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2525th MEETING: 30 MARCH 1984

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2525th MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 30 March 1984, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Javier ARIAS STELLA (Peru).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, Egypt, France, India, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2525)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Letter dated 29 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Nicaragua to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16449)

The meeting was called to order at 4.35 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 29 March 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Nicaragua to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16449)

1. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Spanish*]: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Guyana and Honduras, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sinclair (Guyana) and Mr. Flores Bermúdez (Honduras) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Spanish*]: The Council is meeting today in response to a request contained in the letter dated 29 March 1984 from the representative of Nicaragua to the President of the Security Council (S/16449). The first speaker is the representative of Nicaragua, upon whom I now call.

3. Mr. CHAMORRO MORA (Nicaragua) [*interpretation from Spanish*]: Recently, Sir, I had an opportunity

to express to you our congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of March. On this occasion we should like to thank you for the diligent manner in which you have convened this meeting. The fact that you are a distinguished Latin American, a son of the fraternal people of Peru, guarantees a full understanding of the circumstances in the Central American region at the present time, which seriously threaten international peace and security. We are sure that you, better than anyone else, understand the basic origins of the crisis in our region: the oppression, exploitation and poverty that history has visited upon the Latin American peoples.

4. It was really not our intention to convene the Council only two months after having already done so; nor had we intended to do so on four earlier occasions in 1982 and 1983. Regrettably, however, the criminal, cowardly war being waged by a major Power against our people has made this necessary. That Administration, notwithstanding our constant efforts to bring about peace among the fraternal peoples of Central America, has continued to aim its efforts at the destruction of our revolution and of our country in general.

5. Today, once again, we have come to denounce further acts of aggression which, owing to their level of sophistication, the equipment used and techniques employed, represent a qualitative leap forward in the covert operations against our people.

6. We have come here with confidence and certainty because the international community's expressions of concern and repudiation in debates and resolutions on this subject have in fact contributed to avoiding a confrontation with unpredictable consequences in our region. We have come here in the hope that the international community's rejection will prevent a future of desolation and death following in the wake of acts of aggression against our country. Finally, we have come here so that the international community's outcry, together with Nicaragua's devotion to peace and the efforts of the so-called Contadora Group, will lead the peoples of the region along the path of peace and prosperity.

7. Regrettably, the international community's efforts, as expressed in the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Contadora Group and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, have not been sufficient to prevent resort to military solutions in the region. Although those efforts have prevented a regional war, they have not been able to prevent crimes against Nic-

aragua which cause concern and alarm in our country, because we are a peace-loving people.

8. May I ask the international community if the Nicaraguan people's alarm is not justified in the face of the increased military presence of the United States in a Central American country which it has turned into a "hired" republic where it is building an infrastructure for aggression. May I ask the international community whether the Nicaraguan people are not justifiably alarmed at the large-scale military manoeuvres which have been going on uninterruptedly, with changes of name only, in the territories and waters of Central America and the waters of the Caribbean. May I ask the international community if the Nicaraguan people are not justifiably alarmed at the criminal mining of their ports, which endangers international navigation and makes explicit the economic blockade begun a number of years ago. May I also ask the international community if the Nicaraguan people are not justifiably alarmed at the constant efforts of the American Administration to obtain funds necessary to finance the mercenaries of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

9. Regrettably, the shortsightedness and lack of political vision of the present American Administration, together with the historical failure to understand the realities of Nicaragua, continually lead it astray in its analyses while its mistakes become ever more dangerous. They believe that our alarm and concern at their crimes will make us willing to negotiate; instead our fighting spirit has only been increased and our anti-imperialism and determination have made us willing to fight to the death, whether against them or their puppets, in the war against our national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

10. The American military presence is in its new "land aircraft carrier", bought a few years ago, the name of which is not *America* or *The New Jersey* but "*The Honduras*". It is not an invention of the Nicaraguan Government; it is a palpable reality which has been amply proved by the American information media and other sources. According to information that we have, the present United States military presence in the fraternal Republic of Honduras may be summed up as follows.

11. There are 150 men of the Green Beret special forces battalion in charge of training counterinsurgency forces and classical infantry among Hondurans and Salvadorians in a special military training centre in Puerto Castilla, department of Colón. There are 150 men of the Tactical Air Command in charge of the functioning and management of the Ule Ridge radar station, Department of Francisco Morazán. One hundred men of the special combat group from the naval base at Norfolk, Virginia, are in charge of the management and operation of the Tigre Ridge radar base. There are 600 men from the Engineer Battalion of Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in charge of enlarging the runways in San Lorenzo, El Aguacate, Puerto Lempira and Palmerola,

and during the Granadero I manoeuvres they will expand and rebuild the runways in Jamastrán, department of El Paraiso, Comayagua, department of Copán; and La Florida. Nine hundred men from 43 support groups in Palmerola are at present helping prepare the Granadero I manoeuvres. Fifty men of the Rapid Deployment Command from McDiell, Florida, are in Palmerola, in charge of direction and control of the operations of the joint Honduras-United States exercises. There are 480 men from the 101st Aviation Battalion located in Palmerola, Comayagua, who will give air support to the Granadero I manoeuvres, as they did in the Ahuas Taras II manoeuvres. There are 134 CIA agents in charge of giving support and advice and directing the actions of their mercenaries and of the Nicaraguan counter-revolution. Three hundred men from the 224th Military Intelligence Battalion of Fort Stewart, Georgia, with 12 Mohawk QU-1 aircraft and seven N/D helicopters are carrying out reconnaissance flights in Salvadorian and Honduran airspace in support of the Southern Command activities.

12. The American military presence in Honduras has not been only in the form of sending United States military personnel; there has also been the building and expanding of military facilities.

13. We shall not use our own words to describe the intentions of imperialism and its puppets. What better way to unmask their objectives than to quote the very words of the Senator from Tennessee, a member of the Military Construction Sub-Committee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Jim Sasser.

"The facilities that have already been built or that it is planned to build in Honduras will make it easier to carry out a war in the region. Those facilities could in fact serve to encourage Honduran military commanders to attempt a military solution to their political and diplomatic problems with Nicaragua."

14. The Honduran military infrastructure has been modified since the beginning of Honduran-United States military manoeuvres in 1981. Fourteen military bases and runways have been remodelled or expanded in six Honduran departments.

15. During the Granadero I manoeuvres planned for April, United States military engineers will expand two more runways, at Cucuyagua and Jamastrán in Copán and El Paraiso departments bordering on El Salvador and Guatemala. They will also build three troop-training centres and will install complex 40-channel satellite-communications equipment at the Palmerola base.

16. Already under construction in the Honduran province of El Valle are barricades against armoured vehicles, as well as radar stations. The highway from Mocerón to Puerto Lempira is being remodelled and expanded, as is the highway from Los Trojes to Cifuentes. Those highways border the Jalapa valley in Nic-

araguan territory, which has been a priority objective of the counter-revolutionary and mercenary forces operating in Honduras.

17. United States military assistance to Honduras has increased significantly since 1980. In 1980 it amounted to \$3.7 million, and it increased to approximately \$40 million in 1983. This year, 1984, \$41 million has been approved, and the Reagan Administration has requested the appropriation of an additional \$37 million in assistance.

18. Furthermore, as part of its advice and military training, the United States has sent Honduras 89 mobile training groups, 40 Huey helicopters, six T-28 planes, nine A-37 planes, 11 landing-craft, 10 "Pinaña" speed-boats, 24 howitzers and, in this year only, more than 30 tons of war material, including thousands of M-16 rifles, ammunition, uniforms and camping equipment. It is important to point out that all the military equipment being transported to Honduras in the joint military manoeuvres with the United States is left in that country as a gift and is not counted in the assistance budget approved through normal channels.

19. Furthermore, the various naval and military manoeuvres and exercises being carried out by the armies of the United States and Honduras throughout this period and aimed, as they themselves admit, at intimidating the Sandinist popular revolution and the Central American revolutionary movement, and the building of military bases and training centres for the Salvadorian army and the counter-revolutionary gangs all reveal the interventionist policy of the United States in our region.

20. The joint United States-Honduras military and naval exercises, Big Pine II, which lasted seven months, are but one expression of the military involvement of the United States in Honduras in the past four years. After the spectacular end of those manoeuvres, a whole military infrastructure remained behind, practically turning Honduras into a country under military occupation. Approximately 5,500 United States troops took part in the exercises on land, with the assistance of the United States Navy and Air Force, which raised to almost 15,000 the number of troops in the area.

21. Once the Big Pine II manoeuvres were completed, the United States did not hesitate to reveal its intention to continue to consolidate its military presence in Honduras. Commander Arnie Schossboy, stationed in the Southern Command, in the Panama Canal Zone, said, "Plans exist to continue military exercises until 1988."

22. As a further demonstration of its military force with the clear objective of intimidation, and seeking results favourable to its interventionist policy in El Salvador, Reagan Administration officials said that the United States will carry out further small-scale military manoeuvres in Honduras, beginning in March and con-

cluding in June. Small land units of the United States Army, made up of 100 to 200 soldiers, will be deployed in regions of Honduras very close to the borders with Nicaragua and with El Salvador, and what we might call mini-manoeuvres will be going on on a permanent basis.

23. Indeed, both in Central America and in the Caribbean, the United States, starting in April, will carry out the largest military manoeuvres ever held in Central America's territory and waters, as well as in the Caribbean Sea. It will even try to involve other countries of the area and thus attempt to exceed its performance in the past when it made notorious use of its well-known puppets. In these Granadero I and Ocean Venture II manoeuvres, thousands of United States soldiers will be mobilized on our region's lands and waters, as well as hundreds of combat planes, including B-52 bombers, and dozens of warships. In addition, on this occasion manoeuvres in Honduran territory will be carried out not only in areas close to the Nicaraguan border, but also in areas close to the El Salvador border.

24. As an immediate result of the massive and permanent United States military presence in Honduras, there has been an accelerated increase in the military operations of the CIA mercenaries from bordering territories, especially Honduras, where they have the unconditional support of the army and the Government of the country.

