

**SECURITY
COUNCIL**

**CONSEIL
DE SECURITE**

UNRESTRICTED
S/76
31 May 1946
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
ENGLISH

FACTUAL FINDINGS CONCERNING

THE SPANISH SITUATION

SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM TO THE REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE

APPOINTED BY SECURITY COUNCIL ON 29 APRIL 1946

ITEM 1

(The origin, nature, structure and general conduct of the Franco regime; the extent to which the institutions and policies of this regime are compatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the extent to which they could obstruct the completion of the United Nations' security system.)

Origin of the Franco Regime

On 18 July 1936 the Spanish Civil War broke out. After three years of struggle the Republican Government of Spain was defeated and the Franco regime came into existence. The following evidence seems to indicate that the coming to power of the Franco regime was mainly due to the assistance of the Axis Powers.

According to the notes which were published by the State Department of the United States, covering the interview between Hitler and Count Ciano in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and the State Secretary, Meissner, in Berlin on 28 September 1940, Hitler remarked that:

"When Spain was engaged in the Civil War, Germany had supported Franco in a very extensive measure considering her (Germany's) conditions at the time. This support moreover had not been without risk. It was not limited only to the delivery of material but volunteers were also made available and many Germans and Italians had fallen in Spain. . . . Economically Germany had given out many hundreds of millions for Spain." (Document 6 in American "White Book.")

Lt. General Karl Warlimont, Hitler's personal representative at Franco's headquarters in 1936 and later Colonel General Alfred Gustav Jodl's Chief of Staff at Hitler's headquarters, submitted a statement in an affidavit dated 22 September 1945, to American Intelligence Officers in Germany. This document gives an account of the origin of the Spanish Civil War and explains the purpose in assisting Franco.

The New York Times on November 7 1945 summarizing the statement reported:

"The first faint German intervention came in mid-July of 1936 when Hitler placed a Deutsche Lufthansa plane at Franco's disposal for the historic flight from the Canary Islands to Tetuan, which was the signal for the revolution. The moment fighting started, Franco dispatched the same plane to Germany to plead with Hitler for immediate aid.

"Franco's delegation consisted of high Spanish officers and two German business men. Hitler received the delegation and acceded to Franco's request for transport planes to fly troops across Gibraltar Strait into Spain.

"Thirty JU-52 transports took off immediately via France and the Pyrenees. This was followed in mid-August by a fighter squadron accompanied by a fleet of transport planes containing ground personnel.

"At the same time Hitler sent warships into Spanish waters.

"On August 25, Warlimont was summoned by Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, who told him that Hitler had decided that Germany and Italy would give Franco limited armed aid. Marshal von Blomberg outlined Hitler's policy as follows:

"Although German air support would be substantial German aid on the ground would consist only of armament and sufficient personnel to train Spanish troops in its use.

"On August 26, Warlimont, accompanied by Admiral Canaris, Chief of German Intelligence, flew to Rome, where they met Benito Mussolini and General Mario Rosatta. Mussolini agreed to Hitler's program in Spain and promised like aid. Then Warlimont boarded an Italian cruiser and sailed to Tetuan.

"At Tetuan, Warlimont called himself Guido Waltersdorff. A German plane flew him to Seville, where he and Rosatta conferred with General Gonzalo Queipo De Llano. The latter accompanied them to a first meeting with Franco at Caceres.

"Warlimont and Rosatta each promised to send three companies of fully equipped troops to fill Franco's deficiencies. In October, the three promised German companies arrived, but Franco was upset when he examined the German light tanks equipped with one machine gun each.

"Meanwhile the Luftwaffe was exerting a big effort in Spain, but Franco continued to demand more aid.

"On November 30, Admiral Canaris arrived at Franco's new headquarters in Salamanca to inform the Generalissimo that Hitler was sending the Condor Legion, comprising 6,000 Luftwaffe men under Field Marshal General Hugo Sperrle. Actually, comments Warlimont, the whole conception of the Condor Legion was Goering's. He wanted to give Luftwaffe recruits battle training."

Herman Goering on 14 March 1946 stated before the International War Crimes Tribunal that he had asked Hitler to send help to Franco during the Spanish Civil War "to prevent the spread of Communism and try our young forces experimentally."

On 30 March 1938 Mussolini declared before the Senate saying that:

"Thousands of Italian officers now have actual experience in two wars, in Abyssinia and in Spain."

And in "Il Popolo d'Italia" of 20 May 1938, the Duce wrote:

"We have intervened from the first to the last moment."

