

SECURITY COUNCIL



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NOTE DATED 30 OCTOBER 1953 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE SEVENTY-SECOND REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 7 JULY 1950 (S/1588)

The representative of the United States of America to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to paragraph 6 of the resolution of the Security Council of 7 July 1950, requesting the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the United Nations Command.

In compliance with this resolution, there is enclosed herewith, for circulation to the members of the Security Council, the seventy-second report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16 June through 30 June 1953, inclusive.

53-30520

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA
FOR THE PERIOD 16 - 30 JUNE 1953
(Report No. 72)

I herewith submit report number 72 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16 - 30 June 1953, inclusive. United Nations Command communiques numbers 1647-1661 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Armistice negotiations continued in executive session with staff groups meeting daily to effect necessary changes in the Draft Armistice Agreement. On 16 June, Liaison Officers of both sides also met for several hours. On 17 June a plenary session, lasting twenty minutes, was conducted, and immediately thereafter staff groups resumed their daily meetings to continue their work of finalizing the Draft Armistice Agreement.

During the early morning hours of 18 June 1953, and without prior warning, a series of prisoner of war "escapes" were engineered through the Republic of Korea security guard personnel at anti-Communist prisoner of war camps on the South Korean mainland, which resulted in further delays in signing an armistice. The element of surprise from the Republic of Korea standpoint was complete. It is regrettable, however, that this precipitous action was taken in violation of United Nations Command authority.

The United Nations Command moved rapidly to retrieve the situation in so far as possible. The Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, immediately announced that this action was purely unilateral on the part of the Republic of Korea Government and was taken in spite of previous assurances from President Rhee that no such action would be taken without prior warning. Further, United Nations Command troops were designated to replace Republic of Korea Army troops at the prisoner of war camps without delay. United Nations Command patrols were dispatched to recapture as many prisoners as possible. The latter action could never be productive in view of the attitude of the South Korean populace which had been carefully instructed to provide refuge and assistance to the escaping prisoners.

Ground fighting continued to increase in intensity during the last half of June. Communist forces, ranging from company to division in strength, drove head on against United Nations Command outpost and main line of resistance positions fifty-six times during the period. Two actions of company or larger size were experienced by United Nations Command units in the western sector, thirty-nine by United Nations Command defenders in the central sector, and fifteen by United Nations Command elements in the eastern sector. The overall increase of activity was accompanied by a commensurate rise in artillery and mortar fire against United Nations Command units across the front. In one instance, the enemy employed 131,800 rounds of artillery and mortar during a twenty-four hour period, setting a record high for one-day expenditures.

A considerable increase in enemy activity was experienced across the western front during the period. Two enemy attacks of division and regimental size were reported against outpost positions of one United Nations Command division. Minor probes occurred elsewhere on the western front.

On the evening of 25 June the Chinese Communist Forces launched an aggregate division-size attack, heavily supported with artillery and mortar, against ten outpost positions of a United Nations Command division southeast of Sangnyong, astride the Imjin River. The United Nations Command defenders were reinforced and attempted to stem the enemy onslaught; however, by the morning of 26 June the United Nations Command had withdrawn from four outposts under heavy enemy pressure. One of these positions was reoccupied by the United Nations Command without enemy contact shortly before noon on 26 June. At the close of the period, the enemy continued to occupy the other positions.

Striking again on the night of 28 June, a Chinese battalion attacked the same United Nations Command division near outpost position "QUEEN", also southeast of Sangnyong. The United Nations Command defenders fought off the initial attacks. The Chinese, however, were reinforced to regimental size by the early morning hours of 29 June, and the friendly elements were forced off outpost "QUEEN" on the afternoon of 29 June. See-saw action was continuing in this sector at the close of the period.

Heavy fighting, resulting in the loss of some outpost positions and the denting of the United Nations Command main line of resistance, occurred across the central front. Particularly heavy fighting occurred near KUMHWA and west of the PUKHAN River.

In a United Nations Command division sector southwest of CHUNG DONG, outpost "HARRY" was again the scene of bitter fighting paralleling actions of the previous period. Early on the morning of 18 June an estimated enemy battalion attacked this United Nations Command outpost position and although the enemy employed extensive quantities of artillery and mortar he was forced to withdraw after hand-to-hand combat. An additional enemy assault against this position, during early morning hours of 24 June, was launched by an estimated two battalions. The United Nations Command reinforced with infantry and tanks; however, approximately three hours after the initial attack the enemy was able to partially overrun the position. Vigorous United Nations Command counterattacks resulted in the enemy's withdrawal shortly thereafter. Slightly to the east of outpost "HARRY", also during early morning hours of 24 June, an estimated reinforced enemy battalion, supported by 15,000 rounds of artillery and mortar, launched an attack against friendly main line of resistance positions of the same United Nations Command division. Two hours later the enemy reinforced with another battalion and continued the attack, slightly penetrating the main line of resistance. Elements of this United Nations Command division were quick to regain the initiative and within the hour had re-established the main line of resistance. The enemy withdrew his depleted forces northward shortly thereafter.