25. That, in turn, has resulted in the proliferation of counter-revolutionary bases and camps in neighbouring territories, where training and resupplying is going on systematically. I wish to make clear to the members of the Council that my Government will continue to believe in the good intentions of the Government of Costa Rica and in its constant and active neutrality, and, for that reason, we maintain our understanding that the camps located in its territory do not have the official support of its Government but that, on the contrary, it is the CIA and its mercenaries that are trying to create political problems between our two countries. We hope that the two peoples and Governments, with the necessary maturity and independence, will be able to contribute to a relaxation of the tensions in the area and to an improvement in our bilateral relations, thereby promoting peace and progress in Central America.

26. On the other hand, we are absolutely certain that our region is now in a particularly critical and difficult period and that at any time this could lead to a conflict with serious consequences. That is why, in order to alert the international community, I shall now give a detailed list of the location of these various camps in Honduran territory and shall describe the specific acts of aggression of which we have been the victim since the last Council meeting on this subject [2513th meeting], early in February.

27. There are now 15 counter-revolutionary camps in Honduran territory being used by the CIA to train its

Somozist mercenaries against our country, all along the border with Nicaragua. I shall now read out the list of those camps.

28. First, there is the "Las Tunas" camp, located 11 kilometres to the west of El Espino in Honduran territory; it has 200 counter-revolutionaries. Second, there is the "Cerro Las Uvitas" camp, 13 kilometres to the north of Santo Tomás del Norte in Honduran territory, with 300 counter-revolutionaries. Third, there is the "Cacamuya" camp, which is 15 kilometres to the south of El Espino in Honduran territory and has 100 counter-revolutionaries. Fourth, there is the "Santa Rita" camp, 9 kilometres to the south of El Espino in Honduran territory; it has 300 counter-revolutionaries. The fifth camp is called "Las Dificultades". It is 1 kilometre to the north of the town of Las Dificultades in Honduran territory, and it has 200 counter-revolutionaries. Sixth, there is the "La Lodoza" camp, which is 17 kilometres to the north of the village of San Fernando in Honduran territory and has 200 counter-revolutionaries. Seventh, there is the "San José" camp, 13 kilometres to the north of the village of San Fernando in Honduran territory, with 500 counter-revolutionaries. The eighth camp is called "Nubarones". It is 13 kilometres to the west of Jalapa in Honduran territory and has 250 counter-revolutionaries. Ninth, there is the "Las Mercedes" camp. It is 1 kilometre to the north of Trojes in Honduran territory and has 60 counter-revolutionaries. Tenth, there is the "Quebrada de Oro" camp, 22 kilometres north-east of Jalapa in Honduran territory, with 700 counter-revolutionaries. Eleventh, there is the "Buena Vista" camp, located 19 kilometres to the north-east of Jalapa in Honduran territory, with 110 counter-revolutionaries. The twelfth camp is the "Las Vegas" camp. It is 2 kilometres to the north of the mouth of the Poteca river in Honduran territory and has 200 counter-revolutionaries. Thirteenth, there is the "Banco Grande" camp, 39 kilometres north-east of the village of Murra in Honduran territory, with 570 counter-revolutionaries. The fourteenth camp is called "Rus Rus". It is located 35 kilometres to the north-west of the village of Leymus in Honduran territory and has 300 counter-revolutionaries. Fifteenth, there is the "Auka" camp, 27 kilometres to the north-east of Waspán in Honduran territory, with 100 counter-revolutionaries.

29. I think it is worth pointing out that the names I have just read out are not unknown to the diplomatic missions to the United Nations; on various occasions the United States press has accurately reported about this.

30. I shall now summarize the acts of aggression committed against Nicaragua in the period between 4 February and 29 March 1984.

31. On 4 February, a group of counter-revolutionaries and members of the Honduran army attacked, from Honduran territory, the border port of La Tabla-zón, 5 kilometres to the north of Dipilto. On 12 Feb-

ruary, two fast launches of the Piraña type, coming from Honduran territory, launched a 15-minute attack against Punta San José, in the Chinandega department. On 14 February, a counter-revolutionary group of undetermined size, coming from Honduran territory, harassed the border village of Santo Tomás del Nance, in the Chinandega department, for 10 minutes and sabotaged an electric power station, leaving the village without any electricity. On 16 February, a group of 30 members of the Honduran army, using M-60 machine guns, 81-mm mortars and rifles, attacked the village of Las Papayas, 2 kilometres to the north of El Espino. On 24 February, members of the Honduran army harassed the village of El Ranchón, located 5 kilometres to the north-west of Cinco Pinos in the Chinandega department. No damage was reported. On the same day, two fast launches of an undetermined type tried to penetrate close to the fuel storage facilities at El Bluff, in the Zelaya department, but were driven off by our troops. The enemy withdrew in a southerly direction. On 29 February, a counter-revolutionary group of undetermined size harassed the frontier posts of San Juan del Norte, on our southern border. On the same day, members of the Honduran army used small-arms fire to harass the border post of La Ceiba, located 5 kilometres to the west of Somotillo, in the Chinandega department.

32. On 1 March, a counter-revolutionary group harassed from Honduran territory the frontier post of Leymus, in northern Zelaya. On 3 March, members of the Honduran army launched a 15-minute attack on the frontier post of La Ceiba. On the same day, an olive-drab helicopter flew over the port of Potosí, in the Chinandega department, at an altitude of approximately 1,000 metres, attacking its installations with six rockets. No material or human damage was reported. Also on 3 March, two *Pescasa* motorized vessels came into contact with mines near El Bluff. On 3 March, 50 Honduran army troops attacked the frontier post of Las Minitas, three kilometres north-east of Somotillo, in the department of Chinandega.

33. On 5 March, two Piraña speedboats raided the Potosí sector of the department of Chinandega, with undetermined air support and an artillery launch, which opened fire on Sandinist naval vessels moored there, wounding six comrades and killing one; and an undetermined number of counter-revolutionary troops attacked from Honduran territory the villages of Leymus and Waspán in northern Zelaya.

34. On 6 March, two Cessna aeroplanes flew from Honduras and attacked the frontier post of Leymus in northern Zelaya; Honduran army troops launched a 20-minute attack on the frontier post of El Naranjo, five kilometres north-west of Somotillo in the department of Chinandega; counter-revolutionary elements and Honduran army troops attacked, with small arms and 81-mm mortar fire, the community of Vado Ancho, one kilometre south of Santo Tomás del Norte, causing the death of an 11-month-old girl; and two Piraña speed-

boats attacked the military unit stationed at Montelimar in the department of Managua and then withdrew to the South.

35. On 7 March, two speedboats, with helicopter support, attacked the Sandinist naval unit and the frontier post at San Juan del Sur with cannon fire, small arms fire and four rockets. On 8 March, the Panamanian vessel *Norcaribe* hit a mine in the port of Corinto and was seriously damaged. On 9 March, an undetermined number of Somozist mercenaries based in Honduran territory in the San Jerónimo sector, in co-ordination with Honduran army troops, attacked, with mortars and various kinds of small arms fire, the military installations at El Naranjo, four kilometres north of Somotillo.

36. On 10 March, a 10-man Honduran army patrol waged a five-minute attack against the La Reforma observation post, five kilometres north-west of Somotillo; and a group of approximately 30 to 40 Somozist mercenaries, jointly with Honduran army troops, waged a one-hour attack with AK and FAL rifles against the La Minita observation post, three kilometres north-west of Somotillo.

37. On 11 March, a group of Somozist mercenaries, of undetermined size and originating from Honduran territory, attempted to sabotage the Villanueva electric substation, 10 kilometres south-west of Somotillo, by firing RPG-7 rocket launchers. They neither hit their target nor caused any damage.

38. On 12 March, a group of mercenaries, also of undetermined size and originating from Honduran territory, destroyed with explosives several electric power pylons two kilometres north-west of Somotillo, subsequently returning to Honduras.

39. On 25 March, an undetermined number of Honduran troops attacked, from Honduran territory, Sandinist People's Army units five kilometres south-west of Somotillo, firing forty 81-mm mortar shells; and combined Honduran army and counter-revolutionary forces based on Honduran territory carried out an artillery and mortar attack against the Nicaraguan community of La Ceiba, five kilometres north-west of Somotillo.

40. On 27 March, 30 Honduran army troops attacked, with small-arms fire and from Honduran territory, a Sandinist People's Army patrol passing through the Loma de los Pastores sector, one kilometre south of Santo Tomás del Nance in the department of Chinandega; and in the naval sector of Corinto two Piraña-type speedboats from Honduran waters attacked a Nicaraguan coast guard vessel on patrol off the port of Corinto. At the time of the attack two aircraft overflew the area with their lights extinguished. As a result of this criminal attack, two sailors were wounded, and at present one of them is in critical condition.

41. On 28 March, the Panamanian freighter *Homin No. 7* was attacked with 50-mm guns by a Piraña speedboat from Honduras. On 6.50 p.m. on that same day, the fishing boat *Aracely Pérez* struck a mine in Corinto and sustained serious damage to its stern.

42. On 29 March, two Piraña-type speedboats attempted to lay mines along the Pacific coast but were taken by surprise and driven off by Nicaraguan coast guard vessels, which hit one of them, setting it on fire. At 5.00 a.m. on that same day, an undetermined number of Honduran troops, operating from Honduran territory, attacked Catarina sector, three kilometres from La Ceiba. They also harassed the La Ceiba observation post, five kilometres from Somotillo, with various artillery and 81-mm mortar fire. Fortunately, there were no casualties to mourn. Also on 29 March counter-revolutionary groups operating from Honduras attacked and sabotaged Salto Grande in the Bonanza sector of northern Zelaya, damaging an electricity-generating dam and thus harming the economy of the Miskito population. They were subsequently driven off by our forces; several counter-revolutionaries were killed or wounded and the remainder fled towards Wuapuc territory in Honduras. Also on the same date, two Nicaraguan fishing boats in Corinto harbour were seriously damaged after hitting two mines.

43. On 30 March—today, that is—at 5.50 a.m., there was an explosion in Corinto, between Buoys One and Two. The Nicaraguan vessel *Alma Sultana*, which was engaged in dredging, was seriously damaged as a result; two reservist comrades were wounded and a member of the Sandinist People's Army was killed.

