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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1826)	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
The situation in Namibia	1

NOTE

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Documents of the Security Council (symbol **S/ . . .**) are normally published in quarterly **Supplements** of the **Official Records of the Security Council**. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

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1826th MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 4 June 1975, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Abdul Karim AL-SHAIKHLI (Iraq).

Present: The representatives of the following States; Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Guyana, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Mauritania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1826)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Namibia

The meeting was called to order at 3.45 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions taken by the Security Council at its 1823rd to 1825th meetings, I shall now invite the representatives of Burundi, Dahomey, Ghana, India, Liberia, Nigeria, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, United Arab Emirates, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the sides of the Council chamber in order that they may participate in the current discussion without the right to vote. When any one of them wishes to address the Council, he will of course be invited to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mikanagu (Burundi), Mr. Adjibadé (Dahomey), Mr. Boaten (Ghana), Mr. Jaipal (India), Mr. Dennis (Liberia), Mr. Arikpo (Nigeria), Mr. Datcu (Romania), Mr. Djigo (Senegal), Mr. Blyden (Sierra Leone), Mr. Hussein (Somalia), Mr. Humaidan (United Arab Emirates), Mr. Petrić (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Mwaanga (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with a further decision taken at the 18231-d meeting, I now invite the President and the delegation of the United Nations Council for Namibia to take places at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Banda (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the members of the delegation took places at the Security Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Bulgaria, Cuba, the German Democratic Republic and Pakistan requesting to be invited to participate in the discussion in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure. Pursuant to the usual practice I propose, if I hear no objection, to invite the representatives I have just mentioned to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. Owing to the limited number of places at the Council table, I regret that I must invite the aforementioned representatives also to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber. I shall invite them to be seated at the Council table whenever they wish to address the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Grozev (Bulgaria), Mr. Alarcón (Cuba), Mr. Neugebauer (German Democratic Republic) and Mr. Matin (Pakistan) took places at the side of the Council chamber.

4. The PRESIDENT: The first speaker is the representative of Sierra Leone, and I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

5. Mr. BLYDEN (Sierra Leone): I should like first of all, Mr. President, to associate myself with the felicitations which have been extended to you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the current month. I feel that you are a fortunate choice at a time when we are discussing once again a question related to the mandate and trusteeship systems, because of the distinguished role which your predecessor, the representative of Iraq, played at the first part of the first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, held in London from 10 January to 14 February 1946, when he took a strong position as to the nature of South Africa's Mandate in relation to South West Africa, now called Namibia. We feel ourselves unduly fortunate at having you as our President for this very interesting debate.

6. Permit me further to pay a tribute to the outgoing President of the Council, the representative of Guyana, for the able and distinguished manner in which he

conducted the business of the Council during the month of May. Our special thanks go also to Mr. **Ramphal**, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Guyana, who, from his vast and intimate knowledge of the subject under review, took the time and trouble to participate in this series of meetings of the Council.

7. Turning now to the subject of our debate, permit me, Mr. President, to state, once again, the clear, unequivocal and unyielding position of my Government, by inviting the attention of members of the Council to certain pertinent observations which were made by my Minister for Foreign **Affairs** in the course of his statement at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly. He said:

“**The** Namibian issue is a direct test of the efficacy of the United Nations. No Member State, therefore, can treat it with indifference without betraying the principles that give this Organization its meaning.”*

Continuing in another context, my Minister observed during the twenty-eighth session:

“**In** Namibia, history appears to have stood still or to be moving backwards. It is deeply regretted that in spite of the decision and the subsequent actions of this body to assume the administration of that Territory and free its inhabitants from the clutches of the South African Government, we are witnessing instead the dismemberment of Namibia into homelands in preparation for the wholesale importation of *apartheid*.”*

8. The Namibian question or situation, formerly known as the “South West African Mandate question”, remains the oldest and still the longest surviving issue on the agenda of the United Nations, having been there ever since 1946. Indeed, alone among the items which featured indirectly, and prominently on the agenda of the first session of the United Nations General Assembly at its unveiling in London in January 1946, the South African question and the South West African question has remained a permanent fixture, so to speak, on the agenda of the General Assembly ever since. It is of some incidental interest that South Africa, the party of the second part in the South West Africa (Namibia) question, not only was a Charter Member of the United Nations, but was one of the first seven Vice-Presidents of the Organization and automatically became a member of the original General Committee, the nerve centre of any **organization**. Yet it is this Charter Member, one of its first Vice Presidents, that has chosen for 30 years to flout the authority of its own creature. The significance of this seemingly trivial, if not indeed irrelevant, foot-note to history can only be properly assessed against the background of South Africa’s recalcitrance as a Member of the Organization during these **first** 30 years. **It** is equally pertinent to note, *en passant*, that alone among the Mandatory Powers of the day, South Africa failed to submit a draft trusteeship agreement as called

for by the General Assembly. Thus, when the other eight trusteeship agreements were approved during the first session of the Assembly, that for South West Africa was not one of them. And when during the second part of the first session nearly a year later, in December 1946, South Africa, a Vice-President and General Committee member, as we have already noted, chose to make a submission on the South African Mandate, it was clear that its primary, if not, indeed, its sole interest in the then proposed Trusteeship System, appeared to be no more than the absorption or amalgamation of South West Africa, as it was then known, as an integral part of its own territory, the Union of South Africa.

9. It must come as no surprise to the representatives assembled here today, some 30 years later, to learn from the Fourth Committee’s reports covering that early period that a number of delegations questioned the validity of the referendum conducted by South Africa in South West Africa, on the grounds that it had not been possible to consult the people of the Territory by democratic methods. It is a sad commentary on the credibility of our sister State, the great Union of South Africa, that 30 years later similar doubts continue to exist regarding its intentions in the matter of holding and conducting fair and free elections in Namibia.

10. In retrospect, it would seem that a suggestion put forward by one of the participating delegations, Poland, in those early trusteeship discussions, did not carry, and hence today we are still left with the legacy of South Africa’s distasteful manners in its dealings with the rest of the international community. The Polish delegation had expressed the view, during that first session of the General Assembly in 1946 on trusteeship, that the only way to terminate a mandate was to grant independence to a mandated Territory.

11. Notwithstanding the expressions of goodwill and sympathetic understanding manifested towards South Africa even in the midst of its recalcitrance and obstreperous behaviour throughout those early years, the South African Government reserved its position on the resolution (with regard to a Trusteeship Agreement for South West Africa) as the Administering Authority and also on behalf of the peoples of South West Africa.

12. On the same issue—the proper method for terminating a mandate—a group of five other States that were busy working to have the question of Palestine included on the agenda of the first special session of the General Assembly in April 1947, called to consider the Palestine question, also employed the concept of the legal termination of a mandate being synonymous with accession to sovereign independence on the part of the Mandate terminated.

13. If I have gone back in time to the early days of the South Africa/South West Africa Trusteeship

question in the United Nations, it is merely to point up the nature and character of one of the parties to the subject of our present debate, in the hope that the Council, in 1975, may derive some flash of insight into possible new approaches whereby it can best hold this tiger of the international community at bay.

14. In the light of the foregoing brief excursion into the dim and ugly past of South Africa, our prestigious but regrettably unresponsive and unscrupulous **client-State**, whose dealings with the United Nations have been rooted in patterns of conduct which fall far short of the expectations of reasonable men, it is still the view of my delegation that this series of meetings of the Security Council should address itself directly and speedily to the task of re-establishing direct communication and contact with the Namibian peoples, as we have done in the past, through their **recognized** and acknowledged leaders, namely the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). Precedent for this action is not lacking. The argument advanced in certain quarters that recognition of SWAPO and direct dealings with it would provide a facile excuse for South Africa to shout "wolf" and claim that the international community was inflicting a future one-party State system upon the Namibian people, is rather far-fetched, as we see it.