On 23 February 1941, the New York Times published a report of Stefani, the official Italian News Agency, to the effect that Italy

had sent Franco 763 planes, with 1,414 motors, 1,672 tons of bombs and 9,250,000 rounds of ammunition. For the land forces Italy sent 1,930 cannon, 10,135 automatic guns, 240,747 small arms, 7,514,537 rounds of artillery ammunition and 7,663 Motor Vehicles.

In a letter from Franco to Hitler dated 26 February 1941, Franco said:

"The destiny of history has united you with myself and the Duce in an indissoluble way. I have never needed to be convinced of this and as I have told you more than once, our Civil War since its very inception and during its entire course is more than proof." (Document 13 in American "White Book")

During the conversation between Hitler and Franco on 23 October 1940, Franco said that:

"In the Civil War the soldiers of the three countries had fought together and a profound unity had arisen among them." (Document 8 in American "White Book")

The report, published by the Enemy Division of the Foreign Economic Administration of the United States, December 1945, says:

"During the Civil War in Spain, Nazi Germany actively aided the Franco party by lending technical assistance and sending the so-called 'Condor Division.' In this way Germany was able to test its new weapons in actual warfare. But Germany exacted payment from Fascist Spain and the latter reciprocated German military aid by sending the 'Blue Division' to fight against Russia. A balancing of financial accounts showed that Spain was heavily indebted to Germany for civil-war aid. In November 1943, an agreement was reached wherein Spain admitted a debt of about \$100 million."

The Nature and the Structure of the Franco Regime

The Franco Government is more or less organized on the lines of the Italian and German Governments. Before the National Council of the Falange on 7 October 1942, Franco stated:

"The German, Italian and Spanish revolutions are phases of the same general movement of rebellion of the civilized masses of the world against the hypocrisy and inefficiency of the old system. The historic destiny of our era will be realized, either through the barbaric shape of totalitarian bolshevism or through the patriotic and spiritual formula which Spain and any of the other Fascist nations offer to the World."

In an interview to the United Press in July 1937, Franco declared:

"Spain will have the structure of totalitarian regimes such as Italy and Germany. It will assume corporative forms of which a large part already exist in our country, and it will break with the liberal institutions which have poisoned the people. The patterns of Italy and Germany will, of course, be our inspiration. Not only do we consider the democratic parliamentary regime impractical in Spain, but in other countries as, for example, England. If this regime should last, it would be the death of the powerful empire."

Franco's regime is also based on personal dictatorship. Article 47 of the Statutes of the Falange, approved by decree No. 333 of 4 August 1937 reads:

"The head of the Falange, supreme Caudillo of the Movement, personifies all its values and all its honours. As the founder of the historic era in which Spain acquires possibility and realizes her destiny and at the same time the ardent desire of the Movement, the head fully assumes the most absolute authority. The head answers before God and History."

Franco, by the decree of April 19, 1937, abolished all political parties and created a single official party which bears the name of Traditionalist Spanish Falange and the J. O. N. S. (Junta of Militant National Syndicalists) and at the same time adopted the programme of the Falange as the official programme of his Government.

The first part of the programme of the Falange reads:

Article I "We believe in the supreme reality of Spain. To strengthen it, elevate it, and improve it, is the urgent collective task of all Spaniards. In order to achieve this end, the interests of individuals, groups and classes will have to be remorselessly waived.

Article III "We have a will to empire. We affirm that the full history of Spain implies an empire. We demand for Spain a pre-eminent place in Europe. We will not put up with international isolation or with foreign interference. With regard to the Hispano-American countries, we will aim at unification of culture, of economic interests and of power. Spain claims a pre-eminent place in all common tasks, because of her position as the spiritual cradle of the Spanish world.

Article IV "Our armed forces, on land, on sea and in the air, must be as efficient and numerous as may be necessary to assure Spain's complete independence at all times and that world leadership which is her due. We shall restore to the armies on land and sea, and in the air, all the dignity which they deserve and, following their ideal, we shall see to it that a military view of life shall shape Spanish existence."