44. This detailed account reveals not only the presence of and increase in military camps in Honduran territory, but also the aggression, attacks and violations of our territory, our air space and our territorial waters. We have presented it because we consider it very important that the international community be made aware of the factors which constitute this new phase of the aggression.

45. First of all, attacks and other incidents have been taking place daily against our borders and against our ports. Secondly, we are aware of increasingly direct participation in these attacks by the Honduran army, whether acting alone or in support of the counter-revolutionary groups. Thirdly, it is important to emphasize the use of sophisticated equipment, both aircraft and boats, which far exceeds the technical capacity of not just the mercenaries and counter-revolutionary elements but also of the Honduran Army. Consequently, this implies an increasingly significant involvement of the great Power to the north—the United States.

46. Barely two weeks ago the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries adopted a communiqué [*S/16422, annex*] recalling the Political Declaration of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries [*see*

S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, annex], held at New Delhi in March 1983, which denounced the threats and acts of intimidation and aggression against Nicaragua, the utilization of the territory of foreign countries in and outside the region as bases for aggression and the training of counter-revolutionary forces and the commission of terrorist actions and sabotage. It also expressed its profound concern over the new escalation of such actions and condemned the laying of mines in the ports of Nicaragua, stating further its firm opposition to any measure designed to blockade any country of the region.

47. When that communiqué was adopted at United Nations Headquarters, here in New York, a number of incidents had already taken place which, apart from causing casualties and substantial material damages, had endangered international navigation.

48. These grave incidents arising from the indiscriminate mining of our ports and the combination of air and sea attacks against those ports and other economic and military targets, under the guidance and with the financing and logistic support of the CIA, began, as I have pointed out, on 25 February, when a Piraña-type launch from El Bluff, on the Nicaraguan Atlantic coast, scattered a number of mines which, the next day, caused the sinking of the Nicaraguan motor vessel *Pescasa 15*, wounding two comrades. The next day, the motor vessel *Pescasa 23* hit two mines and was totally destroyed, with nine comrades wounded and two others missing.

49. On 1 March this indiscriminate mining of our ports also began to affect vessels of other nationalities. A Dutch dredging vessel, *Geoponte VI*, which was carrying out dredging operations in the port of Corinto under Dutch Government financing granted to the Government of Nicaragua, was damaged from the blast of an underwater explosion. This explosion resulted in four wounded, among them two Dutch workers, and the loss of more than \$1 million for the Dutch company. On 7 March the freighter *Los Caribes*, of Panamanian registry, was damaged by a mine explosion as it was leaving the port of Corinto, causing injuries to a number of Mexican and Panamanian sailors.

50. While we were still alerting the international community to the gravity of these incidents, and no more than 13 days after the Non-Aligned Movement had condemned such acts, the Soviet vessel *Lugansk*, which was transporting petroleum to our country, upon entering the port of Sandino was seriously damaged by the explosion of a mine with which it had come into contact. As a result, five Soviet sailors were injured, adding to the list of Dutch, Mexican and Central American sailors who had previously been innocent victims of these acts of sabotage carried out by the American Administration against the Nicaraguan Government through covert operations currently being publicly discussed in the United States Senate.

51. One week after that incident, on 28 March, the vessel *Inderchaser*, of Liberian registry, hit a mine while leaving the port of Corinto, causing it to explode. Nicaraguan authorities are now assessing the damaged sustained by that vessel.

52. Yesterday, as I have already mentioned, two Nicaraguan vessels in the harbour of Corinto were seriously damaged when they hit two mines. Fortunately, on that occasion there were no casualties; however, both vessels were virtually destroyed.

53. In addition to irreparable loss of human life and extensive material damage, these actions have had grave consequences for Nicaraguan international trade. A number of freighters of various nations have decided not to unload merchandise in the port of Corinto and, instead, do so in Puerto Caldera, in Costa Rica, thus jeopardizing normal loading and off-loading operations in our country.

54. This strategy of terror involving the use of T-28 aircraft and high-speed Piraña boats, as well as the mining of our territorial waters, which reflects a turning-point in the methods of the "covert war" being waged against our country, is the most tangible example of the State terror that has been unleashed by the current United States Government against our people and Government. This is a violation of the most elementary norms of international law, which must be faithfully respected by all States—particularly when the State involved is a great Power and a permanent member of the Security Council.

55. The increasingly brazen use of State terrorism by the United States Government, through the CIA, means that it has run out of pretexts against our revolutionaries and also lost all hope it had placed in its mercenaries and its Somozist counter-revolutionaries, whom it has, without success, for months and months supported to the tune of millions of dollars, even taking that money from its own people.

56. The latest actions suggest to us that the Reagan Administration intends to proceed with a military blockade of Nicaragua. The international community has the responsibility to restrain a Government which, abusing its economic and military power, is resorting ever more openly to force to resolve international conflicts, under pretexts that are as implausible as they are dangerous.

57. Moreover, not content with the damages it has inflicted on our people, the Reagan Administration is planning to increase its military assistance to its freedom fighters, who every day kill men, women, elderly persons and children in my country. Two weeks ago that Administration announced its decision to appropriate \$21 million for the CIA mercenaries, thus fully disclosing not just its determination to press ahead with realizing its criminal plans against Nicaragua, but also its indifference to and disregard for the American people.

ple, international public opinion and the peace-making efforts of the Contadora Group. Those \$21 million would be obtained by cutting that amount from a bill intended to provide \$200 million to impecunious American senior citizens and to improve the already precarious situation of the country's elderly, thus showing that the Administration is prepared to sacrifice its own citizens to its warmongering policy and the attainment of its military options.

58. The international community cannot remain passive in face of the buildup of the United States military presence in El Salvador, where by its interference it is preventing a reasonable political solution to the civil war in that fraternal country, a solution that would help get to the bottom of the region's crisis. Recently the Non-Aligned Movement, concerned over the deterioration of the conflict owing to continued foreign intervention, expressed its hope that it would cease and appealed to those involved to adopt a constructive position and to refrain from providing military assistance that might impede that process.

59. Unfortunately, even though it might have been expected, the United States reply continues to be the building up of its military presence in that country. In the last few days it has tightened its military grip around El Salvador. Let me give a few brief examples. It has sent the aircraft carriers *America* and *John F. Kennedy* to the Atlantic and the Pacific; it has stationed 2,500 soldiers along the frontier between Honduras and El Salvador; it has mounted counter-insurgent agents in the north-east strip of El Salvador. It is continuing with its \$1-million-a-day military aid which serves only to add to the long and painful list of more than 50,000 Salvadorian deaths, and it has increased its spy overflights. With regard to those spy flights, we have all been informed today by *The New York Times* that American officials accept that this sort of thing has been going on for some time in order to facilitate the military efforts of the Salvadorian army.

60. The false democratic facade that the United States has sought to give the so-called elections in El Salvador can but make the situation there more difficult and complex. Mr. Reagan's sole objective is to be able to justify the military assistance buildup, but let Mr. Reagan not believe that El Salvador is Grenada, or that by sending in his Marines he can win a victory like the pyrrhic victory obtained in Grenada.

61. The only reasonable solution for the Salvadorian people which the international community is aware of, and on which various democratic Governments have already expressed their views, is a dialogue between all the representative forces, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) and the Government, which should have as its object the formation of a broadly representative national government. We thus urge the international community and, in particular, the Contadora Group to lend their good offices for the attainment of this object.

62. The Contadora Group has continued in its efforts in its quest for peace in the region. However, the Group's hard work has been seriously impeded because, consistent with their friends in the north, certain Central American countries have refused to enter into concrete commitments that would once and for all remove the spectre of war which has afflicted the region in recent years. Moreover, the main obstacle to the Contadora Group's efforts and the quest for peace is the United States Government.

63. The height of cynicism is the fact that President Reagan's new special envoy to Central America, before setting off for our region recently said that there was, on the one hand, no incompatibility between the military activities of the United States in the region and the pressures on Nicaragua and, on the other, the activities of the Contadora Group. He went on to add that Contadora was a Latin American initiative and that security problems required another kind of response, namely, the kind of support that the United States Administration intends to lend Contadora.

64. The special envoy holds out peace laurels in one hand while brandishing the sword of war in the other. This is the cynical statement of an official, but it clearly reflects the American position in the sense of not only not taking seriously the peace-making efforts of the Contadora Group, but of impeding those efforts.

65. It was our full understanding of the situation that led Commander Daniel Ortega Saavedra, Co-ordinator of the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua, to make an emergency trip recently to the fraternal Republic of Mexico, where he requested of President de la Madrid implementation of urgent and exceptional measures by the Contadora Group to prevent war in Central America. It was also that same concern and same devotion to peace on the part of Nicaragua which prompted our sending missions to the other Contadora countries—that is, Colombia, Panama and Venezuela—as well as to other countries of the region.

66. My country believes that the efforts to achieve agreement in the region only among the Central American countries, without taking into account the United States, could lead us to a possible failure of the already difficult negotiations that have been taking place in the Contadora Group. Peace in Central America requires as a *sine qua non* the clear and definitive commitment of the United States, which so far, besides pretending to be a mere spectator in the region's crisis, has in fact brought to bear all kinds of political pressures to prevent a genuine, just and lasting solution to the conflicts of the region. Furthermore, not content with that and contrary to the utterances of the Contadora Group, it has stepped up its dirty, undeclared war against my country through the CIA mercenaries and has significantly increased its military presence in the area.

67. In an interview published in *The New York Times*, the President of the United States replied to the ques-

tion of how one could explain or justify United States support for people who are trying to overthrow a Government with which the United States has diplomatic relations, saying:

“I see no contradiction between our support for the democratic Government of El Salvador and the contras. We have told Nicaragua very clearly that this would stop when they fulfil their promise, restore democracy and hold elections. Now pressure has compelled them to say that they will hold elections, apparently next November. But so far there is nothing to indicate that the elections will be anything other than ‘rubber stamp’ elections, which characterize all totalitarian Governments.”

