
Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Chairman: Mr. Yelchenko(Ukraine)

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The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (agenda item 4) (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Kabbaz** (Syrian Arab Republic), speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, said that the current session was taking place in a climate of stagnation, if not regression, with regard to international efforts to promote nuclear disarmament. In that connection, he referred to the public statements by the Government of Israel concerning the right to possess nuclear weapons, which were bound to cause concern among the countries of the Arab Group. Instances of failure to comply with the relevant obligations and resolutions were an indication that the overall non-proliferation regime was proving to be less effective than expected.

2. The Arab Group observed that universal accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was crucial to the effectiveness of that instrument. There were some who raised distinctions regarding the binding force of decisions taken at international conferences, which could only undermine the credibility of the entire system, particularly as far as the 1995 resolution on the Middle East was concerned. The Middle East region remained a glaring example of the ineffectiveness of the Treaty: one country in the region had managed to develop a nuclear capability outside any international control, and it was important to be aware of the risks entailed by the silence of the international community in that regard. Israel's position — supported by certain parties to the Treaty — calling for a comprehensive peace before the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region was a gross error that fuelled doubts about the relevance of the NPT. The Arab States therefore requested States parties to respect all the provisions of the Treaty without discrimination and without double standards in Israel's favour.

3. In recent decades, the countries of the Arab Group had taken individual and collective initiatives aimed at the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. All their efforts had been ineffectual in the face of Israel's intransigence and that of certain Powers, which had lent Israel their support and had given it political cover in the international arena. In that connection, he noted the obstacles that had recently been placed in the way of the adoption, by the Fifty-First Regular Session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), of a resolution concerning Israel's nuclear capability. The Arab States urged the five nuclear Powers, in particularly the three States that were depositaries of the Treaty, to respect the provisions of the 1995 resolution and to ensure that specific measures were taken along those lines during the 2010 Review Conference.

4. The fact that participants in the Twentieth Summit of the League of Arab States in Damascus had confirmed that priority should be given to the denuclearization of the Middle East did not mean that the Arab States accorded no importance to the other items on the conference agenda. In that connection, the Arab Group wished to clarify its position on the three pillars of the Treaty, which had to be balanced in order for the Treaty to be effective, relevant and viable.

5. First of all, with regard to nuclear disarmament, the Group called on the international community and, in particular, the five nuclear Powers, to confirm the commitments they had undertaken in respect of the Treaty and to actively implement the 13 practical steps adopted in 2000, which were effective parameters for measuring progress made. Concerned by the new military doctrines of some States that assigned a positive role to nuclear arsenals and warheads, the Arab States considered it necessary to develop a legally binding formula that would apply to negative security assurances regarding the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

6. With regard to non-proliferation, the Arab States supported the promotion of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards System, whose objective was to prevent the use of nuclear materials or technology for military purposes. They were of the view that an additional protocol, which ensured better verification, should be a supplementary and freely concluded instrument. To impose other obligations on non-nuclear-weapon States without some degree of progress being made in the area of nuclear disarmament would not be consistent with the principle of balance.

7. Lastly, with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the countries of the Arab Group underscored the inalienable character of the right of States to acquire new technologies for peaceful uses, which explained the reservations that had been expressed about attempts to re-interpret the text of the Treaty and, as a result, limit the use of such technologies. The Arab States were concerned at the increasingly strict limitations being placed on exports of certain materials or systems intended for peaceful uses, and wished to see legal, economic and political considerations taken into account in the context of the planned international mechanism. No country should have a monopoly on the use of certain technologies, and all nuclear dependence must be avoided. The decisions taken by certain countries regarding nuclear fuel imports should not infringe on the right of other countries to develop their capability to produce nuclear energy for peaceful uses. In conclusion, he reaffirmed that the countries of the Arab Group were willing to cooperate fully with a view to achieving common objectives.

8. **Mr. Shoukry** (Egypt) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was the cornerstone of international efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and provided a reliable and effective framework for enabling all States parties to benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The main objectives of the review cycle should focus on implementing the three fundamental and interdependent pillars of the Treaty, and priority should be given to achieving Treaty universality. The role of the Preparatory Committee was to strengthen those pillars by pursuing prompt implementation of all NPT provisions, while refraining from reinterpreting or reformulating them or from amending any of its articles.

9. Egypt welcomed the reductions made by nuclear-weapon States in their nuclear arsenals but stressed that those reductions still did not meet the expectations of the vast majority of States parties. The nuclear Powers continued to rely on nuclear deterrence as a salient feature of their strategic security policies, which cast serious doubt on the commitments they had undertaken and upset the delicate balance on which the Treaty was based. In addition, it increased the risks associated with the emphasis placed on nuclear weapons in the quest for security. It was thus all the more urgent to reach a multilateral agreement on legally binding international arrangements to protect non-nuclear-weapon States from the use or threat of use of such weapons.

10. Given that achieving Treaty universality was the greatest challenge facing States parties and an essential precondition for the establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons, Egypt called on all States parties, in particular, the five nuclear-weapon States, to redouble their efforts to achieve that goal by adopting a series of specific, practical and effective measures in that regard. To that end, States parties needed to formulate a variety of suggestions and avoid making hollow statements of support for the principles and objectives of the Treaty.

11. Reiterating that Treaty universality was the necessary first step towards the universal application and strengthening of IAEA full-scope safeguards, the Egyptian delegation rejected any attempt to impose additional obligations on non-nuclear weapon States if they were not counterbalanced by commensurate measures to be taken by States that were not yet parties to the Treaty and not bound by comprehensive safeguards agreements. In that connection, Egypt emphasized that nuclear cooperation between States parties and non-

States parties to the Treaty, which was in direct contradiction to the spirit of article 1 of the Treaty, would raise doubts among non-nuclear-weapon States parties as to the value of remaining within the framework of the Treaty. His delegation called for positive interaction between all States parties within the relevant and appropriate international and legal frameworks that sought to promote non-proliferation, including the IAEA.

