of the special session and its eventual outcome,

Considering that further and more thorough study of the proposals and suggestions listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document than was possible at the special session is essential,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the deliberative and negotiating as well as the studying organs dealing with the question of disarmament all the proposals and suggestions listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document, together with all the official records of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, as well as information and comments made by Member States at the thirty-third session of the Assembly on those proposals and suggestions, except those covered by separate resolutions;

2. Requests the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament to report on the state of the consideration of those proposals and suggestions to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

84th plenary meeting
14 December 1978

20/ Ibid.

M

Study on the relationship between disarmament and development

The General Assembly,

Recalling the provisions contained in paragraphs 94 and 95 of the Final Document of its tenth special session, 21/ about the relationship between disarmament and development,

Noting with satisfaction that the Secretary-General, pursuant to paragraphs 94 and 95 of the Final Document, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him, has initiated a study on the relationship between disarmament and development,

Re-emphasizing that one of the principal aims of the study should be to produce results that could effectively guide the formulation of practical measures,

1. Takes note of the organizational report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development; 22/

2. Appeals to all Governments seriously to consider giving, as a supplement to the financial resources allocated for the study in the regular budget of the United Nations, voluntary contributions to the Disarmament Project Fund or to finance, on a voluntary basis, and in domestic currency, where appropriate, national research projects, in order to ensure the total resources necessary to carry out the study;

3. Appeals to Governments to make available data and information relevant to a meaningful completion of the study;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled "Interim report of the Secretary-General with respect to the study on the relationship between disarmament and development".

84th plenary meeting
14 December 1978

21/ Ibid.

22/ A/33/317, annex.

N

New philosophy on disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, as stated in the Programme of Action adopted at its tenth special session, 23/ an essential condition for halting the arms race and an indispensable step towards the goal of disarmament is the mobilization of world public opinion in support of this effort,

Noting the enormous expansion of concepts of disarmament as developed at the tenth special session and in the First Committee at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly,

Noting, in particular, the many new concepts developed as a result of advances in science and technology with respect to the growth of entirely new generations of weaponry, and their impact on changing strategies with their proliferation of military and defence alliances,

Noting also the changing concepts of disarmament in the light of its relation to the economies of nations, especially its effect on the global dimensions of development,

Aware of the growing realization that the old balance-of-power approach to security is being radically altered by the rapid qualitative changes in the ever-increasing complexity and proliferation of "surprise" and "secret" weapons,

Taking into account the pervading conviction that, in the light of the increasing uncontrollability of the new weapons, the old concept of armed national security to which the peoples of the world are conditioned has become obsolete,

Observing with interest the tendency to brand the arms race in terms of moral and ethical strictures,

Convinced that the world is in fact witnessing a revolution in its mode of thinking as regards the historic legacy of armed national security and giving way to new concepts in a manner that will require the full partnership of peoples,

Confronted by an explosion of new ideas, new theories, new proposals and new strategies in an effort to cope with the short- and long-term plans submitted by statesmen and Governments in intolerable fragmentation and which need to be formulated, as a fused and organized departure from past outmoded premises, into a new philosophy on disarmament,

23/ Resolution S-10/2, sect. III.

1. Considers it necessary that all the new ideas, new proposals, new thinking and new strategies set forth in the broad range of general debates preceding and following the adoption of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session be formulated into a single comprehensive and co-ordinated system, into a new philosophy on disarmament, in a message that can effectively reach the minds of men in a mobilization of world public opinion in support of the United Nations goal for the halting of the present arms race and eventually for complete and general disarmament centred on a new order of national and international security;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, to study ways and means whereby the objectives in paragraph 1 above can be accomplished and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session;

3. Expresses the hope that the Advisory Board may be able to report results, as appropriate, in time for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

84th plenary meeting
14 December 1978



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/33/72
11 January 1979

Thirty-third session
Agenda item 128

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/on the report of the First Committee (A/33/462)/

33/72. Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States

A

The General Assembly.

Convinced of the need to take effective measures for the strengthening of the security of States and prompted by the desire shared by all nations to eliminate war and prevent a nuclear holocaust,

Noting that the non-use of force or threat of force in international relations is one of the fundamental principles enunciated in the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirmed in a number of United Nations declarations and resolutions,

Noting with satisfaction the desire of States in various regions to prevent nuclear weapons from being introduced into their territories through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and being anxious to contribute to this objective,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming the determination of States in various regions of the world to keep their territories free from nuclear weapons,

Mindful of the statements and observations made by various States on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Desiring to promote the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

79-01170

/...

1. Considers it necessary to take effective measures for the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States through appropriate international arrangements;

2. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to consider, to that end, at the earliest possible date, the drafts of an international convention on the subject, submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session, as well as all proposals and suggestions concerning effective political and legal measures at the international level to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all the documents relating to the discussion by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session of the item entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States";

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled 'Strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States'.

84th plenary meeting
14 December 1978

B

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Deeply concerned at the continuation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and the threat to mankind due to the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Taking into account the principle of the non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Deeply concerned about any possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

/...

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop, as appropriate, effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolution 3261 G (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,

Further recalling its resolution 31/189 C of 21 December 1976,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, 2/ in which it requested the nuclear-weapon States urgently to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Taking into consideration the views and proposals submitted on this subject at its thirty-third session,

1. Urges that urgent efforts should be made to conclude effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, including consideration of an international convention and of alternative ways and means of achieving this objective;
2. Takes note of the proposals submitted and views expressed on this subject at its thirty-third session 3/ and recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should consider them and submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session;
3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled "Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

84th plenary meeting
14 December 1978

2/ Ibid

3/ A/C.1/33/L.6, A/C.1/33/L.15, A/C.1/33/7, A/C.1/33/PV.20-28, A/C.1/33/PV.59-61.



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/33/75
16 January 1979

Thirty-third session
Agenda item 50

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/on the report of the First Committee (A/33/486)/

33/75. Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening
of International Security

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security",

Noting with satisfaction that the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security 1/ has played an important role in international life as confirmed by relevant resolutions on its implementation,

Convinced that the Declaration continues to provide an important basis and incentive for further action by the international community towards strengthening and consolidating international peace and security as well as promoting co-operation among States on the basis of the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Noting with concern that some of the important provisions of the Declaration have nevertheless not yet been implemented and that agreement concerning measures for their implementation has not been reached,

Deeply concerned at the frequent acts of violation of the Charter of the United Nations, breaches of the peace and threats to international peace and security, recourse to the threat or use of force, non-compliance by States with their obligations to solve disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter, disregard of the role of the United Nations and the lessening of confidence in the effectiveness of the Security Council in ensuring compliance with the Charter,

Considering that continuation of such a situation is not conducive to the

1/ General Assembly resolution 2734 (XXV).

strengthening of the foundations on which the United Nations is based and threatens international peace and security,

Noting with profound concern the continued existence of focal points of crises and tensions in various regions of the world endangering international peace and security, the continuation and escalation of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, the manifestations of tendencies to divide the world into spheres of influence and domination, continued interference in the internal affairs of States, including the use of mercenaries, and the continuing existence of colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism and apartheid, which remain the main obstacles to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Reaffirming the close link between the strengthening of international peace and security, disarmament, decolonization and development and stressing the need for concerted action to achieve progress in those areas and the importance of the early implementation of the decisions adopted at the sixth 2/ and seventh 3/ special sessions of the General Assembly on the establishment of a new international economic order,

Recognizing some encouraging signs and achievements with regard to the strengthening of international security as well as the necessity to exert further efforts towards consolidating and expanding the results achieved,

Welcoming the struggle of people under colonial exploitation, foreign occupation and racial oppression and other forms of alien domination and their contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Taking note of the actions of the international community aimed at strengthening international security, in particular the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, the ninth special session of the Assembly, on the question of Namibia, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, held at Khartoum from 18 to 22 July 1978, the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 25 to 30 July 1978, the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, held at Geneva from 14 to 25 August 1978, and the International Conference in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, held at Maputo from 16 to 21 May 1977,

1. Calls upon all States to adhere fully, in international relations, to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and to contribute effectively to the implementation and further elaboration of the provisions embodied in the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security;

2. Urges all the members of the Security Council, especially its permanent members, to consider and to undertake, as a matter of urgency, all the necessary

2/ See resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI).

3/ See resolution 3362 (S-VII).

measures for ensuring the implementation of the decisions of the United Nations on the maintenance of international peace and security, particularly the provisions contained in Chapter VII of the Charter and provided in the above-mentioned Declaration for strengthening the confidence of States in the United Nations and in the effectiveness of the Council as the organ bearing primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security;

3. Reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples under colonial and alien domination to achieve self-determination and independence and urges Member States to increase their support for and solidarity with them and their national liberation movements and to undertake urgent and effective measures for the speedy completion of the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 4/ and of the other resolutions of the United Nations on the final elimination of colonialism, racism and apartheid;

4. Also calls for the deepening and extension of the process of relaxation of international tensions, which is still limited in both scope and geographical extent, to all regions of the world in order to help bring about just and lasting solutions to international problems with the participation of all States so that peace and security will be based on effective respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States and the inalienable right of all peoples to determine their own destiny freely and without outside interference, coercion or pressure;

5. Reaffirms its opposition to any threat or use of force, intervention, aggression, foreign occupation or measure of political and economic coercion which attempts to violate the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and security of States or their right freely to dispose of their natural resources;

6. Commends the holding of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, with the active participation of all Member States, particularly its decisions aimed at strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, including those relating to effective machinery for deliberation on, and negotiation of, disarmament measures, and, in this connexion, invites all Member States to take effective measures for halting the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and for disarmament, in accordance with the priorities agreed to during the tenth special session; 5/

7. Considers that the implementation of the new international economic order, assuring, through the settlement of urgent international economic problems, a speedy development of the developing countries, narrowing and overcoming the existing gap between the developed and the developing countries and the democratization of the process of decision-making, constitutes an inseparable part of the efforts for the strengthening of international peace and security;

4/ General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

5/ See resolution S-10/2.

8. Recalls its ninth special session, on the question of Namibia, supports the efforts for achieving the independence of Namibia and invites all Member States to contribute towards the successful implementation of resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and facilitate, within this framework, the fulfilment of the mandate given to the Secretary-General with respect to this question by the Council;

9. Expresses its concern over the worsening of the critical situation in Zimbabwe, urges Member States to increase their support to the people of Zimbabwe in its legitimate struggle against the minority racist régime for its continuous attempts to impede the attainment of independence by Zimbabwe and for its acts of aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring countries;

10. Commends the decision of the Belgrade meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe on the continuation of efforts aimed at implementing fully all the provisions of the Final Act of Helsinki, particularly the agreement on the implementation of the Declaration on the Mediterranean, supports, bearing in mind the close relationship between security in Europe and security in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and other regions of the world, the proposal of the non-aligned countries for the transformation of the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and co-operation with a view to promoting good neighbourly relations, the settlement of all disputes between States by peaceful means, and concrete measures of co-operation among States of the region, in accordance with their mutual interest to concert their views and to seize opportunities to contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security, and, in this context, takes note of the meeting of experts being held in accordance with the decision referred to above;

11. Reaffirms once again the provisions of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace 6/ and calls upon the great Powers to co-operate in its implementation;

12. Considers that the dismantling of foreign military bases would contribute to the strengthening of international security;

13. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General 7/ and, having in mind the forthcoming tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, requests him to prepare a report on the implementation of the Declaration and on the views communicated by the Governments of Member States concerning measures to be taken in order to implement those provisions of the Declaration which have not yet been put into effect, with a view to considering this problem at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly,

14. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security".

85th plenary meeting
15 December 1978

6/ General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI).

7/ A/33/217 and Add.1 and 2.



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/33/91
18 January 1979

Thirty-third session
Agenda item 47

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/33/435, A/33/L.33)]

33/91. General and complete disarmament

A

Report of the Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly,

Having resolved to lay the foundations of an international disarmament strategy which aims at general and complete disarmament under effective international control, through co-ordinated and persevering efforts in which the United Nations should play a more effective role,

Recalling the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, in which it decided to establish the Disarmament Commission, 1/

Emphasizing the importance of an effective follow-up of the relevant recommendations and decisions adopted at its tenth special session,

Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission, 2/

1. Endorses the report of the Disarmament Commission and the recommendations contained therein;

2. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set down in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the

1/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 118.

2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/33/42).

Tenth Special Session, as well as the recommendations contained in its report and the decisions that the General Assembly has taken at its current session and which have a bearing on the Commission's programme of work in 1979;

3. Requests the Disarmament Commission to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session a report on its work, including any recommendations and observations it may deem appropriate;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the Final Document, together with all the official records of the tenth special session, so that the views and proposals presented by States during the session will be available for the implementation of the Commission's programme of work;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to render to the Disarmament Commission all the necessary assistance that it may require for implementing the present resolution;

6. Further requests the Secretary-General to invite Member States to communicate to him, by 31 March 1979, their views and suggestions on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, for transmission to the Disarmament Commission;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission".

86th plenary meeting
16 December 1978

B

Confidence-building measures

The General Assembly,

Concerned at the fact that the arms race is accelerating and that the world figure for expenditures on armaments continues to increase,

Convinced that it is possible to develop effective international methods and procedures to promote general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Desiring to eliminate the sources of tension by peaceful means and thereby to contribute to the strengthening of peace and security in the world,

Stressing the importance of the statement in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session that it is necessary, in order to facilitate the process of disarmament, to take measures and to pursue policies to strengthen international

/...

peace and security and to build confidence among States 3/ in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that strict compliance by all States with the purposes and principles of the Charter is essential to ease international tensions and to create mutual confidence among States,

Recognizing the need and urgency of first steps to diminish the danger of armed conflicts resulting from misunderstandings or from misinterpretations of military activities,

Aware that there are situations peculiar to specific regions, which have a bearing on the nature of the confidence-building measures feasible in those regions,

Expressing its conviction that commitment to confidence-building measures could contribute to strengthening the security of States,

Noting the fact that at its tenth special session a number of proposals for such measures were submitted to that effect which deserve due consideration,

1. Recommends to all States to consider on a regional basis arrangements for specific confidence-building measures, taking into account the specific conditions and requirements of each region;
2. Invites all States to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of their views and experiences of those confidence-building measures they consider appropriate and feasible;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the views of Member States on this question to the General Assembly during its thirty-fourth session;
4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled "Confidence-building measures".

86th plenary meeting
16 December 1978

C

Strategic arms limitation talks

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2602 A (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2932 B (XXVII)

3/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 93.

/...

of 29 November 1972, 3184 A and C (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3261 C (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3484 C (XXX) of 12 December 1975 and 31/189 A of 21 December 1976,

Reaffirming its resolution 32/87 G of 12 December 1977, in which, inter alia, it noted with satisfaction:

(a) The declaration made by the President of the United States of America on 4 October 1977 in these terms:

"The United States is willing to go as far as possible, consistent with our security interests, in limiting and reducing our nuclear weapons. On a reciprocal basis we are willing now to reduce them by 10 per cent, 20 per cent or even 50 per cent. Then we will work for further reductions with a view to a world truly free of nuclear weapons." 4/,

(b) The declaration made by the President of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 2 November 1977 in these terms:

"Today we are proposing a radical step: that agreement be reached on a simultaneous halt in the production of nuclear weapons by all States. This would apply to all such weapons - whether atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or missiles. At the same time, the nuclear Powers could undertake to start the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of such weapons and move towards their complete, total destruction.",

Bearing in mind that the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session 5/ included among those measures which deserve the highest priority the one which is set forth in these terms:

"The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America should conclude at the earliest possible date the agreement they have been pursuing for several years in the second series of the strategic arms limitation talks. They are invited to transmit in good time the text of the agreement to the General Assembly. It should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of, and qualitative limitations on, strategic arms. It should constitute an important step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and, ultimately, of establishment of a world free of such weapons." 6/,

Noting that in the Programme of Action it was established that in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament all the nuclear-weapon States, in

4/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 18th meeting, para. 15.

5/ Resolution S-10/2, paras. 43-112.

6/ Ibid., para. 52.

particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility, 7/

1. Deeply regrets that, in spite of all that has been declared, resolved or reiterated over the last decade, it has not yet been possible for the talks on the limitation of strategic weapons, known as SALT, to achieve even the immediate results envisaged in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first devoted to disarmament,

2. Stresses once again with the greatest emphasis the necessity that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America strive to implement as soon as possible the declarations made in 1977 by their respective heads of State and reiterates its invitation to the Governments of both countries to adopt without delay all relevant measures to achieve that objective, which coincides in essence with the one defined in this regard in paragraph 52 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

3. Trusts that the two Governments will fulfil the invitation which the General Assembly addressed to them in paragraph 52 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, in order that they may transmit to it in good time the text of the agreement which over the last four years has been pursued in the second series of the strategic arms limitation talks.

86th plenary meeting
16 December 1978

D

Study on nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Conscious of its responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for disarmament and the preservation of peace,

Mindful of the important task of the First Committee, to evaluate the state of the arms race and to deliberate on the issues of disarmament,

Recalling the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session in which it was underlined that the most immediate goal of disarmament is that of the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war, 8/

Recalling also that, in the same document, it was recommended that the

7/ Ibid., para. 48.

8/ Ibid., para. 18.

United Nations should increase the dissemination of information concerning the arms race and disarmament with the full co-operation of its Member States, 9/

Noting that the only study on nuclear weapons carried out by the United Nations, entitled Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons, was published more than 10 years ago, 10/

Noting also that since then many important developments have taken place in the nuclear arms sector,

Convinced that a broad study on various aspects of nuclear weapons carried out by the United Nations would make a valuable contribution to the dissemination of factual information and to international understanding of the issues involved,

1. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts, to carry out a comprehensive study providing factual information on present nuclear arsenals, trends in the technological development of nuclear-weapon systems, the effects of their use and the implications for international security as well as for negotiations on disarmament of:

(a) The doctrines of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons;

(b) The continued quantitative increase and qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

2. Recommends that the study, while aiming at being as comprehensive as possible, should be based on open material and such further information that Member States may wish to make available for the purpose of the study;

3. Invites all Governments to co-operate with the Secretary-General so that the objectives of the study may be achieved;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to submit the final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

86th plenary meeting
16 December 1978

E

Study on all the aspects of regional disarmament

The General Assembly,

Concerned about the armaments race and the continued increase in expenditures on armaments,

9/ Ibid., paras. 99 and 100.

10/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.68.IX.1.

/...

Recognizing the importance of pursuing every effort which might contribute to progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Mindful of the importance of the regional measures already adopted, of studies already carried out, notably in the field of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and of regional efforts undertaken on the nuclear and conventional levels, both in the field of measures designed to increase confidence and in that of disarmament and arms control,

Recalling its resolution 32/87 D of 12 December 1977, on the regional aspects of disarmament,

Taking note of national contributions made in accordance with the aforementioned resolution,

Taking fully into account the decisions and recommendations contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session 11/ and the views expressed by Member States at its thirty-third session,

1. Decides to undertake a systematic study of all the aspects of regional disarmament;
2. Specifies in that connexion that the study shall cover, inter alia, the following subjects:
 - (a) Basic conditions governing the regional approach, particularly from the standpoint of security requirements;
 - (b) Definition of measures which, on the initiative of the States concerned, may lend themselves to a regional approach;
 - (c) Link between regional measures and the process of general and complete disarmament;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to carry out the study with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, appointed by him on a balanced geographical basis, and to submit it to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session a progress report on the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on Regional Disarmament.

86th plenary meeting
16 December 1978

11/ Resolution S-10/2.

/...

F

Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States
where there are no such weapons at present

The General Assembly,

Conscious that a nuclear war would have devastating consequences for the whole of mankind,

Desiring to promote the halting of the nuclear arms race,

Bearing in mind the clearly expressed intention of many States to prevent the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories,

Considering that the territorial limitation of the stationing of nuclear weapons is a measure closely related to the maintenance of peace and security in various regions and to the prevention of nuclear war,

Considering that the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would constitute a step towards the larger objective of the subsequent complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territories of other States,

Bearing in mind the desire to promote the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, on the initiative of the States of the region,

1. Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present;

2. Calls upon all non-nuclear-weapon States which do not have nuclear weapons on their territory to refrain from any steps which would directly or indirectly result in the stationing of such weapons on their territories.

86th plenary meeting
16 December 1978

G

Committee on Disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations,

/...

Recognizing also that in accordance with paragraph 28 of its resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, all States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations,

Recalling that in paragraph 113 of the same resolution it declared that, in order to achieve maximum effectiveness in the sphere of disarmament, two kinds of bodies were required: deliberative, in which all Member States should be represented, and negotiating, which for the sake of convenience should have a relatively small membership,

Recalling that the membership of the Committee on Disarmament is to be reviewed at regular intervals in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 12/

1. Recommends that the first review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament should be completed, following appropriate consultations among Member States, during the next special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

2. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to consider the modalities of the review of the membership of the Committee and to report on this subject to the General Assembly during its thirty-fifth session;

3. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to make arrangements for interested States not members of the Committee, to submit to it written proposals or working documents on measures of disarmament that are the subject of negotiation in the Committee and to participate in the discussion of the subject-matter of such proposals or working documents;

4. Reaffirms that States not members of the Committee, upon their request, should be invited by it to express views in the Committee when the particular concerns of those States are under discussion;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session an item relating to a review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament.

86th plenary meeting
16 December 1978

H

Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for
weapons purposes

The General Assembly,

Conscious that effective measures on a universal basis are necessary in order

12/ Ibid.

/...

to facilitate the process of nuclear disarmament and the eventual complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that efforts to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race will facilitate the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices,

Considering that the acceptance by all States of binding and verifiable controls in the form of full scope safeguards, on a non-discriminatory basis, on all production of fissionable material, so as to ensure that it is not used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, would contribute towards the efforts to promote non-proliferation, limit further production of nuclear weapons and facilitate nuclear disarmament,

Recalling with satisfaction that, in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, 13/ it recognized that the achievement of nuclear disarmament would require, inter alia, the urgent negotiation of an agreement, at an appropriate stage and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned, on the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes,

Requests the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its implementation of the proposals set forth in the Programme of Action 14/ contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, to consider urgently the question of an adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

86th plenary meeting
16 December 1978

I

Disarmament and international security

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, in which it declared the decade of the 1970s a Disarmament Decade,

Reaffirming the purposes and objectives of the Decade,

Bearing in mind the close relations between disarmament, international security and development,

13/ Ibid.

14/ Ibid., paras. 43-112.

/...

Recalling its resolution 32/87 C of 12 December 1977, in which it requested the Secretary-General to initiate a study on the interrelationship between disarmament and international security, parallel with the study on the interrelationship between disarmament and development,

Recalling also that, in paragraph 97 of its resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of consultant experts appointed by him, to continue the study of the relationship between disarmament and international security,

1. Considers that the maintenance of international security through the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter is an essential objective of the Disarmament Decade;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to expedite action for the continuation of the study of the relationship between disarmament and international security, with a view to submitting a progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session and the final report to the Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

86th plenary meeting
16 December 1978

CD/2
24 January 1979
Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 JANUARY 1979 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE PROPOSALS AND SUGGESTIONS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 125 OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE TENTH SPECIAL SESSION IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 33/71L OF 14 DECEMBER 1978

Sir,

At its tenth special session, the General Assembly decided that the Secretary-General should transmit to the appropriate deliberative and negotiating bodies dealing with the questions of disarmament all the official records of the special session, "in accordance with the recommendations which the Assembly may adopt at its thirty-third session" (A/RES/S-10/2, para. 125).

At the thirty-third session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 33/71L of 14 December 1978 by which the Assembly, after recalling its decision at the tenth special session as referred to above, requested the Secretary-General "to transmit to the deliberative and negotiating as well as studying organs dealing with the question of disarmament all the proposals and suggestions listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document, together with all the official records of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, as well as information and comments made by Member States at the thirty-third session of the Assembly on those proposals and suggestions, except those covered by separate resolutions".

The proposals and suggestions listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly are the following:

- (a) Text of the decision of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party concerning Romania's position on disarmament and, in particular, on nuclear disarmament, adopted on 9 May 1978 (A/S-10/14);
- (b) Views of the Swiss Government on problems to be discussed at the tenth special session of the General Assembly (A/S-10/AC.1/2);
- (c) Proposals of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on practical measures for ending the arms race (A/S-10/AC.1/14);
- (d) Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (A/S-10/AC.1/7).
- (e) Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Institute for Research on Disarmament (A/S-10/AC.1/8);
- (f) Proposal by Sri Lanka for the establishment of a World Disarmament Authority (A/S-10/AC.1/9 and Add.1);

- (g) Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany entitled "Contribution to the seismological verification of a comprehensive test ban" (A/S-10/AC.1/12);
- (h) Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany entitled "Invitation to attend an international chemical-weapon verification workshop in the Federal Republic of Germany" (A/S-10/AC.1/13);
- (i) Working paper on disarmament submitted by China (A/S-10/AC.1/17);
- (j) Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany concerning zones of confidence-building measures as a first step towards the preparation of a world-wide convention on confidence-building measures (A/S-10/AC.1/20);
- (k) Proposal by Ireland for a study of the possibility of establishing a system of incentives to promote arms control and disarmament (A/S-10/AC.1/21);
- (l) Working paper submitted by Romania concerning a synthesis of the proposals in the field of disarmament (A/S-10/AC.1/23);
- (m) Proposal by the United States of America on the establishment of a United Nations Peace-keeping Reserve and on confidence-building measures and stabilizing measures in various regions, including notification of manoeuvres, invitation of observers to manoeuvres, and United Nations machinery to study and promote such measures (A/S-10/AC.1/24);
- (n) Proposal by Uruguay on the possibility of establishing a polemological agency (A/S-10/AC.1/25);
- (o) Proposal by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on the strengthening of the security role of the United Nations in the peaceful settlement of disputes and peace-keeping (A/S-10/AC.1/26 and Corr. 1 and 2);
- (p) Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Disarmament Fund for Development (A/S-10/AC.1/28);
- (q) Proposal by Norway entitled "Evaluation of the impact of new weapons on arms control and disarmament efforts" (A/S-10/AC.1/31);
- (r) Note verbale transmitting the text, signed in Washington on 22 June 1978 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, reaffirming the principles of the Declaration of Ayacucho with respect to the limitation of conventional weapons (A/S-10/AC.1/34);
- (s) Memorandum from Liberia entitled "Declaration of a new philosophy on disarmament" (A/S-10/AC.1/35);

- (t) Statements made by the representatives of China, on 22 June 1978, on the draft Final Document of the tenth special session (A/S-10/AC.1/36);
- (u) Proposal by the President of Cyprus for the total demilitarization and disarmament of the Republic of Cyprus and the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations (A/S-10/AC.1/39);
- (v) Proposal by Costa Rica on economic and social incentives to halt the arms race (A/S-10/AC.1/40);
- (w) Amendments submitted by China to the draft Final Document of the tenth special session (A/S-10/AC.1/L.2-4, A/S-10/AC.1/L. 7 and 8);
- (x) Proposals by Canada for the implementation of a strategy of suffocation of the nuclear arms race (A/S-10/AC.1/L. 6);
- (y) Draft resolution submitted by Cyprus, Ethiopia and India on the urgent need for cessation of further testing of nuclear weapons (A/S-10/AC.1/L.10);
- (z) Draft resolution submitted by Ethiopia and India on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war (A/S-10/AC.1/L.11);
- (aa) Proposal by the non-aligned countries on the establishment of a zone of peace in the Mediterranean (A/S-10/AC.1/37, para. 72);
- (bb) Proposal by the Government of Senegal for a tax on military budgets (A/S-10/AC.1/37, para. 101);
- (cc) Proposal by Austria for the transmission to Member States of working paper A/AC.107/109 and the ascertainment of their views on the subject of verification (A/S-10/AC.1/37, para. 113);
- (dd) Proposal by the non-aligned countries for the dismantling of foreign military bases in foreign territories and withdrawal of foreign troops from foreign territories (A/S-10/AC.1/37, para. 126);
- (ee) Proposal by Mexico for the opening, on a provisional basis, of an ad hoc account in the United Nations Development Programme to use for development the funds which may be released as a result of disarmament measures (A/S-10/AC.1/37, para. 141);
- (ff) Proposal by Italy on the role of the Security Council in the field of disarmament in accordance with Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations (A/S-10/AC.1/37, para. 179);

(gg) Proposal by the Netherlands for a study on the establishment of an international disarmament organization (A/S-10/AC.1/37, para. 186).

The official records of the tenth special session of the General Assembly are the following:

A/S-10/1-24
A/S-10/PV.1-27
A/S-10/AC.1/1-40
A/S-10/AC.1/L.1-17
A/S-10/AC.1/PV.1-16
A/RES/S-10/1 and 2

All this documentation has already been circulated.

At the thirty-third regular session of the General Assembly, the proposals under (d), (e), (j), (p), (s), (y) and (z) above were covered by separate resolutions as follows:

<u>Proposal</u>	<u>General Assembly resolution</u>
Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency	33/71J
Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Institute for Research on Disarmament	33/71K
Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany concerning zones of confidence-building measures as a first step towards the preparation of a world-wide convention on confidence-building measures	33/91B
Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Disarmament Fund for Development	33/71I
Memorandum from Liberia entitled "Declaration of a new philosophy on disarmament"	33/71N
Draft resolution submitted by Cyprus, Ethiopia and India on the urgent need for cessation of further testing of nuclear weapons	33/71C
Draft resolution submitted by Ethiopia and India on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	33/71B

Concerning the information provided and the comments made by Member States at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly on the remaining proposals and suggestions, they are contained in the verbatim records of the plenary and First Committee meetings of the session in 1978 (A/33/PV.1 to 86 and A/33/C.1/PV.1 to 68). All this documentation has already been circulated.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed)

Kurt Waldheim
Secretary-General

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Message of greeting from Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
to the Committee on Disarmament

As the enlarged Committee on Disarmament begins its work I extend greetings to all of its participants and wish them success in solving the complex problems before this, the main forum for multilateral negotiations on ending the arms race and achieving disarmament.

The time has come for States and peoples, and for statesmen, who bear responsibility for the lives and well-being of their countries, to realize fully the real meaning of the alternative with which mankind is now confronted: either the arms race will be stopped and reversed -- and then peaceful principles will, at last assert themselves irrevocably in inter-State relations -- or the course of events will again lead to dangerous balancing on the brink of war, with all the attendant adverse consequences for the relaxation of tension, for normalization of inter-State relations and for the solution of world economic problems. There can be only one choice here: the efforts to bring about a decisive turn in the struggle to stop the arms race must be doubled, trebled, increased ten-fold.

A major role in this great undertaking belongs to the Committee on Disarmament. Its agenda includes such fundamental questions as nuclear disarmament measures; complete and general cessation of nuclear weapon tests; prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons; prohibition of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, including neutron weapons; reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments; reduction of military budgets. It would be no exaggeration to say that the future of all peoples and the future course of world history largely depend on the solution of these questions.

Over the years of its activities the Committee on Disarmament has had much experience of thorough and comprehensive consideration of extremely complex problems, as well as of the preparation and negotiation of multilateral agreements, which have limited the arms race in certain areas. This experience must be put to good use.

This year the Committee on Disarmament is beginning its work on a more representative basis: it includes States, nuclear and non-nuclear, in different continents, in different regions of the world, members of military alliances and non-aligned countries. This broadens opportunities for a comparison of views on concrete questions to be considered by the Committee, for bringing out constructive ideas, for selecting proposals conducive to progress in the matter of stopping the arms race. These opportunities must also be used fully.

The Soviet Union intends to do everything it can to make the work of the Committee on Disarmament a success. The series of proposals for stopping the arms race, which we submitted at last year's United Nations General Assembly special session devoted to disarmament, and then at the thirty-third regular session of the General Assembly, is known to all. In the Moscow Declaration of 23 November 1978, the Soviet Union, together with other socialist member countries of the Warsaw Treaty, once more appealed for quicker progress in solving the principal problems of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. We have worked and will continue to work most actively and with a sense of purpose in this direction.

In conveying to the Committee on Disarmament my good wishes for success, I express the hope that 1979 will see its activities produce the practical results which are awaited by all nations of the world and on which people in all parts of the globe are pinning their hopes for a more durable and lasting peace.

(Signed) L. Brezhnev
Kremlin, Moscow

CD/4
1 February 1979
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, HUNGARY,
MONGOLIA, POLAND, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Negotiations on ending the production of all types
of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their
stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed

It is generally recognized that the nuclear-arms race poses an extremely grave danger for mankind, and that it must be halted and reversed to avert the risk of war involving nuclear weapons. That is why the task of starting negotiations on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them is at present coming to the fore. The desire of States to conduct such negotiations has found its reflection in the recommendations of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and of the Assembly's thirty-third regular session.

Agreement on this important problem can be reached only provided there is strict observance of the principle of the inviolability of the security of States and the interests of peace throughout the world. The elaboration and implementation of measures in the field of nuclear disarmament should be buttressed by the parallel strengthening of political and international legal guarantees of the security of States.

Appropriate negotiations should be conducted with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States as well as of a certain number of non-nuclear-weapon States. The Committee on Disarmament, in which both nuclear and non-nuclear States are represented, could be a suitable forum for preparing negotiations on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them.

Subject of negotiations

The subject of negotiations should be the ending of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. At different stages of the negotiations consideration could be given, for example, to cessation of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, gradual reduction of the accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, destruction of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. Agreement should also be reached on the necessary verification measures.

Stages of negotiations

The cessation of the production, the reduction and the destruction of nuclear weapons should be carried out by stages on a mutually acceptable and agreed basis. The content of measures at each stage may be decided by agreement among the participants in the negotiations. The degree of participation of individual nuclear States in measures at each stage should be determined taking into account the quantitative and qualitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and of other States concerned. The existing balance in the field of nuclear strength should remain undisturbed at all stages, with the levels of nuclear strength being constantly reduced.

Preparations for the negotiations

For the purpose of preparing the negotiations, consultations should be held in the framework of the Committee on Disarmament. The set of questions to be considered should be determined in the course of these preparatory consultations, during which matters connected with the organizational side of the conduct of the negotiations should also be settled.

Although the Committee on Disarmament is the most suitable forum for the preparation and conduct of the negotiations, alternative methods may be considered.

Timing

The preparatory consultations should be started in the course of the current session of the Committee on Disarmament with a view to beginning the negotiations on the substance of the problem in 1979.

Other negotiations

The preparation and conduct of the negotiations on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them should not be to the detriment of the current bilateral and multilateral negotiations on various aspects of the limitation of nuclear armaments, including strategic armaments. Nor should they impede the achievement of bilateral or multilateral agreements on the limitation or destruction of any nuclear armaments on a mutually agreed basis.

ITALY

Working Paper on Chemical Disarmament Negotiations

1. During the past decade the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons has been one of the crucial topics of disarmament debates.

Virtually all the participants in the negotiations undertaken at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and in the discussions held at the General Assembly of the United Nations have repeatedly voiced their commitment to achieve, as a matter of priority, comprehensive chemical disarmament. A number of constructive working proposals and three draft conventions have been submitted to this effect, over the years, to the negotiating forum by different countries.

In a communiqué of 3 July 1974, the Governments of the United States of America and the USSR announced that they had agreed to consider a joint initiative "with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare". Such an initiative however, despite protracted bilateral negotiations, has failed up to now to materialize.

More recently, the special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament solemnly reaffirmed that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represents one of the most urgent measures of disarmament.

Finally, the General Assembly of the United Nations, at its thirty-third session, recalling its previous pertinent resolutions, formally requested the Committee on Disarmament, to undertake, as a matter of high priority, at the beginning of its 1979 session, negotiations with a view to elaborating an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives.

2. Bearing in mind the recommendations of the General Assembly, and in the light of the growing concern of public opinion at the accumulation of large stockpiles of chemical weapons and the danger of possible development of new generations of such weapons, Italy believes that new and concrete efforts should be promptly pursued within the Committee on Disarmament with a view to the early conclusion of a multilateral convention on the prohibition of chemical warfare.

The multilateral negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament, without hindering current bilateral consultations between the United States of America and the USSR, should, as a first step, review existing proposals and options in order to recognize areas of agreement and disagreement and to identify issues and problems requiring further investigation and clarification, both from a technical and from a legal point of view.

The "Compilation of material on chemical weapons from CCD working papers and statements 1972-76" circulated by the Secretariat of CCD on 11 March 1977 would provide a useful starting point for such negotiations, which should begin, without delay, immediately after the adoption of the agenda and the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament.

Later during the current session — i.e. during the week following the "workshops" on the verification of a chemical convention which are to be held in the Federal Republic of Germany and in the United Kingdom — a series of informal meetings with the participation of experts might also be of some value for the purpose of evaluating the outcome of the "workshops".

The results of these negotiations could be reflected in a position paper to be prepared by the Committee, with the assistance of the Secretariat, before the end of the first session.

3. Not later than the beginning of the summer session the Committee should establish an Ad hoc Working Group, open to the participation of all Member States and, upon invitation, of other interested States for an in-depth consideration of the unresolved problems standing in the way of an agreement.

The terms of reference of the Ad hoc Working Group, which would be assisted by experts whenever appropriate, should be established by the Committee.

In the opinion of the Italian delegation the following controversial issues might be included in the terms of reference:

- (a) Format and scope of the agreement;
- (b) Destruction, under adequate control, of chemical weapons stockpiles and possible redeployment of research, production and storage facilities.
- (c) Verification:
 - organizational structure and functions of an international verification system.
 - co-ordination and interaction between international and national verification techniques.
- (d) Possibility of international co-operative measures, with a view to early detection of potential CW agents.

4. At a further stage, and taking into consideration all the elements resulting from multilateral as well as, hopefully, bilateral negotiations, the Ad hoc Working Group should be entrusted with the task of developing a common understanding of substantive provisions to be agreed upon and then preparing a draft convention universally acceptable.

5. In the view of the Italian delegation, the plan of action outlined above, without hampering progress in discussions proceeding on a bilateral basis, could provide a useful background for such discussions, could contribute to earlier achievement of an effective comprehensive agreement, and give to the international community evidence of specific and fresh activity within the new Committee on Disarmament.