15. It cannot be denied that two of the most prominent and powerful former colonial Powers of our times, namely Great Britain and France, with great respect, have both bequeathed to the science of politics, **government** and public administration a legacy which has among its attributes that which dictates--or is it "legislates"?--that a colonial or ruling Power must never abdicate its alleged or assumed "moral" responsibility for the "governance" of so-called backward or under-developed, now more graciously styled, developing countries, and leave a vacuum behind. It is to the credit of those two former colonial, former Mandatory Powers that, unlike South Africa in present **circumstances**, both Powers were "leisurely quick" to agree with their adversaries and negotiate with erstwhile, supposedly revolutionary, one time hostile political-nationalist organizations, and this as the prelude to independence, as indeed it turned out. In addition, both colonial Powers used this as a guarantee of some measure of stability in the first months of independence of any of their former colonies.

16. The balance sheet in every such successful exercise of negotiation with a nationalist organization will undoubtedly reveal that at the end of the exercise the former "trustee" or "guardian" and the former "ward" continue to maintain a relationship of cordiality and non-compulsory politeness where, formerly, only attitudes of acrimony and resentment, if not outright hostility and venom, would have prevailed.

17. The very sweet and touching hint dropped here in this chamber by the representative of one of such Powers during the current debate did not go unnoticed by some of us. South Africa will do itself some service by taking note of the gentle hint proffered to it by the friendly State of the Republic of France.

18. Having painted the preceding broad sweep of the perspectives of my delegation at this juncture of the South Africa-Namibia debate after 30 years, let me quickly fill in some of the eyelets in the design of the tapestry that constitutes the Namibian question or situation, as we see it.

19. After an estimated 79 General Assembly resolutions on Namibia during the first 22 years of the history of the United Nations—1946-1968—the Security Council began its own rendez-vous with the issue of Namibia, piling up its own equally impressive array of resolutions, the fates of which were no less ignominious than those suffered by their antecedent Assembly counterparts. Thus, by our count, no fewer than 13 Council resolutions have, as it were, gone the way of all the earth: resolution 246 (1968), followed in rapid succession by resolutions 264 (1969), 269 (1969), 276 (1970), 283 (1970), 284 (1970), 301 (1971), 309 (1972), 310 (1972), 319 (1972), 323 (1972), 342 (1973), 366 (1974), down into the limbo of forgotten things. The last-cited resolution, 366 (1974), is the immediate cause of the present series of meetings of the Council.

20. **The** primary question that arises in the minds of members of our delegation and myself out of the preceding observations is, the following: What is the precise purpose of our present meeting? We know it is to discuss the situation in Namibia. Is it to engage once again ad *nauseam* in what almost appears to have become no more than a fruitless academic exercise regarding who owns Namibia as distinct from who rules Namibia? Why does not South Africa of its own volition end its illegal occupation of a Territory to which it no longer has any legal rights? Shall we or shall we not make some further overtures to it, if not indeed plead with South Africa to respect the verdict of the international community, as represented by the myriad resolutions we have adopted both in the Council and in the General Assembly? How shall we bring an illegal and irresponsible regime to its heels without the application of those "effective measures" to which we have repeatedly referred in nearly all the numerous resolutions that have been adopted in recent years in this body and in the General Assembly? Or, is the purpose of our present meeting what is implied in resolution 366 (1974), as indeed it has been in other earlier resolutions, namely, what necessary and effective measures do we now propose to adopt to dispose once and for all of this cancerous growth in the body politic of the international community before that community itself—if it is not careful—collapses or fades into oblivion by our own self-imposed timidity, our compromises and our weak-kneed irresoluteness?

21. One representative after another during the past three days has echoed the theme which underlies my Government's position in the present debate—a theme which it is clear no member State or representative here will eschew, namely, the formulation of concrete steps that should lead to action, vigorous and positive action against South Africa if it continues to show no signs of a change of policies, if not—as we would prefer—a change of heart, on a matter over which it has stood condemned for more than half a century.

22. My Government's long and untiring attachment to the cause of total liberation in Africa—and, indeed, wherever people and nations are held in political subjugation or subordination without their consent—is by now too well known to bear any unwarranted or pedestrian recital before this august body. For there has hardly been a resolution before the Council or before the General Assembly calling for adequate and effective measures to be taken against South Africa to which we have not been party—either as co-initiators, co-drafters, or co-sponsors.

23. On every occasion on which we have thus declared my Government's stand on the Namibian issue, we have asserted and pursued our commitment to the cause of Namibia's achievement of its right to self-determination and complete independence, simultaneously and concurrently with South Africa's total and unconditional withdrawal from Namibian territory.

24. My delegation will now, as in the past, continue to adhere to the spirit, the letter and the policies of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on all matters pertaining to Namibian freedom and independence. In this connexion, my delegation wishes to go on record as being in full support of the OAU's stand on free and unfettered elections in Namibia under United Nations auspices and supervision, with due recognition of SWAPO as the sole, legitimate and popular national voice of the Namibian people.

25. South Africa will do well to heed the lessons of history by which it has been surrounded for the past two decades without appearing to have even been fully aware of it, even in its own backyard. It is the view of my delegation that SWAPO should be seen as the logical body now available, now ready, now willing and now able to provide the first alternative Government to the present illegal regime imposed upon the Namibian nation without its consent during the past 55 years. It is my delegation's hope that this vision of the future which we conjure will not stand in the way of all men of goodwill everywhere who believe in the right of all people to choose and arrange their own way of life.

26. The slogan "Rather self-government than good government*" was not the brain child of an African nationalist or politician; it was a legacy bequeathed to the old League of Nations Council by that eminent

British administrator, Ormsby-Gore. The Namibian people and the Namibian people alone—albeit with the aid and encouragement of this body, the United Nations, and **all** its organs and other well-disposed forces—are the only qualified persons to choose the manner in which they shall continue to live and live as free men.

27. The call of my delegation and my Government on this occasion is not to South Africa; it is to the representatives in this august assembly, through you, Mr. President. In the final analysis, it is you who must have the last word about what the future of Namibia shall **be**. The options open to us are limited; time is running out. Shall it be "Who would be free themselves must strike the blow"? Or shall it be "Come and let us reason together in an attitude of comradeship between South Africa, Namibia and us of the Council"?

28. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the Commissioner for External Affairs of Nigeria, Mr. Okoi Arikpo, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

29. Mr. ARIKPO (Nigeria): Mr. President, I am grateful to you and your colleagues of the Security Council for making it possible for the Nigerian delegation to participate in this crucial debate on Namibia. But before I make my modest contribution to the subject-matter of this series of meetings, may I congratulate you on your assumption of **office** as this month's President of the Security Council. It is entirely appropriate that the representative of a country like yours, Iraq, which has a long history of struggle against colonialism and foreign exploitation, should be presiding over a debate on one of the most brutal forms of repression and exploitation ever known in human history. My delegation is confident that your experience in dealing with the kind of problems now before the Security Council will greatly enrich the present deliberations.

30. May I also thank the representative **of** the brotherly Republic of Guyana and, more specially, its Minister for Foreign Affairs, my friend Mr. **Ramphal**, who set aside all other pressing commitments in order to preside over the first of this series of meetings in recognition of the importance which his country attaches to the issue of Namibian **self**-determination.

31. The 17 December 1974 the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 366 (1974), which condemned South Africa for its continuing illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia and its arbitrary application of racially discriminatory and repressive laws and practices in Namibia, and demanded that South Africa should make a solemn declaration that it will comply with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in regard to Namibia and

that it recognizes the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation.

32. The South African authorities have refused to make any declaration in the terms of the Council resolution. They have contemptuously dismissed any claim by the Council of the right to supervise the transfer of power to the people of Namibia. This blatant act of defiance should in normal circumstances lead to the automatic invoking against South Africa of Chapter VII of the Charter. But the Council has already been served notice that the provisions of Chapter VII will not be applied against South Africa. The friends of South Africa in the Council would rather sacrifice the authority and effectiveness of the Council than jeopardize the security of their investments in that country. And even if the Council adopted yet another strong resolution now, South Africa's friends amongst its members would frustrate those provisions in such a resolution that would seek to compel South Africa to act according to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations.

