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1854th MEETING: 6 NOVEMBER 1975

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NOTE

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The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

1854th MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 6 November 1975, at 8.15 p.m.

President: Mr. Yakov A. MALIK
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Guyana, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Mauritania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1854)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation concerning Western Sahara:
Letter dated 6 November 1975 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11867)

The meeting was called to order at 8.50 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation concerning Western Sahara:
Letter dated 6 November 1975 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11867)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): In accordance with the decisions taken by the Security Council [1849th and 1850th meetings], I propose with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Morocco, Spain and Algeria to participate, without the right to vote, in the Council's consideration of the situation concerning Western Sahara.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Slaoui (Morocco), Mr. Arias Salgado (Spain) and Mr. Rahal (Algeria) took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): Members of the Council will recall that last night [1853rd meeting] the Council heard answers to the questions put by them to the representatives of parties concerned and interested, and it decided to authorize its President to issue an appeal [see S/11868] to the Government of Morocco and to the King, His Majesty

Hassan II, urgently requesting that an end be put forthwith to the declared march into Western Sahara. Early this morning, in answer to that appeal, as President of the Council I received a cablegram from His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco [*ibid.*]. The members of the Council have had an opportunity to study that cablegram.

3. Thus, despite to two resolutions on this matter already adopted by the Security Council, resolutions 377 (1975) and 379 (1975), and despite the special message sent by the Council through its President, the march into Western Sahara is now an accomplished fact. As may be seen from communications that have been received, the participants in the march have crossed the frontier between Morocco and Western Sahara into the territory under Spanish control. The situation in Western Sahara remains serious, and the possibility of a military conflict threatening peace and security is not excluded.

4. In this connexion, I should like to draw the attention of members of the Council to the letter dated 6 November 1975 which has just been received from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations [S/11871]. It contains very disquieting information. I am sure that members of the Council have already studied this letter.

5. I wish to draw members' attention also to the fact that the agenda for today's meeting that has been adopted refers to another letter dated 6 November 1975 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations [S/11867]. That briefly is the situation that must be examined by the Council and on which it must take an appropriate decision. I want to add that in that letter from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations [*ibid.*] there is a request to convene the Council urgently to consider the question of Western Sahara in the light of the events that have occurred.

6. Throughout the day the members of the Security Council have been holding intensive consultations. During the recently concluded consultations among the members of the Council a draft resolution was prepared and agreed on [S/11870]. Council members also agreed that at the beginning of today's meeting the Council would adopt that agreed draft resolution by consensus, after which those members of the

Council and representatives of the parties concerned and interested who so desired would have an opportunity to make statements. If I hear no comments or objections, I shall take it that this procedure is agreed and acceptable to members of the Council.

*The draft resolution was adopted.*¹

7. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I now call on the Secretary-General.

8. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: As the members of the Security Council are aware, since the adoption of resolution 379 (1975) last Sunday [*1852nd meeting*] I have been in constant touch with the parties concerned and interested, through their representatives here at United Nations Headquarters and also through my special envoy, Mr. André Lewin, whom I sent to the area. I have not failed to keep the members of the Security Council fully informed of all developments as they were reported to me. In the course of the many hours of consultation which you, Mr. President, have had with the members of the Council, I had the opportunity of making several oral reports in order to explain in detail the seriousness of the situation.

9. My special envoy returned today and I should be in a position shortly to submit a comprehensive report to the Security Council as requested in resolution 379 (1975). As I stated last Sunday, I wish to assure the Council that I shall continue exercising every effort to contribute to a peaceful solution of the problem before the Council, the importance of which has just been underlined by the Council by the adoption of yet another resolution. I hope that the collective efforts undertaken within the United Nations will bear fruit and that we shall be able to defuse, through our joint action, a situation which continues to be very grave.

10. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I now call on the representative of Spain.

11. Mr. ARIAS SALGADO (Spain) (*interpretation from Spanish*): On 2 November the Security Council adopted by consensus resolution 379 (1975), in paragraph 1 of which the Council:

"Urges all the parties concerned and interested to avoid any unilateral or other action which might further escalate the tension in the area,"

and in paragraph 2

"Requests the Secretary-General to continue and intensify his consultations with the parties concerned and interested, and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible on the results of these consultations in order to enable the Council to adopt any further appropriate measures that may be necessary."

12. That resolution was adopted on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General [S/11863], in which he states in paragraph 20: "Meanwhile, the situation in the area remains grave. I consider it, therefore, of the greatest importance that any action be avoided which might further escalate the tension".

13. In compliance with his mandate from the Security Council, the Secretary-General, whose efforts to find a peaceful solution to this problem can never be sufficiently praised, immediately began consultations with the administering Power and with the parties concerned and interested. As a first step, he decided to send a personal representative to Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria and Spain. That representative was received by the President of the Government of Spain and by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

14. In spite of the Security Council's appeal contained in its resolutions 377 (1975) and 379 (1975), in spite of the Secretary-General's appeal in paragraph 20 of his report, to which I have already referred, and almost at the same time as the return to New York of the Secretary-General's personal envoy to the King of Morocco, we were faced with the decision announced on 5 November in a radio and television broadcast to the entire country to begin a march into Western Sahara. As is already public knowledge, at 11 a.m. local time today the first contingents of the marchers crossed the frontier of Western Sahara.

15. The threat which Spain denounced on 18 October in the letter of its representative to the President of the Security Council [S/11851] has unhappily become a reality. Thousands of Moroccan subjects, bolstered by armed elements of the Royal Army, and with the participation of authorities and even members of the Government, have violated the boundary of Western Sahara and illegally entered foreign territory. Thus an internationally unlawful act has been consummated which makes the Government of Morocco responsible for the consequences that decision might involve at all levels.

16. Despite all the appeals of the Security Council and of many States Members of the United Nations and despite the risk of unleashing armed confrontation which may cause unnecessary bloodshed, the King of Morocco, in an irresponsible act unprecedented in the annals of international relations, has not desisted from his purpose and ignores the last appeal which the Council sent him through its President barely a few hours ago, calling on the King of Morocco forthwith to suspend the march on the Sahara.

17. Spain, conscious of the responsibilities incumbent on it under the Charter of the United Nations and the right of legitimate self-defence also enshrined in that Charter, will take the necessary measures to deal with the violation of the frontier and to restore the situation of normalcy which existed previously.

18. Despite the extremely serious situation that has arisen, perhaps there is still time to prevent major catastrophes. Members of the Council who at its last meetings, whether public or private, were reluctant to accept the truth of our denunciations concerning the constant deterioration of peace and security in the zone and the responsibility of the Government of Morocco have, I believe, obtained the convincing proof they sought.

