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Official Records

Chairperson: Mr. Badji (Senegal)

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

Agenda items 88 to 105 (continued)

Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of draft resolutions submitted under disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): This afternoon, we will first conclude our debate on nuclear weapons, hearing a statement by one delegation that has requested the floor. Then we shall proceed to this afternoon's agenda, concerning other weapons of mass destruction.

However, before giving the floor to the representative of Mexico, I should like to seek the agreement of the Committee on a procedural matter. As members are aware, the deadline set for the submission of draft resolutions was Wednesday, 17 October. Despite the fact that that was the day before yesterday, a number of delegations have submitted additional draft resolutions. I recall that we already discussed at length the issue of the deadline in the Committee and in the Bureau. At that time, I stressed the need for discipline and a degree of flexibility.

In that spirit, may I take it that the Committee wishes to accept the draft resolutions submitted after the 17 October deadline, and thus that it agrees to show a degree of flexibility, as discussed?

It was so decided.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): Therefore, we shall consider the issue of nuclear weapons. There is one speaker on my list: the representative of Mexico, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. De Alba (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): Thank you, Mr. Chairperson, for giving me the opportunity to take the floor at this point.

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, comprising Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden and my own country, Mexico, to introduce once again the draft resolution entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments" (A/C.1/62/L.9).

The members of the New Agenda are convinced that the mere existence of nuclear weapons and the possibility of their use constitute a threat to international peace and security. Therefore, we shall continue to actively promote efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament.

I should like to point out that, in the preambular part of our draft resolution, we recall two fundamental premises: first, that disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing, and secondly, that nuclear-weapon States made an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We hope that that commitment will be honoured.

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.



We should also like to highlight the fact that the draft resolution introduces two new paragraphs. The first is operative paragraph 1, which welcomes the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, held in Vienna from 30 April to 11 May 2007, and looks forward to a constructive and successful preparatory process leading to the 2010 Review Conference, which should contribute to strengthening the Treaty and achieving its full implementation and universality. Operative paragraph 8 recognizes the vital importance of the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the achievement of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and takes note of the Final Declaration and Measures to promote its entry into force, adopted by consensus at the Fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, held in Vienna on 17 and 18 September 2007.

To conclude, I wish to reiterate that the Coalition is submitting this draft resolution because it is convinced that its content is fully valid, constructive and positive. Through this draft resolution, we wish to promote the objective of general and complete disarmament. In that regard, I wish to appeal to all Member States of the Committee to give it their most decisive support.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): We have concluded our thematic debate on nuclear weapons. The Committee will now take up a thematic debate on the subject of other weapons of mass destruction.

This afternoon, the Committee will hold a panel discussion on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and of the establishment of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

We have several high-level participants in the panel discussion, including Mr. Sergio Duarte, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, who needs no introduction; Mr. Rogelio Pfirter, Director-General, OPCW, whom we had the pleasure of listening to at the panel discussion during our 9th meeting; Ms. Annalisa Giannella, Personal Representative for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction of the High Representative for the

Common Foreign and Security Policy, Council of the European Union; Mr. Santiago Oñate Laborde, Legal Adviser, OPCW; Mr. Horst Reeps, Director, Verification Division, OPCW; Ms. Liliam Ballon, Minister Counsellor, General Division of United Nations and Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peru; and Mr. Ralf Trapp, Consultant, Chemical and Biological Weapons, Arms Control and Disarmament.

We are privileged to have the presence of a large number of experts in the field of chemical weapons with us on the panel here today. We also have a rather long list of speakers, which demonstrates the great interest of many Member States in this subject, the importance of which I do not need to stress further. In order to make optimal use of the time available to the Committee, I invite panel participants to make concise statements, so that we give the opportunity to all those who wish to make statements to be able to take the floor within the time frame allotted to the Committee. When we have the question-and-answer session, I would also request those participating to take into account the very limited time allotted to us.

I invite our first speaker, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Sergio Duarte, to take the floor.

Mr. Duarte (High Representative for Disarmament Affairs): I take this opportunity to thank you, Mr. Badji, the Chairman of the First Committee, and members of the Bureau for allowing this event to take place in the context of the Committee's thematic debate. I am honoured and pleased to welcome such an eminent group of panellists who will address various aspects and issues related to the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. I look forward to a fruitful discussion, following the presentations by the speakers.

The entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention on 29 April 1997 was undoubtedly a milestone in our efforts to achieve a world free of chemical weapons. Albania's successful completion last July of the destruction of its entire stockpile of chemical weapons is a significant step forward in fulfilling that great goal. I would personally like to reiterate and further underscore my appreciation to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its Director-General, Mr. Pfirter, for its

significant accomplishments on the road to the full implementation of that historic Convention.

The tenth anniversary of the Convention provides an excellent opportunity to reaffirm our collective commitment to multilateral treaties and to the objective and purpose of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Several joint forums were organized this year by the United Nations, together with OPCW, to commemorate this occasion. Today's panel discussion is but one of our many efforts to mark this anniversary.

In close cooperation with OPCW, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has actively promoted and publicized this anniversary event, among both United Nations Member States and the general public. We participated in the unveiling of the memorial to chemical weapon victims in The Hague. We published an electronic update on the tenth anniversary on our website. In June, we assisted in preparations for a workshop and exhibition on this theme, held in Geneva, and we helped in arranging for the OPCW Director-General to address the Conference on Disarmament. In September, we participated in the academic forum organized by OPCW in The Hague and helped to organize the high-level meeting on the Chemical Weapons Convention held at United Nations Headquarters, which was addressed by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon. We will soon be publishing the papers from that meeting. Finally, we also helped in arranging the current OPCW exhibition outside the General Assembly Hall.

I can say without hesitation that the incremental growth in the membership of the Chemical Weapons Convention, coupled with the efforts now under way by its States parties to fulfil their obligations under the Convention, testify to the strength of the global norm against chemical weapons. They reinforce the long-standing taboo against the use of such weapons dating back to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, of 1925. Beyond that, the Convention helps to promote multilateralism, the rule of law and even the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

I therefore call upon all States to reaffirm their commitment to this historic instrument and to ensure that OPCW has the political support and resources it needs to fulfil its important responsibilities in the years ahead. I also ask all Governments that have not yet

done so to ratify or accede to the Convention without delay, and I call upon all possessor States to complete their destruction according to the agreed deadlines.

The United Nations, for its part, will continue to work together with OPCW and the international community to promote the universality and full implementation of the Convention.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): I would like to thank Mr. Sergio Duarte for having emphasized the importance of the Convention on Chemical Weapons, in particular his appeal for greater commitment to and support for the Convention and its universalization. Concrete proof of commitment to the Convention is particularly important, even if there has been an increase in the accession to the Convention.

The next speaker is Mr. Rogelio Pflirter, Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, who we have the pleasure to hear at this panel.

Mr. Pflirter (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons): My colleagues and I are absolutely delighted to be here at the First Committee today, once again. My organization recognizes in the United Nations a lighthouse of wisdom, with principles and objectives that are very much the principles and objectives that the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is pursuing.

Only two days ago, I delivered a long statement here (see A/C.1/62/PV.9). I think I should spare everyone, including myself, a repeat performance. If you will allow me, Mr. Chairperson, I will just go over in broad strokes our achievements and our challenges. I will also leave to my colleagues, the Director of Verification and our legal counsel, to go into some of the aspects that have to do with the actual programmes and the implementation of the Convention in greater depth.

Before doing so, however, allow me also to say how delighted I am to be here on this panel with the Secretary-General's High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ambassador Duarte. Once more, I would like to say how sincerely we thank him for his commitment to the cause that the OPCW and other treaty organizations are pursuing. We certainly look forward to welcoming him in a few days, at the beginning of November, when our Conference of States Parties takes place in The Hague. I am also grateful to

the Office for Disarmament Affairs for its continued support, as was very well recalled by Ambassador Duarte.

