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NOTE DATED 27 APRIL 1953 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
UNITED STATES ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING
THE SIXTY-SECOND REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 7 JULY 1950
(S/1588)

The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to Paragraph 6 of the Resolution of the Security Council of 7 July, 1950, requesting the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the United Nations Command.

In compliance with this Resolution, there is enclosed herewith, for circulation to the members of the Security Council, the Sixty-second Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16 January through 31 January, 1953, inclusive.

It will be noted that on page 2 of the Report there is stated: "Copies of this publication, 'The Communist War in Prisoner of War Camps', have been furnished to the United Nations Secretariat and are available to Members."* There are enclosed twelve copies of this publication, and it is requested that these be made available to Members who wish to consult them.

* Copies of this pamphlet can be consulted in the Archives of the United Nations.

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA FOR
THE PERIOD 16 - 31 JANUARY 1953
(Report No.62)

I herewith submit report number 62 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 January 1953, inclusive. United Nations Command communiques numbers 1496-1511 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Liaison officers met on five occasions during the period, although the negotiations remained in recess.

On 21 January the Communists charged the United Nations Command with "undermining various administrative agreements relating to armistice negotiations", but acknowledged the reduction of convoy immunity announced by the United Nations Command on 15 January.

On 23 January the Communists protested a strafing attack, alleged to have been made against one of their convoys en route from Kaesong to Pyongyang on 21 January.

On 25 January the reduced grant of immunity to Communist convoys became effective, and on the same day the Communists protested an alleged "shelling" of the conference site area. The shelling consisted of the burst of one erratic round within the neutral conference site on 23 January. The United Nations Command admitted the possibility that a stray shell fired by United Nations Command artillery might have accidentally landed in the neutral zone, but pointed out that the Communist practice of placing weapons in the immediate vicinity of the neutral perimeter, in order to use the neutral zone as a shield for their military operations, invited return fire by the United Nations Command on the basis of self-defence.

No other significant events in connexion with the armistice negotiations occurred during the period.

Over a period of several months, the United Nations Command had collected documented evidence which indicated that the series of riots and incidents of violence which had occurred throughout pro-Communist prisoner-of-war camps had a definite, pre-planned and long-range purpose. Intelligence sources gradually pieced together a picture which demonstrated that the Communists had developed a new phase of warfare -- they were using their captured personnel held in the custody of the United Nations Command as part of their over-all military and political effort. The collation of material was completed and on 28 January 1953

the United Nations Command released its heretofore classified document to the world press. Copies of this publication, "The Communist War in Prisoner of War Camps", have been furnished to the United Nations Secretariat and are available to members.

Enemy initiated action was relatively light and there was little change in the pattern of ground fighting during the latter part of January. One battalion-size attack against a United Nations Command division on the central front, two company-size attacks against main line of resistance positions of another United Nations Command division on the eastern front, and lesser probing actions against other United Nations Command elements constituted the Communist ground activity during the period. The lack of large-scale ground activity also resulted in a decrease in enemy artillery and mortar fire. Only one major change occurred in the disposition of the Communist forces on the front-line. This was a routine relief of a North Korean Corps on the eastern front.

Communist elements on the western front confined their operations principally to routine reconnaissance patrolling. Light and ineffectual probes were made against three United Nations Command divisions. None of the probes were larger than two platoons in size and all were successfully countered. While the enemy failed to undertake any large-scale action on the western front, there was no let-up in his determined resistance against United Nations Command patrols and raids during the latter half of January.

On the central front the largest enemy effort during the period was initiated by a Communist battalion during early evening hours of 17 January against positions of a United Nations Command division near Finger Ridge. Despite determined enemy efforts, United Nations Command defenders successfully repulsed the attack after four hours of fighting. Other enemy actions consisted of minor probes against United Nations Command positions by squad and platoon-size enemy units. United Nations Command resistance to enemy encroachment of their positions was matched by Communist elements defending against United Nations Command patrolling and raiding endeavours.

While the enemy-initiated actions in the eastern sector did not compare in strength with the battalion-sized attack on the central sector, the fighting was none the less intense during two company-size attacks against front line positions of a United Nations Command division near the Punch Bowl. The first enemy effort occurred during early morning hours of 18 January. Supported by mortar and

artillery fire, North Korean elements vigorously pressed the attack against the division's front line positions, and close-in fighting lasted for forty minutes before the United Nations Command defenders forced the enemy to flee. A similar and second effort against the same United Nations Command division again occurred during early morning hours of 28 January. This attack, again against the division's front line positions near the Punch Bowl, entailed close-in fighting of thirty minutes duration before the enemy was repulsed. Elsewhere on the eastern front patrol contacts and small probing actions followed familiar patterns.

United Nations Command naval aircraft operating from fast carriers in the Sea of Japan struck enemy targets throughout central and northeastern Korea. Despite adverse weather conditions and heavy seas, almost two thousand four hundred effective sorties were flown during the fifteen day period.

Heavy strikes continued against the enemy's transportation system, supply storage and billeting areas, factories, bunkers, gun and mortar positions and other targets of military significance.