12. Turning to the current tensions in the Middle East, which pointed to the need for concerted action by all countries in the region to ensure the elimination of nuclear weapons, he condemned Israel's refusal to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State and to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, thereby creating an unacceptable and untenable situation. The credibility of the NPT, as perceived by all the States parties in the region, risked being seriously compromised if a single State continued to be exempt from the Treaty's provisions. Stressing the close relationship that existed between the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East and the achievement of NPT universality, Treaty, and consequently the preservation of international peace and security, he called on all States parties to spare no effort in working towards that goal and to examine carefully the practical proposals that would be contained in the working paper that Egypt planned to present on ways of moving forward towards the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East.

13. In conclusion, his delegation reaffirmed the importance of ensuring the international community's commitment to the multilateral nature of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Egypt believed that the 2010 Review Conference must be able to take positive steps towards NPT universality and thus contribute to the realization of the common goals of peace, security and stability.

14. **Mr. Üzümcü** (Turkey) underscored the unique nature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), whose three pillars should be accorded equal importance. Turkey was of the view that, even though the non-proliferation regime was imperfect and not yet universal, it had thus far been effective in containing or slowing the pace of nuclear proliferation, and in certain cases, even reversing the process, without however managing to stop it altogether. More generally, the NPT and the other main instruments in the struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — including the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention — were indispensable to world peace and security. Given the indivisibility of security in the contemporary world, it was necessary to build a consensus on the measures to be taken in response to challenges and common threats and to make the best possible use of multilateral forums, including the NPT review process.

15. Outlining his country's approach to security policy, he said that Turkey prohibited the production and use of weapons of mass destruction, provided practical support for efforts to combat the proliferation of such weapons and was concerned at the gradual increase in the range and accuracy of their delivery vehicles. The risk of acquisition of such weapons by terrorists should not be underestimated and, in that regard, Turkey attached the highest importance to the effective implementation of all legal means available, including Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Turkey was a party to all international non-proliferation instruments and export control regimes, and favoured their universalization, effective implementation and further strengthening. The NPT was no exception in that regard, and the 13 practical steps adopted in 2000 had given impetus to actions aimed at preventing a nuclear arms race. There seemed to be no reason why all NPT States parties should not build on those measures in order to address the challenges they faced.

16. As to the complementary questions of non-proliferation and disarmament, Turkey would spare no effort in continuing to promote universalization of the Treaty, further reductions in nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system. Turkey attached the highest importance to the early entry into force of the Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty — as evidenced by the fact that, in July 2008, it would be hosting an interregional workshop on that instrument — and, within the context of the Conference on Disarmament, to the initiation of negotiations on the subject of a fissile material cut-off treaty. On that last point, he was of the view that Draft Decision CD/1840 by the Presidents of the 2008 Session of the Conference on Disarmament provided the best possible compromise.

17. Given that the proper functioning of export controls, the reinforcement of nuclear-weapon-free zones, established on the basis of freely concluded agreements, and their extension to other regions of the world were also indispensable to the NPT regime, Turkey supported the conclusion of an effectively verifiable treaty that would provide for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

18. Furthermore, Turkey recognized the importance of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technologies and the crucial role played by the IAEA in that regard. It underscored the delicate balance of rights and obligations enshrined in the NPT. It also recognized that any significant and risk-free increase in nuclear power would be possible only if the international community could meet certain challenges (advances in innovative and evolutionary technologies; nuclear waste treatment; proliferation; safety; and security).

19. Turkey believed that irreversible progress on disarmament would strengthen the other two pillars of the NPT and that transparency would foster mutual trust. It was thus determined to work towards achieving substantive results at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

20. **Mr. Dobelle** (France) said that the French delegation fully associated itself with the statement made by Slovenia on behalf of the European Union. France hoped that the work of the Preparatory Committee would pave the way for a constructive and successful NPT review process and would strengthen support by all States parties for the international non-proliferation regime, at a time of threats to compliance with its norms. Although it was not the task of the participants at the second session of the Preparatory Committee to seek agreement on the various issues in the lead-up to the 2010 Review Conference, since the relevant recommendations were to be formulated at the third session, the participants should engage in a frank and in-depth discussion in order to prepare for those meetings and settle pending procedural issues. Referring to the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) — limiting the risk of arms proliferation, establishing mechanisms aimed at enabling access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy while preventing the diversion of nuclear materials or technologies intended for civilian purposes to non-peaceful purposes, and encouraging nuclear disarmament in the framework of general and complete disarmament — he reaffirmed his country's commitment to the NPT and noted that its implementation presupposed that all States parties abided by their obligations and demonstrated good faith.

21. The work of the Preparatory Committee should demonstrate the capacity of the review process to confront current challenges and to provide solutions to them by identifying consensual topics on which progress was possible. The serious proliferation crises that had marked the 2002–2005 review cycle and the discovery of a clandestine network for the supply of nuclear materials and technologies were problems that had not yet been resolved. Meanwhile, additional threats had emerged: certain nuclear arsenals were still expanding and biological and chemical proliferation, together with the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles, were continuing. In that connection, the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, had declared on 21 March 2008 that, in the face of proliferation, the international community must show no weakness to those who violated international norms, but that all those who abided by them were entitled to fair access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Preparatory Committee must address current

issues, which included strengthening the non-proliferation regime against the backdrop of the grave proliferation crises in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and responding to the growing demand for access to nuclear energy for civilian uses in a context of increasing concern about the security of energy supplies. As to the issue of disarmament, it should be addressed pragmatically, taking into account the substantial reductions that had already been made in most nuclear arsenals since the end of the cold war.

22. The two proliferation crises had provoked a firm response from the international community with the adoption of a number of resolutions by the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council. The fact that the States in question had breached their obligations was likely to undermine the development of international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to the detriment of States that complied with their obligations and at a time of growing global demand for energy, which nuclear energy could help to meet. Efforts should therefore be undertaken to ensure the responsible development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, reconciling energy security with non-proliferation safeguards. Only a credible response from the international community, one that involved strengthening the non-proliferation regime, could provide the assurances necessary for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the development of international cooperation. It was important to respond appropriately to the serious violations of obligations under the NPT by States parties that had circumvented the non-proliferation norm it embodied. It was unacceptable for a few States to breach their obligations, while they simultaneously demanded to enjoy the benefit of their rights, thus undermining the very foundation of the Treaty. The commitment on which the NPT was founded, which was to prevent proliferation, could not be made conditional on progress made towards the other objectives of the Treaty.

