

Distr.
GENERALS/3117
20 October 1953

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE DATED 19 OCTOBER 1953 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE SEVENTY-FIRST REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 7 JULY 1950 (S/1588)

The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor to refer to Paragraph 6 of the Resolution of the Security Council of July 7, 1950, requesting the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the United Nations Command.

In compliance with this Resolution, there is enclosed herewith, for circulation to the members of the Security Council, the Seventy-first Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period June 1 through June 15, 1953, inclusive.

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA FOR
THE PERIOD 1 - 15 JUNE 1953
(Report No. 71)

I herewith submit report number 71 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1 - 15 June 1953, inclusive. United Nations Command communiques numbers 1632-1646 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

The Armistice Negotiations continued in executive session, and the first meeting of the main Delegations was held on 4 June 1953. No details of the discussions were made public until 8 June 1953, at which time the Delegations released to the press the "Terms of Reference for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission" which were ratified at 1400 hours on 8 June by the Senior Delegates of both sides. For the remainder of the period negotiations were continued in plenary sessions and in sub-delegation and staff officer meetings; but no details of the agreement reached at these meetings were released to the press.

The text of this agreement is quoted:

"Terms of Reference
for
8 June 1953
The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission

I
General

"1. In order to ensure that all Prisoners of War have the opportunity to exercise their right to be repatriated following an Armistice, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India shall each be requested by both sides to appoint a member to a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which shall be established to take custody in Korea of those Prisoners of War who, while in the custody of the detaining powers, have not exercised their right to be repatriated. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall establish its Headquarters within the demilitarized zone in the vicinity of Panmunjom,

and shall station subordinate bodies of the same composition as the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at those locations at which the Repatriation Commission assumes custody of Prisoners of War. Representatives of both sides shall be permitted to observe the operations of the Repatriation Commission and its subordinate bodies to include explanations and interviews.

"2. Sufficient armed forces and any other operating personnel required to assist the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in carrying out its functions and responsibilities shall be provided exclusively by India, whose representative shall be the umpire in accordance with the provisions of Article 132 of the Geneva Convention, and shall also be Chairman and Executive Agent of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Representatives from each of the other four powers shall be allowed staff assistants in equal number not to exceed fifty (50) each. When any of the representatives of the Neutral Nations is absent for some reason, that representative shall designate an alternate representative of his own nationality to exercise his functions and authority. The arms of all personnel provided for in this paragraph shall be limited to Military Police type small arms.

"3. No force or threat of force shall be used against the Prisoners of War specified in Paragraph 1 above to prevent or effect their repatriation, and no violence to their persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner for any purpose whatsoever (but see Paragraph 7 below). This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. This Commission shall ensure that Prisoners of War shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention, and with the general spirit of that convention.

II

Custody of Prisoners of War

"4. All Prisoners of War who have not exercised their right of repatriation following the effective date of the Armistice Agreement shall be released from the military control and from the custody of the detaining side as soon as

practicable and, in all cases, within sixty (60) days subsequent to the effective date of the armistice agreement to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at locations in Korea to be designated by the detaining side.

"5. At the time the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission assumes control of the prisoner of war installations, the military forces of the detaining side shall be withdrawn therefrom, so that the locations specified in the preceding paragraph shall be taken over completely by the Armed Forces of India.

"6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 5 above, the detaining side shall have the responsibility for maintaining and ensuring security and order in the areas around the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody and for preventing and restraining any armed forces (including irregular armed forces) in the area under its control from any acts of disturbance and intrusion against the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody,

"7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 3 above, nothing in this agreement shall be construed as derogating from the authority of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners of war under its temporary jurisdiction.

III

Explanation

"8. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, after having received and taken into custody all those prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated, shall immediately make arrangements so that within ninety (90) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission takes over the custody, the nations to which the prisoners of war belong shall have freedom and facilities to send representatives to the locations where such prisoners of war are in custody to explain to all the prisoners of war depending upon these nations their rights and to inform them of any matters relating to their return to their homelands, particularly of their full freedom to return home to lead a peaceful life, under the following provisions:

"A. The number of such explaining representatives shall not exceed seven (7) per thousand prisoners of war held in custody by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission; and the minimum authorized shall not be less than a total of five (5);

"B. The hours during which the explaining representatives shall have access to the prisoners shall be as determined by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and generally in accord with Article 53 of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war;

"C. All explanations and interviews shall be conducted in the presence of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and a representative from the detaining side;

"D. Additional provisions governing the explanation work shall be prescribed by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and will be designed to employ the principles enumerated in Paragraph 3 above and in this paragraph;

"E. The explaining representatives, while engaging in their work, shall be allowed to bring with them necessary facilities and personnel for wireless communications. The number of communications personnel shall be limited to one team per location at which explaining representatives are in residence, except in the event all prisoners of war are concentrated in one location, in which case, two (2) teams shall be permitted. Each team shall consist of not more than six (6) communications personnel.