33. Is it any wonder then that small and weak countries are increasingly seeking protection under the secure umbrellas of the super-Powers rather than under the Security Council, which is supposed to be responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security? Can we be surprised that every major international issue in the last decade has had to be settled outside the United Nations system? The moral issue arising from the Namibian situation is that in the second half of the twentieth century might **is still** right. Of course we are aware of the secret defence links between South Africa and some Security Council members which deter the latter from positive action against South African intransigence.

34. But in spite of my pessimism, I find some hope in the letter [*see S/11701*] of South Africa rejecting the demands of the Council. I see that the Government of South Africa recognizes the distinct international status of South West Africa, the Territory which we know by the name of Namibia. South Africa says that it does not claim for itself one single inch of Namibian soil. Mr. Vorster agrees that the human dignity and rights of peoples, irrespective of colour or race, must be maintained and promoted in Namibia. Mr. Vorster says that South Africa cannot and shall not interfere in the taking of decisions on the constitutional future of the peoples of Namibia. The inhabitants of Namibia themselves, and nobody else, according to Mr. Vorster, will decide upon their future.

35. The Nigerian delegation believes that those are very weighty declarations of policy by the South African authorities and that the Council should afford South Africa the opportunity to translate that policy into practice. South Africa should not be given the opportunity to retract from any part of that declaration and the United Nations should assist South Africa,

in spite of itself, to implement that policy. Namibia is a Trust Territory of the United Nations, whether South Africa accepts this fact or not. South Africa says that it accepts the international status of Namibia; yet it continues to repudiate the right and duty of the most universally **recognized** international organization -the United Nations-to supervise the transfer of power to the owners of the Territory. South Africa says that it recognizes the right of the Namibians to determine their future form of government; yet it works assiduously to promote the political ascendancy of a few ex-Nazi immigrants in that Territory. But in spite of all that, it is prepared to negotiate with the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, representatives of African leaders, the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the Special Committee of the OAU on the implementation of the policy of handing overpower to the people of Namibia.

36. If the Security Council will not exercise its authority under Chapter VII of the Charter-and I believe it ought to exercise that authority-what alternative is there but to talk with South Africa? Mr. Vorster has already proposed the composition of a possible United Nations committee and its terms of reference as set out in the declaration of policy. But I say that the Council ought to reject the more arrogant proposals of Mr. Vorster and take its own action. Nigeria would humbly urge the Council to appoint a committee to facilitate the implementation of the programme for the transfer of power to the people of Namibia. This series of meetings of the Council must give that committee a positive brief upon which to work during the next three months to ensure that the Council achieves positive results on Namibia before the end of 1975.

37. The communication that has been received by the Secretary-General from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa [*ibid.*] makes great play of the earnest endeavours of the leaders of southern Africa to seek a peaceful solution to the problems of southern Africa, and asks for time and goodwill to find solutions to the problems of that part of Africa. Those are very soothing words, but I must say that 50 years are long enough for the South African authorities to prove their **good** intentions. Besides, it is said that faith breeds faith. If the South African Government believes that it can continue indefinitely to exploit the honest desire of African leaders to find a peaceful solution to the problems of African liberation, then that Government is sadly mistaken. Missiles, atomic bombs, napalm and defoliants have never succeeded in burning out the spirit of independence and human dignity anywhere in the world. They will not succeed in Africa. South Africa has had all the time it needs for constructive developments. That time is running out. The leaders of Africa have offered South Africa an olive branch. That offer is not indefinite. And let there be no mistake: there is not a single leader in Africa who does not want to see the black man master of his own house. The choice whether there is peace

or war in Africa is one that South Africa must make now. It cannot continue to dangle its carrots of friendship and good neighbourliness before African leaders indefinitely.

38. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of the United Arab Emirates. I **invite** him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

39. Mr. HUMAIDAN (United Arab Emirates) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, permit me first of all to say how happy I am to see you presiding over this august Council. Your country, Iraq, and mine have a common destiny, the destiny of an Arab nation which has never ceased to struggle for its unity and against colonialism and injustice in the world. I should also like to thank you and the members of the Council for having permitted me to participate in this debate.

40. Furthermore, I have the honour to announce that I am addressing the Council today, with a brief statement, on behalf of the Group of Arab States in the United Nations. The Arab people and **Governments** wish to express their concern and distress at seeing this illegal and inhuman situation persisting in the African Territory of Namibia.

41. The importance of the outcome of this debate is clear, not only for peoples who love justice and peace but also for the credibility and prestige of the United Nations, and particularly of the Security Council,

42. In truth, this affair should be called "the problem of the United Nations", and not "the question of Namibia", because the responsibility of the United Nations in this matter is direct and complete. General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 1966 clearly proclaimed the inalienable right of the Namibian people to freedom and independence. It unambiguously put an end to the Mandate of South Africa over Namibia and placed that Territory under the direct responsibility of the United Nations. According to paragraph 2 of that resolution, Namibia is a Territory enjoying international status and will remain so until its independence.

43. I do not want to mention here all the decisions taken on the subject either by the General Assembly or by the Security Council, nor do I wish to embark upon a juridical analysis of the illegality of the continued presence of the racist administration of Pretoria in Namibian territory. In any case, the International Court of Justice made it quite clear that their presence is illegal when it stated that "the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory."

44. The purpose of this debate is to consider the question of South Africa's compliance with the **pro-**

visions of resolution 366 (1974) of the Council, and particularly the requirements of paragraphs 3 and 4 of that resolution, which have been quoted by several previous speakers. If we wish to be brief and precise, we may well ask if the letter of the Minister of Foreign **Affairs** of South Africa addressed to the **Secretary-General** [*ibid.*] on 27 May last constitutes a positive response to the requirements of resolution 366 (1974) and, if not, what measures the Council might take in order to discharge its responsibilities. This is the crux of the matter.

45. We have studied with close attention the letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa and the annex containing extracts from the speech of his Prime Minister [*ibid.*] We regret to say that neither the letter nor its annex gives any positive response to the requirements of resolution 366 (1974). The letter and its annex constitute no more than an attempt to divert attention from the principal objectives of the resolution, namely: first, that South Africa make a solemn declaration whereby it would undertake to abide by the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the subject of Namibia and undertake to **recognize** the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation, and, secondly, that South Africa take the necessary steps, in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council, for the withdrawal of the illegal administration it maintains in Namibia and for the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations.

46. This is one more act of defiance towards the Organization, and particularly to the Security Council, on the part of the racist Government of South Africa. The question now facing the Security Council is the following: What are the appropriate measures to take?

47. We have followed with great interest the proposals put forward by the President of the Council for Namibia [*1823rd meeting*] and other distinguished ministers and representatives. Taken over all, these proposals are constructive and may be effective.

48. We for our part believe that in the decision to be taken by the Council the following points should not be overlooked: first, the legal responsibility of the United Nations for Namibia should be reaffirmed, and a request made that South Africa take appropriate measures to permit the United Nations Council for Namibia to establish its presence in the Territory in order to facilitate the transfer of power to the Namibian **people**; secondly, in order that the people of Namibia may freely determine their future, the organization of free elections, under the auspices and control of the United Nations must imperatively be seen to as soon as possible and at any rate within one year; thirdly, the Council's support for the struggle of the people of Namibia under the leadership of SWAPO, its authentic and legitimate representative, must be **affirmed**.

49. We would also like to stress that the continuation of the illegal presence of the racist administration of South Africa in Namibia constitutes a serious threat to the peace and security of Africa and, consequently, a threat to international peace and security. That is why we believe that the time has come to contemplate the adoption of severe measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.

50. Like **our** African brothers, we would prefer to see this tragedy brought to a peaceful end. For us, there can be only one solution: the withdrawal of the racist regime of South Africa and the independence of Namibia. If this can be brought about peacefully, so much the better. But in the absence of any peaceful change, or of any real prospects for such a change, we cannot but support the struggle of the African people of Namibia under the leadership of its party, SWAPO.