A major strike on the Pungsan-Pyongbugun barracks areas resulted in the destruction of many buildings. A number of personnel casualties were also inflicted.

On 31 January United Nations Command naval aircraft and a United Nations Command battleship with supporting destroyers carried out a co-ordinated surface and air bombardment on a heavy supply build-up and other significant targets in the Korean east coast port of Wonsan. Buildings, shelters, revetments and other military targets were destroyed or damaged by this striking force during the day.

A number of sorties were flown daily in direct support of friendly ground forces. These missions resulted in destruction of many personnel and supply shelters, bunkers, gun and mortar positions. Many troop casualties were also inflicted.

The coastal main supply routes from Wonsan to Chongjin were struck daily. Naval aircraft teamed up with surface units on many occasions to inflict and maintain rail and road cuts in this vital enemy supply line. Numerous trucks, locomotives, rail cars, rail and road bridges were destroyed. Also rails were cut, roads were cratered and tunnels were closed in many strategic places.

Off the west coast of Korea United Nations Command naval aircraft continued their strikes on enemy targets of military significance in central western Korea,

west of a line between Kaesong and Hanchon. Throughout this area attacks continued unabated on enemy troop concentrations. These attacks resulted in destruction of many buildings.

Attacks on interdiction targets produced rail and road cuts, and destruction of or damage to railroad and highway bridges, locomotives, rail cars and trucks.

Other United Nations Command aircraft provided front line units with close air support and flew combat, reconnaissance, and escort sorties deep into enemy territory. These sorties destroyed or damaged gun and mortar positions, bunkers, building, personnel and supply shelters, warehouses, railroad cars, railroad and highway bridges, and made many rail cuts. Several personnel and troop casualties were also inflicted.

United Nations Command patrol planes supported the United Nations Command effort in Korea by making daily flights over waters adjoining Korea, conducting anti-submarine, reconnaissance, and weather data missions.

Off the Korean west coast United Nations Command surface units carried out routine patrols and blockaded the coastline around the perimeter of Hwanghae Province from the Haeju River approaches to the Taedong. These vessels successfully defended the friendly held islands off the Korean west coast by maintaining constant watch and harassing enemy troop concentrations and gun positions on the mainland.

Extensive ice fields around the perimeter of Hwanghae Province and especially in the Chodo and Sokto areas hampered naval operations during the period.

Enemy coastal guns and mortars were active. The friendly held islands of Sunwido and Chodo were fired on; however, there were no damage or casualties reported. A United Nations Command frigate received a hit on her starboard quarter which caused splinter holes and superficial damage; and four United Nations Command minesweepers were fired on, but no damage or casualties were reported on these four vessels. In most instances surface units were effective in silencing these gun positions, and in some instances the positions were destroyed or damaged by counter battery fire.

The naval blockade continued along the Korean east coast from Kosung to Chongjin. Surface units on day and night coastal patrols fired on key targets along the coastal main supply routes to maintain rail and road cuts and destroy bridges and rolling stock. Tunnels were blocked and several slides were created at various points along the coastal main supply route.

A number of supply and industrial areas were damaged or destroyed at various coastal points from Wonsan to Chongjin.

Off the east coast, United Nations Command cruisers with assigned destroyers rendered direct support for front line troops. Enemy troop movements were illuminated nightly by these units and destructive call fire missions were carried out daily against enemy gun positions, bunkers, supply areas, roads and trenches.

A United Nations Command battleship, and assigned cruisers and destroyers carried out special gun strikes on interdiction and industrial targets between Hungnam and Songjin and in the vicinity of Nanam. Several cuts were made in the rail lines, and heavy slides were created at several points. A number of bridges and rail cars were destroyed. Several buildings were destroyed in supply and industrial areas along the coastal main supply routes.

During five days of the reporting period special task elements bombarded supply and industrial targets, gun positions, and other targets of military significance in the Wonsan area.

Enemy shore batteries in the Wonsan area and in the vicinity of Yunjin-dan were active during the period. Two United Nations Command destroyers were taken under fire by an enemy shore battery in the vicinity of Yunjin-dan. No hits were scored. A United Nations Command destroyer received eighteen rounds of estimated 75 mm fire while in the vicinity of Kosong; however, no damage was sustained. The friendly held island of Hwanto-do was fired upon by the enemy repeatedly during the period. These gun positions were engaged by surface units and were silenced.

The enemy was denied the use of the coastal waters for shipping, and all enemy craft detected were taken under fire and either destroyed or driven ashore. Enemy coastal movements were kept under constant surveillance.

United Nations Command minesweepers continued operations to keep the channels, coastal areas, and anchorages free of mines of all types.

United Nations Command naval auxiliary vessels and transports provided personnel lifts and logistic support for the United Nations Command naval, air, and ground forces in Korea.

United Nations Command aircraft were utilized on a diversified effort during the period attacking supplies, equipment and military personnel, and disrupting communications and transportation facilities.