After 10 years of existence, the OPCW can claim a number of achievements, and we have more or less spoken about them already. Let us look, therefore, at our actual programmes. The first — disarmament — has as its purpose the total reversal and destruction of all stockpiles declared by possessor States at the latest by 2012. Today, we can account for the destruction under OPCW verification of over 30 per cent of such stockpiles — unevenly, depending on the possessor States, but 30 per cent, and that is not a minor figure. I think that we should all take some comfort in that.

Let us look at our non-proliferation objectives, that is to say, at our efforts to ensure that no more chemical weapons are produced in the future. On that front, too, I think the international community can look with satisfaction at the fact that the OPCW has been able to put into operation an effective industry verification regime. Member States have declared over 6,000 facilities, and already over 1,200 inspections have taken place. That is also a reason for satisfaction.

If we look at the international cooperation and assistance chapter — which has to do with helping member States in capacity-building, preventing the eventual use or threat of use of chemical weapons against them and, at the same time, promoting the peaceful uses of chemistry — on that front also we have achieved certain progress. The number of member States or experts of member States that have received support from the OPCW is considerable and is growing. That is one area in which member States have expressed satisfaction.

From the programme-delivery point of view, therefore, the OPCW has indeed done a lot, hence the satisfaction that has been expressed on so many occasions by different countries and organizations during this tenth anniversary year.

Having said that, I think, and I would like to emphasize today, that we should not in any way ignore the enormous challenges we still face. Let us look again at the different programmes.

First, let us look at disarmament and arms control. Yes, over 30 per cent of our declared stockpile has been destroyed. But that has taken place over a period of 10 years. According to the Convention, there

are less than five years left for such destruction to be completed. Close to 70 per cent of the stockpile needs to be destroyed.

There is therefore a big challenge ahead, particularly for the two major possessor States, namely, the Russian Federation and the United States.

The Russian Federation has destroyed under OPCW certification around 24 per cent of its stockpiles, the stockpiles having initially been declared to be about 40,000 tons. That means that around 68 per cent or 66 per cent or 65 per cent — indeed, destruction takes place every day, so good progress is being made — but still 65 or 66 per cent needs to be destroyed in less than five years. That is a major challenge that the Russian Federation has to undertake and, indeed, is undertaking, with the commissioning of new facilities. That will require continued international funding in support of the Russian destruction programme, for that programme is good not just for Russia, but also for the world as a whole. The sooner and the more complete the destruction of the chemical stockpiles, the safer the world is in relative terms.

In the case of the United States, the challenge ahead is also not a minor thing. The United States will have completed the destruction of about 50 per cent of its stockpile by the end of this year, but it will have less than five years to destroy the remaining 50 per cent.

There are the complexities of the programme, the costs and the need to privilege safety above all — indeed, that is logical, since we are destroying chemical weapons in order to make the world a safer place; ironically we were destroying them in a way that was not safe. All those things take a toll in terms of cost and of time. Thus, it is also a major challenge for these States. I think it is crucial that all possessor States continue to demonstrate a strong political commitment in order to ensure that they do everything possible to destroy their chemical weapons within the deadlines established in the Convention.

But we also have other challenges. Suppose that possessor States do destroy their stockpiles by 2012 — they will have completed a major objective of the Convention. Yet the Convention might still be frustrated in terms of disarmament if, by that date, the States remaining outside the Convention, about which there have been allegations of the existence of chemical programmes or chemical stockpiles, do have such programmes and such stockpiles. Therefore,

universality is of the essence for the completion of the disarmament goals of the Convention.

It is not a minor challenge. Some of the States which remain outside are involved in certain conflicts, and they articulate their reluctance to join the Convention in the framework of such conflicts. Of course, I, as the Director-General of the OPCW, believe that nothing should deprive the peoples — of the Middle East, for instance — of the benefits of being free at least of the potential threat of the use of chemical weapons. For while States there do not join the Convention, in theory, at least, that option remains open. We are not the ones to advise as to how best to achieve peace, but common sense would appear to dictate that if we at least close the chemical option, we have made a contribution to peace or to the chances of peace in the future.

Aside from that, chemical weapons today have lost some of their strategic significance, and they only remain really as weapons of terror against civilians. So I think that the international community, for many reasons, would be well advised to continue to try to encourage the countries that remain outside to join the Convention at the earliest possible date. That will be legally, morally and strategically a good step, a good contribution to peace. By the same token, by remaining outside, those States are legally, morally and strategically weakening the determination of the international community to get rid of these heinous weapons.

So those challenges remain in terms of disarmament. We also face challenges in terms of non-proliferation. We need to ensure that industry continues to operate in a way that is compatible with the purposes and objectives of the Convention. For that, we need, first of all, to continue to gain the support of and declarations by the member States, and we need to ensure that we, as an organization, remain up to date in our ability to detect and verify eventual violations. That means that OPCW also needs to remain an organization that, for verification, applies state-of-the-art technology and verification mechanisms.

In terms of international cooperation and assistance, we need to ensure that we continue to provide members with the capacities they want. As a result of the emergence of the terrorist threat and chemical terrorism as a concrete possibility, the requirements imposed on OPCW to provide member

States with capacity-building in that area have increased enormously. OPCW is not an antiterrorist organization, and yet the international community, through Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the General Assembly last year, has expectations that OPCW will make its contribution within its area of competence. That is also something that we need to address.

All of those issues will be considered at the second Review Conference, to be held in The Hague in a few months' time. I hope that everyone is committed to making sure that the Conference continues to strengthen OPCW and that nothing will rock the boat in a way that will endanger the ability of the organization to continue its work. Consensus and a dedication to multilateralism have been at the very basis of the success of OPCW. I hope that that same spirit will prevail. It would be good, not just for OPCW, but for the whole world and for peace and security as a whole.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Pfirter for his very passionate statement and his appeal to member States to face up to their responsibilities, whether they are States parties or not. I think his appeal will be heard, at least in this room.

To complement Mr. Pfirter's statement, I now give the floor to Mr. Horst Reeps, Director of Verification in the same organization, to complete the message of the Director-General on the relevant issues.

Mr. Reeps (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons): Because of the limited time available, I would like to dive right in, in medias res, and point out that verification under the regime of the Convention on Chemical Weapons takes place under a multilateral treaty. That is different from, for example, certain disarmament and verification regimes under Security Council resolutions, such as in the case of Iraq.

What are the key verification aims? On the one hand, we must verify the destruction of chemical weapons, and on the other, ensure non-proliferation. Since the Convention is a multilateral treaty, we must also maintain confidence in the fact that all States parties comply with the regulations laid out in the Convention. That, of course enhances, in parallel, security through transparency — we do issue reports on a regular basis, for example — and enhances the

knowledge about global use and trade in those chemicals.

You may naturally ask yourself: what are we going to do and how are we going to do it? First of all, if a State party or a State to become party would like to join the Chemical Weapons Convention, as was the case with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or as will be the case in the near future with Iraq, initial and annual declarations must be submitted. It starts with initial declarations on chemical weapons, past chemical warfare activities and, last but not least, the possession of riot control agents. We also cover, under article VI — and this covers the non-proliferation area — selected portions of the chemical industry on past and anticipated activities, that is, what the industry did in the past year and what it is intending to do next year. Also, we cover the transfer of chemicals from one country to another.

As the Director-General has already pointed out, we have six States parties. The biggest ones are the United States and the Russian Federation. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has not yet begun the destruction of chemical weapons, whereas India, a State party, is in full swing and Albania has recently completed the destruction of its small chemical weapons stockpile. The precise figures are: 35 per cent of the declared total quantity has been thus far destroyed, that is, almost 3 million pieces of munitions and containers out of some 8.5 million. Some 915 inspections related to chemical weapons destruction facilities have been conducted. Some 120,000 inspector days in the field have been invested. That does not come cheap. Eighty-six million kilometres have been flown in the course of those activities. Last but not least, 85 per cent of our inspector resources go towards the verification of chemical weapons destruction.

