
Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

14 May 2008
English
Original: French

Second session

Geneva, 28 April–9 May 2008

Summary record (partial)** of the 5th meeting

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Wednesday, 30 April 2008, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Yelchenko(Ukraine)

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- * No summary record was prepared for the 4th meeting.
 - ** No summary record was prepared for the rest of the meeting.

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The meeting was called to order at 10 a.m.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (agenda item 4) *(continued)*

1. **Mr. Djumaliev** (Kyrgyzstan) said that at no time since the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had the nuclear question been posed so sharply, having regard to the growing risk of nuclear terrorism, the erosion of disarmament and non-proliferation norms, the weakness of the “strengthened NPT review process”, non-compliance by States with their Treaty obligations and the complacency of too many States parties concerning the scale and urgency of those challenges. He hoped that the current session of the Preparatory Committee would help to strengthen the NPT review process and that States parties, having settled procedural questions, would turn their attention to matters of substance.

2. At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, Kyrgyzstan had applauded the adoption without a vote of three decisions and one resolution on the Middle East. Five years later, his delegation had supported the adoption of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Today, it must regretfully be acknowledged that the high expectations of participants to the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences had not been realized. He very much hoped that the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference would mark a further step towards the verifiable and irreversible reduction of all categories of nuclear weapons and that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, which Kyrgyzstan had ratified in October 2003, would enter into force at an early date.

3. One of the most promising approaches to disarmament and non-proliferation was the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. On 8 September 2006, the States in Central Asia had signed a treaty aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, which had been ratified by Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The five Central Asian States were convinced that the establishment of such a zone would help to strengthen peace and security at the regional and global levels. It should be noted that the States parties to that treaty were required to conclude an additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

4. Given that the world had undergone significant change in recent years and faced new proliferation challenges, the NPT regime must adapt to those changing circumstances, in particular to the growing risk of nuclear terrorism. In that regard, it should be noted that Kyrgyzstan had joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and supported the IAEA’s efforts to strengthen the international safeguard system. Kyrgyzstan had signed an additional protocol in June 2007 and had plans to ratify that important verification instrument without delay. It also supported the efforts being made to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to implement United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). The previous autumn Kyrgyzstan had hosted an international workshop to promote the implementation of that resolution. Every effort must be made to reduce the possibility of terrorists gaining access to fissile materials and especially to highly enriched uranium. In that regard, his country supported efforts, such as those initiated by Norway at the 2005 NPT Review Conference aimed at increasing the security of existing stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, as well as efforts to strengthen export controls and to reduce illicit trafficking in nuclear material.

5. Insufficient attention had been given in the past to the serious issue of the environmental consequences of nuclear weapons programmes. Concerned by that issue, Kyrgyzstan had acceded in 2007 to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. There were large quantities of radioactive toxic waste left behind by the mining industry in Kyrgyzstan, some

of which had been found in the transboundary rivers it shared with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan deeply appreciated the efforts by the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Asian Development Bank and the IAEA to help it address the serious environmental and economic problems it faced. Kyrgyzstan called on States and other international organizations to assist it in disposing of the radioactive contaminants in the region and in organizing an international conference on that global problem, together with the United Nations Development Programme.

6. The role of education and training as a tool to promote disarmament and non-proliferation was a vital but often neglected issue. Kyrgyzstan welcomed the recommendations adopted by the United Nations Group of Experts on the subject and recalled General Assembly resolution 57/60, which had been adopted without a vote in 2002. It appreciated the leadership shown by Japan, among other States, with regard to the issue of education and training in the context of the NPT and welcomed the organization of two special events on that subject, which would be held during the current session of the Preparatory Committee. Kyrgyzstan welcomed the opportunity to find common ground on the most important disarmament and non-proliferation issues in order to ensure the long-term integrity, effectiveness and relevance of the Treaty.