CD, 6
6 February 1979

Original ENGLISH

THE NETHERLANDS

Some Procedural Suggestions with respect to the Development
Of a Ban on Chemical Weapons

As the Representative of the Netherlands indicated in his statement^{1/} on 26 January 1979, it is deemed important that the Committee on Disarmament as a whole should reactivate its discussions on a possible ban on chemical weapons. In this paper some suggestions are made on the possible procedure for such discussions.

In the CCD, a substantial amount of work was accomplished with respect to the chemical weapons question. Besides the presentation of numerous working papers and statements, as well as the holding of informal meetings with experts, several draft treaties were tabled. A substantial amount of background material is therefore available. Most of this material was synthesized in an important informal paper by the Secretariat "Compilation of Material on Chemical Weapons from CCD Working Papers and Statements, 1972-1976" of 11 March 1977. From this paper it appeared that on many issues the views of the members of the CCD were not far apart, while on others there were differences of view. In this connexion, reference is made^{2/} to the statement by the Representative of the Netherlands on 2 August 1977^{2/}.

In particular, in the draft treaty presented by the delegation of the United Kingdom^{3/}, different views were amalgamated. However, for some reason the draft did not become the basis for negotiations, inter alia because the bilateral talks between the USA and USSR had just started and because of objections by some members to certain parts of the draft. A fresh approach to our discussions is therefore perhaps useful.

As was indicated, on several issues there did seem to be a common view. However, these common elements for a future treaty never were formalized. The suggestion of the Netherlands delegation is to develop in a number of steps the basis for a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

As a first step, the Committee could try to develop a rather general paper, indicating the areas of agreement and areas where disagreement still exists. As an example, attention is drawn to an earlier working paper by ten members of the group of 15 of the CCD, document CCD/400. Without pronouncing any opinion on the substance of this paper, it may be pointed out that it provides some broad principles

1/ CD/PV.6
2/ CCD/PV.750
3/ CCD/512

for a chemical weapons ban. To start serious discussions in the Committee on CW, the development of such a general paper by the Committee during its spring session seems useful. Such a process would make the Committee aware of problem areas and could be of important "educational" value. It would also point to gaps in knowledge concerning particular questions.

The Netherlands delegation has an open mind as to whether it is useful to set up a formal working group for this purpose or whether two or three weeks - for example at the end of March or in April - would be sufficient for informal discussions of the Committee on this subject. These discussions could possibly be prepared by informal contacts made before that time.

After the development of a general paper, the Committee could decide on further steps. It could publish the paper or it could keep it as an informal working document. It could decide to set up technical and/or non-technical groups to further refine particular issues etc. If possible, at the end of the session in August, a more refined paper could be agreed upon, which could then be presented to the United Nations General Assembly. This would allow non-members of the Committee to express views on the paper which could be taken into account next year when the Committee continues its consideration of the issue. The text of a treaty itself would probably follow without too many problems out of a detailed paper which lays down the principles of an agreement.

In the opinion of the Netherlands delegation these discussions in the Committee would not hamper or hinder in any way the bilateral talks between the USA and USSR on chemical weapons. On the contrary, they could be of great assistance to these talks, since the views of the other states could be better taken into account. In the discussions in the Committee, the two powers could, individually or together, express views which would undoubtedly weigh heavily. The two powers could also decide that they do not have to work out a complete agreement between themselves but concentrate on particular problem areas. This would, in its turn, assist the Committee in reaching agreement. The bilateral talks and talks within the Committee as well as other contacts between states and experts to clarify particular issues, such as the "workshops" in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom could very fruitfully proceed concurrently.

The procedure outlined would have the advantage - compared with earlier discussions with experts in the CCD, that a basis is laid in a more systematic way for an agreement, which is then refined step by step until a treaty is within reach.

The Netherlands delegation has presented these views in this early stage of our work to make it possible to think them over before the Committee takes up the consideration of its detailed programme of work for this session. Any comments would be highly appreciated.

THE NETHERLANDSOn the use of Short-Period Initial Motion Data
For Discrimination Purposes1. Introduction

In theory, the initial motion data of direct longitudinal waves can be used to discriminate between earthquake sources with compressions and dilatations in varying amplitudes but in equal amounts, and explosions with equal amplitude compressions in all directions. The study of the source, however, is often complicated by a qualitative and quantitative inadequacy of data. This means either too many inconsistent readings from apparently ambiguous seismic records, or too few and too badly distributed observation posts around the source. These two aspects will be considered separately.

Reduction of number of inconsistent data can only be attempted when enough is known about their origin and distribution. Possible causes are:

- (a) a non-uniform radiation of energy from the source by near-focus discontinuities and inhomogeneities, or stress gradients in the focal region;
- (b) transmission irregularities, such as tangential attenuation differences between the near field and receiver;
- (c) the broad, narrow, high or low frequency response of the recording instruments, human errors in record interpretation and report transmission.

The number of inconsistent data in focal mechanism studies can be reduced, as is well-known, by using personal readings only; when the recording seismographs are of standard type; and when the structural features of the focal region are sufficiently known to be used as a detailed base for a specific calculation of the appropriate (i, Δ) -function.

The Data-centre(s) proposed in document CCD/558 will have to rely basically on Level I data reports made up by station operators working on a routine basis with instruments that at least in the beginning of the effort will not be of identical type. The normal errors present in station reports to the existing international centres NEIS, EMSC, ISC, will also occur in future Level I data. The usefulness of short-period initial motion data of the proposed monitoring system for the purpose of interpretation of the source type, therefore, can already now be studied from existing international bulletins.

2. Analysis of the initial motion data of 108 explosive source events

The reliability of the C/D reports can only be determined using a controlled source such as an explosion with a radiation that in theory is equal in all directions. Therefore, five years of actual and supposed underground nuclear explosion data from ISC bulletins were studied, comprising the 1972-1976 data of 57 S. Nevada tests of $m_b = 4.1-6.2$, of 42 E. Kazakhstan events of $m_b = 4.4-6.1$ and of 9 Novaya Zemlya events of $m_b = 5.9-6.9$.

2.1 P-wave data at distances $\Delta = 0-110^\circ$

On a total of 6,045 P-wave data at distances of 0-110°, 849 (or 14.1 per cent) were reported as dilatation instead of compression. The percentages for the different test sites are very similar, namely 15.1 per cent for S. Nevada, 14.9 per cent for E. Kazakhstan and 11.0 per cent for Novaya Zemlya. On the average one observation of initial motion of P-waves in seven is in error. In theory, this value of one in seven or 14 per cent could be used as a diagnostic tool for discrimination purposes. There are, however, great and sometimes unexplained differences between certain events. Parameters that are of influence are magnitude and distance.

An obvious relation exists between the percentage of inconsistencies and magnitude m_b or amplitude of the wave: For $m_b \geq 6.0$ the average percentage using 18 events is 11 per cent, for 55 events of $5.0 \leq m_b < 6.0$ it is 16 per cent, and for 10 events of $m_b < 5.0$, 31 per cent! It is clear that the higher the magnitude is, the more reliable the reported data.

Analysis of the distance influence reveals that in all three test series high numbers of inconsistent readings occur at $\Delta \geq 80^\circ$, amounting to 21 per cent of the total material for these distance ranges (520 S. Nevada data, 360 of E. Kazakhstan and 169 of Novaya Zemlya). These inconsistencies most likely are structural and world-wide, and associated with transmission effects in the deep mantle near the core boundary.

Another range with exceptional high numbers of inconsistent readings is the Δ -interval of 10-20° for both S. Nevada and E. Kazakhstan events, amounting to 33 and 35 per cent respectively. This anomaly is not a world-wide phenomenon since the 44 Novaya Zemlya data in this range are all consistent, but association with the low amplitudes caused by the low velocity layer in the upper mantle seems to be obvious.

Other excessively high percentages of inconsistent P-wave readings are found locally, at $\Delta 70-75^\circ$ for S. Nevada tests, at 45-50° for E. Kazakhstan events and at 25-30° for Novaya Zemlya events. These three anomalies could be traced back to the apparently unreliable readings of one and the same group of stations on a restricted area in the North of the United Kingdom.

Excluding the data of the here mentioned distance ranges reduces the percentage of inconsistent readings to 9 per cent out of a total of 4,016 data; i.e. 9 per cent for S. Nevada events, 11 per cent for E. Kazakhstan and 6 per cent for Novaya Zemlya events. In general the material shows a gradual increase of inconsistent readings from about 6 per cent at short distances to about 11 per cent at distance 80°.

2.2 PKP-wave data at distances of 110-180°

The reliability of PKP-wave data is clearly lower than that of P. On a total of 340 observations the percentage of inconsistencies is 25 per cent. Also here a clear relation exists with magnitude: For $m_b \geq 6.0$ events it amounts to 23 per cent, for $m_b = 5.0-5.9$ events to 32 per cent!

3. Usefulness of the proposed network

For discrimination purposes, and certainly for source mechanism studies, a good distribution of recording stations around the source is imperative, in azimuth as well as in distance.

Azimuthal coverage of the focal sphere is not always optimal because of the land-sea distribution relative to the source region. We will have to aim at the installation of extra stations at some remote islands in the oceans to complete certain barren parts of the focal sphere.

Distance Δ determines the angle of departure from the focus. This (i, Δ) -relation depends strongly on the velocity of longitudinal waves in the focal region (Ritsema, 1958, '78). The higher the velocity in the source medium is, the more widely dispersed the recording stations are projected upon the focal sphere. Deep earthquakes, therefore, produce more often reliable mechanism solutions than do shallow ones. For a sub-crustal focus with $V_p = 8.25$ km/sec the part of the focal sphere possibly covered by data lies between $i = 55^\circ$ for $\Delta = 20^\circ$ and 22° for $\Delta = 80^\circ$, which means 14.1 per cent of the total area of the focal sphere.

Artificial events obviously are restricted to the upper part of the earth's crust. Source medium velocities, consequently, are always relatively low. A normal crustal P-wave velocity of 6.25 km/sec is probably the highest that needs to be considered in the case of man-made explosions. For this velocity the values of angle i are 37 and 18° respectively and the percental coverage of the focal sphere is 7.5 per cent. For a granite velocity of 5.6 km/sec these values are 33° , 16° and 6.1 per cent respectively. For deep sediments with 4.35 km/sec the values are 26° , 12° and 4.0 per cent respectively, and for more shallow sediments of 3.15 km/sec 18° , 8.5° and 2.9 per cent. Note that for 'dry alluvium' with a V_p of only 1500-1000 m/sec the values are respectively $8.6-5.7^\circ$, $4.1-2.7^\circ$ and 0.43-0.19 per cent only (Ritsema, 1967).

It is very questionable indeed, therefore, if any conclusions on the type of source to be drawn from so restricted data sets is justified at all. As an illustration: a source with $V_p = 7.1$ km/sec with an angle i for data at distance 20° smaller than 45° can produce 100 per cent compressions and still being explained by an earthquake of the reversed fault motion type. In such cases namely, only compressions are emitted in the downward quadrangle of the focal sphere. This holds the more so for all cases where the source region velocity is smaller than 7.1 km/sec.

4. References

ISC Bulletins, Newbury, England, of the years 1972-1976.

Ritsema, A.R. - (i, Δ)-curves for bodily seismic waves of any focal depth, Lembaga Meteor. dan Geof. Djakarta, Verhand. 54 (1958), integral reprint KMMI de Bilt (1978).

idem. - Problematics of small shallow earthquake mechanisms, Proc. VESIAC Confer. La Jolla, VESIAC Rep. 7885-1-X p. 25-35 (1967).

FIGURES, CONCLUSIONS

- (a) Figure 1: The relation between the magnitude m_b , the number of reported initial motion data of P-waves and the percentage of inconsistent data in the case of a study of 108 explosive events of the years 1972-1976. The effect of an exclusion of the obviously unreliable data is indicated by broken lines. Conclusion: Data of small magnitude events cannot be used for the purpose of identification.
- (b) Figure 2: The total number of initial motion data and the percentages of inconsistent data in relation to the epicentral distance Δ for events of the test-sites of S. Nevada, E. Kazakhstan and Novaya Zemlya. The effect of an exclusion of the obviously unreliable data is indicated. PKP-wave data have not been taken up in this figure since they invariably have an inconsistent data score of 25 per cent or more. A certain percentage of inconsistencies in reported data should be considered normal, on the average increasing from about 6 per cent at short distances to about 11 per cent at $\Delta = 80^\circ$. Conclusion: Apart from near-field observations only data at distances of 20-80° should be used for source type identification by means of initial motion data. PKP-wave data are unsuitable for discrimination purposes.
- (c) Figure 3: The distribution of the stations of the proposed station network III(SPZ) on the focal sphere in the case of seismic events at different test-sites. In the data-gaps some additional stations have been indicated that possibly could be used to improve the network. The circles for $\Delta = 20^\circ$ and 80° outline the part of the focal sphere where the probability for consistent observations is optimal and around 9 per cent. The part of the focal sphere covered by the ring of $\Delta = 20-80^\circ$ observations is only 7.5 per cent of the total in the case of a normal crust P-wave velocity in the source medium of 6.25 km/sec. A reduction of the velocity to 3.15 km/sec, as in shallow sediments, lowers this to about 3 per cent. In the innermost circle, stations at distances 110-180° are located where PKP is the first arriving wave. Conclusion: The station network III(SPZ) is more effective for some test-sites than it is for others. Some improvement could be reached by adding some particular stations to the network. For some of the test-sites, however, the configuration of the places around the source that potentially are suited as observation posts is such that a radical improvement is not possible. It seems highly questionable whether the restricted data from the network in itself are sufficient to justify any conclusions at all on the type of the generating source. Also in the case of compressional first motions in the whole range of selected azimuths and distances, an explosion is not the unique and exclusive source possible. Earthquakes of the reversed fault type may produce the same P-wave radiation.

Note: Site locations in figure 3 are assumed as follows: India 27°N 72°E, Lop Nor 41°N 89°E, W. Kazakhstan 48°N 48°E, E. Kazakhstan 50°N 78°E, Amchitka 52°N 179°E, Novaya Zemlya 73°N 55°E, Mururoa 20°S 140°W, S. Nevada 37°N 116°W.

(d) Figure 4: Positions of the considered test-sites (black dots) and of a further number of hypothetical source locations (crosses).

(e) Figures 5 and 6: The distribution of the stations of network III(SPZ) on the focal sphere for some hypothetical events shown in the figure 4, distributed somehow regularly over all land-areas of the world. Conclusion: The defects of the station network III(SPZ) are shown. Also here it is obvious that the proposed network is not everywhere equally effective. See also caption of figure 3.

Note: Assumed source locations: Europe 52°N 5°E; Africa N, 20°N 10°E; Africa S, 20°S 25°E; Africa E, 20°N 45°E; Asia NE, 60°N 120°E; Asia E, 35°N 140°E; Asia SE, 0°S 115°E; Australia, 25°S 135°E; N. America N, 65°N 120°W; N. America NE, 55°N 70°W; C. Pacific, 20°N 155°W; C. America, 20°N 90°W; S. America S, 45°S 70°W; S. America N, 10°S 60°W; Antarctica, 90°S.

(f) No identification as an explosion should and can be made on the sole basis of initial motions of short-period P-waves, even at the optimal distance range of 20-80°. A study of amplitudes could be useful, but for the present has not yet been developed into an operational tool.

(g) Although not absolutely essential, it is advised to maintain the short-period C/D data in the Level I data reports. Especially for events of m_b 5 and larger they may be useful as additional evidence in the process of identification. It should also not be ruled out that the monitoring station network, when equipped with identical instruments all over the world, will show a performance which is higher than that hitherto observed in existing networks.

(h) Long-period P-wave data are only of interest in confirmation of high magnitude events. For the interpretation of small and questionable events long-period C/D data are of no significance.




Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3




Figure 4.




Figure 5




Figure 6

RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
(Adopted at the 15th Plenary Meeting on 29 February 1979)

INTRODUCTION

These rules of procedure have been adopted taking into account the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, including the agreement reached following appropriate consultations among the Member States during that Session which the General Assembly welcomed in the Final Document.

I. Functions and Membership

1. The Committee on Disarmament (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) is a disarmament negotiating forum open to the nuclear weapon States and thirty-five other States (Annex I).
2. The membership of the Committee will be reviewed at regular intervals.
3. All Member States of the Committee shall take part in its work in conditions of full equality as independent States, in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

II. Representation and Accreditation

4. The delegation of a Member State of the Committee shall consist of a head of delegation and other representatives, advisers, and experts, as may be required.
5. Each delegation shall be accredited by a letter on the authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Member State, addressed to the Chairman of the Committee.
6. The Delegations shall be seated following the English alphabetical list of membership.

III. Sessions

7. The Committee shall have an annual session divided into two parts. The first part shall begin on the first Tuesday in February. The Committee shall decide, as soon as practically possible, the opening date of the second part and the closing dates of both parts of its annual session, taking into account the requirements of its work.

3. The Chairman of the Committee, in full consultation with and with the agreement of all its Members, may convene the Committee in special session.

IV. Chairmanship

9. When the Committee is in session, the Chairmanship of the Committee shall rotate among all its members on the first day of the calendar month, a rotation which began in January 1979 following the English alphabetical list of membership.

10. If the head of the delegation which performs the function of Chairman cannot be present, he may be replaced by a member of his delegation. If no member of the delegation holding the chair is able to perform the function of Chairman the delegation next in order of rotation shall temporarily assume this function.

11. Apart from exercising the normal functions of a presiding officer and in addition to the powers conferred upon him elsewhere by these rules, the Chairman shall, in full consultation with the Committee and under its authority, represent it in its relations with States, with the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations and with other international organizations.

12. During the period when the Committee is not in session the functions of the Chairman shall be carried out by the representative of the Member State which chaired the last plenary meeting of the Committee.

V. Secretariat

13. At the request of the Committee the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following consultations with the Committee, will appoint the Secretary of the Committee, who shall also act as his personal representative, to assist the Committee and its Chairman in organizing the business and time-tables of the Committee.

14. Under the authority of the Committee and its Chairman, the Secretary shall, inter alia, assist in the preparation of both the provisional agenda of the Committee and the first draft of the reports of the Committee to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

15. At the request of the Committee the Secretary shall provide professional assistance to the Committee by preparing background papers and bibliographies on issues which are the subject of negotiations in the Committee as well as by compiling data and information relevant to the conduct of negotiations.

16. The Secretary shall also perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these rules or by the Committee.

17. The Secretary-General of the United Nations will be requested to provide the staff as well as the necessary assistance and services needed by the Committee and any subsidiary bodies which it may establish.

VI. Conduct of Work and Adoption of Decisions

18. The Committee shall conduct its work and adopt its decisions by consensus.

VII. Organization of Work

19. The work of the Committee shall be conducted in plenary meetings, as well as under any additional arrangements agreed by the Committee, such as informal meetings with or without experts.

20. The Committee shall convene in plenary meetings in accordance with a schedule to be agreed upon. These meetings shall be held in public unless the Committee decides otherwise. In the event that it is decided to hold a private meeting, the Committee shall also decide whether to issue a communiqué of the meeting. The communiqué shall adequately reflect the substance of the proceedings and decisions taken by the Committee.

21. If the Committee is unable to take a decision on the substance of an item under negotiation, it will consider the subsequent examination of that item.

22. The Committee may hold informal meetings, with or without experts, to consider as appropriate substantive matters as well as questions concerning its organization of work. When requested by the Committee, the Secretariat shall provide unofficial summaries of those meetings in the working languages.

23. Whenever the Committee deems it advisable for the effective performance of its functions, including when it appears that there is a basis to negotiate a draft treaty or other draft texts, the Committee may establish subsidiary bodies, such as ad hoc sub-committees, working groups, technical groups or groups of governmental experts, open to all Member States of the Committee unless the Committee decides otherwise. The Committee shall define the mandate for each of such subsidiary bodies and provide appropriate support for their work.

24. The Committee shall decide if its own rules of procedure may be adapted to the specific requirements of its subsidiary bodies. The meetings of the subsidiary bodies shall be informal unless the Committee decides otherwise. The Secretariat shall provide assistance to the subsidiary bodies, as requested, including the preparation of unofficial summaries of the subsidiary bodies' proceedings in the working languages of the Committee.

25. The approval by consensus of reports shall not be interpreted as affecting in any manner the essential requirement that such reports must reflect faithfully the positions of all the members of the respective organs.

26. The Committee and its subsidiary bodies shall normally meet at the Office of the United Nations at Geneva.

VIII. Agenda and Programme of Work

27. At the beginning of each annual session, the Committee shall adopt its agenda for the year. In doing so, the Committee shall take into account the recommendations made to it by the General Assembly, the proposals presented by Member States of the Committee and the decisions of the Committee.

28. On the basis of its agenda, the Committee, at the beginning of each part of its annual session, shall establish its programme of work, which will include a schedule of its activities for that part of the session, taking also into account the recommendations, proposals and decisions referred to in rule 27.

29. The provisional agenda and the programme of work shall be drawn up by the Chairman of the Committee with the assistance of the Secretary and presented to the Committee for consideration and adoption.

30. The subject of statements made in plenary meetings will normally correspond to the topic then under discussion in accordance with the agreed programme of work. However, it is the right of any Member State of the Committee to raise any subject relevant to the work of the Committee at a plenary meeting and to have full opportunity of presenting its views on any subject which it may consider to merit attention.

31. While the work of the Committee is in progress Member States may request the inclusion of an urgent item in the agenda. The Committee shall decide whether and when it should be considered.

IX. Participation by States not members of the Committee

32. Representatives of non-member States shall have reserved seats in the conference room during plenary meetings and, if the Committee so decides, at other meetings.

33. Interested States not members of the Committee may submit to the Committee written proposals or working documents on measures of disarmament that are the subject of negotiation in the Committee and may participate in the discussion of the subject-matter of such proposals or working documents.

34. The Committee will invite States not members of the Committee, upon their request, to express views in the Committee when the particular concerns of those States are under discussion. Having considered such a request, the Committee will, through its Chairman, transmit an invitation to that effect to the State or States concerned.

35. The Committee may also decide to invite the States referred to in rules 33 and 34 to participate in informal meetings and in meetings of its subsidiary bodies, in which case the procedure of rule 34 is applicable.

36. The provisions of rules 4 and 5 shall also apply to delegations of non-member States participating in the work of the Committee.

X. Languages, Records and Documents

37. Simultaneous interpretation, verbatim records of public plenary meetings and documents shall be provided in the languages used within the United Nations system by Member States of the Committee participating in its work.^{1/} Any representative may speak in his own language provided he makes available simultaneous interpretation into a working language.

38. Numbers shall be given in the order in which documents are received by the Secretariat. Check lists of all documents reproduced by the Secretariat shall be available from time to time.

39. Documents of the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC) and Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) series may be referred to without their re-submission.

40. Verbatim records and formal and other relevant documents of the Committee shall be distributed to States Members of the United Nations normally within two weeks. Official documents of the Committee will be made available for public use.

XI. Invitations to organs of the United Nations System

41. The Committee may decide to invite specialized agencies, the IAEA and other organs of the United Nations system to provide information as appropriate if the Committee decides that doing so would advance its work.

XII. Non-Governmental Organizations

42. All communications from non-governmental organizations to the Committee, to the Chairman or to the Secretariat, shall be retained by the Secretariat and be made available to delegations upon request. A list of all such communications shall be circulated to the Committee.

XIII. Reports to the United Nations General Assembly

43. The Committee shall submit, through the Chairman, reports to the United Nations General Assembly annually or more frequently as appropriate.

44. The drafts of such reports shall be prepared by the Chairman of the Committee with the assistance of the Secretary and shall be made available to all Member States of the Committee for consideration at least two weeks before the scheduled date for their adoption.

^{1/} In accordance with this provision the Committee reached an understanding to use, for the time being, Arabic, English, French, Russian and Spanish.

45. The reports of the Committee shall be factual and reflect the negotiations and work of the Committee. Unless the Committee decides otherwise, the drafts shall contain:

- (a) The agenda;
- (b) A summary of specific requests addressed to the Committee by the United Nations General Assembly at its preceding regular session;
- (c) Sectional headings in accordance with items comprised in (a) and (b) above and other matters raised in the Committee during the year;
- (d) Conclusions and decisions;
- (e) A table of contents and an index of verbatim records, by country and subject, of the period covered by the reports;
- (f) Working papers and proposals submitted during the year;
- (g) Verbatim records of the meetings held during the year, distributed as a separate annex;
- (h) Other relevant documents.

46. The Committee shall adopt the annual report at the end of its session. This report shall be made available to all Member States of the United Nations before the opening of the regular sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. All other reports shall be circulated without delay.

XIV. Amendments

47. These rules of procedure may be amended by decision of the Committee.

ANNEX I

(adopted at the 26th plenary meeting held on 10 April 1979)

Algeria	Japan
Argentina	Kenya
Australia	Mexico
Belgium	Mongolia
Brazil	Morocco
Bulgaria	Netherlands
Burma	Nigeria
Canada	Pakistan
China ^{1/}	Peru
Cuba	Poland
Czechoslovakia	Romania
Egypt	Sri Lanka
Ethiopia	Sweden
France	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
German Democratic Republic	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Germany, Federal Republic of	United States of America
Hungary	Venezuela
India	Yugoslavia
Indonesia	Zaire
Iran	
Italy	

^{1/} At the time of the adoption of the Rules of Procedure
China has not participated in the work of the Committee
on Disarmament

ITALY

Additional Protocol to the 1967 "Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies" with a view to
Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space.

MEMORANDUM

I. Paragraph 80 of the "Programme of Action" contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament states:

"In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies".

Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, which is of particular importance to the pursuit of peace and disarmament, provides that:

"States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited".

The obligation assumed in conformity with the first paragraph of Article IV by States Parties to the Treaty is in the common interest of mankind and, in particular, represents a common defence against nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, it establishes a link with the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, which was signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963.

GE.79-60712

The second paragraph of Article IV clarifies the scope of the words "exclusively for peaceful purposes". It establishes a dual legal régime: the first one provides for complete demilitarization of celestial bodies (without prejudice to peaceful uses), the second one imposes a ban, limited only to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, on military activities in orbits around the earth and in outer space, although it could be argued that the combined provisions of Articles I and IV imply a commitment to the total ban of an arms race in outer space. Furthermore, the text of the Treaty does not state clearly that the moon is a celestial body.

II. The 1967 Treaty explicitly calls for international co-operation and scientific exploration of outer space. Indeed, its main purpose is to promote the exclusively peaceful use of outer space in the common interest of all mankind. For more than a decade the implementation of the Treaty has contributed to prevent the introduction in outer space of nuclear arms race. Recent developments in space technology, in particular the development of interceptor/destroyer satellites, and the possible use in outer space of weapons not specifically prohibited by Article IV suggest the need to supplement the existing legal system with specific provisions. Indeed, it seems advisable, in the interest of international security, to impose a total ban on military activities, other than peaceful, in outer space because of the danger of the development of offensive outer space weapons, such as the so-called hunter-killer satellites, which would add a new, more serious dimension to the arms race. Needless to say, the use of reconnaissance, surveillance and communications satellites, and indeed, of any space system which would reinforce the strategic stability by ensuring, inter alia, the verification of disarmament and other arms limitation agreements will not be prejudiced. Therefore it would be advisable to review, even on a limited basis, the régime established by the Treaty of 1967 in order to prohibit, inter alia, the development and use of earth or space-based systems designed to damage, destroy or interfere with the operations of other States' satellites. Such a ban could be embodied in an Additional Protocol to the Treaty of 1967, extending the prohibition contained in Article IV thereof explicitly to the launching and the stationing in orbit or elsewhere in outer space of all weapons, and not merely of nuclear and mass destruction weapons. Were this not to be done, the protection accorded to all space systems could, paradoxically, permit the introduction of offensive space devices other than those prohibited by Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty.

At the same time we should strengthen existing technical means of verification and lay the basis for a wider involvement of the international community in such verification. A first step was taken in this direction at the Thirty-third Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations by the adoption of a proposal, introduced by France and which Italy was happy to co-sponsor, for the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency.

In the view of the Italian Government the problem of military uses and of the prevention of the arms race in outer space falls within the competence of the negotiating multilateral disarmament forum established in Geneva. Such a problem should therefore be dealt with by the Committee on Disarmament at the earliest appropriate time.

The danger of an arms race in outer space and the importance of satellites for the verification of arms control agreements justify its consideration under the terms of reference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

III. Italy has always been in favour of the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Since 9 September 1968, the Italian delegation proposed to the United Nations to review Article IV of the Treaty of 1967 (doc. A/7221). On 1 February 1978, both in New York and Geneva, Italy proposed the adoption of further measures to prevent the extension of the arms race (Working Paper A/AC.187/97). This suggestion is reflected in paragraph 80 of the Programme of Action of the Final Act of the Special Session on Disarmament.

The Italian Government, in submitting this Memorandum to the Committee on Disarmament, hopes that it will be favourably received and make an effective contribution to the elaboration, at an appropriate stage, of timely measures to ensure the practical application of paragraph 80.

In supplementing the rules of the 1967 Treaty, pertinent provisions of the Convention on the prohibition of military and any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques should - in the view of the Italian delegation - be also kept in mind.

Attached to this Memorandum is a draft Additional Protocol to the Outer Space Treaty which Italy has elaborated with the aim to provide a concrete basis of discussion in the proceedings of the Committee on Disarmament.

ANNEX I

Additional Protocol to the Treaty on Principles governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies.

The high contracting Parties

- recalling the need to facilitate, in the interest of all mankind, the exploration and use of Outer Space for exclusively peaceful purposes;
 - considering the urgent need of adopting further effective measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space;
 - noting the necessity to supplement the provisions of the Treaty on principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 27 January 1967;
 - stressing the importance of the latest technological developments for the effective implementation of the principles mentioned in article 1 of the Treaty;
 - convinced of the opportunity to prevent any development that might jeopardize the achievement of the aims of the Treaty;
 - taking note of paragraph 80 of the Final Document adopted by consensus at the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to Disarmament;
- have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1

1. Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be used for peaceful purposes only. States Parties to this Protocol undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in any measures of a military or other hostile nature, such as the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the stationing of devices having the same effect, the launching into earth orbit or beyond of objects carrying weapons of mass destruction or any other types of devices designed for offensive purposes, the conduct of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.
2. The provisions of this Protocol shall not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes as well as the use of such personnel or equipment for the purpose of participating in any control system to be established in order to ensure compliance with disarmament and security agreements.

ARTICLE II

Each State Party to this Protocol undertakes to adopt any measures it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the provisions of the Protocol anywhere under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE III

1. Any State Party to this Protocol which has reason to believe that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Protocol may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all relevant informations as well as all possible evidence supporting its validity.
2. Each State Party to this Protocol undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties of the result of the investigation.
3. Each State Party to this Protocol undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any State Party which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation of the Protocol.

ARTICLE IV

This Protocol shall be of unlimited duration.

ARTICLE V

1. This Protocol shall be open for signature to all the Parties of the Treaty on principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Any State which does not sign it before its entry into force may accede to it at any time;
2. This Protocol shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in their capacity of Depositaries of the Treaty;
3. This Protocol shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by Governments;

4. For those States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Protocol, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession;
5. The Depositaries shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Protocol, as well as of the receipt of other notices;
6. This Protocol shall be registered by the Depositaries in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE VI

This Protocol of which the English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

PAKISTAN

Conclusion of an International Convention to Assure
Non-nuclear Weapon States against the Use or Threat
of use of Nuclear Weapons

The first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament recognized that steps should be taken by the nuclear powers to assure non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. While noting the unilateral declarations made by some nuclear powers at the special session in this connexion, the General Assembly called upon them to urgently "conclude effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

2. Pakistan has consistently expressed the view that, to be credible and effective, assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be extended in a multilateral context and in legally binding form. Therefore, Pakistan welcomed the initiative of the Soviet Union at the thirty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, proposing the "Conclusion of an International Convention on the Strengthening of Guarantees of the Security of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States".

3. During the consideration of this item in the General Assembly, separate draft Conventions were presented by the Soviet Union and Pakistan. These differed in certain respects, but both had the same objective i.e. to obtain, at the international level, legal and credible assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

4. The General Assembly adopted two resolutions on this item, which have called on the Committee on Disarmament to evolve "effective arrangements" or "appropriate international arrangements" on this subject. To this end, the Committee is to consider the draft Conventions submitted by Pakistan and the Soviet Union and to report to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

5. In pursuance of the above-mentioned decisions, Pakistan proposes that the Committee on Disarmament give early consideration during its 1979 session to the conclusion of an International Convention to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The draft Convention circulated on this subject by Pakistan at the thirty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly provides a sound basis for initiating negotiations on this item and is hereby submitted to the Committee on Disarmament.

6. The conclusion of an International Convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons will be of special significance to those states which are not parties to the opposing global military alliances. Its adoption will greatly enhance the climate of world peace and security.

7. It is suggested that the Committee on Disarmament should hold discussions on this draft Convention, and such other proposals and suggestions as may be submitted on the subject, at an early date. Suitable working arrangements should be also established under the aegis of the Committee to enable concrete negotiations to begin on the draft Convention as soon as possible this year.

ANNEX

Draft International Convention to Assure
Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use
or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

The States Parties to this Convention,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Deeply concerned at the continuation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race and the threat to mankind due to the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that only nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, will assure complete security in the nuclear era,

Desirous of safeguarding the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to devise effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Bearing in mind the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council on the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Also bearing in mind that the non-nuclear-weapon States have called for legally binding and credible assurances from nuclear-weapon States that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Convention, as a first step towards the complete ban on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pledge themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear-weapon States.

This undertaking is without prejudice to the obligations of States Parties to this Convention arising from treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Article II

The nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Convention also undertake to avoid the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in any contingency and to achieve nuclear disarmament, resulting in the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, in the shortest possible time.

Article III

Any State Party to this Convention which has reason to believe that there has been or is likely to be a breach of the obligations of the States Parties arising from articles I and II of this Convention may request an urgent meeting of the Security Council, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, with a view to preventing such a breach or redressing the situation arising therefrom.

Article IV

This Convention shall be concluded for an indefinite period of time. It shall lapse once nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

Article V

1. Any State Party to this Convention may propose amendments to this Convention. The text of each proposed amendment must be submitted to the depositary, who shall immediately transmit it to all States Parties.
2. An amendment shall enter into force for each State Party to this Convention which accepts the amendment after the documents concerning its acceptance have been deposited with the depositary by the majority of States Parties. Subsequently, the amendment shall enter into force for each of the remaining States Parties on the date of the deposit by them of the document concerning its acceptance.

Article VI

1. This Convention is open for signature by all States. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Convention is subject to ratification by the States which have signed it. The instruments of ratification or the documents concerning accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is hereby designated the depositary.
3. This Convention shall enter into force following the deposit of the instruments of ratification by ... States including the two leading nuclear-weapon States i.e. the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or documents concerning accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, the Convention shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the instruments of ratification or documents concerning accession.

5. The depositary shall immediately notify all States Parties to this Convention of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or document concerning accession, the date of the entry into force of this Convention or of any amendments thereto, and also of the receipt by him of other notifications.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article VII

This Convention, the Russian, Arabic, Chinese, English, French and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall duly forward certified copies of the Convention to the Governments of the States which have signed or acceded to the Convention.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized for that purpose by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, which was opened for signature on ...

GROUP OF 21

Working paper on negotiations on the prohibition of the
development, production and stockpiling of
chemical weapons and on their destruction

The use of chemical and biological weapons is prohibited in the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Negotiations in the CCD resulted, 1972, in a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. The convention entered into force in 1975. Pursuant to article IX of the convention each State Party to it undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes. Since 1972 three draft conventions on chemical weapons have been presented in the CCD by a group of socialist States, Japan, and the United Kingdom respectively. In 1974 the United States and the Soviet Union announced their intention to present to the CCD a joint initiative on the subject of chemical weapons. Since 1976 these two States have held bilateral talks for this purpose. In the CCD a substantial amount of work was accomplished with regard to the chemical weapons question. In that respect a group of non-aligned and neutral countries members of the CCD stated their position in a working paper (CCD 400).

A considerable amount of background material is available. Most of this material was synthesized in an informal paper entitled "Compilation of Material on Chemical Weapons from CCD Working Papers and Statements, 1972-1976", dated 11 March, 1977.

The United Nations General Assembly has in various resolutions repeatedly emphasized the importance of the chemical weapons issue.

The Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament underlined that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament.

The thirty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted two resolutions with regard to the chemical weapons question.

In resolution 33/59A the Assembly requests the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to undertake, at the beginning of its 1979 session, negotiations with a view to elaborating an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives.

In the same resolution the Committee is requested to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

In resolution 33/71 the Committee is requested to undertake on a priority basis, at its first session in January 1979, negotiations concerning a treaty or convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

As regards the bilateral talks the Soviet Union and the United States are urged (resolution 33/59) to submit their joint initiative to the Committee in order to assist it in achieving early agreement on the subject. From the wording of both resolutions it is clear that negotiations in the Committee do not have to be preceded by the conclusion of the bilateral talks. In other words the negotiations in the Committee may proceed parallel with the bilateral talks. It is the firm belief of the Group of 21 that the negotiations in the Committee would not hamper or hinder the bilateral talks. Quite the contrary, the parallel negotiations would be of assistance to each other.

In view of the above and taking into account that multilateral negotiations have not yet started the Group of 21 is convinced of the urgent need to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group, open to the participation of all Member States of the Committee, with a view to elaborating a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction. States not members of the Committee would be entitled to submit to the Ad Hoc Working Group written proposals or working documents and to participate in the consideration of the subject-matter of such proposals and working documents.

In discharging its responsibility the Ad Hoc Working Group would have as basic texts for its work the draft treaties, proposals and working papers on a convention on chemical weapons presented to the Committee and its predecessors as well as the draft treaties, proposals and working papers submitted to it during the course of its work by both members and non-members of the Committee.