We are also tasked with taking a look at former chemical weapons production facilities. As you can see, we have 12 States parties that in the past were somehow involved in chemical warfare activities. Those facilities are due to be destroyed or converted. We also have relics from the First and Second World Wars. We still have some 13 States parties with chemical weapons from before 1925 and from 1946, which will be popping up for the next 50 years at least.

Something that gives us a headache regarding the future is the issue of abandoned chemical weapons. The biggest member State in that regard is China,

where in 1945 the imperial Japanese armed forces abandoned significant amounts of chemical weapons.

Verification at a chemical weapons destruction site takes place 24 hours a day, 7 days a week in the course of the life of a facility, once it is operational. We also use cameras, process-control instruments and recording devices in order to make the verification process more effective and economical. That is because, bear in mind, we in the Technical Secretariat are not exactly notaries, but we are the ones guaranteeing our member States that everything is going according to the regulations laid out in the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Storage facilities are inspected on a regular basis, as are destroyed or converted former chemical weapons production facilities.

So far, we have invested almost 140,000 inspector days for all weapons-related activities. Industry verification is the area that we would say is non-proliferation. We have three lists of scheduled chemicals, plus discrete organic chemicals as a fourth category. All of the chemicals that we consider are either chemical warfare agents or direct precursors, or at least could potentially be used for chemical weapons production, so their dual-use character is obvious. We naturally verify through data monitoring, declarations and on-site inspections.

This year and next year we will carry out 200 inspections in chemical industrial facilities. A typical inspection consists of three to five inspectors, working two to five days, so we are quite efficient in terms of using our personnel within a very short time frame for quite a huge task. What is important is that it is a multilateral verification system. That means at the end there will be a final inspection report which contains a section where the inspected State party can comment.

So far, we have some 5,200 inspectable facilities in roughly 73 or 74 member States. We have carried out inspections of almost 1,300 facilities, and roughly 15 per cent of our inspector days went into that activity.

Trade monitoring will become even more important in the future. We will actually monitor the streams of goods, listed chemicals and scheduled chemicals among member States. We are continuing to refine that. We also use an improved verification

information system that alternates a certain number of tasks in order to do more data analysis.

On the subject of current status and future challenges, after 10 years I can say from my side that yes, it was a very successful exercise. The regime, as we improved it over the years — nothing starts out perfectly — proved to be successful. Of course there is a bright side, and there is a side with problems or challenges that require thinking about. The workload will increase in the next three years. Four additional chemical weapons destruction facilities will become operational, which will tap a lot from our resources. We therefore also must look at new approaches to verification, using more instruments and using closed areas or “boxes”. Budgetary constraints are something familiar to all of us. Verification has been expensive and will continue to be so. Last but not least, corporate technical knowledge among the staff of the Verification Division must be maintained. Please bear in mind that they are all highly specialized — possibly industrial chemists, former weapons chemists or former warfare production chemists.

As for conclusions, each and every State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention can use chemistry for peaceful purposes. In the framework of inspections, we are having a look at their compliance, and, vice versa, the member States can demonstrate their compliance. All inspections are joint efforts. Without full cooperation of the member States we would not be as effective and efficient as we are.

The Chemical Weapons Convention mandates the organization to verify compliance in order to prevent violations. No violations have been actually detected.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): Thank you, Mr. Reeps, for your clear and detailed presentation of the very difficult verification work that you supervise. You have done a lot and travelled many kilometres, but you certainly have more challenges to meet within the five years remaining between now and 2012. In order to succeed in that work, as you noted in your relevant call to member States, you rely on their cooperation and collaboration.

I now give the floor to Ms. Annalisa Giannella, Personal Representative for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Council of the European Union.

Ms. Giannella (Council of the European Union) (*spoke in French*): I will take advantage of this opportunity of taking part in the discussions on the Chemical Weapons Convention to present an example of cooperation between the European Union (EU) and another international organization, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) — an example that I think we can consider exemplary. I wish to explain this in detail so that listeners may judge the situation themselves.

(*spoke in English*)

In order to fight the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the EU has adopted a comprehensive and structured approach, which is enshrined in a strategy adopted by the European Council in December 2003. The central principle of this strategy is to support effective multilateralism. The strategy calls, *inter alia*, for strong support for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In particular, under the heading “Rendering multilateralism more effective”, it calls for the release of financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, including the OPCW.

Since the adoption of our WMD strategy, and in addition to the political support for the Chemical Weapons Convention and other multilateral instruments, the European Union has adopted three legal acts in support of OPCW activities. These legal acts, which we call Joint Actions, are a specific instrument of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. They allow the European Union to take action and allocate financial resources to a specific objective. In financial terms, this means €5 million to support OPCW activities, which is channelled through the OPCW Technical Secretariat in The Hague.

The first two Joint Actions focused on the areas of universalization, national implementation and international cooperation. The most recently adopted Joint Action includes new projects in new areas that I will explain later. This targeted action complements the more political and diplomatic action carried out by the EU Presidency and its member States in the form of diplomatic *démarches* to individual countries to convince them to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention and to implement it fully.

In specific terms, the financial support provided by the EU to the OPCW has allowed for the organization of a number of regional seminars for the

promotion of universalization in Africa, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Caribbean regions and the organization of assistance visits by legal experts to promote national implementation to States parties. How do we promote national implementation? We assist States parties in drafting legislation and adopting the necessary measures to comply with the Convention. EU support has allowed for the provision of office equipment to 50 national authorities and some essential analytical equipment to 13 laboratories engaged in the analysis of chemicals under the supervision of national authorities.

The national authorities of the following countries have benefited from EU support for capacity-building projects under the Joint Action of 2006: Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Gabon, Liberia, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Uruguay. Laboratory equipment has been provided under the Joint Action also implemented in 2006 to Bangladesh, Eritrea, Ghana, Peru and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The provision of equipment has been complemented by technical assistance on its use.

Now, let us look at the results achieved. Today, thanks to the relentless efforts of OPCW and its Director-General — and the Committee has just heard the passion with which he promotes the Chemical Weapons Convention — 15 new States have ratified the Convention, bringing the total number of OPCW member States to 182. Only six States have signed but not yet ratified it, and only seven have not signed it. The Chemical Weapons Convention is rapidly approaching universality.

Our most recent Joint Action, adopted earlier this year, takes into account the new circumstances concerning universality and national implementation — as a consequence, among other factors, of the results achieved through the first two Joint Actions. It includes new projects in the areas of preparedness in case of chemical attacks, database development, support for industry outreach activities and support for visits to chemical weapons destruction facilities in possessor States. The new Joint Action will also support bilateral visits to enhance universality, instead of regional seminars, and will continue to finance capacity-building projects for national authorities.

In connection with the tenth anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention and OPCW this year,

that anniversary, we will co-sponsor the OPCW Industry and Protection Forum, to be held in The Hague on 1 and 2 November 2007. That is very important because, of course, the chemical industry must be our partner in our efforts against proliferation.

A project of particular interest is the visits to a destruction facility, which will take place shortly at the Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility, which is also supported financially by the European Union. A similar scheme will be applied to future visits in other possessor States.

I would also like to recall — and these are not projects that we carry out together with OPCW — that we also give financial support to the construction of chemical weapons destruction facilities in Russia, in the context of the G8 Global Partnership.

We believe that our cooperation with OPCW is a genuine example of effective multilateralism. We are very happy about that cooperation and very committed to pursuing it and developing further.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): I thank Ms. Giannella for her statement, which allows us to take stock of what I would call the veritable militancy of the European Union in its foreign and security policy in promoting the Convention on Chemical Weapons, in particular the technical assistance it provides to all States parties, notably those that need it the most.

