

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.490
28 February 1989

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 28 February 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Aldo Pugliese (Italy)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 490th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Conference continues today its consideration of agenda items 1, "nuclear test ban", and 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Japan, Peru and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada.

Mr. YAMADA (Japan): Allow me to extend to you, Sir, my belated congratulations upon your assumption of the office of President for this important month of February. With your profound knowledge and experience and under your able leadership, we are able to embark on this year's work with renewed vigour.

May I also pay my tribute to Ambassador Ali Shams Ardekani of the Islamic Republic of Iran for presiding successfully in the closing months of last year's session?

On behalf of the delegation of Japan, I would like to express our most sincere gratitude to all the Governments represented here in this Conference for participating at such a high level in the funeral of His late Majesty Emperor Showa last Friday. Before proceeding to my present post, my wife and I were received in audience in the Imperial Palace, and His late Majesty instructed us to make friends with colleagues in the Conference and do whatever we could for the cause of peace. His late Majesty was always with us, with the people, and wrote in one of his last poems:

"Joy and sorrow
I shared with my people
Year by year
I lived and learned."

The good will shown at this event, we take as your feeling toward what we are and what you expect us to be. We Japanese shall try our best, in reciprocating your good will, to work for a better world.

On 16 February last year, I referred in this plenary to a pervasive anticipation that 1988 would bring about significant developments in the multilateral disarmament process. Today, one year later, I venture to say that the events of 1988 proved this anticipation to have been well founded. Though there have been ups and downs, expectations and disappointments, we discern some underlying trends clearly in motion in the international community. Let me enumerate a few of these trends.

In the relationship between the two super-Powers, the practice of constant dialogue has firmly taken root. One can justifiably look forward to

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this dialogue being irreversibly continued under the new Administration in the United States. Japan, for its part, hopes that this process can act as a catalyst to open vistas for multilateral negotiations on major disarmament items. The significant progress towards the settlement of long-standing regional conflicts or hostilities in Afghanistan and the Gulf has been brought about in large measure by the mediation efforts of the United Nations. Further, the parallel negotiations on further confidence- and security-building measures and on conventional disarmament in Europe will commence next week in Vienna. Though these negotiations will necessarily call for painstaking and sustained efforts on the part of all those concerned, the agreement, after two years of intensive work, on the mandate for negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe marks a historic breakthrough. It is significant that there have also been some important unilateral initiatives whose implications on Europe and other regions of the world merit in-depth consideration.

In the multilateral arena, the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, though without a consensus final document, proved to be a valuable process from which emerged areas of broad convergence such as a nuclear test ban, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the importance of the early conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. The forty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations reflected these areas of convergence, as well as the emerging priorities on conventional disarmament and on issues which cut horizontally across various disarmament areas, such as verification. Most recently, we were greatly encouraged by the success of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. I wish to pay the sincere tribute of my Government to former President Reagan of the United States for taking the initiative for such a conference, and to the Government of France, and especially to Ambassador Pierre Morel, for their untiring and constructive contributions which were crowned with success. I shall address its implications for our work a little later in this statement.

While these trends give us reason for hope, we should not be content only with what takes place outside the Conference. The attention of the international community is focused more and more on the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. With due respect to the sincerity and hard work by the members, to be blunt, I feel constrained to say that we have achieved very little indeed in the Conference. The world is watching how we can take advantage of these outside trends and produce tangible, concrete results. There is much that we have to do here in the Conference.

Let me, in this light, address three areas of particular importance to Japan. Though we see a trend of shifting of priorities to conventional and chemical-weapon disarmament, the issues related to nuclear weapons continue to be of high priority to the Japanese people, who solemnly pray that nuclear weapons will ultimately be eliminated so that a nuclear holocaust can never be repeated. In the view of my delegation, it is no accident that there were tentative but broad convergences in the course of SSOD-III on nuclear disarmament, a nuclear test ban and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

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at a time when we were about to enter the preparatory process towards the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1990. Japan attaches particular importance to the maintenance and strengthening of the NPT régime, and considers that the Fourth Review Conference can be an important watershed for the Conference of the Parties in 1995 which, under article X, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, must determine "whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods".

In this review process which is to go on for the next six years, we will need to consider the issues of nuclear disarmament, a nuclear test ban and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in their interrelationship, and devise a coherent multilateral strategy which will ensure peace and security for all of us. If anyone takes it for granted that nuclear non-proliferation will continue without serious effort on real issues of nuclear disarmament, he will regret such a judgement. I wish to note in particular the commitment contained in the preamble of the NPT to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end.