In order to enable the Ad Hoc Working Group to accomplish its task the Committee would request the States participating in the bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons fully to inform the Ad Hoc Working Group on the state of negotiations indicating areas in which agreement has been reached as well as issues which still are outstanding.

In the process of elaborating the draft convention the Ad Hoc Working Group would inter alia identify areas of agreement and possible new elements of importance for the formulation of the scope and verification of a chemical weapons convention.

CD/12
12 April 1979

Original: ENGLISH

Agenda and Programme of Work of the Committee on Disarmament
(adopted at the 26th and 27th plenary meetings held on 10 and 11 April 1979)

The Committee on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating forum, shall promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The Committee, taking into account inter alia the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, will deal with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:

- I. Nuclear weapons in all aspects;
- II. Chemical weapons;
- III. Other weapons of mass destruction;
- IV. Conventional weapons;
- V. Reduction of military budgets;
- VI. Reduction of armed forces;
- VII. Disarmament and Development;
- VIII. Disarmament and international security;
- IX. Collateral measures; confidence building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned;
- X. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Within the above framework, the Committee on Disarmament adopts the following agenda for 1979 which includes items that, in conformity with the provisions of Section VIII of its Rules of Procedure, would be considered by the Committee:

1. Nuclear Test Ban.
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
3. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
4. Chemical weapons.
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
6. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report as appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In compliance with rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the Committee also adopts the following Programme of Work for the first part of its 1979 session:

PROGRAMME OF WORK

19 - 23 April: Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

24 - 27 April: Chemical weapons.

In adopting its agenda and programme of work, the Committee has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure.

POLAND
Working paper

Further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor

1. In preparing its agenda and programme of work (CD/12), the Committee on Disarmament proclaimed its determination to promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. To that end, the Committee indicated that it intends to deal with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and with other relevant measures in a number of areas, including conventional weapons and other collateral measures of disarmament. In this connexion, it may be pertinent to recall one specific task which derives from the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.
2. As is well known, in the preamble to the Treaty -- one of the international juridical instruments now in force in whose conclusion the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) played a key role, the States parties asserted their conviction that the Treaty constituted "... a step towards the exclusion of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race". With this ultimate objective in view, the States parties included in article V of the Treaty a specific commitment: they pledged "... to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof".
3. Five years later, during the 1977 review of the operation of the Treaty, the States parties were unanimous in recognizing -- in the Final Declaration of the Review Conference -- that, although a partial measure by its nature, the Treaty, together with its objectives, were of continuing importance as a first step towards reserving the vast marine environment for exclusively peaceful pursuits. Indeed, the Final Declaration expressly recognized that an arms race involving nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed or ocean floor would present a grave threat to international security.
4. It was only natural for the Review Conference, therefore, to suggest that the necessary second step in that general direction could be taken with the early consideration in CCD of further measures likely to contribute to outlawing

an arms race from that environment. In fact, affirming the commitment which States parties had made in article V of the Treaty, the Final Declaration of the Review Conference requested CCD "... to proceed promptly with consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof".

5. That urgent appeal of the international community was restated in paragraph 79 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. That paragraph reads:

"In order to promote the peaceful use of and to avoid an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, the Committee on Disarmament is requested-- in consultation with the States parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, and taking into account the proposals made during the 1977 Review Conference ... and any relevant technological developments -- to proceed promptly with the consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race in that environment".

6. In view of the above requests, the delegation of Poland believes that the Committee on Disarmament is duty bound to acknowledge the responsibility incumbent upon it for the promotion of possible measures of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed or ocean floor. One suitable way of recognizing that responsibility would be to envisage an appropriate early occasion in the Committee's schedule of work when attention could be focused on matters in that area.

7. The Polish delegation believes that a failure to provide for the possibility of wide-ranging discussion of the relevant problems would be hard to explain at the General Assembly of the United Nations and at the future Sea-Bed Treaty Review Conference.

CD/14
25 April 1979

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 APRIL 1979 FROM THE AMBASSADOR (POLITICAL AFFAIRS)
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF FINLAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE
AT GENEVA ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON
DISARMAMENT CONCERNING ARTICLES 33 AND 35 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

I have the honour to forward to you, upon the instructions of my Government, a working document entitled "Chemical Identification of Chemical Weapons Agents; a Finnish Project" and ask that it should be circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament. I furthermore ask Your Excellency, in accordance with the Article 120(g) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, to make due arrangements to allow the Finnish delegation to participate in the discussion of the subject matter of chemical weapons which will take place in the Committee on Disarmament on the 24th - 27th April 1979 as well as at later occasions when the above mentioned working paper will be discussed.

Accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Esko Rajakoski
Ambassador

GE.79-61491

Working Document

Chemical Identification of Chemical Weapons Agents - A Finnish Project

1. The need for the prohibition of chemical weapons is widely recognized as a question of high priority. Chemical weapons have been on the agenda of multilateral disarmament negotiations for almost two decades. A commitment to reaching an early agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons is stated, i.a., in Article IX of the Biological Weapons Convention, and the urgency of the prohibition of these weapons was reiterated by the United Nations General Assembly at its Special Session on Disarmament in 1978.
2. Believing that all nations, whether parties to multilateral negotiations or not, have a vital interest in promoting progress in disarmament and a duty to do whatever they can to achieve this goal, the Government of Finland has endeavoured to make a practical contribution to the negotiations on a chemical weapons treaty. In 1972, when the negotiating process on chemical weapons in the CCD had intensified, Finland initiated a research project on the role of instrumental analysis of chemical weapons agents in their verification. The goal of the project is the creation of a national chemical weapons verification capacity, which could be put to international use.
3. Obviously, verification is but one of the issues that has to be solved and agreed upon before the conclusion of a chemical weapons treaty. The Finnish project purports to tackle one aspect of the verification issue, the development of the analytical methods for the detection, in samples, of agents to be prohibited and thus creating capacity for verifying compliance with the treaty. The actual collection of samples would depend on the provisions of the treaty: recommendations on this matter fall outside the project.
4. The Finnish project is focused on the verification of organophosphorus nerve agents, which are generally considered to be the most potent chemical warfare agents.

5. In order to be useful in alternative situations, the project has been conceived as a multipurpose one, both substantively and functionally. Substantively, the planned control capacity could be useful in three different verification activities:

- (1) Verification of the destruction of stocks,
- (2) verification of non-production of chemical weapons, and
- (3) verification of their alleged use.

6. Functionally, the capacity could be of service regardless of the modalities of verification to be agreed upon:

- (1) It could be useful for national verification or any combination of national inspection and international elements,
- (2) it could be used in connexion with an investigation ordered by, for example, the Security Council pursuant to a complaint, if the Council were assigned such a role, and finally
- (3) it could meet some of the concern expressed by some developing countries about possible difficulties in carrying out verification by their national means only.

7. The progress of the project has been described in papers that Finland has annually presented to the CCD. A general review of the most suitable techniques for the organophosphorus warfare agents was presented in 1977 (Chemical and Instrumental Verification of Organophosphorus Warfare Agents, Helsinki 1977, CCD/544).

8. The working papers presented to the CCD are the following:

- on definitions of chemical warfare agents and on technical possibilities for verification and control of C-weapons with particular regard to a Finnish project on creation of a national basis of a CW control capacity for possible future international use (CCD/381, 1972),
- on the progress of the Finnish project for the creation of a national basis of a CW control capacity for possible future international use (CCD/412, 14 August 1973),
- on methodology for chemical identification of CW agents and related compound - progress of a Finnish research project (CCD/432, 16 July 1974, CCD/453, 4 July 1975, CCD/501, 2 July 1976),
- An Analytical Technique for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament - Trace Analysis by Glass Capillary Gas Chromatography with Specific Detectors (CCD/577, 22 August 1978).

9. The Government of Finland intends to continue the project and make available its results to the Committee on Disarmament. At present, the work of the project is concentrated on the following goals:

- (1) the development of reliable and standardizable verification procedures which have maximum sensitivity to detect even the slightest traces of chemicals to be prohibited (at the moment the detection limit is one nanogram per litre),
- (2) the preparation of suggestions for standardization of these techniques and procedures, and
- (3) the preparation of an extensive data bank and a handbook for rapid identification of potential chemical weapons agents and related chemicals in various samples.

10. The project is conducted under the direction of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland and it is supervised by the Ministry's Advisory Board for Disarmament. The requisite funds are appropriated through the State budget. Presently, most of the research work related to the project takes place at the Department of Chemistry of the University of Helsinki.

Geneva, 20 April 1979

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN & NORTHERN IRELAND

Visit to Britain by Chemical Weapons Experts
(14-16 March 1979)

Nineteen governments were represented on the visit which consisted of two parts: the first an inspection of a former nerve agent plant in the process of demolition at Nancekuke in Cornwall and the second a tour of a civil chemical factory near Birmingham. Notes on certain points connected with the visit are given below.

I. Participation

The following governments sent representatives to take part in the visit:

Australia	Japan
Belgium	Netherlands
Canada	Norway
Egypt	Pakistan
France	Romania
Germany, Federal Republic of	Sweden
Greece	Turkey
Indonesia	United States of America
Republic of Ireland	Yugoslavia
Italy	

II. Chemical Defence Establishment, Nancekuke

Note on some problems connected with dismantling a Nerve Agent Plant:

1. The GB pilot plant at Nancekuke was closed down as a toxic facility in the mid 1950s. At that time, the whole plant was washed out with sodium hydroxide solution as a decontaminant. A small part of the plant was dismantled in the 1960s to enable part of the building to be used for other work. The majority of the equipment was not dismantled until 1978/79.

2. On the basis of British experience at Nancekuke, the major tasks involved can be summarized as follows:

- (a) Re-establish special medical control of staff.
- (b) Re-establish full safety precautions.
- (c) Install a detection monitoring system.
- (d) Dismantle item by item, working from the highest point.
- (e) Further decontaminate each plant item removed.
- (f) Recover valuable materials of construction.
- (g) Dismantle cubicles and ventilation equipment.
- (h) Maintain control of decontamination effluent.

3. Medical control of staff required that the blood cholinesterase norm for every person be established before working in the toxic facility. During the dismantling period this cholinesterase level was checked regularly and also measured immediately if any symptoms of poisoning were observed. A medical officer was based in the plant area in direct voice contact with the scientist in charge and each person was medically examined for symptoms of poisoning before leaving work each day. Arrangements were also made for medical treatment to be readily available after working hours, should any symptoms develop then.

4. The safety precautions necessary for work in a toxic environment are that:

- (a) All personnel change completely into works clothing.
- (b) Access to the work area is limited to authorized personnel only, with entry and exit being recorded.
- (c) Entry into toxic cubicles is controlled and recorded.
- (d) Full protective clothing and respirators are to be worn by personnel entering a toxic cubicle.
- (e) There is an alarm system to warn of an emergency.
- (f) All personnel in the immediate area of the plant carry a respirator.
- (g) There are adequate facilities for decontamination of personnel and equipment.

5. The dismantling of the plant must be done by a team of experts who are fully acquainted with all parts of the plant and experienced in toxic engineering techniques. It requires meticulous attention to detail and a painstaking approach to establish that every possible trace of liquid which could either be decontaminant liquor or trapped agent is removed before dismantling of a particular item commences. A systematic and planned procedure is necessary and as each joint is broken, whether in a vessel or in a pipeline, the ends are wrapped with neoprene sheet to prevent drips of material from contaminating other areas.

6. The likely areas of contamination are in jointing materials and glands of moving parts, e.g. agitators and valves. Although the original "wash-through" with decontaminant would serve to destroy the majority of toxic chemical, some will remain trapped by airlocks and absorbed on jointing and packing material. As each item of plant is removed it must therefore be totally immersed in sodium hydroxide solution to ensure complete decontamination.

7. The primary material of construction used in the UK plant was silver, and this was recovered by smelting at high temperature and casting into ingots for re-use as a base metal. If other materials of construction were used (e.g. stainless steel or nickel alloys) it is likely that the equipment could be re-used for other purposes. However, if the equipment were homogeneously lined, say with enamel or lead, the lining would have to be stripped out to ensure complete decontamination as pin-hole leaks may have allowed toxic material to be trapped between the lining and the base metal.

8. Following the removal of all plant the cubicles and ventilation systems would be dismantled and finally the effluent treatment and control systems demolished.

9. On-site inspection of the type demonstrated in the UK visit can establish that plant has been removed and in the case of Nancekuke that the equipment was actually destroyed by melting. It can also show that a facility has been completely immobilized through removal or dismantling of the essential ancillary element of a toxic plant, namely the means of totally enclosing the plant (cubiclisation) and the systems for ventilating the exhaust air through cleaning/detoxification equipment. It should however be emphasized that the comments made apply to the final toxic stage of a pilot plant process to produce a nerve agent.

III. Albright and Wilson Ltd., Oldbury, near Birmingham

Civil chemical works covering twenty hectares and including about thirty-five separate units. Areas visited on 16 March were.

- (a) Phosphorus receipt and distribution; phosphoric acid; phosphorus chlorides.
- (b) Other phosphorus-using processes; phosphorus pentasulphide, alkali phosphates.
- (c) Organic phosphorus compounds (phosphites, phosphates); general organics; malathion building.
- (d) Support facilities; research and technical service laboratories; works laboratory; medical centre, effluent treatment plant.

CD/16
25 April 1979
ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 20 APRIL 1979 FROM THE HEAD OF THE PERMANENT MISSION
OF SWITZERLAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA ADDRESSED TO
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
CONCERNING ARTICLE 34 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to inform you that, on the basis of the provisions of paragraph 120, subparagraph (h), of the Final Document of the session of the General Assembly on disarmament and those of paragraph 34 of the rules of procedure of the Committee, Switzerland would like to be able to make a short statement, when the Committee of which you are Chairman comes to discuss the problem of chemical weapons, setting out the views of the federal authorities on the question of such weapons and their prohibition.

I hope that it will be possible for the Committee to accede to this request. Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Head of the Permanent Mission of Switzerland

O. Exchaquet
Ambassador

GE.79-61487

CD/17
27 April 1979
Original: ENGLISH

Letter dated 28 March 1979 from the Under-Secretary-General
of the United Nations for Political and Security Council
Affairs addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on
Disarmament transmitting the report of the United Nations
Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa

Sir,

At its 412th meeting on 7 March 1979, the Special Committee against Apartheid decided that the report of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa should be transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament.

In pursuance of that decision, I have the honour to transmit herewith, on
... behalf of the Secretary-General, a copy of the report.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Mikhail D. SYTENKO
Under-Secretary-General for
Political and Security Council Affairs

SPECIAL COMMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID

7 March 1979

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SEMINAR ON
NUCLEAR COLLABORATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA

Rapporteur: Abdul S. Minty

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I. ORGANIZATION OF THE SEMINAR

The United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa was organized by the Special Committee against Apartheid in co-operation with the Non-governmental Organizations Sub-Committee on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Apartheid and Decolonization and the British Anti-Apartheid Movement.

It was held in London on 24 and 25 February 1979.

II. AGENDA

The agenda of the Seminar was as follows:

1. Nature and extent of external collaboration with South Africa which enhances its nuclear capacity and potential
2. South Africa's nuclear capacity and potential: (a) its military dimension; (b) its threat to peace and independence
3. Need for international action to end collaboration with South Africa which enhances its nuclear capacity and potential

III. PARTICIPANTS

The participants in the Seminar included members of the Special Committee; representatives of front-line States, national liberation movements of southern Africa, anti-apartheid movements and other non-governmental organizations; and a number of scientists and other experts.

The list of participants is reproduced in Annex I.

IV. ELECTION OF OFFICERS

The Seminar elected the following officers:

Chairman:	H.E. Mr. Leslie O. Harriman
Vice-Chairmen:	Mrs. Edith Ballantyne Professor Eric Burhop H.E. Mr. Serge Elie Charles
Rapporteur:	Mr. Abdul S. Minty

V. OPENING SESSION OF THE SEMINAR

The Seminar began with an open meeting at which statements were made by H.E. Mr. Leslie O. Harriman, Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid; H.E. Mr. Armando Panguene, Ambassador of the People's Republic of Mozambique to Portugal; Mr. Eric Burhop, Emeritus Professor of Physics at the University of London and President of the World Association of Scientific Workers; Mr. Sean MacBride, former United Nations Commissioner for Namibia and winner of Nobel and Lenin Peace Prizes; and Mr. Abdul S. Minty, Honorary Secretary of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement.

A. Statement by H.E. Mr. Leslie O. Harriman^{1/}

H.E. Mr. Leslie O. Harriman, Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid, said that the Seminar had been called to deal with one of the most serious and urgent problems before Africa and the world.

He pointed out that several governments, as well as a number of multinational corporations, institutions and individuals, were collaborating with the apartheid régime in the nuclear field and enabling it to acquire sophisticated weapons and technology in order to perpetuate racism, threaten African States and blackmail the world.

It was only after the disclosure in 1977 that South Africa was preparing a nuclear explosion that the Western Powers became concerned -- not because the proposed test was by a criminal and desperate régime but mainly because of its timing and because it would upset their plans on non-proliferation in general. Since then they had advocated inducing South Africa to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which would mean giving further respectability to an illegitimate régime and providing it with even greater access to nuclear technology. Meanwhile, they continued collaboration with the apartheid régime, claiming that the relations were commercial and that each aspect of collaboration does not by itself make South Africa a nuclear power.

Calling on the Seminar to consider all the implications and ramifications of nuclear collaboration with South Africa, he said that the danger was not only an immediate threat to the peace but a long-term threat of many dimensions.

With its military and nuclear power, the apartheid régime wanted to suppress any internal resistance, restrain and blackmail independent African States and persuade the Western Powers to recognize it fully as a regional power. It also wanted to play a dominant role in supplying uranium and enriched uranium to other countries so that they would become dependent on it, both for their peaceful and military nuclear programmes.

In conclusion, he declared that there was no right, in law or morality, to trade with the apartheid régime, to fraternize with that régime or to assist it in its diabolical plans. Apartheid was a crime against humanity and anyone who collaborated with the apartheid régime was guilty of abetting that crime.

^{1/} The text of the statement is reproduced in Annex III.

B. Statement by H.E. Mr. Armonda Panguene

H.E. Mr. Armonda Panguene, representative of Mozambique, said that nuclear weapons in the hands of the racist rulers of South Africa presented a deadly threat both to the people of South Africa and to the neighbouring independent States.

The purpose of South Africa's nuclear threat was clear. It was to convince the oppressed masses of South Africa that the apartheid state was invincible; it was to intimidate both the national liberation movement and independent Africa. Through nuclear blackmail, South Africa hoped to coerce African States to stop supporting the liberation struggle, particularly the front-line States, all of whose capitals were within reach of South African nuclear weapons.

Mozambique was well aware of the military strength of South Africa and the danger that it represented to the entire region. The South African régime had always collaborated, economically and militarily, with the Portuguese colonial régime to oppress the Mozambican people and prevent the birth of an independent Mozambique. South Africa also gave massive assistance to the illegal régime of Ian Smith in the murderous Rhodesian attacks against the front-line States. The Mirage jets used by Smith's forces in recent raids against Mozambique had been manufactured under licence in South Africa. Only with the collaboration of South Africa could vital supplies, such as oil, reach Rhodesia and maintain Smith's machinery of war.

But the people of Mozambique were not intimidated by the threats of the Salisbury and Pretoria régimes and their allies. Mozambique would continue to support the struggles of the peoples of Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa itself.

Mr. Panguene continued that the responsibility for the danger of an eventual use of nuclear weapons by South Africa did not lie with the racist South African régime alone. South Africa could not possess the technology required for the production of nuclear weapons without the collaboration of Western Powers. The Federal Republic of Germany, France, Britain and the United States had all contributed to the development of this threat.

The West had always talked about solving the problems of southern Africa through peaceful means, but was at the same time contributing on a massive scale to South Africa's military strength. There was a state of war in southern Africa: the real question was not whether one was in favour of war or peace, but whose side one was on in the war that already existed. South Africa's armed forces

had developed their present capacity through direct purchase of equipment from the West and through agreements whereby Western equipment could be manufactured under licence in South Africa. From providing military aircraft and vehicles, such as the British Leyland landrovers used in the massacre of Soweto schoolchildren, it was only a small step in providing the technology for nuclear bombs.

If nuclear weapons were ever used in southern Africa, then it was the Western governments -- which made profits from sales of weapons and technology and exploited the labour of the people of South Africa and Namibia -- which would be guilty of mass murder.

The problem of South Africa's nuclear capability had arisen, he added, in the context of the great advance of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, and Namibia and in South Africa itself. If the Pretoria régime sensed that it faced imminent defeat, there existed a real and terrible danger that it might use tactical nuclear weapons either against its own population or against independent Africa, first and foremost the front-line States. This was a clear threat to world peace and security and fully justified the action of the Government of Mozambique, together with other States in the region, in calling for the creation of a denuclearized zone -- a zone of peace -- in the Indian Ocean.

South Africa, he concluded, must be isolated still further. An effective and total embargo must be applied on all military equipment. The definition of military equipment should be very wide: it should, for instance, cover oil, without which no army can function.

He hoped that the seminar would call on all Governments to take action to break links with the South African régime, to halt immediately further exchanges of technology and all other forms of nuclear collaboration, and to support actively the liberation struggle. He also hoped that the seminar would call for the international recognition of the liberation movements as the legitimate representatives of their peoples, and for increased support for the front-line States so as to strengthen their defensive capacity.

C. Statement by Mr. Eric Burhop

Mr. Burhop said that the World Association of Scientific Workers had, from its very inception, advocated the abolition of nuclear weapons and supported the NPT as a first step. Proliferation of nuclear weapons to South Africa, with its

system of racism, had implications too terrible to contemplate from the point of view of the future of mankind. It was incredible that any encouragement should be given by any government to such development.

And yet, there was a long history of co-operation in the nuclear field, particularly by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, with South Africa. It began with attempts immediately after the Second World War to get South Africa involved in the production of uranium in the gold mines. Subsequently, large deposits were found in Namibia and the Rössing mine was developed by Rio Tinto Zinc.

There was also a long history of association with South African scientists. Many South African scientists who had been trained in the United Kingdom now worked in South Africa. South Africa had many hundreds of competent physicists and there was no doubt about its capacity to develop nuclear weapons if it wished to do so.

There was a real danger of nuclear capability in South Africa which could or might have already produced a few nuclear weapons. But this capability should not be exaggerated. The dangers which lay ahead, if the projects which were now being discussed got under way, were so great in comparison that any exaggeration of the present capability would detract from a recognition of the future threat.

Referring to the report last year that South Africa was ready to test nuclear weapons in a testing range in the Kalahari desert, he said that the pilot enrichment plant was the most likely source from which South Africa would have accumulated some three or four nuclear weapons. That plant had been built by South African scientists using the jet nozzle process which had certainly been supplied to them by a West German firm.

The pilot plant was free from any inspection and was by itself very dangerous. But there was a proposal to expand it by a hundred times by 1985.

One motivation of South Africa might be to sell uranium more profitably as enriched uranium. But if such a large-scale plant was developed, there would be an enormous danger to the stability and peace in the region.

In short, there was already a danger since South Africa certainly had nuclear capability and might have already accumulated a few nuclear weapons. But there was a very much greater potential danger from an expanded enrichment plant.

D. Statement by Mr. Sean MacBride

Mr. MacBride said that he saw no greater danger, not only to Africa but to the rest of the world, than to have a situation in which South Africa had become, or might become, a nuclear power.

Certain facts were already clearly established. South Africa had been enabled to acquire capacity to make nuclear weapons with the assistance of West Germany. Whether the assistance was given with the direct intervention of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany or whether that Government merely permitted firms to transfer the necessary technology and equipment was not material. The Federal Republic of Germany was bound by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and it had a special responsibility to ensure that nothing would be done by West German firms to proliferate nuclear weapons to South Africa.

Collaboration between West Germany and South Africa, he said, dated back to several years. It had been initiated to a certain extent through the auspices of NATO and had been originally limited to conventional weapons and communications systems. It was then extended to assisting South Africa to become a nuclear power.

The matter was taken a step further in December 1976 at a conference in Zurich attended by Mr. B.J. Vorster, then Prime Minister of South Africa, Dr. Henry Kissinger, then Secretary of State of the United States of America, and General Alexander Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the NATO Forces. It was agreed at that meeting that South Africa would be assisted to secure the formation in Namibia and Zimbabwe of governments which would be acceptable to the United States and South Africa. Closer collaboration in regard to arms and in the nuclear field had developed from that conference.

Mr. MacBride suggested that the present administration in the United States should be asked whether it supported the collaboration which was established in 1976. He believed that it would not have gone as far as the previous administration. But in view of the collaboration of some NATO countries, and of NATO itself, with South Africa, the Seminar was entitled to ask for a statement of policy from the major NATO countries.

Mr. MacBride said he did not believe that Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands and Norway would go along with the degree of collaboration which had developed with South Africa. Direct approaches should be made to those countries, and also to the EEC countries.

He suggested that the United Nations Committees concerned should make direct representations to the forthcoming conference for a review of the operation of the NPT with regard to the extent to which South Africa had been enabled to become a nuclear power and the extent to which the Federal Republic of Germany had been able to circumvent the Brussels Treaty by her collaboration with South Africa. They should also make representations to the United Nations bodies on disarmament, the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament.

Another aspect was the degree of collaboration between Rio Tinto Zinc and South Africa. The uranium from the Rössing mine might be used by the South Africans to produce nuclear weapons. He suggested an approach to the British Labour Party which had taken a strong stand against the Rio Tinto Zinc contract.

He also suggested a direct approach to the OAU and its member States to encourage them to exert their influence against collaboration by some Western governments with South Africa.

Finally, he suggested that the available facts should be widely publicized so that public opinion could express itself, and available documentation sent to all non-governmental organizations which had been involved in disarmament and human rights issues.

E. Statement of Mr. Abdul S. Minty

Mr. Minty said that the Anti-Apartheid Movement did not believe that arguments, reason or information about the danger that South Africa's nuclear threat presented to world peace would by itself change the policies of the Western Powers. Pressure and public action were needed. Facts were important and the Seminar could help to assemble all the relevant information and publicize it in such a way as to help stimulate action.

It had already been established that South Africa had nuclear capability. Nor was there any doubt about those who had helped South Africa to achieve this

capability: mainly the United Kingdom, the United States, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, and in more limited ways countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium and others.

It was also known that South Africa had the means of delivery of: (a) the Crotale system and other similar missile systems developed in the late 1960s; and (b) aircraft such as the Buccaneers and Mirages.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement rejected the claims that Western collaboration with South Africa in the nuclear field was for peaceful purposes only. The role of uranium was crucial: South Africa's vast reserves of uranium and its growing enriched uranium capability added to its bargaining and blackmailing power and increased its threat to international peace.

As a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), South Africa received all the benefits associated with membership, not only on a formal level but also informally in terms of meeting with other scientists and experts in the nuclear field. The Anti-Apartheid Movement rejected the argument that South Africa should be allowed to stay in the IAEA, where it could be influenced, even controlled. All evidence had shown that this kind of argument only led to increased collaboration. In November 1978, the Uranium Extraction Technology Group, established by the IAEA and the OECD Nuclear Group, had elected a South African delegate as Chairman. The Seminar should, therefore, call for the expulsion of South Africa from the IAEA.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement also rejected the arguments put forward in favour of persuading South Africa to sign the NPT. All diplomatic activity by the Western Powers, after the disclosure of South Africa's plans to stage a nuclear explosion in 1977, had been concentrated on getting South Africa to sign the NPT. If South Africa did sign the NPT, that would only mean more collaboration with South Africa, greater respectability for the apartheid régime and a lulling of public opinion into believing that South Africa was no longer a nuclear threat. When South Africa was formally installed as a member of the "nuclear club", there would be the argument that South Africa was so powerful that if it was provoked, that would lead to massive destruction and violence. There would be stronger pressure for going soft on the apartheid régime and against supporting the liberation movement.

South Africa's nuclear capability should also be seen in the context of powerful forces in the Western countries which wish to develop South Africa as a regional power in the Southern Hemisphere and around the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, to integrate it into the over-all Western defence strategy and to build, either formally or informally, a close alliance of NATO with South Africa. Such a development must be resisted since it would extend South Africa's destructive capability as well as its ability to blackmail the world.

It was not only South Africa which was a major threat to international peace and security. The policies of certain Western Powers towards the Pretoria régime also constituted a serious threat to world peace: it was they who were responsible for creating a nuclear Frankenstein in Africa.

It was now an urgent matter to expose the allies of apartheid, condemn their policies and, above all, mobilize world public opinion to end all collaboration with South Africa.

Mr. Minty commended the African National Congress and the West German Anti-Apartheid Movement for exposing the collaboration between West Germany and South Africa. He drew attention to a report in the South African Digest of 9 February that an international conference on disaster medicine would be held in August in Cape Town, to discuss among other matters, the mobilization of South Africa's medical and other services to deal with atomic explosions.

The report of the Seminar, he said, should be sent to the Security Council, which should be asked to take action to ensure the cessation of all nuclear collaboration with South Africa. That would be very difficult in view of the policies of the Western Powers. And even if it succeeded, there was no doubt that South Africa would persist with its nuclear programme.

It was important, therefore, to obtain support for the proposition that, in the context of South Africa's nuclear threat, mandatory economic and other sanctions against it were imperative.

Finally, as South Africa's threat to world peace increased, it became more urgent to destroy the apartheid system. Everyone who wanted to bring about freedom in southern Africa and peace in the world should, therefore, give full support to the liberation movement.

VI. SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

A. South Africa's Nuclear Capacity and Potential

The experts participating in the Seminar were in general agreement that South Africa has a nuclear capability at present. It probably has a few nuclear devices which it could test, though as a result of modern methods of simulation it was not strictly necessary to explode any test devices.

South Africa has a large number of highly trained nuclear scientists and other skilled personnel and could therefore produce a reasonably sophisticated nuclear weapon.

It could produce a nuclear device either from plutonium or from the enriched uranium which it could have accumulated at the pilot enrichment plant.

South Africa's major nuclear installation is the Safari-I research reactor, supplied by the United States of America, and operational since 1965. It has so far received 104 kilogrammes of enriched uranium from the United States of America and its spent fuel elements have in the past been reprocessed in the United States and the United Kingdom. The United States has not supplied enriched uranium for over two years and unless South Africa has some other adequate source of enriched uranium -- such as the pilot uranium enrichment plant -- the Safari-I reactor would soon have to be closed down. The Safari-I is subject to IAEA safeguards.

South Africa's other reactor, Safari II, operates at low energy and uses 2 per cent enriched uranium which comes from the United States: the uranium enrichment for this plant is claimed to be too low to be used for nuclear weapons.

South Africa's pilot uranium enrichment plant which has been operating since 1975 is secret and not subject to IAEA inspections or to any form of international control. This plant can enrich natural uranium and thus enable South Africa to end its dependence on the United States supplies. Although there has so far been no public announcement about the construction of a commercial scale enrichment plant it is likely that the existing pilot plant itself will be constantly enlarged, thus increasing the quantity of enriched uranium produced in South Africa.

The Koeberg nuclear power reactors being built by French companies could, in theory, produce 400 kilogrammes of plutonium per year, which is enough to produce a Nagasaki-type weapon every week. The United States has contracted to supply the enriched uranium for this facility from 1981.

There is no doubt that South Africa has adequate technical knowledge and expertise to build its own nuclear device and it could use for nuclear material either enriched uranium or plutonium. It is much easier to make a plutonium bomb because of the ready availability of design information and equipment as well as greater certainty in predicting its probable yield. South Africa could have

diverted plutonium from the Safari-I or indeed constructed its own secret reactor plant for the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. Alternatively, if enriched uranium has been used it could have come from fuel supplied for Safari I, though that would have been detected easily -- or more likely, to have been produced by the pilot enrichment plant which is not subject to any safeguards.

South Africa can easily deliver a nuclear device by any of the several aircraft in its Air Force and it also has access to various rocket and missile systems.

In view of South Africa's substantial nuclear capability, ending international collaboration by itself will not prevent it from producing nuclear weapons. But effective disengagement can slow down the rate at which South Africa can increase its capability.

B. Threat to international peace and other dangers

The Seminar agreed that the threat to international peace and security resulting from the situation in South Africa has greatly increased as a result of the acquisition of nuclear capability by the apartheid régime. If it were permitted to proceed with its plans for nuclear development, and accumulate a large number of nuclear devices and supplies of plutonium and enriched uranium, there would be an enormous danger to international peace, not only regionally but globally.

It was not merely a question of proliferation of nuclear weapons but the acquisition of nuclear capability by a racist régime which is illegitimate and criminal and which has a record of violence against the great majority of its people and of constant aggression against neighbouring States. The situation was, therefore, unique.

The threat is, first of all, to the oppressed people of South Africa who constitute the great majority of the population of the country. The apartheid régime has developed nuclear capability because of the growth of the struggle of the national liberation movements of southern Africa against the racist régimes, and the launching of armed struggles.

In this connexion, the African National Congress of South Africa presented documentation which indicated that the régime planned to conduct explosions in areas where there was little white population and in border regions.

Secondly, the threat is to the front-line States, and indeed to all African States which support the struggle for liberation.

Thirdly, the threat takes on global dimensions, especially if South Africa is allowed to proceed with its present plans.

South Africa had not only the capability to make nuclear weapons, but a sophisticated delivery system. It was a desperate régime, bent on perpetuating racism by resort to force, in defiance of Africa and the world. There is thus a grave danger of nuclear blackmail leading to nuclear strike.

Several participants emphasized that the governments of countries which provided assistance to South Africa in the nuclear field bore direct responsibility for aggravating the threat to the peace. They also stressed the responsibility of several multinational corporations which were involved, directly or indirectly in South Africa's nuclear development projects.

The Seminar also examined the full implications of international dependence on South Africa as a major source of uranium. It recognized that South Africa's involvement in Western nuclear programmes, since the 1950s has been largely due to its role as a supplier of uranium. In order to have continued access to South African uranium the United States of America, the United Kingdom and other Powers entered into various agreements and contracts with the Pretoria régime; their relationships covered most areas of nuclear research and development and so in essence South Africa was integrated into the long term programmes of the nuclear Powers, chiefly as a source of uranium.

Over the years South Africa has entered into long-term uranium supply contracts with various Powers including the United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and Belgium. The expansion of the international atomic power programmes is therefore partly dependent on South African uranium and as these programmes expand further the dependence on South Africa has also grown.

South Africa's role as a source of uranium also enables it to obtain valuable foreign exchange from the sale of uranium, as from gold sales. The role of uranium as an earner of foreign exchange directly strengthens the South African economy and enables the régime to overcome its otherwise serious balance of payments problems.

In order to enhance even further South Africa's role as a supplier of uranium the Pretoria régime has embarked on a programme to enrich uranium within the country. In collaboration with Steag and other companies in the Federal Republic of Germany it established a pilot uranium enrichment plant in 1975 and has declared its intention to build a full-scale commercial operation.

At present there are no non-nuclear weapon countries which supply their own enriched uranium. These countries which receive nuclear plants and equipment are subjected to additional controls which are imposed by the suppliers of enriched

uranium. Once South Africa is able to supply its own enriched uranium to other countries, not only would that enhance South Africa's economic and political power but at the same time enable other countries to effectively bypass existing safeguard procedures imposed by the present suppliers of enriched uranium.

The provision to any country of enrichment technology is very dangerous because of its implications for nuclear proliferation and in the case of South Africa it is particularly dangerous since South Africa has its own sources of uranium. With the capacity to enrich uranium, there is virtually no external limitation on the quantity of uranium it enriches or who it supplies it to. This would give South Africa a commanding bargaining power and create a very special dependence on the apartheid régime in relation to a highly strategic commodity.

Several participants, therefore, considered it essential that all importation of uranium from South Africa be ended, that South Africa be denied all technology for uranium enrichment and that its enrichment plant be dismantled.

C. Nature and extent of external collaboration with South Africa

1. Introduction

The Seminar examined the proposition that the nuclear relations of certain powers with South Africa are limited to so-called peaceful areas which do not enhance the Pretoria régime's nuclear military capability. It reached the conclusion that it was virtually impossible to have a clear dividing line between nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and that for military capability.

There was overwhelming evidence that South Africa had nuclear military capability and potential. It was warned in 1977 by the major Western Powers not to proceed with its planned nuclear explosion in the Kalahari desert. South Africa could never have reached its present nuclear capability without the substantial and comprehensive nuclear assistance it received from the major Western Powers.

It was alarming that even after the 1977 warning to South Africa to desist from exploding its nuclear device, the Western Powers had not reduced or ended nuclear collaboration with the Pretoria régime. Indeed, there has been even more nuclear collaboration in the meantime and consequently South Africa's capability and potential had been advanced even further.

The Seminar examined reports on nuclear collaboration with South Africa by several countries and received papers from the anti-apartheid movements in those countries. They showed that a number of governments and multinational corporations had provided assistance to the apartheid régime for many years in utter disregard of the appeals of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the national liberation movement, and of the enormous dangers to international peace.

They have thereby treated with contempt the ardent desire of the African States for the denuclearization of the continent.

Despite the refusal of the apartheid régime to join the NPT, they have recklessly continued to transfer to it technology and equipment to facilitate its nuclear programme.

This collaboration has extended to many areas such as assistance in the extraction and processing of uranium; the training of large numbers of South African nuclear scientists; the visits of nuclear scientists to South Africa; participation of South Africa in conferences on nuclear matters; transfer of nuclear technology; and provision of reactors and other equipment.

Special mention must also be made of provision of finance for South Africa's nuclear programme. A cessation of investments in, and loans to, South Africa, it was felt, would be an essential measure to prevent an expansion of South Africa's nuclear capability. It was pointed out that the apartheid régime was recently obliged to defer or curtail its plans for nuclear enrichment facilities because of difficulties in obtaining finance.