51. We accordingly undertake to support the struggle of the Namibian people by all **moral** and material means. We consider this struggle as a part of our own struggle against foreign occupation and for the safeguard of human rights .

52. The reasons for the failure of all measures taken by **the** United Nations to compel the racist regime of South Africa to comply with the decisions of the Organization are familiar to everyone. That is why we repeat our appeal to States which continue to have dealings of all kinds with **the** racist regime of Pretoria to cease their co-operation with it and to participate actively in the efforts of the African States and the United Nations to solve this problem.

53. Mr. CAVAGLIERI (Italy): Mr. President, allow me first of all to convey to you my delegation's warm congratulations and good wishes on **your** assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month and to recall with pleasure on this occasion the friendly relations that my country maintains with your own. I should like **also** to associate myself with the well-deserved thanks and congratulations that **have** been addressed to your predecessor, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Guyana, Mr. **Ramphal**. My delegation has highly appreciated his presence here as chairman of our meetings, just before his assumption of the functions of Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, a well-deserved recognition of his qualities and statesmanship.

54. We are meeting at a time when the forthcoming independence of Mozambique and the evolution of events in Angola towards the same objective are adding new positive dimensions to the struggle for total **decolonization** in southern Africa. The remaining traces of colonialism are well on the way towards complete elimination under the increasing pressure of an historical trend. In this framework, the occupation of Namibia by South Africa represents an anachronism, in sharp contrast with today's world realities and

today's human and social standards and we think that the solution of this problem is not, therefore, exclusively African: it is the concern of the entire membership of the Organization.

55. The position of Italy as regards Namibia is clear: it **is** reflected unequivocally-in the votes cast by the Italian representatives in the Council and in the General Assembly. We believe that our record speaks for itself.

56. Italy voted in favour of resolution 2145 (XXI), by which the General Assembly decided to put an end to the Mandate as exercised by South Africa over South West Africa. My country then became a member of the Ad Hoc Committee in charge of finding practical means of administering that Territory on behalf of the United Nations.

57. In 1971, Italy, also at that time a member of the Security Council, voted in favour of resolution 301 (1971), by which the Council **reaffirmed** the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to liberty and independence, recalling as well pertinent resolutions prior to that by which the Council pronounced itself for the unity and **integrity** of this Territory.

58. Further, we would also like to recall our vote in favour of resolution 311 (1972), by which the Security Council called upon States to observe an arms embargo against South Africa in view of its disregard of United Nations resolutions concerning southern Africa. Italy has strictly observed this decision, disregarding any advantage it might have derived from an expansion of its trade which the current economic difficulties might have suggested.

59. Italy has recently expressed its support for the creation of the Institute for Namibia, which will make possible the training of Namibians in view of the establishment of their national State. Furthermore, Italy has given its full support, since their creation, to the various United Nations funds for southern Africa: that is, United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa, United Nations Fund for Namibia. As is well known, these Funds are meant to provide assistance to, among others, refugees and exiles from Namibia.

60. Italy has no commercial, industrial or financial interest whatsoever in Namibia. Neither does it operate any kind of transportation link by air or sea.

61. The Italian Government, as I have indicated, has clearly stressed its position on Namibia to the South African authorities, the most recent occasion of this being a visit by the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs to Rome. We have constantly urged the Government of Pretoria to hasten the process of ensuring self-determination in Namibia on the basis of the principles and resolutions of the United Nations.

In **particular**, we have stressed to the South African authorities that this process should be carried out with full respect for the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, to the exclusion of any separate racial lines. In so doing we have also **emphasized** that the transfer of power to the Namibian people must be accomplished in collaboration with the United Nations and that such a transfer of power must be the result of negotiations in which SWAPO should be a participant. Most recently we have asked the Government of South Africa to draw up a calendar indicating in the clearest way the various stages for its progressive withdrawal and the simultaneous transfer of power.

62. I should now like to refer to the two statements issued towards the end of May by the Government of South Africa in response to the mounting pressure of world public opinion. These are the speech by the South African Premier, Mr. Vorster, in Windhoek on 20 May and the letter addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa to the **Secretary-General** on 27 May [see **S/11701**]. Neither of those statements, in the view of my Government, appears to meet the main request embodied in resolution 366 (1974), which is a resolution whose contents had been anticipated by the representative of Italy in the Council on 1 August 1972, when he stated that:

“... The people of Namibia should be allowed to exercise its right to self-determination and independence. Namibia should achieve full independence in conformity with the principles of the Charter. The unity and territorial integrity of Namibia should be preserved.” [1657th meeting, para. 103]

63. The South African statements are disappointing. We fail to find in them clear-cut commitments which would constitute a real step forward. Both statements contain a certain degree of ambiguity, thus preventing us from establishing their range and possible development. We regret this all the more as the South African Government has given recent proof of being able to look at other realities in southern Africa in a new perspective; this encouraged the hope that peaceful solutions aimed at meeting the aspirations of African peoples might be promoted.

64. The present state of affairs in Namibia cannot continue. We are faced with the illegal occupation of a Territory by a State which has lost its right of administration and has the duty of allowing the people of that area to attain self-determination and independence. My delegation has listened with deep interest to the statements of several previous speakers and is looking forward to hearing the contributions of the other delegations participating in this debate. We still do not know what final judgement will emerge among all the delegations on the contents of the two South African statements. If, however, a general feeling appears in the Council indicating that some elements in those documents deserve more thorough study, my delegation will be ready to join the others in that work.

65. I should like to conclude my statement by expressing our deep sympathy to the people of Namibia, to whom we wish, in spite of today's difficulties, a prompt entry into the international community after the speedy attainment of **self-determination** in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

66. Mr. MALECELA (United Republic of Tanzania): Sir, allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the high office of President of the Security Council for this month, at a time when the Namibian problem has assumed very crucial dimensions. You represent a country whose commitment to the cause of **decolonization** is well known. Furthermore your own personal qualities as an outstanding diplomat should certainly ensure that the current discussion will be conducted in a most serious and fruitful manner.

67. I also wish to express our appreciation to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Guyana, Mr. **Ramphal**, who honoured the Council by presiding over its deliberations, and our gratitude to Mr. Jackson for successfully undertaking the necessary consultations on this question as well as on the other problems of which the Council was seized last month.

68. The Namibian question has a long history which is familiar to all of us. Therefore I will not repeat the whole history of that country today. Rather, I shall briefly refresh our memories with an account of the recent political development in relation to that Territory and throw some light on our expectations with regard to this problem.

69. Since the Security Council met last December to discuss the situation in Namibia [**1811th and 1812th meetings**], the Ninth Extraordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU met in Dar es Salaam from 7 to 10 April 1975 to review the situation in southern Africa, of which Namibia is an important part. At that historic meeting, the OAU restated its position on southern Africa in unambiguous terms. With regard to Namibia, the Council of Ministers? in their Dar es Salaam declaration, stated:

“Africa's and the United Nations position on the question of Namibia is unequivocal. South Africa's continued occupation of that land is illegal and all Member States of the United Nations are under obligation to refrain from doing anything which implies the legality of its administration. Africa must fulfil strictly this obligation to abstain from any action which may be construed as recognition or acceptance of South Africa's right to be in Namibia.

“The OAU and the United Nations hold the unity and territorial integrity of Namibia sacrosanct. Both organizations are working for the independence of the Territory as a whole and are totally opposed to its fragmentation. Both organizations **recognize**

SWAPO as the legitimate and authentic representative of the Namibian people. Despite the specific and unanimous demand of the Security Council, South Africa has not yet accepted withdrawing from Namibia. In fact, the *apartheid* regime has consolidated its repressive rule in the Territory and proceeded with its Bantustanization.”

70. Here I should like to add that when we speak of recognition of SWAPO as the legitimate representative of the Namibian people, I hope it will be **understood** that we are not speaking in absolute terms of a hundred per cent and nothing less, because, when it comes to the representation of humanity, such percentages do not exist.