It is in this overall context that I wish to appeal to all delegations to grapple seriously with the long overdue problem of initiating substantive work on item 1 of our agenda, "Nuclear test ban". Our continued failure to do so can only affect adversely the process I have just referred to, in which the attention of the international community will be focused, among others, on progress on a nuclear test ban. I do believe that we already have in our hands the necessary parameters which, taken together, should enable us to bring us out of the log-jam in the establishment of an ad hoc committee.

The bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in accordance with their joint statement of 17 September 1987 led to the historic Joint Verification Experiments, which seem to have brought the two sides very close to the completion of the first phase of the full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations, namely the ratification of the threshold test-ban Treaty of 1974 and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty of 1976. The momentum should be maintained in an irreversible manner, so that the two sides can proceed without delay to the second phase, namely, negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing.

A prolonged philosophical debate on bilateral versus multilateral negotiations is not likely to lead us very far. What we need is rather to seek parallel progress on both the bilateral and the multilateral fronts. As I have stated before, none of the draft mandates officially tabled by the groups for the establishment of an ad hoc committee has received consensus support. We must squarely face the political realities. A prolonged repetition of the established positions of each group on the mandate question does not help us start substantive work. That is why I renew my appeal to all those concerned to show one more sign of flexibility. Japan believes that the draft mandate in document CD/863 tabled by Czechoslovakia, which takes into account the various positions does indeed constitute a very useful basis for developing a consensus, and is happy to note that similar views are held by an increasing number of States across the Groups.

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Since the beginning of this session, quite a few delegations have addressed themselves to this question and expressed their strong desire to start substantive work in an ad hoc committee on this item, indicating possible flexibility. I noted with keen interest such statements in the plenary as those by the distinguished representatives of Morocco, India, Burma, Yugoslavia, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. Let us try to translate these signs of hope and flexibility into concrete action in this Conference as soon as possible in the 1989 session. I continue to believe that it would also be the best and only way to meet the concern of the international community as a whole, including those who are calling for a conference to amend the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963.

Once we engage in substantive work on a nuclear test ban, as I hope indeed we do, verification will be a main aspect which will merit in-depth, thorough examination from the scientific, security, political and other angles. I highly appreciate the groundwork for this being laid by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts, and look forward to further valuable contributions in this regard. At the same time we may be coming to a point where we should start thinking seriously about the multiple facets of verification from a broader and more purpose-oriented perspective, and give proper guidance to the work of the GSE. The forthcoming United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues to be held in Kyoto from 19 to 22 April, originally proposed by Prime Minister Takeshita, will provide a useful opportunity for policy-makers and scientific experts to brain-storm on a nuclear test ban and other important disarmament issues. It is hoped that the discussions there, though not directly linked to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, may stimulate further thinking for our work in the future.

The prohibition of chemical weapons is one of the most urgent and achievable tasks before us. Japan participated in the Paris Conference with the basic recognition, as Foreign Minister Uno said in his statement, that "so long as chemical weapons are allowed to exist, mankind can never be freed from the danger of the use of these weapons, and conversely, so long as the possibility of their use is left open, we can never rid the world of chemical weapons". We succeeded in mobilizing world opinion to check the undesirable trend of erosion of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and chemical weapons proliferation. It remains for us in the Conference on Disarmament to translate the determination expressed in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference into reality by concluding a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction at the earliest date.

The positive impact of the Paris Conference is also demonstrated by the fact that we now have 22 non-members participating in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, a significant step forward toward ensuring the universality of the convention. I particularly welcome the countries in Asia and the Pacific - the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Viet Nam, participating in the chemical weapons negotiations for the first time.

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Even with the best of efforts and intentions, the convention cannot be finalized and brought into effect overnight. We will have to work very intensively to resolve a number of hard-core issues. As we engage in these efforts in the negotiations here in the Conference on Disarmament, it is also vitally important that we foster further the international climate conducive to the early conclusion and entry into force of the convention. As paragraph 4 of the Paris Declaration states, each of us is called upon to exercise restraint and to act responsibly, in meeting the concern of the international community caused by the growing danger posed to international peace and security by the risk of the use of chemical weapons as long as such weapons remain and are spread.

