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FIRST PROGRESS REPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,
FROM HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN THE CONGO,
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21 SEPTEMBER 1960

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PROGRESS REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS
OPERATIONS IN THE CONGO

20 September 1960

INTRODUCTION

1. This progress report covers all important aspects of the operations of the United Nations in the Congo (ONUC), and seeks to set forth the nature and magnitude of the problems and the manner in which the Organization has attempted to discharge its responsibilities.
2. In its task in the Congo, the United Nations has broken entirely new ground; both the mandate given to it by the Security Council and the development of the situation itself have made this operation unique in the history of international organization. New situations and problems have thus often had to be met by decisions taken in the general spirit of the mandate, but without the benefit of experience from the past. While the role of ONUC and the general principles under which it is operating in the Congo are clear, the detailed method of application of these principles to a kaleidoscopic and often chaotic situation has sometimes been less easy to determine. Legal, political, humanitarian and practical considerations have had to be carefully weighed in determining the most desirable course of action. It is hoped that this appraisal may make the progress and the conduct of the operation more easily understandable and bring into focus the nature of the problems facing ONUC in its unprecedented task.
3. The Congo is a vast territory of 2,343,930 square kilometres - more than four times the size of France - but with a population of only 13,700,000, scarcely six persons per square kilometre. Occupying the greater part of the basin of the Congo in the very heart of Africa, it has a strategic position of great importance. It has great natural resources, in particular rich mineral deposits, extensive forests and ample cultivatable land. The country is largely self-sufficient in food supplies. The main centres of population and activity in the Congo are linked by an intricate system of rail, water and air transport. In view of the enormous distances to be covered, the importance of an efficient system of communications is paramount, and it has been a constant preoccupation of ONUC to prevent any interruption and to ensure the proper functioning of this system. Under colonial rule,

an elaborate economic structure and a Western society of a high material standard were superimposed on the African inhabitants of the Congo. The superstructure remains now, abandoned in large measure, and with almost no social or economic connexion with the life of the average Congolese.

4. On attaining its independence on 30 June 1960, the country would have been faced, even had the circumstances been more normal, with many serious problems - economic, social, political, military and administrative. On the economic plans, the paradoxical situation exists that despite the country's great natural wealth and its considerable development under Belgian rule, conditions of acute economic distress prevail which cannot be alleviated without outside assistance on a massive scale. The almost complete lack of trained civil servants, executives and professional people of Congolese origin in virtually all walks of life, and the striking absence of administrative and political experience would inevitably have created a serious situation for the Government of the young Republic. But the situation was made still worse by a complete failure to arrange for any organized hand-over to the Congolese of the administrative machinery of government or of essential public services.

5. The already difficult situation was still further complicated by the confusion, fear and disorder which gripped the country shortly after independence, as a result of a vicious circle of events. Mutinies of the Force Publique and subsequent outbursts of violence against Europeans were followed, on the one hand, by the sending of Belgian forces, especially parachutists, into action in many places, which in turn gave rise to bitterness and panic among the African population, and, on the other, to a new, fearful flight of many Europeans and the consequent breakdown of many public services and important economic enterprises. Some facilities, for example navigation aids at airports, police communications and some telecommunications, were damaged or destroyed. Funds for the payment of workers in certain public utilities were taken out of the country, creating further work stoppages and unemployment through inability to meet payrolls. General economic distress added to the widespread feeling of insecurity and unrest. Powerless to restore order and to maintain normal life in the country, the Government appealed to the United Nations for military and technical assistance.

6. The United Nations was thus faced from the beginning with serious problems of an economic, social, administrative and technical nature - problems which, with the active support of the world community and the co-operation of the Government of the Congo, it might reasonably have expected to solve by strenuous efforts over a certain period of time. It was also faced with a volatile and explosive situation with which the Government itself was unable to cope, a state of utter lack of public confidence, the disruption of the normal life of the community amidst a general atmosphere of fear and anxiety.

7. In the first phase of its operations under the Security Council mandate, the primary objectives of ONUC were to ensure the speedy evacuation of all remaining Belgian forces from the territory of the Congo, and by the deployment of United Nations forces in various parts of the country, to assist in the maintenance of law and order and the protection of life and property. At the same time, all possible efforts were made to help maintain essential services and to encourage the resumption of normal activity. Another urgent task was to assist the Congolese authorities to restore discipline in the Force Publique, now the Congolese National Army, and to regroup this army in camps where its training and reorganization could start as soon as possible.

8. With the evacuation of Belgian troops, one very potent source of suspicion, fear and panic was removed. It may also be noted with satisfaction that with the assistance of the Deputy Commander of the United Nations Force, acting as its adviser at the formal request of the Prime Minister, the Congolese National Army has begun to re-form in new units and to engage in the training of its officers and men.

9. But while these problems were being attended to, new differences and manifestations of violence began to appear. Tribal warfare, especially in the Province of Kasai, and to a lesser extent in the Province of Equateur, began to take a large toll of human life and to produce a drifting population of many thousands of refugees. In addition, in order to put down secessionist movements in the Katanga and Kasai Provinces by force, a part of the National Army was moved by the Central Government into the Bakwanga area and near the northern border of Katanga. A civil war was thus begun, which was to make many victims, not only among troops, but also among civilians, including women and children.

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10. The United Nations Force, thinly deployed in the area, and circumscribed by its mandate, used its best efforts to safeguard lives, to prevent massacre and genocide, and to mitigate other consequences of these disasters, in particular famine and disease. By the use of United Nations good offices and by the employment of an observer organization, the hostilities on the Kasai-Katanga border have virtually been halted recently by a cease-fire agreement. The violence of the tribal conflicts has also abated, at least for the moment. Nevertheless, the necessary work of reconciliation of tribal differences has still to be undertaken, for these differences can have a direct bearing on the political situation.

11. The people of the Congo comprise many tribes speaking different dialects. The tribal conflicts, which plagued the country long before it attained independence, have since taken on a more serious character and spread into the political field. Many of the political parties have strong tribal affiliations and the provincial governments constituted after the May elections are often dominated by particular tribal elements. There is also a tendency for members of these provincial governments to use their newly acquired authority to promote the domination of their own tribes over others. This has led to a resurgence of tribal conflict with dire political, economic and social consequences, constituting a grave danger to the integrity of the country.

12. A typical example is the Baluba-Lulua conflict in the Kasai Province where, without effective intervention of the provincial authorities, the Lulua have mercilessly attacked the Baluba elements of the Luluabourg region. This has led to a mass exodus of the Baluba to their tribal lands in the Bakwanga region where a rebel government has been set up, and to a civil war between Central Government troops and the local forces, in which sporadic fighting and massacre has taken many lives. It is estimated that the refugees in the Bakwanga area from former and recent Lulua-Baluba conflicts now number about 250,000. Their feeding and maintenance is an urgent concern of the Red Cross, and of the ONUC food relief organization; strenuous efforts are also being made to cope with the medical problems involved. The mass exodus from Luluabourg of the Baluba, who constituted almost the entire clerical and skilled labour force of the town, has contributed largely to the disruption of the economic life of the entire province.