7. **Ms. Abdulrahman** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) associated herself with the statement delivered by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as with the statement delivered by the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic on behalf of the Arab Group. The Preparatory Committee was meeting during difficult times, given that many countries were concerned at setbacks in the implementation of the main obligations set out in the NPT and at recent trends that ran counter to the fundamental principles applicable to relations between States. The main objective of the Treaty, which was to ensure international peace and security, could be achieved only through the instrument's internationalization. All States, without exception, should accede to the Treaty; regrettably, however, that was not the case. States with nuclear weapons continued to maintain destructive arsenals, threatening to use them against States lacking nuclear weapons when they considered it necessary to protect their interests. In so doing, they flouted all existing resolutions and decisions on the subject. In recent years, a number of events had demonstrated that it was impossible to achieve international peace and security if States used or threatened to use weapons of mass destruction; those goals could be achieved only through mutual constructive cooperation and dialogue. It was in that spirit that, on 19 December 2003, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had decided to renounce any programme involving weapons of mass destruction. It wished in this way to associate itself with countries that aspired to live in peace and security, as well as to underscore the fact that States with nuclear weapons had the duty to act responsibly. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya also wished to promote the principle banning the threat or use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction against any country.

8. Several decades after the adoption of the NPT, the nuclear threat persisted. Too little progress had been made in the area of nuclear disarmament, and the objectives of the Treaty had not been realized. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya would like to see measures taken to defend the NPT, preserve its credibility and uphold its three pillars, which were disarmament, non-proliferation and international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. With regard to disarmament, States that possessed nuclear weapons should reaffirm their commitment to that objective by ensuring that the specific measures adopted at the 2000 Review Conference were implemented and by demonstrating transparency in the area of nuclear stockpile reduction. As to non-proliferation, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya supported the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards System and reaffirmed that the only body competent to oversee that System and to deal with all relevant questions on the subject was the IAEA. It urged all States to conclude an additional protocol with the Agency. The third pillar granted States an inalienable right with regard to the development of research,

production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination. In that connection, the text of the NPT should not be reinterpreted in such a way as to prejudice the exercise of that right. The limits imposed on exports of nuclear technology and nuclear materials for peaceful uses were a violation of the rights of States that did not possess nuclear weapons.

9. A number of States, including Israel, continued to develop nuclear weapons with the help of nuclear-weapon States. As a result, the Middle East and Mediterranean regions currently found themselves threatened by Israel's nuclear weapons capability. The fact that Israel was conducting a nuclear programme that fell outside the NPT monitoring system constituted a threat to international peace and security and undermined the Treaty's credibility and comprehensive safeguards system. She drew attention to the resolution on the Middle East that had been adopted by the 1995 Review Conference, which had reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal accession to the Treaty and had called on all States of the Middle East that had not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya regretted that no progress whatsoever had been made in that direction. It hoped the Preparatory Committee would allow sufficient time to reflect on ways of ensuring implementation of the aforesaid resolution and would set up a subsidiary body to consider that issue.

10. **Mr. Uhonoibhi** (Nigeria) said that the Nigerian delegation associated itself with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the NPT. He stressed that the best way to guarantee that the Treaty served the interests of States parties was to ensure strict compliance with its provisions. Nigeria hoped the Conference on Disarmament would see the rapid commencement of negotiations on a multilateral, non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials, since such an instrument would help to achieve the goal of nuclear non-proliferation.

11. It was no less important to reconcile States' right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with the requirements of non-proliferation. All States must affirm their commitment to the moratorium on nuclear testing and to the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In that regard, the Nigerian delegation encouraged States that had not yet done so — particularly those whose ratification was necessary for its entry into force — to ratify the CTBT without further delay.

12. He noted that at its sixty-second session the General Assembly had adopted resolution 62/36, entitled "Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems", which had been introduced by Chile, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland and Nigeria, arguing that by adopting such a measure nuclear-weapon States could demonstrate their willingness to take practical steps towards disarmament and to build trust.