23. The Security Council had fulfilled its role in addressing those breaches. In the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran, through the adoption of four resolutions in less than two years, the Security Council had reacted firmly to that country's repeated breaches of its safeguards agreement. In defiance of the international community, Iran had pursued enrichment activities for which there was no credible civilian rationale. It was a matter of great concern that after five years of investigation, the IAEA still could not certify that the Iranian nuclear programme was intended for peaceful purposes. The development of ballistic missiles of increasingly long range added to those concerns. France would like to see those questions resolved through diplomatic channels and expected Iran to comply with the resolutions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors, and by the Security Council. It called on Iran to establish conditions conducive to restarting talks and negotiations through the suspension of its enrichment and reprocessing activities.

24. As to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), after having announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT, the DPRK had claimed the right to conduct a military programme. The Security Council had responded by adopting two resolutions. France would like to see a political solution to the crisis – one that provided for the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of the DPRK's programmes. The issue of proliferation transfers from that country to several other States was also a source of concern that must be dealt with seriously. In that respect, there was concern about recent reports of DPRK support for a Syrian nuclear programme. France called on the Syrian Arab Republic to provide full disclosure about its past and present nuclear activities and encouraged the IAEA to launch a thorough investigation into those activities.

25. Those crises demonstrated that it was imperative to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the NPT so as not to lead some countries to consider that their security would be better assured through the development of a nuclear capability rather than through compliance with international non-proliferation norms. For that

purpose, it was essential to ensure the universal application of the IAEA safeguards agreements, as well as the universal adoption of additional protocols to the NPT. Moreover, it was important to promote strict export controls and to reduce the risk of terrorism associated with the availability and circulation of nuclear goods, particularly through clandestine networks.

26. Furthermore, it was of fundamental importance to continue the discussions begun the previous year on the issue of withdrawal from the Treaty. It would, in effect, be unacceptable for any State, after having benefited from the provisions of article IV and after having acquired nuclear materials, facilities and technologies through the cooperation provided for in that article, subsequently to withdraw from the Treaty and use what it had acquired for military purposes. The idea was not to amend the terms for withdrawal set out in article X but to consider the consequences that withdrawal would entail and to recall or restate certain principles whose purpose was to organize the response of the international community in the event of such withdrawal.

27. The other major issue for the early twenty-first century was how to meet the growing demand for energy while adhering to the principle of sustainable development. France attached great importance to the development of civilian applications of atomic energy within the framework defined by article IV of the NPT and would endeavour to ensure that full effect was given to the provisions of that article. As the President of the French Republic had declared on 24 September 2007, France stood ready to help any country that wished to acquire civil nuclear technology. There was no contradiction between that commitment and the desire to consolidate the non-proliferation regime. Recalling the conditions that applied to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, he said that that right must not be diverted to contrary purposes. In that regard, it was imperative and urgent to respond to the crises in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in order to restore the confidence of the international community. France cooperated with an increasing number of countries and institutions and paid particular attention to the needs expressed by developing countries. Accordingly, since the previous summer, it had concluded a large number of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, in particular with countries in North Africa and the Middle East. States parties to the NPT must work together to reconcile the requirements of meeting energy needs, protecting the environment and achieving non-proliferation. To that end, steps should be taken to promote the responsible development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a multilateral framework that would guarantee that sensitive technologies and goods were not used for purposes other than peaceful ones. That would require promoting mutual understanding of the conditions to be met for exercising the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. States parties should also reflect on pragmatic solutions to forestall the risks associated with the dissemination of sensitive technologies. In that context, they should develop specific multilateral mechanisms to ensure supplies of nuclear fuel to meet the needs of beneficiary countries, implement effective export controls and develop innovative technologies that were resistant to proliferation. Lastly, steps should be taken to encourage countries developing nuclear energy for civilian purposes to build the necessary safety and security infrastructure. France was currently in the process of setting up a specialized agency to facilitate cooperation in that area.

28. With regard to nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, France complied fully with its obligations under article VI of the NPT and emphasized its commitment to the programme of action adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. France had an exemplary record on nuclear disarmament: along with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France had been the first nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Moreover, it was the only State to have transparently dismantled its nuclear testing site and to have dismantled

its surface-to-surface nuclear missiles. France had never participated in the arms race and applied a principle of “strict sufficiency”. The French President had announced further reductions in France’s arsenal of one third of the total number of nuclear weapons, missiles and aircraft in the airborne component of its nuclear forces. After that reduction, France, which had no other weapons besides those in its operational stockpile, would possess fewer than 300 nuclear warheads. In addition, the President had invited international experts to come and witness the dismantling of France’s facilities for the production of military fissile materials and had indicated that none of France’s nuclear weapons was targeted against anyone.

29. Furthermore, on 21 March 2008, the French President had presented an eight-point plan of action, which he was urging the nuclear Powers to endorse before the 2010 NPT Review Conference and which addressed, inter alia, the following matters: the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; the dismantling of all nuclear testing sites; the prompt initiation, within the context of the Conference on Disarmament, of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for the manufacture of nuclear weapons; the establishment of an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile materials; the initiation of negotiations on a treaty banning short and intermediate-range surface-to-surface missiles; and universal accession to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. It was to be hoped that all nuclear Powers and all other States would join France in promoting and implementing that plan of action, which was genuinely capable of taking them forward on the path to nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. Such progress did not mean that States parties should not strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Experience had shown that progress on nuclear disarmament did not go hand in hand with any lessening of proliferation.