68. In this way, Mr. Reagan seeks to appoint himself legislator, judge and hangman with regard to the entire internal political life of a country. Consequently, he is acting as an international outlaw. His conduct is in the mould of what is known in current international doctrine as “State terrorism”. My country reserves the right to do whatever it deems fit to demand in due course the compensation that in justice should properly be accorded to it for the devastation and killings resulting from the criminal policy of this international terrorist. In the mean time, we request this supreme body to take the necessary immediate action to stop war in Central America, because it has the competence and the responsibility.

69. Before I conclude my statement I should like to ask the representative of the United States—as she is one of the most eminent and closest collaborators of the current Administration—to explain to me what moral authority is possessed by Mr. Reagan, who, it should be remembered, was elected in 1980 by less than 30 per cent of the United States electorate, to demand that we should introduce in Nicaragua political system X or political system Y. Moreover, what right does he have to try to do so by brute force, reverting to the era of gunboat diplomacy and the big stick?

70. I should also like the United States representative to explain to me who appointed President Reagan as the champion of liberty and the guardian of democracy, and who authorized him to establish the parameters determining the concepts of democracy and freedom, which in his case, however, cover a wide range, starting in El Salvador and ending in South Africa.

71. I should also be glad if the representative of the United States would explain to me on what basis President Reagan seeks to appoint himself a defender of human rights in the world, when there are grave social imbalances in his own country, despite its being a great economic Power, when the Hispanic and black minorities in that country are third-class citizens, treated with contempt, and when beggars sleep at night in the streets of Manhattan near the manhole covers to protect themselves against the harsh winter.

72. I wish only to remind President Reagan that it would be good for his Administration to reconsider its errors and, having given them serious thought, to act with the maturity that should properly characterize the rulers of an empire such as that of the United States, thus steering the world away from a holocaust with incalculable consequences.

73. Mrs. KIRKPATRICK (United States of America): Once again the Security Council has been called into session to hear a complaint by the Government of Nicaragua against the Government of the United States. By now the Council must be quite familiar with the thrust of the Nicaraguan complaint, it having been put before this body in one form or another on some six occasions over the past two years. The details change, but the substance of the complaint remains essentially the same—that Nicaragua is the peaceable, innocent victim of an aggression that is orchestrated by, if not carried out by, the United States. Previously it had in fact been suggested, last year and the year before, that the United States was just on the verge of a massive military invasion of Nicaragua. That charge is absent this year, but the essence of the complaint has changed little beyond that important specific.

74. It is probably not surprising that the Nicaraguan complaint comes before the Council in the wake of the elections in neighbouring El Salvador—that happened in March 1982 as well. It happens virtually every time we have a debate on Central American policy in the United States Congress.

75. The Marxist-Leninist Government in Nicaragua cannot have been happy with the election in El Salvador. Indeed, we have just heard the representative of Nicaragua suggest that the elections in El Salvador only make the situation more difficult and complex. One must ask: difficult for whom, complex for what?

76. The Nicaraguan Government itself promised democracy, national independence and self-determination to the people of Nicaragua before that Government came to power. Its members made those promises in writing; they made them in public arenas; they made solemn pledges as they sought help from the Organization of American States (OAS), from the United States and from their neighbours. And, indeed, Sandinists received help from the OAS, from the United States and from Nicaragua’s neighbours in their efforts to overthrow the dictatorship headed by Anastasio Somoza. It is interesting that today, as last year and the year before, the Government of Nicaragua, which sought and received help from those regional groups and those neighbours, does not appeal to those regional groups and those neighbours in the hemisphere to help it with its current problems. Could it be because they are too well informed?

77. Nicaragua began the process of militarization and the introduction of foreign advisers in Central America. Nicaragua began the process of destabilization of its

neighbours. I have no interest today in laying all the facts of these matters before the Council. The Council is presumably familiar with most of them. I would just point out, concerning the process of militarization of Central America, which was begun by the Government of Nicaragua, that today Nicaragua continues to increase its army and its stores of weapons. It now has some 107,000 persons under arms, including the army, the reserves and the militia. It continues to receive weapons from diverse places in the Soviet bloc, augmenting an already formidable arsenal of tanks, heavy artillery, armoured personnel carriers and multiple rocket launchers.

78. I would mention in addition to the process of militarization that Nicaragua began the process of introducing foreign military personnel into Central America. Today it maintains much the largest contingent of foreign military advisers in the area: some 3,500 or more Cuban and other military and security advisers, more than 100 Soviet and other Eastern bloc advisers, Libyan advisers, PLO advisers, some 5,000 to 10,000 Cuban and other civilian advisers, an increasing number of whom are young males who have completed military training.

79. Nicaragua began the process of destabilizing its neighbours in the hemisphere. Again I have no desire today to give the Council a comprehensive list of Nicaragua's efforts. There may be time for that in the course of this discussion. I would simply remind the Council that Nicaragua continues to assist guerrillas in other countries, principally, but not exclusively, the FMLN and FDR in El Salvador, through shipments of arms and other supplies, through training and through the provision of command and control centres.

80. Nicaragua comes before this Council once again, as six times in the past, seeking to prevent its neighbours from defending themselves against Nicaraguan-based efforts at the subversion and overthrow of neighbouring countries.

81. It cannot be, as we have said before, that one country has the right to destabilize by violence its neighbours and that they have no right to defend themselves. It cannot be that one country, Nicaragua, has the right to introduce foreign arms and advisers to destabilize its neighbours and that they have no right to defend themselves. It cannot be that one country, Nicaragua, has the right to the most advanced technical material and that they have the right to only primitive weaponry.

82. The Government of Nicaragua continues its efforts at internal repression as well as external destabilization. Again I have no desire today to take up the time of the Council with a full description of Nicaragua's internal repression in the last year, since we last discussed this matter. I would, however, bring to the attention of the Council and others who are interested the fact that at this time, as we meet here, several

thousand Miskito Indians are fleeing from the Sandy Bay Norte area of Nicaragua. This is north of Puerto Cabezas, about which we have heard a good deal. Those thousands of Miskitos this day fleeing Nicaragua are headed towards Honduras, fleeing from the camps into which they have been forced by the Nicaraguan Government in gross violation of their human rights. As they flee, knowing that they will live under hard physical conditions in Honduras, they are being bombed by Sandinist push-and-pull type aircraft. They are being harassed, fired upon. Every effort is being made to prevent their exodus from Nicaragua, as every effort was made to prevent their living in freedom and peace in Nicaragua.

83. The Government of Nicaragua has apparently still not learned that those who wield swords against their own people and their neighbours risk having swords turned against them.

84. Nicaragua comes to this Council to seek protection while it undermines and overthrows neighbouring Governments and represses its own people. It comes to the Council speaking of mercenaries who attack the Government of Nicaragua. We have in our time heard from totalitarian Governments many examples of the efforts of Governments to dehumanize their own people, to declare their own fellow citizens non-people. Totalitarians regularly define those who oppose them as non-people. The counter-revolutionaries described by the representative of Nicaragua are Nicaraguans. They are Nicaraguans who today, as in the past, are seeking the democratic solutions that they have so long sought. They are seeking democracy and freedom in their Government, just as they sought democracy and freedom when they overthrew the previous dictator of Nicaragua only to see him replaced by new military dictators.

85. As I said, we can understand that the elections in El Salvador cannot have been a happy occasion for the Government of Nicaragua. The spectacle of hundreds of thousands of Salvadorian workers and peasants voting enthusiastically in a closely contested election represented a repudiation of the Nicaraguan-backed guerrillas who had denounced and tried to sabotage the election. It represented a repudiation of the Nicaraguan style of democracy, which substitutes the will of the Government for the consent of the people. It represents an embarrassing contrast with the Sandinist dominated and controlled election process, so-called, now under way in Nicaragua.

86. Indeed, the nature of the conflict in Central America is illuminated by the policies of the Governments of El Salvador and Nicaragua as they search for solutions to the conflicts which afflict their countries. In response to the declaration by the armed opposition in Nicaragua—that is, the contras, the famous counter-revolutionaries—that they were prepared to lay down their arms if they could only participate in peaceful political competition in Nicaragua and settle Nicara-

gua's political questions through the ballot box, the Nicaraguan Government announced that such opponents would not be permitted to participate under any circumstances and would in fact be tried *in absentia* as criminals.

87. The Government of El Salvador, to the contrary, took exactly the opposite position and actually invited the armed opposition to participate in the election on condition that they laid down their arms and agreed to peaceful political competition. The Government of Nicaragua continued to provide arms, supplies, training and other forms of assistance to Salvadorian guerrillas dedicated precisely to sabotaging the political process and imposing a dictatorship in El Salvador.

88. Since the beginning of this year Nicaraguan-supported terrorists in El Salvador have assassinated three members of the Constituent Assembly, a military judge and a campaign organizer. Under the slogan "Electoral farce no, popular war yes"—how is that for a peaceful solution?—the armed insurgents in El Salvador have done everything possible to disrupt the elections and reduce voter turn-out. They disenfranchised thousands of voters by seizing and destroying their identity cards, which are necessary for voting. They mined roads, threatened drivers, threatened gas-station owners selling fuel. In some places citizens were told there would be lots of bombs going off and that they had therefore best stay away from polling places.

89. On election day the guerrillas attacked the towns of Jucuapa, Chinameca, El Triunfo and Santa Clara as the voting was taking place. On election eve they killed soldiers stationed in Tejutepeque and prevented voting. Guerrilla sabotage caused about 80 per cent of the country to be blacked out over 12 hours immediately preceding the opening of the polls. This loss of electrical power severely disrupted the final sorting and dispatch of voting materials and obviously had an effect on the timely arrival of voting materials to some polling places.

90. None the less, despite all that, some 1.4 million Salvadorians, over 75 per cent of all eligible voters, cast their ballots. According to scores of firsthand reports by election observers, they voted in freedom, with genuine enthusiasm. The observer delegation from Colombia called the election "an impressive demonstration of the will of the Salvadorian people to find a democratic solution"—and its view was shared by most observers.