13. For years, non-nuclear-weapon States had consistently called for the conclusion of a legally binding instrument that would provide comprehensive and unconditional security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them. Such a balanced and non-discriminatory instrument could help to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

14. **Mr. Bauwens** (Belgium) said that he wished to add some comments to the statement made by the presidency of the European Union. He stressed the need to take full advantage of the NPT review process, which provided a regular opportunity to see whether it was necessary to adapt the Treaty to changing circumstances. Belgium was of the view that the review process should take into account the effects of globalization on the changing political environment and on questions of security, the economy, energy and the environment. Technological advances in the nuclear field, as well as increased access to nuclear energy, opened up many possibilities but also posed a number of challenges calling for innovative measures to preserve the relevance of and ensure compliance with the

international non-proliferation regime. Belgium considered that all States should recognize that the verification standard best suited to those new challenges was one consisting in a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol to that agreement, and it encouraged all States that had not already done so to take the corresponding legislative measures. It called on the Islamic Republic of Iran and on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to respond positively and urgently to the wishes of the international community and to cooperate with the IAEA.

15. The Belgian delegation also highlighted the importance of a cooperative and purposeful approach and in that connection welcomed Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), reaffirmed on 25 April 2008 by Security Council resolution 1810 (2008). She pointed out that Belgium had signed the Proliferation Security Initiative and had joined the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

16. International cooperation to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should also be strengthened. The balance between rights and duties called for careful study, as did proposals and initiatives on the nuclear fuel cycle, and role of the IAEA in that context should be clearly established.

17. Belgium took the view that the clue to the total elimination of nuclear weapons was a firm commitment to reducing nuclear arsenals. It supported a method based on transparency, verification and irreversibility. It attached particular importance to the reduction and, ultimately, complete elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons, and it called on the nuclear Powers to pursue unilateral reductions in their tactical nuclear weapons arsenals and to gradually codify them, bearing in mind the necessary verification measures.

18. The Belgian delegation believed that universal accession to the NPT would promote international peace and security, and it called on States that were not yet parties to the Treaty to ratify it as non-nuclear-weapon States and on signatory States to continue to be bound by the Treaty.

19. **Mr. Aleinik** (Belarus), associating himself with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the States parties of the Non-Aligned Movement, said that Belarus accorded equal importance to the three pillars of the NPT: disarmament, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It also considered that, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the decisions taken at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, there was a need to discuss the regional aspects of non-proliferation, in particular, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Belarus was the first country of the former Soviet Union to have voluntarily renounced possession of nuclear weapons following the dismantling of the USSR. Statements made by nuclear-weapon States on measures relating to the reduction of their strategic weapons, although positive, were not sufficient in view of the technological advances made, the new types of weapons developed and the persistence of defence doctrines that envisaged the possible use of nuclear weapons. As the State most affected by the Chernobyl disaster, Belarus found the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons to be unacceptable as a means of resolving any international dispute. In addition, it called on States that had not already done so to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as soon as possible.

20. The Belarusian delegation was in favour of strengthening the non-proliferation regime. In view of the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the materials that could be used by terrorists to manufacture them, it called on the international community to give effect to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and to promote universal accession to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. It moreover welcomed other measures taken at the international level, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and

the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. In its view, the present Members of the Conference on Disarmament should begin negotiations, without further delay, on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

21. Belarus had ratified the NPT in 1993 as a non-nuclear-weapon State. In 1994, the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland had pledged to respect the independence and sovereignty of Belarus and, in particular, not to exert economic pressure on it. For its part, Belarus had voluntarily renounced the possession of nuclear weapons. However, in 2007, the United States, having forgotten its pledge, had applied economic sanctions against certain petrochemical companies in Belarus. In so doing, it showed that it complied with its international obligations selectively. Belarus stressed in that connection the importance of concluding a legally binding international instrument on negative security assurances.