In the Franco regime no opposition party is allowed. Article 6 of the programme of the Falange reads as follows:

Article VI "Our State will be a totalitarian instrument in the service of National integrity. All Spaniards will take part in it through their family, municipal and syndical functions. No one shall take part in it through any political party. The system of political parties will be irrevocably abolished with all that flows from them -

The law of July 1942 re-established the Spanish Cortes on Fascist lines as the supreme organ of the State in the preparation and enactment of laws. The Cortes was composed of 438 members selected either by election or by virtue of State office. They include, 13 from Cabinet Ministers, 103 from members of the National Council, 3 from Presidents of State Council, Supreme Court and High Court, 142 from representatives of National syndicates, 102 from mayors and representatives of provincial capitals and other municipalities, 12 from heads of universities, 50 members appointed by Franco, and 13 from other categories. According to Article 57 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Spanish Cortes, the plenary sessions will not be public, unless the President of the Cortes orders it so.

The economic policy of the regime is centered on vertical syndicates. The law of June 23, 1941, classified these syndicates with 26 branches of production. The individual is replaced by the producing concern as a whole. In other words, they may only be producers. There is only one labor union incorporated in the Falange.

The Labour Law reads:

2. "All the economic elements will be joined together in vertical syndicates formed according to branches of production or service. The liberal and technical professions will be organized along similar lines as determined by law.
3. "The vertical syndicate in a corporation of public Right which is constituted by the integration, in a centralized organization, of all the elements which indicate their activities to the fulfillment of the economic process within a determined branch or service of the production, while corporation is hieretically governed under the direction of the State.
4. "The hierarchies of the syndicate will necessarily be formed of militant members of the Traditionalist Spanish Falange party."

General Conduct of the Franco Regime

The General Conduct of the Franco Regime in Internal Affairs

1. As has been said, the Falange became, by Government decree, the sole political party in Spain. The existence of any other political party or its opponents is suppressed. On 9 February 1939 a law was issued with retroactive effect against those persons who before the Civil War had been members of the following political parties or unions:

"Republican Action, Left Republican, Republican Union, Federal Party, The National Confederation of Labour, General Union of Workers, The Socialist Party, Communist Party, Syndicalist Party, The Syndicalist Party of Pestana, The Iberian Anarchist Federation, The Nationalist Basque Party, Basque Nationalist Action, Solidarity of Basque Workers, The Catalan Left, The Galician Party, The Workers United Marxist Party, The Libertarian Athenaeum, International Red Relief, The United Socialist Party of Catalonia, Union de Rabassaires, Catalan Republican Action, Catalan Republican Party, Democratic Union of Catalonia, the Catalan State, All Free Masonic Lodges and all the entities, groups or parties affiliated, or of an analogous nature."

2. The Falange Party has adopted all those methods of the German and Italian regimes. The members of the Falange wear uniforms and are organized on a semi-military basis. The party controls an Armed Militia. By decree of 24 April 1937 the manner of salute is an imitation of the Fascist and Nazi salutes. The title "Caudillo" adopted by Franco has the same significance as "Duce" and "Fuehrer."

3. The Youth Front is the same as the organization of Mussolini's "Ballilas." The law of 6 December 1941 established the "Frente de Juventudes," including it within the Falange. The new member had to take the following oath:

"I swear by God to place myself always at the service of Spain and its Caudillo. I swear to have no other pride than that of my country and to live under its Spanish Traditionalist Falange and the J. O. N. S. with obedience and joy, enthusiasm and patience, bravery and silence. I swear to reject and pay no attention to any voice of friend or enemy which may weaken the spirit of our Falange."

4. The Falange has been subsidized by the Government and the members of the Falange enjoy special privileges. In accordance with the law of 22 February 1941 the members of the National Council of the Falange can be arrested only by order of the National Chief of the Movement, regardless of the crimes they may have committed. The Courts must refrain from instituting any proceedings without this prerequisite.

The General Conduct of the Franco Regime in External Affairs

1. When the war broke out in Europe, Franco's regime manifested at once its sympathy with the Axis powers. Franco in a speech on 6 November 1940 said:

"In all the moments of its history, Spain has felt the warmth of German friendship. It is easy to imagine, therefore, what its feelings are now, when on the sea and in the air of Europe, a battle is being fought to bring about the social revolution for which we are struggling together."

The Franco regime was also performing concrete acts in support of the Axis nations. In June 1940 the Spanish troops took possession of Tangier and in November of the same year announced officially the annexation of that zone to the Spanish state. Serrano Suner, Spanish Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 6 November 1940, declared that:

"Spanish troops have today occupied the international zone of Tangier in the interest of maintaining true order. I am sure that within a short time we shall be able to attain there our objective, namely, the full inclusion of Tangier in the geography of Spain."