19. We hope the Security Council will not disappoint the hopes which the international community and public opinion in my country have placed in its action. The Council must act by clearly and decisively condemning this violation of international law, of the Charter and of the resolutions of the General Assembly on the decolonization of the Sahara. The Council must demand that Morocco withdraw from the Territory forthwith and that it co-operate with the Secretary-General in seeking a peaceful solution to the problem. Spain is prepared to continue to offer the Secretary-General all the co-operation he may need. In the meantime we shall endeavour by every means to restore the territorial integrity of the Sahara and the inviolability of its frontiers.

20. For humanitarian reasons, of course, Spain will always strive as far as possible to avoid any shedding of innocent blood. We hope that the Government of Morocco will realize the responsibility it assumes if it continues to maintain an illegal occupation in a Territory that does not belong to it.

21. Spain's position on the question of the Sahara has neither changed nor can it change in the future. The Government of Morocco must recognize this fact. Many ties and interests unite us at present and many must be developed in the future. It would therefore be politically irresponsible to make such co-operation impossible by insisting on solutions for the decolonization of the Sahara which are today objectively impossible for Spain to implement. The sooner Morocco accepts this reality the sooner we shall have a peaceful solution to the problem and the more fruitful will be the relations between our two countries.

22. Before concluding, because of the insistence with which certain Moroccan authorities endeavour to continue to maintain confusion and ambiguity on the position of Spain on this matter—an attitude which seems to have been favourably received by some members of the Council—I should like to recall the two fundamental elements of our position taking into account the present circumstances. First, withdrawal, as required by the resolution adopted a few minutes ago, of the march organized by the Government of Morocco, which has violated the frontier of Western Sahara, has become a *sine qua non* for considering any peaceful solution to the problem of the decolonization of the Territory. Secondly, no peaceful solution to the problem of the decolonization of the Sahara can be conceived of outside the frame-

work of the United Nations or in contradiction of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the basic premise of which is the right of the people of the Sahara to self-determination.

23. My delegation wishes that it could have spoken before the adoption of the resolution by the Security Council a few minutes ago. It addressed to the President of the Council a letter requesting an urgent public meeting of the Council [S/11867] so that it could bring before the Council data, information and reports on attitudes that could have been very useful to the Council at the time of evaluating the strength and vigour of the terms used in and the scope of the resolution. In the opinion of the delegation of Spain, it was necessary for the Council to condemn the march and to demand the withdrawal of Moroccan subjects and the military forces accompanying them to the other side of the Saharan frontier until such time as the General Assembly took a final decision of the formula of decolonization applicable to the Territory.

24. As I said earlier, my delegation did not have an opportunity to state its position before the Council took its decision. The information in the possession of my delegation had to be submitted in a letter addressed to the Council [S/11871]. Mr. President, in introducing this item you clearly and perfectly focused on the subject. I shall therefore limit myself to drawing the attention of the members of the Council to the information contained in this letter.

25. In the resolution that has been adopted there is no mention of the request for a Security Council meeting by the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations [S/11867], nor does the resolution take note of the additional information submitted to the Council by my delegation. I am not raising a procedural question but a very serious matter in view of the situation in the Territory. The illegal occupation has been consummated. At this very hour, thousands of persons are in a highly dangerous zone. The decisions taken by the Spanish military authorities with great moderation and a sense of responsibility do not mean that there has been any lack of resolution in defending the area. If the information contained in the aforementioned letter proves true and the facts show that the policy of Morocco is to seek a confrontation of this kind, my delegation would like to point out to the Council the grave responsibility incumbent upon it unless it faces up to this new situation.

26. I do not wish to dwell further on this because I think that all the facts of the problem are clearly before the Council. In connexion with the draft resolution which was just adopted by consensus, I should like to point out that there is a certain inconsistency. Paragraph 1 deplores the holding of the march, but a fundamental element is lacking, which is, precisely, a mention of the unlawful act that has been committed, namely the violation of a frontier and the trespass

against the territorial integrity of the Sahara. My delegation would have wished this basic element included in the resolution. But, be that as it may, we believe that the terms of this resolution are sufficiently clear and unambiguous to cause the Government of Morocco to proceed forthwith to a withdrawal of all the participants in the march from the Territory of Western Sahara, as stated in paragraph 2 of the resolution.

27. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Morocco.

28. Mr. SLAOUI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): His Majesty the King yesterday gave an address in which he announced the departure of the "Green March" for today, 6 November. At that time His Majesty the King wished to make it perfectly clear that, first, the participants were required to observe strict discipline and to preserve the peaceful character of the march; secondly, there was to be no counter-move to any Spanish reaction. In response to your message this morning [see S/11868], His Majesty the King felt it incumbent on him to say that we wish to reassure the Council once again, as we have repeatedly done, that the march will not at any time cease to be as peaceful as was the inspiration for the initiative and that its peaceful character will be maintained throughout. His Majesty the King added that the Moroccan army would be prepared to face up to any intervention by anyone other than Spaniards. He praised the sense of civic responsibility and the maturity of the Moroccan people and paid a tribute to the friendly and brotherly countries participating in the march.

29. As I had occasion to confirm in my statement at the last meeting, Morocco is more than ever determined to use peaceful means in order to settle the colonial dispute with Spain. The address by His Majesty the King was perfectly clear in that respect. The "Green March" has absolutely no aggressive character and is inspired by no feeling of hostility towards anyone at all. The people of Morocco has acted within its legitimate rights. Morocco solemnly reaffirms its desire to participate in all serious efforts to arrive at a negotiated solution for the decolonization of Western Sahara.

30. The question of Western Sahara is an indivisible whole. The "Green March" cannot be dealt with separately from the other factors in the matter. This has been confirmed in Security Council resolution 377 (1975) which, while reminding the parties of the possibility of negotiation, calls on them to exercise restraint and moderation. We note that, despite the goodwill of Morocco, the negotiating process has been blocked as a result of all kinds of pressure and this has brought us to a real deadlock. Thus, the "Green March" falls within the exercise by Morocco of its inalienable rights.

31. The people of Morocco is determined to defend its existence as a nation as well as the territorial

integrity of its State. By deciding to organize a peaceful march it has affirmed its right to life. That right is unchallengeable, and it is not by having recourse to legal quibbles or ideological mystification that obstacles can be raised to the Moroccan nation's right to its existence. That right springs from and is rendered legitimate by our consciousness of nationhood forged during two centuries of history. All observers have noted the existence of that national consciousness which was made manifest in response to the appeal of His Majesty King Hassan II to undertake a peaceful march towards the Moroccan territory we were deprived of by colonization. It is precisely to defend their right to life that thousands of Moroccans have left their homes, families and daily occupations to accomplish their national duty. This is a fact of human life which all must obey.