Of special relevance in this connexion was the stubborn resistance by the governments concerned to international action to prevent South Africa from obtaining nuclear weapons capability. The importance of mobilization of public opinion in those countries, and of diplomatic action by all States committed to peace, was therefore essential.

2. United States of America

The Executive Secretary of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), Mr. George Houser, said that it was principally the United States which had created South Africa's nuclear capability. He recalled that Dr. A.J.A. Roux, President of the South African Atomic Energy Board (SAAEB) had declared in October 1976:

"We can ascribe our degree of advancement today in large measure to the training and assistance so willingly provided by the United States of America ..."

Now that it is clear that South Africa has acquired a large degree of nuclear sophistication, the United States Government has an understandably anxious commitment to exercise some "control" over the South African nuclear programme.

United States interest began with the purchase of South African uranium in the early 1950s. This trade continued until 1965 when the United States no longer needed foreign uranium supplies. By that time, the Government was working together with commercial interests to assist South Africa with its own programme. By 1977 at least 155 South African scientists had visited American nuclear facilities and over 90 had assumed positions in the United States.

On 8 July 1957 the United States signed an agreement with the Government of South Africa for full co-operation in nuclear development until the year 2007. Ironically that agreement was called "Atoms for Peace" by the Eisenhower administration. Today, a vital concern of the United States Government was to receive some guarantees from South Africa that its nuclear potential would be used for "peaceful" purposes.

In 1961, Allis Chalmers contracted to build South Africa's first nuclear reactor, Safari-I, at Pelindaba. Eight United States research organizations had co-operated in this venture, which was completed in 1965: Argonne Laboratory, the National Laboratories at Brookhaven and Oakridge, Rochester University, the University of Illinois, New York University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the Reno Research Centre.

In 1963, Foxboro International sent two computers to Pelindaba along with technicians to train white South Africans. Since Safari-I has been in operation, the United States had supplied the reactor with more than 231 pounds of enriched uranium, enough to construct 10 bombs of the type employed by the United States during the Second World War.

As a result of the training which South African scientists received in the United States and the use of the research reactor at Pelindaba, the South Africans were able to construct a second reactor, "Pelindaba Zero", at the same site. The significance of this second reactor was that, as an indigenous project, it was not subject to IAEA controls of any sort.

The work of the African National Congress of South Africa and the West German Anti-Apartheid Movement had disclosed the close collaboration of the West German Government in South Africa's enrichment capability. However, vital nuclear hardware was also supplied by the United States for the construction of an enrichment plant at Valindaba. Among those mentioned in the report were Federal Products, Providence, precision equipment; Varian MAR, isotope gauging equipment; SWF Gustava-Rau, ITT subsidiary, ventilation and cooling systems; and possibly Honeywell and Leeds and Northrup, electronic equipment.

South Africa also made plans for a large enrichment plant or expansion of the pilot plant to reach full capacity by 1985. This development placed South Africa in direct competition with the United States as the leading exporter of uranium.

In November 1978, the Energy Policy Information Center of Boston revealed that four New England utilities had inquired into purchasing 9.2 million pounds of South African uranium at a market value of \$460 million. However, Congressional and public reaction influenced them to withdraw the inquiry.

This incident illustrated the increasing importance of uranium on a world scale. While present use is approximately 30,000 pounds a year, it was expected to leap to 80,000 pounds by 1985. The United States was expected to provide roughly 26 per cent of its electrical needs by nuclear power by 1985 -- a 250 per cent increase from today.

The uranium industry could become a significant economic windfall for the South African apartheid régime and could have grave consequences in the attempt to end the racist apartheid policies now in force in that country.

It was out of concern that this scenario could take place, as well as awareness of South Africa's nuclear threat, that the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) maintained that all Member States of the United Nations should cease all nuclear collaboration of any sort with South Africa until the racist policies had ended and true majority rule had been established. This appeal was made particularly to the Government of the United States as the leader in nuclear collaboration historically and as a principal party in present negotiations with South Africa on the nuclear issues.

While the United States Government claimed that there had been no nuclear collaboration of any sort with South Africa since 1976, the fact was clear that the United States policy had not changed since the Eisenhower administration. The basis for the claimed cut-offs of supplies of enriched uranium had not been to focus on South Africa's apartheid policies, but rather to move South Africa to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The signing of the treaty would reopen "friendly relations" with South Africa and a continuance of the traditional policy.

The two most significant obstacles to ending apartheid with a South African nuclear build-up were: (1) the threat of nuclear weapons; and (2) the tremendous bargaining position of uranium in a dependent world. Present United States emphasis on NPT was only concerned with the first. The United States Government insisted that it must not "discriminate" against any nation in the supply of nuclear fuels and technology to promote free world access. However, it was clear that the United States does discriminate according to what suits its interests. It would not provide enrichment and reprocessing technology to developing nations. (An additional concern here was that some developing nations, eager to acquire nuclear technology, might consider trading with South Africa if they were unable to get it from other countries).

The signing of a treaty would not preclude the possible nuclear threat from South Africa. South Africa had announced that in the case of attack, no rules apply -- including any treaty that South Africa might sign.

While nuclear threat is an obstacle to accelerated international pressure on South Africa to end apartheid, the more significant obstacle is the increased bargaining position that South Africa was acquiring on the international scene through the uranium industry.

While the United States appeared not to be in immediate danger of dependency on South African uranium ore, there are significant American interests in related industries upon which the United States had become dependent.

The most obvious was the gold industry. At this time, most South African uranium was extracted as a by-product of gold mining. United States interests were the largest foreign investors in South African gold mines. Therefore, the United States investors have a considerable stake in the state of the South African uranium market.

In addition to direct involvement in South African mining efforts, United States interests had also gained concession agreements of their own. Union Carbide and Utah Mining had been conducting explorations in the Cape Province, near Beaufort West, since 1973. Exxon, Newmont Mining and United States Steel had also sought concessions.

A known American firm prospecting in Namibia is O'Kiep Copper Company, a subsidiary of Newmont Mining.

This kind of complex and substantial involvement in the nuclear fuel industry in South Africa placed the United States and other highly developed nations in a state of dependency upon South Africa. This dependency greatly increased South Africa's bargaining power with these nations on any matter and this power appeared to be growing as the nuclear industry grew.

It was precisely this kind of dependency that focussed United States strategy on the NPT and away from confrontation with South Africa. United States policy was directed toward renewed trade, not for the purpose of "increased influence" upon South Africa, but toward increased dependence or interdependence.

United States action at the United Nations on nuclear collaboration with South Africa was illustrative. It opposed recommendations to cut off all nuclear co-operation with South Africa and only favoured efforts to prevent South Africa from developing a nuclear weapon capability.

Mr. Houser suggested four types of action by the United States and the international community in order seriously to confront South African nuclear build-up: (a) directing focus away from persuading South Africa to sign NPT; (b) destroying South Africa's bargaining position by ending technology co-operation, and by breaking dependency on South Africa in trade; (c) instituting total economic sanctions; and (d) removing South Africa's foothold in Namibia.

3. The United Kingdom

The representative of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, Mr. Michael Terry, said that criticism of Britain's links with South Africa in the nuclear field had usually concerned Britain's involvement in the Rössing uranium project. In practice, however, Britain had played a much more central role in developing South Africa's nuclear capability than was generally recognized.

Britain's involvement with South Africa in the field of uranium extraction dated back to the immediate post-war period. Britain and the United States had formed a joint uranium procurement agency, the Combined Development Agency (CDA), which soon chose to examine the possibilities of extracting uranium from the Rand gold mines. On 23 November 1950, the CDA entered into an agreement with the South African Atomic Energy (SAAEB) for the development of uranium production on four mines. CDA's involvement, however, went much further than that of a mere purchaser of uranium. As part of an agreement between CDA and SAAEB, loans, at an estimated R66 million in total, were raised in Britain and the United States to provide for the capital costs of the uranium oxide production plants. In return the CDA was the sole customer of South Africa's uranium oxide production. During the 1950s CDA's involvement expanded: uranium production was extended to 27 mines, 17 uranium oxide extraction plants were built, together with nine sulphuric acid plants to provide acid for the extraction process.

In turn, production rose from zero in 1950 to 6,400 tons of uranium oxide in 1959.

South Africa's uranium extraction industry, at least in its crucial initial stages, was financed entirely by British and United States capital. Equally significant was the contribution by Britain and the United States in directly enabling South Africa to perfect its extraction and processing capacity.

In 1957 the United States/South Africa Agreement for Co-operation Concerning Civilian Uses of Atomic Energy was signed, and it covered the supply of enriched uranium from the United States to Safari-I. The responsibility for production of the enriched uranium fuel elements was, however, entrusted primarily to the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) at Harwell. According to figures published in the United States from October 1967 to April 1975, the UKAEA supplied 62,075 kg of U-235.

Interchange of nuclear experts has been a common feature of British/South Africa relations during South Africa's nuclear build-up. As early as 1955 at the First International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva, one of the leading figures on the South African delegation, Dr. B.F.J. Schonland,

was attached to the Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell. British-trained nuclear physicists today dominate SAAEB and the nuclear power programme of the Electricity Supply Commission itself is headed by a former employee of the UKAEA, John Colley. Through these informal interchanges of personnel, South Africa has been able to obtain valuable technical "know-how" and expertise.

During the development of South Africa's nuclear programme, contact was maintained at the highest level under both the Labour and Conservative Governments. For example, in August 1965, when the Pelindaba reactor went "critical", Sir William Penney, Chairman of UKAEA, visited South Africa for its formal inauguration. Then, in November 1970, the current Chairman of UKAEA, Sir John Hill, was in South Africa to inspect nuclear projects. The following June, a reciprocal visit to Britain by the President of SAAEB, Dr. Roux, was exposed in the British press. Included in his itinerary was a visit to the fast breeder reactor at Dounreay. Significantly, this visit coincided with an "arms-buying tour" of Britain by the then Defence Minister, P.W. Botha. Dr. Roux was received at the highest level, his official guides being Sir John Hill and UKAEA's reactor assessment expert, Dr. Bainbridge.

The return of the Labour Government in 1974 did not result in the termination of these relations. A visit by two nuclear experts from the SAAEB to the atomic energy establishment at Risley was revealed by the Anti-Apartheid Movement in November of that year. During the political row caused by this visit, UKAEA admitted the existence of an official commercial agreement between the United Kingdom and South Africa in the nuclear field.^{1/}

A much more significant collaborative exercise was the provision of technology to South Africa to produce "Rex", or uranium hexafluoride, which is the final product required before enrichment. During the 1960s UKAEA had an agreement with the South African Nuclear Fuels Corporation whereby it had the first option on all uranium ore for conversion to hexafluoride. However, the South Africans were determined to develop their own conversion process in preparation for their own

^{1/} In a report of SAAEB in 1972, Dr. Roux had claimed that co-operation agreements existed with the United States, the United Kingdom and France. There is no evidence that any of these agreements has ever been terminated. Various press reports would indicate that the degree of collaboration is much greater than would be apparent from official reports and documentation. For example, in 1967 the Cape Times reported that South Africa was monitoring the French atomic tests in the Pacific in collaboration with Harwell and the United States monitoring network.

enrichment programme. In October 1970, the South African press reported that the British Government was on the point of deciding whether to provide the technology to South Africa. No government announcement was ever made -- but Dr. Roux announced later that month that South Africa was going to build its own conversion plant -- in collaboration with overseas interests.

The Rössing project in Namibia, however, was the clearest example of direct British collaboration. The mine itself, which came into production in 1976, is the largest single mining venture in Namibia -- and takes the form of extensive low-grade uranium deposits. The project involves direct collaboration between the South African authorities through the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa and the British-based transnational Rio Tinto Zinc, which has the largest equity holding in Rössing and has been primarily responsible for the mine's development.

The main contract for the supply of uranium from Rössing is with the British Nuclear Fuels Ltd., a para-statal corporation linked with UKAEA, for the supply of 7,500 tons of uranium between 1977-82. The contract, approved by the United Kingdom Government, has been the subject of on-going protests, in particular following the adoption of Decree No. 1 of the United Nations Council for Namibia on the protection of Namibia's natural resources.

The Rössing project has enabled the South Africans to develop even more sophisticated and technically advanced extraction processes for low-grade ore.

The United Kingdom had contributed to the development of South Africa's nuclear capability in two further ways. First, through the raising of capital for the financing of South Africa's nuclear programme. A recent specific example was the participation of Barclays Bank in a £600 million loan to the South African Electricity Supply Commission's Koeberg nuclear power station programme.

South Africa's nuclear programme was also dependent upon a wide range of technical personnel and, again, Britain had been a crucial recruiting ground. Regular advertisements had appeared in the British press for nuclear scientists. Construction programmes in the nuclear field also required a wide range of engineering expertise. One company which played a key role in the nuclear construction industry, Roberts Construction, recently attempted to organize a nationwide recruiting campaign in British universities, only to be faced with constant disruption by anti-apartheid activists.

The policy of the British Government was expressed in its most explicit form when it chose to join with the other Western permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in October 1977, in vetoing a draft resolution calling for the termination of all forms of nuclear collaboration with South Africa.

The British Government has continued to deny that the relations between Britain and South Africa in the nuclear field had any military significance. Instead Britain sought to reduce the issue of nuclear collaboration with South Africa to the more general issue of nuclear proliferation. Dr. David Owen, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary stated in November 1978: "The United Kingdom and the United States will persist in active efforts to persuade South Africa to sign the NPT and accept international safeguards on all her nuclear facilities. This would be the best way for South Africa to allay suspicions about her nuclear intentions."

This policy conveniently allows Britain to continue to sustain its collaboration with South Africa in this field without bringing into question the effect of this collaboration.

Greater exposure of the links, more determined campaigning and greater understanding of the importance of this issue was necessary in Britain. The United Kingdom Government should be required to implement national policies including:

- (a) the banning of all uranium imports from South Africa and Namibia;
- (b) the termination of all agreements between Britain and South Africa in the nuclear field;
- (c) legislation to prevent British citizens from working in nuclear establishments in South Africa;
- (d) the end of all exchange of technical "know-how" in the nuclear field, academic exchanges, etc;
- (e) measures to ban all other forms of collaboration with South Africa which could enhance its nuclear capacity and potential, including the provision of capital.

4. France

The representative of the Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour l'Amitié entre les Peuples (MRAP), Mr. Albert Levy, described the nature and extent of French relations with South Africa in the nuclear field and in particular, France's role in the construction of a nuclear power project at Koeberg.

On 29 May 1976, an agreement was reached between France and South Africa for the Koeberg project which led to widespread international condemnation. The contract, estimated to be worth between 6 and 8 billion francs, was signed by the South African Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) and three French industrial corporations (Framatome, SPIE-Batignolles and Alsthom).

The decision of the apartheid régime to proceed with the Koeberg nuclear project was primarily due to South Africa's vulnerability in the energy field. Because of the threat of sanctions, Mr. B.J. Vorster, then Prime Minister, had

announced that South Africa was progressively substituting the production of electricity from oil by other means. South Africa had stockpiled an enormous reserve of oil and developed the production of hydro-electricity, and in 1974 decided to launch a nuclear energy programme.

French relations with South Africa in the nuclear field in fact preceded the Koeberg agreement. France had provided equipment for the Safari-I research reactor and in 1966 had sent technicians to assist with that project. In 1968 the French company Sodeteg, which is involved in France's own nuclear arms programme, set up a branch in Johannesburg. Other French companies have also provided equipment in the nuclear field to South Africa, notably those which subsequently won the Koeberg contract.

French companies have also been actively involved in prospecting and in the extraction of uranium both in South Africa and Namibia. In 1977, a ten-year contract was signed between France and South Africa for the supply of uranium to France.

France is also directly involved in the Rössing uranium project in Namibia. A French group, Minatome, formed by CFP-Total and PUK, has a 10 per cent holding in the mine. The French airline UTA each week brings a cargo of uranium from Windhoek to France.

Mr. Levy said that this nuclear collaboration should be viewed in the context of the central role played by France in providing military equipment to South Africa from 1963 to 1977, and the great increase in France's economic relations with South Africa. A French banking consortium, led by the nationalized Crédit Lyonnais, was providing 85 per cent of the capital required for the Koeberg nuclear project.

Mr. Levy suggested that world public opinion should be constantly informed of the daily crimes of apartheid. In the countries which continue to aid South Africa in the nuclear field, there should be campaigns for the creation of commissions of inquiry, either parliamentary or extra parliamentary, with the object of exposing the nuclear collaboration with South Africa. The United Nations should launch a similar enquiry and the Centre against Apartheid should publish all available information. Campaigns should be organized for the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of an effective boycott in the nuclear field. In the EEC countries, a campaign must be organized in connexion with the forthcoming elections to the EEC Parliament with the aim of alerting public opinion about this grave issue.

5. Federal Republic of Germany

The representative of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Wolf Geissler, said that there was no economic justification for South Africa's nuclear plans. The centre of South Africa's nuclear activity -- the enrichment plant -- could only be explained by South Africa's military ambitions, and the assistance provided to South Africa had been given with the knowledge of these ambitions.

West Germany was playing a special role in South Africa's nuclear programme. Its collaboration was prompted by its wish to make nuclear weapons for itself and this wish had now become the plan of NATO countries.

West Germany had a cultural agreement with South Africa and this agreement specifically allowed for an exchange of scientists, an exchange which worked both ways. The Safari-I and II reactors had been built with the collaboration of two West German companies: Krupp and BBC.

In 1978 an international conference on nuclear technology was held in South Africa. Among the 165 participants were 77 from West Germany, 25 from the United States and 18 from South Africa, and smaller numbers from Japan, France, Israel, Romania, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Spain and Brazil. The large participation from West Germany showed that country's specific interest in South Africa's nuclear development.

The West German corporation STEAG had also acted as the technological agent for UCOR in building the pilot plant for uranium enrichment. Even today components for the enrichment plant were being delivered to South Africa though the West German Government had denied that in a booklet entitled "Facts versus Fiction."

For example, the German company GHHMAN was delivering the necessary compressors, which were a sensitive nuclear equipment listed in the international nuclear embargo list: the booklet said that for technical reasons those compressors could not be delivered to South Africa by the above company, yet the STEAG protocol stated that those components would be delivered. Separation elements were also being delivered by Siemens and Messerschmidt; they were the most important part of the plant and could not be produced in South Africa. A written statement of the public prosecutor of the town where those elements were produced said that those elements were exported to South Africa; the Government said that the statement of the public prosecutor did not refer to the specific elements but it could be proved that it was not correct. Other components being delivered by different companies included slide valves, cooling material and special isotope measuring equipment.

Mr. Geissler proposed that a list of these and other concerned West German companies should be prepared for the Organization of African Unity, so that they could be boycotted. For it was not only in the separation plant itself but in all the chemical and industrial activity in the nuclear field in which these West German companies were participating: extraction of uranium, conversion, electricity for the plant, specific chemical material, etc.

6. Netherlands

The report for the Netherlands Anti-Apartheid Bewegung was given by Mr. Pim Juffermans who gave an account of attempted Dutch participation for ESCOM's Koeberg nuclear power project. In 1974 a Dutch group consisting of RSV (shipyard machine industry), Bredero (building group), and Comprimo (engineering company), in association with General Electric (USA) and Brown-Boveri (Switzerland) submitted a tender to ESCOM. There were competitive tenders from Kraftwerk Union (Federal Republic of Germany) which is connected with Murray and Stewart in South Africa, and Framatome (French, with United States of America connexions).

According to South African sources the Dutch-US-Swiss tender was favoured for the contract. During 1975-76 the Dutch firms involved made strong representations to Parliament in order to secure the necessary export licences and financial assurances and they argued that the contract was important to help reduce unemployment in the Netherlands.

There was considerable protest by several pressure groups against Dutch nuclear co-operation with South Africa and the Engineering Union decided not to co-operate with the construction of the nuclear boilers. The Dutch Government postponed its decision as to whether to provide export financing arrangements. Finally in June 1975, ESCOM awarded the contract to Framatome and the Dutch firms blamed the Government for having lost the order. According to Dutch law it was clear that an export licence would have been necessary for the export of equipment to South Africa if the contract had been placed with the Netherlands and its partners.

The Netherlands is connected through Urenco with certain West German companies involved in the Rössing uranium mine in Namibia. As a result German companies will be getting Namibian uranium to be enriched in Almelo after 1980.

On 14 November 1978, four Dutch Anti-Apartheid organizations wrote to the Government protesting at the British and West German involvement in the Namibian

uranium industry since that uranium would be enriched at the common Urenco plants. The four organizations also pointed out that uranium contracts needed to be approved by Euratom and therefore the Dutch Government should insist that the Euratom Council of Ministers take a decision to end all Namibian uranium contracts. Moreover, the Urenco Treaty should be revised so that the provision requiring Urenco to accept any uranium offered to it for enrichment on any electricity generating plant in the member countries should not operate contrary to international duties and responsibilities of the governments.

The Dutch Government, in response to Parliamentary questions and a visit by a SWAPO delegation in November 1978, had promised an extensive investigation into the question of Namibian uranium being enriched by Urenco. The investigation is still not over.

In January 1975, Dr. G.F. de Vries of the South African Atomic Energy Board visited the Netherlands as part of an extensive study tour of European nuclear research establishments.

In the same year, Professor Kistemaker, one of the inventors of the ultra-centrifuge process of uranium enrichment, visited South Africa under the Netherlands-South Africa Cultural Agreement which is due to be abolished soon.

Visits of these types had taken place during other years as well.

More recently when Professor Endt of the Laboratory of Nuclear Physics of the University of Utrecht had been invited to a nuclear congress in Johannesburg, students at the University organized protests against such a visit and Professor Endt decided not to go.

On 21 August 1978, Professor Lemmer of the University of the Witwatersrand was due to visit the Kernfysisch Versneller Instituut of the University of Groningen and students organized major campaigns against it.

On 1 December 1978, Jan Smit of Potchefstroom University arrived at the Laboratory for Nuclear Physics at the University of Utrecht for a six-month study visit. Students had organized a campaign to end the exchange of nuclear physicists between that university and South African institutions and it was still continuing.

There is considerable controversy in the Netherlands about nuclear energy in general but nuclear relations with South Africa involves one of the most dangerous forms of nuclear collaboration and therefore there was likely to be widespread action on this question in the near future.

7. Other countries

The Seminar briefly took note of information on nuclear collaboration with South Africa by other countries, particularly Belgium, Israel, Japan and Switzerland.

It noted that a Belgian company had recently signed a long-term contract for purchase of uranium from South Africa and that the Government had approved guarantees.

Israel had repeatedly denied nuclear collaboration with South Africa, but there was evidence of such collaboration especially as regards scientific co-operation.

Japan is a major purchaser of South Africa's uranium.

Switzerland, one of the countries which bid for the contract to supply reactors for the Koeberg plant, maintained collaboration with South Africa in all fields.

D. Question of Safeguards

The Seminar held extensive discussions on safeguards.

It was noted that there were three aspects which are directly relevant to South Africa's nuclear capacity and potential:

(a) The International Atomic Energy Authority's system of inspection which is aimed at detecting and therefore deterring diversion from peaceful uses to development of nuclear weapons. At present IAEA safeguards were applied to the Safari-I reactor as well as the two French reactors which would receive their first fuel in 1981. The IAEA itself was merely a technical agency and for its safeguard system to be applied it was necessary for such controls to be imposed by the suppliers of nuclear equipment and fuel and accepted by the country which operates the plant.

(b) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which South Africa had not signed.

(c) The ease with which South Africa had been able to secure scientific training and knowledge, as well as extensive nuclear collaboration at every level, including the transfer of sensitive technology and equipment for over two decades from the major Western Powers, despite the virtual inherent risk through such collaboration to make South Africa capable of developing its own nuclear explosive devices. The danger was particularly highlighted by the development of South Africa's uranium enrichment plant which was secret and not subject to IAEA or other safeguards.

The Seminar considered the moves by the major Western Powers to persuade South Africa to adhere to the NPT and many participants expressed concern that South Africa would then be entitled to certain privileges, especially in connexion with the supply of nuclear materials, technology and information. The result may well be continuation and increase of the collaboration by the Western Powers with South Africa. It was also alleged that the Western Powers intended to provide security and other guarantees to South Africa in return for adherence to the NPT.

In this connexion, the representative of the African National Congress of South Africa made a statement that the ANC rejected any proposal that South Africa be asked to sign the NPT. Instead, all efforts should be directed at ending nuclear collaboration in every field with the Pretoria régime. (See summary of ANC statement in section G below.)

On the other hand, the view was expressed that adherence by South Africa to NPT should not be discouraged. The NPT system, though not foolproof, would reduce the threatened danger in the next decade.

The IAEA representative pointed out that for IAEA safeguards to operate, full scope safeguards or NPT adherence was essential; international safeguards can reduce the risks and it was better to have controls even if they were not totally effective.

Another expert participant held that it was not constructive to dismiss the safeguards in the case of South Africa, or to totally reject South Africa's adherence to NPT.

Although it was not possible to have complete control, it should be recognized that the problems would become very serious when South Africa operated the two French reactors: with some control the danger could be substantially reduced.

Another expert participant pointed to the discriminatory practices of certain Powers which often favour non-members of NPT over members of the Treaty and claimed that South Africa was a case in point. It had not signed the NPT, it had withheld its uranium enrichment plant outside the international safeguards system, but it had benefited from an almost unprecedented degree of nuclear assistance.

The Seminar agreed that South Africa's role as a major source of uranium facilitated its substantial nuclear collaboration with countries which did not themselves have uranium resources. This applied in the main to several Western European Powers which had long-term uranium supply contracts with South Africa.

Related to this special role of South Africa was also the fact that the United States of America, as the major source of enriched uranium for the Western countries was imposing strict controls in order to prevent nuclear proliferation. These controls could be avoided by Western European and other Powers if they were able to secure enriched uranium from an alternative source. It was in this context that the development of South Africa's uranium enrichment plant, and the extensive external assistance provided for it, had to be seen.

The issue became even more complex when considered in the context of the export of reactors to various countries which refused to accept safeguard provisions. In those cases, for example, the Western European suppliers of reactors might import enriched United States/Canadian/Australian uranium, which required safeguards, for use in their own domestic power plants and use South African uranium for those importers of reactors which do not consent to safeguards. The fact that South Africa could sell its enriched uranium to such countries had been a major element in its decision to develop the enrichment plant.

In this respect, it was remarkable that in view of the great danger involved in providing South Africa with the capability to develop its own enrichment plant, the Powers which had been directly involved in transferring the relevant technology and equipment, had not applied full scope safeguards. This applied particularly to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Security Council resolution 418 of 4 November 1977 clearly stated that "all States shall refrain from any co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons." In the specific South African case it was clear that all nuclear collaboration, even though intended for peaceful purposes, would give South Africa substantial capability to develop nuclear explosive devices and therefore all such collaboration should be ended. Despite this mandatory decision of the Security Council neither the Federal Republic of Germany nor France had imposed full scope safeguards for South Africa, which was the absolute minimum that was required.

The acquisition of an enrichment plant and technology by South Africa added immeasurably to the dangers of proliferation and at the same time provided the Pretoria regime with substantial bargaining power which could only serve to make South Africa even more self-confident and aggressive in its defiance of the world community.

Moreover, with the capability to produce its own fissionable material without any control it could develop nuclear explosive devices at an alarming rate and thus gravely increase its direct threat to neighbouring African States and the rest of the world.

E. Statement by scientists and experts

The scientists attending the seminar stressed the need to alert the world scientific community of the implications of South Africa's nuclear plans, and presented the following joint statement:

"We appeal to scientists and engineers to recognize their responsibility to deny, as far as lies in their power, to South African scientists and engineers, the possibility of acquiring new technologies or scientific information that could assist the furtherance of South African nuclear or other military capability. We recognize the traditions of international co-operation in science; nevertheless, the threat to world peace posed by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the racist régime of South Africa is so grave that South African scientists and engineers concerned in any way with the development of a nuclear capability should be placed in quarantine in much the same way as, before World War II, many anti-fascist scientists refused traditional international co-operation with Nazi scientists."

F. Proposals by anti-apartheid movements

The following proposals were made by the anti-apartheid movements at the Seminar, "in the context of their support for the liberation struggle in southern Africa and in the awareness that South Africa's activities in the nuclear field and all collaboration with South Africa in this area constitute a great threat to world peace":

"1. The United Nations should take mandatory action, either by extending the mandatory arms embargo or by other means, to ban any nuclear co-operation with South Africa. Such action should ensure that delivery to and from South Africa of nuclear material or technology should be banned.

2. All countries should be required to make it illegal for their nationals to work in South Africa and for South Africans to work in their countries in regard to nuclear matters, so that visits would be banned, recruitment ended and exchange and training of personnel would be brought to an end.

3. Action should be taken to prevent the exchange of information and know-how by, for example, excluding South Africa from international conferences and preventing others from attending such conferences in South Africa.
4. All agreements with South Africa, such as monitoring agreements, should be brought to an end.
5. All supplies of equipment of all sorts should be prevented from being sent to nuclear facilities in South Africa.
6. All governmental and other financial assistance for the development of the South African nuclear capability should be ended.
7. Collaboration by governments and companies with South Africa in the nuclear field should be fully exposed and maximum publicity given to all available information. The United Nations should produce a list of corporations involved in any way in South Africa's nuclear build-up. There should be special emphasis on major collaborating companies, and the list should be published by the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid. Short profiles on major companies which are collaborating and other relevant information should be sought from anti-apartheid movements.
8. The United Nations should demand from Member States information on their links with South Africa in the nuclear field.
9. The United Nations should give assistance to anti-apartheid groups in holding investigations, seminars and conferences on collaboration by their own countries. Anti-Apartheid groups should make this a major aspect of their work and press for parliamentary enquiries on this question in their own countries.
10. South Africa should be expelled from the International Atomic Energy Agency."

The anti-apartheid movements added:

"While we do not regard ourselves as competent to comment on the Non-Proliferation Treaty in any other respect, we strongly reject attempts to obtain South Africa's signature to the Treaty, since we believe that this would provide a rationale for further collaboration in this field.

"We believe that the urgency of the situation is such that there should be a high level mission to collaborating countries.

"Finally, we believe that the only way in which the objectives set out above and the specific measures proposed can be realized will be when South Africa is subject to comprehensive mandatory sanctions in all spheres."

G. Statements by southern African liberation movements

1. South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)

The representative of SWAPO, Mr. Peter Hanning, said that South Africa had never sought an international settlement in Namibia but had consistently undertaken a systematic programme aimed at installing a puppet régime to implement its own policy for Namibia. "The struggle against South Africa's illegal occupation must be stepped up and international pressure must be vastly increased in order to bring about an early end to South Africa's illegal occupation.

A key element at present was the implementation of Decree No. 1 on the Protection of Natural Resources of Namibia which would not only bring an end to the theft of Namibia's uranium and other resources, but would force most Western countries to clarify their position regarding the illegality of South Africa's position in Namibia.

2. Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe

The representative of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe (ZANU), Mr. W. Mangwende, said that the racist régime of South Africa was important in the geopolitics of the region and was a party to the so-called "internal settlement" in Rhodesia. The struggling masses of Zimbabwe were committed to liberating themselves through armed struggle. The people would defeat the minority régimes in the region whether they had nuclear weapons or not.

He expressed satisfaction that the international community was at last awakening to the threat posed by the minority régimes to international peace and security. The barbarous acts of aggression against the people of Zimbabwe and the refugees in Zambia and Mozambique, and the wanton destruction of innocent lives and property in those countries showed clearly that those régimes were a grave threat to peace. There was no need to emphasize that the racist apartheid régime could easily use nuclear weapons as a last bid to defend minority rule in the region.

He condemned the apartheid régime for ignoring the call of the Organization of African Unity to make Africa a nuclear-free zone.

3. Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)

The representative of the PAC, Mr. Isaac Mafole, said that the PAC called upon all freedom-loving peoples of the world, all progressive nations and organizations, and all countries of the Third World, and workers of oppressor and exploiting nations, to join the people of South Africa in a united action of exposing, vehemently

condemning and opposing imperialist designs of the Western Powers in giving nuclear weapons to racist South Africa. Their use could never be for peaceful purposes but only for the annihilation of the indigenous African majority and all those opposed to apartheid colonialism and its fascist war machinery.

4. African National Congress of South Africa (ANC)

The representative of the ANC, Mr. Yeyedwa Zungu, said it cannot be over-emphasized that South Africa by its very political nature posed a threat to international peace and security. But the fact that it had developed a nuclear capacity, thanks to its Western allies, aggravated the threat.

Apartheid as a political system had been condemned, through countless resolutions at the United Nations, the OAU and other international forums, as a crime against humanity. That placed South Africa in a unique category. However, despite these condemnatory resolutions, the apartheid régime had continued with its programme of repression of the black population in all spheres of human endeavour.

Secondly, the South African régime lacked the legitimacy accorded other governments by virtue of the representativeness of their peoples. There was no doubt that the South African régime did not represent the majority of the people of South Africa.

Such a régime had developed a nuclear capability partly because the black people of South Africa, indeed of all southern Africa, had taken up arms to rid themselves of white supremacist régimes. The defeat of Portuguese colonialism by the peoples of Mozambique and Angola had probably vindicated in their own thinking the South African régime's efforts to develop a nuclear capability.

The ANC had presented evidence that the South African régime intended to use its nuclear capability militarily. There was no doubt that the targets were primarily the people of South Africa who were struggling to liberate themselves, the neighbouring front-line African States which were themselves in the forefront of that struggle, and generally the continent of Africa as a whole that was supportive of their struggle.

The problem of South Africa's nuclear capability could not be separated from the intentions of the apartheid régime. The most important issue was whether such a régime should be receiving the assistance of its allies to enhance its systematic repression of the people of South Africa, and allowed to continue with its nuclear programme.

Any discussion of the relevance or otherwise of South Africa becoming a signatory to the NPT had to be placed within the following context:

1. The entire nuclearization programme of South Africa was in direct violation of the declared policy of the OAU that Africa must be a nuclear-free zone. In this respect South Africa stood condemned, together with West Germany, France, United Kingdom, the United States of America and Israel, which had deliberately assisted and collaborated with the racist régime by providing technology, technicians, equipment, know-how and finance for the development of the régime's nuclear capability.
2. The military and commercial use of nuclear energy were inseparably bound. The combination in the hands of the white minority racist régime of a nuclear capability which could, if required, be activated within days, together with the sophisticated delivery systems, constituted a grave threat to the independence of the African States. The step from nuclear blackmail to nuclear strike by the racist régime against African States actively supporting the struggle for national and social emancipation in South Africa would become an increasingly attractive option for the racists as the struggle intensifies.
3. There had been a growing incorporation of transnational corporations and their subsidiaries in South Africa into the military-industrial complex and war preparations in South Africa. This had been reflected in the choice of P.W. Botha as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of South Africa. That represented a strategic political shift of the régime's policy to deal with the crisis which was now increasingly being perceived as military rather than political. Spokesmen of the racist régime had themselves admitted that "South Africa is in a state of war".
4. The United Nations General Assembly and the international community had declared the South African racist régime illegitimate and condemned the policy of apartheid as a crime against humanity. They had recognized the legitimacy of the struggle by the oppressed people of South Africa for the armed seizure of power.

Within that context, the ANC believed that the issue of South Africa's becoming a member State of the NPT did not confront the real issues of a nuclear South Africa. Membership in NPT would give legitimacy to the régime, enable it to continue the development of its nuclear capability, and allow it to gain access to the free flow of vital technical and technological information and exchange of expertise on nuclear development. Finally, it would elevate the sinister collaboration to the level of the acceptable when, in fact, that collaboration was itself an obstacle to the elimination of apartheid.

He concluded that there was only one real safeguard that could guarantee that South Africa's resources would not be used for the devastation of the African continent -- and that was the destruction of the apartheid system itself.

H. Concluding statement by the Chairman

In his concluding statement, the Chairman said that the discussion had shown that the Seminar was not dealing with a remote and potential danger but with a threat that existed today -- because the apartheid régime either had or could have nuclear weapons.

Second, it was a danger which would certainly increase tremendously as South Africa acquired greater nuclear capability and expanded its uranium enrichment plant.

Third, the actions of those powers which continued nuclear collaboration with South Africa -- so-called "peaceful" collaboration -- even after the disclosure of South Africa's plan to stage a nuclear explosion in the Kalahari desert were reckless and intolerable.

Fourth, there must not only be a total cessation of all nuclear collaboration with South Africa, but a dismantling of South Africa's nuclear plants, with the threat of collective sanctions, in order to avert a grave danger.

Referring to the discussion of safeguards and the question of South Africa's adherence to the NPT, he said that the Seminar was not concerned with the merits of the NPT as a step towards total nuclear disarmament. That Treaty should have perhaps included a provision for a total embargo against any State practising apartheid.

South Africa had not acceded to the NPT, so that it could continue with its nuclear programme and threaten African States. It had challenged the OAU's commitment to the denuclearization of Africa.

Now, after South Africa's planned nuclear explosion in the Kalahari, the Western Powers had come up with the proposal to persuade South Africa to accede to the NPT. The Pretoria régime had indicated that it would consider joining NPT if it was assured of supplies and technology by the Western Powers. It also wanted to keep its enrichment facilities secret.

If the South African régime wanted to sign the NPT there was no move to prevent that. The Special Committee's position of principle on the illegitimacy of the apartheid régime and the legitimacy of the liberation movement did not change the fact that the treaty was open for signature by South Africa.

But it must be insisted that the South African régime should not be given inducements to become a party to NPT. It should not be offered free access to nuclear materials and technology.

Moreover, South Africa's adherence should not be regarded as an adequate reassurance. The apartheid régime was a criminal régime which had proved by its record that it could not be trusted.