Ten attacks by the enemy from company to regimental size were initiated during the period against positions of a United Nations Command division deployed astride the KUMHWA complex. Additionally, just prior to the period an enemy attack of regimental size was launched in this sector. This assault by the enemy began at 142310 June when an enemy company, supported by artillery and mortar, launched the attack against main line of resistance positions of this division. The enemy reinforced piecemeal to regimental size during the battle. A see-saw fight continued until the United Nations Command defenders finally forced the beaten enemy to withdraw about daybreak on 15 June. During the period the enemy twice attempted to occupy this sector of the United Nations Command main line of

resistance, initially with a company attack early on 16 June and with a vicious two-battalion assault on 24 June. The latter enemy effort lasted for over three hours and the enemy suffered extensive casualties. The remaining eight enemy attacks against this United Nations Command division were concentrated near SNIPER RIDGE, northeast of KUMHWA, and commenced during the early morning hours of 24 June. One outpost position was lost to the enemy as a result of these attacks.

In the eastern portion of the central sector another United Nations Command division also experienced heavy fighting. Five enemy attacks of two-company to regimental size were reported occurring at the close of the previous period. One of these actions commenced at 142130 June when an enemy battalion attacked and secured United Nations Command outpost positions southeast of KUMSONG. On 15 June, in the same general area southeast of KUMSONG, the enemy launched one regimental and two two-company-size attacks against main line of resistance positions of this United Nations Command division, forcing slight withdrawals of some positions. The remaining action was initiated by the enemy late on 15 June. An enemy platoon, southeast of KUMSONG, later reinforced to battalion size, fought a losing two-hour battle against United Nations Command defenders. During the current period, the enemy mounted twenty company to battalion-size attacks against elements of this division. With the exception of one minor company-size attack to the east, these attacks were concentrated near FINGER RIDGE, southwest of TALCHON-NI. From early morning of 16 June until late on 20 June, the enemy mounted a total of eighteen company and battalion-size attacks against these United Nations Command positions. The initial attack commenced at 160015 when an enemy company engaged a United Nations Command position for twenty-five minutes before being forced to withdraw. In the same area, ten minutes later, an enemy battalion launched an attack which penetrated the friendly main line of resistance position; however, friendly counterattacks contained the enemy thrust. Another enemy battalion, early on 16 June, slightly to the west, was successful in securing one United Nations Command-held hill. United Nations Command counterattacks recaptured this terrain feature on the night of 21 June. On the night of 16-17 June the enemy mounted three attacks of company and battalion size against the embattled defenders of the main line of resistance of this United Nations Command division. Friendly forces were slowly forced to give ground to

the vicious onslaught of the numerically superior attackers; however, vigorous friendly counterattacks resulted in a general re-establishment of former positions. From 18 to 20 June the enemy continued to apply pressure by mounting twelve-company and two-company-size attacks against the United Nations Command outpost and main line of resistance positions near FINGER RIDGE. In all cases, after brief periods of heavy fighting for control of friendly positions, the enemy was forced to withdraw his depleted forces. The last attack during the period against elements of the division was an ineffective company-size attack on 27 June in the same area. The enemy was forced to withdraw after an hour of sporadic fighting.

Another United Nations Command division, west of the PUKHAN River, was attacked by an estimated enemy regiment on the evening of 25 June. Heavy fighting followed with a few outpost positions in the hands of the enemy by noon of the following day. The United Nations Command forces counterattacked and on the evening of 26 June had reoccupied the previously lost position. During the night of 26-27 June, this same position changed hands several times, ending up under United Nations Command control on the morning of 27 June. Enemy counterattacking forces had re-established control over the position at the close of the period. The remaining significant action initiated by the enemy against this division was an enemy company-size attack against an outpost position on the afternoon of 27 June. The determined enemy force reinforced with a battalion-size unit but was unable to penetrate the friendly main line of resistance. After a four-hour firefight the enemy was forced to break contact.