"9. Prisoners of war in its custody shall have freedom and facilities to make representations and communications to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to representatives and subordinate bodies of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to inform them of their desires on any matter concerning the prisoners of war themselves, in accordance with arrangements made for the purpose by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

IV

Disposition of Prisoners of War

"10. Any prisoner of war who, while in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, decides to exercise the right of repatriation, shall

make an application requesting repatriation to a body consisting of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Once such an application is made, it shall be considered immediately by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission or one of its subordinate bodies, so as to determine immediately by majority vote the validity of such application. Once such an application is made to and validated by the Commission or one of its subordinate bodies, the prisoner of war concerned shall immediately be transferred to and accommodated in the tents set up for those who are ready to be repatriated. Thereafter, he shall, while still in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, be delivered forthwith to the prisoner of war exchange point at Panmunjom for repatriation under the procedure prescribed in the Armistice Agreement.

"11. At the expiration of ninety (90) days after the transfer of custody of the prisoners of war to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, access of representatives to captured personnel as provided for in Paragraph 8 above, shall terminate, and the question of disposition of the prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated shall be submitted to the political conference recommended to be convened in Paragraph 60, Draft Armistice Agreement, which shall endeavor to settle this question within thirty (30) days, during which period the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall continue to retain custody of those prisoners of war. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall declare the relief from the prisoner of war status to civilian status of any prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated and from whom no other disposition has been agreed to by the political conference within one hundred and twenty (120) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has assumed their custody. Thereafter, according to the application of each individual, those who choose to go to neutral nations shall be assisted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Red Cross

Society of India. This operation shall be completed within thirty (30) days, and upon its completion, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall immediately cease its functions and declare its dissolution. After the dissolution of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, whenever and wherever any of those above-mentioned civilians who have been relieved from the prisoner of war status desire to return to their fatherlands, the authorities of the localities where they are shall be responsible for assisting them in return to their fatherlands.

V

Red Cross Visitation

"12. Essential Red Cross service for prisoners of war in custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be provided by India in accordance with regulations issued by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

VI

Press Coverage

"13. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall insure freedom of the press and other news media in observing the entire operation as enumerated herein, in accordance with procedures to be established by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

VII

Logistical Support for Prisoners of War

"14. Each side shall provide logistical support for the prisoners of war in the area under its military control, delivering required support to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at an agreed delivery point in the vicinity of each prisoner of war installation.

"15. The cost of repatriating prisoners of war to the exchange point at Panmunjom shall be borne by the detaining side and the cost from the exchange point by the side on which said prisoners depend, in accordance with Article 118 of the Geneva Convention.

"16. The Red Cross Society of India shall be responsible for providing such general service personnel in the prisoner of war installations as required by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

"17. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall provide medical support for the prisoners of war as may be practicable. The detaining side shall provide medical support as practicable upon the request of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and specifically for those cases requiring extensive treatment or hospitalization. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall maintain custody of prisoners of war during such hospitalization. The detaining side shall facilitate such custody. Upon completion of treatment, prisoners of war shall be returned to a prisoner of war installation as specified in Paragraph 4 above.

"18. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission is entitled to obtain from both sides such legitimate assistance as it may require in carrying out its duties and tasks, but both sides shall not under any name and in any form interfere or exert influence.

VIII

Logistical Support for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission

"19. Each side shall be responsible for providing logistical support for the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission stationed in the area under its military control, and both sides shall contribute on an equal basis to such support within the demilitarized zone. The precise arrangements shall be subject to determination between the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the detaining side in each case.

"20. Each of the detaining sides shall be responsible for protecting the explaining representatives from the other side while in transit over lines of communication within its area, as set forth in Paragraph 23 for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, to a place of residence and while in residence in the vicinity of but not within each of the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be responsible for the security of such representatives within the actual limits of the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.