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SEMINAR

The Seminar unanimously adopted the following conclusions and recommendations:

1. The Seminar expresses its grave concern over the serious and immediate threat which South Africa's nuclear capacity now presents to world peace and in particular to all African States. The threat to international peace, resulting from the policies and actions of the apartheid régime, has assumed new dimensions. There is now the grave danger that the apartheid régime, armed with nuclear weapons, may, in its desperation, unleash a major regional war which could precipitate a global confrontation.
2. This grave danger has been caused by the collaboration at various levels with the apartheid régime by the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as Belgium, Israel, Japan, Netherlands and Switzerland, through assistance in uranium extraction and processing, supply of nuclear equipment, transfer of technology, provision of training and exchanges of scientists. This collaboration, as well as external financial support for its nuclear programme, have encouraged the Pretoria régime in its defiance of the international community and have been an obstacle to the elimination of apartheid.
3. There must be an immediate end to all forms of nuclear collaboration with the Pretoria régime and effective international action taken to prevent it from pursuing its plans.
4. In the context of the nature of the Pretoria régime and its record, the Seminar rejects that any meaningful distinction can be made between 'peaceful' and 'military' nuclear collaboration with that régime. The major Western Powers, which have always claimed that their 'peaceful' nuclear collaboration would not give South Africa any capability to develop nuclear explosive devices, were obliged in 1977 to warn the Pretoria régime not to proceed with its planned nuclear explosion.
5. The abhorrent apartheid régime is both illegitimate and criminal. It continues to increase its oppression of the black people of South Africa and is engaged in a virtual war with the great majority of the population. It has a long record of deliberate and systematic aggression against African States and persists in its defiance of international law and morality. It is prepared to go to any lengths and resort to desperate means in order to perpetuate the system of racist domination. Faced with growing internal resistance and increasing international pressure, it is relying more and more on military power and the use of violence in order to maintain the apartheid system.

6. In this context the threat that South Africa presents to the world when it is armed with nuclear weapons is obvious. In addition, when it develops its uranium enrichment plant, the Pretoria régime will gain substantial international bargaining power. It will use its nuclear weapon capability and its role as a major supplier of enriched uranium to blackmail the international community.

7. In view of the availability of raw uranium fuel from other sources, there is no compelling reason for governments and corporations to trade in uranium with South Africa.

8. Moreover, the natural resources of South Africa, including uranium, belong to the people of that country and not to the apartheid régime.

9. It is essential, therefore, that urgent action be taken to ensure, within the context of an international policy of comprehensive sanctions against South Africa, that there is no further nuclear collaboration in any form with South Africa, or financial or other assistance to its nuclear programme. The international community will have to adopt firm measures to prevent South Africa from continuing its present nuclear programme.

10. In view of the nature and record of the apartheid régime, no international or bilateral safeguards, including the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguard system and the system of control of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (to which South Africa is not a party), are adequate. The Seminar rejects and denounces the moves by certain Western Powers to offer to the apartheid régime the benefits of international nuclear collaboration, and security and other guarantees, in return for adherence to the NPT. There must be international action against the apartheid régime, not provision of additional benefits to that régime, which would result were South Africa to become a party to the NPT.

11. The Seminar recommends that the Security Council consider the matter urgently and adopt a mandatory decision, under Chapter VII of the Charter, to end all nuclear collaboration with South Africa, to require the dismantling of its nuclear plants and to warn the Pretoria régime that any efforts by it to continue its nuclear programme or to build a uranium enrichment plant would result in further international action, including effective collective sanctions.

12. Urgent action must be taken by the United Nations and the international community to ensure that all nuclear contracts and agreements between South Africa and other countries, such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and Israel, be terminated and the supply to South Africa of nuclear equipment by these and other countries ended. Equally, the following areas of collaboration need to be ended:

- (a) the training of, and exchanges with, South African scientists involved in the nuclear sector and the granting of visas to them;
- (b) contracts and agreements concerning uranium extraction and processing in South Africa;
- (c) the import of South African or Namibian uranium;
- (d) the reprocessing of South Africa's spent nuclear fuel, and in particular the return to it of plutonium;
- (e) all financial, economic and other forms of support for South Africa's nuclear industry or any ancillary and related industry; and
- (f) the transfer of technology, supply of equipment and financial support for South Africa's uranium enrichment programme, including isotope separation.

13. Decree No. 1 of the United Nations Council for Namibia on the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia should be fully enforced.

14. All countries concerned should enact effective legislation to make illegal all forms of nuclear collaboration with South Africa by corporations and institutions. There should be severe penalties for all infringements; parent companies should be held responsible for offences committed by their subsidiaries and associates operating in South Africa.

15. The Seminar urges African and other governments committed to the struggle against apartheid urgently to take all necessary initiatives at the United Nations, and make direct contact with the States concerned in order to achieve the above objectives."

ANNEX I

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid

H.E. Mr. Leslie O. Harriman (Nigeria), Chairman
H.E. Mr. Serge E. Charles (Haiti), Vice-Chairman
Mr. Kwado Faka Nyamekye (Ghana), Chairman, Sub-Committee on the Implementation
of United Nations Resolutions and Collaboration with South Africa
Mr. Gerhard Schröter (German Democratic Republic)
Dr. Loutf Haydar (Syria)

International Atomic Energy Agency

Mrs. Merle S. Opelz, Head of IAEA Office in Geneva.

Frontline States

Mozambique: H.E. Mr. Armando Panguene, Ambassador to Portugal, Member of
Central Committee of Frelimo
Tanzania: Mrs. L.E. Howell, Acting High Commissioner, United Kingdom
Zambia: Mr. E. Nyirenda, Deputy High Commissioner, United Kingdom

Southern African Liberation Movements

- (a) African National Congress of South Africa
 - Mr. Yeyedwa Zungu
 - Mr. Dumisani Tyala
 - Dr. Frene Ginwala
- (b) Pan Africanist Congress of Azania
 - Mr. Isaac Mafole
 - Mr. Diphero Abel Chiloane
- (c) South West Africa People's Organization
 - Mr. Peter Manning
- (d) Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe
 - Mr. W. Mangwende
 - Mr. Robson Mabika Manyika

Anti-Apartheid Movements and other Non-Governmental Organizations

- (a) British Anti-Apartheid Movement, London
 - Mr. Abdul S. Minty, Honorary Secretary
 - Ms. Ethel de Keyser, Vice-Chairman
 - Mr. Vella Pillay
 - Mr. Michael Terry, Executive Secretary
 - Mr. Christopher Child

- (b) Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour l'Amitié entre les Peuples (MRAP), Paris
Mr. Albert Lévy, Secretary-General
- (c) Anti-Apartheid Bewegung, Bonn
Mr. Wolf Geisler
- (d) Stichting Anti-Apartheid Bewegung, Nederland, Amsterdam
Mr. Pim Juffermans
Mr. Arend Kouwenaar
- (e) Holland Committee on Southern Africa, Amsterdam
Mr. Ruurd Huisman
- (f) American Committee on Africa, New York
Mr. George Houser, Executive Director
- (g) Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Geneva
Mrs. Edith Ballantyne, Secretary-General
- (h) International University Exchange Fund, Geneva
Mr. Craig Williamson, Deputy Director
- (i) World Federation of Democratic Youth, Budapest
Mr. H.M. Ibrahim, Vice President

Experts and individual invitees

- Professor Ulrich Albrecht, Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies,
Department of Political Science, Free University of Berlin, West Berlin
- Dr. Frank Barnaby, Director, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Professor Eric Burhop, President, World Federation of Scientific Workers and
Professor Emeritus of Physics in the University of London
- Mr. David de Beer, adviser to Dutch churches on Namibia
- Mr. Sverre Lodgaard, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
- Mr. Séan MacBride, President, International Peace Bureau; former Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Ireland; former United Nations Commissioner for
Namibia; Nobel and Lenin Peace Laureate
- Professor P.M. Makhurane, Vice-Rector and Head of Department of Physics,
University of Botswana and Swaziland, Gaborone
- Ms. Barbara Rogers, co-author of The Nuclear Axis
- Dr. Ronald W. Walters, Associate Professor, Political Science Department,
Howard University

Observers

- Mr. Roger Murray, Consultant to United Nations Commissioner for Namibia;
formerly consultant to the Commonwealth Secretariat on Namibia, London
- Mr. Robert van Overberghe, Director, Political Desk for Independent Africa,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belgium
- Mr. Alan Roberts, Campaign Against the Namibia Uranium Contract, London
- Mr. Robert Schwere, representative of the International Commission of Inquiry
into the Crimes of the Racist and Apartheid Régimes in Southern Africa
- Mr. Michael Wolfers, Research Assistant, International Department, British
Labour Party

ANNEX II

LIST OF PAPERS SUBMITTED TO THE SEMINAR

1. "United Nations Action against Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, with special reference to action by the Special Committee against Apartheid" by the United Nations Centre against Apartheid
2. "The urgent need for immediate cessation of all nuclear collaboration with South Africa" by Abdul S. Minty
3. "United States Policy and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa" by George M. Houser
4. "Uranium politics and United States foreign policy in Southern Africa" by Ronald W. Walters
5. "Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa: Britain's profile" by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement
6. "Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, Status and Prospects" by Sverre Lodgaard
7. "The nuclear threat posed by the apartheid régime" by the African National Congress of South Africa
8. "West German - South African technology relations in a policy perspective" by Ulrich Albrecht
9. "Assessment of the dangers of South Africa in relation to the dissemination, production and use of nuclear weapons" by E.H.S. Burhop
10. "The support of France to the apartheid régime in the nuclear field" by Albert Levy
11. "The Dutch involvement in the complex of South Africa" by Stichting Anti-Apartheid Beweging Nederland

ANNEX III

OPENING STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. LESLIE O. HARRIMAN, CHAIRMAN
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID

24 FEBRUARY 1979

It is perhaps symbolic that this Seminar is taking place on the eve of the centenary of the birth of Albert Einstein, that great scientist, humanist and anti-fascist. I may recall that he was also a great supporter of African freedom.

Albert Einstein, who was called the father of the atom bomb, was acutely concerned over the danger of the acquisition of the nuclear bomb by the Nazis in Europe.

We face today the enormous danger of the acquisition of that bomb by the fascist, racist criminals in Africa.

I have no doubt that if Albert Einstein was alive today, he would be among us and ahead of us in calling for firm action.

Let us be moved by the indomitable spirit of that great intellectual giant of the twentieth century.

One would have thought that there would hardly be a need in the last quarter of this century to discuss means to end collaboration with a criminal apartheid régime in the development of weapons of mass destruction.

How can any human being, or any government or institution, which professes moral values, co-operate in any way with the Pretoria régime -- a régime of murderers of the children of Soweto, a régime of torturers and killers of African patriots, a régime which practises the heinous crime of apartheid -- especially in enabling it to acquire sophisticated weapons and technology in order to perpetuate racism, threaten African States and blackmail the whole world?

Yet we know that several governments are collaborating with South Africa in the nuclear field and obstructing effective international action.

Many multinational corporations, institutions and individual scientists have been assisting the apartheid régime.

We have appealed to them for two decades to cease such collaboration.

In fact, when the Special Committee against Apartheid was established in 1963, one of its first concerns was the news from South Africa that the apartheid régime was undertaking development of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.

But we could hardly get any action from the Western Powers. They tried to assure us that there was no question of South Africa acquiring nuclear capability.

It was only after the Soviet Union disclosed, in the summer of 1977, that South Africa was preparing a nuclear explosion that the Western Powers reluctantly came to admit the facts and got excited -- not so much because the proposed test was by a criminal and desperate régime but because of its timing and because it would upset their plans on non-proliferation in general.

Today there is a new twist.

The Western Powers tell us that it is now too late to prevent South Africa from acquiring nuclear capability. They tell us that the only thing that can be done is to cajole and persuade South Africa to become a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and thereby come under international control.

I personally had many discussions with the representatives of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union in 1977. I drew attention to the fact that earlier, people like Dr. Henry Kissinger had been worried about terrorists coming into possession of fissionable nuclear material. Dr. Kissinger had warned that there was only a thin line between the possession of fissionable nuclear material for ordinary peaceful use and the acquisition of nuclear weapon capability.

It is today very upsetting that by being brought into the non-nuclear proliferation régime South Africa may be given further respectability and the illegitimate régime given the possibility of even greater access to nuclear technology.

Meanwhile, as we know, there is constant collaboration with the apartheid régime in the nuclear field.

The United States and the United Kingdom were, of course, the first to assist South Africa in the nuclear field.

The United States -- which provided training, enriched uranium and technology -- says that it has temporarily suspended deliveries of uranium, but only to press South Africa to accept safeguards and subscribe to NPT.

Britain claims it is not collaborating -- except for deals on the Rössing mine and all that it involves -- but we have received information on other areas of such collaboration.

France has signed large contracts to build a nuclear power station -- with the involvement of several multinational companies and banks. It claims that it is not assisting in the development of nuclear weapons but only in "peaceful" uses of atomic energy.

There have been revelations about extensive collaboration by the Federal Republic of Germany. The Government of the Federal Republic protests that there has not been assistance at the governmental level, but does not deny collaboration by semi-government institutions, exchanges of numerous scientists, and supply of technology.

Several countries have signed long-term contracts for the purchase of uranium from South Africa. Belgium signed a contract only a few days ago for supplies until the 1990s.

I wish to remind you that there are many uranium deposits in other parts of Africa which are not even developed. But there is a short-sighted "kith and kin" approach and these sources may be frozen when things change.

So we have a series of pretexts to continue collaboration on the grounds that it is commercial and that each aspect of collaboration does not by itself make South Africa a nuclear power.

The Special Committee felt that it should hold this urgent consultation, not only with the front-line States, the liberation movements and non-governmental organizations, but also with scientists and other experts to consider all aspects of the matter as thoroughly as possible and decide on the course of action to be taken.

I would like particularly to express my appreciation to the scientists and experts who have agreed to give us the benefit of their valuable advice.

Although this Seminar has had to be convened at short notice, and although we have very little time, we must find ways to consult on all the implications and ramifications of nuclear collaboration in South Africa.

We must deal with the argument that some nuclear collaboration is for peaceful purposes only.

When we discuss nuclear non-proliferation in the United Nations, the Western countries tell us that there is only a thin line between so-called peaceful technology and military technology.

When it comes to South Africa, however, they change their arguments.

Then there is the argument that the solution is to persuade South Africa to join the NPT. That must be thoroughly analysed.

I would suggest that we should try, in fact, to analyse why the South African régime is devoting so much attention to nuclear development and why the Western Powers are stubbornly resisting all appeals to desist from collaboration with South Africa.

South Africa's own calculations, I feel certain, are both military and non-military. The danger is not only an immediate threat to peace but a long-term threat of many dimensions.

On the one hand, the acquisition of nuclear weapons is a continuation of the enormous military build-up since the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, reflected in the fifty-fold increase in the military budget of South Africa.

During these years, South Africa has not only obtained sophisticated military hardware but set up an arms industry and has developed rockets and missiles.

With this military power, it wants to suppress any internal resistance by ruthless massacres. It wants to restrain and blackmail independent African States. It also wants to persuade Western Powers to recognize it fully as a regional Power and a valuable ally, and not just a secret accomplice.

But South Africa is also thinking in terms of economic and other aspects. It wants to play a dominant role in supplying uranium -- and even enriched uranium -- to the rest of the world. With the growing scarcity of energy resources, it hopes that it can acquire a potential to lay down terms of trade. It hopes that many countries will become dependent on it for enriched uranium, both for peaceful and military purposes.

But why is it that the Western Powers are anxious to collaborate with the apartheid régime in its diabolical plans?

Here, as an African, and as Chairman of the Special Committee, I cannot afford to mince words.

All our experience makes us suspect that the Western Powers are determined -- despite all their protestations -- to keep the apartheid régime in their exclusive club, to preserve it and, in fact, to enable it to become even more of a menace to Africa.

They want to give us the impression that the apartheid régime is an embarrassment to them. But we suspect that the apartheid régime is a dagger they point deliberately at Africa and the Third World.

For thirty years, while the liberation movement and its friends have pressed for the isolation of the apartheid régime, the Western Powers have constantly tried to frustrate international action.

Soon after the apartheid régime came to power in 1948, they invited it to join the Berlin airlift and the Korean War -- and provided military equipment in return. They began developing South Africa as the major source of uranium.

In the 1950s, when the United Nations took up the problem of apartheid, they built up South Africa as the key power on the so-called Cape route and signed the Simonstown Agreements.

Before the arms embargo was originally adopted by the Security Council in 1963, they assisted it to build up a domestic arms industry. They left many loopholes in the arms embargo, which they cynically called "voluntary".

And they arranged for continued arms supplies by France and other countries, which were less amenable to pressure by local anti-apartheid movements or African States, in violation of the embargo.

I do not think I need to refresh your mind that while France claimed that it did not belong to the military pact of NATO, France used that opportunity to supply most of the licences for the manufacture of weapons in South Africa. At the same time, NATO on the side of Portugal supplied the technology and the munitions of war to keep down liberation movements and liberation in southern Africa.

We should also recall that this started as a grand design by Cecil Rhodes when he tried in the last century to link up the lines of communication so as to drain all the resources of this vast and richest region of Africa, all the way to the copper and diamond mines of Katanga and Kasai, into the ports of Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth in South Africa. I do not think that this strategy has changed today. And as we see the arms build-up in South Africa, we begin to see that this grand design is becoming more and more a reality.

When we pressed for an oil embargo, the Western Powers expanded the refineries in South Africa and enabled the apartheid régime to acquire a stockpile and build a second large oil-from-coal plant.

The same game is going on as regards nuclear collaboration. They not only resist action, but do advance planning to enable the apartheid régime to resist United Nations action.

We must also stress the nefarious role of multinational companies.

They have developed the uranium mining in South Africa -- in preference to many other sources -- at gold mines which are owned by foreign interests.

They have played a key role in providing nuclear equipment, technology and know-how to South Africa.

They operate through several channels and several countries.

When the Governments in Britain or the United States or the Netherlands are confronted with the mobilization of anti-apartheid opinion in their countries, they operate from France or West Germany or Switzerland.

We have seen this in connexion with the contract for the nuclear energy installation in South Africa. The French have won the deal, but the American Westinghouse is a major supplier.

There are all the elements of an international conspiracy.

We have, of course, the Tories in Britain, the conservatives in the United States and the Christian Democrats in West Germany who want even more open collaboration with South Africa.

They are anxious to preserve even the Smith régime in Rhodesia with the so-called internal settlement, and are planning to observe and bless the sham of an election in Rhodesia on 20 April.

But what of the ruling parties which profess loyalty to the United Nations?

Have they become prisoners of multinationals and bureaucratic establishments -- or are they trying to take us for a ride?

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The point, as I see it, is not merely the survival of the apartheid régime on the African continent.

The new Prime Minister of white South Africa, P.W. Botha, who is well-known to us as a rabid racist and the man behind the aggression against Angola -- is now being advertised in the West as some kind of liberal. Vorster, of course, was a pragmatist.

Botha boasted in his New Year's broadcast on 31 December that "The Republic of South Africa and its sphere of influence remain practically intact".

As I said, the issue is not merely South Africa, but its sphere of influence, far beyond its borders and as far as its rockets and missiles can reach.

A few days ago, I was obliged to express my great disappointment and dismay at the policy of the United States of America.

In a formal statement from no less an authority than the President himself, it was stated:

"It will be increasingly important to maintain our position of impartiality among the parties (in southern Africa) so we can help them to resolve their differences, should they choose the path of peace."

After thirty-odd years of discussion in the United Nations, after scores of resolutions supported by the United States, after all the promises by the Carter administration, it appears that the limit of progress we have achieved is "impartiality" between the racist oppressors and the forces of liberation, between criminal usurpers and the rightful owners of the land.

If this is "progress" it is only because the record has always been of partiality to racists, of assistance to racists, of keeping the racists in the club and of bailing them out of difficulties. It has been hostility to Africa, ever since colonialists landed on the African continent, and carried African men and women as slaves: I am speaking of almost half a millenium of subjugation.

Ladies and gentlemen:

I felt compelled to speak bluntly, as this is no time to be "diplomatic" -- especially on a subject such as the one before this seminar.

But I do not wish to leave the impression of pessimism.

I am confident that freedom will triumph in Africa.

I only want to stress that we must co-ordinate our efforts much more and fight without any illusions whatsoever.

We must declare that there is no right, in law or morality, to trade with the criminal régime in South Africa, to fraternize with that régime, or to assist it in its diabolical plans.

Apartheid is a crime against humanity and anyone who collaborates with the apartheid régime is guilty of abetment of that crime.

Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the Seventh Session
of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International
Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events

1. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, initially established in pursuance of the decision taken by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 22 July 1976, held its seventh session from 19 February to 1 March 1979 in the Palais des Nations at Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Ulf Ericsson of Sweden. It took note with appreciation of the decision of the Committee on Disarmament at its 11th meeting on 15 February 1979, by which arrangements for its work were maintained.
2. The Ad Hoc Group continues to be open to all Member States of the Committee on Disarmament as well as to non-Member States. Accordingly, scientific experts and representatives of the following Member States of the Committee on Disarmament participated in the session: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Germany Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and United States of America. On the basis of a previous invitation by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, upon their request, scientific experts of the following non-Member States of the Committee on Disarmament participated in the session: Austria, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand and Norway.
3. Representatives of the World Meteorological Organization attended the session and took part informally in its work.
4. The Ad Hoc Group confirmed that in its final form the report would contain the following chapters:
 - Chapter 1. Summary of the report
 - Chapter 2. Background and mandate
 - Chapter 3. Instructions and specifications for data to be routinely produced at participating stations (Level I data)
 - Chapter 4. Instructions and specifications for data format and procedure for Level I data transmission through the WMO communications network
 - Chapter 5. Instructions and specifications for procedures to be used for data analysis at data centres

Chapter 6. Instructions and specifications for format and procedures for the exchange of wave-form data (Level II data)

Chapter 7. Recommendations

5. The Ad Hoc Group conducted thorough discussions on Draft Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and on working papers related to these chapters. It agreed to detailed modifications to be taken into account in the drafting of the final versions of the chapters.

6. After consideration of the questions involved the Ad Hoc Group discussed the guidelines to be given for the drafting of the remaining Chapters 1, 2 and 7. It established procedures for the remaining work. Accordingly, the Chairman and the Scientific Secretary were asked to prepare the drafts of Chapters 1, 2 and 7.

7. The Ad Hoc Group considered also the time schedule for its remaining work and agreed on a provisional agenda for its next session. Since the second report of the Ad Hoc Group would have to be approved at the next session, it was unanimously felt that sufficient time should be given for the preparation of the drafts. In view of this requirement, the Ad Hoc Group suggests that, subject to the approval by the Committee on Disarmament, its third session under its present mandate of 4 May 1978, should be held between 23 July and 3 August 1979, in Geneva.

Programme of Work of the Committee on Disarmament

(Adopted at the 33rd Plenary Meeting on 19 June 1979)

In compliance with rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the Committee on Disarmament adopts the following Programme of Work for the second part of its 1979 Session:

- | | |
|---------------------|---|
| 21-22 June: | Nuclear test ban. |
| 25-29 June: | Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. |
| 2-6 July: | Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. |
| 10-13 July: | New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons. |
| 16-27 July: | Chemical weapons. |
| 30 July - 3 August: | Nuclear test ban. |
| | Consideration and adoption of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.* |

In adopting its Programme of Work, the Committee has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure.

*/ In accordance with rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure, the draft reports to the United Nations General Assembly shall be made available to all Member States of the Committee for consideration at least two weeks before the scheduled date for their adoption.

CD/20
20 June 1979
Original: ENGLISH

HUNGARY

Letter dated 19 June 1979 from the Permanent Representative of the Hungarian People's Republic addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the text of a communiqué adopted at the meeting of the Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States held in Budapest on 14 and 15 May 1979

I have the honour to transmit to you the communiqué adopted at the meeting of the Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States held in Budapest on 14 and 15 May 1979.

I would be grateful if you would have the communiqué circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

Authentic English, French, Russian and Spanish versions of the communiqué are enclosed herewith for ready reference.

(Signed) Dr. Mátyás Domokos
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Communiqué adopted at the meeting of the Committee of the Ministers
for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States held at
Budapest on 14 and 15 May 1979

A meeting of the Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was held in Budapest on 14 and 15 May 1979.

Taking part in the meeting were F. Mladenov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria; F. Fuja, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic; O. Fischer, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic; E. Vojtaszek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Polish People's Republic; St. Andrei, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania; A.A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and B. Chnoupek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

In accordance with the directive of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, the Ministerial Committee, having held an exchange of views on questions of security and co-operation in Europe, cessation of the arms race and disarmament, examined measures, with due regard for current developments, to implement the tasks set forth in the Declaration adopted by the Political Consultative Committee at its meeting held in Moscow on 23 November 1978.

1. On behalf of their States the Ministers emphasized that the development of the international situation fully reaffirmed the timeliness of the conclusions and the importance of the proposals contained in the Declaration of 23 November 1978, intended to ensure real progress in solving the fundamental problems of today and above all the problem of ending the arms race and achieving disarmament, eliminating armed conflicts and seats of tension and deepening the process of international détente.

The Ministers declared the firm determination of the States represented at the meeting to continue to work for the practical implementation of these proposals in close co-operation with other peace-loving countries and democratic and progressive forces. Such practical results can be achieved through constructive negotiations between the States concerned through a purposeful search for and formulation of generally acceptable solutions. In this work for the benefit of peace it is imperative to show perseverance, to take active practical steps, and to overcome any difficulties without delays or procrastination.

2. In this context the participants in the meeting considered the most pressing task related to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. They stressed that in the current circumstances a major step in this direction, fully consistent with the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, would be the conclusion among all the participating States of that Conference of a treaty on the non-first use of either nuclear or conventional weapons against each other. The conclusion of such a treaty will go a long way towards reinforcing the political and legal foundation underlying the observance in Europe of the principle of the non-use or threat of force, enhancing its effectiveness and thereby providing new safeguards against the unleashing of armed conflicts on the European continent.

At present conditions are also ripe for expanding the measures to strengthen confidence among States, for taking concrete steps in the field of military détente in Europe in the spirit of the Final Act of the all-European conference. In addition to the measures which are being implemented now in accordance with the Final Act, the States represented at the meeting are prepared to agree on prior notification of significant military movements in the same area, major air force manoeuvres in that area and major naval manoeuvres conducted in close proximity to the territorial waters of other participating States of the all-European conference. The countries represented at the meeting are also prepared to agree on the non-enlargement of the military-political groupings in Europe, the limitation of the levels of military manoeuvres and the extension of confidence-building measures to the Mediterranean. They are also willing to give very careful consideration to other proposals aimed at strengthening confidence among States and at military détente.

What is required now is at an early date to begin discussing and negotiating practical measures of such a nature as would contribute to the building of confidence among States in Europe, the easing of the military confrontation and the subsequent lessening of the concentration and the reduction of the armed forces and armaments on the continent. The States represented at the meeting propose that a conference be convened to this end on a political level to be attended by all the European States, the United States and Canada. They believe it desirable for such a conference to be held in 1979. The venue and the date of the conference can be agreed upon among all the States concerned through consultations which the Warsaw Treaty Member Countries are ready to start immediately.

3. On behalf of their States the Ministers expressed dissatisfaction over the lack of real progress at the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe. They pointed out that the socialist countries, in their proposals of 8 June 1978, provided realistic answers to the key issues before the talks, broadly taking into account the ideas of the other participants in the talks contributing thereby to a significant accommodation of the positions. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization States, however, have failed - for almost one year now - to give a businesslike reply to these constructive proposals.

The Ministers emphasized that if speedy and successful headway is to be made at the Vienna talks the Western participants must also show goodwill.

4. The Ministers stated further that the latest steps to intensify the arms race, which have recently been taken within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization bloc, are in direct contradiction with the interests of détente and its deepening. Of particular danger in this respect are the plans for deployment on the territories of some West European countries of medium-range nuclear missile weapons aimed at targets on the territories of European socialist States, as well as the revival of the plans for development and deployment of neutron weapons.

The States represented at the meeting are convinced that the strengthening of the security of all States in Europe should not be sought through the further intensification of the arms race, but rather through the limitation of nuclear missile weapons and conventional armaments on the basis of complete reciprocity. They believe that all the necessary conditions exist now to that effect and, as they stated in the Moscow Declaration of 23 November 1978, they are ready to make efforts in this direction jointly with other States. It should be clear, however, that if a positive result is to be achieved along these lines a constructive approach is necessary on the part of all. Therefore, the States represented at the meeting call on the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to desist, in the interest of the security of European countries, from exacerbating the situation in Europe and fuelling military tensions, to renounce the measures for stepping up the arms race, and to embark firmly on the road of military détente and disarmament.

5. The Ministers reiterated the view of their States to the effect that the Madrid meeting of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to be held in 1980, is called upon to promote and consolidate the relaxation of tensions, strengthen security and expand all-European co-operation. The member countries of the Warsaw Treaty are prepared to make their constructive contribution to ensure its success.

They stressed in this connexion that it is extremely important for the success of the Madrid meeting that it should be held in a businesslike and constructive atmosphere, which must be characterized above all by a commitment of all its participants to achieve practical results at the meeting. Accordingly, the States represented at the meeting are in favour of focusing the work of the Madrid meeting on negotiating concrete positive steps for implementing the principles and understandings of the Final Act both as an integral whole, including strong measures for military détente, and for the development and expansion of equal and mutually beneficial economic, scientific, technical and cultural co-operation.

The States represented at the meeting believe it essential to ensure a thorough and comprehensive preparation of the Madrid meeting and to that end are willing to keep in touch and hold bilateral and multilateral consultations with all States signatories to the Final Act of the all-European conference. The subjects of the consultations may also include the question of the level of representation of States at the meeting, bearing in mind its importance for the cause of détente, security and co-operation in Europe.

Of great importance for the success of the Madrid meeting would be a constructive preparation and productive work of the proposed all-European conference on the question of military détente.

6. In expressing the position of principle of their States as regards the need for ending the arms race and ensuring a decisive transition to real disarmament measures, particularly nuclear disarmament, the Ministers unanimously declared themselves in favour of redoubling the efforts to the utmost with a view to a speedy achievement of practical agreement regarding:

(a) The conclusion and bringing into force of the new Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive arms and a transition to the next stage of negotiations on their reduction;

(b) The dates and procedures for holding talks on ending the production of nuclear weapons of all types and on gradual reduction of their stockpiles up to and including their complete elimination;

(c) The permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and simultaneous renunciation by all States of the use or threat of force in their mutual relations;

(d) The conclusion of a treaty on complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests;

(e) The adoption of measures to strengthen the guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States, including the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against the States that do not possess nuclear weapons and do not have them on their territories, and the undertaking not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

The participants in the meeting confirmed once again that their countries strongly advocate the reduction of military expenditures by States having a major military and economic potential. They call for starting negotiations promptly on the specific extent of such reductions as the first step for the next three years or any other initial period acceptable to all.

The States represented at the meeting are against building up armed forces and armaments on the territories of other States. They pronounce themselves in favour of concluding agreements on the reduction of armed forces and armaments, for new international efforts to be made towards the dismantling of military bases on foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other States, towards the creation of non-nuclear zones and zones of peace in various regions, including Europe.

They state again that they are ready to disband the Warsaw Treaty Organization concurrently with the disbandment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, as the first step, to dismantle their military organizations, starting with the mutual reduction of military activities.

7. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs pointed out that new attempts have lately been made to undermine the process of international détente, create new hotbeds of military danger, launch campaigns hostile to socialist countries and stir up animosity between peoples. The revival in some countries of the activities of neo-fascist and neo-nazi organizations and trends is highly dangerous too.

The States represented at the meeting are convinced that all these attempts are doomed to failure if peace-loving States and peoples demonstrate proper vigilance, give adequate rebuff, and step up in every possible way their activities in the struggle for further progress towards a more durable peace in Europe and in the world at large.

The member States of the Warsaw Treaty call upon all States to build their relations on the basis of strict observance of the principles adopted by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: sovereign equality, respect for rights inherent in sovereignty; refraining from the threat or use of force; inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity of States; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-intervention in internal affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination; co-operation among States; fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.

The socialist States represented at the meeting will continue, as before, to act consistently and unswervingly in the interests of peace, détente and international co-operation.

The meeting of the Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty proceeded in an atmosphere of fraternal friendship and mutual understanding.

CD/21

20 June 1979

Original: ENGLISH

POLAND

Prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of
all chemical weapons and their destruction: working paper

As the Committee on Disarmament is about to proceed at its current session with the consideration of the substantive matters on its agenda, the question of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction stands out as one of the pressing issues.

Indeed, the problem of the total elimination of these weapons from the arsenals of States has been under active consideration for well over a decade. The comprehensive discussions in the General Assembly of the United Nations and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, often with the benefit of expert advice, have helped to identify some of the crucial problems involved. They also served to clarify the positions of individual States and of the community of nations at large with respect to chemical disarmament. Over the years, these positions have found their reflection in three draft agreements tabled by the socialist countries,^{1/} by Japan^{2/} and by the United Kingdom^{3/} as well as in countless working documents and General Assembly resolutions.

More recently, the views of States with respect to the prohibition of chemical weapons, have been put together by the Secretariat in a useful informal paper of 11 March 1977: "Compilation of Materials on Chemical Weapons from CCD Working Papers and Statements, 1972-1976".

It is a matter of record that Poland and other socialist States, spared no effort, in the General Assembly of the United Nations and in the CCD, to bring closer the conclusion of an agreement on the complete elimination of chemical weapons, i.e. indiscriminate weapons of mass annihilation which, if ever used, would have most devastating effects upon innocent and unprepared civilians. There was also the concern that unless a comprehensive ban on all chemical weapons is

^{1/} CCD/361.

^{2/} CCD/420.

^{3/} CCD/512.

agreed upon, the technological progress in the field of chemical warfare could lead to unpredictable further breakthrough, posing even greater threat to man and to his environment.

The Government of Poland shared in the widespread gratification at the opening and pursuit of intensive bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States seeking to elaborate a joint initiative on the prohibition of chemical weapons for its subsequent presentation to and finalization in a treaty form by the CCD. Accordingly, the announcement of the negotiating parties earlier last year that in their negotiations large measure of agreement emerged on a number of issues while several important questions remained to be resolved in the time ahead, particularly in the area of verification, was welcomed in Poland with satisfaction and anticipation.

At the same time, while believing that a political framework agreement between the USSR and the United States offered the most realistic approach to the multilateral effort aimed at an effective CW ban, Poland considered that the CCD should continue giving its close attention to the question of the total elimination of chemical weapons.

That basic view has been reaffirmed in paragraphs 45 and 75 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament as well as in operative paragraph 2 and 3 of resolution 33/59 of the General Assembly.

The interesting working papers contained in documents CD/5, CD/6 and CD/11, which address the Committee's responsibility in the field of CW, deserve attention in the first place as manifestations of the determination of their authors and co-sponsors to contribute to the elimination of the threat posed by the ever growing inventories of chemical weapons.

Bearing in mind the differences of views with regard to the substance of the question of prohibiting chemical weapons reflected, as they are, in the three draft agreements as well as in other documents submitted in the Committee and taking into account the various proposals concerning the method of pursuing discussions within the framework of the Committee on that subject, the Polish delegation suggests to establish, as a modest first step, an open ended and informal contact group. Its objective should be to seek to define further the most appropriate methods and forms of the Committee's work and to harmonize them with the bilateral efforts in order to accelerate progress towards early agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

To accomplish its tasks, the contact group could hold consultations with the authors of the existing documents as well as with the representatives of the States participating in the bilateral negotiations. The group should subsequently submit its suggestions for their consideration at a later stage of the current session of the Committee on Disarmament.

CD/22
20 June 1979
ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH/RUSSIAN

MONGOLIA

Letter dated 20 June 1979, addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament by the Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic, transmitting the Declaration by the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic, published in Ulan-Bator on the occasion of the signature of the Soviet-United States Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II)

I have the honour to transmit the enclosed Declaration by the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic dated 19 June 1979, published in Ulan-Bator on the occasion of the signature of the Soviet-United States Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II).

I should be grateful if you would circulate this Declaration as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) D. ERDEMBILEG
Ambassador,
Permanent Representative.

DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

At the meeting held in Vienna on 18 June 1979 between L.I. Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and J. Carter, President of the United States of America, a new Soviet-United States Strategic Offensive Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) was signed. The Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States of America reached an agreement of vital importance to mankind to undertake practical measures for the quantitative limitation of strategic offensive arms and for the restriction of their qualitative improvement, and assumed the obligation, once the Treaty has come into force, of initiating active talks on further steps towards the limitation and reduction of strategic arms.

The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic and the Mongolian people warmly welcome the conclusion of the SALT II Treaty as a major step forward in the field of curbing the arms race and in the cause of achieving the aims of disarmament.

The Soviet-United States Treaty offers a favourable opportunity for the adoption of effective disarmament measures, and gives a new impulse to other important talks at present being held in the field of disarmament, in particular the talks on a complete nuclear test ban, on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe, etc.

The new Treaty makes a real contribution towards reducing the threat of nuclear missile war, and strengthening world peace and international security.

Itself the fruit of international détente, the new SALT II Treaty will in turn lend substance and depth to this process which is of vital importance for the world as a whole.

This historically important document is above all the result of the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union, and its repeated and persistent efforts directed towards the control of the arms race, the adoption of effective measures on disarmament, and the strengthening of universal peace and security. Due recognition should also be given to the fact that the prevailing good sense and realism of Washington's policy was of major significance in the conclusion of the Treaty.

The Mongolian People's Republic takes the view that the strengthening of the principles of peaceful co-existence in international relations and the extension of détente are based on continuing changes in the alignment of forces in the direction of peace, national independence and social progress of peoples, and on the steady growth of the power of genuine socialism.

Conclusion of the SALT II Treaty once more confirms that however difficult and complex the problems of curbing the arms race, mutually acceptable solutions can always be found, provided that both parties have the necessary political will and determination. The history of the negotiations on this subject also demonstrates that observation of the principle of parity and equal security is an essential condition for the solution of any problem concerning disarmament.

Now that the Treaty has been signed, it must, of course, be ratified by both parties.

This is all the more important in the light of the unceasing attempts made by the proponents of the "cold war" in the United States to prevent the entry into force of the present Treaty. All peace-loving countries and peoples express the hope that the interests of strengthening peace and international co-operation will prevail over the dark schemes of the forces of reaction and military adventures.