As the period opened the United Nations Command division deployed astride the PUKHAN River was determinedly fighting back against elements of two enemy divisions which had mounted attacks on 15 June. Fighting valiantly, the outnumbered troops took a heavy toll of the enemy force but were slowly forced to withdraw to the PUKHAN River, giving up bitterly contested outpost and main line of resistance positions. Fighting subsided in this sector until the evening of 26 June when elements of an enemy regiment stormed main line of resistance positions and thrust south, setting up roadblocks on the United Nations Command main supply routes. Other elements of the enemy regiment attacked, overran, and occupied several additional friendly positions. Two more company-size attacks were initiated in the same general area by the enemy late on 27 June; however, these attacks were unsuccessful.

Heavy fighting along the eastern front was concentrated in the sector from the PUKHAN River east to the MUNDUNG-NI Valley. During the period there were fifteen Chinese attacks of company-size or larger in this sector. Additionally, there was one brief and unsuccessful North Korean company-size attack early on 19 June against elements of another United Nations Command division farther east.

East of the PUKHAN River, one United Nations Command division repulsed four company and battalion-size attacks launched by the Chinese Communist Forces between 22 and 27 June. One of these attacks, of company-size on 22 June, was insignificant and of short duration. The remaining three enemy thrusts occurred on 26 and 27 June, with the enemy initially being successful in penetrating United Nations Command outpost positions southwest of MULGUJI. At the close of the period determined fighting was still in progress.

As the period opened another United Nations Command division west of the MUNDUNG-NI Valley was experiencing heavy fighting as a result of four company to battalion-size attacks launched by the Communists on the night 15-16 June. United Nations Command defenders were successful in repulsing all but one enemy effort, which resulted in the loss of a United Nations Command held hill, south of MULGUJI, to an enemy two-company-size assault. Friendly counterattacks met stiff enemy resistance; however, the hill was temporarily regained by the United Nations Command forces early on 17 June. A see-saw battle for this terrain feature continued through 19 June, with both sides gaining short time control of the position. Early on 19 June friendly elements launched a concerted effort and by daybreak on 19 June had occupied the position and were in control at the close of the period. Between 19 and 24 June the Chinese Communist Forces in this sector mounted seven other company-size or larger attacks against the CHRISTMAS HILL complex, also south of MULGUJI; with little success. Slight withdrawals made by the United Nations Command defenders were followed by persistent counterattacks to contain and expel the enemy forces from friendly positions.

United Nations Command Naval aircraft, operating from fast attack carriers in the Sea of Japan, struck pre-selected targets and targets of opportunity from the main line of resistance throughout northeast Korea to the Manchurian Border. In spite of seven days of non-operational weather, almost two thousand sorties were flown during the period.

Nearly nine hundred fifty direct-support sorties were flown in support of United Nations Command ground forces along the front lines from the Iron Triangle to Kosong. The targets on these strikes consisted of enemy supply and billeting areas, gun positions, bunkers and trenches. Accurate evaluation of the results of many of these attacks often was prohibited due to the nature of the target or to the nature of this type of mission.

Strikes continued unabated along the main supply lines leading from Manchuria southward along the Korean East Coast to the main line of resistance. These attacks resulted in the destruction of rail cars and trucks. In addition, a number of bridges and tunnels were destroyed or damaged and rail and road cuts were inflicted.

The enemy's rear supply and billeting areas were struck almost daily. Many buildings were destroyed or damaged as a result of these strikes and an undetermined number of casualties were inflicted. Enemy coastal defense positions along the south coast of Wonsan Harbor and on Hodo Pando continued to receive special attention in continuation of the effort to neutralize this particular threat to our surface forces and friendly-held islands in Wonsan Harbor.

Strikes were made on certain major enemy airfields for continued unserviceability. The airfields at Sondok Hoemun, Chongjin and Kilchu were bombed and numerous craters were made on the runways. Photographic reconnaissance on 30 June revealed that the airfields at Hyesansin and Hamhung West were non-operational. In addition Konpo, Wonsan and Yoeryong airfields were kept under close observation.

In order to check the nightly harassing sorties of low flying enemy aircraft, four Corsair fighter aircraft with experienced pilots and specially modified for night fighter use were based at a United Nations Command airfield in South Korea. On the night of 29 June one of these planes intercepted and destroyed two aircraft identified as enemy YAK-18s in the Suwon area.

United Nations Command surface vessels continued the blockade of the Korean East Coast from the vicinity of Kosong to Chongjin. Marginal weather, heavy seas, and low-lying fog over coastal areas reduced the effectiveness of short bombardment in some instances. However, routine patrols were carried out and key targets along the coast were fired on daily. These targets consisted of coastal supply routes, rolling stock, gun positions, supply and industrial areas.