"21. Each of the detaining sides shall provide transportation, housing, communication, and other agreed logistical support to the explaining representatives of the other side while they are in the area under its military control. Such services shall be provided on a reimbursable basis.

IX

Publication

"22. After the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the terms of this agreement shall be made known to all prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining side, have not exercised their right to be repatriated.

X

Movement

"23. The movement of the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and repatriated prisoners of war shall be over lines of communication as determined by the command(s) of the opposing side and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. A map showing these lines of communication shall be furnished the command of the opposing side and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Movement of such personnel, except within locations as designated in Paragraph 4 above, shall be under the control of, and escorted by, personnel of the side in whose area the travel is being undertaken; however, such movement shall not be subject to any obstruction and coercion.

XI

Procedural Matters

"24. The interpretation of this agreement shall rest with the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and/or any subordinate bodies to which functions are delegated or assigned by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, shall operate on the basis of majority vote.

"25. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall submit a weekly report to the opposing commanders on the status of prisoners of war in its custody, indicating the numbers repatriated and remaining at the end of each week.

"26. When this agreement has been acceded to by both sides and by the five powers named herein, it shall become effective upon the date the armistice becomes effective.

"27. Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1400 hours on the 8th Day of June 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

"Signed

Nam Il

General, Korean People's Army

Senior Delegate

Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers

Signed

William K. Harrison, Jr.

Lieutenant General, United States Army

Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Delegations"

On a somewhat reduced scale during the period, strongly Communist prisoners of war in United Nations Command custody continued their efforts to harass and embarrass the United Nations Command. Main difficulties were encountered in the Koje-do complex where on several occasions prisoners, in deliberate violation of standing instructions, refused to participate in headcounts, showed their defiance by shouts and mass chanting, and were abusive to their guards.

Also, of particular note were many instances of beatings by fellow prisoners in the pro-Communist camps. These acts of violence were widespread enough throughout the various compounds to indicate there is a continuing struggle by the hard core leaders to maintain rigid control.

Meanwhile, as the negotiations at Panmunjom developed, those prisoners who have elected not to return to Communist control showed signs of apprehension as to their ultimate fate after an armistice. To insure that all these anti-Communist prisoners could be certain that the United Nations were adhering firmly

to the principle of no forced repatriation, the normal information program at each camp emphasized the factual developments occurring at Panmunjom as they became public. Emphasis was placed on United Nations Command insistence that, in any arrangement finally carried out for the disposition of prisoners of war not directly repatriated, force or coercion would not be used.

As the world watched closely those developments which might lead to a full exchange of prisoners of war who desire repatriation, Communist attempts to capitalize on the exchange of sick and injured personnel slackened. Instead of the earlier broadcasts from enemy areas alleging maltreatment, underfeeding and poor medical care for those prisoners returned by the United Nations Command, reports were received of certain Communist prisoners who were being treated as defectors. This contradicted previous Communist claims that all who had been returned had been greeted as outstanding patriots and would enjoy special privileges henceforth.

Heavy ground fighting which commenced during the preceding period was intensified during the first half of June. Communist elements ranging from company to regimental strength smashed against United Nations Command outposts and main line of resistance positions forty-eight times during the period. Heavy fighting, in some cases resulting in the loss or denting of United Nations Command positions, raged on the central and eastern fronts. Communist artillery and mortar expenditures remained high and on one occasion established a new high - 119,478 - for the number of rounds falling across the front during a twenty-four hour period.

The western front was relatively quiet during the period. Only two attacks - a company-size effort against a United Nations Command division on the western flank and an attack by two Chinese companies against another United Nations Command division farther to the east - deviated from the squad and platoon-size probing actions which occurred during the first part of June.

The two-company-size effort against the United Nations Command division on the western flank occurred just before midnight on 5 June against outpost positions southeast of Hungwang. The United Nations Command outpost defenders repulsed the attacking Chinese after a forty minute battle.

Two Chinese companies battered against main line of resistance positions northeast of Kigong for two hours before being forced to withdraw on 5 June.

United Nations Command elements on the central front experienced thirty-one attacks by Chinese elements of company-size or larger. Particularly heavy fighting occurred in four United Nations Command division sectors and less intense fighting occurred in two other division sectors. One United Nations Command division sector was relatively quiet.