32. The United Nations cannot ignore the right of the Moroccan nation. Were it to do so this would be a grave and flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of the Charter. The Organization's *raison d'être*, as stipulated in the Preamble to the Charter, lies in respect for the equality of nations large and small, and Article 2 of the Charter closely associates the equality of rights of nations and their right to territorial integrity.

33. In the nineteenth century Morocco was fragmented by colonialism. Sectors of a single nation were subjected to different colonial régimes. Lines were drawn on maps to define the strategic and economic interests of European countries. Those lines had absolutely no effect on the reality in human terms. Far from weakening Moroccan nationalism they revived it and gave it new vigour. That national sentiment has been expressed in the constant struggle which the Moroccan people from the Sahara to Oujda have waged against foreign domination.

34. With the return from exile of King Mohammed V in 1955, Morocco did indeed obtain partial independence but, above all, it gained a right to be heard in international forums. From then on my country, which was still colonized, devoted all its means and its energies to the service of the sacred cause of national liberation. Immediately after the partial independence of Morocco in 1955, unanimity on that subject was declared from the north to the south of the country. The Moroccan population in Western Sahara revolted against the perpetuation of Spanish colonial occupation and asked to be associated with the mother country; that action led to the liberation of the greater part of the Western Sahara. A major foreign alliance was needed to reduce the Moroccan people to submission. The national sentiments of the Saharan population were thus made clear and our brothers in the Sahara have never ceased since then to behave as genuine nationalists, whether Moroccan or Mauritanian.

35. Tarfaya, Ifni and Spanish Sahara are engraved in the national conscience of every Moroccan as the

provinces which were the cradle of the Almoravid, the Almohade and the Alaouite dynasties and the melting-pot of our the values of civilization. Therein lies the true character of the Moroccan people; the great veneration in which the sage Maa El Ainin, representative of the Sultan at Sakiet El Hamra, was held throughout Morocco is the manifestation of this in concrete form.

36. The people of Morocco has been struggling since 1955 to safeguard its true character, and in this endeavour it is certain that it will receive the unre-served support of its African brothers, for each of the peoples of Africa have the same concern. Throughout this lengthy period our people has not forgotten for a single second its natural duty of solidarity with the liberation movements of its African brothers. Morocco resolutely opposed every colonial attempt to jeopardize the unity of any African country, whether it be Algeria, Zaire or Nigeria.

37. My country therefore has no anti-colonialist lesson to learn from anyone. My country was in the forefront of the nations which laboured for the liquidation of colonialism in all its forms. We are therefore fully aware of the role we have to play among the third-world countries, and we ask for understanding on the part of those peoples in our own liberation struggle. Together we must foil the manoeuvres of colonialism and prevent the perversion of the most sacred principles of the Organization in the service of special interests. It is in this constant struggle for liberation that Morocco sees the basis and justification of its right to recover the territories of which it had been deprived. The distinguished Lebanese judge Fouad Ammoun, in the separate opinion annexed to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on Western Sahara, declared:

“Nothing could show more clearly the will for emancipation than the struggle undertaken in common, with the risks and immense sacrifices it entails. That struggle is more decisive than a referendum, being absolutely sincere and authentic. Many are the peoples who have had recourse to it to make their right prevail. It is, one need hardly repeat, that thousand-year struggle which has established the right of peoples to dispose of their own fate, a right which jurists, statesmen, constitutions and declarations, and the United Nations Charter, have merely recognized and solemnly proclaimed.”²

38. Taking note of the irresistible will of the Moroccan nation, the colonial Power in 1958 restored the province of Tarfaya without any referendum. The case of Ifni, however, is more revealing in this respect, inasmuch as the United Nations was seized of the question. In 1966, the General Assembly, in paragraph 3 of resolution 2229 (XXI), requested

“the administering Power to take immediately the necessary steps to accelerate the decolonization

of Ifni and to determine with the Government of Morocco, bearing in mind the aspirations of the indigenous population, procedures for the transfer of powers in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).”

39. What objective conclusions may be drawn from this text? First of all, the transfer of power was decided in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV), the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. This is clear proof that the application of resolution 1514 (XV) is not limited solely to the organization of a referendum. The Declaration states the principle of decolonization, which can be brought about either by a referendum or by a transfer of power.

40. Furthermore, a referendum is meaningless when there are national ties between the Territory to be decolonized and an independent neighbouring State. Thus there was no question of asking Moroccans whether they wished to become Moroccans. Thus, convinced of the existence of national ties between the population of Ifni and the Kingdom of Morocco, in 1966 the General Assembly advocated procedures for the transfer of power and Ifni was reintegrated with the mother country in 1969, precisely as a result of direct negotiations with Spain.

41. As regards Western Sahara, the policy of the General Assembly has been more hesitant. The first resolution adopted in 1965, resolution 2072 (XX), requested Spain to enter into negotiations on the problems relating to sovereignty presented by the Territory. But in 1966, the General Assembly set aside the modality of the transfer of power and advocated a referendum in paragraph 4 of resolution 2229 (XXI). This proved once again that there are two procedures which the General Assembly may use as alternatives to suit the prevailing circumstances.

42. In fact, these hesitations are explained by the administering Power's exploitation of certain differences which appeared at that time among the neighbouring countries. Since 1966 Morocco has unceasingly reiterated at every session of the General Assembly its right to national unity. The controversy regarding the legal ties that bind the population of Sahara to the Kingdom of Morocco has been latent throughout these last 10 years. In fact, if those ties are recognized, as they were in the case of Ifni, there will be no further need to have recourse to the referendum procedure. It will be necessary in that case to propose negotiations for the transfert of power.

43. Last year when Spain proposed to organize a referendum within the next six months, in order to prevent a fait accompli, Morocco could only request the International Court of Justice to pronounce itself on the existence of legal ties between Western Sahara and the two neighbouring countries concerned at the time of the Spanish colonization. The International

Court of Justice gave its advisory opinion³ and clearly established the existence of legal ties of personal allegiance between the populations of the Kingdom of Morocco and Western Sahara, as well as of legal ties of a territorial nature between Mauritania and Western Sahara. To be sure these could not be links of sovereignty in the conventional sense of the word. The region concerned was a desert area peopled by nomads. The existence of an effective, stable, fixed power was, in the circumstances, inconceivable.