2. Before the German attack on Russia, the Franco regime was mainly "anti-imperialistic", "anti-democratic" and "anti-liberal." When the U. S. S. R. came into the war, the Franco regime became fiercely anti-communistic. On 17 July 1941, Franco declared before the National Council of the Falange that:

"I should like to transmit to all corners of Spain the restlessness of these moments in which, together with the fate of Europe, is being debated that of our nation, and not because I have doubts of the outcome of the conflict. The lot has already been drawn. On our field were fought and won the first battles. In the diverse theatres of the European war took place the battles which are decisive for our continent. The terrible nightmare of our generation, the destruction of Russian Communism, is already absolutely inevitable."

Franco also made a promise in his speech on 7 December 1942:

"We maintain our traditional policy, our loyalty to the peoples who shared our anguish. If Berlin should some day be in danger Spain, if it were necessary, would send a million men, in order to defend it from the Red hordes."

Though Franco did not send a million men, he did send the "Blue Division" to the Russian front in order to manifest his determination in the conflict.

3. Franco's external policy was not limited to the overthrow of democratic and communistic systems but also aimed at the building of an "Empire." On 17 April 1941, he spoke at the opening of New Staff College at Madrid as follows:

"Peace does not exist. Peace is a constant preparation for war. I have faith in you and this generation in its destiny of raising Spain and taking her on the road to Empire."

In 1942, Vice-Secretariate of Popular Education, Arias Salgado, published two books: "(1) Aspectos de la Mision Universal de Espana, in which not only Gibraltar, but also a large sector of the French Pyrenees, the southeastern part of the United States of America, Florida and the West

Indies are claimed as territories over which Spain has a right and to which she aspires. The book contains a map indicating all those zones desired by the returning Spanish Empire, which also desires eventually to obtain the union of all Latin America with Spain.

"The second book, Espana en Marruecos, claims almost all the possessions which France has in North Africa. The map mentioned also indicates these territories." (Appendix 7, Second Report of the Spanish Republican Government)

According to the "Volkischer Beobachter," Serrano Suner declared, in September 1940, that:

"It is incorrect to designate as a territorial claim the return of Gibraltar, which is due us in accordance with the most elementary justice and which constitutes a living and bleeding piece of the Fatherland."

Referring to French Morocco, he declared:

"The geographic position of Spain and its tradition as a bridge between our continent and another, embody natural claims which only a decadent policy could abandon."

He ended his statement by saying:

"We have no other claim to make. But I must not fail to recognize our will to project a moral influence toward Spanish America and to reestablish the prestige of Spanish culture in opposition to the attempted usurpation on the part of another culture, devoting to this task the same generous spirit which Spain contributed when she gave her blood, her strength and the best of her soul to the work of discovering, conquering and evangelizing new lands. In this sense our aspirations refer also to America, with the object of defending the rights of those sister nations."

United States Memorandum summarized the activities of the Franquista Spaniards in other American Republics as follows:

"Nationalist Spain from its beginning to the present day has fomented foci of Nazi-fascist influence in the Western Hemisphere. Spanish diplomatic officials and persons in Spanish quasi-official organizations have for years been encouraging groups in the other American Republics which opposed Inter-American unity against the Axis during the war, and which still strive to perpetuate the principles of the Axis system in the New World.

"As to activities of the Falange and other Franco organizations in the Philippine Commonwealth, these were in the past sympathetic to Axis objectives and thus contrary to the interests of the United Nations. So far as concerns present activities, the same general consideration mentioned above with respect to the other American Republics apply in the case of the Philippine Commonwealth."

The Franco Regime and the United Nations

The foregoing analysis indicates that the Franco regime was brought into power by the armed forces of the Axis powers and that the nature and structure of the regime has patterned itself along the Fascist lines. It is also noted that the policies, activities and public manifestations of the regime are intimately associated with those of the Axis Powers and openly opposed to all democratic principles.

The general position of the United Nations with respect to the compatibility of the Franco regime with the principles of the Charter has been repeatedly manifested in resolutions at San Francisco on 19 June 1945 and in London on 9 February 1946. The position of the principal powers was also made clear at Potsdam on 2 August 1945 and the Tripartite note of 4 March 1946. It is agreed that as long as the Franco regime is in power, Spain will have no place in the community of nations.

The United Nations is organized on a collective basis; it concerns itself with the peace and security of the world. Geographically, Spain is a nation of importance with respect to the organization of the security system of the United Nations. The exclusion of the Franco regime from the United Nations would leave Spain outside of any international arrangements relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in that region and render impossible a really effective system of international control of atomic energy and the relating scientific information and raw materials or regulation of armaments, as envisaged by the United Nations.