The Mongolian People's Republic is firmly convinced that the interests of all mankind require that resolute efforts should continue to be made and effective consequential steps should be taken to bring about the elimination of strategic nuclear weapons from the military arsenals of States. In the opinion of the Mongolian People's Republic, the SALT II Treaty creates a favourable opportunity for the solution of such vitally important problems as the further strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons of all kinds, and the gradual reduction in stocks of nuclear weapons until they have been completely eliminated.

The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic considers it extremely important that effective use should be made, within the framework of the United Nations, the Committee on Disarmament and other international forums, of the favourable atmosphere which is being created as a result of the conclusion of the new Soviet-United States Treaty, for the purpose of adopting concrete measures to achieve genuine disarmament - a task which involves all mankind, for participation in efforts to attain this goal is the duty of all countries, and above all that of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

Faithful to its fundamental policy of peace, the Mongolian People's Republic will continue to make every effort to contribute to the control of the arms race and to disarmament in close co-operation with all peace-loving States.

BULGARIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, HUNGARY, MONGOLIA,
POLAND, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Working Paper

Draft international convention on the strengthening of guarantees
of the security of non-nuclear States

The States Parties to this Convention,

Conscious of the fact that a nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Prompted by a desire to take all possible steps to reduce and ultimately to eliminate the danger of such a war,

Wishing to contribute to the prevention of the wider proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote the cessation of the nuclear armaments race and the adoption of effective measures directed towards nuclear disarmament,

Welcoming the desire of States in various regions of the world to keep their territories free from nuclear weapons,

Bearing in mind their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to maintain peace, to refrain from the threat or use of force and to live in peace with each other as good neighbours,

Having regard to Security Council resolution 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968, General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972 and the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament of 30 June 1978, including the request made therein that urgent efforts be made to conclude effective agreements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Regarding guarantees that nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear States as an important means of strengthening peace and universal security and wishing to give such guarantees an international legal character,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Convention pledge themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States Parties to this Convention which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no nuclear weapons in their territory or anywhere under their jurisdiction or control, on land, on the sea, in the air or in outer space.

Article II

The obligation set forth in article I of this Convention shall extend not only to the territory of non-nuclear States Parties, but also to the armed forces and installations under the jurisdiction and control of such States wherever they may be, on land, on the sea, in the air or in outer space.

Article III

Any State Party to this Convention which has reason to believe that the actions of any other State Party are contrary to the provisions of articles I and II of the Convention may request that consultations be held between the States Parties with a view to clarifying the actual circumstances of the matter. Such a request must include any information relating to the matter and also all possible evidence to support it.

Article IV

1. This Convention shall be concluded for an indefinite period of time.
2. Each Party to the Convention shall, in the exercise of its State sovereignty, be entitled to secede from the Convention if it decides that exceptional circumstances relating to the content of the Convention have placed its higher interests in jeopardy. It shall notify all the Parties to the Convention and the Security Council of the United Nations of its secession, giving three months' notice. Such notification must include a statement of the exceptional circumstances which it regards as having placed its higher interests in jeopardy.

Article V

1. Any State Party to this Convention may propose amendments to this Convention. The text of each proposed amendment must be submitted to the depositary, who shall immediately transmit it to all States Parties.
2. An amendment shall enter into force for each State Party to this Convention which accepts the amendment after the documents concerning its acceptance have been deposited with the depositary by the majority of States Parties. Subsequently, the amendment shall enter into force for each of the remaining States Parties on the date of the deposit by them of the document concerning its acceptance.

Article VI

1. This Convention is open for signature by all States. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention is subject to ratification by the States which have signed it. The instruments of ratification or the documents concerning accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is hereby designated the depositary.

3. This Convention shall enter into force following the deposit of the instruments of ratification by ... States which have signed the Convention, including at least ... nuclear-weapon States.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or documents concerning accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, the Convention shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the instruments of ratification or documents concerning accession.

5. The depositary shall immediately notify all States which have signed or acceded to this Convention of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or document concerning accession, the date of the entry into force of this Convention and of any amendments thereto, and also of the receipt by him of other notifications.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the depositary in accordance with article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article VII

This Convention, the Russian, Arabic, Chinese, English, French and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall duly forward certified copies of the Convention to the Governments of the States which have signed or acceded to the Convention.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized for that purpose by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, which was opened **for** signature on ...

CD/24
22 June 1979
ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 21 JUNE 1979 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON
DISARMAMENT BY THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AD INTERIM OF THE
PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF
VIET NAM TO THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA
CONCERNING RULES 33 AND 34 OF THE
RULES OF PROCEDURE

On the instructions of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, I have the honour to inform you that Viet Nam, in accordance with the provisions of rules 33 and 34 of the Committee's rules of procedure, would like to submit proposals and express its views during the Committee's discussion of the problem of "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" from 25 to 29 June 1979 as well as on other occasions in the future when the Committee resumes its discussion of this question.

I hope it will be possible for the Committee to grant this request and ask you, Mr. Chairman, to accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Truong Quan Phan
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim
of the Permanent Mission of
the Socialist Republic of
Viet Nam to the United Nations
Office and other international
organizations at Geneva.

PAKISTAN

Working Paper

Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon
States against the Use or Threat of Use of
Nuclear Weapons

1. The nuclear arms race poses a pervasive threat to international peace and security and to the survival of civilization. The non-nuclear weapon States are the most vulnerable to nuclear attack or threat. While the best assurance against the nuclear threat is the total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament, the nuclear powers have an obligation, as a first and immediate step, to extend credible assurances to the non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This obligation of the nuclear powers arises from their claim to retain nuclear weapons, at least for the time being. Such assurances are moreover, a necessary incentive to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
2. The United Nations General Assembly has adopted several resolutions on the subject of assurances to non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Final Document adopted at the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament recommended in paragraph 59 that the nuclear powers should make urgent efforts to conclude effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Following this, the Thirty-third Session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted two resolutions concerning the adoption of an International Convention on Security guarantees to non-nuclear weapon States. These resolutions have inter alia requested on the Committee on Disarmament to consider the draft Conventions submitted on the subject in the General Assembly by the delegations of Pakistan and the Soviet Union together with other proposals designed to achieve the same objective.

3. In response to these recommendations, the Committee on Disarmament has included on its agenda the item entitled "Effective International Arrangements to assure Non-Nuclear Weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons." In its consideration of this subject, the Committee on Disarmament should seek to build on the considerable area of agreement evolved at previous sessions of the General Assembly. At this stage, the negotiations could usefully focus on two points:

- (1) the nature, scope and content of the "assurances" or "guarantees" to be provided to the non-nuclear weapon States;
- (2) the form in which such assurances or guarantees should be extended.

Nature, scope and content of the security assurances to nuclear weapon States

4. In principle, all non-nuclear weapon States are entitled to receive assurances that they will not be subjected to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. However, it appears from the declarations made by the nuclear powers at the Special Session that, with one exception, they are not in a position to extend such a universal and unconditional guarantee to non-nuclear weapon States. The difficulty in extending such assurances arises from the strategic doctrines espoused by the two rival military blocs, both of which envisage the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons against the nuclear and non-nuclear members of the opposing bloc. The overall objective endorsed by the majority of the international community is to secure the dismantling of such nuclear alliances and military groupings. However, until this is achieved, those non-nuclear weapon States, which are outside these military alliances and groupings have a right to be assured that they will not be subjected to the use or threat of nuclear weapons. This was the objective of General Assembly resolution 31/189C which invited the nuclear weapon States to extend assurances against the nuclear threat those non-nuclear weapon States which are "not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear powers". This formulation, with suitable modifications, could serve as the basis for security assurances to non-nuclear weapons which are not members of the global military alliances of the nuclear powers.

5. To be credible, the assurances extended by the nuclear powers to non-nuclear weapon States should be uniform in their scope, application and interpretation. If each nuclear weapon State were to undertake an obligation which is different in scope and application, it would obviously erode the efficacy of the assurances in their totality, especially if each contained such conditions and qualifications as have the effect of neutralizing the assurances provided by the other nuclear weapon States.

The "form" in which security assurances are to be extended to non-nuclear weapon States

6. As is clear from the title of the agenda item, the Committee on Disarmament is to evolve effective, international arrangements to assure the non-nuclear weapon States against the nuclear threat. This would exclude unilateral declarations since these are merely statements of intention, not irrevocable commitments, and are therefore not "effective". Bilateral and regional arrangements, although they may be evolved in legal form, cannot be a substitute for assurances of a universal character since they would not assure a non-nuclear weapon State that it will not face a nuclear threat from any quarter.
7. It is also evident that "effective" international arrangements will have to be in the form of an instrument with binding legal force. This is supported by the call in paragraph 69 of the Final Document urging the nuclear powers "to conclude" such effective arrangements to assure the non-nuclear weapon States. In any case, the mandate of the Disarmament Committee is to negotiate binding agreements, conventions and other instruments and it is with this object that the General Assembly has requested the Committee to take up consideration of the two draft Conventions submitted on this subject, together with other proposals designed to achieve the same objective.
8. Therefore, as regards the form of the security assurances to be provided to the non-nuclear weapon States, the Committee has a choice of two alternatives: first, an International Convention, and second, a binding resolution of the Security Council. The majority of Member States in the United Nations General Assembly appeared to prefer the adoption of an International Convention.
9. The General Assembly has asked the Committee on Disarmament to consider this question "as soon as possible" and to submit a report to the Thirty-fourth Session of the Assembly. It is, therefore, proposed that the Committee on Disarmament should hold an exchange of views on the item forthwith and thereafter establish an open-ended, informal Working Group to initiate negotiations on the two main points discussed above. The Working Group should submit a full report on the progress made in its deliberations to the Committee on Disarmament by
1 August 1979.

Compilation of Material on Chemical Weapons from
the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and
the Committee on Disarmament Working Papers and Statements, 1972-1979
(prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Committee on Disarmament)

Editorial Remarks

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), on 3 September 1976, requested the Secretariat "to undertake, if possible before the beginning of the Committee's 1977 session, a compilation of appropriate material from working papers and statements on the question of chemical weapons presented to the Committee in recent years" (CCD/PV.727).

On 11 March, the Secretariat distributed an unofficial paper entitled, "Compilation of Material on Chemical Weapons from CCD Working Papers and Statements, 1972-1976." The paper consisted of (i) an outline listing the areas covered in the compilation, (ii) the body of the compilation, and (iii) a list of references.

In carrying out its task, the Secretariat adopted the following criteria:

(a) As requested, the compilation referred only to statements and working papers of the CCD.

(b) The compilation covered the material of the years 1972 to 1976, that is, the period following the conclusion of the Convention on Biological Weapons. Only occasional references were made to earlier CCD sources.

(c) The compilation consisted of a summary description of the main points covered in that material.

(d) In the text of the compilation views were not attributed to any particular member of the CCD. However, as mentioned above, a list of references to sources was provided.

(e) No attempt was made to try to identify possible trends towards a consensus on any of the various aspects of the question of chemical weapons. Also, no attempt was made in the text of the compilation to refer to or summarize statements as supporting or questioning specific suggestions.

(f) While detailed technical information regarding chemical properties, toxicities, operation of verification methods, etc., was not summarized, that information could be easily identified by means of the list of references.

(g) No references were made to informal meetings with experts, since no official records existed for them. However, if material relating to informal meetings with experts was subsequently issued in official CCD documents, it was covered in the compilation.

(h) The material of the compilation was arranged under headings that roughly followed the provisions of the draft agreements submitted to the CCD.

At its 31st plenary meeting, on 27 April 1979, the Committee on Disarmament requested the Secretariat to bring up to date the informal document of 11 March 1977 and to circulate it as an official document of the Committee (CD/PV.31, p.53).

Pursuant to that request, the Secretariat has prepared this document, which follows the same criteria adopted for the original paper, as described above. The updated document includes in the compilation material from working papers and statements presented to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during its 1977 and 1978 sessions as well as those working papers and statements presented to the Committee on Disarmament during the first part of its 1979 session.

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1. Introduction

In 1971, the CCD started negotiations on a ban on biological weapons separately from negotiations on chemical weapons, but with the understanding that the final objective remained the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons as well. It was also agreed that toxins would be included in the ban, thus significantly broadening its scope.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction was concluded by the CCD in 1971. It was commended by the General Assembly in resolution 2826 (XXVI) and entered into force on 26 March 1975.

In the Preamble of the Convention the States Parties recognized that an agreement on the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons represented a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Moreover, in Article IX of the Convention, each State Party affirmed the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to that end, undertook to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes. Article VIII of the Convention also provided that nothing in the Convention should be interpreted as in any way limiting, or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases, and on Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

Beginning with its twenty-sixth session in 1971, and at its subsequent sessions the General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions^{**} by which it requested the CCD and subsequently the CD to continue negotiations as a matter of high priority with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their

^{**}/ Resolutions 2827A (XXVI), 2933 (XXVII), 3077 (XXVIII), 3256 (XXIX), 3465(XXX), 31/65, 32/77, S-10/2, 33/59A and 33/71H.

destruction. It also invited all States that had not yet done so to accede to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and called for the strict observance by all States of the Objectives contained therein.

From 1972 to 1979 the CCD and the CD devoted intense efforts to the question of chemical weapons. It considered in detail all the main aspects of the question, including the scope of a ban, verification, complaints procedures and other related matters.

The main points considered by the CCD and the CD in this context are referred to below under the relevant sections.

2. Scope of ban

With respect to the scope of a ban on chemical weapons, two main approaches have been discussed: a comprehensive ban in one step and a step-by-step approach.

2.1 Comprehensive ban

The following suggestions have been made in connexion with the question of a comprehensive ban.

Development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of chemical warfare agents and of chemical weapons should be prohibited (1) as well as their use (2). These activities should also be prohibited with regard to munitions, equipment and means of delivery (3). Chemical warfare agents, chemical weapons, equipment and means of delivery should be destroyed or diverted to peaceful use (4). Various kinds of military activities, such as offensive military training, should be prohibited (5).

Parties to any convention banning chemical weapons, in addition to assuming the obligations as determined by the scope of the convention, should undertake not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever and not in any way assist any State or international organization to manufacture or acquire any of the agents, weapons, equipment or means of delivery to be banned under the convention (6).

A convention should not hinder measures for acquiring protection against chemical warfare (7), including assistance (8), prophylaxis and medical treatment (9).

In order not to encourage the development of chemical warfare agents, it should be prohibited to issue patents for chemical warfare agents and presently existing patents should be voided (10).

The convention should provide for adequate verification (11) or a system of guarantees to ensure that all parties are complying with the obligations (12).

Adequate verification should be based on a combination of national and international arrangements, including the creation of a consultative committee (13).

Upon signing or adhering to a convention (14), or when a convention enters into force (15), parties should declare their possession of chemical weapons, agents and production facilities (16).

Any such convention should be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development in the field of peaceful chemical activities (17).

In a convention banning chemical weapons nothing should be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations under the Geneva Protocol of 1925 as well as under the Biological Weapons Convention (18).

The need for a further general position paper with a broad covering of the subject has been expressed (19).

2.2 Step-by-step approach

Various suggestions, as indicated below, have been made in connexion with this approach, on the assumption that a comprehensive ban could not be attained in one step. What these suggestions have in common is that they define initial, limited steps which would help achieve a comprehensive ban at a later stage (20). The view has been expressed that a partial approach introduces new technical elements and may stimulate military interest in sectors not covered by a partial agreement. Binding obligations to continue negotiations would then be needed (21).

One suggestion is that a moratorium would be declared on the development, production and stockpiling of the most lethal chemical warfare agents, pending agreement on the prohibition of such weapons (22).

According to another proposal, the first stage would consist of a ban on the development, production and stockpiling of supertoxic chemical warfare agents, together with the destruction of such agents (23).

Another formula envisages, as a first step, the conclusion of a convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare (24).

The prohibition of all lethal chemical warfare agents, with or without a phased destruction of stockpiles, has also been envisaged (25).

Another proposal covers lethal chemical agents and other toxic chemical agents intended primarily to cause long-term physiological harm to human beings, with phased destruction of such agents (26).

Verifiability of production of chemical warfare agents (sec 2.4.2 below) has been proposed as another possible criterion (27). This criterion might be applicable to the production of nerve gases, belonging to the so-called organophosphorus chemical compounds, which include many compounds having peaceful uses (28).

Some comments have been made regarding the delimitation of weapons, equipment and delivery systems to be banned (29). In one instance reference was made to munitions instead of weapons, with a view to covering binary chemical weapons (30).

With regard to activities to be prohibited, a first step might comprise a ban on production without destruction of stockpiles (31). On the other hand, stockpiles might be destroyed, while production facilities would be kept "moth-balled" (32).

A phased approach with regard to gradual destruction of stocks but within a comprehensive scope has also been suggested (33).

A comprehensive ban might be reached in steps by bringing under the ban, at appropriate times, items which had been left out (34). The scope of a convention should not be such as to be discriminatory against certain countries (35). The use of chemical weapons may be more probable in regional conflicts than in a major war (36). Regional agreements might prove to be useful supplements to a convention and could increase the prospect that the international community accept a chemical weapons ban (37).

Principles for delimiting the scope might be set out in a protocol to the convention or drafted and finalized outside the text of the basic agreement (38).

A method of delimiting the scope would be to list the chemical warfare agents to be covered by a convention (39). In this connexion it has been suggested that the warfare agents which the parties agreed to ban should be listed in an annex to the convention. As an alternative, one might list those agents which were to be exempted from a ban (40). One could also exempt for some time activities to be prohibited rather than agents (41).

The principle of delimitation would also apply with respect to the distinction between activities and agents related exclusively to warfare use, referred to as "single-purpose", and those which might also have a peaceful use, referred to as "dual-purpose" (42). A way of dealing with this problem might be to make a prohibition of single-purpose activities and agents unconditional, while the prohibition would be conditional with regard to the dual-purpose activities and agents (43). The so-called "purpose criterion" (sec 2.4.1 below) could also be used in dealing with this problem (44).

2.3 Definitions regarding scope

2.3.1 Activities

With respect to the scope of activities which might be banned, three main categories of activities have been considered, namely, development, production and stockpiling, covering agents as well as weapons. Also planning, organization and training for offensive purposes have been mentioned.

In connexion with a phased agreement, the question has been raised whether such an agreement should initially encompass all activities affecting only certain CW agents, certain activities affecting all agents, or certain agents as well as certain activities (45).

Possible new elements of importance for the formulation of the scope of a convention may be identified in the process of the elaboration of the draft convention (46).

Reference has been made repeatedly to the fact that peaceful activities must not be hindered or interfered with (47).

With regard to development, production and stockpiling, it has been proposed that the general purpose criterion should apply (48). It has been suggested to examine the possibility that new types and new systems of chemical weapons be covered by an agreement on new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction (49).

2.3.2 Chemical weapons

Chemical weapons have been described as combinations of the effective component -- the chemical warfare agent -- and the means and organizational structures for their military use (50).

Binary chemical weapons have been described as chemical weapons in which two less toxic chemical agents react to form a highly toxic agent on the way to the target (51).

Chemical weapons are considered to be weapons of mass destruction (52). It has been pointed out that there is a real danger that chemical weapons may be gradually assimilated and accepted as conventional weapons, if no agreement is reached to ban them (53).

It has also been suggested that "multi-purpose chemical weapons" causing physiological as well as mechanic and thermal effects should be treated as chemical weapons (54). The possible effect of chemical weapons on civilian populations and their sources of food and water make them detrimental to national and international security (55).

2.3.3 Chemical warfare agents

Chemical warfare agents are chemical substances which might be used in war because of their toxic properties (56). Effects on animals and plants should also be considered (57). Chemicals used in war for other purposes as, for instance, explosives, gun powder, fuel, smoke-generating chemicals, lubricators and napalm, etc., (58) have effects which are physical in their nature and do not belong to the category of chemical warfare agents.

Those chemicals which are precursors to the active agents in binary chemical weapons are in a special position (59). The purpose criterion might apply to them as well as to incapacitating agents (60).

A detailed definition of chemical warfare agents, including binary components, might be provided for in a protocol to a convention (61).

Several criteria have been suggested to describe the toxic properties of chemical warfare agents. They refer to the different toxic effects with regard to men, animals and plants (62). They are related to the various types of toxic effects (63) and penetration routes depending on the toxic agents involved (64). The degree of toxicity has been suggested as a criterion for determining the delimitation of single and dual purpose chemicals from each other, and from those with only peaceful use, as well as for delimiting super-toxic substances from less toxic ones (65).

Not only toxicity but also other properties have to be taken into account when evaluating a chemical as a possible chemical warfare agent (66). Relationship with respect to chemical structure has been mentioned as one delimitation criterion (67). One should also consider that the absence of protection and medical treatment facilities against chemical warfare may make less toxic agents suitable as chemical warfare agents in an attack against a country (68). Some of these criteria have been discussed (69) and their relationships for delimitation purposes have been analysed (70).

Toxins are already covered in the BW Convention, but since they have been characterized as lethal chemical substances (71), and in order to avoid ambiguities in interpretation, it has been suggested that they should be explicitly mentioned also in any future CW convention (72). Corresponding views have been expressed with respect to herbicides and defoliants about which it has been noted that certain restrictions apply to their use under the Enmod Convention and the new Protocols to the Geneva Conventions on Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (73).

Recently, consideration has been given to some chemical agents with respect to their particular effects, such as those resulting from delivery of non-toxic or low-toxic agents to the target area, where they, either by reacting with components in the target or making it possible for components in the target to react with each other, result in some detrimental effects which directly or in the long run may cause harm to human beings (74).

2.4 Delimitation criteria

2.4.1 Purpose and quantity criteria

One important way to distinguish between activities and weapons (including agents) which are to be prohibited and those which are not to be prohibited, is to look for the underlying purpose, i.e. the general purpose criterion (75). Accordingly, all single-purpose activities and agents having use only for war should be unconditionally prohibited. The purpose criterion might also cover incapacitating agents as well as agents which may be developed in the future (76). Dual-purpose agents might be only conditionally prohibited, i.e. allowed as long as no warfare use was intended (77). The presence or absence of such intentions might be judged from the amounts of possible warfare agents and equipment involved. This quantity criterion is closely connected with the purpose criterion (78). With regard to the basis for justification of the quantities produced, which may vary considerably from thousands of tons to just a few kilograms a year (79), suggestions have been put forward aiming at national analysis of open-production statistics by the parties to a convention (80) (see 3.2.3.2 below), or reporting or declarations of production to some international body for further analyses (81).

2.4.2 Verifiability criteria

There exists an inter-relationship between attainable prohibitions and the potential of various approaches to verification (82).

One criterion for deciding whether production of a potential chemical warfare agent shall be banned or not is the verifiability of the production (83). The application of this criterion to at least the organophosphorus compounds has been considered to be possible (84), as these compounds have a relatively homogenous basis in the consumption of certain types of phosphorus and certain derivatives of that element.

(Verification issues are dealt with in detail in section 3.2 below).

2.4.3 Effect criteria

The main property that makes a chemical substance a chemical warfare agent is its toxic effect. One definition of "toxic" that has been suggested is "poisonous in the sense of causing physiological injury to a human; this includes blistering, blindness and death" (85). The expression "long-term physiological harm to human beings" has also been used in this connexion (86). Accordingly, a system to determine toxicities of chemical substances was suggested early during the deliberations on chemical weapons (87). This system has been regarded as a possible tool for determining the scope of a ban with respect to chemical warfare agents (88). One might, for instance, differentiate super-toxic, single-purpose agents from less toxic, dual-purpose agents (89). Two different toxicity limits might be used to delimit such less toxic dual-purpose agents from super-toxic agents and from other chemical substances which cannot be used as warfare agents (90). A step-by-step approach might utilize the purpose criterion, supplemented by the toxicity criterion (91).

Delimitation might be facilitated by combining structure and toxicity criteria, at least with regard to super-toxic, organophosphorus compounds (92).

Some of the technical discussions in the CCD have been devoted to suggestions on actual numerical values of suitable toxicity limits (93). With regard to suitable limits for super-toxic agents, several figures have been suggested, which are all within the same order of magnitude (94). These differences, nevertheless, imply that potentially important chemical warfare agents may or may not be delimited as super-toxic agents, among them binary and multicomponent weapons (95). Methods to establish the limits as well as the degree of confidence that may be placed in the different approaches have been discussed (96). The need for evaluating and agreeing on standardized procedures for toxicity determination have been stressed (97).

Somewhat different methods must be used to determine the toxic effects -- other than lethal -- of harassing and incapacitating agents (98).

2.4.4 Chemical structure

The scientific system for describing the chemical structure of chemical compounds allows prediction of the structure even of compounds which may not yet have been synthesized. Thus it is theoretically conceivable to describe entire groups of toxic, chemically related compounds and suggest that such groups should be subject to prohibition under a convention. Therefore, one should, in theory, be able to cover in a convention even compounds similar to existing chemical warfare agents but not yet synthesized (99). Examples of groups of chemical agents which might be delimited in this way are the super-toxic organophosphorus compounds, which include the nerve agents, and also certain binary weapons components, mustard-type agents and arsines (100).

2.4.5 Other properties

Chemical substances may be very toxic, but, for a number of reasons, may be unsuitable for use in chemical weapons. By evaluating to which extent the properties of a chemical substance fulfil certain requirements, one could develop a method to determine whether a chemical substance can be considered to fall under the prohibitions of a CW ban (101). Such properties comprise, among others, shelf-life, volatility and explosion stability. By giving properties weighted numbers, a combination of such scales could provide an index or "evaluation number" that could help determine whether chemical substances can be classified as chemical warfare agents (102).

A way to establish whether known chemical agents fall under a ban is to list them (103). Combinations of criteria like toxicity and structural properties have been suggested in order to reduce the number of substances which might be necessary to list (104).

Lists, both of banned and exempted agents, might appear in one annex to a convention, implying that agents not mentioned in either of them would be covered by the purpose criterion of the convention which, in effect, would be comprehensive (105). Such lists could be reviewed and updated from time to time. This dynamic character of the scope of the convention should be the subject of closer analysis, with a view to determining whether this might provide for an effective step-by-step procedure towards a comprehensive agreement (106).

Using the (amended) single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as a model other types of lists of CW agents could be constructed with a special view to the desirability of different types of verification. For this purpose the UNEP International Register of Particularly Toxic Compounds may be useful (107).

3. Compliance

With respect to the question of compliance, the following aspects have been considered.

3.1 Confidence-building measures

It has been suggested that confidence-building measures might occur both before and under a convention (108).

Countries should declare their CW policies and those possessing chemical weapons should declare their stocks (109). Parties could declare their possession of chemical weapons and production facilities either upon signing the treaty (110), when ratifying it (111), or upon its entry into force (112). With respect to requests for information the principle of equal security has been evoked (113). Other confidence-building measures, prior to the conclusion of a convention, might be to invite other countries to observe destruction of declared stocks (114) or to arrange technical exchange visits to selected facilities (115). Invitations to technical visits were discussed in the Committee on Disarmament and results from the visits have been described (116). Exchange of information on protection activities might also serve as a confidence-building measure (117). Partial agreements might themselves be confidence-building with respect to reaching a comprehensive ban (118). It has been pointed out that confidence-building and verification are different concepts that should be separated (119). Further consideration of confidence-building measures might be valuable (120).

3.2 Verification measures

3.2.1 National verification measures

One basic approach to the problem of verification is that the convention should to some degree be an expression of trust among countries (121). A nation's continued assurance that a convention is complied with should be based on utilizing national means of verification in combination with some international measures (122). This might imply setting up particular national verification organizations or control committees. Members of the committees might be representatives of governmental agencies, public organizations and experts. Their task should be to monitor that no violations against the convention take place within a country. A national verification organization might also exchange and analyse nationally and internationally available information (123). National means of extraterritorial control could utilize a combination of remote monitoring, including the use of

satellites, and indirect monitoring by means of statistical data analysis (124). Such an organization should put forward suggestions regarding necessary national legislation for compliance with the treaty (125). One task might be to report information about national activities to an international verification agency (126). Countries which lack national technical facilities for establishing verification measures on their own might be put at a disadvantage if a convention only provided for national means of verification (127). In order to work out standardized programmes for national verification agencies, it might be useful to arrange international expert conferences or establish basic principles internationally (128). The possibility of using supervision procedures in addition to national means may be investigated. (129)

3.2.2 International verification measures

The view has been expressed that a country in possession of a chemical weapons capability gives up a significant military option if it becomes party to an agreement banning such weapons (130) and that it would renounce the possibility of "retaliation in kind" if it were attacked with chemical weapons. It would also lose the deterrent effect such a capability might have (131). For the sake of its own security, a country may wish to include in the agreement verification provisions designed to prevent other parties to the convention from secretly preparing or maintaining a chemical weapons capability (132). Such provisions have been suggested specifically to comprise international verification measures, including on-site inspections (133). Regularity of inspections would enhance confidence-building (134). These measures should be sufficiently effective to actually deter parties from possible violations (135). The verification measures need not be 100 per cent effective (136). States armed forces should be exempted from international verification (137). In addition to its deterring effects, an international verification system would provide continuous reassurance to the parties that no violations were occurring (138). A country having been subject to on-site verification can share its experience with other countries (139). International verification measures can be supplemented by national ones (140). Concerning the degree of intrusiveness of methods, on-site inspection has been considered to be too intrusive (141). However, different degrees of intrusiveness can apply also to on-site verification activities (142). Different international verification

methods, applied together, will reinforce each other (143). Non-intrusive international verification measures may observe certain activities and involve analysis of the observations, in order to obtain indications of possible violations as a basis for further verification and complaints procedures (144).

3.2.2.1 Organizational aspects

International verification activities could be conceived of as taking place on a voluntary basis in co-operation with national control committees (145). Consultative committees could also be established from among the parties themselves as a result of a formal agreement (146).

The agreed type of information prepared by national verification committees, or otherwise available, could be circulated, studied and analysed for consistency either by particular expert groups called upon by the Parties to the Convention (147), by a consultative body or committee (148), or by a verification agency (149). The Secretariat of the United Nations might be assisted by experts in considering verification problems (150). A comprehensive scheme would comprise an international body authorized to carry out verification, when so requested by a party or on its own (151). Such a body could also be entrusted to carry out on-site inspections (152). Preparation of technical material, for use in the implementation of a chemical weapons ban, for instance in the form of an "analytical handbook" for chemical analyses, is already being undertaken at this stage (153).

With regard to international verification agencies, different suggestions regarding their names and functions have been put forward (154). Some suggestions also consider the specific need for international verification of a chemical ban together with the question of international verification of a disarmament agreement in general (155).

Existing international organizations with technical resources, like WHO and UNEP, might suitably take on certain monitoring activities to ensure compliance with a treaty (156). They could, for instance, collect technical information on properties of chemical substances and methods of chemical analyses and also provide experts (157).

Costs and manpower requirements for any international verification activities and organizations should be kept as low as possible (158). There is a risk that international verification measures may lead to unwanted and illegal disclosures of a nation's military, technical and industrial secrets to other nations (159) and some measures to avoid such risks have been suggested (160). Information on chemical agents listed in annexed lists to a convention could contribute to verification measures (161).

3.2.3 Verification for specific activities

3.2.3.1 Development

Much development in the field of chemical weapons has originated from research and development for peaceful purpose, sometimes far in advance of the actual weapons development (162). One way of getting an early indication on potential chemical weapons applications is a systematic, computerized search of internationally available scientific and technical literature on a routine basis (163). Open reporting and internationalization of information has been called for (164). Suggestions on voluntary exchange of information have taken into account results of scientific research and developments for peaceful purposes (165).

One activity that is related to the development of chemical weapons is field testing. Field tests might be detected and monitored by so-called remote sensing methods (166). What is usually meant by remote sensing is the use of analytical equipment that can provide information on phenomena at a distance from the analysing equipment or the observer (167). The possibility of detecting field tests with nerve agents by means of satellite based spectrophotometric instruments (infra-red sensitive) have been analysed (168). An analysis has also been carried out regarding the capacity of similar instruments, as well as of others based on different principles, on the assumption that such instruments would be placed on earth but outside the borders of countries to be monitored. Geographical and meteorological conditions are found to influence all the methods discussed (169).

3.2.3.2 Production

Verification of non-production of chemical weapons presents the basic difficulty of proving the negative (170). Control measures can be carried out in production facilities resulting in assurance of non-production of chemical warfare agents, without disclosure of production secrets. Such measures could include regular on-site inspections, arranged by an international control agency (171).

Verification problems relating to the production of chemical agents, munition and equipment for delivery, and of facilities for filling the munition have been considered (172). Parties to a convention should declare means of production of chemical munitions and chemicals covered by the convention. (173) The difficulties of obtaining access to military installations for verification purposes have been mentioned (174). Confirmation by some method that production for chemical weapons

* / Some of the methods mentioned in this section might be applicable also to monitoring air, earth and water around production and destruction facilities and be considered also in the next three sections.

does not occur may be relevant only with respect to that particular verification activity and not necessarily prove that a violation had not occurred (175). Even if verification methods by means of which violations of a production ban can be devised, their practical application would be difficult due to the magnitude and diversity of the chemical industry (176).

Providing information on pertinent production activities for analysis by concerned parties constitutes one way of providing material for verification activities (177). Historically known chemical warfare agents might be continually listed as a basis for information on chemical production facilities (178).

Reference has been made to the use of production statistics, transportation data, etc., as a means to follow the production of relevant chemical substances in different countries (179). As an illustrative example of such an accounting method, a verification system relating to the production of organophosphorus compounds, to which the nerve agents belong, has been worked out in some detail and a number of limitations, including possible evasions, have been described. That system envisages that both national and international organizations would operate. The system requires that information be available from independent sources. Verification personnel should be allowed to visit production sites and would require basic information from different production levels to check the overall balance of the system, when warranted by analyses of statistical material (180). Verification measures should encompass also other chemical warfare agents than those of organophosphorus origin (181).

With regard to proposals for verification of a ban on production of dual-purpose agents for warfare use, it has been indicated that the production of dangerous chemical agents is being increasingly brought under both national and international regulations (182).

Several methods to control the actual production of chemical warfare agents have been suggested. On-site inspection has been requested for verifying that proscribed chemicals are not produced in facilities for similar substances (183). It has been debated whether photographing from satellites or airplanes, or mere ocular observation from the outside of a production plant might provide useful information (184). Remote sensing methods for monitoring outlets and surroundings of chemical plants are conceivable under certain conditions (185). Highly sensitive chemical analysis of actual samples from such areas is also conceivable (186). Attempts may be made to detect those products that may develop when CW agents, as

well as other chemical substances involved in their production, leak out into the surroundings. Also, the presence of certain binary weapons precursors could be demonstrated (187). Also, it may be possible to analyse and follow chemical traces in the environment for some time after a release, or in connexion with an alleged use (188).

One prerequisite for resorting to such methods is either to get access to the place from which the material to be analysed can be obtained, or to ensure that unmanned analytical equipment can function undisturbed at the place. The possibility of sampling of material by means of unmanned "black boxes" for actual chemical analysis in situ or elsewhere, as well as the usefulness of these methods, should be investigated (189).

In this connexion, several technical devices characterized as "on-site but non-intrusive" have been presented with the aim of ensuring that, after an agreement has been reached, relevant equipment or areas are not tampered with. These might include production facilities which, in accordance with the agreement, would cease production and remain "moth-balled" without on-site inspection -- a technique that has also been developed to safeguard nuclear facilities. Monitoring of compliance of that agreement might then take place by means of a country's "own national means of verification" (190). Non-intrusive verification methods of "moth-balled" production facilities could not substitute for destruction or conversion to civilian uses of the facilities (191). Absence of safety measures in a production plant may be a sign that no CW agents are produced there, even if in some instances production of substances with low acute, but high chronic toxicity exist (192).

Possibilities for "familiarization exchange" of information, as discussed in connexion with other arms control treaties, have been suggested (193).

It has been suggested that by utilizing a proposed system for delimitation of potential chemical warfare agents by means of a combination of evaluations relating to the different properties of a substance (194), one might find a means of directing the activities of a verification agency with regard to development or production of chemical substances for potential warfare use (195).

It is considered that verification of production of chemical weapons must reflect the fact that this production has more in common with biological weapons than nuclear weapons (196).

3.2.3.3 Stockpiling

Discussion on this subject has dealt with munitions and bulk storage of chemical agents (197). Reference has been made to the problem of how to verify that chemical munition is not stored together with ordinary munition (198). Remote monitoring of munition transports may be the only way of finding secret stockpiles (199). A comprehensive ban might facilitate verification of munition stockpiles, since no chemical munitions at all would be allowed (200). The difficulty of finding hidden stockpiles has been mentioned (201). Declaration of stocks before the conclusion of a convention, or upon its entry into force, could inspire confidence among parties concerned (202), and facilitate planning of a destruction programme (203). A convention should contain provisions for declaration of stockpiles (204).

Monitoring the state of known stockpiles by air or satellite reconnaissance seems to have only limited possibilities (205). On-site visits to known stockpiles may confirm the nature of the stockpile, if admittance to the storage facilities is allowed. Possibilities would exist to find out whether stockpiles contain chemical weapons and what type of agent they contain, if measurements were allowed immediately outside the actual site (206). When stored over a long time, munition and bulk storages may begin to leak and deteriorate, necessitating adequate arrangements for taking care of such situations. Such measures may or may not be observable depending on whether particular precautions had been taken (207).

3.2.3.4 Destruction of stockpiles

Various technical aspects of destruction of stockpiles and the possible means of verifying such destruction have been discussed in a number of working papers (208). It has been suggested that the possibility of using additional supervision procedures for verifying destruction of stockpiles might be discussed (209).