As for the negotiations before us in the coming months, I believe that we are now into the final crucial phase where some fundamental hard-core issues have to be faced and resolved. Some issues do not lend themselves to easy solutions if we just look at them piecemeal in isolation. That is why I welcome the approach taken by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Pierre Morel, and the chairmen of the five working groups in their working programmes to address the remaining issues in their interrelationship in a structured manner. As we proceed further, it will probably become increasingly necessary for us to consider some issues which cut across different working groups.

With this in mind, let me comment on what I consider to be the priority issues. In Group 1, we have the opportunity to bring together the various loose ends on the subject of verification. With respect to on-site inspection on challenge, the experience of my delegation, which had the honour of chairing Group C in the 1988 session, indicates that we now have in the "rolling text" a fuller picture than before of what a challenge inspection régime based on the assumption of "any time, anywhere, without the right of refusal" may look like. At the same time, basic issues remain, such as the specificity of the request, the alternative arrangements, the involvement of the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties after the submission of the report and possible further actions. Underlying these issues seem to be different perceptions among States as to the nature of challenge inspections, including their usability, and how their security, industrial and other interests may be affected when challenge inspection is invoked against them. If there are such differences, they need to be thrashed out further in search of common ground.

It is also time for each of us to take a considered look at the whole range of verification measures contained in the convention, with a view to ensuring that these measures give reasonable confidence that the objectives of the convention will be fulfilled. For this reasonable confidence to be felt by all States parties, it is important that the burden resulting from the application of verification measures should fall equitably among States parties in a manner commensurate with the risks they pose to the objectives of the convention. My delegation is open to examining closely whether there are gaps in the verification measures that need to be filled. In doing so, we consider it important that the whole balance of rights and obligations throughout the spectrum of various verification measures should be considered. For example, when we consider the risks to the convention which

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may be posed by particular chemical agents or facilities, we should ask ourselves whether the risks to the convention increase in simple proportion to the toxicity of the agent or the number of relevant facilities, or whether other factors should also be taken into account. Care should be exercised to ensure that no particular State or group of States is unduly penalized, and that the technical secretariat is not politicized, either wittingly or unwittingly.

In addition to the above, my delegation is looking forward to the pooling of experience from our national trial inspections, which should give us practical guidance in bringing the current verification provisions closer into line with reality. Japan has conducted its national trial inspections on several schedule [2]-related facilities since last autumn, and is now preparing the report. This practical experience, together with the accumulation of data provided voluntarily by States, should give us a more realistic idea of the staffing requirements and costs of the organization, which will be addressed in Group 3. It is hoped that the work in Group 1 on verification, in Group 3 on staffing requirements and costs, and in Group 5 on data exchange and the Preparatory Commission, will bring us closer to a truly balanced and cost-effective verification régime.

The new additions to the "rolling text", in appendices I and II, of the elements on confidentiality provide useful general parameters for the consideration of this issue, which merits careful consideration in ensuring that the convention gains full public acceptance, and is lived up to by our civil chemical industries. We look forward to further elaboration of the related provisions, in constructive dialogue with our industries.

My delegation notes with appreciation the focus in the work programme on several underlying political and legal problems. They represent the hard nuts that we have to crack to achieve a meaningful and effective convention. Among these issues, the question of how non-compliance or violations should be dealt with is a major unresolved problem which runs throughout the convention and merits in-depth examination. Though my delegation does not necessarily feel that "sanctions" in the normal sense of the term provide the best answer to the problem, it will be necessary to address this problem through the whole spectrum from the question of ambiguities or anomalies arising in the course of inspection to the possibility of sanctions.

At this early stage of the 1989 session, I have limited myself to presenting my views on these few items. I do sense that there is again in this Conference a considerable degree of anticipation on what we may be able to achieve this year. It is up to us to make this come true. I pledge the full co-operation of my delegation to that end.

Before concluding, may I extend my warm welcome to the distinguished representatives who have joined the Conference since my last intervention in the plenary of 18 August 1988? I look forward to working closely with Ambassador Aung Thant of Burma, Ambassador Sharma of India, Ambassador Houlliez of Belgium, Ambassador Dietze of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, Ambassador Reese of Australia, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, Ambassador Vajnar of Czechoslovakia and Ambassador Bullut of Kenya.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement, and for the kind words addressed to me. At the opening of his statement Ambassador Yamada recalled the passing away of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and the mandate entrusted to him by the Emperor. We and our countries had occasion to pay our respects to the Emperor, and I wish now to reiterate to Ambassador Yamada our deep condolences for such a loss suffered by the people of Japan. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador de Rivero.