71. Thus the main problem with regard to Namibia is the continued illegal presence of the *apartheid* regime in Namibia. Our objective, therefore, is to end that regime's illegal presence in that Territory. If today South Africa were to declare its willingness to leave Namibia, everything else would be a matter of details to be worked out. Yet South Africa has continued to remain there illegally and, with characteristic cynicism, even attempts to rationalize its illegal presence in that Territory.

72. At the same Dar es Salaam meeting, the OAU endorsed the efforts of the Council and accepted the goodwill shown by the Council in resolution 366 (1974) of last year. It declared that the only peaceful solution to the problem of Namibia was for the *apartheid* regime to implement fully that resolution—for that resolution sought to give South Africa an opportunity to show its goodwill following the statement made by its representative in the Council in 1974 [*1800th meeting*], to the effect that, in the light of new developments in the Territory, the South African Government believed that the stage when the people of Namibia could exercise their right to self-determination might be considerably sooner than the 10 years we had been told of before. **It** was, therefore, at least, with a great deal of curiosity that my delegation awaited the response of the *South* African regime to Security Council resolution 366 (1974).

73. We now have the response of the racist regime to the decisions of the Council. It is not only negative but also cynical, arrogant and contemptuous. Paragraph 4 of resolution 366 (1974) demands that South Africa take the necessary steps to effect the withdrawal of its illegal administration, in accordance with Council resolution 264 (1969), and to transfer power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations. To this demand the South Africans say that they cannot leave Namibia because the people of Namibia want them to stay. Is this not really the height of cynicism? To say that the people of Namibia want the occupation forces to stay in Namibia is to insult not only the Namibian people but also the OAU and indeed the international community as a whole. The people of Namibia do not want any kind

of ~~occupation~~—**least** of all, that of the racist regime of South Africa. They demand freedom and independence for their country. Led by their national liberation movement, SWAPO, they have taken up arms to secure this objective. By demonstrating that they are prepared to pay the supreme sacrifice for their freedom, the Namibian people have long put to rest any claims by the racists that the Namibians are subservient to foreign domination.

74. However, let us for one moment suppose that we are prepared to follow South Africa's argument and thus test the validity of its assumptions. Resolution 366 (1974) stipulated that the assistance of the United Nations should be provided in the transfer of power to the people of Namibia. To this demand, Mr. Vorster and his regime have been categorically negative. They will not accept the United Nations supervision. One would have thought that, for example, there should be no problem whatsoever in accepting free elections in the Territory conducted under the supervision and control of the United Nations; for how is the United Nations supposed to know that the people of Namibia want the South African regime to stay if it is not going to be involved in the process? What prevents the South Africans' accepting United Nations involvement if they do not have anything to hide? Is it not a fact that those people who oppose South Africa's presence in Namibia are prosecuted, persecuted and denied all means of expressing and propagating their views? Is it not a fact that those who oppose the South Africans in Namibia are hunted down with all the armed might of the racist regime there? Do we really need to recapitulate the variety of atrocities inflicted upon the opponents of South Africa's illegal rule? Public floggings, arbitrary arrests and detentions and all sorts of intimidations are a daily routine in that unhappy land. Yet Messrs. Vorster and Muller have the audacity to tell the Council that the Namibians exercise their right to self-determination without interference from South Africa. Perhaps they would like the Council to believe that all these years the South Africans have been mere tourists in Namibia. What cynicism! Certainly the Council, as indeed the international community, expected a more serious response.

75. In any event the case for United Nations supervision in Namibia is not merely a question of ensuring fair elections. We have maintained that Namibia is a United Nations responsibility. Hence it is the height of absurdity for South Africa to tell the United Nations to keep out; it is for South Africa to comply with the decisions of the Council and get out of Namibia and not for South Africa to **tell** the United Nations to keep out. The flat refusal of the *apartheid* regime to comply with the demands of the United Nations on this matter clearly displays South Africa's unabashed contempt for the Organization.

76. Paragraph 5 (a) of resolution 366 (1974) calls on South Africa, pending the transfer of power, to comply

fully with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Namibia. Nobody here can claim that South Africa has implemented that call. The resolution also calls on the racist **régime** to release all political prisoners. That call has fallen on deaf ears, and in fact that **régime** has indulged in political repression of the highest magnitude through threats, imprisonment and torture of political opponents. Document A/AC. 109/L. 1007 and Add. 1⁴ indicates that numerous opponents of the **régime** were imprisoned after the call contained in resolution 366 (1974) was made. To give one example, Mr. Thomas Kamati, who was found to have written in his prison cell the words "One Namibia, one nation", was taken to court and found guilty because in South Africa for someone to write what this young man wrote is a crime.

77. The resolution also calls on the Pretoria **régime** to abolish the application in Namibia of all racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws and practices, particularly those pertaining to the Bantustans and homelands. This **call** has not been heeded at all. Instead we are told vaguely by the racist **régime** of certain unspecified proclamations having been repealed. Yet **apartheid** remains intact in Namibia. Has South Africa, for instance, discontinued the application of the so-called Terrorism and Sabotage Acts? Has the regime discontinued its Bantustan policies? **The** answer is obviously no, for the statements of the **régime** indicate clearly that the policy of Bantustans is to continue. The answer of the racists of South Africa is that the so-called multiracial talks have been instituted. Yet the motion to institute those talks lays down conditions which indicate clearly that the objective of those talks is to perpetuate **apartheid** Bantustans and the **so-called** homelands.

78. These conditions speak for themselves and I need only outline a few of them: first, they acknowledge that there are various population groups in the Territory and that the right of each group to its culture and language should be recognized; secondly, they express the opinion that non-whites are not interested in political rights, but only in the recognition of human rights; thirdly, they bar the participation of the non-white political parties in these talks on the alleged ground that there were too many political groupings among the non-whites and that no one knew who was represented. In other words, the representation of the non-whites is to be assumed by those who are in the pay of the racist regime and who are now acting as instruments of repression.

79. These are talks designed to divide **and** weaken the African people of Namibia and to create hatred amongst the non-white population. They serve no good purpose and should be condemned for what they are. It is not surprising, therefore, that these talks have been denounced even amongst the whites of South Africa. Mr. Bryan **O'Lynn**, Vice-Chairman of the United Party, has said that they represented nothing more than a masterpiece in evasion, self-contradiction

and obscurity. in such an atmosphere any talks or so-called constitutional arrangements conducted by the **apartheid** regime in Namibia are a total farce; they are illegal and should be denounced by the Council. Furthermore, resolution 366 (1074) calls on South Africa to accord **unconditionally** to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities to return to their country without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment.

80. The South Africans' response is patently unsatisfactory. They have neither taken the necessary steps to give these guarantees effect nor created the necessary political atmosphere for the free expression of views. And as I indicated earlier, the leaders of Namibia continue to be imprisoned for expressing views which call for the unity and freedom of their country.

81. Do I need to go further to show that the racist regime has not complied with resolution 366 (1974)? I repeat, the racist regime has not only defied resolution 366 (1974), but has even gone further to reject categorically the supervision of the United Nations in a Territory which is the responsibility of the Organization.

82. We have been told in the Council that we should explore the "positive" elements of South Africa's response in respect to contacts. Yet, what seems to be lost is the gist of the problem. The issue is not whether there can be or should be contacts between the Organization or the OAU or both and South Africa. The real issue is, what is the basis of such contacts? **After** ah, we have had them in the past and they have produced nothing. We have always recognized that negotiations are an important aspect of the struggle, but we have also recognized that there must be a solid basis for such negotiations. I have already said that the crucial point in the question of Namibia is the United Nations responsibility there. If, therefore, South Africa rejects that, what is the basis of such contacts? Furthermore, we must not confuse form with substance. The substantive question is the termination of South Africa's illegal occupation. Once South Africa unequivocally accepts this principle, the modalities or instrumentalities of contacts can be worked out. But where that commitment is lacking, **where** South Africa continues to defy the Organization, we find it difficult to comprehend the priority given by some of **our** colleagues to the question of further contacts.

83. I must, however, add that my delegation will remain open to any other constructive suggestions that would lead the Council to action rather than to the fruitless exercises which we have had in **the** past. Fifty years is a long time for Africa to wait for a positive response from South Africa.