It is conceivable that also undeclared stocks may be destroyed: for instance, in the case of the need to destroy "obsolete" munition (210). The possibility of verifying such destruction is, however, related to the problem of finding the stocks in the first place (211). The information contained in some working papers indicates that destruction of stockpiles is a protracted process involving, inter alia, hazards for the environment, and that rigorous procedures must be followed in carrying out such operations, which under some conditions might be observed (212). The consequences of a possible long destruction period on the formulation of a convention have to be taken into consideration (213).

Monitoring of destruction of stockpiles should account for the particular agent that is destroyed, and the quantity and quality of the destroyed agent, considering also weight and volume of other components in the stockpiles (214).

If on-site access to a stockpile destruction is not permitted, the activity cannot be verified by any presently known methods (215). Extraterritorial monitoring may be of some use (216).

Different suggestions have been given to find as non-intrusive verification methods for stockpile destruction as possible. One suggestion is that a country may choose a destruction site where on-site access would be acceptable (217). The destruction could be checked in situ by observers, as distinguished from inspectors (218). In this connexion, the possibility has been mentioned for the "familiarization" of other parties with the site of an activity through information exchange, a technique which has also been discussed in connexion with other arms control measures (219). Observation of destruction of stockpiles would not need to be looked upon as a recurrent on-site inspection measure, since a stockpile can be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses, and thus inspected once only (220).

The degree of disclosure related to the technical verification methods referred to above ranges from total disclosure of the destruction process of the agent, and the quantity being destroyed, to only an assurance that some toxic substance is being destroyed or converted into a less toxic one (221).

Ways of evading effective verification have been described (222).

The verification process should not result in unwarranted disclosure of military information leading to proliferation of chemical weapons or in disclosure of industrial secrets (223).

In connexion with suggestions for arranging technical exchange visits during ongoing negotiations, the usefulness of visiting also working facilities for destruction of chemical weapons has been mentioned (224). International co-operation in this field might be useful (225).

3.2.3.5 Other military activities

A chemical warfare capacity comprises not only development, production and stockpiling of chemical agents and weapons but also other activities like planning and training of personnel (226).

A comprehensive ban on chemical weapons might, perhaps, lead to observable changes in military doctrine, training, organization and equipment, and thus serve verification purposes (227).

The difficulty of distinguishing between defensive and offensive measures has been noted (228).

A convention should cover adequately the situation when a country has on its territory chemical weapons belonging to, and under the control of, another country (229).

As previously mentioned, it has been suggested that protective measures against chemical warfare should not be banned (230). In this connexion, it has been suggested that international co-operation regarding protection against chemical warfare might take the form of regular meetings of experts, or exchange of information, especially relating to organophosphorus poisoning, therapy and prophylaxis (231). It has also been proposed that a convention should ensure that support and assistance be rendered to a country victim of a chemical weapon attack (232).

3.3 Complaints and clarification procedures

A complaints procedure must be based on a number of interrelated measures to be appropriately included in any CW agreement (233).

The procedure for submitting a complaint to the Security Council under the provisions of the Charter could be spelled out in a convention (234). Due to the political nature of the decisions of the Council, it might be desirable to resort to international investigation and fact-finding procedures before a complaint is lodged with the Security Council (235).

Parties to a convention could undertake to consult with each other (236). Consultations could also take place within the multilateral framework of a consultative body (237), a consultative committee (238) or a verification organization (239).

Consultations might be arranged so that requests for clarification do not need to appear as formal complaints or allegations of violations with ensuing political difficulties (240).

A party to a convention which wanted to allay suspicions or respond to the provisions of the convention might take initiatives for verification by invitation (241). Verification might be an obligation under a convention providing for co-operation by a party when challenged by other parties (242). If such challenges were met with negative replies, they could lead to suspicion (243).

When consultations fail or if actual complaints are filed with a competent body, further measures might be taken requiring additional information, fact-finding investigations or inspections (244). With regard to fact-finding measures being taken as a result of complaints, adequate expertise for assistance (e.g. for chemical analyses and toxicity determinations) should be available either within the competent body itself or through experts or expert groups (245) available nationally or in international organizations (246).

It has been emphasized that possible conclusions by an international organization with respect to results from technical analyses and fact-finding should be expressed in language that can be easily grasped by agencies and personnel in developing countries and accordingly be useful when making complaints accompanied by evidence (247).

4. Other provisions

4.1 Review conferences and amendments

Review conferences should be held periodically (248). Review conferences should serve to ensure that the preamble and the provisions of the convention are complied with (249). Review conferences should take into account new technological and scientific developments relevant to the convention (250).

Parties should have a right to suggest amendments to the convention. Various systems for accepting such amendments have been envisaged (251).

4.2 Technical assistance and use of disarmament savings

Scientific and technical development in the field of chemistry should benefit peaceful activities and to this end, exchange of information and equipment for peaceful purposes should be facilitated (252).

The principle that a substantive part of savings derived from disarmament measures should be used to promote economic and social development, particularly in developing countries, must be recognized (253).

4.3 Duration and withdrawal

The convention could be either of unlimited (254) or limited duration (255).

When the supreme interests of States are threatened, parties should be able to withdraw from the treaty after prior notification (256).

4.4 Adherence, entry into force, depositary agent

Different provisions for signature, ratification and entry into force of the convention have been suggested (257). Governments could act as depositaries (258) or, as a result of discussions within the framework of the United Nations, another depositary could be designated (259).

4.5 Protocols and annexes

Some provisions and procedures of an agreement might be contained in protocols, annexes or "agreed interpretations". They might include principles for delimiting different kinds of chemical warfare agents (260), definitions, lists of agents, reporting procedures (261), and stipulations for a possible consultative committee (262), or verification organization (263).

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190. USA, CCD/352; USA, CCD/360, p.8; USA, PV.702, p.4, 14; USA, CCD/498.
191. Poland, CCD/PV.764, p.12.
192. Federal Republic of Germany, CD/PV.29, p.18.
193. USA, PV.702, p.12-13; Poland, PV.722, p.9.
194. Federal Republic of Germany, CCD/458; Federal Republic of Germany, PV.674, p.6.
195. Sweden, PV.676, p.7.
196. Poland, CCD/PV.735, p.12.
197. USA, CCD/366, p.2.
198. Netherlands, PV.552, p.17; Egypt, PV.555, p.12; Netherlands, PV.560, p.8; USA, CCD/366, p.5; Netherlands, CCD/PV.741, p.19.
199. USSR, CCD/538, p.3.
200. Netherlands, CCD/PV.741, p.16.
201. USA, PV.654, p.11-12; Sweden, CCD/485, p.1; USA, PV.702, p.8; USSR, CCD/538, p.3.
202. Yugoslavia, PV.714, p.34; UK, draft convention CCD/512, Article II, UK, PV.720, p.10-11.
203. Netherlands, CCD/PV.758, p.24.
204. USSR, CCD/PV.788, p.7; USA, CCD/PV.802, p.20.
205. USA, CCD/366, p.2.
206. Sweden, CCD/485, p.7.
207. USA, CCD/366, p.1-3.
208. Sweden, CCD/324; USA, CCD/360, p.6; USA, CCD/366; USA, CCD/367; Finland, CCD/381; Socialist working paper CCD/403; Canada, CCD/434; USA, CCD/436; Sweden, CCD/485; USA, CCD/497; USA, CCD/498; German Democratic Republic, CCD/506.

209. USSR, CCD/522, p.9; USSR, CCD/PV.728, p.20.
210. USA, CCD/367.
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213. Sweden, CD/PV.29, p.34.
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215. USA, PV.654, p.12; Sweden, CCD/435, p.7.
216. USSR, CCD/538, p.3.
217. USA, CCD/436; USA, PV.654, p.12.
218. Japan, draft convention CCD/420, Art.II-3; Japan, PV.631, p.8.
219. USA, PV.702, p.12-15; Poland, PV.722, p.9.
220. Non-aligned working paper CCD/400, paragraph III-c; Sweden, PV.622, p.9.
221. Sweden, CCD/485.
222. USA, CCD/436; Hungary, PV.721, p.11.
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225. Netherlands, CCD/PV.758, p.22.
226. Sweden, PV.499, p.8, 10; Netherlands, PV.560, p.8; Yugoslavia, PV.377, p.2;
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227. Netherlands, PV.560, p.8; Sweden, CCD/PV.764, p.16; Netherlands, CCD/PV.758,
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228. UK, CCD/308, p.4.
229. Yugoslavia, CCD/PV.742, p.9.
230. Japan, draft convention CCD/420, Article I-a; UK, draft convention CCD/512,
Article I-a.
231. Yugoslavia, CCD/503, p.3; Yugoslavia, PV.714, p.35-36; UK, draft convention,
CCD/512, Article XII(I); UK, CCD/PV.761, p.18; UK, CCD/541.
232. Egypt, PV.744, p.11.
233. Sweden, PV.569, p.25.

234. USA, CCD/360, p.12; Socialist draft convention CCD/361, Articles VI, VI-1, VII, Non-aligned working paper CCD/400, paragraphs 16-17; UK, draft convention CCD/512, Article X-2.
235. Sweden, PV.549, p.11; Netherlands, PV.560, p.11; Sweden, PV.569, p.25; Pakistan, PV.571, p.21.
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237. USA, CCD/360, p.10; USA, PV.702, p.16.
238. UK, draft convention CCD/512, Articles VIII, X.
239. Japan, draft convention CCD/420, Article VII.
240. Sweden, CCD/395, p.3; Sweden, PV.590, p.11.
241. Japan, draft convention CCD/420, Article IX-1; Japan, PV.631, p.11.
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244. Non-aligned working paper CCD/400, paragraph 17; Japan, draft convention CCD/420, Article VIII-3; UK, draft convention CCD/512, Article X-1.
245. Japan, draft convention CCD/420, Article VI.
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247. Egypt, PV.572, p.26.
248. Socialist draft convention CCD/361, Article XI; Japan, draft convention CCD/420, Article XVII; UK, draft convention CCD/512, Article XIV.
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250. USA, CCD/360, p.12; Socialist draft convention CCD/361, Article XI; Japan, draft convention CCD/420, Article XVII-1; UK, draft convention CCD/512, Article XIV.
251. USA, CCD/360, p.14; Socialist draft convention CCD/361, Article X; Japan, draft convention CCD/420, Article XVI; UK, draft convention CCD/512, Article XIII.
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253. Non-aligned working paper CCD/400, paragraph 5; Venezuela, CD/PV.29, p.10.
254. Socialist draft convention CCD/361, Article XII-1; Hungary, PV.554, p.15; Japan, draft convention CCD/420, Article XVIII-1; UK, draft convention CCD/512, Article XV-1.
255. USA, CCD/360, p.14.
256. Socialist draft convention CCD/361, Article XII-2; Japan, draft convention CCD/420, Article XVIII-2; UK, draft convention CCD/512, Article XV-2.
257. USA, CCD/360, p.13, Socialist draft convention CCD/361, Article XIII; Japan, draft convention CCD/420, Article XIX; UK, draft convention CCD/512, Article XVI.
258. Socialist draft convention CCD/361, Article XIII-2; Japan, draft convention CCD/420, Article XIX-2.
259. UK, PV.720, p.12.
260. Sweden, PV.569, p.26; USSR, PV.567, p.18; Non-aligned working paper CCD/400, paragraph 10; Poland, PV.611, p.9.
261. Japan, draft convention CCD/420, Article IV; UK, CCD/PV.741, p.31.
262. UK, PV.720, p.5.
263. Japan, draft convention CCD/420, Article IV; Venezuela, CD/PV.29, p.10.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Working Paper

Proposal for a CD Recommendation to the United Nations
General Assembly Concerning the Security of
Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against Nuclear Attack

The Committee on Disarmament should propose to the United Nations General Assembly that the individual unilateral pledges that have been made by the nuclear weapon States be incorporated in a General Assembly resolution. Such a resolution would (1) recognize the willingness of the nuclear-weapon States to be responsive to the desire of non-nuclear-weapon States to be assured that they will not be attacked by nuclear weapons and (2) give international status to the individual assurances by the nuclear weapon States, thereby enhancing their character as solemn commitments. An illustrative General Assembly resolution is attached.

Discussion

The approach of this proposal to strengthening the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in their security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons takes into account paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Special Session on Disarmament which states:

In the same context, the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly notes the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States and urges them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The proposal also takes into account the diverse nature of the security requirements, both of the nuclear-weapon States, and also of the non-nuclear-weapon States. For many of the non-nuclear-weapon States, relations with specific nuclear-weapon States are an essential ingredient in their national security.

This proposal recognizes that, in view of these diverse interests, an effective and practical way of enhancing the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in their security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is by individual declarations by nuclear-weapon States rather than by a single

world-wide treaty, which is not likely to be a fruitful subject for negotiation. The suggested approach can and should be buttressed by treaty obligations regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons in regional situations where appropriate, such as in the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The pledges by the nuclear-weapon States which would be incorporated in a General Assembly resolution are those that were made in connexion with the United Nations General Assembly Special Session devoted to disarmament. The Presidential statement issued by the United States reads as follows:

The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack.

Such solemn pledges given by the nuclear powers represent an immediately effective measure of security for the non-nuclear-weapon States, and the international community should take cognizance of them. To accomplish this objective, the proposal suggests that they be incorporated in a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly.

ILLUSTRATIVE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION

The General Assembly,

Convinced of the need to promote international peace and security,

Recognizing the legitimate security concerns of States that have undertaken firm obligations not to acquire nuclear explosive devices,

Taking note of paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Special Session on Disarmament which called upon the nuclear-weapon States to pursue, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting that the five nuclear-weapon States recognize the significance of action to meet more fully the concerns of the great majority of States which have not sought to acquire or develop, alone or with others, any nuclear explosive devices,

Recalling that each of the five nuclear powers has stated its willingness to take formal action to affirm its support for and to adhere to appropriate regional arrangements establishing defined nuclear-free zones,

1. Welcomes the declaration of the nuclear-weapon States providing assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States with respect to the use of nuclear weapons;

2. Takes note of the following undertakings by each of the five nuclear powers:

A. By China -- To call for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and at no time and in no circumstances to be the first to use nuclear weapons;

B. By France -- To participate in negotiating the necessary agreements with nuclear-free zones the terms of which preclude, according to a formula to be defined, any use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons against States that are part of a nuclear-free zone;

C. By the USSR -- To offer a binding commitment in a new international convention not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to such a convention which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no nuclear weapons in their territory or under their jurisdiction or control, and to consult whenever any party to the convention has reason to believe that the actions of any other party are in violation of this commitment;

D. By the United Kingdom -- Not to use nuclear weapons against States which are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices except in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

E. By the United States -- Not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces or its allies by such a State allied to a nuclear weapon State or associated with a nuclear weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack.

3. Recognizes these solemn declarations as important contributions to strengthening international peace and security.

CD/28
27 June 1979
ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 27 JUNE 1979 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE USA AND USSR TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TREATY AND THE PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND BASIC GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS AND THE JOINT UNITED STATES-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE

We have the honour to transmit and to request, for the information of the Committee on Disarmament, the circulation of the following documents, in the English and Russian languages, each equally authentic, signed by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the meeting of the President of the United States of America, Jimmy Carter, and General Secretary of the CC of the CPSU, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, L.I. Brezhnev, in Vienna on 15-18 June 1979: the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of the Strategic Offensive Arms, the Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms, and the Joint US-Soviet Communique.

(Signed) A.S. FISHER
Representative of the
USA to the Committee
on Disarmament

(Signed) V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Representative of the
USSR to the Committee
on Disarmament

TREATY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,
Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 29 May 1972,

Attaching particular significance to the limitation of strategic arms and
determined to continue their efforts begun with the Treaty on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with
Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, of 26 May 1972,

Convinced that the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms
provided for in this Treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between
the Parties, help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen
international peace and security,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Guided by the principle of equality and equal security,

Recognizing that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests
of the Parties and the interests of international security,

Reaffirming their desire to take measures for the further limitation and for
the further reduction of strategic arms, having in mind the goal of achieving
general and complete disarmament,

Declaring their intention to undertake in the near future negotiations further
to limit and further to reduce strategic offensive arms,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each Party undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, to
limit strategic offensive arms quantitatively and qualitatively, to exercise
restraint in the development of new types of strategic offensive arms, and to
adopt other measures provided for in this Treaty.

Article II

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers are land-based launchers of ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental part of the territory of the United States of America and the northwestern border of the continental part of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that is, a range in excess of 5,500 kilometres.
2. Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers are launchers of ballistic missiles installed on any nuclear-powered submarine or launchers of modern ballistic missiles installed on any submarine, regardless of its type.
3. Heavy bombers are considered to be:
 - (a) currently, for the United States of America, bombers of the B-52 and B-1 types, and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, bombers of the Tupolev-95 and Myasishchev types;
 - (b) in the future, types of bombers which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of bombers listed in subparagraph (a) above;
 - (c) types of bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres; and
 - (d) types of bombers equipped for ASEMs.
4. Air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASEMs) are any such missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres and installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings.
5. Launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) are launchers of the types developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs.
6. ASEMs equipped with MIRVs are ASEMs of the types which have been flight-tested with MIRVs.
7. Heavy ICBMs are ICBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.
8. Cruise missiles are unmanned, self-propelled, guided, weapon-delivery vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and which are flight-tested from or deployed on aircraft, that is, air-launched cruise missiles, or such vehicles which are referred to as cruise missiles in subparagraph 1 (b) of Article IX.

Article III

1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, each Party undertakes to limit ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and ASBMs to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,400.

2. Each Party undertakes to limit, from 1 January 1981, strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,250, and to initiate reductions of those arms which as of that date would be in excess of this aggregate number.

3. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of these aggregates.

4. For each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs, the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall include the maximum number of such missiles for which a bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission.

5. A heavy bomber equipped only for ASBMs shall not itself be included in the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.

6. Reductions of the numbers of strategic offensive arms required to comply with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be carried out as provided for in Article XI.

Article IV

1. Each Party undertakes not to start construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers.

2. Each Party undertakes not to relocate fixed ICBM launchers.

3. Each Party undertakes not to convert launchers of light ICBMs, or of ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into launchers of heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.

4. Each Party undertakes in the process of modernization and replacement of ICBM silo launchers not to increase the original internal volume of an ICBM silo launcher by more than thirty-two per cent. Within this limit each Party has the right to determine whether such an increase will be made through an increase in the original diameter or in the original depth of an ICBM silo launcher, or in both of these dimensions.

5. Each Party undertakes:

- (a) not to supply ICBM launcher deployment areas with intercontinental ballistic missiles in excess of a number consistent with normal deployment, maintenance, training, and replacement requirements;
- (b) not to provide storage facilities for or to store ICBMs in excess of normal deployment requirements at launch sites of ICBM launchers;
- (c) not to develop, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload of ICBM launchers.

6. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to have under construction at any time strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of Article III in excess of numbers consistent with a normal construction schedule.

7. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ICBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the heavy ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

8. Each Party undertakes not to convert land-based launchers of ballistic missiles which are not ICBMs into launchers for launching ICBMs, and not to test them for this purpose.

9. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy new types of ICBMs, that is, types of ICBMs not flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, except that each Party may flight-test and deploy one new type of light ICBM.

10. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs of a type flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, with a number of re-entry vehicles greater than the maximum number of re-entry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of that date.

11. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs of the one new type permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of this Article with a number of re-entry vehicles greater than the maximum number of re-entry vehicles with which an ICBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, that is, ten.

12. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy SLBMs with a number of re-entry vehicles greater than the maximum number of re-entry vehicles with which an SLBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, that is, 14.

13. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ASBMs with a number of re-entry vehicles greater than the maximum number of re-entry vehicles with which an ICBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, that is, ten.

14. Each Party undertakes not to deploy at any one time on heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres a number of such cruise missiles which exceeds the product of 20 and the number of such heavy bombers.

Article V

1. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article III, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, and heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres to an aggregate number not to exceed 1,320.

2. Within the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs to an aggregate number not to exceed 1,200.

3. Within the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs to an aggregate number not to exceed 320.

4. For each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall include the maximum number of ASBMs for which a bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission.

5. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this Article and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of these aggregates.

Article VI

1. The limitations provided for in this Treaty shall apply to those arms which are:

- (a) operational;
- (b) in the final stage of construction;
- (c) in reserve, in storage, or mothballed;
- (d) undergoing overhaul, repair, modernization, or conversion.

2. Those arms in the final stage of construction are:

- (a) SLBM launchers on submarines which have begun sea trials;
- (b) ASBMs after a bomber of a type equipped for such missiles has been brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where its final assembly or conversion for the purpose of equipping it for such missiles has been performed;

- (c) other strategic offensive arms which are finally assembled in a shop, plant, or other facility after they have been brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where their final assembly has been performed.

3. ICBM and SLBM launchers of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in Article V, which undergo conversion into launchers of a type subject to that limitation, shall become subject to that limitation as follows:

- (a) fixed ICBM launchers when work on their conversion reaches the stage which first definitely indicates that they are being so converted;
- (b) SLBM launchers on a submarine when that submarine first goes to sea after their conversion has been performed.

4. ASBMs on a bomber which undergoes conversion from a bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs which are not subject to the limitation provided for in Article V into a bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs which are subject to that limitation shall become subject to that limitation when the bomber is brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where such conversion has been performed.

5. A heavy bomber of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in paragraph 1 of Article V shall become subject to that limitation when it is brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where it has been converted into a heavy bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres. A bomber of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in paragraph 1 or 2 of Article III shall become subject to that limitation and to the limitation provided for in paragraph 1 of Article V when it is brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where it has been converted into a bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

6. The arms subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty shall continue to be subject to these limitations until they are dismantled, are destroyed, or otherwise cease to be subject to these limitations under procedures to be agreed upon.

7. In accordance with the provisions of Article XVII, the Parties will agree in the Standing Consultative Commission upon procedures to implement the provisions of this Article.

Article VII

1. The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers or to space vehicle launchers for exploration and use of outer space. ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers are ICBM and SLBM launchers used only for testing or training.

2. The Parties agree that:

- (a) there shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers or in the number of such launchers of heavy ICBMs;
- (b) construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training;
- (c) there shall be no conversion of ICBM test and training launchers or of space vehicle launchers into ICBM launchers subject to the limitations provided for in Article III.

Article VIII

1. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres or ASBMs from aircraft other than bombers or to convert such aircraft into aircraft equipped for such missiles.

2. Each Party undertakes not to convert aircraft other than bombers into aircraft which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber as referred to in subparagraph 3 (b) of Article II.

Article IX

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy:

- (a) ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres for installation on waterborne vehicles other than submarines, or launchers of such missiles;
- (b) fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement on the ocean floor, on the seabed, or on the beds of inland waters and inland waters, or in the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles, which move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of inland waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers;
- (c) systems for placing into Earth orbit nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, including fractional orbital missiles;
- (d) mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs;

(e) SLBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty, or launchers of such SLBMs; or

(f) ASBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

2. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test from aircraft cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres which are equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads and not to deploy such cruise missiles on aircraft.

Article X

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

Article XI

1. Strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate numbers provided for in this Treaty as well as strategic offensive arms prohibited by this Treaty shall be dismantled or destroyed under procedures to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission.

2. Dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 1 of Article III shall begin on the date of the entry into force of this Treaty and shall be completed within the following periods from that date: four months for ICBM launchers; six months for SLBM launchers; and three months for heavy bombers.

3. Dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 2 of Article III shall be initiated no later than 1 January 1981, shall be carried out throughout the ensuing twelve-month period, and shall be completed no later than 31 December 1981.

4. Dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms prohibited by this Treaty shall be completed within the shortest possible agreed period of time, but not later than six months after the entry into force of this Treaty.

Article XII

In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of this Treaty, through any other state or states, or in any other manner.

Article XIII

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

Article XIV

The Parties undertake to begin, promptly after the entry into force of this Treaty, active negotiations with the objective of achieving, as soon as possible, agreement on further measures for the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. It is also the objective of the Parties to conclude well in advance of 1985 an agreement limiting strategic offensive arms to replace this Treaty upon its expiration.

Article XV

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article XVI

1. Each Party undertakes, before conducting each planned ICBM launch, to notify the other Party well in advance on a case-by-case basis that such a launch will occur, except for single ICBM launches from test ranges or from ICBM launcher deployment areas, which are not planned to extend beyond its national territory.

2. The Parties shall agree in the Standing Consultative Commission upon procedures to implement the provisions of this Article.

Article XVII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of 21 December 1972.

2. Within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, with respect to this Treaty, the Parties will:

- (a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;
- (b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;
- (c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification, and questions involving unintended impeding of verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty;
- (d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;
- (e) agree upon procedures for replacement, conversion, and dismantling or destruction, of strategic offensive arms in cases provided for in the provisions of this Treaty and upon procedures for removal of such arms from the aggregate numbers when they otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, and at regular sessions of the Standing Consultative Commission, notify each other in accordance with the aforementioned procedures, at least twice annually, of actions completed and those in process;
- (f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;
- (g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures limiting strategic offensive arms.

3. In the Standing Consultative Commission the Parties shall maintain by category the agreed data base on the numbers of strategic offensive arms established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms of 13 June 1979.

Article XVIII

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

Article XIX

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall remain in force through 31 December 1985, unless replaced earlier by an agreement further limiting strategic offensive arms.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Done at Vienna on 13 June 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOR THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU,
CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE
SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR

PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed on limitations on strategic offensive arms in the Treaty, Have agreed on additional limitations for the period during which this Protocol remains in force, as follows:

Article I

Each Party undertakes not to deploy mobile ICBM launchers or to flight-test ICBMs from such launchers.

Article II

1. Each Party undertakes not to deploy cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers on sea-based launchers or on land-based launchers.

2. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers which are equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads from sea-based launchers or from land-based launchers.

3. For the purposes of this Protocol, cruise missiles are unmanned, self-propelled, guided, weapon-delivery vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and which are flight-tested from or deployed on sea-based or land-based launchers, that is, sea-launched cruise missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, respectively.

Article III

Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ASBMs.

Article IV

This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the day of the entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force through 31 December 1981, unless replaced earlier by an agreement on further measures limiting strategic offensive arms.

Done at Vienna on 18 June 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOR THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU,
CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE
SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR

JOINT STATEMENT
OF PRINCIPLES AND BASIC GUIDELINES
FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS
ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having concluded the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Reaffirming that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security,

Convinced that early agreement on the further limitation and further reduction of strategic arms would serve to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war,

Have agreed as follows:

First. The Parties will continue to pursue negotiations, in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, on measures for the further limitation and reduction in the numbers of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation.

In furtherance of existing agreements between the Parties on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, the Parties will continue, for the purposes of reducing and averting the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, to seek measures to strengthen strategic stability by, among other things, limitations on strategic offensive arms most destabilizing to the strategic balance and by measures to reduce and to avert the risk of surprise attack.

Second. Further limitations and reductions of strategic arms must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means, using additionally, as appropriate, co-operative measures contributing to the effectiveness of verification by national technical means. The Parties will seek to strengthen verification and to perfect the operation of the Standing Consultative Commission in order to promote assurance of compliance with the obligations assumed by the Parties.

Third. The Parties shall pursue in the course of these negotiations, taking into consideration factors that determine the strategic situation, the following objectives:

- (1) significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms;
- (2) qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the development, testing, and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms;
- (3) resolution of the issues included in the Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in the context of the negotiations relating to the implementation of the principles and objectives set out herein.

Fourth. The Parties will consider other steps to ensure and enhance strategic stability, to ensure the equality and equal security of the Parties, and to implement the above principles and objectives. Each Party will be free to raise any issue relative to the further limitation of strategic arms. The Parties will also consider further joint measures, as appropriate, to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.

Vienna, 18 June 1979

FOR THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOR THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU,
CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE
SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR

JOINT UNITED STATES-USSR VIENNA COMMUNIQUE

VIENNA -- FOLLOWING IS THE JOINT UNITED STATES-USSR COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT VIENNA 18 JUNE FOLLOWING THE MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRESIDENT BREZHNEV:

(BEGIN TEXT)

BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA JIMMY CARTER AND GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET LEONID I. BREZNEV HELD MEETINGS IN VIENNA, AUSTRIA, FROM 15 TO 18 JUNE 1979. PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRESIDENT BREZHNEV CONDUCTED THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF:

ON THE AMERICAN SIDE, CYRUS VANCE, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; HAROLD BROWN, SECRETARY OF DEFENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; AND GENERAL DAVID JONES, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

ON THE SOVIET SIDE, A.A. GROMYKO, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CPSU AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; D.F. USTINOV, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CPSU AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE; K.U. CHERNENKO, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CPSU AND SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU; AND MARSHAL N.V. OGARKOV, FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE USSR AND CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR.

ALSO PARTICIPATING IN THE TALKS WERE:

ON THE AMERICAN SIDE, GEORGE SEIGNIOUS, DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY; HAMILTON JORDAN, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT; JODY POWELL, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT; MALCOLM TOON, AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE USSR; AND RALPH EARLE, CHIEF OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION AT THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS.

ON THE SOVIET SIDE, A.M. ALEKSANDROV, ASSISTANT TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU; L.M. ZAMYATIN, SECTION CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU; G.M. KORNIYENKO, FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR; A.F. DOBRYNIN, AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; V.G. KOMPLEKTOV, MEMBER OF THE COLLEGIUM OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR; AND V.P. KARPOV, CHIEF OF THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS.

PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRESIDENT BREZHNEV SIGNED THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. BASIC ISSUES OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS AND PRESSING INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS WERE ALSO DISCUSSED. THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WAS CHARACTERIZED BY THE DESIRE TO EXPAND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS OF INTEREST TO BOTH SIDES. IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS, THEY DEVOTED SPECIAL ATTENTION TO REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR THROUGH FURTHER LIMITS ON STRATEGIC ARMS AND THROUGH OTHER ENDEAVOURS IN ARMS LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT.

THE TWO SIDES EXPRESSED THEIR APPRECIATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRIA FOR ITS HOSPITALITY AND FOR PROVIDING ALL NECESSARY FACILITIES FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE MEETINGS.

I. GENERAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS

THERE IS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES THAT THE STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLES OF BOTH COUNTRIES AND THAT IT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AS A WHOLE. RECOGNIZING THE GREAT RESPONSIBILITY CONNECTED WITH THIS, THE SIDES HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR FIRM INTENT TO CONTINUE WORKING TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MORE STABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE FOUNDATION FOR UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS. TO THIS END, THE TWO SIDES ACKNOWLEDGED THE NECESSITY OF EXPANDING AREAS OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THEM.

SUCH CO-OPERATION SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF COMPLETE EQUALITY, EQUAL SECURITY, RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-INTERVENTION IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND SHOULD FACILITATE THE RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND THE PEACEFUL CONDUCT OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES, AND THEREBY ENHANCE INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AND WORLD PEACE.

THE SIDES REAFFIRMED THEIR CONVICTION THAT FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF EACH OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE "BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS" AS WELL AS OTHER TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BETWEEN THEM WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

THE TWO SIDES STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES, RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES, AND OF EFFORTS SO THAT CONFLICTS OR SITUATIONS WOULD NOT ARISE WHICH COULD SERVE TO INCREASE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS. THEY RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLES OF ALL STATES TO DETERMINE THEIR FUTURE WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

RECOGNIZING THAT AN ARMED WORLD CONFLICT CAN AND MUST BE AVOIDED, THE SIDES BELIEVES THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME THEIR IS NO MORE IMPORTANT AND URGENT TASK FOR MANKIND THAN ENDING THE ARMS RACE AND PREVENTING WAR. THEY EXPRESSED THEIR INTENTION TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ATTAIN THAT GOAL. TO THAT END, THEY ALSO RECOGNIZED THE VALUE OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS, AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND ELSEWHERE, IN ORDER TO PREVENT AND ELIMINATE CONFLICT IN VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE WORLD.

THE SIDES NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THE GROWING PRACTICE OF CONTACTS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE USSR IN THE COURSE OF WHICH KEY QUESTIONS OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS AND PRESSING INTERNATIONAL ISSUES ARE DISCUSSED. THE PROGRESS OF DEVELOPING USEFUL TIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR AND OF EXCHANGES BETWEEN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IS CONTINUING.

THE TALKS AGAIN CONFIRMED THE SPECIFIC SIGNIFICANCE OF PERSONAL MEETINGS BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE USSR IN RESOLVING THE BASIC QUESTIONS IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO STATES. IN PRINCIPLE, IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT SUCH MEETINGS WILL BE HELD IN THE FUTURE ON A REGULAR BASIS, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SPECIFIC TIMING WILL BE DETERMINED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT.

AGREEMENT HAS ALSO BEEN REACHED ON BROADENING THE PRACTICE OF CONSULTATIONS AND EXCHANGES OF OPINION BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SIDES ON OTHER LEVELS.

II. LIMITATIONS OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS

THE TWO SIDES REAFFIRMED THEIR DEEP CONVICTION THAT SPECIAL IMPORTANCE SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR AND TO CURBING THE COMPETITION IN STRATEGIC ARMS. BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZED THAT NUCLEAR WAR WOULD BE A DISASTER FOR ALL MANKIND. EACH STATED THAT IT IS NOT STRIVING AND WILL NOT STRIVE FOR MILITARY SUPERIORITY, SINCE THAT CAN ONLY RESULT IN DANGEROUS INSTABILITY, GENERATING HIGHER LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS WITH NO BENEFIT TO THE SECURITY OF EITHER SIDE.

RECOGNIZING THAT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE USSR HAVE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR AND CONTRIBUTE TO WORLD PEACE, PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRESIDENT BREZHNEV COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO TAKE MAJOR STEPS TO LIMIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF ULTIMATELY ELIMINATING THEM, AND TO COMPLETE SUCCESSFULLY OTHER ARMS LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS.

SALT -- IN THE COURSE OF THE MEETING, PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRESIDENT BREZHNEV CONFIRMED AND SIGNED THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE USSR ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE PROTOCOL THERETO, THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND BASIC GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS AND THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED AGREED STATEMENTS AND COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS REGARDING THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND USSR ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE SIDES AGAIN STRESSED THE GREAT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS AND STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS AND OF OTHER AGREEMENTS PREVIOUSLY CONCLUDED BETWEEN THEM IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AND REDUCING THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR.

BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED THEIR DEEP SATISFACTION WITH THE PROCESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS AND THE FACT THAT THEIR PERSISTENT EFFORTS FOR MANY YEARS TO CONCLUDE A NEW TREATY HAVE BEEN CROWNED WITH SUCCESS. THIS TREATY SETS EQUAL CEILINGS ON THE NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS OF BOTH SIDES; TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF REDUCTIONS IT REQUIRES THE REDUCTION OF EXISTING NUCLEAR ARMS; TO BEGIN TO LIMIT THE THREAT REPRESENTED BY THE QUALITATIVE ARMS RACE IT ALSO PLACES SUBSTANTIAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE MODERNIZATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW ONES.

THE NEW TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THE PROTOCOL THERETO REPRESENT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BALANCE BETWEEN THE INTERESTS OF THE SIDES BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. THESE DOCUMENTS ARE A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR AND THE DEEPENING OF DETENTE, AND THUS SERVE THE INTERESTS NOT ONLY OF THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET PEOPLES, BUT THE ASPIRATIONS OF MANKIND FOR PEACE.

THE TWO SIDES REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT STRICTLY TO OBSERVE EVERY PROVISION IN THE TREATY.

PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRESIDENT BREZHNEV DISCUSSED QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE SALT THREE NEGOTIATIONS AND IN THIS CONNEXION EXPRESSED THE FIRM INTENTION OF THE SIDES TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND BASIC GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY -- IT WAS NOTED THAT THERE HAS BEEN DEFINITE PROGRESS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS, IN WHICH THE UNITED KINGDOM IS ALSO PARTICIPATING, ON AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY COMPREHENSIVELY BANNING TEST EXPLOSIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ANY ENVIRONMENT AND AN ASSOCIATED PROTOCOL. THEY CONFIRMED THE INTENTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE USSR TO WORK, TOGETHER WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM TO COMPLETE PREPARATION OF THIS TREATY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

NON-PROLIFERATION -- THE TWO SIDES REAFFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION. THEY CONSISTENTLY ADVOCATE THE FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF THE REGIME OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CONFIRM THEIR RESOLVE TO CONTINUE TO COMPLY STRICTLY WITH THE OBLIGATIONS THEY HAVE ASSUMED UNDER THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF APPLYING COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND PLEDGED TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THESE SAFEGUARDS.

THEY NOTED THE PROFOUND THREAT POSED TO WORLD SECURITY BY THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND AGREED THAT THE STATES ALREADY POSSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS BEAR A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO DEMONSTRATE RESTRAINT. TO THIS END, THEY AFFIRMED THEIR JOINT CONVICTION THAT FURTHER EFFORTS ARE NEEDED, INCLUDING ON A REGIONAL BASIS, AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE CONCLUSION OF THE SALT TWO TREATY WILL MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TOWARD NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES.

BOTH SIDES FURTHER COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO CLOSE CO-OPERATION, ALONG WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, TO INSURE A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE IN 1980, AND CALLED UPON ALL STATES WHICH HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO TO SIGN AND RATIFY THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS -- PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRESIDENT BREZHNEV EMPHASIZED THE GREAT IMPORTANCE THE SIDES ATTACHED TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN WHICH THEY ARE PARTICIPATING WITH OTHER STATES. A REDUCTION OF THE MILITARY FORCES OF BOTH SIDES AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD BE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY AND SECURITY.

ASAT --- IT WAS ALSO AGREED TO CONTINUE ACTIVELY SEARCHING FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT IN THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS ON ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS -- THE TWO SIDES AGREED THAT THEIR RESPECTIVE REPRESENTATIVES WILL MEET PROMPTLY TO DISCUSS QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE NEXT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON LIMITING CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- THE TWO SIDES REAFFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE OF A GENERAL, COMPLETE AND VERIFIABLE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND AGREED TO INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO PREPARE AN AGREED JOINT PROPOSAL FOR PRESENTATION TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT;

RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS -- PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRESIDENT BREZHNEV WERE PLEASED TO BE ABLE TO CONFIRM THAT BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON MAJOR ELEMENTS OF A TREATY BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS HAS BEEN REACHED. AN AGREED JOINT PROPOSAL WILL BE PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT THIS YEAR.