A United Nations Command division on the left flank of the central front repulsed an attack by two Chinese companies against outpost positions northwest of Chorwon, after a two and one half hour battle on the 11th of June. A Chinese battalion had no better luck when it struck other outpost positions northwest of Chorwon, during late evening of 12 June. The United Nations Command defenders repulsed the enemy effort after a fight lasting a little more than one hour. A Chinese company attacking another outpost of this same United Nations Command division, located west of the outpost hit by the battalion, was also forced to withdraw after a one hour fight on the night of 12 June.

Fighting in one United Nations Command division sector centered on outpost "HARRY" southwest of Chungdong, scene of an epic defense by United Nations Command defenders. The enemy commenced his effort against this position just before midnight of 10 June when an enemy battalion, heavily supported by artillery and mortar, attacked the outpost. Fierce fighting raged throughout the night and the enemy was forced to withdraw by daylight of 11 June. The next night, shortly after midnight, a fresh enemy contingent of regimental-size renewed the attack. The enemy initially gained some of the position but friendly counterattacks regained all of the lost ground. Once again the enemy was forced back by daylight hours of 12 June. The enemy came back with the better portion of a regiment on the night of 12 June and again was heavily supported by artillery and mortar fires. The battle see-sawed throughout the night but for the third time the enemy was driven off at daylight. At the close of the period outpost "HARRY" was firmly secured by the United Nations Command defenders.

Enemy efforts against another United Nations Command division sector consisted of one company-size, two battalion-size and two regimental-size attacks. The enemy-initiated actions commenced just before midnight on 11 June when a small Chinese force - later reinforced to company-size - struck an outpost northwest of Kumhwa. Hand-to-hand fighting ensued before the enemy was driven back an hour before daylight. On the same night an estimated Chinese battalion hit two other outpost positions of this United Nations Command division located in the Sniper Ridge area, northeast of Kumhwa. This attack was also repulsed before daylight of 12 June. The next enemy effort consisted of a ten hour battle against a Chinese regiment attacking outpost and main line of resistance positions northwest of Kumhwa, on the night of 12 June. The enemy initially overran an outpost and penetrated main line of resistance positions; however, fierce United Nations Command counterattacks decimated the Chinese force and regained all lost ground. During early morning hours of 13 June a Chinese battalion once again attacked friendly positions in the Sniper Ridge area but this effort was repulsed after a two and one half hour fight. Just before midnight on 13 June the enemy shifted his effort back to friendly main line of resistance positions northwest of Kumhwa. An enemy regiment fought here for three hours before withdrawing in the face of withering United Nations Command defensive fire.

Two Chinese companies attacked main line of resistance positions of another United Nations Command division southwest of Kumsong just before midnight of 2 June but both efforts were successfully countered after short fights.

Fighting in another United Nations Command division sector centered on the Capitol Hill area, northwest of Mulguji. Two attacks against this area - one by a Chinese battalion and the other by a company-size contingent - were successfully countered by United Nations Command defenders early in the period after fights lasting up to four hours. A short while later, during early morning hours of 2 June, another company-size effort in this area was repulsed after a two hour fight. For the next ten days the enemy was kept busy defending positions, which he had won during the latter half of May, from United Nations Command efforts to retake them, but just before midnight on 12 June the enemy again struck positions of this United Nations Command division on and near

Capitol Hill. Two battalions struck in one area and an aggregate of two additional battalions made six company-size efforts at other nearby locations. Some outpost positions were lost to the enemy and the friendly main line of resistance was forced back in one or two locations. At the close of the period fighting was continuing in this area and the issue had not yet been resolved.

Heavy fighting also was experienced by another United Nations Command division on the extreme right flank of the central front. One company-size attack against outpost positions near Bloody Ridge southwest of Mulguji, was successfully repulsed during the morning of 5 June after a brief fight. Later attacks, commencing on the night of 5 June, by battalion and regimental-size groups were continuing at the close of the period and had resulted in the loss of several friendly outpost positions and the withdrawal of the United Nations Command main line of resistance in some places.

Heavy fighting on the west flank of the eastern front centered on Hill 812. Smaller actions also occurred in two other division sectors.

A two-company attack by Communist elements against an outpost position of a United Nations Command division located southeast of Mulguji, shortly before midnight on 10 June, succeeded in obtaining a foothold on the outpost position. Subsequent United Nations Command counterattacks encountered heavy opposition and the position had not been completely restored at the close of the period.

A company-size attack by North Korean elements against main line of resistance positions of another United Nations Command division on the night of 1 June was repulsed after a short battle.