44. Furthermore, political power in Morocco is based on the allegiance of the basic communities and their chiefs to the sultans. This does not in any way mean that their populations could decide, on the death of a sultan, to cease to be Moroccans. It meant only that those peoples have the right and the duty to decide on the successor and thus to confirm his legitimacy. It was therefore a domestic matter regarding the organization of power within the State of Morocco. Thus, it is clear that the ties of personal allegiance established by the Court confirm a fact which Morocco has at all times proclaimed—namely that the populations of Western Sahara have always been a part of the Moroccan nation. It was this same concept that Mr. Khatri Ould Joumaïni, the President of the Jemaa in Western Sahara, indicated clearly in a letter addressed to you, Mr. President. I quote:

“As President of the Jemaa and in the name of the entire authority of the Jemaa, which Spain has always defended at the United Nations and before the opinion of the Arab-African non-aligned countries, I reiterate the desire of the people of the Sahara to link their fate with that of their brothers from whom they have been separated.”

45. These new data and the unanimous expression of the will of the Moroccan people in the peaceful march should logically lead the General Assembly to adjust its earlier resolutions. To be consistent, the General Assembly must advocate, as in the Ifni case, recourse to the other technique of decolonization, that is to say, the transfer of powers by negotiation with the administering Power. In so doing the General Assembly would implement fully and in all its elements resolution 1514 (XV) and thus accelerate the process of decolonization, while respecting the right to territorial integrity which is reaffirmed in paragraph 6 of the Declaration contained in that resolution.

46. The process envisaged will take into account, as in the case of West Irian and Ifni, the aspirations of the indigenous population. Morocco, following its age-old tradition, will respect the local institutions of the peoples. The Jemaa and the traditional chiefs will remain the spokesmen, within the framework of the Moroccan State concerning the particular interests of the peoples of the Sahara. As His Majesty the King declared in his address at

Marrakesh on 9 July this year: “The administration of El Aaiún or Smara will be in the hands of the local population because they are closer than we to local realities”.

47. The indigenous populations have again expressed their wishes without any ambiguity. Only four days ago, the President of the Jemaa was received by His Majesty King Hassan II at Agadir and made the following statement.

“I have come on behalf of all the inhabitants and tribes of the Sahara to render to Your Majesty the allegiance of our ancestors. I have come out of patriotism because Sahara is an integral part of Morocco. We have never ceased to be Moroccans. When we saw that we had become a pawn, that our fate was literally put at risk by the appetites and ambitions of some, we decided to say what we think, loudly and clearly.”

48. That statement acquires its full significance when we realize the functions delegated to the Jemaa by the Spanish State, which considers it to be the supreme representative organ of the Saharan people, according to the 1975 report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Western Sahara.⁴ The President of the Jemaa is elected by the 103 members of that assembly, who in turn are elected by the local jemaas and municipal councils. After the very important statement by the President of the Jemaa, we must now reconcile United Nations procedures with the more recent developments in the situation in the region. Furthermore, it must be recalled that many members of the Jemaa represent tribes which are an integral part of the Mauritanian nation.

49. Morocco wishes to recall that it declared, before the International Court of Justice, that in the Western Sahara “there is a north and there is a south which juxtapose in space the legal ties of Western Sahara with Morocco and with Mauritania”.³ Spain itself has recognized this fact by inviting the delegations of Morocco and Mauritania to participate in the most recent negotiations at Madrid.

50. The procedure I have described is the only course open to the Organization which will enable it to take into consideration all the principles of the Charter. This course falls within the framework of the spirit and the letter of resolution 1514 (XV); it would prevent the perversion and mystification of the law of decolonization. This law was never conceived as a means of creating puppet States for the benefit of particular interests and certain imperialist aims. This law was never conceived as a weapon against the nationals who constitute the tangible reality of the world of today. This law, on the contrary, strengthens and protects all nations, large and small, against foreign intervention and the threat of disintegration.

51. The Court pronounced itself on certain legal aspects of the question of the decolonization of

Western Sahara, as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 3292 (XXIX). But in the same text the General Assembly reserved to itself the right to indicate the procedure to be followed to speed up decolonization. This policy is necessary because of the new circumstances to which we have referred. These circumstances lead to the choice of the technique of transfer of power by negotiation between the administering Power and the States concerned.

52. As I clearly yesterday indicated at the private meeting of the Security Council [1853rd meeting], Morocco is more than ever determined to co-operate with the United Nations in seeking a solution negotiated with the administering Power. In so doing, Morocco intends to comply with resolution 1514 (XV) which confirms the right of peoples to national unity and territorial integrity. This remains within the context of what the Council itself decided in resolution 377 (1975), when it called on the parties to negotiate. But Morocco cannot envisage such a solution by negotiation except between the administering Power and the parties concerned, that is to say those who have unceasingly proclaimed their rights over their territory and established the legitimacy of their claims in many ways, in particular before the International Court of Justice.

53. It is time for the situation to be clarified and positions made clear. It is difficult to conceive of the participation in negotiations in regard to the Sahara of a party which has at all times proclaimed that it has no territorial claim to make. Is it because the right conclusion has not been drawn from this that we have not arrived at a logical and final solution?

54. Morocco has been greatly comforted by the sincere and unreserved support of a certain number of countries representing African and Arab opinion. The Ambassadors of the following countries have indicated their wish to participate personally in the peaceful march of my country: Gabon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Qatar. Delegations of volunteers from those countries have also joined their Moroccan brothers in their liberation march.

55. In conclusion, I should like to appeal to the conscience of each member of the Council and beg them to take into account all the elements of the matter and never to dissociate the substance of the matter from the question of the peaceful march of the Moroccan people. The influence of one on the other is such that any objective solution must of necessity take into account all the facts submitted for your consideration.

56. Finally, I should like to affirm Morocco's confidence in your assessment and its conviction that you will never take any decision which does not take into account the legitimacy of our rights and the justness of our claims and initiatives.

57. The representative of Spain informed the Council just now [see S/11871] of a communication from his Government regarding the audience accorded by the Minister of Information of Morocco to the Ambassador of Spain at Rabat. Allow me to give you the pertinent information. I shall do so in two parts: the reply of my Government resulting from the official position of my Government, and the latest information that I received by telephone a few minutes before this meeting of the Council opened.

58. On behalf of my Government, I most formally contradict the information just communicated to the Council by the representative of Spain in regard to an alleged change in the position of Morocco and the significance of the peaceful march. As King Hassan II has reported, the march is being carried out by unarmed civilians, men and women. Morocco maintains its initial position in every respect and I solemnly declare that the Government of Morocco is determined to avoid any incident with Spanish armed forces. Morocco reaffirms solemnly its will to seek a solution within the framework of the United Nations; this position has been reiterated to the Secretary-General and to his representative by His Majesty King Hassan II in the course of the visits to Morocco. There is therefore no question of taking seriously the content of this purely imaginary information. We sincerely hope that Spain will avoid reporting wild information with the object of creating confusion.