I now give the floor to Mr. Santiago Oñate Laborde, Legal Adviser in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Mr. Oñate Laborde (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons): My task this afternoon is to underline the progress made in the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction during its first decade.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), as the Committee well knows, is the result of a long and difficult process of negotiations that were conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. It codified a set of principles of international customary law, and it relied on previous efforts intended to put an end to the use of chemical weapons. In order to achieve such a goal, the Convention provides for the complete destruction of all chemical weapons within a fixed

timeline. It also provides for the establishment of a stringent non-proliferation mechanism. All of that is to be carried out under a unique regime of international verification.

As the Convention is a multilateral treaty that has gained a significant degree of universality and is characterized by the banning of an entire type of weapons of mass destruction, its implementation is primarily the responsibility of each member State and is exercised under the supervision and with the assistance of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

With regard to the implementation of the Convention in the area of disarmament, my colleague, Mr. Horst Reeps, has already provided a very clear explanation of what we have been able to achieve.

It is in the area of non-proliferation that we must work with the States parties and ensure that each one of them is able to put into effect, within its territory, the provisions of the Convention. Treaties are intended to be binding. Treaties are more than diplomatic exercises or political statements. Treaties should be executed and carried out in good faith, following the dictum of *pacta sunt servanda*.

The Convention has gained a significant degree of universality. In its first 10 years, OPCW has grown from an organization of 37 States parties to one of 182 States parties. But that growth in the number of States parties must be accompanied by the fulfilment of the obligations of those who are member States. It is there that we have the concrete challenge of implementation. The non-proliferation regime tries to ensure two basic principles.

On the one hand, achievements in the field of chemistry should be used exclusively for the benefit of mankind. The desire to promote the free trade in chemicals and to enhance exchanges of technical and scientific information for purposes not prohibited by the Convention must be developed through a complex system of rights and duties: on the one hand, rights to develop, produce, acquire, transfer and use stocks of chemicals for purposes that are not prohibited; the duty, on the other hand, to adopt the necessary measures that will ensure that toxic chemicals are properly used and to subject them to a regime of international verification. The challenge of implementation of the CWC at the national level has to do, basically, with the introduction of criminal

legislation that establishes prohibitions of conduct that is prohibited to States parties by the Convention.

Secondly, the non-proliferation regime must establish a system of control of transfers and provide for the enforcement of such provisions. That must all be carried out within the framework of cooperation and legal assistance mechanisms. The implementation of legislation for each State party will enable it to identify declarable activities, will establish a system to enable the State party to collect information and request reports from the industry and will enable it to sanction conduct that is in violation of the Convention.

When we talk about the number of States parties and about how the Convention has been implemented in the past, it is necessary to recognize that in 2003, after five years of the Convention being in force, the third review conference had to acknowledge that, at that time, less than one third of the States parties had implemented the Convention at the national level. It was then that the States parties approved an action plan, which came into effect in November 2003, was later reinforced by Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and has been in place for the past five years. What has taken place during those five years through actions such as the ones described by Annalisa Giannella of the European Union — that is to say, through workshops, seminars and capacity-building with the States parties — is presented in the graphic that members have before them. On the one hand, in 2003, out of 154 States parties, only 79 per cent had a national authority in place. That number has been growing significantly, and, as of today, 96 per cent of our States parties have constituted a national authority. In 2003, only 60 per cent of States parties had some form of legislation in place. As of today, 122 States parties, that is to say, 67 per cent, have enacted some type of legislation. What is our goal? It is for States parties to enact comprehensive legislation. The road ahead is still a long one. When we started in 2003, only 33 per cent of States parties had comprehensive legislation. After five years, that figure is 42 per cent.

The Convention requires full and global enforcement in order to be able to ensure the goal of security at both the national and international levels. Until that point is reached — that is, the point at which all the States parties have put in place implementing legislation — the possibility of seeing a recourse or a return to the creation of chemical weapons will, unfortunately, remain open. The common

responsibilities are those of the States parties and those of the organization created by them, which is in charge of providing assistance and support to those efforts.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Santiago Oñate Laborde for his case, which rounds out the statements already made by Mr. Pfitter and Mr. Reeps of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

It is a great pleasure for me to now give the floor to Ms. Liliam Ballon, of the General Division of United Nations and Multilateral Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peru.

Ms. Ballon (Peru): In responding to the kind invitation extended by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, I would like to refer this afternoon to one particular issue related to the Chemical Weapons Convention which is an initiative undertaken by the Latin American countries regarding a chemical weapons regional assistance and protection network. Article X of the Convention on Chemical Weapons states, in paragraph 1:

“For the purposes of this Article, ‘Assistance’ means the coordination and delivery to States Parties of protection against chemical weapons, including, inter alia, the following: detection equipment and alarm systems; protective equipment; decontamination equipment and decontaminants; medical antidotes and treatment; and advice on any of those protective measures.”

I am going to speak, as I stated, on an initiative undertaken in the framework of a meeting on assistance and protection against chemical weapons. The initiative came into being at a meeting held in Lima from 8 to 12 November 2004, organized by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Government of Peru. At that time, Latin American countries decided to request technical assistance from the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean to establish our chemical weapons regional assistance and protection network.

The aim of the network is to strengthen national capacity-building for the protection of civilian populations and the environment in the region vis-à-vis possible casualties caused by chemical weapons, should it be considered that a possible emergency

scenario in the region might necessitate a fast and efficient capacity to respond against chemical weapons. In that regard, the network could be instrumental in providing information with respect to potential emergency procurement and assistance among Latin American and Caribbean countries.

The network is an Internet-based platform which features information and data to facilitate the coordination and delivery, to States parties in the region of protection against chemical weapons, including detection equipment and alarm systems; protection and decontamination equipment; advice and lessons learned; and other related protective measures. In that connection, the network could achieve the following: the creation of a tool for obtaining standardized and automatic information on reporting related to article X of the Chemical Weapons Convention; the creation of a national standardized chemical authority website; the creation of a platform through which to obtain specialized information on related activities of all the countries in the region, including meetings; and the creation of a tool to manage country inventories on assistance and protection.

With regard to the provisional organization and components of the network, the regional network’s Internet-based database, hosted at the United Nations Regional Centre premises in Lima, is currently supported by the following: a help desk; a liaison officer from the OPCW; a liaison officer from the Peruvian Ministry of Defence represented at the National Council for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (CONAPAQ); and a liaison officer from the CONAPAQ technical secretariat.

There are provisions for creating this database, which could be undertaken in two phases. In the first phase, network software development is scheduled. The Regional Centre is currently producing the database, in consultation with CONAPAQ and with OPCW. The software currently resides on the Regional Centre facility’s server. The software itself, which is being developed using Microsoft .NET technology, will require minor maintenance once completed and tested. The second phase, which includes network use and maintenance, will consist of making the network software accessible to all chemical authorities in Latin America and the Caribbean for their use. Prior to that stage, a new server and network maintenance operator must be identified.

Who owns the database? Here, we must distinguish between the software intellectual property, the information on the chemical authority's web page and the information of the chemical weapons regional assistance and protection network. Regarding the software intellectual property, although the software is being developed in response to a request by Latin American and Caribbean countries, to which I referred before, its intellectual property legally remains the property of the United Nations. Note that the Regional Centre would provide a licence for the regional States to use the software in a network environment; source code could also be provided to the entity to be in charge of the maintenance of the network database for future changes if necessary. The information on the chemical authority's web page would be the property of the countries. Finally, the information on the chemical weapons regional assistance and protection network would be the property of the OPCW, since the information is requested to be provided to the OPCW by member States as part of the implementation of article X of the Convention. All of that needs to be assessed for legal purposes and further discussed.

What are the financial implications? The development of the concept phase and test of the prototype is being covered, currently, by the Regional Centre from a contribution made by Sweden as part of seed funding, through which it uses funds to start activities and develop regional concepts for projects and activities while also approaching other donors. The Regional Centre's activities are based on voluntary contributions. That means that no United Nations regular budget funds are used in this project, aside from its participation directly in the project.