A United Nations Command battleship and two cruisers with destroyers assigned rendered direct support for front line ground forces during the period. These gunfire support missions were conducted against enemy strongpoints, gun positions, bunkers, supply areas, trenches and supply routes. In addition illumination and harassing fire was provided nightly.

Enemy coastal defense gun positions in Wonsan Harbor, particularly along the southern approaches to Yonghung-Man and on the southern coast of Hodo Pando were active and aggressive during the period. Although to a lesser degree, coastal guns in vicinity of Hungnam and Tanchon were also active. The enemy fired six hundred thirty-eight rounds, ranging in caliber from 75mm to 155mm, at ships in these areas. Numerous rounds were also fired on friendly-held islands in Wonsan Harbor. These batteries appeared willing to engage in gun duels with any surface unit up to and including a heavy cruiser. Although United Nations Command ships were cautious and used evasive tactics when within range of known enemy gun positions, four ships received direct hits. In no case was the operational effectiveness of the ship seriously impaired. Personnel casualties were very light.

In continuation of a concerted effort begun in April several gun strikes and co-ordinated air-gun strikes were conducted against these positions during the period. As a result a number of the positions were destroyed and in other cases the positions were silenced or neutralized. Unfavorable weather conditions precluded a number of scheduled strikes on these positions, and only surveillance of the area could be conducted at these times.

United Nations Command surface units continued their anti-train patrols conducting harassing and interdiction fire along the coastal main supply routes between Hungnam and Songjin and fired on key targets, as the opportunity presented itself, as far north as Chongjin. Unfavorable weather conditions limited the effectiveness of these gunfire missions in many instances. On 25 June a United Nations Command destroyer stopped a train approximately ten miles northeast of Tanchon. With the assistance of another destroyer the locomotive and five boxcars were destroyed. Several additional boxcars were damaged.

Marine aircraft based in Korea struck at the enemy with more than one thousand six hundred combat sorties. Over eight hundred of these sorties

were close air support flown in support of United Nations Command troops along the front lines. Many bunkers, gun and mortar positions, supply and personnel shelters and enemy strongpoints were destroyed on these close support missions. Enemy supply lines and build-up areas, dams, troop concentrations, and other military targets were hit by almost three hundred fifty interdiction sorties. In addition numerous armed reconnaissance, intercept, and escort sorties were flown throughout North Korea. A majority of the escort missions were with United Nations Command Superforts hitting special targets deep in North Korea.

As the enemy's night harassing raids increased during the month, Marines flying radar equipped night fighters destroyed one PO-2 biplane and probably destroyed another in the Inchon-Seoul area.

United Nations Command carrier based aircraft operating off the Korean West Coast continued their strikes on enemy targets from the front lines to the Chinnampo area. Marginal to non-operational weather reduced the effective sorties during the period. However, in spite of this, nearly five hundred fifty sorties were flown. Attacks were pressed on troop billeting areas, transportation facilities, supply areas and gun positions throughout the Hwanghae Province. Many rail cuts were inflicted on the main supply routes in the Changyon, Chaeryong, Sariwon and Haeju areas and a number of rail cars, bridges, and trucks were destroyed. Attacks were also made on particularly troublesome coastal gun positions around the perimeter of the Hwanghae Province. Attacks on troops in villages resulted in the destruction of a number of buildings. Many troop casualties were also inflicted. More than one hundred of the total sorties were in direct support of United Nations Command ground forces along the front lines. Due to unfavorable weather conditions, a majority of these missions were electronically controlled and damage was not assessed.

United Nations Command surface units operating off the Korean West Coast continued to carry out routine patrols and blockaded the coastline around the perimeter of the Hwanghae province. These vessels successfully defended the friendly-held islands north of the 38th Parallel by maintaining constant surveillance to detect and prevent aggressive moves by the enemy. Coastal communications, troop concentrations and other coastal targets were harassed almost daily by gunfire.

Coastal areas, anchorages, and channels were maintained free of mines by daily minesweeping operations and check sweeps by United Nations Command minesweepers. A number of mines were sighted and sunk by surface units along the Korean East Coast during the period. Almost all these mines were MKB, M-26, and MYAM types. Most of these mines were old as indicated by the heavy coverage of barnacles and other marine growth. This represents a greater than normal number of sightings for a fifteen-day period. However, it was probably caused by the heavy seas during the period tearing them loose from their moorings.

Patrol planes flew ninety-nine sorties during the fifteen-day period. These planes continued to support the United Nations Command effort in Korea by conducting daily shipping surveillance, anti-submarine and weather reconnaissance missions over the waters surrounding Korea.