Heckling raids were flown in the Yongni-dong-Sinanju area where large-scale attacks had been made during the preceding period. Fighter bombers repeatedly flew night bombing missions against bridges in this important transportation hub and attacked crews trying to repair damage inflicted by previous raids. Bridges were damaged, some rail cuts inflicted and many vehicles destroyed.

On regular daylight strikes in North Korea fighter bombers struck troop billeting areas and supply installations and made rail cuts on main transportation routes. Thunderjet and Shooting Star fighter bombers attacked supplies in the Sariwon and Sinmak areas and struck troop concentrations in the central sector of Korea. Rail cuts were made on all routes with particular attention given to the line between Pyongyang and Sariwon and the branch lines from Sariwon to Changyon and Haeju. Rail cuts were also made between Wonsan and Pyongyang.

Jet and propeller driven fighter bombers furnished close support for ground units all along the front line throughout the period.

Light bombers ran nightly patrols on the supply lines between Pyongyang and Wonsan and the routes running south. Particular attention was given to the destruction of locomotives and rolling stock in the Haeju-Sariwon area and on the lines north of Wonsan.

Some daylight attacks were made on supply targets and troop billeting areas but the bulk of the light bomber effort was concentrated on night strikes on rail and highway targets. Road blocks were made by these aircraft and the position of these blocks relayed to aircraft reporting into the area on armed reconnaissance missions. Trains and vehicle traffic were attacked while stopped at the blocked areas.

United Nations Command light bombers also provided nightly close air support for ground troops. These sorties were flown with the attacking aircraft using electronic aiming devices to hit obscure targets.

United Nations Command Superforts carried out night attacks on large enemy supply areas and troop concentrations deep in enemy territory. Supply targets included installations near Hangwon, Kung-dong, Kompo-dong, Sosang-ni, Suryo-ri and Kum-ni. Barracks areas were bombed at Tangdong, Kumsan-ni and Cholsan. On 26 January six medium bombers attacked the ore processing plant at Moktong and five others hit the Sagok communications centre.

Opposition to the night-flying Superforts was not consistent. Enemy night fighters appeared periodically but did not always attack the medium bombers. On 28 January one Superfort was shot down by enemy fighters over Kompo-dong. In no instance, however, did fighter attacks prevent the Superforts from reaching the assigned target.

United Nations Command Superforts dropped 500 pound general purpose bombs on enemy front line positions as part of the close air support programme for United Nations Command troops. The aircraft operated under control of ground radar stations on these missions. In addition to the close support sorties and attacks on primary target areas, the medium bombers flew leaflet sorties over enemy troops and civilians in rear areas.

Sabrejets observed MIG-15s over North Korea every day during the period and engaged the enemy jets each day except 18 January when the weather was non-operational. The predominance of the observations were in the afternoon. The Communist pilots continued their hit-and-run tactics and only occasionally attempted to carry through an engagement. A total of 447 Russian-built MIGs were engaged in 124 separate battles. The Sabrejets initiated all but forty-one of these engagements and constantly carried the battle to the Manchurian border. The apparent lack of desire to fight and the ease with which some "kills" have been made in recent weeks indicates that a low caliber of enemy pilots has been encountered.

Probably the most unusual incident of the period was the destruction of a Russian-built TU-2 aircraft which was intercepted by Sabrejets over the Yellow Sea northwest of Pyongyang, on 30 January. The twin-engine bomber was easily destroyed. No survivors were observed after the aircraft crashed into the sea. There was no indication as to the mission of the enemy TU-2 and no other enemy aircraft were observed in the immediate vicinity. This was the first destruction of TU-2 aircraft reported since 30 November 1951, when a light of twelve was caught by United Nations Command Sabrejets in the Namsidong area. On that occasion eight TU-2s were destroyed.

Total destruction claims for the United Nations Command interceptors against the enemy MIGs were twenty-five MIGs destroyed, two probably destroyed and twenty-one damaged. There were two Sabrejets lost during the same period.

Combat cargo planes flew normal airlift supplies, equipment and personnel in support of United Nations Command operations in Korea.

Leaflets and radio broadcasts were directed to enemy troops and civilians outlining United Nations objectives and stressing the humanitarian principles which are the foundation of United Nations and United Nations Command policies in Korea. United Nations championship of human rights was contrasted with the persecution of minorities practiced in Communist-dominated countries. The people of North Korea were urged to avoid co-operating with Communist leaders in their efforts to perpetrate the alien-inspired aggression against fellow Koreans.

Civil relief supplies delivered by the United Nations for use in Korea, as of 31 December 1952, totaled approximately \$249,641,882.00. The United States furnished \$224,248,923.00 of this amount; thirty-four United Nations and other free nations contributed \$11,742,316.00; United States voluntary agencies contributed \$11,203,117.00 and United Nations voluntary agencies \$2,447,526.00

Thailand was still highest of the United Nations contributors, excluding the United States, with \$4,368,000 in rice donations. The Philippines was second with \$1,875,468 in rice; and Nationalist China third with contributions valued at \$617,130.

1 Incl

The Communist War in
Prisoner of War Camps