91. A democratic solution is also the chief, indeed the sole, objective of United States policy in Central America. Nothing more clearly illustrates the seriousness with which the United States has approached the problems of Central America or the commitment of the American people to finding a democratic solution to those problems than the report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. That Commission, chaired by former Secretary of State Henry Kis-

singer and consisting of 12 distinguished American citizens from both political parties representing very diverse points of view, undertook an intensive, six-month examination of the Central American crisis. The Commission heard testimony from hundreds of expert witnesses. It made on-the-spot visits to each of the five Central American countries and to the four countries comprising the Contadora Group and reviewed voluminous documents.

92. Its conclusions and recommendations are the product of as careful an examination of the problems of Central America that we are likely to have for some time. They form the basis of the Central American Democracy, Peace and Development Initiative Act of 1984, which President Reagan has submitted to the United States Congress. This bill represents a far-reaching attempt to address the problems in Central America comprehensively. It identifies the United States firmly and unequivocally with the aspirations of the peoples of Central America for social and economic development, for democracy and human rights and for a peaceful solution to the conflicts now plaguing the region.

93. The fundamental conclusion of the Commission is that the roots of the crisis in Central America are both indigenous and foreign; the discontents are real and, for much of the population, conditions of life are miserable. While these conditions invite indigenous revolution, they have also been exploited by hostile outside forces—specifically by Cuba, backed by the Soviet Union, now operating through Nicaragua—which will turn any revolution they capture into a dictatorship, threatening the peace and stability of the region and robbing the people of their hopes for liberty.

94. The interrelationship of these problems is such, the Commission concluded, that neither the military, nor the political, nor the economic, nor the social aspects of the crisis should be considered independently of the others. Without progress on the political, economic and social fronts, peace on the military front would be illusive and fragile. But unless the externally supported insurgencies are checked and the violence curbed, progress on those other fronts will also be illusive and fragile. Progress in any one, therefore, is not enough. All the sources of the crisis must be addressed, and be addressed simultaneously.

95. The distinguished President of Costa Rica, Luis Alberto Monge, has characterized the report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America as "an intervention against misery and ignorance". That, surely, was the intention of the Commission: to call upon the United States Government and the American people to become fully engaged at the side of our Central American neighbours in the struggle against misery and ignorance.

96. In order to combat injustice and poverty, the Commission has proposed a series of bold measures

to support agricultural development, education, health services, export promotion, land reform, housing, humanitarian relief, trade credit insurance, and small businesses and other activities. Because democracy is essential to effective development, special attention will be given to increasing scholarships, leadership training, educational exchanges and support for the growth of democratic institutions.

97. A programme of substantial assistance is proposed to revitalize the Central American Common Market and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, which made a major contribution to the region's rapid economic growth in the 1960s and early 1970s and which today could stimulate increased intra-regional trade and economic activity. To give structure, consistency and continuing direction to this sustained effort, the Commission proposed a high-level meeting of United States officials with their Central American counterparts to consider the creation of the Central American Development Organization (CADO). This organisation would provide guidance and review, as well as assistance, for economic, social and political development programmes of those Central American nations eligible to join by reason of their commitment to internal reform and democracy, as well as to external non-intervention. It is envisioned that other democracies outside the region would participate as well in this major effort to channel external assistance to the region.

98. The Commission also squarely confronted the dangers created by the unprecedented military buildup in Nicaragua, the régime's ideological commitment to the export of revolution and its military ties to the Soviet Union and Cuba—dangers which weigh heavily on the neighbouring countries. I will not on this occasion, as I have said before, describe in detail this military buildup or demonstrate the extent of Nicaragua's intervention in neighbouring States or its militarization and military ties. All those points are thoroughly covered in the Commission's report.

99. What I wish to emphasize here is the Commission's call for a vigorous diplomatic strategy and a negotiating effort designed to resolve the conflict and to include Nicaragua in a regional settlement that would ensure lasting security guarantees, as well as national independence for all the nations of Central America. Such a settlement would be squarely based on the principles contained in the 21-point proposal of the Contadora Group [see S/16041, annex]. They include: respect for sovereignty and non-intervention verifiable commitments to non-aggression and an end to all attempts at subversion; limitations on arms and sizes of armed forces; prohibition of all military forces, bases and advisers of foreign nations; no military forces, bases or advisers of non-Central American countries; commitment to internal pluralism and free elections in all countries; provision for verification of all agreements; and establishment of an inter-government council, to meet regularly and review compliance.

Adherence to the overall agreement to those 21 points would be required for membership in CADO.

100. In drawing up those recommendations the Commission drew heavily on its consultation with the leaders of the Contadora countries. It declared that the Contadora countries are engaged in a bold, new experiment; they deserve the gratitude and encouragement of all the nations in the region. These are also the views of the United States Government.

101. As the Commission repeatedly emphasized, all elements of the crisis must be addressed simultaneously. No short cuts were discovered, no gimmicks, diplomatic or otherwise. Thus as one element of the broad programme the report recommends increased military assistance, under proper conditions, to the Governments of El Salvador and Honduras. That assistance will reinforce the diplomatic effort by helping create the conditions under which peaceful settlements may be reached and the objective of a better life in freedom and national independence for all Central Americans successfully pursued.

102. In discussing Central America, there is a tendency sometimes to succumb to despair, especially by those who know little about the region. But the Commission found everywhere "a hope for a democratic future and a readiness to sacrifice towards that end".

103. I believe the election just held in El Salvador demonstrates as clearly as any single event could that the people of that country have not succumbed to despair and that they are ready to sacrifice for a better, brighter, democratic future. The Commission's report stated:

"The people of Central America have lived too long with poverty, deprivation and violence. The current turmoil must not be allowed to shatter their hopes for a brighter future. They have endured too many generations of misrule to let their aspirations for democratic political development be dashed, in this generation, on the rocks of fear, division and violence.

"Not least, their own security and ours must no longer be threatened by hostile Powers which seek expansion of influence through the exploitation of misery.

"The crisis thus poses an urgent challenge to the United States, but that challenge in turn presents us with an opportunity, an opportunity to help the people of Central America translate their dreams of a better and freer life into a reality."

104. That is our wish. It is our only wish. The rest is hard work, good will, fortitude and uncompromising commitment to democratic values and practices and a respect for the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.

105. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Spanish*]: The next speaker is the representative of Honduras. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

106. Mr. FLORES BERMÚDEZ (Honduras) [*interpretation from Spanish*]: Mr. President, allow me on this occasion, on behalf of the delegation of Honduras, to congratulate you on your wise conduct this month of the debates in this most important forum. Your broad experience as a statesman guarantees a successful outcome of the Council's work. At the same time I should like to thank the members of the Council for allowing me to speak as it begins its consideration of the item on its agenda.

107. The Council is meeting for the third time at the urgent request of the Sandinist Government in order to consider another repetitious montage of national political propaganda, resorted to by that Government almost as a matter of routine, notwithstanding the negative and fruitless experiences of the two previous occasions the Council met on the subject.

108. Honduras has once again had to request the Council to allow it to participate in the meeting on this item, because it feels obliged, out of respect for the Council, to provide it with as much information as possible in order for it to see how one of its members is trying to distort and make use of this body for purposes that do not best serve the re-establishment of internal peace in Nicaragua or the maintenance of peace and security in Central America.

109. With the same lack of decorum, the same strategy of diverting attention from its crisis at home, the same purpose of preventing the process of bringing real democracy to its authoritarian structures, the same aim of continuing to attempt to deny on the one hand the internal struggle being waged against that Government by anti-Sandinist rebel forces based in Nicaraguan territory and on the other the presence of thousands of foreign military technicians and advisers who direct the Sandinist troops and distort the very identity of Nicaragua, with the same objective of covering up policies of extermination that have caused the mass exodus of ethnic groups and the lack of respect for religious freedom, with the same intent of hiding the progressive frustration of Nicaraguans at the Sandinist Government's lack of respect for the fulfilment of the objectives or the bases of the revolution—political pluralism, a mixed economy and non-alignment—with this same strategy, these same intentions and purposes, the Sandinist Government has come here once again to denounce dangers and imaginary attacks on its territory from the neighbouring States, trying to draw attention to the region, to turn Central America into an area subject to confrontation between the two major Powers and, finally, to frustrate the diplomatic efforts that are being made within the scope of the Contadora regional peace process to build a climate of security, peace, democracy and economic and social development in Central America.

110. At the last meeting of the Security Council convened at Nicaragua's request [2513th meeting] to deal with attacks on its territory alleged to have been carried out by military planes from Honduran territory, the delegation of Honduras affirmed with complete certainty that such an accusation was entirely groundless.

111. The facts have once again demonstrated that Honduras was right and that the Nicaraguan charges were irresponsible. Today we are faced with another series of charges just as invalid as all the preceding ones.

112. In the message from the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction to the people of Nicaragua and the world of 13 March of this year, distributed on that same date as a Security Council document at the request of the representative of Nicaragua [S/16413, annex], among other slogans and groundless assertions there appears the fanciful interpretation that they give to the training activities that the Honduran armed forces are carrying out in co-operation with the United States, and reality is falsified once again by alleging certain designs aimed against El Salvador and Nicaragua. This argument has been repeated here yet again.

113. The Government of Honduras has on many occasions contacted the Sandinist Government to deplore such systematic tactics that are at variance with proper international conduct. We have also done this on various occasions before the OAS, this Council and the United Nations General Assembly, where we have also provided well-documented replies refuting false charges of responsibility for past events and tendentious interpretations of actions carried out by Honduras in exercise of its full responsibility over its territory. All these accusations are being repeated once again today. This is all part of the pathological lies resorted to by the Sandinist régime.

114. Although Honduras has already submitted considerable detailed information, we believe it is necessary once again to make clear that Honduras has a constant and sincere desire for peace, as is shown by its invariable and constructive participation in the Contadora Group. We state again that the measures that have been taken to improve the professional level of the armed forces of Honduras—including the joint exercises carried out with members of the United States Army—are eminently defensive in nature and are designed to protect our sovereignty. This is in contrast to the unconscionable arms race engaged in by Nicaragua and to its policy of flagrant intervention in other countries of Central America, with the purpose of internationalizing the conflict in which it is involved today. The military manoeuvres in which Honduran armed forces are participating are not prohibited by the documents adopted by the Contadora Group—for example, in the first document on the measures to be taken to fulfil the commitments entered into in the Document of Objectives, the Contadora Group proposed that there should be a duty to report to the other States on the

carrying out of manoeuvres. Honduras not only has reported to the other States but has even extended invitations to the countries of the Americas—including Nicaragua—and of Europe to observe the military exercises.