59. At the moment this meeting began I was able to communicate with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and I shall read the notes I made. At his own request the Ambassador of Spain at Rabat was received by Mr. Benhima, who was exercising the function of Acting Prime Minister. The Ambassador of Spain said:

"Tomorrow a meeting of the Council of Ministers of Spain must be held. Have you any message to transmit to my Government? I am the Ambassador of Spain at Rabat, and I should like to make my contribution to the search for a solution. Can I therefore help by transmitting a message to the Council of Ministers?"

60. Mr. Benhima, Acting Prime Minister, immediately telephoned His Majesty the King at Agadir. His Majesty was with Mr. Laraki, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom I have just spoken by telephone, and he said this to me:

"His Majesty told the Prime Minister that the negotiations both at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and at the level of Prime Ministers were simply suspended and that Morocco was prepared to resume the dialogue."

That is the information which I am authorized to give the Council and which was dictated to me from Agadir three quarters of an hour ago by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

61. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Spain.

62. Mr. ARIAS SALGADO (Spain) (*interpretation from Spanish*): At this late hour and after the lengthy meetings which we have devoted to this problem, it was not my intention to speak again. However, the statement just made by the representative of Morocco compels me to provide some clarifications.

63. The first is that the representative of Morocco appears to have forgotten where we are and why we are meeting. We are not in the General Assembly; nor are we at the International Court of Justice, where I had the honour to take part with him in many meetings during the month of July; nor are we in the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. We are in the Security Council. We are meeting to consider an urgent, grave, concrete and specific question which is creating at the moment enormous problems of all kinds for my country.

64. To claim that at present we are debating the basic problem of the decolonization of the Sahara without covering the fundamental question created by the illegal invasion and occupation of the Territory seems to me to be wholly unrealistic and to show a total loss of any sense of proportion. Continually—and this is a second aspect that I should like to make perfectly clear—in the statements of the representative of Morocco there are affirmations of what Spain recognizes, is doing, is saying, is intending, in this matter. I really must insist once again that the Spanish position, what Spain recognizes and does not recognize, Spain itself can clarify in the appropriate organs. There is absolutely no need for the representative of Morocco to remind us daily what the position of Spain is on these matters.

65. At recent meetings I have very often had occasion to make clear the scope of the negotiations recommended in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations in the present context. At the 1850th meeting of the Council the representative of Spain gave Spain's interpretation of that Article and of the scope of negotiations, to which paragraph 3 of the resolution just adopted¹ also refers. He said:

“Regarding the negotiations provided for in Article 33 of the Charter, in relation to the international tension created by the Government of Morocco with the announcement of a march on the Sahara, my delegation considers that any action which would contribute to eliminating the cause of the international tension which has been created must be accepted in accordance with the commitment which all Members of the United Nations have undertaken in accepting the Charter of the United Nations.” [1850th meeting, para. 112.]

66. All Members have the obligation under the Charter to settle problems and disputes of all kinds peacefully and obviously negotiations are one of the appropriate means to this end. But to try to confuse the scope of negotiations of this kind with the solution of a substantive problem which is within the competence of the General Assembly—and on that I think that the position of Spain is clear—seems to me to be insisting repeatedly on a course which can lead to nothing.

67. Lastly, I believe that in the statement of the representative of Morocco one fundamental element was lacking in that not once did he refer to the resolution which has been adopted. Furthermore, he did not say whether the march, which is the subject of the resolution and of the meeting of the Council, would be halted and the marchers withdrawn from the territory of Western Sahara, as called for in the resolution. I believe that this is the problem, the cause of the very serious situation in which we find ourselves, and that it leads us nowhere at this time to consider the situation as presented by the representative of Morocco.

68. Furthermore, on the basis of the information provided in the aforementioned letter from the representative of Spain [S/11871], if the situation really is as described by the representative of Morocco, it is very easy to prove this, since tomorrow, because of the time differential, the withdrawal could start in compliance with the request addressed by the Security Council to the Government of Morocco.

69. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I now call on the representative of Algeria.

70. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): I must admit that I rather hesitated to ask to speak at this meeting because I am not really sure what its purpose is. I wonder, with all due respect to this body and to its members, what is the meaning of this masquerade which has been going on for some time now.

71. The Algerian delegation, like the delegations of other parties concerned and interested in the problem of Western Sahara, has already had the opportunity on several occasions to set out quite clearly the position of its Government on this question and my delegation sees no need to repeat once again what we have already stated here and what has been recorded as the fundamental position of the Algerian Government.

72. Today we have heard statements, no doubt eloquent but aimed at the wrong parties. I do not believe that the Council has met today at this late hour, after half a day of consultations and after having met throughout last night, to consider the validity of the territorial claims of any particular country.

73. The Security Council is authorized by the international community to watch over international peace and security, and all the meetings that you have held so far, all the consultations which you have held, have referred to a situation in which peace and security in a region of the world are threatened. I shall therefore not follow the example of those preceding speakers who have tried to draw the attention of the Council to problems which in no way relate to the present debate and do not fall within the competence of the Council. The statements we have heard today have surely been made before international bodies more qualified to hear them. And, to my knowledge, those authorized bodies which have heard those pleadings, which have studied those documents and which have been able to weigh those arguments have not been convinced of the validity of those claims.

74. Why then come here and repeat the same arguments? Why come here at a time when a very serious situation is brewing, at a time when incidents may perhaps occur at any moment? Why draw the attention of the Council to developments which have no place here and the value of which has been duly assessed by the bodies to which they have already been addressed?

75. I felt compelled to make this comment at the beginning of my statement, but what I wanted to say first was that I find the method followed by the Security Council in adopting a decision which related so directly to the countries concerned and interested, which involves their own security and in which they have a legitimate right to participate to some extent, to be abnormal. What does it mean for the parties interested to come before the Council now when the Council has already taken a decision? I should not like my observation to appear impertinent, but, in view of the gravity of the situation which you are considering, but which we are living through, permit me to express all the same some amazement at this procedure.

76. Perhaps, by listening to the parties, hearing their arguments and discussing their suggestions with them, you might have arrived at a resolution which would have given us more satisfaction and would have been somewhat more effective. For this procedure which I am now criticizing nevertheless has certain advantages, in that it enables us to ascertain immediately whether or not the decisions you take are effective.

77. You have just taken a decision. It is addressed to the Government of Morocco. That Government is called upon to take certain decisions. The representative of the Government of Morocco has given you his reply. You do not need to wait any longer to ascertain whether your resolution is an effective one or not. You do not even need to wait any longer to ascertain whether you have taken a good decision

or not. And all the members of the international community are now in a position to know whether the Security Council has been equal to its responsibilities or not.