Item 2.

(The attitude of the Franco regime; during the recent war, to the Axis powers and the Allied powers.)

It is clear from numerous pronouncements of Franco that Spain adhered to the cause of the Axis. In a statement to the United Press at Salamanca in July 1937, Franco said:

" Spain will have the structure of a totalitarian regime similar to that of Italy and Germany. In most of the branches of the national life of our state, corporative forms are to be found, and the liberal institutions which poison people will be abolished. The state will be inspired by the principles applied in Italy and Germany....." (Quoted in "Words of the Caudillo," National Edition, Madrid, 1943).

On 2 October 1938 (at the time of Munich) Franco sent the following telegram to Hitler:

" For the success that has crowned your efforts to reunite the Sudeten German region into the Reich, I address to Your Excellency my most cordial felicitations and the renewed assurances of the sympathy of the Spanish Nationalists towards the great German people, together with expressions of my admiration and friendship." (Quoted in Memorandum of the Spanish Nationalist Government).

In a message to Hitler on 3 June 1940 Franco wrote:

" At a time when, under your guidance, the German Armies are bringing to a victorious conclusion the greatest battle of history, I would like to offer to you the expression of my enthusiasm and admiration, as well as those of my people which has been following with great emotion the glorious prosecution of a fight, which it feels to be its own, and which realizes the hopes which were kindled in Spain already in the days when your soldiers were fighting side by side with ours in a war against the same, though hidden, enemies ...

I need hardly assure you that it is my sincere desire not to stand aloof from the matters which preoccupy you, and that I would be deeply gratified to render you, at any time, such services as you might consider most valuable."

On 17 July 1941 Franco said: "The Axis is now a triangle comprising Germany, Italy and Spain." (Appendix 5 of Second Report of Spanish Republican Government).

In a conversation with Hitler at Hendaye on 23 October 1940, Franco said:

" Spain has always been allied with the German people spiritually without any reservation and in complete loyalty. In the same sense Spain has in every moment felt at one with the Axis. In the Civil War the soldiers of the three countries had fought together and a profound unity has arisen among them. Likewise, Spain would, in the future, attach herself closely to Germany ... " (Document 8 in American "White Book")

The members of Franco's Cabinet and the Spanish Press constantly re-echoed these sentiments and systematically attacked democracy and exalted totalitarianism. (File No. 2 of documents submitted by the Spanish Republican Government, and Appendix 4, 5 and 6 of the Second Report).

Preparation for War.

After the outbreak of war in Europe, Franco prepared for Spain's entry into the war on the side of the Axis. Viscount Templewood, British Ambassador in Madrid, reported a speech of Franco's on 18 July 1940 stating that 2,000,000 Spanish soldiers were ready to forge an empire in the conquest of Gibraltar and in African expansion. In a message to Mussolini on 16 August 1940 Franco wrote:

" Since the beginning of the present conflict, it has been our intention to make the greatest efforts in our preparations, in order to enter the war at a favourable opportunity....

Spain in addition to the contribution which she made to the establishment of the New Order ... offers another in preparing herself to take her place in the struggle against the common enemies....

I at the same time assure you of our unconditional support for your expansion and your future." (Document 2 in American "White Book").

In a message to Hitler on 22 September 1940, Franco wrote:

"I am likewise of the opinion that the first act in our attack must consist in the occupation of Gibraltar....

"For our part we have been preparing the operation in secret for a long time

"I reply with the assurance of my unchangeable and sincere adherence to you personally, to the German people, and to the cause for which you fight. I hope, in defense of this cause, to be able to renew the old bonds of comradeship between our armies ..."

(Document 5 in American "White Book")

In a further message to Hitler on 26 February 1941, Franco wrote:

... "I stand ready at your side, entirely and decidedly at your disposal, united in a common historical destiny..." (Document 13 in American "White Book").

The German and Spanish General Staffs worked out a joint plan, called the "Isabella-Felix Plan" for the capture of Gibraltar and expansion of the Spanish territories in Africa. Details of the plan were well advanced by July 1940, with both Spanish and German troops carrying on intensive training for the storming of Gibraltar which was fixed for 10 January 1941. The plan was abandoned in the autumn of 1940, however, as Hitler had decided

to prepare for the attack on the Soviet Union (Statements of Lieutenant General Krappé, German Military Attache in Spain 1941-1942, and Colonel Renner, German Military Attache in Tangier 1942-1944, submitted by the Representative of the U.S.S.R.)