Mr. de RIVERO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, first of all I would like to convey to you the satisfaction of my delegation at your accession to such an important post for the month of February. The fact that the Conference has taken significant steps forward in the organization of its work bears witness to your acknowledged experience and great diplomatic talent. Allow me also to extend a warm welcome to the new colleagues who have joined this negotiating forum since October of last year. I am referring to the Ambassadors of Australia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, India, Pakistan, the German Democratic Republic and Sweden. My delegation wishes them every success in discharging their functions, and assures them of all necessary co-operation.

This year in the Conference on Disarmament, we have all chosen and given priority to chemical disarmament. All the Conference's topics have given up some time and made room for the negotiations on chemical disarmament. The Peruvian delegation thinks that this is right and logical, because since the Paris Conference it would appear that there are greater political possibilities for chemical disarmament. We might say that at present chemical disarmament is less difficult than making progress in other areas, for instance nuclear disarmament. That is all very well, but this also involves a risk because if, on this subject that we have chosen and to which we have given priority because of its political possibilities, we do not come up with a draft convention by the end of this year or the beginning of next year, then, if we cannot manage to do this, if we cannot manage to make maximum possible headway in disarmament now, this could cause irreparable damage for the work of the Conference on Disarmament and could have a depressing effect on all the work in general. For this reason, we should be resolutely determined to make progress in the negotiations on chemical disarmament. It is absolutely vital to do so because all the confidence that we may place in the Conference on Disarmament in the future is at stake. For these reasons, my delegation would like to focus this statement on agenda item 4, on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Mr. President, my delegation was particularly pleased to see the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, for the reasons that I have just described, as well as the election of Ambassador Pierre Morel to chair its work. Nevertheless, it cannot hide a degree of disappointment at the unexpected difficulty encountered by the Conference in adopting an updated mandate in the light of the important results of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Even if we proceed from the assumption of transparency which underlay the consensus on the Final Declaration that was adopted in Paris by 149 countries on 11 January this year, it remains

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paradoxical that the reaffirmation of political will and commitment to ban chemical weapons as soon as possible has not been reflected in a new mandate that would enable the Ad hoc Committee to agree on a draft convention (without needing to refer to a final version) during this session of the Conference, or by the very latest in 1990. And what is most paradoxical is that the reasons for which a group of countries has not been in a position to go along with the consensus promoted by the Group of 21, with the support of the socialist countries and China, are not at all clear, at least officially. It is to be hoped that this state of mind, which is at variance with the spirit of Paris, will change in the coming months for the benefit of all of us and all peoples throughout the world, who are waiting for the conclusion of negotiations which, once and for all, will lead to the final elimination of all chemical weapons, as well as facilities and equipment designed to produce them.

For all these reasons my delegation welcomes the restructuring of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to facilitate the thematic treatment of the present "rolling text". The proliferation of footnotes, square brackets, appendices and annexes has turned this document into gibberish for the uninitiated. There is an urgent need to streamline it, rationalize its content and possibly structure it in such a way that at the end of this session we will be able to have a cleaner, more coherent text without any interruptions, which is closer to the format and language of a convention and not what we have now, which looks rather like a hybrid, because it tends to mix the setting of standards with the regulatory aspects. If there is a conviction that this is inevitable, then it will be necessary to see how far we have to go with regulatory clarifications or aspects.

Despite what I have said, the establishment of five working groups at first sight deserves a somewhat cautious welcome, because of the risk of overlapping of subjects, or watering down of subjects which are differentiated but complementary. Another additional problem with this distribution of work is that which will face delegations with a small number of members that have to follow all the activities of the Conference on Disarmament with the same zeal. My delegation greatly appreciates the steps taken by Ambassador Morel of France to minimize the difficulties that might stem from the functioning of these five working groups, as well as this commendable initiative of favouring the Group of 21 with the chairmanships of three of these working groups, which is an important precedent. It is to be hoped that the good will that inspires Ambassador Morel and his remarkable skill and diplomatic tact will enable the Committee to overcome its own mandate, politically speaking, and place the Conference on the home straight of the negotiations in 1990.

The Final Declaration of the Paris Conference had the merit of casting light on some of the basic issues which are still awaiting a solution in the Ad hoc Committee. First, we have the problem of "second use" by way of recourse to retaliation or self-defence. In paragraph 1 of the Paris Final Declaration there was evidence of the unwillingness of some States that are parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to withdraw the reservations that they have made in this regard. Obviously, every State has sovereign power to indicate the conditions within which it expresses its consent to be bound to a treaty. Nevertheless, the problem arises when that position is in conflict

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with its decision to negotiate a convention designed to prohibit and destroy chemical weapons. The fact that the Conference on Disarmament has not managed to add the prohibition of use to its mandate this year only reconfirms this uncertainty and gives rise to doubts about the intrinsic value of the entire negotiating exercise that has been under way now for some years.