13. Latterly, new forms of division and strife have appeared. Violent political rivalry in the Central Government itself has led, in the past weeks, to a confused

and prolonged constitutional crisis, and to much discord and attempted violence. This situation is described in the next section of this report in relation to the problems of non-intervention.

II. POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND THE PROBLEMS OF NON-INTERVENTION

14. A brief outline of the political developments is given in the following paragraphs, together with an indication of the nature of the problems confronting ONUC in the performance of its function in relation to the changing political situation. This is followed by an analysis of the application of the principle of non-intervention, as laid down by the Security Council, in the face of a succession of constitutional crises.

15. It is evident that in their size and scope the civil and military programmes described in this report are already, when measured in absolute terms, the largest which the United Nations has ever been called upon to organize. This extensive programme, viewed against the background of a comparative absence of governmental organization, bulks even larger. This situation imposes on the United Nations operation an increasingly grave responsibility to weigh its every action, and to impose on itself the most careful restraint in order to ensure that its presence promotes, and does not retard, the political development and independence of the new State. The Charter itself has established the guiding principle that the United Nations must not - reserving the special authority of the Security Council - intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State; and the Security Council, in paragraph 4 of its resolution of 9 August 1960, has reaffirmed that the United Nations Force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise. On the other hand, it is manifest that the decision of the Security Council, in acceding to a governmental request for military assistance to the national security forces in the restoration of law and order, has itself automatically juxtaposed the international and the domestic spheres of action. In addition, in the civilian field alone, there is always the danger that the very extent of the aid offered may give the appearance of constituting in some manner a degree of intervention in the work of the government institutions into whose programmes the aid must be integrated.

16. It was already a difficult and delicate task for ONUC, in the period from the date of its first entry in mid-July up to the end of August 1960, to exercise its responsibility for maintaining peace and security without infringing on any internal function of government. By mid-September, however, the constitutional crises had resulted in the breakdown of the formal structure of government into partially overlapping but largely competitive power groups headed by the Chief of State, the Prime Minister, the Parliament and, more recently, the Army. In such circumstances, actions undertaken by the United Nations tended to become a bone of contention with one internal group or another. Indeed, even in matters on which ONUC's responsibilities were not attracted, it frequently transpired that opposing factions - always prompt to accuse it of "intervening" in favour of a rival - were nevertheless proclaiming for themselves some special monopoly of United Nations support.
17. The developments in relation to the entry of the United Nations Force into the Province of Katanga have previously been reported to the Security Council by the Secretary-General (S/4417/Add.6, 7 and 9) and the differences of viewpoint in the interpretation of ONUC responsibilities with regard to Katanga, relating to the Organization's mandate, have been fully explained in that report.
18. The difficulties encountered by ONUC in its relations with the Congolese Central Government as a result of the latter's mistaken notion of the United Nations functions in the Congo, are illustrated by the following instance. The Prime Minister demanded, and used military threats to seek to enforce, the control of the airports entirely by the Congolese National Army, a step which would have deprived the United Nations Force of its ability to guarantee the security of the centres of communication which are indispensable to the performance of its functions. Only the most skilful military liaison succeeded in avoiding a clash from this attempted use of force against ONUC, and in working out a demarcation of ONUC and Congolese military functions at the airports.
19. During this period, an attempt was made by ONUC to enter into negotiations with the Government, through the Foreign Minister. A draft agreement was submitted on the status of the United Nations in the Congo, modelled on the agreement on the status of the United Nations Emergency Force adopted in 1957 by the United Nations and the Government of Egypt. On particular

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points, proposals were also offered for increasing liaison between ONUC and the Government, including the assurance of the Government's civil control at airports over non-ONUC flights.

20. These negotiations had no more than commenced, however, when the capital found itself in the midst of a grave constitutional crisis. On the evening of 5 September 1960, the Chief of State in a declaration broadcast on the national radio proclaimed in effect that the Prime Minister had betrayed his office by provoking discord within the Government, depriving citizens of their fundamental liberties and plunging the country into a fratricidal civil war. He therefore revoked the Government with immediate effect and named the President of the Senate, Mr. Joseph Iléo, to form a new government. He requested the United Nations to assure peace and order. During the same evening, the Prime Minister spoke three times to the population, indicating that the President was no longer Chief of State and calling upon the people, the workers and the Army to rise. In the face of an imminent breakdown of law and order, with a civil war already under way in parts of the country, and with a clear threat to the United Nations Force from the prospective movements of mutually hostile elements of the army, ONUC, in the interests of the maintenance of peace and security, that night closed all major airports to any traffic other than that of the United Nations. The following day, recognizing that the risk of major clashes between political and ethnic groups could present the Force with a peace and security problem far exceeding its powers, the United Nations took a directly related emergency measure and temporarily closed the Leopoldville radio station. The first demonstrations, with some casualties, had in fact taken place that day. After these two measures, the city of Leopoldville remained quiet, however, and in particular the closing of the airports soon brought the civil war in the provinces to a halt and checked the influx of arms into Katanga.

21. Also during the night of 5 September the Council of Ministers published a communiqué declaring the Chief of State deprived of his functions for having violated the fundamental law, nullifying the latter's revocation of the Government and accusing him of high treason. Parliament met continuously on 7 September. After an address by the Prime Minister, the Chamber of Representatives, by a vote of 60 to 19, undertook to cancel both the decisions of the Chief of State and of the Prime Minister dismissing one another. The

Foreign Minister and one other Cabinet member who had countersigned the presidential revocation of the Government both announced their resignations. The following day the Senate voted 41 to 2, with 6 abstentions and 29 absent, against the presidential proclamations. On the same day the Prime Minister stated at a press conference that he would consider demanding the immediate withdrawal of the United Nations Force if the airports and radio stations were not immediately turned over to the exclusive control of the Government. Mr. Kasa-Vubu also protested that his spokesman had not been permitted to broadcast from the station.

22. On 9 September, Mr. Lumumba stated in a speech in Camp Leopold, while referring to the voting in the Senate and the Chamber, that he was now Chief of State and Supreme Commander of the National Army. On the same day, President Kasa-Vubu issued a declaration rejecting the votes of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, on the ground that the decisions of the Chief of State were not subject to the approval of the Senate or Chamber of Representatives.

23. On 10 September 1960, the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who had assumed his functions on 8 September, called on the Prime Minister and then on the President. The Prime Minister handed him a memorandum accusing the United Nations of flagrant interference in the internal affairs of the Congo with reference to the action taken at the airports and radio station, and attributing to Parliament alone the power to revoke either the Government or the Chief of State. The Chief of State addressed a letter to the Special Representative declaring the non-existence of the Lumumba Government and requesting the United Nations not to treat with it. On the same day the bureau of the Chamber of Representatives communicated to the Secretary-General through his Special Representative its position that the interpretation of the fundamental law rested solely with Parliament and that the Secretary-General's comments to the Security Council on the constitutional situation therefore represented interference in the internal affairs of the country. On 11 September, the President of the Chamber of Representatives and the Acting President of the Senate informed the United Nations that the votes of their separate bodies constituted a sovereign determination of renewal of confidence in the Government of Mr. Lumumba and an annulment of the ordinance of the Chief of State. That night the Prime Minister designate, Mr. Ilebo, announced the formation of his new government.