In a secret protocol entered into between Spain and Germany on 10 February 1942, Spain pledged itself to wage war on any Anglo-American forces that entered upon the Iberian Peninsula or upon Spanish territory outside the Peninsula. (Document 14 in American "White Book").

The American "White Book" contains ample evidence of Franco's "conditions" for entering the war on the side of the Axis; namely, the satisfaction of Spain's territorial demands for Gibraltar, French Morocco, Oran and the extension of Rio de Oro and Guinea, and also the furnishing by Germany of considerable supplies of food, gasoline and munitions.

The German Ambassador in Madrid, Von Stehrer, told Lieutenant-General Krappé when the latter arrived in Madrid in October 1941 that Germany did not want Spain to enter the war openly. If Spain had formally entered the war, Germany would be unable to supply Spain's requirements, and would lose her only outlet from the blockade ring. Spain was more useful to Germany under the mask of neutrality (Statement of Krappé and Renner submitted by the Representative of the U.S.S.R.).

War Aid to the Axis.

The actual assistance rendered by Franco to the Axis during the war continued despite numerous Allied protests.

In the summer of 1940 Spain seized Tangier in breach of an international statute. As a result of Spain's maintaining a large army in Spanish Morocco, large numbers of Allied troops were immobilized in North Africa.

In June 1941 Franco organized the Blue Division which fought as the 250th Division with the German armies against Russia on the Novgorod and Leningrad fronts from October 1941 until November 1943. The original strength of the division was about 20,000. In November 1943 about 3,000 sick and wounded were returned to Spain, and this transfer was advertised as the withdrawal of the whole division. But the remnants of the division, about 2,500, were formed into a Spanish Legion of "Volunteers," which fought on

Yugoslavia against the partisans. In addition to the Blue Division and the Spanish Legion of Volunteers, a Spanish air squadron, the Salvador, consisting of nine planes, fought on the Russian front from October 1941 to December 1942. In all, taking into account reinforcements, about 47,000 Spaniards fought with the Germans against the Red Army. (Memorandum submitted to the Sub-Committee by the U.S.S.R. Representative).

The Franco Government granted special privileges, benefits and bonuses to members of the Blue Division. These continue in force to the present day. (Page 5, Appendix 9 of the Second Report of the Spanish Republican Government).

Spanish ports were made available to Germany as submarine bases and for fuelling destroyers (Documents 9 and 10 in American "White Book"). Although these were made available as early as October and December 1940, nevertheless on 21 June 1942 the Spanish Foreign Minister issued a statement categorically denying charges in this respect. German U-boats and other ships obtained repairs and supplies in a number of Spanish ports, including Vigo (Atlantic), Villa Sanjurjo (Morocco), Las Palmas and Tenerife (Canaries). (Statement of Kravce and Renner submitted by the U.S.S.R. Representative). The memorandum of the U.K. of May 30th, 1946, confirms the use of Spanish ports by Axis ships and U-boats and lists the following ports where Axis ships obtained aid or supplies; Algeciras, Cadiz, Cartagena, El Ferrol, Pasajes, Gijon, Vigo, Las Palmas, Teneriffe and Seville.

Air bases were provided for the Luftwaffe in Galicia and the Basque country. From Badajoz, Vigo and Seville German planes operated against Allied shipping. German planes forced down on Spanish territory were serviced by Spaniards, while the Germans, by agreement of the Spanish authorities, were permitted to carry out detailed inspections of British and American planes forced down, and took photographs of and samples from their equipment and explosives. (Article on "Spain and the Axis," by W. Horsfall Carter in Foreign Affairs, October 1941, and Statement of Kravce and Renner submitted by the U.S.S.R. Representative).

The American Foreign Economic Administration Report of August 1945 stated on page nine that "A German shipping agent in Bilbao sent reports to Berlin of British ship movements for use in submarine warfare and even sent supplies to Germans besieged

in French ports." The French Government memorandum of 27 May, 1940, states that in April 1945 the French, British and American Governments protested to Spain about the supplying of German rockets on the Atlantic coast by Spanish ships.