Secondly, we have the problem of the proliferation of chemical weapons. Paragraph 4 of the Final Declaration did not accurately reflect the state of thinking and feeling at the Paris Conference about this. On the one hand, there was the concrete and urgent problem of halting the production and refinement of chemical weapons. And on the other, nothing was done to avoid the risk of an increase in the number of States with the capability to produce chemical weapons, a risk which could be smaller if certain supplier States were less complacent in their trade policies. Discussions are being held on whether the two aspects of chemical weapons proliferation can be dealt with on an equal footing, but what there can be no doubt about is the indissoluble link between them, as well as the frame of reference established by the priorities in the negotiations on disarmament which are set forth in the Final Document of 1978.

This question of proliferation leads me to make a few remarks on the principle of undiminished security. As understood by my delegation, this principle cannot come to an end with the agreed 10-year destruction period. It is obvious that during that time there will be greater interest in avoiding any deterioration in the existing levels of security for each State. But, in addition to the bilateral, regional and global dimensions in which this principle should be seen, it cannot in any way serve as a pretext for discriminating qualitatively or quantitatively among stocks in the order of destruction, nor for justifying a delay for certain chemical-weapon States parties as compared to other States parties in the process of destruction of their respective chemical stockpiles. In the view of my delegation, the mere fact of becoming a party to the convention should offer States parties sufficient proof of the good will and necessary mutual trust of all concerned with a view to the full achievement of the objectives set out in the convention. In other words, the principle of undiminished security cannot be based on the implicit presumption of suspicion, but on the conviction that the confidence and political will of the States parties for the full application of the convention must be strengthened. Consequently, we must not await the entry into force of the convention to ensure that this principle is applied. There is a need for prior work, basic and preventive work from the moment the convention is adopted and opened for signature, in order to avoid any change in regional or subregional security levels as far as chemical weapons are concerned, or any vertical multiplication of the existing chemical arsenals. It would be illogical and of dubious morality if, during the negotiation of the convention and the time necessary for its entry into force, the world were made to witness an ill-timed chemical arms race, however discreet, cloaked in the precept of undiminished security which should subsequently govern the destruction of larger and more deadly arsenals.

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Another dimension concerning this issue of undiminished security is that which will arise on the day after the end of the 10-year period for the destruction of chemical weapons. Proceeding from the logical assumption that all States parties will faithfully comply with the obligations entered into, one may suppose that the chemical industry, including the pharmaceutical industry, will continue its development, handling chemicals which may be more sophisticated and dangerous. This possible or probable risk brings us out of the political dimension to the human dimension of undiminished security. Once chemical weapons, for example, have been destroyed and eliminated forever from the face of the Earth, the most urgent problem in the next century will undoubtedly be chemical pollution of the environment, with its negative and indiscriminate effects. For these reasons, we consider that the drafters of the convention must not overlook this potential threat, and one may suppose that the future international organization will not remain indifferent or defenceless in the face of this problem which homo sapiens is inflicting on himself. Therefore, Peru believes that article X on assistance and protection could far-sightedly provide for assistance and support to those States parties that are victims of chemical disasters which cause great harm to their people or go beyond national borders with the ensuing implications for the integrity of ecosystems. This is an issue that demands consideration in future negotiations.

Another question arising out of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference relates to the role that the United Nations should play in bringing about the total prohibition of chemical weapons. My delegation believes that the convention cannot institutionalize a parallel system; the arrangements must fall within the broader system of the United Nations. Therefore, besides drawing on the purposes and principles of the Charter, the convention could bring about a correlation between the two international instruments in order to resolve situations in which a State party was, for instance, confronted by a State that is not a party, or in those cases involving two or more States that are not contracting parties to the convention. The interest here lies not only in the production and maintenance of stockpiles, but also in possible allegations of use. It is to be hoped that improved machinery to carry out investigation missions can be supplemented by another system entailing the application of sanctions so that there will be some sort of disincentive to States that might wish to stand aloof from the convention.