24. It is to be noted that these declarations and counter-declarations, although they divided the Executive, Ministerial and Legislative Branches of Government on the interpretation of their several powers under the Loi fondamentale (Fundamental Law), were made against a relatively non-violent background. In addition, the Presidents of the two chambers, on 12 September, addressed statements to the Special Representative that the Parliament would undertake the surveillance of the normal and peaceful utilization of the radio station and airports. Thus, on 12 September the United Nations, on its own initiative, reopened the radio station, appealing to all to exercise restraint in its use. The Minister of Information designated by Mr. Ileo broadcast a speech during the day, in the course of which he stated that Mr. Lumumba would be arrested and given a fair trial; two days later, a speech of Mr. Lumumba was broadcast. A serious show of force by both governments, however, did take place at the radio station both before and after its reopening. On 12 and 13 September, the airports were opened to all peaceful, civilian and humanitarian traffic and remain open.

25. On 12 September, an ordinance of the Chief of State proclaimed the composition of the new government and revoked the functions of another eleven members of the "former" government. That same day Mr. Lumumba was arrested by the Gendarmerie on the order of the Army Chief of Staff but was released by the Army Command in circumstances which are unclear. A parliamentary committee seeking a reconciliation between the Chief of State and the Prime Minister protested against this action and called attention to the fact that the Ileo government had not yet had a vote of confidence from Parliament and therefore could not substitute itself for the legal government. At the same time, Mr. Lumumba transmitted through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General an appeal to the Security Council that it furnish his government with direct aid in the form of twenty aircraft with crews, a "large quantity" of arms and munitions, and a powerful radio transmitter, or it would seek this aid elsewhere.

26. On 13 September a joint session of Parliament conferred full powers on Prime Minister Lumumba in a vote which was somewhat uncertain both as to substance and count. On 14 September the Chief of State suspended Parliament; the Presidents of the two chambers replied to him in writing that his ordinance was countersigned by Mr. Ileo as Prime Minister though the latter has received no parliamentary investiture. On the same day, a letter from Mr. Lumumba

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formally requested the detachment of a specified national contingent of the United Nations force to aid his government in the pacification of the country. That evening the Chief of Staff of the Army broadcast a statement that, two opposing governments having for some time fought for power in the country, the Army was taking power, by means of a peaceful revolution, until 31 December 1960. Dignitaries in all groups began a series of appeals to the United Nations for special protection of their persons and residences. At a press conference the Chief of Staff announced his reliance on the United Nations for assistance, and his intention to set up a "Collège des universitaires" for the governance of the country.

27. The following morning, 15 September, Mr. Lumumba took refuge in the Ghana Officers Mess in the Army's principal camp in Leopoldville. Throughout the day his life was seriously threatened while hard-pressed Ghana troops held off riotous soldiers of the hostile Baluba tribe who charged that their families had been victims of the civil war in Kasai. After personal intervention on the spot by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, it proved possible by nightfall for the national Gendarmerie and the Ghana troops to escort him out. During the same afternoon the Chief of State and his Prime Minister designate requested the United Nations to effect the arrest of Mr. Lumumba, which the Special Representative firmly declined, explaining that this was entirely outside the functions of ONUC. On 16 September, Mr. Lumumba demanded that the United Nations enable his government to fly in troops from Stanleyville to assure the security of Leopoldville.

28. To complete this chronicle of political events as at the time of the preparation of this report, an unsuccessful attempt on the life of the Chief of Staff was made on 18 September in Camp Leopold. Two successive announcements were made by Mr. Lumumba, and categorically denied by Mr. Kasu-Vubu, that the Prime Minister and the President had signed an agreement of reconciliation. On 20 September, Mr. Lumumba protested in writing to ONUC that the Chief of Staff with elements of the Army had occupied the administrative buildings of the Central Government, and requested ONUC intervention to reverse this action. On the same day, the Chief of Staff announced the formation of his government, consisting of a College of Commissioners designated by ordinance of the Chief of State, thus apparently raising the number of rival governments to three.

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29. In this confused situation, with three rival governments jockeying for position, and each demanding as of right the enlistment of ONUC's support to enforce its own particular political solution, any action taken by ONUC in the performance of its disinterested mission has been liable to be seized upon by one or more groups, for reason of political advantage, as a basis for the unfounded charge of intervention in the domestic affairs of the country. In such a situation ONUC has maintained with scrupulous care an attitude of strict neutrality, avoiding any action which could be interpreted, even remotely, as influencing the political balance. The fragmentation of the branches of government into separate claims of supremacy by rival prime ministers, by the Parliament and by the Army has greatly increased the degree of circumspection required to avoid even the appearance of influencing the outcome of the conflict. Although it is a relatively easy matter to refrain from any open pronouncement, or to balance an interview with one leader with discussions with others, the real difficulty lies in the fact that the United Nations is not in the Congo as a mere observer; it has a military and a civil assistance programme regarding each of which it has certain specific responsibilities. The very size of these programmes has induced charges that they amount to a "take-over" of the government by the organization. It has therefore been unavoidable that operations should have been slowed down in many ways: formal agreements cannot be negotiated in the confusion at the governmental level; even the more routine contacts at lower levels are to an extent disrupted by the crisis; and some actions of unquestioned propriety in ordinary circumstances have perforce to be deferred lest they appear to favour one political faction against another.

30. In the field of law and order the effect of these inhibitions is particularly complex. While it is axiomatic that ONUC is in the Congo to assist the government in the maintenance of law and order, it is also true that its force cannot be placed at the disposal of one faction against another. In the exercise of the functions assigned to it by the Security Council, ONUC actions will inevitably have some impact on domestic matters. It must nevertheless ensure, and has striven to do so, that every such act is both impartial and strictly confined to the necessary fulfilment of its international mandate.

31. It is obvious that in so complex and variable a situation, the imperative of non-intervention requires continuous analysis and careful weighing by ONUC in the context of rapidly unfolding events. During the protracted political crises, while ONUC has maintained an attitude of strict detachment, it has not been one of indifference to the point of denying the possibility of the exercise of the function of good offices, should it be sought by all concerned.

III. MILITARY OPERATIONS

32. The United Nations Force now consists of some 16,400 officers and men coming from 28 nations. This total will soon reach nearly 19,000. The main contingents are supplied by 13 countries, the remainder supplying administrative and ancillary units, air force personnel and staff officers. The first units arrived within forty-eight hours of the Security Council decision, and were immediately deployed. Such exceptional speed was warranted by the seriousness of the situation, but it also entailed considerable risks and disadvantages. The troops had to be deployed before the Headquarters, logistic organization and signal communications were even formed. Operations in local areas were further hampered by lack of vehicles, a situation which is still in process of being rectified. The Force at present consists of a Force Headquarters the equivalent of 20 battalions, signals, engineers, supply and transport units, and ordnance depot, a field hospital, postal units, and an air transport force. For present location and strength of the Force, see annex 1.