84. One must seriously attempt to understand why in spite of the overwhelming international opposition, South Africa continues to pursue its obdurate and

recalcitrant policies. It would be an oversimplification to attribute the behaviour of the **apartheid régime** to simple obstinacy. It is obvious that to a very great extent South Africa's defiance is encouraged by the policies of some of the very powerful members of the United Nations and the Security Council. South Africa believes that it can continue to rely on their support. The **apartheid régime** believes that it is protected from the wrath of the international community because the three Western permanent members of the Council will protect it from appropriate effective measures, especially when such Powers in the Council argue on flimsy legal grounds devoid of **all** moral principle.

85. Those three members, who provided the triple veto last year [*see 1808th meeting*] in defence of South Africa's membership, have, by their actions, given comfort and support to the racist **régime**. And, it is these actions which really matter, and not verbal professions of abhorrence of South Africa's actions and policies. In this connexion, it would be pertinent to recall some of those actions.

86. Last year, the Council in effect gave an ultimatum to the South African **régime** regarding Namibia by adopting resolution 366 (1974). The three Western permanent members of the Security Council supported that ultimatum. Yet, Britain conducted sea manoeuvres with South Africa. France did the same and continues to sell arms to South Africa. The United States received the Chief of South African Defence Forces. I have ample evidence that since that time there has been a group of South African military experts who have visited almost all the Western capitals looking for arms. These men, Mr. I. Rodger, Mr. A. G. Engelter and Mr. L. L. Van Zyl, have been to London, New York, Paris and Bonn. I need not elaborate what they discussed, but should my statement be challenged I would be prepared to provide further evidence on this question.

87. Some of our colleagues have argued in the Council that the situation in Namibia does not constitute a threat to international peace and security. With all due respect to those representatives and the great countries which they represent, it is difficult for us and indeed difficult for the people of Africa to understand the logic behind their assertions. Right now, as has been repeatedly stated, there is a war going on in Namibia itself between the **freedom-fighters** and the illegal occupation forces. The South Africans themselves admit this; the South **Africans** themselves say they have military bases in Namibia to pursue this war. South Africa has consolidated its military arsenals in Namibia and is waging a war of repression in that Territory and thus at the same time posing a direct threat to the peace and security of the whole region of southern Africa.

88. Free Africa has made no secret of its unequivocal support for and its solidarity with the liberation **move-**

ment. All the potential for an expanded conflagration is there, unless the Security Council takes timely action to promote a peaceful solution-of the problem.

89. South Africa's reaction so far has been to block all peaceful avenues. Those who support South Africa's **manœuvres**, either directly or indirectly, must **realize** that they are contributing to the intensification of tension and the escalation of a military conflict. Do we really need a full-fledged Viet-Nameese type of war in Namibia for the Council to be convinced of the threat to international peace and security in that area? Are we looking for a blood-bath to convince ourselves of the urgent need for prompt and decisive action in Namibia?

90. It is quite clear that a racial conflagration in Namibia, with the inevitable repercussions beyond its borders, will have the most dire consequences for the peace and security not only of the African continent but of the whole world community. Are we to understand that those who refuse to **recognize** this clear danger would wish to see that conflagration before the Council can take the necessary action?

91. Clearly, the Council would be wiser to work for the prevention of a conflagration than to attempt desperately to stop one after it has started. We submit therefore that in whatever way one conceives the current situation in Namibia arising from South Africa's continued defiance of the will of the **international** community and its brutal repression of the people of the international Territory of Namibia, the problem is one which seriously threatens the peace, security and tranquillity of the area. It is one which cries for a prompt, decisive and definitive decision by this Council. And the demand made in the Council by African and other spokesmen of freedom and justice that the Security Council take action commensurate **with** the gravity of the situation is sound, timely and logical. We are not exaggerating the fact; we do not desire overdramatization; but we desperately seek the freedom and independence of Namibia so that peace, security and harmony can prevail in that area. And we firmly believe that the Security Council has a duty to act in a responsible manner.

92. In its resolution 366 (1974), the Security Council declared that in the event of South Africa's non-compliance with this resolution, the Council would take appropriate measures under the Charter. There is no doubt that South Africa has failed to comply with the provisions of that resolution, as I have clearly stated. All those who have taken part in the debate of the Council have attested to this fact, and no one, either in the Council or outside, can by any stretch of imagination claim the contrary. Thus; the question that now arises is: What should the Council do? What are those measures which this body undertook to take in order to enforce its decisions? For the Council cannot remain immobile and retain its credibility as an organ primarily responsible for the maintenance

of international peace and security. The Council must therefore act, and do so **firmly** and decisively. It must, as a minimum, take such measures as **will** clearly demonstrate to South Africa its determination not to abandon our responsibility with regard to the question of Namibia.

93. The Council must insist on the full and scrupulous implementation of its resolutions, and in particular the relevant provisions of resolution 366 (1974), which was adopted with unprecedented unanimity. The Council cannot afford to equivocate on this. The oppressed Namibians cry for action. The peace and security of the continent, as **well** as international peace and security, are being put in serious jeopardy. The very credibility of the Security Council and indeed of the United Nations is being called in question.

94. The Council therefore has a responsibility to ensure that its decisions are respected; and it is in this context that my Government **firmly** believes that the time has now come for the Council to adopt enforcement measures against South Africa so as to compel that **régime** to abide by international law and rules of conduct. At least, the Council must impose a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. Such action would surely demonstrate the Council's determination to act, while at the same time reducing South Africa's capacity for continued mischief and defiance of the Organization. Such action would also give hope and confidence to the struggling people of Namibia. Above all, it would enhance the prospects for a peaceful settlement while reducing the despondency and frustration that must certainly confront the African people both in Namibia and elsewhere on the continent should the Security Council fail to take decisive action on this issue.

95. We also hope that in any measures contemplated by the Council in the form of a resolution the Council will include the following:

(a) The reaffirmation by the Council of the authority of the United Nations over Namibia;

(h) A clause to the effect that the United Nations should **organize** and supervise elections to enable the people of Namibia freely to determine their own future;

(c) The complete rejection of Bantustans and a call to South Africa to abandon that policy;

(d) The reaffirmation of the territorial integrity of Namibia;

(e) A call for a halt to repression and for the release of all political prisoners;

(f) A call for the dismantling of **all** military bases in Namibia set up by the South African **régime** in a United Nations Territory contrary to the Charter;

(g) A call for the suspension by **all** Member States of any investments in South Africa for the time being as a clear demonstration to South **Africa** that this will continue **only** until there is a clearer positive response from South Africa;

(h) The rejection by the Council of any kind of sham elections and any kind of so-called expressions of will by the people of Namibia organized by the South African regime.

%. We make those proposals with the **firm** conviction that positive action by the Council will be a crucial contribution to the solution of the problem of Namibia. But whether the Council acts firmly, as we hope it will, or remains **immobilized** because of the actions of a few in our midst, the struggle in Namibia will continue. The issue, therefore, is whether there should be freedom and independence in Namibia with the minimum sacrifice or whether that freedom must be brought only by armed confrontation, with all its consequences. Either way the United Republic of Tanzania, like the rest of Africa, will support our brothers in Namibia. But can the Council really afford to be a passive observer in such a situation? Action on its part will save thousands of lives and contribute effectively to the relaxation of international tension. Inaction will certainly serve to enhance the prospects of further suffering, bloodshed, and further escalation of tension. Does the Council really have a choice? We hope that the Western permanent members of the Security Council will consider this as they decide their course of action.

97. We must make it absolutely clear that Africa has not come to the Council with its hands folded. As the Chairman of the Liberation Committee for Southern Africa of the OAU, I must emphasize Africa's belief in the armed struggle. I should like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to China, to the Soviet Union and to the other socialist countries for the material assistance they have rendered to the liberation movement. We should like to express our appreciation also to the Scandinavian countries, and indeed to other peace-loving peoples of the world, for the aid they have given the liberation struggle in southern Africa.