There is no doubt that the verification system to be established under the convention cannot be absolute nor can it decipher the private intentions of States parties. This is very difficult. In other words, it should be based on good faith, mutual trust and the willingness of all to abide faithfully by commitments that have been entered into. From this angle it is necessary to have ad hoc inspections as a way of dispelling any doubts that might arise out of a routine inspection but that are insufficient to give rise to a formal allegation. However, care will have to be taken that this procedure does not lead to a sort of hysteria causing an unnecessary increase in the costs of verification. Without achieving absolute verification we can ensure a reasonable and financially feasible level of verification if we proceed from the presumption of the good faith of all.

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Finally, the institution of the competent national authority should be elaborated upon further. For the present my delegation considers that the convention should contain an article devoted specifically to the national authority, with provisions drafted in a generic way, endeavouring not to be exhaustive, because of the wide variety of possible forms that the national authority might take, depending on the capacity of the chemical industry of each State party. But it would be desirable to give the national authority the status of the State party's sole representative vis-à-vis the international organization, and also to declare it competent in matters of co-ordination with regard to all the sectors covered by the convention for each State party. Finally, it is also desirable that a State should designate its national authority at the same time as it deposits its instrument of ratification or accession to the convention.

The question of amendments is of special importance if we take account of the special nature of the convention which we are negotiating. We are legislating on something new, and so the fundamental precept underlying the convention must be its privileged nature. Obviously, like any human endeavour, the convention may be subject to improvement; nevertheless, the commitment should be to safeguard its integrity to the greatest extent possible. Proceeding from the assumption that amendments will be the last resort available, once attempts to reform this multilateral instrument from within have failed, it would be of great value, in the view of my delegation, to establish a special régime during the 10-year period of transition. A kind of pause or truce could be provided for during the destruction stage as far as the presentation of amendments is concerned. We do not envisage the triggering of the amendment procedure during a critical period of implementation of the convention, since that might jeopardize the principle of undiminished security. If, after the 10-year period, the contracting parties agree that it is necessary to amend the convention, a distinction should be made between the convention as such, or main treaty, and the additional annexes or protocols. In the former case, a stricter procedure could apply, especially if the amendments involve fundamental obligations set forth in the convention, both as regards acceptance of the amendments and as regards their entry into force. We cannot set aside the rule of unanimity, which would be accompanied by a waiver clause to avoid deliberate or involuntary vetoes. In the second case, it would be advisable to adopt a simpler procedure, in keeping with the nature of the amendments, which would not entail any fundamental changes in the convention.

My delegation will play an active part in the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee and the five working groups, with the aim of contributing to the speedy conclusion of the ongoing negotiations, which, as I said at the beginning of this disquisition, constitute a very important responsibility for us all.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I should now like to give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): As 28 February is the last day of your presidency, allow me to express my satisfaction at the manner in which you have guided the work of the Conference in the month that is now ending. Today the Soviet delegation has taken the floor in order to communicate the results of a trial inspection held in the Soviet Union, which was organized at a chemical facility near the town of Dzerzhinsk in the Gorky region. At this facility, among other chemicals, certain dialkylaminoethanols are produced. These chemicals, as you know, are included in the "rolling text" for further consideration from the standpoint of their possible inclusion in schedule [2]. The national experiment, including the necessary preparatory work, was conducted during the period September-December 1988. It was based on the recommendations contained in document CD/CW/WP.213. The results of the experiment are set out in the report which we have passed to the secretariat for publication as a document of the Conference and the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the symbols CD/894 and CD/CW/WP.225.

In the course of the experiment two types of inspection were tried out. First of all there was the initial visit provided for in the annex to article VI of the draft convention. It included a detailed inspection of the areas of the facility, including production areas, storage facilities for raw materials and finished production, the control centre, administrative areas and laboratories. When the flow chart was examined the specific characteristics of the equipment were studied and the key points at which the production process could be monitored were identified. As a result an agreement was prepared on the facility, on the basis of which a routine inspection was subsequently conducted. The initial visit took five days, of which two days were required for the preparation of the draft agreement on the organization of the systematic inspection of this facility. Next, monitoring equipment was set up at points on the process path which had been identified in the course of the initial visit. These operations were carried out over a period of 24 hours during a scheduled shutdown of the production process, and therefore did not affect the operation of the facility as a whole. Between that moment and the holding of the routine inspection samples were taken automatically, hermetically sealed and placed in a sealed container.