115. The achievement of peace, democracy, security and co-operation for development in Central America is the sole objective of the foreign policy of Honduras. That is why we are seeking diplomatic solutions that would eliminate the causes of the conflicts in the region. That is a fact.

116. The Sandinist Government has an unequivocal attitude: it seeks to create confrontation and thereby to undermine the order and respect that should exist when there are clearly delineated boundaries between the Central American countries and when there is a regional peace procedure under way involving the five Central American countries.

117. The many violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Honduras by Sandinist troops—as is clear from the many protests made to the Government of Nicaragua and communicated to the OAS and to the United Nations—demonstrate that that régime has no respect for boundaries. An even more serious example of this was furnished recently by the Sandinist Government when it unilaterally removed the monuments delineating one part of the boundary between Honduras and Nicaragua and moved them into Honduran territory, committing a series of abuses harmful to Honduran citizens. Notwithstanding this flagrant violation of the rules of international law and the principles contained in the treaty delimiting the respective boundaries, Honduras, in order not to inflame the situation still further, has proposed to the Government of Nicaragua that a committee of engineers of both countries be established to ensure that the monuments that have been moved are quickly and permanently put back where they belong.

118. The Sandinist Government has on a number of occasions also violated the territorial sovereignty of other Central American countries. As an example, I would refer to the note addressed by Costa Rica to Nicaragua and distributed on 2 March for the information of the States Members of the United Nations. In that note, the Government of Costa Rica protested against a “flagrant violation” by Sandinist troops of Costa Rican territory and stated that this cast suspicion on the sincerity of the intentions of the Nicaraguan Government to promote a relaxation of tension in the area. Later, on 13 March, in the message of the Governing Junta of Nicaragua already referred to, it was stated that there were anti-Sandinist bases of operation and camps in Honduran territory. Similar statements have been made today regarding other territories.

119. Honduras has formally appealed to the Government of Nicaragua to act with the wisdom required by the circumstances, in order to avoid spreading the inter-

nal conflicts it is facing, either by action or by implication.

120. The fact that the Sandinist Government is seeking to jeopardize the peace efforts of the Contadora Group is reflected in these incidents. It is reflected also in the request to convene the Security Council, since the aim is to undermine the confidence of the other Central American countries in the regional peace procedure. It is trying also to maintain in its country a war psychosis by continuing to feed the voracious appetite of its arms race and by its desire to make the Central American region a scene of confrontation and ideological pressure between different blocs. This is of particular concern because of the unusual presence of warships from outside the continent in the Caribbean, where Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras have coastlines.

121. The fact that the Sandinist Government is intervening in neighbouring countries is confirmed by the support, so far unsuccessful, it gives to the promotion of subversion in Honduras, and of the guerrillas in El Salvador by supplying them with weapons. As part of this strategy, a week ago Commander Humberto Ortega Saavedra, Nicaragua’s Defence Minister, announced the possibility that local guerrilla fighters would mine the ports of the other Central American countries, from Guatemala to Panama. This statement is a new and very clear threat of the use of force against other countries, in open violation of the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, it is an open admission that the subversive groups attempting to destabilize Governments in the area are operating with the support and under the control of the Nicaraguan Government, as Mr. Edgardo Paz Barnica, the Minister for External Relations of Honduras, said in his firm message of protest [S/16444]. It was precisely in application of Commander Ortega Saavedra’s statement that terrorist acts were carried out in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula: five bombs exploded, leaving one person dead and one wounded.

122. Honduras has been the victim of frenzied attacks by the Sandinist Government. Between 3 and 11 January, in only three incidents in Honduran territory, 11 of our compatriots were killed. Since 3 February, the Sandinist Government has gone even further. In its message of 13 March to the world, it appealed for technical and military assistance, thereby making clear its intention to continue to arm itself frantically, at the precise moment when the working Commission on security affairs established under the Contadora procedure was to study the methods for applying a policy for the control and reduction of armaments and troops in order to restore a military balance in the area, to establish international control machinery, to eliminate the illegal traffic in weapons and to put an end to acts of subversion and terrorism.

123. The Sandinist Government called for a meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-

Aligned Countries, to which the representative of Nicaragua referred in his statement today. It was thus trying to use that distinguished Movement, taking advantage of being one of its members. We have had an opportunity to read carefully the draft that Nicaragua submitted to the non-aligned countries and the one that was finally adopted on 15 March. It should be noted that, although that distinguished Movement did give satisfaction to Nicaragua as a member, a number of significant changes were made in the original draft in order to include references to a number of matters that Nicaragua had omitted—such as the great progress made by a number of countries in Central America in regard to elections, and the importance of using democratic procedures as tools for relaxation of regional tension and for internal reconciliation. That is reflected also in the Contadora communiqué of 28 February [S/16394, annex].

124. The Co-ordinating Bureau also recalled General Assembly resolution 38/10, which reaffirms the overall regional nature of the Central American conflict, condemns “the acts of aggression against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the States in the region”—not just those cited by one of them—and notes with satisfaction that the countries of the region have agreed to establish or improve “democratic, representative and pluralist systems” through honest and periodic electoral processes.

125. There is no doubt that there is now a keener awareness of the facts of the situation in Central America, which is affecting a number of countries and which the Sandinist Government has been trying to distort with information prepared for that purpose, which it disseminates through its participation in the Non-Aligned Movement. We welcome the effort at greater realism in the analysis of the situation in Central America, and we hope that all countries will continue to be objective so that we Central Americans will succeed in solving our own problems in a propitious climate of trust.

126. One of the most recent steps taken by the Nicaraguan Government in this overall context was the release on 26 March of another communiqué [S/16440, annex], in which it called on the Contadora Group to withdraw its offer of good offices—good offices that because of their neutrality have brought about noteworthy progress in the search for peace in Central America—implicitly requesting the Group to take direct action and involve itself in the sub-regional conflict, to become a part of and to take sides in it. It would be a serious mistake with disastrous consequences if the valuable Contadora forum, with its five Central American member countries, were to lose its objectivity and good will.

127. These initiatives show us that Nicaragua is trying to blame other countries for its own internal conflicts and to relieve itself of all responsibility for the present crisis. The Sandinist Government is also obviously

trying to give priority to the solution of security problems which are of concern to itself alone. Nicaragua is seeking to relegate to the background problems which are of concern to other Central American countries, such as weapons trafficking, support of all kinds for sabotage, terrorism and destabilization against other Central American Governments, the Nicaraguan arms buildup, the large number of Nicaraguan troops, and the growing presence in Nicaragua of Eastern-bloc advisers. All those factors have made it necessary for other countries to make preparations for adequate defence and for deterring Nicaragua from any direct aggression, preparations which are all being made with the full support of a free people, as is the case of Honduras.

128. The 26 March communiqué to which I have referred also demonstrates that Nicaragua is trying to stress the military presence in Central America of the United States and to minimize the Soviet military presence, especially naval, and the Soviet-Cuban manoeuvres to be carried out in the Caribbean. Looking at the communiqué in that light, it is clear that it is just another attempt by Nicaragua to justify in the eyes of the international community its acquisition of more weapons and the buildup of its military personnel.

129. We hope that the Council, in its wisdom, will continue to take a pragmatic approach to these problems and to play its proper role and that therefore it will not allow itself to be used to interfere in action by Central Americans and in the regional approach that we have taken to resolve our problems. In that context, no possible expression of opinion should disregard the imperative need to encourage the Sandinist Government to behave with consistency, good faith and great responsibility in what must be a serious position within the Contadora process and a responsible position as a member of the Security Council.

130. Nor should we forget the political expression of the 26 Latin American States which met at the highest level in January of this year, stating in the Quito Declaration that

“Latin America and the Caribbean do not resign themselves to being the arena of alien confrontation and firmly believe that the region’s problems should and can be resolved in our own sphere, thereby ensuring that the Latin America area will be a zone of peace.”

131. For its part, Honduras reiterates its unchanging position: that of fostering and supporting the comprehensive, peaceful solution of regional disputes through the Contadora peace process and within the framework of the inter-American system.

132. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Spanish*]: The representative of Nicaragua has asked to speak in right of reply.

133. Mr. CHAMORRO MORA (Nicaragua) [*interpretation from Spanish*]: I shall try to be brief, for I think I have already made a comprehensive and lengthy statement about Nicaragua's reasons for calling for this meeting of the Security Council: the acts of aggression, deaths and material damage which my country is suffering. I believe that I have already set before the Council and the international community the valid points needed to corroborate our claims, points consisting not merely of our own words, but of things which in the normal course of events any United Nations delegation can read about in *The New York Times*, in *The Christian Science Monitor*, in *The Wall Street Journal*, or in the rest of the American press.

134. Nevertheless, I should like to make some clarifications regarding the statement of the representative of the United States. It seems to me that she made use of a number of points which, aside from suggesting a little confusion on her part, might tend—at the least—to seek to confuse others.

135. The representative of the United States presented an apologia for past, present and intended United States support for the Central American region, for each of the countries of our region. She spoke—at great length—of United States support for the Contadora Group, and she spoke of the interest of the United States in promoting democracy in Central America. I think it is fitting for me to refer very briefly to the fact that the truth of the history of the United States in Central America is the exact opposite of what she stated today. It is not only my people which ever since its independence has suffered acts of United States intervention, although it has suffered such acts since 1854, following the first American intervention, when a pro-slavery adventurer from the southern United States proclaimed himself the President of Nicaragua and introduced slavery to Nicaragua.

136. It is not a case of Nicaragua alone; many Latin American countries—not just in Central America—in this century have suffered the grave consequences of the United States military presence. In addition to Nicaragua in 1912, 1925 and 1926 we can cite, among others, the case of the Dominican Republic and that of Cuba. The United States still maintains a military presence in the latter country, in spite of the opposition of the Cuban Government. There are the actions taken against Guatemala in 1954 and in Chile in 1973 to overthrow their legitimately constituted Governments elected in a process which, by Western standards, was democratic.