98. In the past when we spoke in these chambers of the armed struggle, some of the Members of the Organization did not take us seriously. After the events in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau, we believe that we can now be taken seriously by both our friends and our enemies. If we in Africa say—and we have said it already—that we wish the problem of Namibia to be solved peacefully, through the United Nations, we should like both the Council and South Africa to take our words seriously and believe **what** we say. But if, through the attitude of certain members of the Council, the efforts of Africa are frustrated, then the armed struggle—I repeat: the armed **struggle**—must continue.

99. The people of Namibia have already taken up arms to wage the struggle. The Council has the responsibility to shorten their suffering. I should like to say that we in Africa, and indeed the people of Namibia, do believe that the Council will in fact take those actions that will shorten the suffering of the people of Namibia. It is the sincere hope of my delegation that the people of Namibia and the people of Africa as a whole will get the support from the Council that will help to strengthen their faith in the Security Council and the United Nations.

100. The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania for the kind remarks he made about my country and about me personally.

101. I have just received from the representative of Saudi Arabia a letter containing a request that he should be invited to participate in the discussion in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Security Council's provisional rules of procedure. Pursuant to the usual practice I propose, if I hear no objection, to invite the aforementioned representative to participate in the discussion without **the** right to vote, in accordance with his request.

It was so decided.

102. I now invite the representative of Saudi Arabia to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

103. Mr. BARROODY (Saudi Arabia): First, Mr. President, I should like to say that if I were to congratulate you it would be like congratulating myself. After all, you hail from the Arab world. The less said about the qualities you have for assuming the duties of the presidency of the Council, the better. I am afraid that if I were to try to enumerate those qualities, I would not give the complete list, and in any case praise might be embarrassing to a gentleman who is as modest as you are. So I shall stop there.

104. I have been hesitating about making a statement on this question ever since it was broached again. I felt that we might be going around in circles. No new element has been introduced—I do not consider Mr. Vorster's statement [see *S/11701*] to be something new that opens up an avenue which will lead to practical results.

105. But I must salute my colleagues, the representatives of France and the United States, for having made clear and straightforward statements [*1824th and 1825th meetings, respectively*] and for not having tried to play politics, so to speak. They said what their respective countries were prepared to do and what they were not prepared to do.

106. I have an inkling what my good friend the representative of the United Kingdom will say. It is

not that I have pried into any documents, but I believe that his **statement** will not be too far removed from the statements made on the subject by the representatives of France and the United States.

107. Then I must take into account the statement made by the representative of the People's Republic of China [*1825th meeting*]. It was very straightforward—perhaps it was not harsh enough, but it was in the best Chinese tradition.

108. There remains the Soviet Union, and I am sure it will take a stand in support of the people of Namibia.

109. Where do we go from there? The pattern is clear. Shall we continue to go in circles or shall we break new ground? Perchance some seeds will germinate and produce something practical.

110. I submit that I have been actively seized of **this** situation since the special session of the General Assembly of 1967. To recapitulate, I thought it might be feasible to have two co-administrators from neutral countries join with South Africa in accelerating the process of self-determination. My African brothers were very avid for this and supported the plan until, unfortunately for them and for us all, the United States then thought it would encourage the idea of a Council for Namibia. I would recall to the memory of my colleagues what Mr. Clemenceau said at the League of Nations: if you want to kill any item, just create a committee and refer that item to it. Of course, it was a council, which one would call a glorified committee.

111. I have seen the representatives of Namibia. They are acting like most of us here, like diplomats far from the scene of action—with all due respect to their deep patriotism and their deep desire to see their country liberated. But I must say that like many of us they have been peddlars of words without any action. That is unfortunate. It is a question of power. Those who wield the power can call the action, and we Asian and African Powers, I submit, even in our collectivity, do not wield any power that enables us to translate our desires into the action of liberation.

112. Those who wield power are not prepared to use that power. They may be right. I do not say they should. But let us face the facts. Mr. Scali has told us that the United States is not even prepared to resort to sanctions, and he has also told us that the United States is recommending that no arms be sold to South Africa. But we know very well that, whether or not they sell arms to South Africa, South Africa can obtain arms from other sources. This is not unusual. I would just recall to memory what happened in the First World War. Luxembourg sold steel to both France and Germany, who were at war. And nowadays what we call embargoes and sanctions do not function properly. The world is very corrupt, and you can always find people who are middlemen and who try

to find ways and means of sending the things that are needed to the embargoed or sanctioned country.

113. Let us be practical and face the facts. How do I know that some of our oil, Arab oil, went to certain countries? But I do not open the oil question now, because that might lead us into a digression. There are ways and means of keeping South Africa strong, arms-wise.

114. Then we should take into account the genuine fear of the white people of South Africa. But this, I submit, should pertain to South Africa as such, not to Namibia, which since the early 1920s has been entrusted to South Africa in order to prepare the people for ultimate self-determination. .

115. In the fertile crescent of the Arab world we experienced what is implied in mandates. In countries such as Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq we had high commissioners, English or French. They had puppet governments, too. It was colonialism by proxy. But even then circumstances changed and events came about. The Second World War accelerated the full liberation of those countries and the relative insolvency of the mandatory Powers. They could not keep their colonies because the colonial peoples were becoming aware and could not be kept under the thumb of the colonial Powers.

116. Now, do the Western Powers believe that the people in Namibia are not aware of what is happening outside and that they may rebel? Do we have to wait for a rebellion inside a mandated Territory before we give the people their freedom? I think this is impractical in modern days, because it might ignite a conflict which could not be easily contained—the more so because it so happens that all the Africans and Asians and, I submit, some of the European Powers, not to mention China and the Soviet Union, are behind the people of Namibia. But how? With words? They are not prepared to have a confrontation, the major Powers—China, the Soviet Union, the socialist States and all the conglomeration of Asian and African States. And that is why those who formulate the policies in Washington and in London and in Paris take into account the weakness of **the** Asian and African States and the desire of socialist States such as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China not to have a confrontation with them. Therefore the whole question is stymied. And why are we here—just to have the conditions of war in order to stir ourselves in the Council and do something? Is that practical? Is that what the United Nations was predicated on—not dealing with the patient until he is in the terminal stage?

117. Then the United Nations would die, not necessarily actually die, but the essence of it would fade out. What is the solution? No doubt there will be a couple of resolutions. I admonished my African friends for having produced a voluminous resolution, with

five, six or seven chapters, each divided into several paragraphs. They injected *apartheid* and everything into it that related to the question of Namibia.

118. Now I must recall that I submitted two **comparatively** succinct, draft resolutions: one before the Council and one before the General Assembly. I am not talking of the draft resolution of 1967, during the special session, but the one of last year. During the month of May I set a target period of six months, or nine months, during which time the co-administrators from neutral countries would accelerate the process of self-determination. I was prevailed upon by my good African brothers to withdraw it because they had something better. But I found it so voluminous; good Lord, I got lost in it. There are too many cooks amongst our African brothers. Everybody put in his pinch of salt and pepper and we lost time.

119. On the other hand, our Western friends were placid and content. That is the Anglo-Saxon way. This is not a digression. I marvelled at the freedom of speech at Hyde Park corner in 1929. They could say everything. Then it dawned on me, after years and years, that they **were** very sagacious, the **Anglo-Saxons**. They let everybody say what he wants and then they know what people think. They note it all down and note how **they** are affiliated. Then, when they constitute a danger, somebody comes and takes them to Bow Street and fines them—in those days 10 shillings or 21 shillings, before the inflation—for having done something which might affect public order. They were great psychologists, those in power, who thought: let the people who have something which is troubling them get it off their chests; they will not be dangerous.

120. So you Africans and Asians here, you are playing into the hands of this Anglo-Saxon system. You come here and blow your tops; you get it off your chests. My good friend the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania got it off his chest. He came all the way from Tanzania; and then there was the representative of Liberia. They are all good friends and brothers of mine, and I respect them. They got it off their chests. So our friends **from** the West know what they have in mind. Knowing that we have no power to wield, they devise new formulas which perhaps might work after 20 years **or** after 30 years, if ever, because as long as Mr. Vorster lives—I do not know how old he is; he might live to be **100—the** policy will be the same. Many a serious thing is said in jest, but this is not a joke. This is what is happening. What is happening is that nothing will happen. There will be new resolutions submitted and the question will be protracted for another period and there will be no result.