33. The Force had to be air-lifted into unknown situations in distant places without, in many cases, any communications other than through liaison officers with Force Headquarters in Leopoldville. Time allowed very little briefing on the United Nations mission, and lack of information permitted even less instruction on the situation in a given area. An immense responsibility, therefore, devolved upon local commanders and their men, and it is the best evidence of their devotion, discipline and judgement that no serious situations arose in any of the varied and delicate situations in which they found themselves at such short notice. A high degree of improvisation has thus been required at all levels throughout the first stages of the operation.

34. The contingents of the Force have been called upon to deal with matters beyond the range of normal military experience in their assistance to local authorities. They have had to deal with civil disturbance, maintenance of essential services, protection of refugees, and with situations very often complicated by irrational fear and a host of alarmist rumours. They have constantly been asked for help in protecting minorities and in facilitating the resumption of work in a variety of enterprises. They have used their good offices in situations ranging from tribal war to arbitrary arrest of individuals and the molestation of minority groups. A further source of difficulty in many areas has been to discover who really constitutes the effective authority.

35. Communications of all kinds have hitherto been at a minimum. When a brigade of three battalions is responsible for an area the size of France, which is beset by problems ranging from famine to tribal war, the lack of communications aggravates the already exhausting task of the troops. At present, radio communications have been established by the Force signals between ONUC Headquarters and the majority of the territorial commands. There are, however, still some territorial commands which depend for their link with Headquarters on borrowed or public facilities. The situation within the territorial commands is also not completely satisfactory, many of the units being without radio communication between their headquarters and sub-units. This is due to the fact that the normal radio equipment with which a unit is equipped is not designed to cover the distances over which they are presently deployed. The Force signal communications are being progressively improved. For further information on communications, see annex 2.

36. The fact that the United Nations Force is a peace force provides another problem unfamiliar to the highly trained soldier. He is allowed the right to use force only in the last resort of legitimate self-defence. The troops are also compelled by the demands of non-intervention not to resort to military initiative in situations which would normally call for a strong reaction from courageous and responsible troops. This imposes on them a heavy strain, and only high morale, discipline and a belief in their mission have made it possible for contingents to meet this challenge with honour, and without the use of force.

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37. Much attention has been given to the restraint which the United Nations imposes on its troops. This restraint is the only possible course for a peace force of this kind. It has been proved by the performance of the soldiers themselves, beyond any doubt, that well-trained and devoted troops can achieve their objective, even under these very difficult conditions, and can inspire a respect for their authority, which is more effective than any momentary physical advantage that could be gained by the use of force.

38. An emergency operation, extended over an area as large as the Congo, is in its initial phases almost entirely dependent upon aircraft for communications, transport and supply. The ONUC air component has had to be put together from a bewildering variety of sources. Such a situation is not conducive to maximum efficiency or performance and has created a large-scale and costly training programme.

39. In spite of this, and by the unrelenting efforts of air staff, air crews and ground crews, the ONUC air transport force is now in existence in the Congo and has been functioning with increasing efficiency for many weeks. Its tasks have included transporting of troops, supplies, relief food and necessary civilian personnel all over the Congo. With the development of this air component, the United Nations Force is gradually becoming independent of other less reliable agencies of air transport. A chart of the organization of the ONUC air transport force is attached as annex 3. Recommendations for the expansion and reorganization of this air transport force are now under consideration.

40. In the period of the build-up of the Force many services have necessarily been improvised. Medical services have been gradually organized, and, fortunately, there has been no major epidemic or significant number of casualties before this organization was completed. Local procurement of food on a large scale has so far been possible in most areas and has relieved the burden of long-range supply by air until a regular organization of supply by surface transport could be achieved. Nevertheless, in many areas it has not been possible to obtain adequate supplies of local food, and inroads have been made into the Force's stock of reserve rations. The development of postal services for the Force has, for various reasons - including the lack of necessary governmental agreements - been very slow, and this has been a hardship to which the men of the Force have submitted with patience. Similarly, owing to other more pressing demands, recreational facilities

have thus far been poor. As yet, there has been little time or opportunity for normal leave periods or recreation, since the strength available and the magnitude of the task to be performed have resulted in units having to operate at full pressure without the normal reserves necessary for regular reliefs. The excellent spirit of the Force, however, has remained unimpaired by these shortcomings.

IV. CIVILIAN OPERATIONS

41. For the first time in the history of international organization, the United Nations and the specialized agencies have collaborated in the Congo as a single team, under the mandate of the Security Council, to meet the economic emergency following the country's independence. They have put together, in a little over a month, the largest civilian team they have ever had in one country at one time. The vast responsibilities which the individual members of the mission have assumed are in themselves indicative of the void which exists in almost every sector of Congolese life today: the responsibilities which they have not been able to undertake, and the recommendations they have not been able to put through are indicative of the political and organization vacuum in which the United Nations has had to work, a situation which has regrettably been worsened in recent days.

42. To give a fair and accurate picture of the meaning of United Nations civilian operations in the Congo, one would have to begin by describing the extent to which the country's normal facilities were disrupted and by listing the services which would not be functioning save for the presence of the United Nations. There was an immediate and country-wide breakdown in the regular commercial arrangements for distributing food, to the point where people in some parts of the Congo must now rely for their main sustenance on food supplies distributed from Leopoldville by the United Nations. There was, at the same time, the threat of a major breakdown in the maintenance of water supply and sanitation facilities. Without the services of WHO personnel, who arrived within two days of the plea for help, these facilities might have failed. There is a more recent ominous threat of a smallpox and plague epidemic, and disquieting reports are being received of an increased number of malaria and filariasis cases.

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43. With the voluntary departure of European personnel incident to independence, there was virtually no trained staff to supervise the operation of telephone, telegraph, telex and radio transmission installations, and these facilities are in operation today only because of the presence of a large UN-ITU team. Likewise, air traffic control services were deteriorating with the departure of technicians from a very large number of airports. Today, adequate servicing of flights can only be assured at the three airports where United Nations advisers, controllers and radio technicians are based. If there were not any meteorologists assigned by the United Nations to the country (there are five), there would be absolutely no meteorological protection for planes. Machinery for the radio transmission of weather trends within the country and from other parts of the world to the Congo has been almost completely disrupted, to the point that the chief of the meteorological mission has made an arrangement to send a helicopter once a day to Brazzaville to pick up necessary weather maps.

44. At the beginning of the crisis, in July, almost all surface transportation had become paralysed for lack of security and supervisory arrangements. This traffic has now been put into motion again, but at a lower level of efficiency and on an uncertain basis. The vital port of Matadi, for example, is running now because ONUC opened it to traffic and assured the continuation of dredging and pilot operations. The United Nations has taken measures to ensure the passage of rail freight through Kasai Province into Katanga, and from Matadi to Leopoldville.