Eight Spanish observation posts were set up along the Straits of Gibraltar, which gave the Germans exact information about the number, type and course of Allied ships as they entered the Mediterranean. The information was transmitted by radio to Nazi naval and air units, enabling them to attack and sink Allied ships. Spanish military wireless stations were used by the Germans, and the Nazis set up their own radio stations in Madrid, along the Straits of Gibraltar, and in the Canaries and Rio de Oro. A radio monitoring service was set up jointly by the Spanish and Germans to intercept radio messages between Allied ships in the Atlantic and between Allied units in North Africa. (Statement of Kruppe and Renner submitted by U.S.S.R. Representative). Viscount Templewood, in his Memoirs, states that "on both the African and European coasts, there was a chain of radio stations to report direct to Berlin the movements of Allied shipping."

Throughout the war Spain supplied Nazi Germany with quantities of strategic war materials. In February 1944 the German Review, Die Deutsche Volksewirtschaft, stated that 39.2 per cent of all Spain's exports went to Germany and 30 per cent went to German industries in occupied countries. In the field of armaments, Spanish plants at Trubia and Reinoso produced heavy guns and gun barrels for the Nazis, and in Valencia hundreds of thousands of rifle cartridges were turned out daily for the German armies. In Barcelona motors were built for German airplanes and submarines. Factories in Catalonia manufactured uniforms and parachutes for the German forces. In the matter of chemicals Spain supplied Germany with ammonia, nitrogen and glycerine, and Spanish factories in Seville turned out explosives for shipment to Germany. In the field of vital metals, Spain furnished iron ore, pyrites, lead, zinc, nickel and wolfram. The Nazi economic agent, Bernhardt, in addition to other vital metals, shipped 60,000 tons of iron ore to Germany every year, and also leather, fiber and cod liver oil. Mr. Dingle Foot, Parliamentary Secretary of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, told the House of Commons on 26 January 1944 that in 1943 Germany received from Spain 100 tons

had the Spanish exports of wolfram to Germany become that on 2 May 1944, Mr. Eden made a statement in the House of Commons announcing that, as a result of months of Anglo-American pressure, Spain had been persuaded to cut her exports of wolfram to Germany to 280 tons for the balance of the year 1944. (See the reports of the U.S. Foreign Economic Administration of August and December 1945, the Statement of Krapac and Renner submitted by the U.S.S.R. Representative, the article on Spanish Exports to Germany in the London Financial Times, April 1944, "Nazi Haven in Spain," by Joaquin Garcia in The New Republic of 24 December 1945 and the Memorandum to the Sub-Committee by Mr. Abel Plenn, who was Chief of Propaganda Analysis attached to the U.S. Embassy in Madrid in 1944).

In August 1941 the Franco Government agreed to send 100,000 Spanish workers to Germany. (French Government Memorandum of 27 May 1946).

Although Spain was herself short of food and raw materials, she carried on trade negotiations involving a "three-cornered deal" with Germany and Argentina whereby she would send arms to Argentina which would be replaced by German shipments to Spain, and Spain would send wool, casene, linseed oil and leather to Germany which would be replaced by shipments from Argentina, and would forward meat and tallow from Argentine imports. (Chapter IV of the American "Blue Book" on Argentina). This was not a mere commercial agreement, but a political device to circumvent the Allied blockade of Germany. The statement of Krapac and Renner shows that the Spanish Merchant Marine dispatched quantities of raw materials to Germany from South America, under the guise of carrying the goods to Spanish consumers. The Government of Venezuela in its statement dated 24 May 1945 stated that during 1942-43 Senor Sangroniz, the Spanish Diplomatic Representative, carried on clandestine activities in the diamond trade with the aim of supplying the Axis with critical war materials.

According to the League of Nations World Economic Surveys, Spain's exports to Germany had increased from 24.8 per cent of her total exports in 1939 to 46.5 per cent of the total in 1941. In addition, there should be taken into account Spanish exports to Italy and Axis occupied countries. Germany had become by a large margin first in the list of countries to which Spain

On July 31, 1938 the German Gestapo and the Spanish secret police entered into a secret agreement for mutual assistance and joint collaboration and this continued throughout the war years. The French Government Memorandum stated that after the interview between Franco and Himmler in Madrid on 20 October, 1940, close co-operation between the German and the Spanish police was established. German authorities were installed in the Spanish police headquarters in Madrid and many facilities were given to German agents and police in carrying on their activities on Spanish territory.