121. I am not going to go into all the subtleties of what was said by our friends, who need time to persuade Mr. Vorster. They are self-evident. The argument is self-evident. We cannot use sanctions,

they said. We belong to parliamentary systems, they said, and if our Congress or Parliament does not agree to sanctions, we are democratic regimes and we have to go by what the people want. These are elected representatives.

122. I know this formula very well. And then where are we? We are left by the wayside on this question, we Africans and Asians. What shall we do? We should do something that is against my own principles. After **all**, we should all be dedicated to peace, but it seems that without a struggle you cannot win peace. It is contradictory.

123. Do the South Africans and the Western Powers who support them expect that things will remain as they are, notwithstanding the **OAU** and the support it receives from Asia, and from Latin America-for I am sure that many are sympathetic to the **cause** of Namibian liberation.

124. Shall we try to activate the question by the use of force, against the principles and purposes of the United Nations? Is this the only answer? If we have no other alternative, what can we do but try and arm the people there, or have activists who will resort to force, which would be deplorable.

125. But **what is** the alternative, can you tell me? Is it just making speeches here in the Security Council and from the podium of the General Assembly, just, as we say in Arabic, trying to start a fire by blowing into the ashes of an empty hearth? I have a few suggestions to make and I am going to speak again on this question. I am not **going to leave it to float** around in such a miasma. We are all responsible here, not only to our respective Governments but to the peoples of the world, because the Charter starts with the words "We the peoples of the United Nations*"; and I am speaking in terms of belonging to the peoples of the world, not only as a representative of a country, Saudi Arabia.

126. To begin with, I will await the emergence of any draft resolution, which I will study carefully in my humble capacity as a member of the Organization and, in the light of my past experience, which goes **back to** the days when some of my friends and I elaborated the principle of self-determination into a full-fledged right, between 1948 and 1956. I will have to address myself to the practical ways and means **by** which this imbroglio will be resolved-because it is becoming an imbroglio.

127. And how do we expect the Western Powers which are supporting Mr. Vorster to persuade him when he can hide behind the Charter and say nobody is allowed to interfere in the domestic affairs of another State? He can dismiss it simply by such a statement. But Namibia is not his State: it is a Mandated Territory. **All** the colonial Territories have been liberated, so why should the **Namibians** still be

under a foreign yoke? Because there are so many tribes and we should see whether we can make them agree by referendum or by any other means on a form of government? This can go on and on and on.

128. Why should South Africa do it by itself? That is why, ever since 1967 I have thought we should have two co-administrators, from two neutral countries -because we did not trust South Africa, and I told Mr. Muller, in the lounge, that we did not trust **them**-to accelerate the process of self-determination. In fairness to Mr. Muller, he was toying with the idea. He said: "I cannot promise you we will accept, but we will think about it." But instead we have had the Council for Namibia, and the Council will remain with us for many years-not that I have anything against the members of the Council; do not get me wrong: they are fine people. But they are getting to be the traditional type of diplomat: some of them wear French cuffs and they act like traditional diplomats. Let us face facts: we want people who have a sense of innovation, of something new, to attack the problem from its roots, rather than to use pruning shears.

129. Baroody will surprise you and not speak for a full hour. It is going to be six o'clock, and you all can go and have your cocktail, or what have you. But, once and for all, please-and here, with all due respect, I would paraphrase the words of Shakespeare-let us be true to ourselves as diplomats and not just wear the straitjacket of instructions from our Governments. Of course, they would dismiss us if we did not, but perhaps some people would like to **be** dismissed now that New York is bankrupt. But that is not the point. Let us be true to ourselves and try and advise our Governments that this is becoming the laughing stock of the world, and see to it that they do not tell us, "Tell those people that we have to ask the Congress", or the Parliament, with all due respect to my good friend from France, "to have contacts, a sort of liaison". It is all very good, but with what result? And where is the Secretary-General? He is not here today: he has Cyprus; he has I do not know what; everything is put on his shoulders.

130. Let us have two co-administrators, neither from among the Western Powers nor from among the Socialist countries but from countries like Sweden, like Switzerland, which are neutral-Austria, perhaps, but not the Secretary-General. Do not burden him too much: he would not be able to handle it. And let them be sent to Mr. Vorster to find out from him what he intends to do. I have read the letter, with its vague statements. It is like a slippery fish: once you think you are getting it, it jumps out of your hand back into the ocean. We are only fooling ourselves with **rationalizations**. But that does not work any more: the whole world-the people-are aware of this. Who are we Governments here? We **come** and go. You cannot sell these ideas to the **peoples** of the world any more. Thank God they are **aware**, because **Govern-**

ments are expendable; they change their policies according to the circumstances. But people of every country, especially the young, have minds of their own; and, sooner or later-if not already, in **Namibia**—they are aroused. That is why we opt for the liberation of Namibia within a certain period of time.

131. If they had listened to me in 1967, when I proposed a target date of six or seven years hence, the Namibian people--or, as we called them then, the people of South-West Africa-would already be free. No. We have a Council here; we want everything at one time; yet we have still got nothing. When I say "**we**", I mean the Africans and the Asians who were supporting that idea of liberating the Mandated Territory.

132. It does not matter whether we call them **co**-administrators or emissaries, if you prefer, as long as they are from neutral countries. But they should be sent to work out something practical and stay there-unless Mr. Vorster tells them they are *persona non grata*—to get a proclamation, not a letter, that he will abide by a plan whereby, by a certain target date--let it be a year, two years, three years hence, as long as we know where we stand-South Africa will hand over all authority to the people of the Mandated Territory.

133. There is no other alternative. Otherwise, they will be fooling themselves, not us. We cannot be fooled any more. "There are certain modalities to be observed"; "**we** should see what this tribe is." It is all economic and financial. Politics revolve around financial and economic interests. All right. As I said to the Western Powers, "We will see to it that your financial and economic interests are protected." After all, it is better for the Namibians to deal with the South Africans than to get somebody from elsewhere, because they know each other. We have an Arabic proverb. It is about the shepherd who says: "I do not want my flock to perish, but I do not want the wolf to get hungry either." Well, satisfy the **wolf**—those who have financial interests-but not at the expense of the whole flock of sheep.

134. What are we talking about, always in diplomatic cliches? I have to be unorthodox in my approach,

because if we use only the cliches of diplomacy we get nowhere.

135. A last warning, before I wind up this statement. This question of Namibia might activate many Africans against Western interests-not the Governments, mind you, but the people of Africa. They will say, "Those Westerners are against us-why should we trade with them, why should we do business with them? How do I know? I know because in the Arab world I have been accosted. One man asked me, "Why do you live in America?*" I said, "I am in the United Nations." He probably did not know the United Nations. He was a simple man. He said, "Move it to some other place-those Americans are our enemies." I said, "No, the American people are/nice people, like everybody else." The people, rightly or wrongly, will arise and trample on us Governments, and rightly so if we go against their wishes day in and day out. Do not think it is a simple question. What are **Governments**? Today they are here and tomorrow they are gone, but not the people, unless the major Powers want to use the atom bomb and bring the world to an end. That is another question, and we are not concerned with that now. We will speak about it in the First Committee of the General Assembly. This is a warning. The people cannot put up any longer with all this dilly-dallying and **shilly-shallying**. It is high time. As Shakespeare said, anyone who is true to himself cannot be false to any other man. I am paraphrasing, not quoting textually.

136. I thank you, Sir, and members of the Council for having been patient with me. I have something else which is more serious to say, but I think I will leave it until the next meeting.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.

Notes

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 2250th meeting.*

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-Eighth Session, Plenary Meetings, 2133rd meeting, para. 154.*

³ *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970). Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.*

⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 23. vol. II. chapter X, annex.*

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