

# UNITED NATIONS

## SECURITY

## COUNCIL



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REPORT OF THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN  
THE CONGO TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION  
OF PARAGRAPH A-2 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF  
21 FEBRUARY 1961

Addendum covering developments during 16-17 September 1961

1. Attempts to establish a cease-fire were pursued, but without success.  
Attacks against UN personnel continued in Elisabethville, Jadotville and Kamina.
2. The jet fighter operating against the UN attacked a DC-3 plane which was transporting wounded personnel from Kamina to Leopoldville. The aircraft was hit, but could continue on its way. Two more Congolese civilians, injured in the strafing raid on Kamina on 15 September, died of their wounds. On 16 September the jet fighter again attacked Kamina, throwing bombs on the airfield, as well as on the UN company encircled in Jadotville. It also carried out a number of flights over Elisabethville, with the object of preventing the landing of supplies or reinforcements to UN forces.
3. The situation in Elisabethville was relatively quiet, except for occasional sniping at UN forces in the European city and mortar fire directed at the UN civilian headquarters, which caused several casualties.
4. The UN unit in Jadotville was supplied in the morning of 16 September by helicopter. Two companies were sent out from Elisabethville to relieve the Jadotville unit, but ran into heavy fire from a strongly fortified gendarmerie position about 20 kilometres before reaching the city. Fire was returned and continued for most of the day. In the late afternoon, the Congolese soldiers in Jadotville refused to obey their foreign officers and stopped attacking UN troops. A cease-fire was agreed upon, including a provision that the jet fighter would be grounded and the road-blocks set up by the gendarmerie on the

Elisabethville-Jadotville road removed. UN troops were provided by the Congolese soldiers with fresh food and other commodities, and it was agreed that a joint tour of Jadotville by UN officers, gendarmerie and local authorities would take place in the morning of 17 September.

5. Kamina base suffered mostly from strafing by the jet fighter, but was also subject to mortar fire. The outlying areas of the base, from which UN personnel had been evacuated, were raided and looted by small gendarmerie units.

6. Water and electricity supply services in Elisabethville were restored after a short interruption. The Congolese population throughout Katanga remained calm and fraternized with the UN, as did gendarmerie units in locations where there were no non-Congolese officers or mercenaries.

7. Efforts to contact Mr. Tshombé continued. The British Consul reported Mr. Kibwe's statement that he and Mr. Tshombé were about to leave for the meeting with the UN representative arranged for 1900 hours on 15 September, when they were prevented from so doing by Mr. Tshombé's "military advisers". At midnight on 16 September the British Consul informed the UN representative at Elisabethville that Mr. Tshombé wished to meet him at 1130 hours on 17 September in Bancroft, Rhodesia. The Secretary General asked the following reply to be transmitted from him:

"(1) The mandate of the United Nations force in the Congo is, broadly speaking, to help maintain public order. The resolution of 21 February defined further two aspects of this mandate which are binding on the Organization and on all Member States and their nationals. I quote the two relevant paragraphs:

'1. Urges that the United Nations take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort;

'2. Urges that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries.'

"(2) In the same resolution the Security Council declares that it is convinced that the solution of the problem of the Congo lies in the hands of the Congolese people themselves without any interference from outside and that there can be no solution without conciliation. The Council adds

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that it is convinced further that the imposition of any solution not based on genuine conciliation would, far from settling any issues, greatly enhance the dangers of conflict within the Congo and threat to international peace and security.

"(3) A principle of the United Nations which is absolutely binding upon all is the maintenance of peace and, to that end and in order to protect human life, they are bound to cease all hostilities and to seek solutions to the conflict by means of negotiation, mediation and conciliation.

"(4) You have yourself accepted the objectives of the United Nations mission as defined in paragraph (1), that is to say, the maintenance of public order, the prevention of civil war and the evacuation of all the personnel referred to by the Security Council. There should therefore be no difference of opinion between the Organization and you as to the framework within which ways must be sought of putting an end to the present armed conflict.

"(5) As regards the idea that a solution to the problem of the Congo should be sought through reconciliation - which would naturally have to be achieved within the framework of the Constitution of the Republic - you have several times given us clear indications that you also accepted this point of view. I am therefore convinced that you do not share the opinion of certain elements who reject the idea of reconciliation, which leads me to the conclusion that your views and those of the United Nations are identical with respect to the principles on which the attempt to find a solution to the political problem should be based.