45. In the all-important sector of finance and trade, ONUC stepped in to sound the alarm and suggest control measures at a time when there was a possibility of foreign exchange being completely exhausted. The flight of capital from the country, which had begun several years previously, is being brought under control by hastily improvised economic and financial measures. In the area of labour administration, the entire social security system has been, and to an extent still is, threatened by collapse. For the time being, the system of labour inspection has been suspended. For this service, and for the completely depleted statistical offices of the Government, substantial United Nations assistance has been requested. The collapse of the judiciary and court system has given rise to very serious problems affecting the administration of justice; a legal consultant has recently arrived and is faced with the very difficult task of helping to set up judicial machinery in the absence of trained Congolese judges and magistrates.

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46. This is an abbreviated and incomplete picture of the stark background against which the United Nations established its programme of technical assistance in the Congo. Because of the nature of the emergency, this assistance has begun by being largely operational. It will undoubtedly continue to be operational for some time, but this has not prevented the advisory mission from turning its attention to the enormous planning, training and organizational problems which lie immediately beyond the first emergency. They have found reason to warn that the bigger crisis is yet to be surmounted; that there are many sectors of the country's economy, in agriculture, food distribution and some areas of health, for example, where a reasonably normal level of activity is being carried out on the basis of the momentum of earlier days. When this momentum wears down, however, the old ways of doing things and the old machinery will no longer be serviceable or feasible.

47. In almost every one of the major fields of current United Nations activity, new and simpler structures must be built to replace the old ones which will become useless later on. This vast undertaking must be carried out within the circumstances and the limitations which are described in the paragraphs that follow.

Deficiencies in the organization structure

48. A development plan begins with a Minister, with his central staff and with an administrative organization which reaches into the different sections of a country. The United Nations Mission in the Congo has begun its collaboration at the Central Government level, has worked with Ministers and their staffs where they existed, and has tried to help in their formation when no organization did exist. Nonetheless, the situation in this critical sphere has, if anything, deteriorated in the past two weeks.

49. Most of the senior United Nations consultants, whose work depends on day-to-day co-operation with Ministers and other host officials, have found (with a few notable exceptions) that they had no experienced Minister with whom to work, that there was overlapping of functions and that the staff who formed the Ministry were caught up in the confusion of the political situation. In the paragraphs that follow, there will be references to high priority actions recommended, and even drawn up, by United Nations advisers which still await signature, ratification or follow-through by a government department which is not functioning.

50. At the base of this situation is the fact that substantial numbers of European civil servants abruptly left the country soon after independence. No real arrangements had been made to set up a new structural basis - a civil service - for the Congolese Government. Ministries which had, suddenly, to be staffed from the ground up are now little more than names, with no well-defined functions and no experienced personnel. In this atmosphere, lower level staff began to promote themselves into higher jobs without any system or basis for doing so.

51. The member of the consultative group responsible for public administration, after nearly a month of not being able to find a proper ministerial base for his work, has now been operating more effectively within the Ministère de la fonction publique, which has only just been established. Slowly, civil servants are responding to the measures he has recommended, but there is always the threat of political considerations putting an end to the progress that has been made. A promotion system has been worked out, and the consultant has helped to draw up a salary scale, but the chances of reaching an agreement on the latter as between the various Ministries are very slight for the immediate future.

52. On the all-important point of developing co-ordination between Ministries, it might be mentioned that the first meeting of the Secretaries-General of all Ministries was held last week. Out of twenty-seven such officials, ten did not attend.

53. The structure and effectiveness of provincial governments and their co-ordination with the Central Government are undefined and obscure, a fact which seriously hampers the activities of ONUC.

54. In brief, ONUC is in the process of helping to build a civil service, working with an untried and inexperienced skeleton group which is diffused and lacking in esprit de corps. It may take twelve months, with the co-operation of the staff that exists, to survey the status, organization and efficiency of the current machinery, with a view to building from that point. In the meantime, the presence of United Nations advisers has made it possible for some organizational arrangement to function.

The financial and economic situation

55. Economic conditions in the Congo at the present time are characterized by an abnormally low level of production and high unemployment in the

major urban centres, by a substantial decline in the volume of foreign trade and in public revenue and expenditure. There are also signs of price increases for certain imported and domestically produced goods and services, and of a pronounced depreciation in the value of the Congolese currency in the foreign exchange markets.

56. Since the independence of the country, there has been a very substantial decline in the level of aggregate demand. The basic economic reasons for the tendency of prices to rise and for the present lack of confidence in the currency are therefore to be found on the supply side. The normal processes of production and distribution within the economy have been disrupted and there has been a steep decline in imports of certain raw materials and essential consumer goods. These developments reflect the absence of economic relations with Katanga, the lack of security and order, the breakdown of the administrative machinery and the inability of the Government to take appropriate measures in the fields of foreign exchange control, import regulations and monetary and financial policies. The revival of business activity is hampered by an acute shortage of credit, which is partly caused by the inability of the Government to meet its obligations.

57. On the positive side, the physical machinery of production and distribution remains largely intact and, as soon as the serious problems in the fields of security, public administration and economic policies have been eased and a certain amount of foreign aid has been made available, the volume of production should begin to rise at relatively rapid pace. In these circumstances, the United Nations economic and financial advisers have concentrated their efforts on problems of money and credit, foreign exchange and import regulations and budgetary planning and execution. The status of these activities is as follows.

The Central Bank

58. An Agreement for the liquidation of the old Central Bank of the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi was entered into between Congolese and Belgian officials a month ago under United Nations auspices. Moreover, United Nations advisers assisted in the preparation of proposals for the creation of an interim organization to operate after the liquidation and before the establishment of a new Central Bank. As a result of the recent political crisis, no action has been taken, and the Government is still not in a position to create money and credit.

Foreign exchange and import regulations

59. As a result of extreme deterioration of foreign exchange balances of the Central Bank, the Government, on the advice of ONUC, has decided on strict rationing of foreign exchange and on import licensing limited to goods essential to the functioning of the economy. A list of such goods was prepared and ONUC advisers helped in drafting new foreign exchange control regulations. Although these regulations were approved in principle, they have not yet been put into operation. Owing to lack of a firm decision the granting of import licenses does not follow procedures recommended by ONUC. The help given is now on a day-to-day basis, by suggesting emergency measures for control, by filling some administrative jobs and by operating as liaison between local businessmen and the Government when urgent import-export and foreign exchange problems arise.

Budget

60. Both the revenues and expenditures of the Government have dropped very considerably. Whilst the revenue from taxation has declined in August to approximately one-third of the monthly average of the first half of 1960, the expenditure decreased by 50 per cent. The cash deficit, which was characteristic also in the first half of 1960, continued on a much reduced level of expenditure. The only means used for covering it since independence were advances from the Central Bank.