137. History shows us clearly what has been the United States attitude. If we look at what is happening at present, we can also see the consequences of events reported every day.

138. The representative of the United States has on various occasions in this Council said that Nicaragua's requests for meetings of the Security Council—and

I wish here to confirm that we have been obliged to request such meetings on six occasions, and not three—were prompted by childish motives on the part of our leaders, since there really were no reasons to be fearful or apprehensive about United States attitudes towards Nicaragua. I should like to point out to her that the United States Congress and various American politicians have on many occasions manifested their concern at the policy conducted by the Reagan Administration against Nicaragua and in respect of Central America in general. To refer to only one case, I would mention the statements we have read recently in the United States press, now that the Democratic Party primaries are under way, statements such as that by Senator Hart, in which he condemned the war-mongering policy of the United States and its presence in Central America.

139. The United States representative also said that her interest had always been and continued to be the democratic development of the Central American countries. Again, we must refute her affirmations. In a recent statement I made in the Council in respect of the complaint of Sudan [2521st meeting], I pointed out that the economic crisis has had a significant impact on the African countries and caused them great hardship and that everyone knows where that crisis comes from and how it has been brought about. The same applies to Central America. I believe that what is a fact of history is the abuse—I do not say the use—by the United States Government of the natural resources of our countries, our primary commodities, which they have always bought from us extremely cheaply for their convenience only to sell them back to us later as processed goods at extremely high rates of profit.

140. The United States representative also said that now as in the past the United States Administration was interested in contributing to democratic development in Central America.

141. I do not know how one can consider contributing to the development of democracy in Central America when the whole world knows—all the members of the Council and everyone present in this chamber, with the exception of the United States representative—that, on the contrary, United States policy is characterized by its support for dictatorial régimes, such as that of Somoza in Nicaragua, which it not only created when it was obliged to leave Nicaragua after Sandino's war of liberation but also maintained in power for more than 45 years. The case of Somoza in Nicaragua is not the only case of dictatorship the United States has created and fomented in various Central American countries.

142. The United States representative said that the Government of Nicaragua had a clear purpose in having recourse to this forum on various occasions, that the aim was not only to divert attention from its own problems but also to make sure that certain other problems of the region would not be given serious consideration. This is not the first time we have heard that assertion. She herself made it in the Security Council, and we

have also heard it in the corridors of the United Nations, where, as everyone knows, many things are said. All I can say about that is that Nicaragua's requests for Security Council meetings are the result of United States acts of aggression and the policy of death and destruction the American President is carrying out against my country. If the United States Administration were more mature and less inclined to war-mongering, and if it did not seek military solutions to problems, Nicaragua would never have been obliged to have recourse to the Security Council. Regrettably, this war-mongering policy is sowing death among our population and causing enormous damage to our economy. All we can do in response to the blows of a great Power is resort, in a responsible manner, to the organ entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security. Furthermore, in my statement I indicated that Nicaragua sincerely believed that its frequent recourse to the Council, the support of the Non-Aligned Movement and the various political manifestations of concern by European leaders and others tended to dissuade the Reagan Administration from implementing its 1980 decision to overthrow my country's Government by force of arms.

143. Among other things, the United States representative accused us and spoke extensively in this regard, that the problem of the United States is, from its point of view, that Nicaragua wishes to interfere and is interfering in the internal affairs not only of the other Central American countries but also of Latin America. It seems that various United States military strategists have gone so far as to say on various occasions that my country had the most powerful army from the Rio Bravo to Patagonia.

144. In this respect I should like to point out to Mrs. Kirkpatrick that my Government does not have a policy of interference. Indeed, we cannot have such a policy because we do not have the capacity to carry it out; we do not have the means to send arms to other countries, as does the United States, which supplies El Salvador and Chile, for example. With its economic and military might, the United States can and indeed does do this.

145. The example of our revolution is what we have and what American warmongering policy-makers fear, and that is why they seek to impede our consolidation. They know that that example could be harmful for the militaristic policy they are pursuing, not just in Central America but also in Latin America and other regions of the world.

146. The American representative stated that my Government was the one which started militarization in Central America, and if I remember correctly she said that we have 107,000 persons under arms. Let me correct her on that; she was in error. First of all, it was not my Government that started it. On 19 July we will have the fifth anniversary of Nicaragua as an independent Republic, and I think everyone realizes that the mili-

tarization of Central America existed many years prior the coming to power of the Sandinists in Nicaragua. There was Somoza, who was created by the United States and whom it set up as the guardian of United States interests in Central America.

147. The problem for the United States now is that there has been a change. For the first time in history, Nicaragua under the Sandinists can claim to be a truly non-aligned country, one which for the first time in its history can determine its own future, and therefore the United States had to have recourse to another guardian in Central America, finding one in a general in Honduras named Alvarez. It is arming him to the teeth, as I mentioned, and unfortunately it has turned that country into one more "aircraft carrier" of the United States Navy.

148. I said I wanted to correct the representative about the number of Nicaraguans under arms. I can assure Mrs. Kirkpatrick that the day when her Administration, directly or indirectly, seeks to intervene more than it is already doing in Nicaragua, it will not be 107,000 Nicaraguans under arms; the entire people will be under arms in responding to that aggression, and for the second time in this century we will succeed in driving them out.

149. We take pride in saying that the greatest arsenal Nicaragua has is not made up of Soviet tanks or tanks of any other national origin that we may have, nor the French-built patrol boats, or boats of whatever other nationality, nor is it cannons and small-arms; rather, it is the popular support enjoyed by the Sandinist popular revolution. That is our strength.

150. They know better than anyone that we are the only Central American Government that can give its people arms to defend its sovereignty. Let me suggest to the representative that she recommend to the present Government of El Salvador that it give arms, the arms which the United States itself is sending, to its people to protect it from the intervention by Nicaragua in El Salvador. I believe that what would happen, apart from the fact that it would not take very long, is obvious: the Government would be overthrown by its own people.

151. The representative said also that our Government in its totalitarian strivings chose to ignore the efforts and concessions being made by Nicaraguans friendly to the United States and proposed to us in respect of our elections. I should just like to make a point on this and perhaps she would like to reply. As a good academician, she doubtless knows the difference between a civil war, a national war and a war of aggression. I am not an expert in the military field; I will not delve into this, but the most elementary logic inclines me to believe that when a civil war is unleashed in a country there has to be popular support. Among other things, there is a need to have or to obtain in the course of that war liberated territories which both factions control, which, as we all know, is certainly the case in

El Salvador. I would ask the representative—because it would help to shed light on the claims which she and her Government and other Central American Governments have made about Nicaragua's problem being an internal one—what square inch of Nicaraguan territory have the counter-revolutionary CIA mercenaries come to control?

152. If she wishes, I could bring a map of Nicaragua right now and she could show everyone where that piece of territory is that the counter-revolution and the CIA mercenaries have liberated, and in what part of that territory they keep the high-speed patrol boats, mines, arsenals and aircraft with which they have been attacking and killing our people and the foreign shipping that comes to our home. If she does not want a map today, I can send one to her Mission tomorrow so that she may consider it quietly and be able to pinpoint it at another time, next week when we continue the debate.

153. There are many other things in her long speech to which I could refer. I could refer to the apology that she presented for the Kissinger report. The only thing I will say about that is that for Latin America Kissinger is an unhappy memory. Moreover, I think there was a minority report submitted by one of the members of the Commission concerning military and security aspects of the report, and it seems to me that in Congress certain politicians are not very contented with the militaristic contents in that report as a complement to the economic offers made in it.

154. Before finishing, I wish to refer to two more aspects. Mrs. Kirkpatrick said that Sandinism had failed to live up to its promises, including public promises, made in regional organs. It is not the first time she has said that in this Council. I think she referred to that when certain countries which are no longer members were in the Council. I remember the first time was when the Co-ordinator of our Junta first addressed the Council. She brought a letter sent by those who were going to represent the Junta to the OAS.

155. I merely wish to say to Mrs. Kirkpatrick that in order to guarantee elections we do not need to send bullets, as President Reagan requested of Congress. We all know that two weeks ago, when he was trying to obtain the additional \$93 million for military aid to El Salvador, President Reagan was reported in the United States press to have said that bullets were needed to guarantee the elections. That is a strange way to guarantee elections, a curious way to support democracy.

156. I can assure Mrs. Kirkpatrick that we will carry out the process of democratic institutionalization that has begun in Nicaragua, though not because of United States pressure. I can assure her also—and it is necessary for the American Administration to understand and analyse this fact—that it is not as a result of American pressure that Nicaragua has been taking positions in international forums, adopting policies with respect

to the Contadora Group, or trying to institutionalize its internal processes. We have been doing this because we are serious, responsible, peace-loving people, unlike the American Administration, which has brought the world to the brink of a nuclear holocaust. We are doing this because we have a commitment to our people and to no one else.

157. Perhaps Mrs. Kirkpatrick could be invited to visit Nicaragua as an observer of the elections as we intend to invite representatives of other Governments of friendly countries with which we have relations. But I say it would be to observe and not to supervise, as the Americans did in 1928, when Sandino's war of liberation started. I can promise her that these elections, which will take place two days before the United States elections, will be an example of elections in Latin America. I am sure that Mrs. Kirkpatrick, President Reagan and his principal advisers are fully aware that Sandinism will win the elections, and not through fraud. We could put a United States Marine at each ballot box to supervise, and the same thing would happen. They know, because they have their own means of espionage—not just by aircraft and radar in the Gulf of Fonseca and on Honduran territory; they have CIA agents inside Nicaragua and they know the majority feeling of the Nicaraguan people. It is precisely because they do know it that they are trying indirectly to prevent the holding of elections in Nicaragua; that is why they are trying to make sure that our Government will retreat from its already announced commitment. But I can assure them that we shall not do so. We shall withstand United States pressure.