30. France wished to reiterate the importance of the issue of NPT universality. It was desirable for States parties, through dialogue, to encourage India, Israel and Pakistan to adhere as far as possible to international standards on non-proliferation and export controls. Welcome progress had been made in that direction, but much more remained to be done. France reaffirmed its commitment to the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East and noted that, as declared by the Security Council, a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to achieving the objective of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

31. In order for the dawn of the new nuclear era to be synonymous with collective security and shared prosperity, it was vital for the members of the international community to work together to encourage the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, strengthen control of the nuclear fuel cycle in order to forestall any risk of proliferation and continue to progress towards disarmament, and nuclear disarmament in particular.

32. **Mr. Jazaïry** (Algeria) said that the Algerian delegation fully associated itself with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and with that made by the Syrian Arab Republic on behalf of the Arab Group. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) faced serious difficulties, mainly relating to the risk of vertical and horizontal proliferation, selectivity in its implementation and the lack of good faith and good will in honouring commitments made in the area of nuclear disarmament. Additionally, there was the risk that terrorist groups might acquire weapons of mass destruction. Algeria supported all the efforts made by the IAEA to prevent attempts at nuclear proliferation and to ensure respect for related obligations. Algeria fully respected its non-proliferation commitments but was of the view that non-proliferation alone was incapable of averting the danger posed by nuclear weapons. The credibility and authority of the NPT remained dependent on its universality, which was why the Algerian delegation

was calling on States parties, in particular those with nuclear weapons, to fulfil their non-proliferation obligations without discrimination or selectivity.

33. He noted with regret the delay — or indeed the backward movement — in the implementation of the provisions on nuclear disarmament contained in article VI of the Treaty. The commitments undertaken during the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences had either become a dead letter or had been called into question. Although quantitative reductions in nuclear arsenals had been made, they could never take the place of the unequivocal commitment on the part of nuclear-weapon States to bring about the total elimination of such weapons. Instead, those States, parallel to announcements of reductions in their weapons stockpiles, had adopted policies intended to give renewed legitimacy to those weapons and to modernize them. More worrying still was the radical shift that had occurred in nuclear thinking: classical deterrence had been superseded by the threat of the actual use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Thus, a dangerous trend was emerging, whereby the status of nuclear-weapon States was recognized as a permanent right for a very small minority of States. Previously, however, that status had been recognized only temporarily on the basis of geostrategic considerations relating to the balance of power during the cold war.

34. Algeria reaffirmed the validity of the decisions adopted by the 1995 Review Conference and the recommendations adopted during the 2000 Review Conference, including the 13 practical steps established as a means of giving effect to article VI of the NPT. In that connection, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile materials intended for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices were matters of priority.

35. Algeria welcomed the adoption of treaties providing for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and was in favour of extending the existing agreements to cover all regions of the world, especially the Middle East. In that regard, it deplored the fact that it had not been possible to make the Middle East a nuclear-free zone, owing to Israel's refusal to accede to the NPT and to submit its nuclear facilities to the IAEA safeguards regime. Israel had thus defied the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, the recommendations issued by the 2000 Review Conference and various other relevant United Nations resolutions. The double standard employed by some countries did not contribute in any way to achieving the above-mentioned objective or to strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Whereas other countries in the region were subjected to pressures and threats based on allegations that they had breached the non-proliferation regime, Israel was left alone and thus gained an advantage from the fact that it had not acceded to the NPT. The Algerian delegation called on the international community, and especially the NPT depositary States, to take all necessary measures and to urge Israel — the only nuclear-weapon State in the region — to give effect to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and to the relevant recommendations of the 2000 Review Conference.

36. The negative security assurances that protected non-nuclear-weapon States from the use or threat of use of such weapons were of utmost importance to Algeria. Such assurances would certainly contribute to strengthening the non-proliferation regime and would encourage nuclear disarmament. Given the limited nature of the regime established by Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the treaties relating to nuclear-weapon-free zones, it would be wiser to codify that regime by means of a legally binding international instrument. Algeria reiterated its endorsement of the inalienable right of NPT States parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Efforts to prevent proliferation and measures aimed at strengthening non-proliferation must not be used as a pretext for impeding the exercise of that right or eroding it. Algeria fully understood the concerns that access to nuclear technology could arouse in some people, which was why it reiterated its support for the measures taken by the IAEA to establish the necessary transparency with regard to the

nature of States parties' nuclear programmes. Lastly, it wished to put an end to the repeated failures that had plagued the multilateral disarmament process.

37. **Mr. Biabaroh-Iboro** (Republic of the Congo) said that the lack of progress in the nuclear disarmament process and the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation remained factors that were capable of triggering a nuclear war. He stressed that it was high time to put an end to the arms race and to give priority to combating world hunger and poverty and climate change by allocating the necessary resources to those issues.

38. The Congolese delegation associated itself with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and reaffirmed its commitment to full compliance with the obligations arising from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to strengthening the regime the NPT had established. The Republic of the Congo urged all States parties to take the same approach. Negotiations should be begun without delay to conclude agreements on further and irreversible reductions in nuclear weapon stockpiles with a view, ultimately, to their total elimination. The States that possessed the largest nuclear arsenals bore a large portion of the responsibility in that regard. Negative security assurances to prevent the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States should be applied.

39. The Congolese delegation reaffirmed the inalienable right of all States to carry out research into, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, in accordance with recognized international norms. It acknowledged, however, that the IAEA system of safeguards remained the one element that was indispensable for preventing the process from being diverted to other ends, in particular the acquisition of nuclear weapons. It was therefore necessary to strengthen the role of the IAEA as the authority charged with verifying and ensuring respect for the safeguards agreements concluded with States. It was also necessary to strengthen cooperation between States with a view to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, as well as that of explosive nuclear devices. Yet such cooperation could not be effective if certain States escaped scrutiny by the mechanism set up under the non-proliferation regime; it must take place within the framework of the United Nations and be transparent and non-discriminatory in nature. It was therefore urgently necessary to strive for universal accession to the NPT. Such cooperation should also include reinforcing the regime provided for by Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) concerning the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and by other existing international legal instruments, with a view, in particular, to preventing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by non-State groups or actors.