22. Promoting the peaceful use of nuclear technologies in sectors as varied as energy production, health care, agriculture and environmental protection was likewise of importance. The IAEA had the necessary tools to provide all interested States with equal and non-discriminatory access to the benefits of nuclear energy for the purpose of development. States pursuing programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy should do so with total transparency and in accordance with the letter and spirit of their obligations.

23. **Ms. Göstle** (Austria), associating herself with the statement delivered by Slovenia on behalf of the European Union, said that Austria had contributed in recent years to strengthening the instruments aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. However, in order to ensure a comprehensive framework that provided the necessary safety and security for generations to come, progress had to be made in parallel in various areas. Austria strongly supported recent statements by certain leaders from nuclear-weapon States advocating a world without nuclear weapons, and it urged them to pursue their efforts in that direction, particularly since it corresponded to one of the objectives of the NPT.

24. In its capacity as co-president of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry of Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Austria continued to raise awareness about the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the scientific civil applications of the international monitoring system set up under it, so as to promote better understanding of the benefits of speeding up the process of ratifying and implementing the Treaty. It was not possible to develop a comprehensive legal framework in the nuclear field while ignoring the possible dangers of nuclear technology and adopting a short-sighted policy based on national economic interests fears of limitation of State sovereignty or loss of control over a key technology sector. It was time to design a framework that was suited to the realities of the twenty-first century and that restricted the use of the most dangerous technologies — enrichment and reprocessing — to facilities under multilateral control, while applying the rules of transparency and ensuring that legitimate users could obtain the fuel supply they needed. In recent years, the IAEA and several States, especially suppliers, had proposed a variety of interesting approaches along those lines.

25. Austria believed that an initial step could be to entrust the IAEA with the role of virtual broker for all transactions in the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, which would make transactions more transparent and contribute to more confidence among nations. That transparency would gradually be supplemented by IAEA control rights over users of sensitive technology, in particular enrichment and reprocessing facilities. In the long term, new facilities would be placed under multilateral control from the start. It went without saying that the companies operating those facilities would continue to manage them and reap the profits and that they would remain the sole proprietors of their technologies. The role of the IAEA would be to monitor operations and to ensure that buyers fulfilled their non-proliferation obligations. It would in no way be a matter of preventing access to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. All States would fully maintain their NPT rights, including

under article IV of the Treaty. However, enjoying a right could also mean deciding to exercise it together with other States or through an international organization. By entrusting control of the facilities to the IAEA, States would make joint use of their right and would benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear technology in a safe and equitable manner at lower cost. Control by the IAEA meant fair and reliable distribution of nuclear fuel to the countries that had chosen nuclear energy. Joint facilities placed all participants under more scrutiny, which strengthened security. New facilities would be built exclusively for economic reasons, not for reasons of strategic politics or national pride. As a consequence, there would be fewer facilities — only as many as needed — and the IAEA would thus be in a position to monitor more carefully. The proposal was admittedly ambitious, but it was neither new nor unrealistic. Over 50 years ago, the founding members of what was today the European Union had successfully placed potentially dangerous substances and technologies, such as coal, steel and nuclear technology, under the control of joint multilateral institutions. The system being proposed by Austria could be at the core of a new framework for international security, which would also include the additional protocols concluded with the IAEA, the future fissile material cut-off treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and a strengthened NPT with universal membership.