78. Be that as it may, what is the situation that has been described to you here and that has been the cause of so many hours of Council meetings? It concerns a Territory called the Sahara. That Territory is under Spanish administration. Certain countries have submitted claims to the sovereignty over that Territory. To submit a claim does not mean that one is entitled to submit it; still less does it mean that the claim is to be satisfied by the one submitting it. Hence, sovereignty over the Territory in question, regardless of the claims put forward—and at this stage of the debate I do not want to state my views on the validity of the claims because that is not the purpose of the debate—belongs, as I said in one of my previous statements, to the people of the Sahara [*see 1850th meeting, para. 11*]. That sovereignty is given material form in frontiers. Any unauthorized crossing of those frontiers, against the will of the people or of the Power administering the Territory, is a violation of that Territory. A violation carried out with the intention to occupy the territory, with the declared intention to annex the territory, cannot be a peaceful march, a stroll down the Champs Elysées.

79. That is the situation. As representative of Algeria, I have drawn your attention to the gravity of the situation resulting from a crossing of the frontier of the Territory of the Sahara by a march whose dimensions have already been pointed out. The Security Council met before the frontier was crossed. The Security Council adopted a resolution. Since there was a desire not to hurt the pride of any of the parties, the resolution was drafted in courteous language; it asked all the parties concerned and interested to exercise restraint and moderation. What effect did resolution 377 (1975) have? If I am to believe the comments made by Moroccan circles, the resolution, since it did not actually condemn the planned march on the Sahara, was taken as encouragement and as recognition of the legitimacy of the march.

80. The Security Council met on the eve of this crossing of the frontier. The members of the Council were very disturbed about the imminence of such a serious operation. Your concern prompted you to ask the parties concerned and interested to come here so that you could ascertain for yourselves the gravity of the imminent events. You put some questions. You received answers. You, the members of the Council, knew full well how the situation would develop. Perhaps you thought that there would be only minor incidents, that the possibility must be left open of saving the pride of certain Governments. Perhaps you thought, after you learned that the Spanish army had withdrawn a few kilometres inside the Territory, that the Moroccan marchers were going to make

only a symbolic entrance into the Territory and then were going to withdraw. But you put the question to the delegation of Morocco. You asked whether it was the intention of the Government of Morocco to withdraw its marchers. I am not saying that the delegation of Morocco misinformed you. The delegation of Morocco gave you a very clear answer; it did not tell you that the Moroccan marchers would withdraw. Hence, it was in full knowledge of the facts and having weighed your responsibilities that you took the decision to issue an appeal to His Majesty the King of Morocco to put an end forthwith to the march [see S/11868].

81. You know, as we know, what the answer to that appeal was and in what terms it was couched. If you issued this appeal, it was certainly not merely to please one or two of the parties concerned and interested. You issued this appeal so that it could produce a result. You issued the appeal because you knew that it was your responsibility to prevent the situation from developing to the point of confrontation. You now know what the situation is because you have been meeting all afternoon.

82. You have negotiated amongst yourselves the terms of a resolution which you have just adopted.¹ The reply of the Moroccan delegation to this decision has been clear and I do not believe it is necessary for you to wait any longer to take another decision.

83. After having heard the statement of the representative of Morocco, there should be no further doubt in your mind that the invasion of Saharan territory by the Moroccan marchers will continue. There should be no doubt in your mind that this march will reach the line occupied by the Spanish army. It is not for me to say what Spain's attitude at that point will be, but if I am to believe the statements that I have heard, just as you have heard, from the representative of Spain, I suppose that this situation will degenerate into clashes, in incidents that will result in deaths, and that situation will simply increase the tension and danger for the entire region, not to mention dangers that should not be disregarded because they have already appeared—for example, clashes between Moroccans who have ventured into Spanish territory and the Saharans themselves. These are not imaginary dangers, since, as you also probably know, there have been such clashes already. When a situation develops in this way, everyone knows that it gets completely out of hand, and it is because of this that I have already informed the Security Council of the apprehensions of the Algerian Government and its intention to face up to this situation.

84. As a representative of a country which is one of the parties concerned and interested in this case, I am entitled to wonder why the Security Council, knowing how the situation would develop, aware of the

deterioration in the situation, assessing the increasing tension and able to foresee what would happen on the morrow, has shown itself to be so timid in its resolutions. Either the Council considers itself responsible for this situation—and the Council exists to take the necessary measures to prevent such a danger in our region—in which case it should take the appropriate measures prescribed in the Charter with the means provided by the Charter. Or else the Council is shirking its responsibility and says that there is nothing it can do, in which case there is no reason to hold so many meetings and there is no need for so many consultations.

85. Our countries, which are Members of the United Nations, have faith in the Charter; they have faith in the Security Council's mission. That is why I have been directed in several instances by my Government to come before you and inform you of what is happening in our region, to tell you of the fears of my Government and of its responsibilities and its ability to discharge them.

86. I am not objecting to the language that you use. I am not saying that it is necessary to change the wording of decisions you take. Algeria sees no advantage for itself if the language you use in addressing another country is lacking in courtesy or might offend the national dignity of that country; however, what interests my country is the result of your negotiations. You have negotiated the terms of these decisions; you have replaced the word "condemns" by "deplores"; you have replaced the word "demands" by "calls upon", and what have you obtained? You have obtained a reply which is more than a rebuff to this, the highest body of the Organization. You have received a cold reply telling you that your decision, as of now, is null and void and will not be respected.

87. Since, despite the danger of this situation, despite the gravity of the events which are occurring, speakers have indulged in a little philosophy, perhaps I might make a little digression. We must do this, we the new countries which have just entered the international arena, which is already organized with its own laws, its own customs, its own methods, its own conventions, and we have tried to behave as members of the international community should. It is not without deep concern that for some years now we see certain very dangerous customs developing. We deplored them prior to this when they did not affect us directly, but who can avoid such dangerous distortions of international life? The fact is that we are affected by these distortions which are now making themselves felt at our very frontiers. These customs are those of the triumph of might over right.

88. Without putting too fine a point on it, these customs amount to utilization of the *fait accompli*. The law is violated, a *fait accompli* is perpetrated

and then negotiated. The fait accompli validates your claims. I have claims on the Sahara, and I occupy the Sahara to prove that my claim is justified. It is most distressing for us to see this philosophy develop generally in the world, and particularly in a region where we ourselves are compelled to establish sound customs and bilateral relations based on an equally sound conception of international law.