40. It was indispensable to revive the mechanism established by the Conference on Disarmament, whose work had regrettably been at an impasse for the past several years. The Congolese delegation supported all multilateral initiatives aimed at preventing nuclear war — through nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — and at consolidating international and regional peace and security. It supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and strongly encouraged the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East, or anywhere else where that might prove necessary.

41. **Mr. de Macedo Soares** (Brazil) said that Brazil associated itself fully with the statement made by Mr. Mackay, Ambassador of New Zealand, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition. He drew attention to the results obtained by the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, which had led to the strengthening of the review process, the establishment of a new set of principles and goals for non-proliferation and disarmament and the unequivocal commitment on the part of nuclear-weapon States to the achievement of total disarmament. Unfortunately, the 2005 Review Conference had been less successful, and during the past few years, emphasis had been placed on non-proliferation, while nuclear

disarmament had received scant attention. The meagre progress made in nuclear disarmament had been the result, not of multilaterally negotiated, irreversible and verifiable agreements, but of unilateral decisions by nuclear-weapon States that could be reversed at their total discretion. As a country that had decided, long before its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to relinquish the military nuclear option and not to base its national security on the acquisition of nuclear weapons, Brazil opposed attempts by nuclear-weapon States to reinterpret the commitments they had made under article VI of the NPT owing, it would seem, to events that had occurred in the first years of the current decade and to the atmosphere of insecurity that had prevailed since then. It was not certain that the unwillingness shown by those States to advance towards nuclear disarmament was the best way to promote international peace and security and to combat terrorism. Brazil shared the concerns of the international community at the emergence of new strategic and military doctrines that provided for the possibility of using nuclear weapons on a pre-emptive basis, even against non-nuclear-weapon States, which would lower the threshold for the utilization of nuclear weapons.

42. Brazil acknowledged that one of the challenges facing the NPT concerned proliferation attempts by both State and non-State actors, but it reiterated its position that an effective and sustainable non-proliferation strategy could not be carried out without implementing multilaterally negotiated and verifiable measures on nuclear disarmament and the control of fissile material. Brazil was in favour of efforts to negotiate a universal, non-discriminatory and internationally verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty. Such a treaty would constitute a necessary complement to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and a significant step forward in efforts to curb nuclear weapons proliferation and to achieve complete and irreversible disarmament. Brazil called on States that had not yet done so to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty with a view to its early entry into force without conditions.

43. One of the objectives — endorsed by Brazil — of the NPT Review Conference was to urge States that had not already done so to ratify the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, without conditions and without delay, and at the same time to urge States parties to refrain from adopting any measure that contravened the provisions of the Treaty or were inconsistent with its spirit. Brazil was fully aware of the importance of the non-proliferation pillar of the NPT and had therefore expressed support for strengthening the safeguards regime. At the beginning of the 1990s, Brazil had signed a quadripartite safeguards agreement with Argentina, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). Since then, Brazil's nuclear facilities, which had already been under safeguards since the early 1970s, had been subject to comprehensive safeguards. Likewise, the uranium enrichment facilities that were to be brought into service under the joint initiative launched in February 2008 by the Presidents of Argentina and Brazil would necessarily be subject to supervision by ABACC. Brazil's strategic cooperation with Argentina in the area of nuclear energy was strong evidence of the commitment by the two countries to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes.

44. Brazil was a founding member of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in an inhabited area of the world, which had been established more than 40 years previously by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). That treaty had been ratified by all the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and served as a model for similar initiatives around the world. Brazil therefore strongly supported and encouraged the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the Middle East. In that spirit, it reiterated its call to the nuclear-weapon States to reconsider the terms of their adherence to the relevant protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, so as to provide complete and unconditional negative security assurances to all countries in the region pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament.

45. The preparatory process for the 2010 Review Conference presented a good opportunity to test the willingness and good faith of all States parties to live up to their commitments and to fulfil the expectations generated by the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

46. **Mr. Ford** (United States of America) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which had been open for signature for 40 years, was the most widely ratified non-proliferation or arms control agreement in existence. It was an important contributor to international peace and security, promoted the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and encouraged progress in nuclear disarmament. The contemporary world was vastly safer and more secure than it had been at the end of the 1960s, partly because of the success of States parties in ensuring compliance with non-proliferation obligations arising from the Treaty and in recognizing, even at the height of the cold war, that it was in their common interest to avoid further nuclear proliferation. Nevertheless, despite progress in disarmament and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the international community had to face problems such as those posed by the nuclear ambitions of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). It was therefore imperative for States parties to work together more effectively to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, while continuing to engage in cooperation on nuclear technology.

47. With regard to the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, real progress had been made since the end of the 2005 NPT Review Conference. There was widespread awareness among States that the unchecked acquisition of fissile material production capabilities with potential military applications posed a serious threat to the non-proliferation regime. The spread of such capabilities would require additional resources to be allocated to the safeguards regime so that it could provide warning of diversion in sufficient time to permit effective responses and so as to ensure that countries with the requisite technology to produce nuclear materials reported such production.

48. Moreover, international cooperation in the field of nuclear energy must be intensified in order to meet skyrocketing energy needs in ways that minimized further damage to the environment while increasing energy security. The growing number of nuclear power plants around the world and their appetite for fuel might appear to give rise to contradictions between the various articles of the NPT, pitting peaceful use objectives against non-proliferation objectives. In reality, the possibility existed for States parties to expand nuclear energy in ways that strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as Presidents Bush and Putin had stated in July 2007. The United States had been moving forward in that direction with programmes such as the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which were aimed at expanding international nuclear energy cooperation in ways conducive to non-proliferation and at providing attractive cooperation alternatives that persuaded participating countries not to acquire enrichment and reprocessing technologies. In addition, many of the major nuclear fuel suppliers, working with the IAEA, had formulated proposals for the development of an even more robust and reliable international system of fuel supply that would help remove the perceived need for more countries to develop enrichment and reprocessing capabilities of their own. The United States looked forward to working with all countries, and with the IAEA, to develop further the concept of reliable fuel supply.