"(6) On the morning of 13 September, you yourself requested a cease-fire and I understand that you made efforts to bring it about. Since the United Nations desires without reservation to avoid hostilities and the shedding of blood, your request was accepted in advance, on condition, of course, that you could establish an effective cease-fire on your side. In so doing, you would remain faithful to the position you have taken, which I mentioned in paragraphs (4) and (5) above. The efforts to bring about a cease-fire have failed for reasons which we do not know, but which seem to derive from the opposition of certain of those responsible for military operations in Katanga. We have unceasingly sought to make contact with you and you even promised us that you would meet United Nations representatives for discussions on Friday evening, but you did not come to the meeting place chosen by common consent.

The United Nations, faithful to its principles, still wishes to see established, without delay, the cease-fire which you yourself requested and which it should be possible for you to achieve, given your position of principle as I have described it.

"(7) I have been informed of the message received by Mr. O'Brien from Mr. Dunnett, the British Consul, inviting him to meet you tomorrow at 11.30 at Bancroft in Northern Rhodesia. I suggest that I should meet you personally, so that together we can try to find peaceful methods of resolving

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the present conflict, thus opening the way to a solution of the Katanga problem within the framework of the Congo. The proposed meeting obviously requires that orders should be given beforehand for an immediate and effective cease-fire. I therefore propose to you that such a cease-fire should be firmly imposed by both sides, so as to make a meeting possible and to come nearer to a solution of the present conflict within the framework established by the Security Council and already accepted by you. As I shall have to go to the meeting place by air, I suggest that the meeting should be at Ndola. I am dependent on our transport facilities and for this reason the hour which you propose is impossible for me. I shall inform you as early as possible tomorrow morning of my time of arrival, allowing for the fact that before I leave I must have your reply to this message, including your decision regarding the cease-fire. The cease-fire will occur automatically on the United Nations side, in view of the fact that according to the instructions given and the rules followed by the Organization, it only opens fire in self-defence.

"(8) I am awaiting your urgent reply to this proposal for a meeting and for an immediate cease-fire.

(Signed) Dag HAMMARSKJOLD"

8. On 17 September the fighting abated in Elisabethville, though the Ghurka camp was mortared throughout the night of 16-17 September. Several casualties resulted - one Indian soldier was killed and six others wounded.

In Jadotville there was a sudden change; at noon on 17 September a message was received from the Irish company commander indicating that they were being held as hostages by the gendarmerie. In spite of all efforts, no other communications with Jadotville were possible after this message, though it was understood that this changed situation had not resulted in any further casualties amongst the Irish company.

9. At Kamina the airport control tower was again attacked by the jet fighter early in the morning of 17 September. This same aircraft came back towards noon and bombed the base, setting a UN DC4 in flames and wounding one UN pilot and one Swedish soldier.

10. At 1000 hours on the 17th, the British Consul transmitted to the UN representative in Elisabethville the reply of President Tshombe to the message addressed to him by the Secretary-General on 16 September (paragraph 7 above). President Tshombe's reply was as follows:

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"(a) The President and the government agree on the principle of an immediate cease-fire.

(b) He requests that UN troops be confined to their camps.

(c) He requests that the UN stop troop movements and the sending of reinforcements by land and air.

(d) The President agrees to go to Ndola and requests transportation by light plane capable of landing and taking off from the Rhodesian airport of Kupushi."

11. President Tshombe also indicated that his delegation would be composed of his Minister of Finance, Mr. Kibwe, his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kimba, and the Secretary of State for the Common Market, Mr. Mwenda-Odilon, in addition to himself.

12. In answer to this second message from President Tshombe, the Secretary-General asked the UN representative in Elisabethville to inform President Tshombe as follows:

"Kindly inform Tshombe that the Secretary-General finds it impossible to accept the conditions for a cease-fire and a meeting which have been conveyed to him.

"According to the terms of the letter from the Secretary-General (para. (7)), in the existing circumstances, there can be no question of anything but an unconditional cease-fire on both sides and an agreement to meet together, all other modalities obviously to be discussed in the course of the meeting. The Secretary-General cannot agree to meet Tshombe unless this preliminary agreement, which is fully in accord with normal practice, is accepted.

"The Secretary-General regrets that by introducing conditions, Mr. Tshombe has delayed the taking of measures to protect human life. He sincerely hopes that a favourable reply to his observations by Mr. Tshombe will make possible a meeting without further delay.

"As regards military movements and maintaining the positions of the various military groups, the cease-fire order should naturally be interpreted as having no effect on the status quo, which is to be maintained in all respects throughout the period during which an agreement is being sought."

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13. When the UN representative in Elisabethville contacted the British Consul to ask him to convey this last message from the Secretary-General to President Tshombe at approximately 1400 hours, he was informed that President Tshombe had already made plans to travel with his group to Ndola at 1500 hours, and that President Tshombe had already chartered a plane for this journey.

In the absence of further word from President Tshombe, the Secretary-General decided to go to Ndola and consequently left Leopoldville at approximately 1700 hours.

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