89. However much I may desire to develop this idea further, I realize it is quite late and I especially do not wish to overlook the fact that the subject of the Council's debate today, on which you have adopted a resolution that has had so little effect, does not allow me to tax the Council's time or attention by referring to matters, however interesting they may be, which might perhaps cause the Council to forget the gravity of the subject itself.

90. It is not for me to tell the Security Council what it should do. It is not for the Algerian delegation to remind the members of the Council of their responsibilities. I must repeat what I have already said on behalf of my Government: if the Security Council cannot or will not act in keeping with its responsibilities, my Government will be compelled to discharge its own responsibilities. This is neither a threat nor a provocation. It is the clearest possible expression of the strongest possible determination.

91. The issue before the Council is the threat to the peace represented by the march organized by the Moroccan Government in the Territory of the Sahara. The fundamental problem, the political problem, falls within the purview of the General Assembly. The Algerian Government has taken a position on this problem. Naturally, I could state our position here and go into the arguments of my Government, but I shall do so before the General Assembly; I shall do so before the Fourth Committee when this matter comes up. That, in the view of the Algerian delegation, is how the problem should be settled in an international organization.

92. However that may be, I should like as clearly and explicitly as possible to state that the Algerian Government will not accept any solution of the problem of the decolonization of Western Sahara which might be reached outside the United Nations which is not arrived at in accordance with the resolutions and decisions of this body, and in particular of the General Assembly, and which does not involve all the parties concerned and interested.

93. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): The representative of Algeria has used very strong words in referring to the Security Council and the purpose of convening today's meeting. As representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, I can say that in my country criticism and self-criticism are greatly encouraged. Criticism and self-criticism promote progress and improve work.

94. As PRESIDENT of the Security Council, I would very willingly explain to the representative of Algeria the purpose of today's meeting. As President of the Council, this morning I received from His Majesty the King of Morocco a reply [*see S/11868*] to the communication I sent him last night [*ibid.*], as authorized by the Council. Neither I nor the members of the Security Council are indifferent to that reply. I immediately convened a consultative informal meeting of the Council members. The Council members very willingly reacted to my suggestion. The purpose of the meeting was to inform them of the contents of the reply received from the King of Morocco. As you know, intensive consultations were held today. All the members of the Council actively participated in the consultations.

95. It was recognized that this reply called for further measures by the Security Council. The general view was expressed that firmer, stronger measures should be taken by the Council. Despite the difficulties and the complexity involved, a draft resolution was prepared, a draft decision, and that draft is known to you now, to us and to the entire world.

96. In the resolution that has now been adopted,¹ the Council has expressed great concern at the fact that the situation concerning Western Sahara has seriously deteriorated. The Security Council has noted this fact. It has also noted that Morocco has not implemented the two other resolutions and the special appeal and it expresses regret and deplores the holding of the march.

97. Compared with the preceding resolutions, this is a crystallization of the Security Council's decisions. Unfortunately, it is hard to view such an action by the States Members of the United Nations and the Security Council as encouraging. There seems to be rather a kind of blame. Paragraph 2 of the resolution calls upon Morocco—and Morocco is named for the first time in a Council resolution—immediately to withdraw all the participants in the march from the Territory of Western Sahara. In the preceding Council resolutions that did not appear. The members of the Council consider this to be a step forward. Naturally, you may or may not agree with the wording. Other views were expressed, but the draft resolution was kept in the form that now appears in the resolution.

98. It goes without saying that Council members will take note of the statement made by the representative of Algeria to the effect that he does not insist on a revision of the resolution that has been adopted, nor on revising its wording. He simply insists that this wording should be made stronger. That is how I understood his appeal, through the translation. I assume that Council members will take note of this view and this wish of the representative of Algeria.

99. In connexion with his statement, I must inform you that at today's consultative meeting, as I already

reported at the outset, the attention of members of the Council was drawn to a letter from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations [S/11871]. The members of the Council and the Secretary-General took note of the seriousness of the situation as set forth in that letter and on the further deterioration of the situation in that area.

100. In this connexion, at the second consultative meeting held today it was decided that, after adopting by consensus the resolution at this meeting and after hearing the statements made by the parties, the Council members could again exchange views in the light of the additional information they might have received on the situation in that area. Furthermore, a number of members of the Security Council have referred to new facts which have emerged during the present meeting and the wish was expressed that informal consultations among the Council members be held promptly.

101. Accordingly, I as President of the Council intend—of course with the Council's agreement and after the closing of the present meeting held to take a decision dealing mainly with the reply of the King of Morocco—to hold further consultations as to what additional measures the Council should take. That is how matters stand with regard to our consideration of this problem in the Council.

102. I now call on the representative of Morocco.

103. Mr. SLAOUI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): The representative of Algeria thought it necessary to remind the Council that: "as representative of Algeria, I have drawn your attention to the gravity of the situation resulting from a crossing of the frontier" [see paragraph 79 above].

104. With your permission, Mr. President, and with that of the members of the Security Council, allow me to say what President Boumediène himself thinks of the problem. Paragraph 59 of appendix II to the report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Western Sahara, dated 21 October 1975, says:

"In conclusion, the President"—President Houari Boumediène—"said that he felt particularly at ease in talking to the Mission because his country had no territorial claim on Sahara. If it did have such a claim, it would recover what belonged to it without waiting for the arrival of a United Nations mission, despite the great respect it had for the Organization."⁵

105. That statement made by the Algerian head of State to the Chairman of the United Nations Visiting Mission enables us properly to assess the many statements made by the delegation of Algeria concerning its devotion to the principle of self-determination within the framework of the United Nations. Such is the case; as for the rest, I think that the

representative of Algeria has spoken irresponsibly because he wishes to lead the Council to make condemnations which would close the door to any negotiated solution likely to prevent to worst from occurring.

106. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I called on the representatives of the parties to exercise their right of reply, since none of the Security Council members were on my list. Now that I have a speaker on my list I shall call on him. I shall then call on any other speaker and then on the representative of Algeria in exercise of his right of reply.

107. Mr. EL HASSEN (Mauritania) (*interpretation from French*): I shall be very brief in order to enable my colleague from Algeria to speak. I shall be very brief not only because it is late but because my country, through its delegation here, has had an occasion to state its position on the problem of the Sahara at previous meetings of the Council [1849th, 1850th and 1852nd meetings]. We shall have an opportunity to do so, if the occasion arises, in other United Nations bodies.

108. These numerous consultative and official meetings prove, if proof was required, that the problem of Western Sahara can hardly be assimilated to the classical problems of decolonization. It proves too that this is a problem which is of concern, quite rightly, to the international community because of its complex and explosive nature. It is certainly because of this fact that we realize how urgent it is to find a solution to this problem, and I believe that this is the first duty of the Security Council. What solution is envisaged? As we see it is not a matter of dealing with one aspect rather than another. We must deal with the substantive problem of decolonization of the Territory itself. This decolonization, we believe, can be achieved—and, in our opinion, this is the most appropriate procedure—within the framework of the United Nations. We also believe that United Nations action would be considerably facilitated by negotiations, which the parties concerned could start forthwith.