49. Efforts by Iran to justify its nuclear activities, which were in violation of the safeguards regime and the NPT, were encountering increasing resistance during the current review cycle as compared with the preceding cycle. There was much less talk about the alleged denial of inalienable rights and more legitimate and constructive debate about the concrete benefits and technical merits of fuel-supply programmes and GNEP-style

cooperation. That was a potential path towards the resolution of much of the seeming tension between articles II and IV of the Treaty.

50. At the end of the NPT review cycle in 2005, some States parties, supported by Iran and other States, had appeared to argue that nuclear-weapon States had somehow backtracked on their commitment to the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament and were thus in violation of their obligations under article VI of the Treaty. As far as the United States was concerned, that was patently false. The United States had reduced its operationally-deployed strategic nuclear weapons from over 10,000 to under 3,000. It had fully complied with its commitment to reduce by 90 per cent the number of its tactical nuclear weapons. It had accelerated its rates of warhead dismantlement and was on its way to dismantling three out of every four of all the many thousands of nuclear weapons that had been in existence at the end of the cold war, bringing its arsenal down to its lowest levels since the 1950s. The United States continued to: reduce the number of its delivery systems; eliminate entire classes of weapons, such as intermediate-range missiles and nuclear artillery shells; remove many hundreds of tons of fissile material from its nuclear weapons programmes; maintain its moratorium on underground nuclear testing; help peacefully dispose of hundreds of tons of fissile material from former Soviet nuclear weapons; fulfil its promise to slash non-strategic nuclear forces; build a new plant to convert large quantities of plutonium from former United States nuclear weapons into nuclear reactor fuel; refrain from producing new uranium or plutonium for nuclear weapons; and work to bring about a total, global ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

51. The United States delegation hoped that the Conference on Disarmament would reach a consensus on the production of fissile material in compliance with the provisions of the Draft Decision by the Presidents of the 2008 Session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1840) and that negotiations would begin on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for the production and manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

52. The United States had taken steps to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons by improving the means to accomplish strategic deterrence through a “new triad”, consisting of the development of non-nuclear capabilities, active and passive defences and a production capability that would allow the United States to adapt its weapons needs on the basis of evolving requirements and which was already helping it to reduce the number of its nuclear warheads. States parties knew that the United States remained firmly committed to the disarmament goals set out in the preamble and article VI of the Treaty and had become a leading contributor to international discussions on how to advance in that direction and to rid the world once and for all of nuclear weapons, since no country would win significant strategic benefits by breaking out of a disarmament regime. Most of the nuclear-weapon States were demonstrating voluntary transparency in nuclear matters, and there seemed to be a growing interest in realistic and practical discussions about the possibility of nuclear disarmament. The first part of the 2010 NPT review cycle should therefore be counted as a success for all those who were serious about the cause of disarmament.

53. Regarding non-proliferation, which was the overarching purpose of the NPT and the foundation on which peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament rested, the record was mixed. It was not certain that all States parties were as strongly committed to non-proliferation as they had been at the end of the 2005 review cycle. The unchecked spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies would create the risk of the development of nuclear weapons programmes in certain countries. The world had become appropriately alarmed at Iran’s rush to produce fissile materials in order to prevent a so-called “energy crisis”. Given the nuclear programmes established by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the recent adoption of a third United

Nations Security Council resolution, which required that Iran should suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities and which imposed additional sanctions, was encouraging.

54. With regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, much additional work still needed to be done to achieve the vision expressed in the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks in September 2005, under which the DPRK had committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards as a non-nuclear-weapon State. There was cause for alarm in the fact that the DPRK had collaborated with a State party to the NPT that, by definition, was bound by the non-proliferation obligations of articles II and III of the Treaty, in the covert construction of a nuclear reactor not intended for peaceful purposes, in violation of the procedures designed to reassure the international community of the peaceful purpose of nuclear activities. Nonetheless, the Six-Party process had resulted in progress towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The United States was committed to ensuring that the DPRK did not engage in further proliferation activities and, to that end, would work to establish a rigorous verification mechanism within the Six-Party framework. There had been evidence that sustained international solidarity in enforcing compliance with the Treaty could produce changes in the behaviour of proliferator States.

55. The United States delegation had outlined a proposed workplan, which it encouraged all States parties to review and which, in its view, could serve as a basis for reaching consensus on the most substantive issues and for an effective final document in 2010. The United States believed that all States parties should be able to agree in 2010 on the critical importance of ensuring strict compliance with the provisions of all articles of the NPT; promoting and expanding international cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in ways consistent with non-proliferation principles; taking steps to deter and, if necessary, to respond to withdrawal from the Treaty by States that were in violation of its provisions (which was not a matter of denying them the right to withdraw from the Treaty, for that was enshrined in article X, but rather of making it more difficult for violators to use the withdrawal mechanism to escape accountability for their violations); taking swift and effective action in response to violations of Treaty provisions; and ensuring the application of strong and viable nuclear safeguards, including those provided for by additional protocols to IAEA safeguards agreements.

56. The United States believed that it would be valuable to reaffirm the principles — expressed, for instance, in the 1995 resolution on the Middle East — regarding the importance of bringing about conditions that would allow for the elimination from that region of all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

57. The United States also believed that all States parties — including, of course, the nuclear-weapon States — should be able to reaffirm their commitment to the disarmament goals set out in the preamble and article VI of the Treaty. All of those building blocks could form the basis of a strong, constructive and realistic final document in 2010.

58. **Mr. Tarui** (Japan) said that his country, the only one to have actually experienced a nuclear attack, strongly hoped for the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world at the earliest possible date. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Despite the many challenges encountered, Japan hoped that the NPT regime would be supported by States parties and that substantial deliberations would be held during the Preparatory Committee's current session. The most pressing issues concerned the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and, in the meanwhile, a moratorium on nuclear test explosions, as well as the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and, in the meanwhile, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Despite progress in reducing the number

of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States should dismantle their arsenals in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner. In that connection, he drew the attention of States parties to the working paper on nuclear disarmament that Japan had prepared.