The cost of the maintenance of the database in the second phase of the project will basically involve the following. The cost of the database equipment has been calculated at \$25,600. The cost of maintaining the database on a monthly basis has been calculated at \$4,435. Those amounts have been estimated on the basis of the assumption that the network will be based at the Regional Centre headquarters in Lima. In addition to the equipment, security and maintenance costs, the network must be maintained by a software developer, estimated to be hired on a part-time annual basis. A political officer will also be required to act as a help desk, to provide States with substance-related coordination concerning the network. Those costs will vary according to the entity hosting the server.

Confidential information is to be handled in two ways: the chemical authority from the country itself will have access, through its chemical authority web page, to the network through a username and password. All other users will have access through password-protected areas and a network environment where the entire system would have to be behind a firewall system established at the location of the network server.

What planning is required to use the platform of the regional network to enhance submissions by Latin American countries under paragraph 4 of article X of the Convention? That paragraph states:

“For the purposes of increasing the transparency of national programmes related to protective purposes, each State Party shall provide annually to the Technical Secretariat information on its programme, in accordance with procedures to be considered and approved by the Conference.”

Latin American and Caribbean countries should keep their national authority web pages updated, which would allow them to select the assistance and protection items in the national inventory that they would like to include in their annual reports to OPCW. The regional network would therefore provide a platform for Latin American and Caribbean countries to develop their inventory on assistance and protection issues in an orderly and automatic manner.

How many countries have contributed by providing information to the network? Here are some slides referring to how this information is currently managed. For the preparation of the software for this project, the information used has been provided by the national authority of Peru. We will then see how the network will be prepared. On all the pages being displayed on these slides, we can see the information related to country assistance on training, equipment, medical support and staff training.

What are the role and responsibilities of the liaison officials from the Regional Centre, the national Peruvian authority and the OPCW? The project has two phases. The first phase consists of the development of the network software and the completion of the software network test using data provided by Peru. The second phase, which could be coordinated by the OPCW or a national authority in the region, will consist of the use and maintenance of the database.

While the Regional Centre's role was envisaged to be central to the development of the software in the first phase, its involvement in the second phase, and hence in the maintenance of the network, is expected to be limited to assisting States in the organization of activities such as training on the use of the software and activities related to assistance and protection, provided that a project proposal is developed and funding is available.

The following roles have been considered for the first phase. The OPCW would appoint liaison officers, who would act as network liaison officers with the States in the region, provide guidance on technical and legal matters related to the Chemical Weapons Convention and provide information related to the Convention to assist in the development of the network software. In respect to the national authority, the national coordinator would act as the entity in charge of the chemical weapons assistance and protection regional network, ensure the participation in the network of all national authority members and other national entities related to the Convention and ensure the provision of information related to the assistance and protection inventory of the network.

The national network coordinators will oversee the design and adaptation to the network's structure and functionality, ensure the provision of information to the network and ensure the regular updating of information to the network. The United Nations Lima Regional Centre help desk would provide technical support for the development of the concept and the design of the network software, provide the OPCW and the national authorities with functional network software and ensure capacity-building for the maintenance of the software through the proper authorities.

Before ending, I would like to advise members that, as they might be aware, the OPCW is a treaty organization that oversees the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, including in the area of assistance and protection. The United Nations Regional Centre has been asked to support the creation of the network for countries to better organize their information and use it in support of what the OPCW may find useful and opportune in the implementation of article X of the Convention.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): I thank Ms. Liliam Ballon for that presentation and for having

given us a detailed description of an excellent project that will undoubtedly inspire many member States here today.

I now give the floor to Mr. Ralf Trapp, a consultant on chemical and biological weapons arms control and disarmament.

Mr. Trapp: It is a true pleasure to be here and to talk to members and address some of the issues related to the upcoming second review conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The Chemical Weapons Convention is 10 years old, and so is the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Ten years does not sound like a lot in the life of a treaty, or in the life of an organization; it is a short period of time. But a lot can happen in 10 years. The environment within which the Convention operates and in which it is being implemented can change fundamentally. We have seen changes in the security environment. We have seen advances in the underlying science and technology that drives the Convention. We have seen changes in the chemical industry in those 10 years — or 15 years, if you count back to the signing of the Convention.

That was foreseen by the drafters of the Convention and that is why they built a number of mechanisms into the treaty regime that could be used to adapt the treaty to changes in circumstances. There are amendment procedures, including simplified amendments for technical and administrative changes. There is the possibility of taking decisions at the level of the Conference of the States Parties or the Executive Council. Every five years, there is the review conference. That is an opportunity for a more systematic review.

There are people who ask why we need a review conference when we have a standing treaty organization. The first review conference has shown that it is an opportunity for a systematic review of the whole operation, of getting some distance from the process and looking at it in a broader context. The second Review Conference is now coming up. It will be held in The Hague from 7 to 18 April 2008, and it will be another opportunity to do just that.

It is perhaps important to realize that this is the last review conference before the 2012 deadline, so it comes at an important juncture for the organization and for the OPCW member States. The review process in

the OPCW is similar to what people are familiar with in the case of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or the Bacteriological Weapons Convention. Having a standing organization that implements the treaty makes it easier, in a sense. The existing standing mechanisms within the organization can be used to prepare for the review. Indeed, many of the substantive discussions that would normally be expected to only take place at the review conference itself can be prepared by very deep substantive work in the run-up to the conference. That work has started within the OPCW in an open-ended working group, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Lyn Parker from the United Kingdom, supported by a Bureau which represents all the various regional groups and which ensures that the process is fully inclusive and that all the issues that need to be covered are in fact covered. The group has been working since July 2006 and in the spring of this year started to address substantive issues. They have covered a whole range of issues, starting with the universality of the Convention, through national implementation, chemical weapons destruction, verification issues including in industry, national implementation measures, international cooperation and assistance and the functioning of the organization. It is the whole package that needs to be reviewed.

The Scientific Advisory Board of the OPCW has also provided its input to that process. It has prepared a first provisional report and submitted it to member States for their benefit and for their work in preparation for the review conference. A final full report by the Scientific Advisory Board will then be submitted to the second Review Conference itself.

But the process is not just a review process by the States parties. Of course, because they are the key stakeholders, the parties are the ones that drive the review. But there are other stakeholders involved, and they are also taking part in the process. Allow me to start with the chemical industry.

The chemical industry has always been a close partner in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. In fact, they were a partner in the design of the treaty itself. The chemical industry is changing. It is, so to speak, on the move. Chemical production is now taking place in places where, 10 or 15 years ago, there was no chemical industry. We have seen the migration of chemical production from the traditional locations in North America, Western Europe

and Japan into other regions: Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe and, to some extent, Africa. That is an important factor. It will change the world map of chemical production and chemical manufacturing. It will involve a whole variety of countries that have no past experience in regulating the chemical industry and that will need to adapt to changing circumstances. It is a challenge for the OPCW with regard to national implementation and supporting countries to ensure that their national implementation systems are actually up to the task. It also increases the complexity of the work in the OPCW Verification Division with the changing pattern of and increase in the trade in chemicals.

The industry itself is part of that process. The industry has developed its own voluntary measures to implement the Convention, comply with regulations and ensure that the objectives of the Convention can be met. The interaction between the industry and the OPCW — through, for example, the Responsible Care programme — is an important factor in ensuring that there is worldwide compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The industry is also directly involved. A meeting was held in June with the chemical industry and the working group for the preparation of the second Review Conference. The upcoming Industry and Protection Forum, to be held in November 2007, which was already mentioned, will be another opportunity to address those issues and to make sure that the views of the industry are in fact part of the process.