109. I believe furthermore that the Security Council has perfectly well perceived the usefulness of such an approach when it speaks about negotiations between the parties. Those negotiations dealing with the substance of the problem, in our opinion, are likely to facilitate the solution of the present problem created by the Moroccan march.

110. That is why I concur in what my colleague from Morocco has said—namely, that our two countries are prepared not only to co-operate faithfully and sincerely with the Secretary-General, but are likewise prepared to start negotiations with Spain, which is the administering Power, so as to discuss the entire problem and thus facilitate future action by the General Assembly regarding decolonization.

111. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I now call on the representative of Algeria.

112. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): Of all that my colleague, the representative of Morocco, has said, I shall not take up anything I need not take up; things, which in any case should not be taken up by me since they concern me personally. But as regards the sentence he extracted from the report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Western Sahara, I do have something to say.

113. First of all, I am pleased that the delegation of Morocco seems to show so keen an interest in this document, a document which has many other paragraphs than the one quoted. The delegation of Algeria has always urged that we refer to the report and also to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice¹ so as to be able to decide on the way of decolonizing the Sahara.

114. When the Algerian people wished to recover their independence and their country, they embarked on a war of liberation which has been sufficiently praised by others for me not to have to glorify it here. This struggle, however, did not prevent Algeria from first putting its problem to the United Nations. Whatever the developments of that liberation struggle, the Algerian people accepted the fact that the solution of its problem be reached by its exercise of the right of self-determination.

115. This reminder, I believe, can give some indications of the philosophy of Algeria as regards the satisfaction of claims. And when the head of State of Algeria stated that he would not have waited for a visiting mission from the United Nations to come to his country, that meant that he himself would have gone directly to the United Nations. I must say, too, that the method applied by the Government of Morocco is all the more illogical in that it comes after years and years of commitments made in the General Assembly to the acceptance of a solution to this problem through the exercise, by the population of the Western Sahara, of its right to self-determination. I do not believe that if a Government had to defend its position on the basis of logic, it would be the Government of Morocco that would find it easiest.

116. After the statement you made a little while ago, Mr. President, I feel bound to say that my respect for the Security Council and the respect which I have for each of its members individually, permits me to claim that the possibly harsh language I used just now was not directed either to the members of the Council or to the Council as such. My judgement was perhaps very harsh as regards a situation which is developing contrary to our wishes and contrary, no doubt, to the wish of the Council also.

117. I was very happy to point out in the course of my statement all the efforts which the Council has

made, all the meetings it has held—often late at night—all the consultations its members have had; once again I should like to accord those efforts the tribute they deserve. This, however, does not enable me to accept light-heartedly the fact that the desired effects have not been achieved. Of course, I cannot hold the Council itself responsible. In fact, when I deplored the attention lavished on the choice of words, I did say that what mattered was not the terms in which a decision was expressed but rather, at least in the opinion of the delegation of Algeria, the effect that such a decision might produce.

118. I shall not avail myself of this opportunity to make another statement, but I had, nevertheless, to assure the Security Council and each individual member that it was never the intention of the delegation of Algeria, or of its spokesman, myself, to cast a slur on the dignity of the Council. On the contrary, I wish to emphasize that dignity here, and indeed to request that everything be done in order that the dignity of the Council may be not only respected but strengthened.

119. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): Since there are no more speakers, I would like to address the Council in my capacity as representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. The position of the Soviet Union on this question has been set forth in the statements made by the delegation of the Soviet Union at the meetings of the Security Council held on 22 October [1850th meeting] and 2 November [1852nd meeting], and also during the informal consultations among Security Council members which have taken place over the past few days.

120. The development of events in Western Sahara has again required an urgent convening of the Security Council. We can only express our deep regret that at the present time Council resolutions 377 (1975) and 379 (1975) have not yet been implemented—resolutions which were aimed at preventing a further deterioration of the situation in Western Sahara. Furthermore, as a result of the unilateral actions taken in violation of the aforementioned Council resolutions and of the decision taken this evening by the Council with regard to the appeal of the President of the Council to the King of Morocco to put an end to the march in Western Sahara, that march has taken place. We share the concern of Council members, the Secretary-General and the interested parties concerning the escalation of tension in that area.

121. I should like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the Secretary-General for his tireless efforts and the efficient measures he has undertaken to provide Security Council members with the detailed information which he has systematically reported to the Council, including the report he made today concerning Western Sahara.

122. As has been frequently stated by the Soviet Union, the process of decolonizing Western Sahara has been dragged out. The peoples of that Territory should be granted their right to self-determination in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The colonial domination of Spain should be ended. All problems arising therefrom should be settled by peaceful means, and the solution to those problems should be achieved through negotiations and agreements. In this connexion, the Soviet delegation considers it extremely important that the parties concerned and interested should refrain from any unilateral activities that might complicate or aggravate the situation in that area and threaten peace and security. In other words, the Soviet Union is in favour of the kind of solution to this question that would satisfy the interests of the peoples of Western Sahara themselves. On this basis, the Soviet delegation insists on the implementation of the relevant United Nations decisions on decolonization and also the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on Western Sahara, including the one adopted today by the Security Council.

123. The Soviet delegation, having supported the compromise resolution adopted at today's meeting, considers that it could be a means of reducing tension in that area and of restoring peace and security there. We are deeply convinced that the prompt cessation of unilateral activity with regard to Western Sahara, and the withdrawal of all participants in the march into the Territory, would normalize the situation in that area.

124. Speaking now as PRESIDENT, as I already stated in my previous comments, I should like once again to remind members of the Council that at the second consultative meeting we held today it was decided that, after the adoption of a consensus resolution by the Council and after hearing the statements of the parties, Council members would exchange views in the light of any additional information they had received.

125. Furthermore, I already stated that a number of Council members are in possession of new facts that have become known during the course of today's meeting, and the wish was expressed that an urgent informal consultation among Council members be held. In accordance with this wish, therefore, I, as President of the Council, intend—of course, with the assent of Council members—to invite the Council members to remain after the adjournment of the official meeting so that we can have a brief exchange of views at a short, informal consultative meeting. I emphasize the word "short" in view of the very late hour.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 11.15 p.m.

Notes

¹ See resolution 380 (1975).

² *Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975*, p. 100.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 23*, vol. III, chap. XIII, annex.

⁵ *Ibid.*, appendix II.