158. Unfortunately, we shall continue suffering the loss of the best of our sons. It will be difficult for us to continue providing our peasants with bread, because the Americans have cut off the loans for wheat purchases which they granted us at one point. But they did not realize that despite that cut-off, Sweden, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, France and many other countries of the international community would send us the wheat that the United States cut off, and we were able to give bread to our workers and peasants. What we did then, we shall do again.

159. We shall continue our process of institutionalization. We shall hold elections, as people in the United States are accustomed to doing. We intend nothing else. We shall show them that in Nicaragua the President will not win with the support of only 25 or 27 per cent of the eligible voters.

160. Unfortunately, I have gone on for too long, but there is one last point I wish to make, with regard to Mrs. Kirkpatrick's grave concern about the minorities and the Miskitos in Nicaragua. I shall not refer to the extermination of the American Indians, nor shall I point out that her concern for the Miskitos is recent. I have never heard her mention the percentage of unemployment among the Indian population in the United States—that is, among the small number of them that man-

aged to survive. I do not have the exact data here with me, but I think that the figure exceeds 40 per cent. She does not seem very concerned about that, or about the Mexican labourers who are allowed in and then mercilessly exploited.

161. Regarding the Miskitos, I wish to point out to Mrs. Kirkpatrick that in December 1982 my Government discovered—and publicized, because some of those involved were captured—a plan which the CIA had sought to carry out on the Nicaraguan Atlantic Coast. The plan, called “Red Christmas”, sought to use the Miskitos—in other words, to manipulate the historic ignorance of the settlers on the Atlantic Coast, for which the Americans are responsible, because Somoza was responsible internally in my country and they supported him. Somoza was not at all concerned for the indigenous inhabitants of the eastern sector of Nicaragua. Logically, the blame lies with those—perhaps Mrs. Kirkpatrick, or some in the other Administrations in the United States over the 45 years of Somoza’s rule—who could have brought in roads and telephones, improved literacy and provided health centres. But they did not advocate those things, or Somoza ignored them. In fact, they obviously did not, because Somoza certainly listened to his American advisers. Through this “Red Christmas” plan they even tried to take possession of this isolated and under-developed area. “Under-developed” is not the right description for it, because Nicaragua is under-developed generally. Mr. Treiki said earlier that he had been astonished by the levels of poverty in Nicaragua. It is true, and those to blame are right here in front of us.

162. But within the poverty existing in Nicaragua the poverty on the Atlantic Coast is really astonishing and disturbing. It is with the revolution starting in 1979 that something has been done to try to improve the minimal, subsistence living standards of the 270,000 inhabitants of that Atlantic Coast. That figure includes the Miskitos, blacks and persons of mixed ancestry. In a television programme a year or so ago on which Mrs. Kirkpatrick appeared with the Nicaraguan Minister for External Relations—I do not know whether it was in good faith or for some other purpose—she charged the violation of Miskito rights in Nicaragua, saying that there were 270,000 Miskitos.

163. Actually, there are 90,000 Miskitos in Nicaragua, of whom perhaps 15,000 have left for Honduran territory. We cannot deny, nor do I seek to deny, that we may have made certain mistakes in our treatment of the Miskito minority. We are an honest and revolutionary Government. We are proud of our achievements, but we are aware of our shortcomings, and we try to overcome them.

164. The 15,000 Miskitos in Honduran territory are people who have been manipulated by the United States and are being used now. Some of them are involved in military activities against my country. They are even being prevented from returning to Nicaragua.

165. In 1982 my Government, on the basis of article 48 f of the American Convention on Human Rights,² took steps so that the pertinent organ could assume its functions for a friendly solution of difficulties between the Government of Nicaragua and citizens of our country of Miskito origin. That was an agreement for an amicable solution, signed in August 1982 with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

166. I think it was in December of last year moreover, that we announced broad amnesty without exceptions for Miskito citizens. On instructions from my Government, I personally requested the Secretary-General to ensure that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) participate in repatriation efforts—repatriation being one of the objectives pursued by Contadora—and facilitate the measures needed to carry out the repatriation of the Miskitos. Unfortunately the CIA mercenaries have been preventing that repatriation from being carried out totally and satisfactorily, although I can assure the Council that quite a number of Miskito Indians in Honduras have started returning to my country, thanks to UNHCR. That can be corroborated by UNHCR. Certainly the Nicaraguan Government is not removing them, and we have not asked it of the American representative, because she has confirmed that they are leaving. It just could be that her Government is moving them.

167. I have already taken up too much of the time of the Council, and I apologize to members. If the need arises I may wish to speak again to supplement my replies to some of the observations made by Mrs. Kirkpatrick.

168. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Spanish*]: I call on the representative of the United States, who has asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

169. Mrs. KIRKPATRICK (United States of America): First, in the interest of accuracy, I may say that I never suggested that Nicaragua had the most powerful army in South America; I only suggested that Nicaragua had the most powerful army in Central America, which of course includes, conventionally, the five small nations of Central America that are well known, presumably, to members of the Council.

170. Secondly, with regard to the Miskitos, who I do think long to return to Nicaragua, if only they could live in peace on the north Atlantic coast, as they have for centuries, with just decent respect for their right to freedom and self-determination. Unfortunately, they continue to flee. It is normally estimated that there are today approximately one half million Nicaraguans who have already fled the beneficent ministrations of the new dictatorship. Some 25,000 of those are Miskitos now in Honduras. More than 1,000 Miskitos are, as I have already said, fleeing Nicaragua this very day towards the Honduran border, suggesting that the practices that have made these very peaceable people, who seek only to be left alone to live their lives, flee have not in fact improved.

171. Thirdly, I find it very difficult to listen to the repeated accusations in this Council of the Nicaraguan representative and some of his associates concerning a United States penchant for dictatorship in Central America. It may come as a surprise to members of the Council, having heard so many interventions by the Nicaraguan representative for so long, to know that Somoza was a Nicaraguan. He was not a North American. He was not only a Nicaraguan, but he was head of a Government which consisted entirely of Nicaraguans and the son of another Somoza who was also a Nicaraguan who headed a Government which was comprised entirely of Nicaraguans. During this whole period the United States expressed its own preference for and commitment to democracy by living within democratic institutions and respecting democratic liberties in our own society.

172. I do not deny in this Council that my country has from time to time made mistakes in our policy *vis-à-vis* Central America or the world, or Nicaragua quite specifically. It may even be argued that we have from time to time been material accomplices to the rise of a dictatorship in Central America, or even in Nicaragua. I fear in fact that a close examination of the record would suggest that in 1978 and 1979 the United States Government, acting in the best of faith, did in fact assist in the rise to power in Nicaragua of a new military dictatorship which has consolidated a new and highly repressive power in that society and governs today, creating hundreds of thousands of refugees among Nicaraguans, who flee their country still seeking the freedom they were seeking when they overthrew Somoza.

173. Finally, concerning those elections in Nicaragua which we heard about from colleague who likes to read *The New York Times*. I too would like to read a piece from *The New York Times*, written by one of his former colleagues, Arturo Cruz, who was—as I am sure many members of the Council know—a member of the Governing Junta of the Nicaraguan revolutionary Government and its Ambassador to the United States until he resigned out of dismay, disillusionment and disappointment with their Government. He has since lived in exile and works for the establishment of democracy in Nicaragua, as indeed he did before he left. He wrote a column in *The New York Times* titled “Sandinista Democracy? Unlikely” about the proposed elections in Nicaragua, which appears on page A 27 of the issue of 27 January 1984, and in it he said:

“the revolutionary commanders’ statements about the voting process foreshadow a mockery of elections. The Sandinistas are determined to exclude leading dissident personalities like the former guerrilla leader Edén Pastora Gomez and former junta member Alfonso Robelo Callejas, who is also the leader of an important political party. Under these

constraining conditions, citizens with a sense of self-esteem will be neither candidates nor voters . . .

“Our erstwhile liberators, the Sandinistas, are becoming addicted to power. Having gallantly faced bullets in battle, they are now resorting to phony balloting—just as our right-wing dictators did in the past.”

174. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Spanish*]: I call on the representative of Nicaragua, who has asked to be allowed to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

175. Mr. CHAMORRO MORA (Nicaragua) [*interpretation from Spanish*]: I see that you are concerned, Sir, perhaps fearing that I will consume more time than I already have. I mentioned a moment ago that there would be another opportunity to expand on what I have already said; therefore I shall not even refer to how an American President—Mr. Roosevelt, I think it was, during the 1930s—described Somoza. The representative of the United States said Somoza too was a Nicaraguan. On the next occasion I have to speak I shall tell the Council what Roosevelt said—will all due apologies to the ladies in the chamber.

176. What I do wish to do—since it would perhaps be obsolete by next week—is to make one point about the United States Administration’s fear in the face of the triumph of the Sandinist revolution. It fears not only our internal actions in Nicaragua but also our presence in the United States.

177. Representatives know full well that on various occasions Nicaraguan leaders have been denied visas to come here at the invitation of institutes. I shall not go into details. I just want to say that a trip scheduled by a member of the Governing Junta—not an official tour, obviously—could not be made because the United States Government was not interested. The trip was planned to begin on 23 April. Mr. Sergio Ramírez Mercado was to travel to Kansas City, Washington, New York, California, Boston and I am not sure to what other cities. He had been invited by various American intellectual organizations, universities and the like. In addition to being a member of the Governing Junta, Mr. Ramírez Mercado is a distinguished Nicaraguan intellectual, who lived many years in West Germany and many of whose books have been translated into German.

178. Following democratic procedures, and because of fear of the Sandinist revolution, whether inside or outside Nicaragua, the State Department decided to give Mr. Mercado an eight-day visa only, allowing him to go just to Kansas City, between 29 March and 6 April. That is just one example of the United States Government’s fear of the words of the Sandinists. It is

an example of how they are trying to manipulate the truth to their own people.

179. The PRESIDENT [*interpretation from Spanish*]: There are no other names on the list of speakers for this meeting. With the consent of the President of the Security Council for the month of April, the next

meeting of the Council to continue consideration of this item will be held on Monday, 2 April 1984, at 3.30 p.m.

The meeting rose at 7.30 p.m.

NOTES

¹ See A/39/118-E/1984/85, annex, para. 3.

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 1144, No. 17955.

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