There is another aspect, and it is broader than just the chemical industry: the changes that have been seen in the past years in science and technology. One of the specific requirements of the Convention is that the review conference address the impact of those advances in science and technology. We truly have seen a revolution in the life sciences. We have seen a whole range of developments and advances that create new scientific and technological potential that is relevant to the Convention implementation process, both in terms of the possible emergence of new chemicals that may be relevant and in terms of the industry and the technology that we are looking at from the verification perspective. But of course, that also brings opportunities in the form of new technologies that can be used to those ends.

There is a feature that is unique to the OPCW and that has evolved over the past years: the OPCW has

developed a partnership with the international science union that is active in that sphere, the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC). IUPAC has been active in supporting the review process. It conducted, this past April, a workshop in Zagreb, Croatia, at which it analysed advances in science and technology and how they affect the treaty implementation. One of the key results that came out of those discussions is that we are seeing increasing crossover between chemistry and biology — between chemistry and the life sciences — which changes some of the underlying assumptions that we had when the Convention was designed. We need to come to grips with what that means for the future. I do not think that we have the answers at this stage, but it is an issue that needs to be carefully studied and reviewed.

We understand the traditional world of chemical warfare agents and precursor chemicals as they are set out in the schedules. That very much defines the way in which verification is done these days. But we also know that other advances are taking place in this rather nebulous category, which Horst Reeps described, “other chemical production facilities”, a not very well defined class of organic chemistry. That is where those developments take place. We need to think about how verification can react to those trends and what the options are. In fact, it is not just verification: it is also a question of how national implementation will react.

Of course, the Convention itself has its answers to these issues, in the form of definitions of chemical weapons and of how it requires States to implement the Convention, the so-called general purpose criteria, which links the terms “chemical weapons” and “precursors” to the intent. But that is an abstract concept. It is not easy to implement, and we need to think again about what it actually means for the practical application of the Convention and how it relates to the other aspects of implementation.

Issues that we need to come to grips with in the process of preparing for the review conference include these. What is the future role of the schedules and do we need to take any action on the schedules in the Chemical Weapons Convention or not? What will the chemical industry look like in five or 10 years’ time? How do we deal with the emerging broader applications of biotechnology and biological principles in that industry, and what does that mean for the way in which the Convention is being implemented? What expertise must the OPCW acquire to be able to verify

effectively in this context? Also — and this is perhaps more for an audience such as this one — what will be the future relationship between the chemical weapons regime and the biological weapons regime? If there truly is a crossover between chemistry and biology, what does it mean for the international treaties and the regime that we apply?

Let me say one more word on the relationship that we have seen evolving between the OPCW and IUPAC. One of the things that became clear was that the scientific community itself has a role to play. It must look at its own responsibilities in this field. If we look back to the first review conference, it noted that a valuable aspect of national implementation lay in ensuring that the chemical industry, the scientific and technological communities, the armed forces of the States parties and the public at large were knowledgeable about the prohibitions and requirements of the Convention. That is a field in which we need to take action. IUPAC has, in fact, started working on it, in the form of both educational projects and an attempt to develop codes of conduct.

I should come to an end here — I see the red light, and I apologize for running overtime. As I said at the beginning, we are at an important juncture for the OPCW. The second Review Conference is an important step in coming to a common understanding of what the future of the OPCW and the Chemical Weapons Convention will be. As we are coming to the end of disarmament mandates in 2012, we are approaching an almost chemical-weapons-free world, we hope. We need to address what comes next. What is the function of an OPCW in this world? We need a common goal and a common sense of the direction to take from here in the areas of non-proliferation and international cooperation.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Ralf Trapp for his presentation. His statement, in particular, looked towards the future and made us face the challenges of the future in order to take a look at the measures that should be adopted after the 2012 deadline. I think that he gave us food for thought, which all member States should consider as we face our common future, hoping that our world will finally be free from chemical weapons. Above all, this issue must be mastered, as it will define our common future.

We have now heard all of the panellists’ statements. I will now suspend the official meeting, so

that we can move straightaway into an informal question and answer session.

The meeting was suspended at 4.45 p.m. and resumed at 5.30 p.m.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): I would like to thank our panellists for their excellent statements and ideas, and for the perspective they have provided. I thank them for their participation.

Mr. Pereira Gomes (Portugal): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and the countries that align themselves with this statement.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery remains a growing threat to international peace and security which requires a global approach. Moreover, the risk that terrorists may acquire chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery has added a new critical dimension to that threat. Appropriate cooperation with the United Nations and other international organizations and regimes, as well as among all States, will assist in ensuring a successful outcome to the global fight against proliferation.

The European Security Strategy and the European Union (EU) Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, both adopted by the European Council in 2003, made clear that the EU does not ignore those dangers. The adoption of those documents has underscored our common goal to use all instruments and policies at our disposal to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of concern worldwide. We are also committed to implementing our Common Position of 17 November 2003 on the universalization and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

The commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation of biological, toxin and chemical weapons is the necessary foundation from which we can exploit the potential of science and technological development for peaceful purposes. That requires us to manage the risks associated with the inherent dual-use nature of biological or chemical agents, materials, equipment and knowledge. The management of those risks in the complex world of today requires a multifaceted approach.

The multilateral instruments adopted in the field of weapons of mass destruction — namely, the Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol — play an essential role in countering the proliferation threat. Together with other key multilateral agreements, they provide a basis for the international community's disarmament and non-proliferation efforts and decisively contribute to international confidence, stability and peace, including the fight against terrorism. The EU urges all States that have not yet adhered to those important instruments to do so without further delay and to fully implement the obligations established therein. The EU also calls on those that are not yet party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to adhere to it, and on all States Parties to lift their remaining reservations to that topical instrument at the crossroads of humanitarian demands and disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.

The EU will continue to provide assistance, when requested, to other countries in the fulfilment of their obligations under multilateral conventions and regimes.

At the United Nations level, the EU supports the work carried out by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Council resolution 1540 (2004) in outreach to those regions where the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is most urgent. We continue to be available to provide assistance, in particular in building legal and administrative infrastructure, sharing our experience of implementation and training the respective national authorities. In our view, resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006) are fundamental for the development of an effective mechanism to prevent and counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of production and delivery to or from States and non-State actors worldwide. We urge all countries to fully implement those legally binding resolutions. The EU remains committed to the Group of Eight Global Partnership initiative and underlines its relevance for WMD disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

The EU welcomes the successful outcome of the sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), held in Geneva in November and December 2006, as reflected in its final document. The Conference reaffirmed the importance of the BTWC as a normative and legal cornerstone and core multilateral agreement

in the disarmament and non-proliferation framework. We all now have the responsibility to implement the decisions contained in the final document, at the national, regional and international levels.

Given the rate of scientific and technological change in areas relevant to the Convention, coupled with the potential threat posed by bioterrorism, the need for the international community to discuss and promote common understandings and to take effective action to strengthen and further implement the BTWC is all the greater. The European Union remains committed to the development, in the longer term, of measures to verify compliance with the Convention.

The adoption of a new inter-sessional work programme, leading to the seventh Review Conference not later than 2011, is a significant achievement. We are sure that the inter-sessional work will contribute to the effective implementation and strengthening of the Convention.

The EU welcomes the establishment of the Implementation Support Unit for the BTWC within the Office for Disarmament Affairs. We note with satisfaction that the Unit is already performing its tasks. The European Union also welcomes the decisions taken at the sixth Review Conference aimed at facilitating States parties' access to information exchanged in the framework of confidence-building measures within the Convention.

The protection of populations is another important challenge. The European Union is also active in that field. The European Commission adopted in July a "green paper" on bio-preparedness, with a view to launching a process of consultation at the European Union level on how to reduce biological risks and enhance preparedness and response capabilities.

The EU is taking practical measures to support the universalization and effective implementation of the BTWC. That was accomplished through a Joint Action adopted last year, which intends to promote two major objectives: first, to increase the membership of the BTWC; and secondly, to assist States parties to transpose their obligations into appropriate national legislation and administrative measures. We urge all States to adhere to the BTWC.