As a result of continued maximum effort of the combatant forces, whenever weather permitted, United Nations Command Naval auxiliary vessels continued their round-the-clock supply and replenishment of the operating forces. United Nations Command Naval auxiliary vessels and transports provided personnel lifts and logistic support for the United Nations Command forces in Korea.

Air operations throughout the period were highlighted by record breaking MIG kills, new sortie records and continued heavy close air support for United Nations Command ground forces who have been under almost constant attack by Communist forces. Adverse weather dominated the battle areas throughout the period, but did not materially disrupt air operations.

In maintaining air superiority, Sabrejets found exceptionally good hunting in the skies high over northern Korea. During the two week period, fifty-five MIGs were destroyed and twenty-four damaged. A new record was established on 30 June, when fifteen MIGs were shot down in a single day. No Sabrejets were lost in air to air encounters.

United Nations Command fighter bombers flew 5,920 effective sorties during the last half of June. Thunderjets and bomb-carrying Sabrejets paced United Nations Command air assaults, pounding enemy battleline positions and smashing Communist transportation and supply centers throughout the peninsula. Over 2,000 sorties per day on 16 and 17 June established new highs in sortie rates. Fighter bombers and light bombers also more than doubled the previous mark for close support strikes against the enemy battleline positions for similar periods. 3,600 fighter bomber sorties were flown against enemy front line

positions and a considerable concentration of ordnance was directed against the attacking Communist hordes in the PUKHAN River Valley in the east central sector. Poor weather hampered the assessment of these strikes, however hundreds of personnel shelters, buildings, supply shelters, vehicles, rail car and road bridges were observed destroyed and road and rail cuts made. Spotter aircraft continued their role in successfully controlling the close support strikes.

Further north, fighter bombers destroyed rail bridges, tanks, road bridges, vehicles, buildings, personnel shelters and rail cars. In addition road and rail cuts were made and many troop casualties inflicted. The airfield at Kangdong was cratered in sixteen places. At Hamsi airfield a POL dump was destroyed and the airfield cratered. Sabrejets, Thunderjets, light bombers on their night intruder missions over the main supply routes in North Korea, destroyed hundreds of vehicles and made many road cuts. Several day interdiction missions were flown also, but in most cases poor weather prevented assessment of strike results. Close support effort continued to be directed against enemy front line positions in all sectors of the battleline and on several occasions more than seventy sorties were flown by the light bombers during a single twenty-four hour period in this role.

United Nations Command Superforts were active in saturating battleline targets throughout the two week period in support of United Nations Command troops. Close support sorties totaled sixty-one for the period. Medium bombers continued their neutralization of selected North Korean airfields, pounding the runways at Saamcham, Pyongyang Main, Pyongyang downtown Sinuiju, Taechon, Uiju, Sinuiju Northeast and Sinanju, rendering them unserviceable. The Superforts encountered intense flak, powerful searchlights and a few fighters, but were not deterred in their missions. In addition sixty-seven sorties were directed against supply areas and troop concentrations throughout North Korea.

Fourteen sorties were flown, to carry Psychological Warfare leaflets to all areas of northern Korea.

Combat cargo aircraft flew normal logistical airlift of supplies, equipment and personnel in support of United Nations Command operations in Korea.

Search and Rescue Units completed 200 sorties, in which six downed United Nations Command aircrew members were rescued from behind enemy lines and seventy-five personnel were evacuated from friendly positions to rear area hospitals.

United Nations Command leaflets and radio broadcasts made factual reports on the continuing discussions and negotiations with the Republic of Korea, and with the Communists, to arrange an end to hostilities. Particular emphasis was also placed on summarizing the monumental efforts which have already been made by the United Nations Command and other agencies of the United Nations to give economic assistance to the Korean people in rebuilding and rehabilitating their nation in the wake of Communist aggression. The numerous contributions by various member nations to this difficult program are being fully reported to the Korean people.

The United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea (UNCACK) was reorganized and redesignated as the Korea Civil Assistance Command (KCAC), so as to operate under the direct supervision of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. The chief purpose in creating KCAC was to assure a more efficient administration of the economic assistance being extended to the Republic of Korea by the member nations of the United Nations through the Unified Command. In activating the Korea Civil Assistance Command under the direct control of Headquarters, United Nations Command, two intervening command echelons were eliminated. The Korea Civil Assistance Command will administer all phases of civil assistance rendered by the United Nations Command to the Republic of Korea including formulation of programs for relief and support of the civilian population, distribution of relief supplies and carrying out projects of reconstruction and rehabilitation which are not undertaken by the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency.