Communist efforts against Hill 812 northeast of Sohui, commenced shortly before midnight on 1 June when two North Korean companies opened the assault on this tactically important position. An intense see-saw battle continued until the afternoon of 5 June when the friendly elements were forced to give up a portion of Hill 812. When the enemy attacked Hill 812 on 1 June, another North Korean battalion attacked Hill 854 south of Sohui. The

United Nations Command defenders repulsed this attack after a fierce three hour battle. On the night of 5 June the North Korean elements renewed their efforts against the Hill 812 area. A two-battalion Communist contingent struck in this area and again heavy fighting ensued. The battle ceased the night of 8 June, and once again some enemy gains were registered. Subsequent United Nations Command counterattacks had not succeeded in regaining Hill 812 at the close of the period. On the night of 6 June a reinforced North Korean company made another effort in the Hill 854 area, but once again the United Nations Command defenders repulsed the attack after a one hour battle.

Fighting on the east flank of the eastern front centered on Anchor Hill east of Oemyon. One company-size attack was made against an outpost position of Oemyon, but this effort was repulsed after a short battle.

The North Korean onslaughts against Anchor Hill began in the early morning hours of 2 June when a reinforced regiment attacked the United Nations Command defenders. The battle continued furiously until the morning of 7 June when the United Nations Command elements ceased their efforts to retake the position.

United Nations Command Naval aircraft, operating from fast carriers in the Sea of Japan, struck pre-selected targets and targets of opportunity from the frontlines north throughout central, eastern, and northeastern Korea. In spite of marginal to non-operational weather during five days of this period, almost three thousand five hundred sorties were flown, nearly three thousand of which were offensive sorties.

There was a noticeable increase in close air support missions during the period. One thousand two hundred eighty-eight sorties were flown in direct support of United Nations Command ground forces. The major targets included supply and billeting areas, gun positions, bunkers, and trenches in enemy frontline areas. Although accurate evaluation of the results was difficult, heavy damage to the enemy positions is known to have been inflicted.

The remaining number of offensive sorties ranged over central and northeastern Korea. The most significant targets attacked consisted of supply and storage areas, transportation facilities, rolling stock, billeting areas, coastal defense positions and industrial areas.

Enemy airfields were bombed almost daily. The following airfields are considered non-operational as a result of air strikes during the period: Wonsan, Sondok, Hamhung West, Yonpo, Kilchu, Hoemun, Chongjin, Hyssanjin, and Hoeryong.

United Nations Command surface vessels continued the Naval blockade of the Korean east coast from the vicinity of the eastern terminus of the frontline positions to Chongjin. Marginal weather over coastal areas reduced the effectiveness of shore bombardment in some instances. However, routine patrols were carried out and key targets along the coast were fired on daily. These targets consisted of coastal supply routes, rolling stock gun positions, supply and industrial areas.

Enemy coastal defense batteries in vicinity of Wonsan, Hungnam, and Hodo Pando were active during the period. The enemy fired almost three hundred rounds, ranging in caliber from 75mm to 155mm, at ships in these areas. One United Nations Command vessel received one hit on her starboard side from an estimated 76mm to 105mm coastal battery. Numerous shrapnel holes were made in the deck and bulkhead. However, no personnel casualties were sustained and the operational effectiveness of the ship was not impaired. The friendly-held islands in Wonsan harbor also received several rounds of fire from enemy coastal batteries. In all cases these gun positions were engaged by surface units and in some instances these engagements were coordinated with air strikes on the same targets. Many of these positions were destroyed and heavy damage was inflicted on others.

United Nations Command surface ships rendered maximum support to frontline ground forces during the period. These gunfire support missions were conducted against enemy strongpoints, gun positions, bunkers, supply areas, trenches, and supply routes to the frontlines. Night illumination was provided in front of United Nations Command positions at the front to disclose enemy movements.

Marine aircraft flew over one thousand six hundred sorties during the period. More than seven hundred of these sorties were flown in direct support of United Nations Command ground forces. Heavy damage was inflicted on supply and billeting areas, gun and mortar positions, and bunkers. Numerous troop casualties were inflicted. The remainder of the sorties were reconnaissance, intercept, escort, and interdiction missions flown deep into enemy territory.

United Nations Command carrier-based aircraft flying over the west coast of Korea flew almost seven hundred sorties during the period. One hundred fifty-five of those were in direct support of frontline ground forces. Most of the strikes were concentrated west of a line drawn between Yonan and Chinnampo. Major targets attacked included transportation facilities, supply and storage areas, troop concentrations, gun positions, bunkers, and coastal defense positions. The enemy sustained considerable losses as a result of these strikes.