59. The nuclear disputes with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Islamic Republic of Iran posed a serious challenge to the international non-proliferation regime. The abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes by the DPRK was essential for the preservation of peace in North-East Asia and for the security of the international community as a whole. Japan would continue striving to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue in a peaceful and diplomatic manner through the Six-Party Talks. It called on the DPRK promptly to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programmes and to take decisive action with a view to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, as agreed in the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks in September 2005. Furthermore, Japan urged the DPRK promptly to comply with the requirements set out in Security Council resolution 1718 (2006). He noted that the Government of the United States of America had recently released a troubling report regarding allegations of DPRK assistance to covert nuclear activities in the Syrian Arab Republic. Moreover, the Japanese Government regretted that, despite repeated calls by the international community, the Islamic Republic of Iran had not complied with the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions. In order to resolve those issues peacefully and diplomatically, Japan urged the Iranian Government to comply with the requirements of those resolutions, especially Security Council resolution 1803 (2008).

60. The universalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol was the most realistic and effective way to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime. Japan exhorted all States parties that had not yet done so to conclude an additional protocol without delay. In recent years, the growing global demand for energy and efforts to prevent global warming had led to a re-examination of the role of nuclear energy and its use for peaceful purposes. Nuclear energy use must be accompanied by commitments to effective implementation of the triad consisting of nuclear non-proliferation safeguards, safety and security. While such implementation was primarily the responsibility of the interested States, the role of international cooperation was also vital. Japan intended to continue to support the various activities carried out by the IAEA in those three areas. Although the NPT recognized the right of a State party to withdraw from the Treaty, such action would undermine international peace and security. Japan had prepared a working paper on that topic, which it hoped would be the subject of in-depth discussions during the current session of the Preparatory Committee.

61. Education and awareness-raising for civil society were essential factors in making progress towards disarmament and non-proliferation. There must be greater awareness of the role of the NPT and the immensely destructive power of nuclear weapons. Japan had prepared a working paper on that subject and, in cooperation with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), planned to hold a side event on disarmament and non-proliferation education with the participation of civil society representatives. In addition to the above-mentioned three working papers, Japan intended to participate proactively in the working groups in order to lay a solid foundation for the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

62. **Mr. Cserveny** (International Atomic Energy Agency) said that just as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was based on three equally important pillars, namely nuclear non-proliferation, peaceful nuclear cooperation and nuclear disarmament, the activities of the IAEA were also based on three pillars, which were nuclear verification, nuclear safety and security and nuclear technology. His statement

would focus on the activities of the IAEA in relation to the implementation of the Treaty since the conclusion of the first session of the Preparatory Committee.

63. With regard to the verification of nuclear non-proliferation commitments and after referring to the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, he said that, since the spring of 2007, a comprehensive safeguards agreement had entered into force for only 1 State and that no such agreements had yet entered into force for 30 NPT States parties. Of those 30 States, 10 had already signed a safeguards agreement; 6 had a safeguards agreement that had been approved by the IAEA Board of Governors; and 14 had yet to initiate negotiations with the Agency. The IAEA urged those 30 States parties to conclude safeguards agreements and bring them into force without delay, as well as to make every effort to accomplish that objective prior to the opening of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Given the limitations of its verification tools, the Agency was able to provide credible assurances only in respect of States that had brought into force both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol. Since May 2007, 7 States had concluded an additional protocol and 9 had brought an additional protocol into force, making a total of 125 States parties that had concluded an additional protocol and 87 States parties, including 4 nuclear-weapon States, that had brought an additional protocol into force.

64. The Agency currently ensured the application of safeguards in 950 facilities, located in more than 70 countries, on a regular budget of approximately 110 million euros a year. It was clear that if the Agency was to continue to provide credible verification assurances and strengthen its safeguards system, its verification mission must be endowed with the necessary resources. The report on the implementation of safeguards in 2007 would concern 82 States that had both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force; 72 States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force, but without an additional protocol; 4 of the 5 nuclear-weapon States that had voluntarily offer safeguards agreements; and 3 non-States parties to the NPT that had concluded item-specific safeguards agreements. With regard to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the IAEA had continued its verification mission, but had not been able to provide credible assurances as to the absence in that country of nuclear material and activities that were required to be declared. While the Agency had been able to clarify a number of the outstanding safeguards issues relating to the Islamic Republic of Iran's past nuclear activities, it expected the Iranian authorities to provide the necessary clarifications concerning the remaining outstanding issues. Contrary to the decision of the United Nations Security Council, Iran had not suspended its uranium enrichment activities and continued its heavy water production projects. As to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the IAEA, pursuant to the ad hoc verification arrangements emanating from the request of the States in the Six-Party Talks, continued to verify that the DPRK's nuclear installations at the Yongbyon nuclear facility and the Taechon facility remained shut down.

65. With regard to nuclear safety and security, in 2007, the nuclear industry had continued to demonstrate a high level of safety and security worldwide. The threat of nuclear terrorism continued to be of serious concern to the international community. Although a series of legally binding and non-binding international instruments had been developed, progress on their entry into force remained slow. That was particularly true of the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The IAEA continued to assist States in ensuring nuclear security at major public events, and had established projects with the Governments of Brazil and China in preparation for the 2007 Pan American Games and the 2008 Olympic Games, respectively. Established in 1995, the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database Programme currently benefited from the voluntary participation of nearly 100 States. As at April 2008, participating States had reported or otherwise confirmed over 1,416 incidents, including 322 incidents involving the seizure of nuclear material or radioactive sources. In 395 of the confirmed cases, the materials had

been reported as stolen or lost. Nuclear safety officials from all of the world's nuclear Powers had met in Vienna in mid-April. As at April 2008, there were a total of 65 signatories to the Convention and 61 contracting parties. It was noteworthy that all countries with operating nuclear power plants were parties to the Convention.