The routine inspection was conducted in the course of one day. A further day was required for the preparation of the report of the inspection team. The inspectors examined the production equipment, checked the condition of the seals on the monitoring and measurement apparatus and samplers, checked the instrument readings and compared them with the facility records. A number of staff of the facility were questioned. When the inspectors arrived at the facility, the sample container was opened in their presence and two samples were extracted. The analysis of these samples, as well as the samples taken on the initial visit, was conducted on the spot (in the facility laboratory) by representatives of the facility in the presence of one of the inspectors. Both on the initial visit and on the routine inspection the inspection team was made up of four persons. It included a specialist in monitoring (team leader), a specialist in chemical technology, a specialist in monitoring and measuring instruments and automation, and a specialist in physical and chemical methods of analysis. They were all representatives of the Ministry of Chemical Industry of the USSR. In addition, the routine on-site inspection

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was attended by representatives of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Ministry of Defence of the USSR.

In the course of the inspection, issues relating to the maintenance of confidential information were addressed. In actual fact, no real problems arose in this area, as all those participating in the experiment, including the observers, have specific obligations under Soviet legislation. Nevertheless, in the course of the inspection the management of the facility drew the attention of these persons to the degree of confidentiality of each type of information. The participants studied the question of what information can be conveyed to the technical secretariat and what should be retained at the facility. As a result of the holding of the national experiment, it was recognized that, in cases where the inspection team detected no violations at the facility, it might perhaps compile a short report, in the form of replies to questions based on the inspectors' mandate. Where breaches of the provisions of the convention were detected, a more detailed report would have to be drawn up. It should include information confirming the violations detected.

Generally speaking, the national experiment confirmed the practical applicability of the monitoring procedures agreed upon during the negotiations, and supplied answers to a number of concrete questions which have yet to be considered in detail in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons (duration of inspections, specific composition of the inspection team, etc.). The experiment also demonstrated that it is possible to conduct inspections without disrupting the operations of chemical plants.

The results of the experiment, the specific procedures followed, and actual data on production and consumption of chemicals are set out in greater detail in the report. Official documents used during the experiment are annexed to the basic report. These are: the initial declaration concerning the facility; a notification regarding the proposed production of dialkylaminoethanols in 1989; a facility agreement, prepared on the basis of the results of the initial visit, containing a detailed description of areas and buildings, the technology and production processes, measuring points and sampling points, etc. Annexed to the agreement are a layout diagram of the facility indicating its position in relation to Dzerzhinsk and the railway line, a diagram of the dialkylaminoethanol production plant, a diagram of the principal material flows in the facility, a plan of the facility, a schematic of arrangements for monitoring output of chemicals, and a schematic of the dialkylaminoethanol production monitoring system. We have also attached the mandates for the initial visit and for routine inspections, which were followed by the inspection team, as well as the inspection team's reports on the initial visit and the routine inspection. Although the inspection team did not observe any violations or divergences from standard procedure, the outline for the conduct of the national experiment included various violation scenarios which were "acted out" in theoretical terms and reflected in the report, and also in a special document entitled "Possible instances of discrepancy between the actual situation and earlier declarations concerning a facility". I should like to draw attention to the fact that in the context of actual application of the convention, part of the information contained in the report should not, in our opinion, be forwarded to the technical secretariat

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but should remain at the facility. However, guided by a desire to do our utmost to promote the analysis of the results of national experiments, we put this information in the report.

In submitting this report, the Soviet delegation considers that it will contribute towards "fine tuning" of the system for monitoring the production of key precursors. Naturally, our experts will be prepared to provide any clarifications required and answer any questions you may have.

We note with satisfaction that three reports have already been submitted - from Sweden, Hungary and Italy - and that 13 other States have either conducted or intend to conduct national trial inspections and to submit reports on them. A positive factor is the fact that the trial inspections are being conducted not only by members of the Conference on Disarmament but also by States participating in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons as non-members of the Conference.

We consider that the holding of national trial inspections testifies to the fact that the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons have entered a decisive stage, where work on the drafting of the future convention is going hand in hand with practical preparation for its entry into force.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement, and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I have no other speakers on my list for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage?

I should now like to make my concluding statement.

Since this plenary meeting is the last one for the month of February, allow me, as President of the Conference for this month, to make a few remarks regarding the work done by the Conference until now.

First of all, I would like to express to all of you my sincere gratitude for the spirit of co-operation you have shown, for the effective support you have so kindly granted to my presidency, and also for the many expressions of friendship addressed to me. The Conference on Disarmament opened this year's activities in a promising world climate, which was not only characterized by the satisfactory trend in East-West relations, but also by the significant progress towards solution of many local conflicts and by the general decrease in international contention. In the multilateral arena the successful outcome of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of use of chemical weapons was undoubtedly an event of primary importance, which raised growing expectations for the specific work of this Conference and the disarmament process in general.