The EU has also adopted an action plan with the purpose of promoting the increased effectiveness of the Secretary-General's mechanism for investigating cases

of alleged use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons by contributing to the update of the list of experts and laboratories. We agreed, in the same action plan, to revitalize interest in and use of BTWC confidence-building measures in ensuring the annual submissions of returns by all EU member States. The EU strongly urges all States parties to the Convention to further enhance transparency through the annual submission of confidence-building measure returns.

This year, we commemorate the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Convention is a unique disarmament and non-proliferation treaty, and its integrity and strict application must be fully guaranteed. Its uniqueness arises from the fact that it is the only convention to ban completely and without exception an entire category of weapons of mass destruction and to require the destruction of all existing weapons and stockpiles under international verification and within specified deadlines. In this light, we welcome the high-level meeting held on 27 September 2007, which underlined the importance we attach to the objectives and purposes of the CWC and our commitment to the multilateral treaty system. We recognize that the CWC has come close to universal membership, with an increase of States parties from 88 to 182 in the last decade, and we therefore call on those States that have not yet adhered to this important multilateral instrument to do so without further delay.

The EU takes this opportunity, once more, to congratulate the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its remarkable success in the effective discharge of the functions entrusted to it under the terms of the Convention. In this respect, the EU considers the OPCW to be an inspiring example of effective multilateralism in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament.

We are looking forward to contributing to the successful outcome of the second Review Conference of the CWC, to be held in 2008, and are willing to continue to work for the achievement of all the Convention's objectives in the coming years with a view to further strengthening the CWC disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

The EU attaches great importance to the full and effective implementation of the Convention, to the comprehensive nature of the prohibition of chemical weapons and to the obligation to destroy existing

stockpiles as well as production capacities within the agreed time limits and under systematic verification according to articles IV and V of the Convention. The destruction of existing stocks and the prevention of future development, production or stockpiling of chemical weapons represent not only a multilateral commitment, but also a contribution to the fight against terrorism. To achieve these objectives, we believe that further strengthening of the verification regime under article VI is required. Furthermore, we encourage States parties to make full use of the provisions on consultations, cooperation and fact-finding, including the challenge inspection mechanism, wherever required, as stipulated in article IX of the Convention.

Through its successive Joint Actions in support of the OPCW, the EU has supported the objectives of the Convention, in particular by assisting in and promoting chemical weapons destruction, universality, national implementation and international cooperation. The EU urges States parties which have not yet provided information about the designation of their national authorities or about the steps taken to enact legislation to do so as a matter of urgency. The EU also believes that effective implementation of the Convention's industry verification regime is instrumental in further enhancing confidence in the non-proliferation of chemical weapons.

The problem of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction needs to be properly addressed. Missile proliferation puts at risk the security of our States and our peoples. We view with growing concern the development of ballistic programmes by several countries. The missile tests conducted last year by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are cases condemned by Security Council resolutions. The Iranian missile programme also gives reason for deep concern.

The EU believes that The Hague Code of Conduct constitutes the most concrete initiative in the fight against the proliferation of ballistic missiles and a fundamental step in addressing the problem of missile proliferation. One hundred twenty-six States have subscribed to the Code, and the EU urges all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Code as soon as possible. It nearly goes without saying that the authority and effectiveness of the Code depends not only on the sheer number of its subscribing States but also on our determination to remain committed to implementing the Code, inter alia, by the submission of

pre-launch notifications and of the annual declarations. We take this opportunity to urge all subscribing States to do so. We stress that continued disregard for obligations accepted upon subscribing to The Hague Code threatens the functioning, and thus the viability, of the Code as a whole.

This year marks the fortieth anniversary of the signature and entry into force of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, generally known as the Outer Space Treaty, which declares the use of outer space to be the province of all mankind and thus not subject to claims of national sovereignty.

The EU recognizes the growing involvement of the international community in outer space activities for development and progress and the increasing dependence by States on outer space for their economic and industrial development, as well as their security. In this context we are very concerned about a test of an anti-satellite weapon early this year and the amount of dangerous space debris caused by it. Space activities should be conducted in a peaceful environment. The more the international community is dependent on outer space for its economic and scientific development and security, the more important it is to ensure that space is a safe and secure environment.

The EU recognizes the need for the development and implementation of confidence-building measures to strengthen transparency, confidence and security in the peaceful uses of outer space. The EU unanimously voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 61/75, entitled "Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities", and resolution 61/58, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", and the European Union recently forwarded its joint reply to resolution 61/75, which contains concrete proposals in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation on space issues. The almost universal support for those resolutions clearly shows a willingness to develop confidence-building measures, based on the principle of non-interference with non-aggressive activities in space, and to draw up a code of conduct and rules of behaviour in space.

We continue to attach importance to consideration in the Conference on Disarmament of the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

and we look forward to the technical work carried out by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, including on space debris and the proposed agenda item on preservation of the space environment, which contributes to space security and will be relevant to the Conference's deliberations. Complementarity between the work in the Conference on Disarmament and the Outer Space Committee, as well as communication between those two bodies, will be essential to ensure a coherent approach and avoid duplication of efforts.

Mr. Streuli (Switzerland) (*spoke in French*): Members of the French-speaking community, I beg leave, as an exception, to make my statement in English.

(*spoke in English*)

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is celebrating its tenth anniversary this year. A number of events have taken place commemorating the entry into force of the Convention 10 years ago, in The Hague, in New York, in Geneva and, in fact, in many other locations around the world. Let me repeat Switzerland's full endorsement of the statement adopted at the high-level meeting on the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, held in New York at the end of September 2007.

A lot has been achieved in the past 10 years, but a lot remains to be done. There are at present 182 States parties to the Convention; we are thus only a few steps away from universality. Switzerland would like to warmly welcome Iraq's intention to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention in the near future. Let me nonetheless reiterate my country's call to the States that have not yet done so to sign or ratify the Convention as soon as possible.

In the eyes of my country, the destruction of chemical weapons arsenals remains one of the priorities of the Convention. Switzerland has been, and still is, providing financial support to the Albanian and Russian authorities to assist them with the destruction of their chemical weapons arsenals within the deadlines set by the Convention and as extended by the Conference of States Parties. We would like to congratulate Albania on having completed its destruction programme in the summer of 2007, thus becoming the first possessor State to have done so.

The destruction process is advancing indeed. At the same time, we are also nearing the deadlines fixed in the Convention and extended by the Conference of States Parties. Switzerland appeals to all States possessing chemical weapons to keep up their efforts to meet the extended deadlines that have been agreed upon. This is paramount not only for the credibility of the Convention, but also for global security.

In its general statement, Switzerland alluded to the positive outcome of the sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, held under the able presidency of Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan. Such progress is crucial if we want to ensure a world safe from biological and toxin weapons. It is particularly positive that the sixth Review Conference managed to adopt a final document of substance, which has paved the way for constructive talks during the inter-sessional process.

The direction in which our efforts should be heading is clear. First, it is crucial to achieve universal adherence to the Convention. Switzerland therefore calls on all States that have not yet signed or ratified the Convention to do so as soon as possible.

Secondly, States parties have to strive to further strengthen the provisions of the Convention. To date, the yearly submissions on confidence-building measures remain the only transparency mechanism within the Convention. Thus they play a significant role in providing States parties with information concerning compliance. As one of my country's contributions regarding this issue, Switzerland has, in collaboration with experts from civil society, carried out a study on how the data for submissions on confidence-building measures is collected in different States parties. Switzerland considers such substantive contributions necessary for a thorough review of these mechanisms in 2011 and for the much-needed strengthening of the system related to confidence-building measures.

Efforts of this nature are crucial if we want to ensure a world safe from biological and toxin weapons. The biological sciences are developing rapidly, and this is, of course, very positive, per se. Nonetheless, it is the task of the States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention to ensure that these scientific and technological advances are used for peaceful, not destructive purposes.