Surface ships continued to maintain the blockade of the Korean west coast around the perimeter of the Hwanghae Province. These ships supported the evacuation of a number of islands in the area and maintained constant surveillance to detect and prevent aggressive moves by the enemy. In addition enemy coastal defense positions, troop concentrations, and other coastal targets were harassed almost daily by gunfire. A United Nations Command vessel received two direct hits from an estimated 75mm enemy coastal battery adjacent to Sokto. Five personnel casualties and damage to the radio room and messing compartment were sustained. A number of friendly-held islands, including Sokto, Hachiwira-do, Chodo, Mahap-do, and Mudo were fired on by the enemy during the period. These gun positions were engaged by surface units and in many cases were destroyed or heavily damaged.

Coastal areas, anchorages, and channels were maintained free of mines by daily minesweeping operations and check sweeps by United Nations Command minesweepers.

Navy patrol planes continued to support the United Nations Command effort in Korea by conducting daily shipping surveillance, anti-submarine reconnaissance, and weather reconnaissance missions over the waters surrounding Korea.

United Nations Command Naval auxiliary vessels and transports provided personnel lifts and logistic support for the United Nations Command forces in Korea.

United Nations Command air operations during the period were featured by the increased close air support furnished for United Nations Command ground forces who were battling desperate Communist attacks along the front. A record number of close support sorties were effective during this fifteen-day period.

In their assigned mission of maintaining air superiority, Sabrejets continued to inflict heavy damage on the Communists Manchurian based Air Force. Air to air engagements between United Nations Command F-86s and Russian-built MIG-15s resulted in the destruction of nineteen MIGs, damage to fifteen, and the probable destruction of an additional nine. No sabrejets were lost as a result of these encounters. The major fighter bomber effort was placed on close support of friendly ground units. Results of this close support effort included the destruction of personnel shelters, buildings, supply shelters and automatic weapons. In addition, roads were cut. LT-6 spotter aircraft did a superior job in controlling these close support air strikes, and contributed immeasurably to the success of the overall operation.

Bomb laden Sabrejet fighter bombers and F-84 Thunderjets penetrated deep into enemy held territory, attacking interdiction and other military targets, including supply areas, troop concentrations, airfields and electrical power facilities. Airfields at Anak, Kanggye, Sinmak, Ongjin, Onjong-ni, Kangdong, Sondok, Chunggangjin, and Pyong-ni were sufficiently cratered to render them unserviceable. Claims on other targets included the destruction of buildings, bridges, personnel shelters, vehicles, railroad cars and bridges. In addition, road and rail cuts were made and troop casualties inflicted.

In their strikes against the North Korean main supply routes, the B-26s made numerous road cuts and destroyed many trucks attempting to move their war materials to the frontlines under cover of darkness. On night armed reconnaissance of Communist rail lines light bombers destroyed locomotives and rail cars, in addition to severing the rails in several places. Approximately 742 B-26 sorties were employed in day and night operations along the frontline in close support of friendly ground forces.

United Nations Command Superforts concentrated a large portion of their effort on the neutralization of selected North Korean airfields, including those

at Uiju, Sinuiju, Sinuiju Northeast, Sinanju, Namsi, Taechon, Saamcham, Pyongyang Main, Pyongyang East, and Pyongyang Downtown. These installations were successfully cratered and rendered unserviceable. A record number of medium bomber close support sorties were effective in leading a close air support along the frontline during the hours of darkness in this fifteen-day period. In addition, sorties were mounted against Communist supply centers and Psychological Warfare leaflets were distributed throughout North Korea. Ineffective antiaircraft and fighter opposition was experienced by medium bombers over most targets.

Combat cargo aircraft flew normal logistical airlift of supplies, equipment and personnel in support of United Nations Command operations in Korea.

United Nations Command Search and Rescue Units rescued eight downed United Nations Command pilots from behind enemy lines and 126 personnel were evacuated from friendly frontline positions to rear area hospitals.

After agreement was reached on the organization and functions of a neutral nations repatriation commission on 8 June, the full text of the terms of reference was communicated to all prisoners of war held by the United Nations Command. A summary of the principal points was also broadcast, both to prisoners and to the Korean people in general. Leaflets and broadcasts described the salient provisions of the draft armistice agreement, and emphasized the continued support of the United Nations for achievement of Korean rehabilitation and unification by peaceful methods.