66. In the area of technical cooperation, emphasis had been placed during the previous year on human health and on supporting the use of nuclear techniques for the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of disease, as well as for the improvement of nutrition, particularly of children. The IAEA's Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy (PACT) had secured pledges, grants and donations amounting to more than \$3 million. The second largest area was food and agriculture. The overall resources of the technical cooperation project had reached a total of approximately \$100 million in 2007.

67. Energy security was a major concern for both developed and developing countries. The current situation revealed a profound imbalance between populations in that roughly 1.6 billion people lived without access to electricity. There were currently 439 nuclear reactors in operation in 30 countries; they supplied some 15 per cent of the world's electricity. Seventeen of the 35 reactors currently under construction were in developing countries, primarily in Asia and Eastern Europe. It seemed clear that nuclear power would continue to be a part of the global energy mix. If the demand for nuclear energy increased, the question would arise as to where the nuclear fuel would come from and whether it would remain in the hands of the few existing suppliers. There had been proposals for the creation of new mechanisms that would settle that question. To date, the IAEA Secretariat had received 12 proposals covering a broad spectrum of mechanisms aimed at ensuring the supply of nuclear fuel.

68. It was undeniable that the links between non-proliferation and disarmament had come under growing stress over the past decade. Nevertheless, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament were mutually reinforcing, and the IAEA had the means to ensure the promotion of both of those aspects and was ready to contribute to strengthening that regime.

69. **Mr. López-Trigo** (Cuba) said that his delegation associated itself fully with the positions expressed by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Although nuclear disarmament was a matter of priority, the lack of progress on the total elimination of the arsenals of nuclear-weapon States was extremely disturbing. The success of actions undertaken to give effect to the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences would depend primarily on the political will of all States parties.

70. Cuba had always stated that it possessed no weapons of mass destruction and had no intention of manufacturing any. It was regrettable that, 40 years after the adoption of the Treaty, there were still some 32,300 nuclear weapons in existence, of which more than 12,000 could be utilized immediately and were capable of destroying the human species several times over. The existence of those weapons and the doctrines that justified their possession themselves represented a threat to international peace and security. The nuclear-weapon States had the legal obligation to find ways to completely eliminate such weapons. The Advisory Opinion delivered by the International Court of Justice on 8 July 1996 on *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* was an important precedent that should be taken into account. Moreover, since 2000, nuclear-weapon States had begun talks aimed at total nuclear disarmament based on a system of strict international verification. Cuba demanded the immediate application of the 13 practical steps, which had been adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

71. It had to be acknowledged that, since the entry into force of the NPT, not only had its ultimate objective not been reached but, what was more, regrettably, there had been a

number of setbacks. It was unacceptable for international security to depend on the policies of nuclear deterrence and military alliances in disregard of the NPT and the principle of multilateralism. It was immoral for certain nuclear-weapon States to condemn third world countries for supposedly failing to meet their obligations while they themselves continued to build their nuclear arsenals. Nuclear non-proliferation was not an end in itself but rather a milestone on the road to general disarmament. Cuba rejected any selective implementation of the NPT. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it was imperative to negotiate and to adopt, in the context of the Conference on Disarmament, a universal, legally binding instrument without conditions that guaranteed the non-utilization of nuclear weapons. The balance between the three pillars of the NPT should be respected. That implied recognition of the inalienable right of all States parties, without discrimination, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The unfair restrictions on exports to developing countries of nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful purposes were cause of concern. Moreover, technical cooperation must be fair and must not serve as an instrument for political ends. The activities of the IAEA, in particular with regard to its verification function, should be free from any undue pressure or interference, and diplomacy and peaceful dialogue should be the preferred means for resolving all disputes. As demonstrated by recent events concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran, it was crucial that a spirit of negotiation and cooperation should prevail in order to create a climate of trust conducive to the work of the IAEA.

72. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was an important step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Cuba supported the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, as it would address the justifiable claims of the vast majority of the States in the region. To that end, Israel — the only State in the region that was not a party to the NPT — should accede to the Treaty without delay and should subject its nuclear facilities to IAEA comprehensive safeguards. Moreover, the United States of America should stop providing Israel with nuclear information, facilities, equipment and materials.

73. Cuba reiterated its commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons. Global military expenditure each year exceeded \$1 billion, and the only country that had ever utilized the atomic bomb accounted for half of that expenditure. In the meantime, each year, millions of persons died from curable diseases, malnutrition and hunger. It was time to take the funds currently devoted to weaponry and to allocate them to the production of food and medicines and to the establishment of educational programmes.

Statements in exercise of the right of reply

74. **Mr. Logar** (Slovenia), speaking on behalf of the European Union and addressing his comments to the Iranian delegation, said that he wished to reiterate the position of the European Union, which was that it recognized the inalienable right of the Islamic Republic of Iran to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV of the Treaty but was of the view that that country must respect the provisions of relevant Security Council resolutions and comply with the demands of the IAEA Board of Governors concerning its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities so that a climate of trust could be restored within the international community.

75. **Mr. Kabbaz Hamoui** (Syrian Arab Republic) said it was regrettable that the Canadian delegation had made spurious allegations about nuclear activities supposedly conducted in the Syrian Arab Republic. He deplored the fact that the United States of America, as well as Japan and France, also claimed to have information concerning such activities. He recalled that the Government of the United States had falsified the facts when it had claimed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. The authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic firmly refuted all allegations that nuclear activities had been carried

out in Syrian territory, which had purportedly justified the raid launched by Israel. The Syrian authorities were of the view that the main purpose of those spurious allegations was to influence the negotiations concerning Israel's nuclear facilities. They called on the United States Government to demonstrate good judgement and to refrain from further aggravating the crisis in the Middle East. If the Canadian delegation genuinely wished to promote peace, it should urge Israel to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), stop producing nuclear weapons and subject its facilities to IAEA inspection. The Syrian Arab Republic reiterated its full support for the provisions of the NPT and hoped that States parties that called for compliance with them would be more careful in the future about making unsubstantiated allegations.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.