26. **Mr. AL-Hayen** (Kuwait), associating himself with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as with that of the Syrian Arab Republic on behalf of the Arab Group, said that the world was regressing in terms of the goal of achieving universal accession to the NPT, which remained the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation system. By failing to implement the decisions and outcomes of previous Review Conferences and by being selective in their recognition of the extent to which the Treaty was legally binding, some States parties were weakening the credibility of that instrument, undermining all the efforts made to date and mutual trust between States, and jeopardizing regional and international security and stability. Kuwait was gravely concerned at the prevailing international situation, particularly in the Middle East region, where security was threatened by the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction despite the 1995 resolution concerning the region. The situation highlighted the failure of the Treaty to achieve security for the States that were parties to it. He therefore hoped that all States parties would comply with their obligations under the NPT and under the safeguards agreements concluded in respect of it, and that they would cooperate closely with the IAEA through negotiations and constructive dialogue so as to clarify all doubts and questions raised by their programmes. In that connection, Kuwait demanded of Israel — the only Middle East country possessing nuclear weapons that had not acceded to the NPT — that it accede to the Treaty, rid itself of its nuclear arsenal and bring all its nuclear facilities within the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards System. It likewise demanded of the international community that it should stop bolstering the sale of the scientific and technological resources that could help Israel or any other country to produce nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.

27. Reaffirming the important role of the United Nations Organization in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, he urged NPT member States to adhere to their commitments and to cooperate and coordinate with each other to that end. He deplored the lack of political will to implement internationally agreed arrangements. In the view of Kuwait, the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference should focus on: the non-selective implementation of all NPT provisions, in particular article VI concerning disarmament and article IV concerning facilitation of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology; adherence to the principles adopted at the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, as well as to the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences; the adoption of more effective measures to encourage States that had not yet acceded to the NPT to do so immediately; strong reaffirmation of the inalienable right of States to have

access to the necessary technology, development and expertise for the peaceful use of nuclear energy within the limits allowed by relevant international treaties; closer cooperation with the IAEA in order to dispel any ambiguity surrounding nuclear programmes; strong reaffirmation of the content of the Final Declaration of the Fourth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; support for efforts aimed at creating a legally binding international instrument on the illegality of the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons to resolve conflicts and at providing assurances to non-nuclear States in that regard; and adherence to the 1995 resolution to make the Middle East region a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction.

28. **Ms. Ashipala-Musavyi** (Namibia), associating herself with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, said that in the process of ensuring that atoms of mass annihilation were transformed into atoms for peace and prosperity, one should never lose sight of the untold and endless suffering and deaths that could result from the use of nuclear weapons.

29. Namibia believed that upholding all three pillars of the treaty was the most viable means of achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Namibia fully subscribed to the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and arms control, and reiterated that the multilateral setting offered by the NPT provided security for all countries — whether or not they were nuclear-weapon States — and that universal accession to the NPT could not be realized in a context of regional proliferation.

30. Namibia, which remained committed to the full implementation of the NPT, wished to draw attention to the Algiers Declaration, which made reference to the Pelindaba Treaty, reaffirmed the importance of universal accession to the NPT and to the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards System, reiterated the need for balanced and non-selective implementation of the NPT provisions and stressed the primary role of the IAEA in the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The right of States parties to such peaceful uses was thus integral to the Treaty.

31. Moreover, the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) would greatly enhance the international regime for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The international community had given ample proof of its support for the CTBT, as evidenced by the fact that 178 States had signed and 144 ratified the Treaty, and Namibia strongly urged all countries that had not yet done so to sign and ratify that instrument.

32. Lastly, conscious that access to nuclear fuel was of paramount importance to all NPT States parties, the Namibian delegation believed that the views of all member States should be taken into account and that comprehensive and transparent consultations should precede any substantive consideration of the question. She concluded by reiterating that one must resist the temptation to create the impression that there were good and bad nuclear weapons: the promotion of selective disarmament, based on double standards, was tantamount to encouraging nuclear proliferation.

33. **Mr. Alfarargi** (Observer for the League of Arab States), taking the floor at the invitation of the Chairman and welcoming the opportunity extended to regional organizations to deliver a statement during the general debate, said that the main task at the current session was to re-establish a balance in examining the three pillars on which the Treaty rested. He wished to comment on those issues on which a frank dialogue was necessary in order to arrive at viable solutions.