Mr. Larson (United States of America): I will try to be brief, in view of the lateness of the hour on a Friday afternoon. Our delegation wishes to highlight the important work being done to combat other, non-nuclear, weapons of mass destruction, namely chemical and biological weapons. We are pleased to join others in noting the tenth anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an important landmark in the field of disarmament. The United States believes that we must build on the success of that Convention by promoting and strengthening compliance with it and with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and in seeking their universal application.

Chemical and biological weapons represent a continuing threat to the international community. The United States has a clear history of seeking strong multilateral action to prevent the proliferation of these weapons and commits itself to working with the United Nations and the international community to achieve this goal.

The Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention are the foundations for global efforts to rid the world of these horrific weapons. Fundamental to their success is the full and effective compliance with them by all States parties.

It is terrifying to consider the possibility of biological or chemical weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. The international community must continue to take a strong and active stand against that risk. The United States is a strong supporter of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which puts binding obligations on all States Members of the United Nations under Chapter VII of the Charter to take and enforce effective measures against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their means of delivery and related materials. Council resolution 1540 (2004), if fully implemented, can help ensure that no State or non-State actor is a source of WMD proliferation.

As with all treaties, the most important factor is how well they are enforced and how countries are complying with their obligations. Unfortunately, not all parties are yet implementing the Conventions as thoroughly as required, and we urge all to do their best in this regard. Effective implementation requires a number of things, including strong legislation and regulations that are well written and conscientiously

executed, consistent enforcement and, above all else, political will. Implementation and compliance at national levels are crucial because that is where steps are taken to prevent proliferation and deny terrorists access to these terrible weapons. Effective implementation can also help ensure that materials, technologies and expertise that could help terrorists to create and use chemical weapons do not fall into the wrong hands.

The United States considers the 2006 Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention to have been an unqualified success. It reaffirmed the critical international norm condemning the use of biology as a weapon and underscored the need for all States to remain vigilant in combating all biological weapons threats. The accomplishments have been significant, and they bode well for the future. States parties established a clear work programme with practical topics for discussion from 2007 to 2010. For the first time in 10 years, the States parties completed a full, comprehensive article-by-article review of the Convention and its operations. An Implementation Support Unit was established to provide administrative support to States parties in carrying out their work. The implementation of the confidence-building measures process was reviewed, and States parties agreed to steps that will facilitate such measures being submitted by more States parties. And States parties also called on all States not party to the Convention to accede to it with an eye towards the universality of the Convention by the next review conference, in 2011.

There is still work to be done, especially in fighting non-compliance. In this regard, the United States, first, calls upon all CWC and BWC parties and signatories that have not done so to terminate their offensive chemical and biological weapons programmes immediately and to comply fully with their treaty obligations; secondly, requests States parties to submit BWC confidence-building measures declarations to increase transparency and to demonstrate their commitment to the Convention; and thirdly, calls upon States parties to develop, on a national basis, more rigorous methodologies for assessing and detecting non-compliance, as there is simply no catch-all method for verification that is appropriate for every treaty regime.

The United States is encouraged by the progress that has been made in the context of the Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions. But

there is more work to be done. The United States will remain vigilant against the threat of chemical and biological weapons use and will continue to work to see that these Conventions are effective in helping rid the world of these weapons.

The Chairperson (*spoke in French*): I congratulate the representative of the United States on having been so concise.

Mr. Park Hee-kwon (Republic of Korea): I will try to be as brief as possible. As many previous speakers have already pointed out, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) has served the international community well as a primary multilateral instrument for the enhancement of international peace and security. My delegation welcomes the recent statement adopted at the high-level meeting on the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the CWC, held on 27 September in this conference room. The anniversary was an occasion to highlight the remarkable achievements of that first decade. In only 10 years, membership of the Convention has reached 182 nations, encompassing 98 per cent of humanity.

However, near-universality is not universality. There have been no significant developments in the status of those States that are not parties and whose non-adherence to the Convention is a cause for serious concern. The uphill struggle to convince those countries of the merits and benefits of the Convention will require painstaking work. We need to deliver a strong message encouraging non-States parties to join the rest of the world, in the conviction that we can and must achieve a world free of chemical weapons.

My delegation takes this opportunity to stress the importance that the Republic of Korea attaches to the achievement of universal adherence to the CWC. My Government has actively promoted universal adherence in various ways, including providing recommendations on ensuring universality that were adopted at previous Conferences of the States Parties.

A primary obligation under the Convention is the destruction of chemical weapons in an irreversible, verifiable and timely manner. For each State party, steady progress towards the total elimination of chemical weapons and their means of production will be a demonstration of an unflinching dedication to reach the goal of the Convention.

In that regard, my delegation welcomes the completion by Albania of the destruction of its chemical weapons. We commend the efforts and the dedication of the Government of Albania in overcoming every challenge and difficulty to become the first possessor State to rid itself of chemical weapons. That is an exemplary achievement and one that we hope will soon be matched by many more possessor States, including the Republic of Korea.

In the light of the looming danger of chemical terrorism, my delegation also highlights the importance of enhancing the effectiveness of chemical-industry verification. Such verification can underpin and strengthen not only the Convention, but also the integrity and viability of the global non-proliferation regime. Scientific and technological developments in the chemical industry make it clear that serious risks could lie ahead. My delegation hopes that the upcoming second Review Conference will provide an opportunity to assess and address the current challenges, laying a solid foundation for ensuring full implementation and enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention.

Allow me to now turn to the Biological Weapons Convention. The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters rightly pointed out in its recent report (see A/62/309) the importance of tackling the issue of new weapons technology, including biotechnology. We agree that advances in biotechnology and the life sciences and their widespread availability increase the risk that proliferators, State or non-State, might take advantage of loopholes associated with the inherent dual-use nature of biological agents and toxins.

Those developments require a multifaceted response within the multilateral regime. The Biological Weapons Convention remains the fundamental legal and normative foundation for our collective endeavour to prohibit and prevent the use of biological and biotoxic weapons while ensuring the benefits of the peaceful uses of biotechnology. We believe that its Review Conferences are the right forum for taking stock of the implementation of the Convention.

The sixth Review Conference, held in 2006, is generally considered to have met the objectives set for it and to have provided a solid basis for further strengthening the Convention. Although the States parties failed to agree on an action plan for comprehensive implementation, a final declaration was

adopted for the first time in 10 years. Furthermore, the States parties agreed on a series of measures that would make the Convention more robust, including the establishment of an Implementation Support Unit, the continuation of the inter-sessional work programme and the adoption of the universalization action plan. It is our belief that such decisions clearly demonstrate the willingness of the international community to step up the implementation of the Convention.

We would like to express our satisfaction that the Implementation Support Unit has accomplished most of its mandated tasks in just a few short months. Furthermore, the meeting of experts held in August 2007 provided States parties with a good opportunity to share their experiences and learn from others, especially on national implementation of the Convention. It is our hope that the Unit will play an active role in promoting the universality and implementation of the Convention while further deepening cooperation among States parties.

I take this opportunity to reaffirm my Government's unwavering commitment to the Biological Weapons Convention. Last year, the Republic of Korea enacted a new implementation law, namely, the Act on the Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons and the Control of the Production, Export and Import of Specific Chemicals and Biological Agents. That new law is a revision of our Chemical Weapons Prohibition Act and is now fully operational, serving as a consolidated framework for various regulations already in place for the prohibition and control of biological weapons, agents and toxins. The successful implementation of the BWC in the Republic of Korea has demonstrated that we can faithfully abide by the principles of the Convention without undermining the development of the biotechnology industry.

Allow me to conclude by expressing my sincere hope that all States parties will be encouraged to put extra effort into the development of action plans to further promote universal adherence and national implementation of the Convention.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.