61. Recommendations were made by ONUC as to type and number of technicians needed to improve the tax administration; it suggested short-term steps necessary for raising revenue in the existing situation. So far no action has been taken on recruitment and the short-term measures suggested were not put into operation in the very uncertain political situation.

62. As the 1960 budget became quite unrealistic in relation to the completely changed situation, ONUC suggested that necessary adjustments should be made for the remaining four months of the year. It was suggested that each ministry and provincial government should enumerate its needs on a simplified form for consideration of the Ministry of Finance. As the answers were delayed, it was decided to call in the representatives of the Ministries to the Ministry of Finance, for quick consultation, and, in the case of the Provinces, to allocate funds on a proportional basis. It is hoped that the resulting adjustments will lead to a more rational allocation of funds to government services.

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Lack of adequate information on which to base planning

63. From the summaries which have already been given, it should be clear that the lack of sufficient background information underlines the present ineffectiveness in most fields. The breakdown of the Government statistical services has been noted. To go further, there is an almost complete breakdown in the transmission of statistical and factual information from the provinces into Leopoldville and even from points within Leopoldville. To give only an example of the effect which this situation has on civilian operation: the shipment of emergency food supplies from ONUC to points of demand is based on the most haphazard notice of such demand, depending on word received informally from United Nations military observers, some provincial authorities, Red Cross teams and anyone else who might be travelling in an area where food is scarce; there is no systematized way of knowing where these supplies should be sent.

64. In regard to the extremely vital programme of public works which is being organized to help alleviate the unemployment problem, ONUC engineers found that provincial authorities did not have adequate information about work stoppages and local needs on which to base a sound selection of projects. There is, for example, no reliable information on the number and kinds of agricultural plantations which have been abandoned, and - for that matter - the basic information on the extent of unemployment is in itself only an estimate.

Training of Congolese staff and recruitment of foreign technicians

65. There is perhaps no more serious long-range economic and social problem facing the Congo than that of finding a corps of officials and technicians, in the long run from among its own people or, more immediately, from other countries. The United Nations mission has turned its attention to questions of training and recruitment, regarding which the following preliminary observations are presented.

Training

66. At the time of independence there were only seventeen Congolese university graduates, not one doctor, no engineers, professors, architects, etc., and few, if any, qualified lawyers. If there is to be a large-scale programme of fellowship awards, and parallel programmes of in-service training, one must find people with sufficient educational prerequisites to qualify for this training. In the field of health, the ONUC Senior Consultant has

estimated that it will take some twenty-two years before the Congo can produce enough of its own doctors to staff even a reduced schedule of health services. Recently, a Government offered to train a substantial number of Congolese technicians in the much-needed skills of weather forecasting. So far, only six Congolese have been found who qualify for these awards, and they have not yet been sent abroad because it has been impossible in the present political hiatus, over a period of exactly one month, to get the necessary Government agreement.

Recruitment from abroad

67. It is apparent that for a long while to come, the Congo will have to depend on large numbers of technicians from abroad, and in fact CNUC has already been approached to use its machinery to recruit teachers, doctors, labour inspectors, administrators and other specialists who would become employees of the Government. UNESCC has been asked to undertake the task of finding over 1,000 teachers to staff, for the most part, the secondary schools. Effective recruitment is found difficult, however, because of the prevailing political conditions in the country.

68. Less than 50 of the 400 hospitals operating throughout the country have doctors, most of them provided by the Red Cross and bilateral aid teams. Many of these teams will have to return home within the next few months, and it will be difficult to find replacements.

Reorganization and simplification of basic services

69. In the introduction to this section of the report it was pointed out that a greater crisis is yet to come when the momentum of the old system wears out and when the old institutions - which still exist - can no longer be used. The elaborate health services which were built up throughout the Congo can no longer be maintained for lack of staff and financing. A smaller, simplified establishment will have to be substituted, and ONUC is already working on the structure of such a system. In the agricultural field, activity has not been seriously affected so far, but the very basis of the agricultural programme and the methods of work of the smaller plantations and farms will have to be reformed to conform to the new economic conditions and facilities of the country.

Likewise, the social security system, which was built on an elaborate base, will be reorganized to fit the needs of Congolese administration. The same can be said for the management of airports, the educational system and almost every phase of the country's structure. It will be a slow and painful process, which will take most of the attention of the United Nations civilian operations team for a long time to come.

70. The foregoing paragraphs have attempted to set out in relief the major problems in the social, economic and administrative fields, which are facing the country and having a direct impact on the day-to-day life of the people. A preliminary study of the problems has been made and measures devised to meet the immediate situation, which, however, have been prevented by the confused situation prevailing at the Government level, both Central and provincial, for taking full effect. The magnitude of the problems are enormous, but with the resources of the country in relation to its population, there is every hope for their ultimate solution in a measurable period of time, given the basic conditions to which attention has been drawn repeatedly in this report.

V. CONCLUSION

71. The magnitude and intricacy of the problems facing ONUC will be evident from the foregoing pages. The vast organization required before the implementation of the Security Council's mandate became at all possible was set up with great speed. The response from the Member States to the Secretary-General's invitation for assistance was prompt and encouraging. Contingents of specialist services and of troops, asked for or offered, are still arriving. The civil operations branch received excellent support and co-operation from the specialized agencies of the United Nations.

72. As soon as the basic organization, both civil and military was set up, no time was lost in attending to the manifold responsibilities cast upon ONUC. The presence of the United Nations contingents widely scattered throughout the country has had a calming and reassuring effect, and few occasions have arisen where they have had to resort to the regrettable necessity of using force, as in the protection of refugees, or to prevent looting or in self-defence. Even in such situations the degree of force used has been kept

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to the minimum. Although the troops have suffered a few casualties, it is indeed fortunate that despite the fact of their deployment in distant areas and in difficult circumstances, the number of these casualties has been remarkably small. They have been involved in situations of grave provocation and humiliation, but have comported themselves with tact and dignity. In Leopoldville, for example, the tasks of the Force include constant patrolling in a populous community, and the protection offered to public personalities at their request has so far helped to prevent any violence or bloodshed. It is a tribute to the men of the Force that despite their possession of the means of retaliation, they have used the utmost restraint and forbearance.

73. The civilian operations have been designed in consultation with the Government, to provide bone and sinew to the Administration in its different branches, denuded as it was of technical and administrative personnel. Thanks to such assistance, the essential public services have been prevented from collapsing in Leopoldville and elsewhere. The urgent problems facing the country, such as serious unemployment, shortage of essential articles in various parts of the country, the closure of educational institutions, the absence of a judiciary or magistracy, the ineffectiveness of the civilian administrative machinery, the breakdown of the tax collecting and customs agencies, the disruption of the security organs including the army and the police, the partial paralysis of the public health and social security services and, above all, the depletion of the treasury, to mention some of the most pressing problems, are matters engaging the constant attention of the civil operations branch of ONUC. It is of the utmost importance to activate the different branches of the Administration so that these pressing problems which are daily mounting up, adding to the volume of insecurity and distress of the population, are tackled on a determined basis. The responsibility for dealing with these pressing problems is of course that of the Congolese Government, the United Nations being willing and ready to help the Government in meeting its responsibilities.