Right at the outset of my term of Office, the Conference was able to adopt its agenda for the 1989 session, including the programme of work for the first part of the session. To our great satisfaction, we have witnessed this year an interesting and encouraging increase in the number of applications to participate in our work put forward by a number of non-member States, which

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were all admitted. At the same time significant progress was made which enabled various problems relating to the internal organization of the Conference to be rapidly solved.

We were also able to re-establish the ad hoc committees on item 6, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", and item 7 "Radiological weapons", including the appointment of their respective chairmen, Ambassador Ardekani of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Ambassador de Rivero of Peru. Furthermore, the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament resumed its work under the chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles.

Owing to the assistance and good will of all, it has also been possible to reach agreement on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, under agenda item 4, appointing moreover an able Chairman, Ambassador Morel of France, to that subsidiary body. As you are all well aware, many hopes and expectations are bestowed on the work of this important Committee, especially after the Paris Conference: International public opinion is looking at this subject with particular attention and sensitivity. Therefore I cannot abstain from renewing the appeal for all political groups and delegations to redouble their utmost efforts for the decisive progress of this negotiation. The success brought about by an agreement on a convention on the total prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons could only increase the prestige and renown of the Conference. To this effect, I would like, on behalf of you all, to renew the most sincere wishes of success to Ambassador Morel, who has been assigned the responsibility of leading the work of this important Committee for the 1989 session.

I would have been pleased to welcome, as early as in February, the establishment of another important subsidiary body, the one in charge of the delicate and important problem of "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". Despite great good will, my efforts have not yet led to a conclusive result on this matter. I am sure that, where I did not succeed, my successor will be able to reach more concrete results in the pursuit of a reasonable compromise solution to enable the Ad hoc Committee on outer space to resume its work as soon as possible.

Nor has the Conference been successful in establishing working arrangements for the so-called "nuclear items" on our agenda. This seems to indicate that additional intensive efforts are required if we want to see some signs of movement on these issues.

Informal consultations on other pending subjects are also worthy of attention. For instance on the expansion of the membership of the Conference. It will be up to my successor to continue ongoing consultations and hopefully succeed in consolidating agreement on those questions.

I believe it to be a legitimate aspiration of any President of the Conference on Disarmament to obtain from the Conference positive progress in its work. Not merely for reasons of personal prestige, which are, after all, of secondary relevance, but from a belief in the importance our multilateral exercise assumes with regard to the problems of the contemporary world, among

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which the issue of disarmament certainly plays a role of primary importance. I therefore beg the indulgence of those who expected from me more than was achieved.

In conclusion, it is my wish to thank all delegations again, for the assistance they have lent me in many ways during my presidency. First and foremost comes to my mind the significant contributions of group and item co-ordinators for the solution of outstanding problems. I also want to thank sincerely the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, whose great competence and qualities I have been able to appreciate fully. I would like to express all my gratitude to the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Berasategui, whose advice and assistance have also been extremely valuable to me during this month. My gratitude goes also to all the staff of the secretariat, as well as to the interpreters and translators, whose competence and dedication I myself have been able to appreciate.

Lastly, I would like to present to my successor, Ambassador Yamada of Japan, my very warm good wishes for success in the exercise of his mandate. I am sure that under his competent guidance the Conference will be able to carry on its work in the most efficient possible manner. I would like to assure him of my delegation's constructive support.

I now proceed to other business. I should like to inform you that Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, His Excellency Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, His Excellency Giulio Andreotti, have expressed the wish to address the Conference on Thursday, 2 March. In view of the very tight schedule and previous commitments of the Ministers, they will only be able to stay in Geneva during the afternoon of that day. This being the case, I should like to propose - after consulting with the incoming Chairman, Ambassador Yamada of Japan, and the presiding officers of other meetings to be held on that date - that we hold our regular plenary meeting on that day at 3.30 p.m. This will make possible the visit of the Ministers. If there is no objection, we shall so proceed.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT as a result of this change in our timetable of meetings, the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet in this Council chamber at 10.a.m., and Working Group 2 of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will hold its meeting, also at 10 a.m., in room V, on 2 March. I should like to thank the incoming President of the Conference, Ambassador Yamada of Japan, as well as the presiding officers of those meetings, for their understanding and co-operation.

I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held as I said, on Thursday, 2 March at 3.30 p.m.

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.