INDIAN OCEAN -- THE TWO SIDES AGREED THAT THEIR RESPECTIVE REPRESENTATIVES WILL MEET PROMPTLY TO DISCUSS THE RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS ON QUESTIONS CONCERNING ARMS LIMITATION MEASURES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

OTHER QUESTIONS OF ARMS LIMITATIONS AND GENERAL DISARMAMENT -- IN DISCUSSING OTHER QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF LIMITING THE ARMS RACE AND OF DISARMAMENT, THE SIDES EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE FINAL DOCUMENT ADOPTED AT THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON DISARMAMENT. THE SIDES

NOTED THEIR SUPPORT FOR A SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT AND FOR THAT SESSION TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE CONVOCATION OF A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE WITH UNIVERSAL PARTICIPATION, ADEQUATELY PREPARED AND AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE USSR WILL CONTINUE TO CO-OPERATE BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND WITH OTHER MEMBER STATES OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT WITH ITS ENLARGED MEMBERSHIP FOR THE PURPOSE OF WORKING OUT EFFECTIVE STEPS IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT IN THAT FORUM.

IN SUMMING UP THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS BEING CONDUCTED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE USSR, OR WITH THEIR PARTICIPATION, ON A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH ARMS LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT, THE SIDES AGREED TO GIVE NEW IMPETUS TO THE JOINT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PRACTICAL RESULTS AT THESE NEGOTIATIONS

III. INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS

THERE WAS A BROAD EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. THE SIDES EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL DETENTE WHICH IN THEIR VIEW SHOULD BECOME INCREASINGLY SPECIFIC IN NATURE AND SPREAD TO ALL AREAS OF THE GLOBE, THUS HELPING TO PROMOTE INCREASED INTERNATIONAL STABILITY.

PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRESIDENT BREZHNEV DEVOTED PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO SITUATIONS OF TENSION WHICH COMPLICATE THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND INTERFERE WITH POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER AREAS. THE TWO SIDES BELIEVE THAT ALL STATES MUST CONDUCT THEMSELVES WITH PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY AND RESTRAINT IN ORDER TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE ELIMINATION OF PRESENT SITUATIONS OF TENSION AND TO PREVENT NEW ONES FROM ARISING.

THE TWO SIDES NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF INCREASING INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION ON SUCH GLOBAL ISSUES AS THE PROMOTION OF WORLD-WIDE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT, AND THE PEACEFUL USE OF SPACE AND THE WORLD OCEAN FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL MANKIND. THEY EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS THEY FACE.

NOTING THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR MAINTAINING PEACE, SECURITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE USSR CONFIRM THEIR INTENTION TO PROMOTE THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS ORGANIZATION ON THE BASIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.

THE SIDES NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN RECENT YEARS WITH RESPECT TO THE SITUATION ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT; THEY UNDERScoreD THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND

CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE. THE TWO SIDES AGREED THAT CONTINUATION OF THE CSCE PROCESS IS IMPORTANT TO PROMOTE SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE. THEY CALLED ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE USSR WILL WORK TO FACILITATE A CONSTRUCTIVE MEETING OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE, WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN 1980 IN MADRID.

EACH SIDE REAFFIRMED ITS INTEREST IN A JUST, COMPREHENSIVE AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SET FORTH ITS POSITION ON WAYS AND MEANS OF RESOLVING THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM.

THERE WAS AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS CONCERNING DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA. THEY NOTED SOME NORMALIZATION OF THE SITUATION IN CERTAIN AREAS OF THAT CONTINENT, AND THE EFFORTS OF THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF AFRICA TOWARD CO-OPERATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND PEACEFUL RELATIONS AND THE POSITIVE ROLE IN THIS RESPECT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY. THEY ALSO INDICATED THEIR RESPECTIVE VIEWS REGARDING THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

THE SIDES RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE TO WORLD PEACE OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN ASIA. THEY AGREED THAT THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL NATIONS IN THE AREA MUST BE FULLY RESPECTED. THEY ALSO INDICATED THEIR RESPECTIVE VIEWS REGARDING THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

IV. CO-OPERATION IN BILATERAL MATTERS

THE IMPORTANCE OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE USSR ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL BENEFIT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENTS WHICH EXIST BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, WAS EMPHASIZED. THE SIDES TOOK NOTE OF POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WIDE RANGE OF CULTURAL, ACADEMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMMES, WHICH ARE CONTINUING BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

PROCEEDING ON THE ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY, RECIPROCITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT AS THE BASIS FOR THE CONDUCT OF SUCH PROGRAMMES, THE SIDES REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO CONTINUE AND INTENSIFY CO-OPERATION IN THESE AREAS.

THE TWO SIDES CONFIRMED THAT ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS REPRESENT AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED BILATERAL TIES. BOTH SIDES STATED THEIR POSITION IN FAVOUR OF STRENGTHENING THESE RELATIONS AND RECOGNIZED THE NECESSITY OF WORKING TOWARD THE ELIMINATION OF OBSTACLES TO MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TRADE AND FINANCIAL RELATIONS. THE TWO SIDES EXPRESSED THEIR DETERMINATION TO ENCOURAGE THE RELEVANT ORGANIZATIONS AND ENTERPRISES IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES TO ENTER INTO MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS AND CONTRACTS ON A LONG-TERM BASIS.

PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRESIDENT BREZHNEV EXPRESSED MUTUAL SATISFACTION WITH THE RESULTS OF THE TALKS WHICH WERE HELD. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE DEEPENING OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES ON SEVERAL ISSUES AS A RESULT OF THE MEETING AND THE CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN REACHED WILL FACILITATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS AND REPRESENTS A JOINT CONTRIBUTION OF THE TWO COUNTRIES TO STRENGTHENING DETENTE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND PEACE.

CD/29
2 July 1979
Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 JULY 1979 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF
THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE COMMITTEE ON
DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS RELATING
TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

I have the honour to enclose, for the information of the Committee on Disarmament, additional documents relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The additional documents are the following:

Agreed Statements and Common Understandings Regarding the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms;
Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms;
Statements of Data on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms of the Date of the Signature of the Treaty; and the
Soviet "Backfire" Statement.

I request that these documents be circulated for the information of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed): Adrian S. Fisher
United States Representative
to the Committee on
Disarmament

AGREED STATEMENTS AND COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS
REGARDING THE TREATY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

In connexion with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties have agreed on the following Agreed Statements and Common Understandings undertaken on behalf of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

To paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. The term "intercontinental ballistic missile launchers", as defined in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, includes all launchers which have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs.

First Common Understanding. If a launcher contains or launches an ICBM, that launcher shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs.

Second Common Understanding. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM, all launchers of that type, except for ICBM test and training launchers, shall be included in the aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms provided for in Article III of the Treaty, pursuant to the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty.

Third Common Understanding. The 177 former Atlas and Titan I ICBM launchers of the United States of America, which are no longer operational and are partially dismantled, shall not be considered as subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty.

Second Agreed Statement. After the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force, mobile ICBM launchers shall be subject to the relevant limitations provided for in the Treaty which are applicable to ICBM launchers, unless the Parties agree that mobile ICBM launchers shall not be deployed after that date.

To Paragraph 2 of Article II of the Treaty

Agreed Statement. Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are: for the United States of America, missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines; for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered submarines made operational since 1965; and for both Parties, submarine-launched ballistic missiles first flight-tested since 1965 and installed in any submarine, regardless of its type.

To Paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. The term "bombers", as used in paragraph 3 of Article II and other provisions of the Treaty, means airplanes of types initially constructed to be equipped for bombs or missiles.

Second Agreed Statement. The Parties shall notify each other on a case-by-case basis in the Standing Consultative Commission of inclusion of types of bombers as heavy bombers pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty; in this connexion the Parties shall hold consultations, as appropriate, consistent with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the Treaty.

Third Agreed Statement. The criteria the Parties shall use to make case-by-case determinations of which types of bombers in the future can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of current heavy bombers, as referred to in subparagraph 3(b) of Article II of the Treaty, shall be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission.

Fourth Agreed Statement. Having agreed that every bomber of a type included in paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty is to be considered a heavy bomber, the Parties further agree that:

(a) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a heavy bomber type shall not be considered to be bombers of a heavy bomber type if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a heavy bomber;

(b) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres shall not be considered to be bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres, except that heavy bombers of current types, as designated in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty, which otherwise would be of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres shall not be considered to be heavy bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable differences from heavy bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres; and

(c) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs shall not be considered to be bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for ASBMs, except that heavy bombers of current types, as designated in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty, which otherwise would be of a type equipped for ASBMs shall not be considered to be heavy bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable differences from heavy bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs.

First Common Understanding. Functionally related observable differences are differences in the observable features of airplanes which indicate whether or not these airplanes can perform the mission of a heavy bomber, or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for ASBMs. Functionally related observable differences shall be verifiable by national technical means. To this end, the Parties may take, as appropriate, co-operative measures contributing to the effectiveness of verification by national technical means.

Fifth Agreed Statement. Tupolev-142 airplanes in their current configuration, that is, in the configuration for anti-submarine warfare, are considered to be airplanes of a type different from types of heavy bombers referred to in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty and not subject to the Fourth Agreed Statement to paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty. This Agreed Statement does not preclude improvement of Tupolev-142 airplanes as an anti-submarine system, and does not prejudice or set a precedent for designation in the future of types of airplanes as heavy bombers pursuant to subparagraph 3(b) of Article II of the Treaty or for application of the Fourth Agreed Statement to paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty to such airplanes.

Second Common Understanding. Not later than six months after entry into force of the Treaty the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will give its 31 Myasishchev airplanes used as tankers in existence as of the date of signature of the Treaty functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a heavy bomber.

Third Common Understanding. The designations by the United States of America and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for heavy bombers referred to in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty correspond in the following manner:

Heavy bombers of the types designated by the United States of America as the B-52 and the B-1 are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations;

Heavy bombers of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the Tupolev-95 are known to the United States of America as heavy bombers of the Bear type; and

Heavy bombers of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the Myasishchev are known to the United States of America as heavy bombers of the Bison type.

To Paragraph 5 of Article II of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs.

First Common Understanding. If a launcher contains or launches an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, that launcher shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs.

Second Common Understanding. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, all launchers of that type, except for ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers, shall be included in the corresponding aggregate numbers provided for in Article V of the Treaty, pursuant to the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty.

Second Agreed Statement. ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs are ICBMs and SLBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with two or more independently targetable re-entry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also been flight-tested with a single re-entry vehicle or with multiple re-entry vehicles which are not independently targetable. As of the date of signature of the Treaty, such ICBMs and SLBMs are: for the United States of America, Minuteman III ICBMs, Poseidon C-3 SLBMs, and Trident C-4 SLBMs; and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, RS-16, RS-18, RS-20 ICBMs and RSM-50 SLBMs.

Each Party will notify the other Party in the Standing Consultative Commission on a case-by-case basis of the designation of the one new type of light ICBM, if equipped with MIRVs, permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty when first flight-tested; of designations of additional types of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs when first installed on a submarine; and of designations of types of ASBMs equipped with MIRVs when first flight-tested.

Third Common Understanding. The designations by the United States of America and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs correspond in the following manner:

Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Minuteman III and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, a light ICBM that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles;

Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Poseidon C-3 and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, an SLBM that was first flight-tested in 1968 and that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles;

Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Trident C-4 and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, an SLBM that was first flight-tested in 1977 and that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles;

Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-16 and known to the United States of America as the SS-17, a light ICBM that has been flight-tested with a single re-entry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles;

Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-18 and known to the United States of America as the SS-19, the heaviest in terms of launch-weight and throw-weight of light ICBMs, which has been flight-tested with a single re-entry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles;

Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-20 and known to the United States of America as the SS-18, the heaviest in terms of launch-weight and throw-weight of heavy ICBMs, which has been flight-tested with a single re-entry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles;

Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSM-50 and known to the United States of America as the SS-N-18, an SLBM that has been flight-tested with a single re-entry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles.

Third Agreed Statement. Re-entry vehicles are independently targetable:

(a) if, after separation from the booster, manoeuvring and targeting of the re-entry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of devices which are installed in a self-contained dispensing mechanism or on the re-entry vehicles, and which are based on the use of electronic or other computers in combination with devices using jet engines, including rocket engines, or aerodynamic systems;

(b) if manoeuvring and targeting of the re-entry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of other devices which may be developed in the future.

Fourth Common Understanding. For the purposes of this Treaty, all ICBM launchers in the Derazhnya and Pervomaysk areas in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are included in the aggregate numbers provided for in Article V of the Treaty.

Fifth Common Understanding. If ICBM or SLBM launchers are converted, constructed or undergo significant changes to their principal observable structural design features after entry into force of the Treaty, any such launchers which are launchers of missiles equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable from launchers of missiles not equipped with MIRVs, and any such launchers which are launchers of missiles not equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable from launchers of missiles equipped with MIRVs, on the basis of externally observable design features of the launchers. Submarines with launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable from submarines with launchers of SLBMs not equipped with MIRVs on the basis of externally observable design features of the submarines.

This Common Understanding does not require changes to launcher conversion or construction programmes, or to programmes including significant changes to the principal observable structural design features of launchers, under way as of the date of signature of the Treaty.

To Paragraph 6 of Article II of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with MIRVs are all ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with two or more independently targetable re-entry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also been flight-tested with a single re-entry vehicle or with multiple re-entry vehicles which are not independently targetable.

Second Agreed Statement. Re-entry vehicles are independently targetable:

(a) if, after separation from the booster, manoeuvring and targeting of the re-entry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of devices which are installed in a self-contained dispensing mechanism or on the re-entry vehicles, and which are based on the use of electronic or other computers in combination with devices using jet engines, including rocket engines, or aerodynamic systems;

(b) if manoeuvring and targeting of the re-entry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of other devices which may be developed in the future.

To Paragraph 7 of Article II of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. The launch-weight of an ICBM is the weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch.

Second Agreed Statement. The throw-weight of an ICBM is the sum of the weight of:

(a) its re-entry vehicle or re-entry vehicles;

(b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for targeting one re-entry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or more re-entry vehicles; and

(c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release.

Common Understanding. The term "other appropriate devices", as used in the definition of the throw-weight of an ICBM in the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 7 of Article II of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more re-entry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more re-entry vehicles or for targeting one re-entry vehicle, which cannot provide their re-entry vehicles or re-entry vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 metres per second.

To Paragraph 8 of Article II of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. If a cruise missile is capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

First Common Understanding. If a cruise missile has been flight-tested to a range in excess of 600 kilometres, it shall be considered to be a cruise missile capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

Second Common Understanding. Cruise missiles not capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres shall not be considered to be of a type capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable design features from cruise missiles of types capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

Second Agreed Statement. The range of which a cruise missile is capable is the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact.

Third Agreed Statement. If an unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicle which sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all vehicles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

Third Common Understanding. Unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and are not weapon-delivery vehicles, that is, unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles, shall not be considered to be cruise missiles if such vehicles are distinguishable from cruise missiles on the basis of externally observable design features.

Fourth Common Understanding. Neither Party shall convert unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles into cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres, nor shall either Party convert cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres into unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles.

Fifth Common Understanding. Neither Party has plans during the term of the Treaty to flight-test from or deploy on aircraft unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles which are capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres. In the future, should a Party have such plans, that Party will provide notification thereof to the other Party well in advance of such flight-testing or deployment. This Common Understanding does not apply to target drones.

To Paragraph 4 of Article IV of the Treaty

Agreed Statement. The word "original" in paragraph 4 of Article IV of the Treaty refers to the internal dimensions of an ICBM silo launcher, including its internal volume, as of 26 May 1972, or as of the date on which such launcher becomes operational, whichever is later.

Common Understanding. The obligations provided for in paragraph 4 of Article IV of the Treaty and in the Agreed Statement thereto mean that the original diameter or the original depth of an ICBM silo launcher may not be increased by an amount greater than that which would result in an increase in the original internal volume of the ICBM silo launcher by 32 per cent solely through an increase in one of these dimensions.

To Paragraph 5 of Article IV of the Treaty

Agreed Statement. The term "normal deployment requirements", as used in paragraph 5 of Article IV of the Treaty, means the deployment of one missile at each ICBM launcher.

To Paragraph 6 of Article IV of the Treaty

Common Understanding. A normal construction schedule, in paragraph 6 of Article IV of the Treaty, is understood to be one consistent with the past or present construction practices of each Party.

To Paragraph 7 of Article IV of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. The launch-weight of an ICBM is the weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch.

Second Agreed Statement. The throw-weight of an ICBM is the sum of the weight of:

- (a) its re-entry vehicle or re-entry vehicles;
- (b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for targeting one re-entry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or more re-entry vehicles; and
- (c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release.

Common Understanding. The term "other appropriate devices", as used in the definition of the throw-weight of an ICBM in the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 7 of Article IV of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more re-entry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more re-entry vehicles or for targeting one re-entry vehicle, which cannot provide their re-entry vehicles or re-entry vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 metres per second.

To Paragraph 8 of Article IV of the Treaty

Common Understanding. During the term of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-14 and known to the United States of America as the SS-16, a light ICBM first flight-tested after 1970 and flight-tested only with a single re-entry vehicle; this Common Understanding also means that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce the third stage of that missile, the re-entry vehicle of that missile, or the appropriate device for targeting the re-entry vehicle of that missile.

To Paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. The term "new types of ICBMs", as used in paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, refers to any ICBM which is different from those ICBMs flight-tested as of 1 May 1979 in any one or more of the following respects:

- (a) the number of stages, the length, the largest diameter, the launch-weight, or the throw-weight, of the missile;
- (b) the type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid) of any of its stages.

First Common Understanding. As used in the First Agreed Statement to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, the term "different", referring to the length, the diameter, the launch-weight, and the throw-weight, of the missile, means a difference in excess of 5 per cent.

Second Agreed Statement. Every ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty shall have the same number of stages and the same type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid) of each stage as the first ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM launched by that Party. In addition, after the twenty-fifth launch of an ICBM of that type, or after the last launch before deployment begins of ICBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier, ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to that Party shall not be different in any one or more of the following respects: the length, the largest diameter, the launch-weight, or the throw-weight, of the missile.

A Party which launches ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty shall promptly notify the other Party of the date of the first launch and of the date of either the twenty-fifth or the last launch before deployment begins of ICBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier.

Second Common Understanding. As used in the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, the term "different", referring to the length, the diameter, the launch-weight, and the throw-weight, of the missile, means a difference in excess of 5 per cent from the value established for each of the above parameters as of the twenty-fifth launch or as of the last launch before deployment begins, whichever occurs earlier. The values demonstrated in each of the above parameters during the last 12 of the 25 launches or during the last 12 launches before deployment begins, whichever 12 launches occur earlier, shall not vary by more than 10 per cent from any other of the corresponding values demonstrated during those 12 launches.

Third Common Understanding. The limitations with respect to launch-weight and throw-weight, provided for in the First Agreed Statement and the First Common Understanding to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, do not preclude the flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs with fewer re-entry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than the maximum number of re-entry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, even if this results in a decrease in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of 5 per cent.

In addition to the aforementioned cases, those limitations do not preclude a decrease in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of 5 per cent, in the case of the flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs with a lesser quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, than the maximum quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, provided that such an ICBM is at the same time flight-tested or deployed with fewer re-entry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than the maximum number of re-entry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, and the decrease in launch-weight and throw-weight in such cases results only from the reduction in the number of re-entry vehicles, or penetration aids, or both, and the reduction in the quantity of propellant.

Fourth Common Understanding. The limitations with respect to launch-weight and throw-weight, provided for in the Second Agreed Statement and the Second Common Understanding to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, do not preclude the flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty with fewer re-entry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than the maximum number of re-entry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested, even if this results in a decrease in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of 5 per cent.

In addition to the aforementioned cases, those limitations do not preclude a decrease in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of 5 per cent, in the case of the flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs of that type with a lesser quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, than the maximum quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested, provided that such an ICBM is at the same time flight-tested or deployed with fewer re-entry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than the maximum number of re-entry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested, and the decrease in launch-weight and throw-weight in such cases results only from the reduction in the number of re-entry vehicles, or penetration aids, or both, and the reduction in the quantity of propellant.

To Paragraph 10 of Article IV of the Treaty
First Agreed Statement. The following types of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs have been flight-tested with the maximum number of re-entry vehicles set forth below:

For the United States of America

ICBMs of the Minuteman III type	---	7 re-entry vehicles;
SLBMs of the Poseidon C-3 type	---	14 re-entry vehicles;
SLBMs of the Trident C-4 type	---	7 re-entry vehicles;

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

ICBMs of the RS-16 type	---	4 re-entry vehicles;
ICBMs of the RS-13 type	---	6 re-entry vehicles;
ICBMs of the RS-20 type	---	10 re-entry vehicles;
SLBMs of the RSM-50 type	---	7 re-entry vehicles.

Common Understanding. Minuteman III ICBMs of the United States of America have been deployed with no more than three re-entry vehicles. During the term of the Treaty, the United States of America has no plans to and will not flight-test or deploy missiles of this type with more than three re-entry vehicles.

Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after 1 May 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the maximum number of re-entry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are understood to mean manoeuvres of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its re-entry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a re-entry vehicle is actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defence penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a re-entry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defence penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing re-entry vehicles.

Third Agreed Statement. Each Party undertakes:

(a) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with multiple re-entry vehicles, of a type flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, with re-entry vehicles the weight of any of which is less than the weight of the lightest of those re-entry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of that date;

(b) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with a single re-entry vehicle and without an appropriate device for targeting a re-entry vehicle, of a type flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, with a re-entry vehicle the weight of which is less than the weight of the lightest re-entry vehicle on an ICBM of a type equipped with MIRVs and flight-tested by that Party as of 1 May 1979; and

(c) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with a single re-entry vehicle and with an appropriate device for targeting a re-entry vehicle, of a type flight-tested as of 1 May 1979, with a re-entry vehicle the weight of which is less than 50 per cent of the throw-weight of that ICBM.

To Paragraph 11 of Article IV of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy the one new type of light ICBM permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty with a number of re-entry vehicles greater than the maximum number of re-entry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of the twenty-fifth launch or the last launch before deployment begins of ICBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier.

Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after 1 May 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the maximum number of re-entry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are understood to mean manoeuvres of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its re-entry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a re-entry vehicle is actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defence penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a re-entry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defence penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing re-entry vehicles.

To Paragraph 12 of Article IV of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. The following types of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs have been flight-tested with the maximum number of re-entry vehicles set forth below:

For the United States of America

ICBMs of the Minuteman III type	--	7 re-entry vehicles;
SLBMs of the Poseidon C-3 type	--	14 re-entry vehicles;
SLBMs of the Trident C-4 type	--	7 re-entry vehicles;

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

ICBMs of the RS-16 type	--	4 re-entry vehicles;
ICBMs of the RS-13 type	--	6 re-entry vehicles;
ICBMs of the RS-20 type	--	10 re-entry vehicles;
SLBMs of the RSM-50 type	--	7 re-entry vehicles.

Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after 1 May 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the maximum number of re-entry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are understood to mean manoeuvres of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its re-entry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a re-entry vehicle is actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defence penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a re-entry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defence penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing re-entry vehicles.

To Paragraph 13 of Article IV of the Treaty

Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after 1 May 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the maximum number of re-entry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement "procedures for releasing or for dispensing" are understood to mean manoeuvres of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its re-entry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a re-entry vehicle is actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defence penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a re-entry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defence penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing re-entry vehicles.

To Paragraph 14 of Article IV of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. For the purposes of the limitation provided for in paragraph 14 of Article IV of the Treaty, there shall be considered to be deployed on each heavy bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres the maximum number of such missiles for which any bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission.

Second Agreed Statement. During the term of the Treaty no bomber of the B-52 or B-1 types of the United States of America and no bomber of the Tupolev-95 or Myasishchev types of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be equipped for more than 20 cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

To Paragraph 4 of Article V of the Treaty

Agreed Statement. If a bomber is equipped for ASBMs equipped with IIRVs, all bombers of that type shall be considered to be equipped for ASBMs equipped with MIRVs.

To Paragraph 3 of Article VI of the Treaty

Agreed Statement. The procedures referred to in paragraph 7 of Article VI of the Treaty shall include procedures determining the manner in which mobile ICBM launchers of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in Article V of the Treaty, which undergo conversion into launchers of a type subject to that limitation, shall become subject to that limitation, unless the Parties agree that mobile ICBM launchers shall not be deployed after the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force.

To Paragraph 6 of Article VI of the Treaty

Agreed Statement. The procedures for removal of strategic offensive arms from the aggregate numbers provided for in the Treaty, which are referred to in paragraph 6 of Article VI of the Treaty, and which are to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission, shall include:

(a) procedures for removal from the aggregate numbers, provided for in Article V of the Treaty, of ICBM and SLBM launchers which are being converted from launchers of a type subject to the limitation provided for in Article V of the Treaty, into launchers of a type not subject to that limitation;

(b) procedures for removal from the aggregate numbers, provided for in Articles III and V of the Treaty, of bombers which are being converted from bombers of a type subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty or in Articles III and V of the Treaty into airplanes or bombers of a type not so subject.

Common Understanding. The procedures referred to in subparagraph (b) of the Agreed Statement to paragraph 6 of Article VI of the Treaty for removal of bombers from the aggregate numbers provided for in Articles III and V of the Treaty shall be based upon the existence of functionally related observable differences which indicate whether or not they can perform the mission of a heavy bomber, or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

To Paragraph 1 of Article VII of the Treaty

Common Understanding. The term "testing", as used in Article VII of the Treaty, includes research and development.

To Paragraph 2 of Article VII of the Treaty

First Agreed Statement. The term "significant increase", as used in subparagraph 2(a) of Article VII of the Treaty, means an increase of 15 per cent. or more. Any new ICBM test and training launchers which replace ICBM test and training launchers at test ranges will be located only at test ranges.

Second Agreed Statement. Current test ranges where ICBMs are tested are located: for the United States of America, near Santa Maria, California, and at Cape Canaveral, Florida; and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the areas of Tyura-Tam and Plesetskaya. In the future, each Party shall provide notification in the Standing Consultative Commission of the location of any other test range used by that Party to test ICBMs.

First Common Understanding. At test ranges where ICBMs are tested, other arms, including those not limited by the Treaty, may also be tested.

Second Common Understanding. Of the 18 launchers of fractional orbital missiles at the test range where ICBMs are tested in the area of Tyura-Tam, 12 launchers shall be dismantled or destroyed and six launchers may be converted to launchers for testing missiles undergoing modernization.

Dismantling or destruction of the 12 launchers shall begin upon entry into force of the Treaty and shall be completed within eight months, under procedures for dismantling or destruction of these launchers to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission. These 12 launchers shall not be replaced.

Conversion of the six launchers may be carried out after entry into force of the Treaty. After entry into force of the Treaty, fractional orbital missiles shall be removed and shall be destroyed pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph 1(c) of Article IX and of Article XI of the Treaty and shall not be replaced by other missiles, except in the case of conversion of these six launchers for testing missiles undergoing modernization. After removal of the fractional orbital missiles, and prior to such conversion, any activities associated with these launchers shall be limited to normal maintenance requirements for launchers in which missiles are not deployed. These six launchers shall be subject to the provisions of Article VII of the Treaty and, if converted, to the provisions of the Fifth Common Understanding to paragraph 5 of Article II of the Treaty.

To Paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty Agreed Statement. For purposes of testing only, each Party has the right, through initial construction or, as an exception to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, by conversion, to equip for cruise missiles, capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres or for ASBMs no more than 16 airplanes, including airplanes which are prototypes of bombers equipped for such missiles. Each Party also has the right, as an exception to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, to flight-test from such airplanes cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres and, after the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force, to flight-test ASBMs from such airplanes as well, unless the Parties agree that they will not flight-test ASBMs after that date. The limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty shall not apply to such airplanes.

The aforementioned airplanes may include only:

(a) airplanes other than bombers which, as an exception to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, have been converted into airplanes equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres or for ASBMs,

(b) airplanes considered to be heavy bombers pursuant to subparagraphs 3(c) or 3(d) of Article II of the Treaty; and

(c) airplanes other than heavy bombers which, prior to 7 March 1979 were used for testing cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

The airplanes referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this Agreed Statement shall be distinguishable on the basis of functionally related observable differences from airplanes which otherwise would be of the same type but cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres or for ASBMs.

The airplanes referred to in subparagraph (c) of this Agreed Statement shall not be used for testing cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres after the expiration of a six-month period from the date of entry into force of the Treaty, unless by the expiration of that period they are distinguishable on the basis of functionally related observable differences from airplanes which otherwise would be of the same type but cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

First Common Understanding. The term "testing", as used in the Agreed Statement to paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, includes research and development.

Second Common Understanding. The Parties shall notify each other in the Standing Consultative Commission of the number of airplanes, according to type, used for testing pursuant to the Agreed Statement to paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty. Such notification shall be provided at the first regular session of the Standing Consultative Commission held after an airplane has been used for such testing.

Third Common Understanding. None of the 16 airplanes referred to in the Agreed Statement to paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty may be replaced, except in the event of the involuntary destruction of any such airplane or in the case of the dismantling or destruction of any such airplane. The procedures for such replacement and for removal of any such airplane from that number, in case of its conversion, shall be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission.

To Paragraph 1 of Article IX of the Treaty

Common Understanding to subparagraph (a). The obligations provided for in subparagraph 1(a) of Article IX of the Treaty do not affect current practices for transporting ballistic missiles.

Agreed Statement to subparagraph (b). The obligations provided for in subparagraph 1(b) of Article IX of the Treaty shall apply to all areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.

Common Understanding to subparagraph (c). The provisions of subparagraph 1(c) of Article IX of the Treaty do not require the dismantling or destruction of any existing launchers of either Party.

First Agreed Statement to subparagraphs (e) and (f). The launch-weight of an SLBM or of an ASBM is the weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch.

Second Agreed Statement to subparagraphs (e) and (f). The throw-weight of an SLBM or of an ASBM is the sum of the weight of:

- (a) its re-entry vehicle or re-entry vehicles;
- (b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for targeting one re-entry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or more re-entry vehicles; and
- (c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release.

Common Understanding to subparagraphs (e) and (f). The term "other appropriate devices", as used in the definition of the throw-weight of an SLBM or of an ASBM in the Second Agreed Statement to subparagraphs 1(e) and 1(f) of Article IX of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more re-entry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more re-entry vehicles or for targeting one re-entry vehicle, which cannot provide their re-entry vehicles or re-entry vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 metres per second.

To Paragraph 2 of Article IX of the Treaty
Agreed Statement. Warheads of a cruise missile are independently targetable if manoeuvring or targeting of the warheads to separate aim points along ballistic trajectories or any other flight paths, which are unrelated to each other, is accomplished during a flight of a cruise missile.

To Paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty
First Agreed Statement. Deliberate concealment measures, as referred to in paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, are measures carried out deliberately to hinder or deliberately to impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

Second Agreed Statement. The obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures, provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, does not preclude the testing of anti-missile defence penetration aids.

First Common Understanding. The provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty and the First Agreed Statement thereto apply to all provisions of the Treaty, including provisions associated with testing. In this connexion, the obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures includes the obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing.

Second Common Understanding. Each Party is free to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including its encryption, except that, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, neither Party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

Third Common Understanding. In addition to the obligations provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, no shelters which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty shall be used over ICBM silo launchers.

To Paragraph 1 of Article XVI of the Treaty

First Common Understanding. ICBM launches to which the obligations provided for in Article XVI of the Treaty apply, include, among others, those ICBM launches for which advance notification is required pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed 30 September 1971, and the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, signed 25 May 1972. Nothing in Article XVI of the Treaty is intended to inhibit advance notification, on a voluntary basis, of any ICBM launches not subject to its provisions, the advance notification of which would enhance confidence between the Parties.

Second Common Understanding. A multiple ICBM launch conducted by a Party, as distinct from single ICBM launches referred to in Article XVI of the Treaty, is a launch which would result in two or more of its ICBMs being in flight at the same time.

Third Common Understanding. The test ranges referred to in Article XVI of the Treaty are those covered by the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 2 of Article VII of the Treaty.

To Paragraph 3 of Article XVII of the Treaty

Agreed Statement. In order to maintain the agreed data base on the numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article XVII of the Treaty, at each regular session of the Standing Consultative Commission the Parties will notify each other of and consider changes in those numbers in the following categories: launchers of ICBMs; fixed launchers of ICBMs; launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs; launchers of SLBMs; launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs; heavy bombers; heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres; heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs; ASBMs; and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs.

To Paragraph 2 of Article II of the Protocol
Agreed Statement. Warheads of a cruise missile are independently targetable if manoeuvring or targeting of the warheads to separate aim points along ballistic trajectories or any other flight paths, which are unrelated to each other, is accomplished during a flight of a cruise missile.

To Paragraph 3 of Article II of the Protocol
First Agreed Statement. If a cruise missile is capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

First Common Understanding. If a cruise missile has been flight-tested to a range in excess of 600 kilometres, it shall be considered to be a cruise missile capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

Second Common Understanding. Cruise missiles not capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres shall not be considered to be of a type capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable design features from cruise missiles of types capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres.

Second Agreed Statement. The range of which a cruise missile is capable is the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact.

Third Agreed Statement. If an unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicle which sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all vehicles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

Third Common Understanding. Unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and are not weapon-delivery vehicles, that is, unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles, shall not be considered to be cruise missiles if such vehicles are distinguishable from cruise missiles on the basis of externally observable design features.

Fourth Common Understanding. Neither Party shall convert unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles into cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres, nor shall either Party convert cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres into unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles.

Fifth Common Understanding. Neither Party has plans during the term of the Protocol to flight-test from or deploy on sea-based or land-based launchers unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles which are capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometres. In the future, should a Party have such plans, that Party will provide notification thereof to the other Party well in advance of such flight-testing or deployment. This Common Understanding does not apply to target drones.

Done at Vienna, on 18 June 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOR THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU,
CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE
SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR

MEMORANDUM
OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
A DATA BASE ON THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

For the purposes of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties have considered data on numbers of strategic offensive arms and agree that as of 1 November 1978 there existed the following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty which is being signed today.

	<u>United States</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Launchers of ICBMs	1,054	1,398
Fixed launchers of ICBMs	1,054	1,398
Launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs	550	576
Launchers of SLBMs	656	950
Launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs	496	128
Heavy bombers	574	156
Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers	0	0
Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs	0	0
ASBMs	0	0
ASBMs equipped with MIRVs	0	0

At the time of entry into force of the Treaty the Parties will update the above agreed data in the categories listed in this Memorandum.

Done at Vienna on 18 June 1979 in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOR THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

CHIEF OF THE
UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS
LIMITATION TALKS

CHIEF OF THE
USSR DELEGATION
TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS
LIMITATION TALKS

STATEMENT OF DATA ON THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS AS OF THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY

The United States of America declares that as of 18 June 1979, it possesses the following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty which is being signed today:

Launchers of ICBMs	1,054
Fixed launchers of ICBMs	1,054
Launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs	550
Launchers of SLBMs	656
Launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs	496
Heavy bombers	573
Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers	3
Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs	0
ASBMs	0
ASBMs equipped with MIRVs	0

18 June 1979

CHIEF OF THE
UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS
LIMITATION TALKS

STATEMENT OF DATA ON THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS AS OF THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that as of 18 June 1979 it possesses the following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty which is being signed today:

Launchers of ICBMs	1,398
Fixed launchers of ICBMs	1,398
Launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs	608
Launchers of SLBMs	950
Launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs	144
Heavy bombers	156
Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers	0
Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs	0
ASBMs	0
ASBMs equipped with MIRVs	0

18 June 1979

CHIEF OF THE
USSR DELEGATION
TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS
LIMITATION TALKS

SOVIET BACKFIRE STATEMENT

On 16 June 1979, President Brezhnev handed President Carter the following written statement:

"The Soviet side informs the United States side that the Soviet 'Tu-22M' airplane, called 'Backfire' in the United States, is a medium-range bomber and that it does not intend to give this airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. In this connexion, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this airplane in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the United States. Nor does it intend to give it such a capability in any other manner, including by in-flight refuelling. At the same time, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the production rate of this airplane as compared to the present rate."

President Brezhnev confirmed that the Soviet Backfire production rate would not exceed 30 per year.

President Carter stated that the United States enters into the SALT II agreement on the basis of the commitments contained in the Soviet statement and that it considers the carrying out of these commitments to be essential to the obligations assumed under the Treaty.

CD/30
3 July 1979
ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 2 JULY 1979 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
SPAIN TO THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA ADDRESSED TO THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT RELATING TO THE
DECISION ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEE ON 15 FEBRUARY 1979
CONCERNING THE AD HOC GROUP OF SEISMOLOGICAL EXPERTS

On instructions of my Government, I have the honour to inform you that, pursuant to the decision adopted by the Committee on 15 February 1979, my Government's intention is to be represented by an expert at the meetings of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. Having regard to the aforementioned decision, and if the Committee has no objection, Dr. Gonzalo Payo Subiza would be designated for this purpose.

Dr. Payo Subiza is one of Spain's leading seismologists. At present he holds the post of Director of the Observatorio Geofísico Central at Toledo. Further details of his curriculum vitae are at the Committee's disposal at the Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

(Signed) Fernando Benito
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

DOCUMENT IDENTIQUE A L'ORIGINAL

DOCUMENT IDENTICAL TO THE ORIGINAL