74. The United Nations operations in the Congo have been conducted on the basis of consultation with the Central Government of an unprecedented intensity and extensiveness and under unusually difficult conditions. There have been continuous consultations with the Prime Minister, with the full Council of

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Ministers and with Committees of that body, with individual Ministers and Ministries, with parliamentary members and delegations and with high officers of the Congolese Army. All important actions of the United Nations in the Congo have been based upon such consultations, which had begun, in fact, even before the Government presented its formal appeal to the United Nations for assistance. In and out of Council meetings, the Prime Minister and individual Ministers have pressed the United Nations representatives with urgent demands for the deployment of United Nations troops in specific localities, for United Nations intervention in troubled areas, for food relief, for emergency health service, for United Nations protection, for quelling disturbances, for aid in financial crises and in unemployment, and on numerous other matters. The Special Representatives and all other senior officials of ONUC, civilian and military, have always been available for such consultations and have given full co-operation. There has been, in addition to the oral consultations, a voluminous correspondence with the Prime Minister and the Ministries of the Government. In spite of this, the difficulties amply exposed in other parts of this report, have developed.

75. While a great deal has been done in the face of almost insuperable odds to assist the civil administration in its different functions, from the Central and Provincial Ministries down to the district level, more could have been done, and more can be done, if the basic conditions can be established. Those conditions are some measure of stability in the Central Government, an integrated policy and the assurance throughout the country of a sense of security and freedom from disorder. Unfortunately, the experience of the last two months shows that these conditions have not been achieved either at the Central Governmental level or elsewhere. Indeed, during recent weeks the trend has been in the reverse direction.

76. Nevertheless, in spite of the serious difficulties and impediments which have daily, and even hourly, confronted this mission, there is no doubt whatsoever that the United Nations presence has had a steadying effect on the situation. The impact of the moral force of the Organization has not been inconsiderable since the very presence of the United Nations troops, conscientiously discharging their peaceful functions, the band of technical advisers and administrators devotedly assisting the Government in its different

branches in conditions of extreme difficulty, the Headquarters organization maintaining always an attitude of co-operation and conciliation, scrupulously refraining from taking sides in the political conflict, have all helped in maintaining some measure of calm and reassurance and prevented the situation from degenerating into chaos and disorder.

77. There is yet time for the Congolese leaders and people to take stock of the situation, to put an end to factional and party strife, to reconcile political and sectional interests and to embark on the path of national unity. That path would lead the country to the realization of its integrity, to the achievement of conditions of stability, and to order, progress and prosperity. The path of division would lead only to fratricidal strife, disorder and disintegration, dangerous not only to the Congolese people but to the continent of Africa and, indeed, to the world. This mission is in the Congo to help but not to intervene, to advise but not to order, to conciliate but not to take sides. While it is not part of its functions to get involved in any way in the political crises which have been constantly erupting, it is hoped that before it is too late, the political leadership will make its choice, both wisely and well. In that event, the United Nations assistance programmes, in consultation with the Government, could be applied - and applied with all possible speed - in the interests of the Congolese people, so that the sovereign independent Republic of the Congo could be enabled to take its rightful place in the world community as a stable, self-reliant and prosperous State.

ANNEX 1

ONUC LOCATION AND STRENGTH STATEMENT

A. ONUC LOCATION STATEMENT

Srl. No.	Nationality	Unit/Sub Unit	Location	Remarks
1		ONUC Headquarters	LEOPOLDVILLE	
2	CANADA	Signal squadron	"	
3	INDIA	Supply platoon	"	
4	PAKISTAN	Ordinance company	"	
5	GHANA	Brigade of three battalions and two police companies	"	
6	SUDAN	Battalion HQ and two companies	"	
7	TUNISIA	One company	"	
8	UAR	"	"	
9	MORCCCO	Brigade HQ	"	
10		HQ 1st battalion	THYSVILLE	One platoon in BOENDE
11		Company HQ and one platoon	BOMA	
12		Platoon	TSHELA	
13		Platoon	LUKULA	
14		Platoon	KITOMI	
15		Company	MATADI	
16		Company HQ and one platoon	SANGOLOLO	
17		Section	LUFU	
18		Platoon	LUKALA	
19		Platoon	MOERBEKE	
20		HQ 2nd battalion	KIKWIT	Two companies in KATANGA
21		Company	LEVERVILLE	

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A. ONUC LOCATION STATEMENT (continued)

Srl. No.	Nation-ality	Unit/Sub Unit	Location	Remarks
22	GUINEA	Platoon	BANGA	
23		Platoon	KIZIA	
24		Company HQ and two platoons	POPOKABAKA	
25		Battalion HQ	BANNINGVILLE	
26		Company	DIMA	
27		Company HQ and one platoon	MUSHIE	
28		Platoon	KWAMOUTH	
29		Platoon	BOLOBO	
30		Company HQ and two platoons	INONGO	
31		Platoon	KIRI	
32		Company HQ and one platoon	KUTU	
33		Platoon	OSHWE	
34		Platoon	NIOKI	
35		Platoon	MABENGA	
36	MOROCCO	Parachute company	COQUILHATVILLE	One company in LEOPOLDVILLE
37		Platoon	BOENDE	
38	UAR	Battalion less three companies	GEMENA	
39	ETHIOPIA	Company less one platoon	LISALA	
40		Company	BUMBA	
41		Company	LEBENGGE	
42		Brigade HQ	STANLEYVILLE	
43		HQ 1st Battalion and two companies	BUNIA	
44		Platoon	ABA	
45		Platoon	MAMBASA	

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A. ONUC LOCATION STATEMENT (continued)

Srl No	Nation-ality	Unit/Sub Unit	Location	Remarks
46	TUNISIA	Company HQ	PAULIS	Moving to PAULIS
47		Platoon	POKO	
48		Platoon	WATASA	
49		HQ 2nd Battalion and two companies	YANGAMBI	One Company in LEOPOLDVILLE
50		Company HQ and one Platoon	ISANGI	
51		Platoon	ELISABETHA	
52		Company HQ and two Platoons	PONTHIERVILLE	
53		Platoon	BANALIA	
54		HQ 3rd Battalion and two Companies	STANLEYVILLE	
55		Company HQ and two Platoons	BUTA	
56		Platoon	AKETI	
57		Company	BAMBESA	
58		Brigade HQ	LULUABOURG	
59		HQ 10th Battalion	"	
60		Company HQ	BAKWANGA	
61		Platoon	KABINDA	
62		Platoon	DIBAYA	
63		Section	KAULU	
64		Section	KALALA	
65		Platoon	LUSAMBO	
66		Company HQ and one Platoon	MWENE LITU	
67		Platoon	KANDAJIKA	
68		Platoon	LUPUTA	
69		Company HQ and one Platoon	KADIMA-DIBA	
70		Platoon	DIMBELENGA	