34. Firstly, nuclear-weapon States confined themselves to reducing their arsenals in quantitative terms, while simultaneously continuing to develop new generations of nuclear weapons as part of their defence and security strategies. Such a situation merely confirmed

doubts about the sincerity of the intentions of some States to make progress in the direction of disarmament.

35. Secondly, on the question of making the signing of an additional protocol a precondition for the purchase of new technologies for peaceful uses, which would create new obligations for States parties, the League of Arab States had stressed at the Council of Foreign Ministers in September 2007 that violation of the right of States to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes was unacceptable. The League collectively rejected the entire set of proposals for making the additional protocol a compulsory instrument.

36. Thirdly, on the question of access to nuclear fuel, there was a need to put in place a multilateral mechanism guaranteeing to all States parties the possibility of acquiring the necessary fuel by means of a transparent process divorced from all political considerations and without laying down conditions that might infringe on the right of States to possess and develop nuclear technologies for peaceful uses.

37. Lastly, the League of Arab States considered it essential to implement the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. Thirteen years after the adoption of that resolution, Israel still refused to accede to the NPT and to bring its nuclear facilities within the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards System. Noting that all the Arab States had acceded to the Treaty without — as Israel was currently doing — invoking the Arab-Israeli conflict as an excuse to hold back, the League wished to reaffirm that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region was essential to building trust and preventing an arms race. The League was surprised that certain NPT signatory States considered it reasonable for Israel to set peacebuilding as a precondition for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, thereby lending support to the dangerous argument that such weapons guaranteed security to those who possessed them.

38. As it had pointed out in numerous resolutions, the League of Arab States was firmly opposed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and was convinced that, in order to halt their proliferation, it was necessary to break with the current selective approach biased towards certain States in favour of one that engaged all parties in dialogue so as to ensure the credibility and viability of the NPT regime.

39. **Mr. Oliveira** (Observer for the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC)), also taking the floor at the invitation of the Chairman, said that the ABACC had been established for the purpose of managing and applying the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials instituted in 1991 by Argentina and Brazil. The system was currently applicable to the approximately 70 nuclear facilities present in those 2 countries, and 110 inspections were carried out each year with the support of the national authorities, which provided the ABACC with human and economic resources as well as scientific and technical facilities.

40. ABACC had become an essential instrument of transparency and rapprochement between the two countries on the path leading to non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and promotion of the peaceful use of atomic energy. On the strength of its 17 years of existence, the ABACC enjoyed considerable standing in the international arena and was recognized as a major contributor to the international non-proliferation system.

41. In the view of the ABACC, the contemporary world with its ever-increasing energy needs left no room for disingenuousness. The fact must be recognized that nuclear energy was poised to play a fundamental role. Several nations, opting for a new approach, today considered nuclear reactors as reliable energy sources and an expansion of all activities related to the nuclear production chain could reliably be predicted. The last 53 years had clearly demonstrated that understanding and cooperation among nations were the best guarantee of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and the IAEA and the ABACC had made mutual cooperation central to their joint activities under the quadripartite agreement on the

exclusively peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. The positive results of that agreement attested to the high level of understanding and cooperation achieved. It was to be noted in that regard that, in paragraph 7 of the document INFCIRC/153, the Board of Governors of the IAEA had highlighted the role of regional agencies and had requested the IAEA to take due account of their technical effectiveness. In Part I of the IAEA's "Programme 93 + 2", adopted in 1995, enhanced cooperation with the national or regional systems had likewise been cited as a way of improving the effectiveness of safeguards.

42. Against the background of the decision by the Argentine and Brazilian Governments to reactivate their nuclear programmes, and the signing early in 2008 by the Presidents of both countries of a cooperation agreement in the nuclear field, covering in particular nuclear power reactors and uranium enrichment and providing for Argentina and Brazil to continue working together in an open and transparent manner with every guarantee that such materials would be used for peaceful purposes, the ABACC was set to play an even more significant role and to increase its inspection, accounting and control activities.

The discussion covered in the summary record ended at 11.45 a.m.