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A. ONUC LOCATION STATEMENT (continued)

Srl. No.	Nation-ality	Unit/Sub Units	Location	Remarks	
71	TUNISIA	HQ 9th Battalion and one Company	TSHIKAPA	On railway protection duties	
72		Company	FORT FRANCOIS		
73		Company	MWEKA		
74		Platoon	LUBAMI		
75		Platoon	KATUMBA		
76	LIBERIA	Battalion HQ and one Company	LULUABOURG		
77		Platoon	TSHIMBULU		
78		Platoon	KALU		
79		Platoon	KELE		
80		Platoon	MUSENGA BANZA		
81		Platoon	LUPUTA	One Company in KAMINA	
82	HQ UNCC	Sub Command	ELISABETHVILLE		
For Eastern Provinces (KATANGA-KIVU)					
83	SWEDEN	Battalion HQ and one Company	ELISABETHVILLE		
84		Platoon	KASENGA		
85		Platoon	SAKANIA		
86		Platoon	MANONO		
87	MOROCCO	Company HQ and one Platoon	JADOTVILLE		
88		Platoon	KAMBOVE		
89		Platoon	MITWABA		
90		Company HQ and one Platoon	LUBUDI	From 2nd Moroccan Battalion	
91		Platoon	TENKE		
92		HQ 3rd Battalion	KOLWEZI		
93		Platoon	NZILO		

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A. ONUC LOCATION STATEMENT (continued)

Srl. No.	Nation-ality	Unit/Sub Units	Location	Remarks
94	SWEDEN	Company HQ and one Platoon	DILOLO	One Company each from 32nd and 33rd Battalions
95		Platoon	MUTSHATSHA	
96		Platoon	KASAJI	
97		Platoon	SANDOA	
98		Platoon	KAPANGA	
99		One Company	KAMINA	
100	IRELAND	Two Companies	KAMINA	
101	ETHIOPIA	HQ 4th Battalion	KAMINA	
102		Platoon	KANIAMA	
103		Platoon	MALEMA	
104		Platoon	BUKAMA	
105		Platoon	LUENA	
106		HQ 33rd Battalion	ALBERTVILLE	
107	IRELAND	Platoon	KABINDA	One Company each from 32nd and 33rd Battalions
108		Platoon	BENDERA	
109		Platoon	BAUDOUINVILLE	
110		Company HQ and one Platoon	MANONO	
111		Platoon	PIANA	
112		HQ 32nd Battalion	GOMA	
113	MALI	Company	KINDU	
114		Company	BUKAVU	
115		Battalion HQ and one Company	KABALO	
116		Company	NYUNZU	
117		Company	KANGOLO	
118		Company	KABONGO	

B. STRENGTH OF CONTINGENTS

Sr.No. :	COUNTRIES :	H.Q. : CNUC :	DEPLOYED :	TOTAL : STRENGTH :	EXPECTED :	TOTAL :
1. :	ARGENTINA :	- :	10 :	10 :	- :	10
2. :	AUSTRALIA :	- :	- :	- :	- :	-
3. :	BRAZIL :	- :	9 :	9 :	- :	9
4. :	BURMA :	8 :	1 :	9 :	- :	9
5. :	CANADA :	26 :	234 :	260 :	- :	260
6. :	CEYLON :	9 :	- :	9 :	- :	9
7. :	DENMARK :	4 :	26 :	30 :	- :	30
8. :	ETHIOPIA :	6 :	2,566 :	2,572 :	- :	2,572
9. :	GHANA :	3 :	2,288 :	2,291 :	- :	2,291
10. :	GUINEA :	1 :	748 :	749 :	600 :	1,349
11. :	INDIA :	23 :	350 :	373 :	217 :	590
12. :	INDONESIA :	8 :	- :	8 :	1,144 :	1,152
13. :	IRELAND :	6 :	1,377 :	1,383 :	- :	1,383
14. :	ITALY :	1 :	89 :	90 :	- :	90
15. :	LIBERIA :	11 :	223 :	234 :	- :	234
16. :	MALAYA :	8 :	- :	8 :	444 :	452
17. :	MALI :	1 :	576 :	577 :	- :	577
18. :	MOROCCO :	10 :	3,247 :	3,257 :	- :	3,257
19. :	NETHERLANDS :	1 :	5 :	6 :	- :	6
20. :	NEW ZEALAND :	- :	1 :	1 :	- :	1
21. :	NORWAY :	4 :	46 :	50 :	- :	50
22. :	PAKISTAN :	4 :	244 :	248 :	- :	248

B. STRENGTH OF CONTINGENTS (continued)

Sr.No.	COUNTRIES	H.Q. ONUC	DEPLOYED	TOTAL STRENGTH	EXPECTED	TOTAL
23.	SUDAN	4	394	398	-	398
24.	SWEDEN	22	594	616	32	648
25.	SWITZERLAND	-	22	22	-	22
26.	TUNISIA	1	2,632	2,633	-	2,633
27.	UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC	1	518	519	-	519
28.	YUGOSLAVIA	-	20	20	-	20
	TOTAL	162	16,220	16,382	2,437	18,819

Chief of Personnel (Mil)

ANNEX 2

ONUC Communications

Outline plan

The main command communications are being provided by a Canadian signal squadron using ANGRC 26 (Radio teletype).

Each territorial command HQ is to be served by a Canadian signals detachment working back to HQ ONUC at Leopoldville.

Within territorial commands, communications are provided by the national contingents. As their normal wireless sets in many cases cannot work over the great distances involved, additional equipment (ANGRC 9, ANGRC 19, and BC610) are to be issued where necessary.

Owing to the distances involved and the fact that it is an area of mixed national contingents, SCOMEF command communications will be provided by the Indian Signals using BC610 provided by the United Nations. These sets arrived in the Congo on 16 September. The Indian signal company is expected towards the end of September.

Present communications

At present the command net is working to Gemena, Coquilhatville, Stanleyville, Luluabourg, Elisabethville and on borrowed equipment at Kamina. It is expected to have the detachment at Matadi working in a few days.

The situation within units is not as agreeable, as most of the sets ordered to supplement unit communications have not yet arrived.

Future requirements


Additional Canadian signal detachments are required to provide communications to Goma, Kamina and Banningville.

The equipments already demanded for units is also now required urgently.

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Annex 3

ONUC Air Transport Force



- (a) Italian C119 Squadron - 10 aircraft.
- (b) Indian C119 Squadron - 5 aircraft.
- (c) Brazilian/Argentinian DC3 Squadron - 17 aircraft (some aircraft detached for operations).
- (d) Swedish/Norwegian Helicopter Squadron - 6 H13, 2 H19, 6 "Alouettes" helicopters (majority detached for operations).
- (e) Swedish/Norwegian light Aircraft Squadron - 4 "Beavers", 4 "Otters" (majority detached for operations).
- (f) UN Air Transport Maintenance Base Kamina - All second line repairs and overhaul UN aircraft (First line maintenance to be done at parent base or detached base).