The Spanish Intelligence Service (SIM) and the German Intelligence Service (Abwehr) also worked in close cooperation. Many Abwehr agents were installed in the German consulates in Spanish territory and a number of Spanish consulate employees were in the pay of the Germans. Spanish authorities collaborated with Axis and Gestapo agents in carrying on anti-Allied espionage and sabotage. Prior to each of the Allied invasions of North Africa, Sicily and Normandy, the SIM furnished the Nazis with details of the prospective landings. The Spanish Military Attache in London regularly supplied the Germans in Spain with valuable information respecting the situation in England, including air raid damage, morale of the people, the number and movements of troops and the nature of the Home Guard. German sabotage agents in Spanish territory helped blow up Allied ships. Spanish ships were used to transport Nazi agents and spies to the Americas. Spain in fact granted the Nazis peseta credits to finance the activities of Nazi spies and saboteurs. (Statement of Kraope and Renner submitted by the U.S.S.R. Representative, U.S. State Department Statements Nos. 30 and 154 on 28 January and 1 May 1944 page 49 of the U.S. Government Memorandum to the Sub-Committee, and Viscount Templewood's reports to London contained in his Memoirs).

Spain refused to surrender to the Allies Italian ships interned in Spanish ports, although by the terms of the Italian armistice all Italian ships were placed at the disposition of the Allies. It was not until 1945 that Spain turned over the last of these ships to the Allies.

Policy towards the Allies.

On 17 July 1941 in a speech to the National Council of the Falange, Franco said:

" The war did not start on a sound basis for the Allies. They have lost it ... The fight against Soviet Russia, today apparently making common cause with the plutocratic world, cannot alter the result."

He ended his speech with a declaration of "solidarity" with the German Army which, he said, was fighting the battle "which Europe and Christianity have so long awaited."

On 14 February 1942 in a speech to Army officers at Seville, he said:

" Germany was fighting to defend Western civilization, and had for twenty years defended Europe from 'the invasion of Communism' ... if the Russians opened the road to Berlin it would not only be one Spanish division but 1,000,000 Spaniards who would volunteer."

And on 9 May 1943 in a speech at Almeria he said;

" Russian barbarism is awaiting its prey. It is the enemy of Europe, the negation of our civilization, the destruction of all that is dearest and most precious to us."

The Franco Regime's desires for territorial expansion at the expense of the Allies appears in great detail in two books published by the Vice Secretariat of Popular Education in 1942, Aspectos de la Mision Universal de Espana, and Espana en Marruecos. Those books lay claim to a Spanish Empire which would include most of Latin America, the south eastern part of the U.S.A., Florida, the West Indies, nearly all the French possessions in North Africa, Gibraltar and a large sector of the French Pyrenees. (Appendix 7 of Second Report of the Spanish Republican Government).

Spain joined the Anti-Comintern Pact on 27 March 1939, and throughout the war Franco engaged in anti-Russian propaganda in his "crusade against Bolshevism," and attempted to divide the Allies and sow dissension among them.

On 8 December 1941, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs sent congratulations to the Japanese Legation on the successful Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour.

In 1942 Franco recognized the puppet government of occupied China set up by the Japanese in Nanking. He also recognized the puppet regimes of Pavelich in Croatia and of Father Tiso in Czechoslovakia.

In October 1943 Franco sent a message of congratulations to the

Philippine quisling, Jose P. Laurel, who had been set up as head of the Japanese puppet regime.

It should be noted that Mr. Carlton Hayes, U.S. Ambassador to Spain from 1942 to March 1945, in his book, Wartime Mission in Spain, prints out that despite the Franco Government's pro-Axis policy, nevertheless for various reasons it did give help to the Allies in refraining from joining the war on the side of the Axis, in twice refusing Germany free passage across Spain for her troops, in permitting Allied airmen and refugees to be repatriated and, generally, in resisting German pressure for greater pro-Axis aid. He gives his opinion that after Franco dismissed Suncer from the post of Foreign Minister in 1942, Spain's policy became less and less pro-Axis, until towards the end of the war it could be described as "benevolent neutrality" so far as the Allies were concerned.

On 3 December 1943, the German Ambassador to Madrid, Dieckhoff, discussed with Franco the matter of Spanish concessions to the Anglo-Saxon powers. Franco explained that the refugees he had permitted to go to North Africa were "almost all of them bad, undesirable elements ... predominantly of Communist riff-raff ... people so inferior and so undesirous of fighting, who had actually fled from France only to avoid work, and that their entry into the De Gaulle army would mean no strengthening of the enemy fighting power worth mentioning at all. Moreover he had directed that the transports cease from now on." With respect to the note of caution in Spanish policy, "the Caudillo said that he believed that this cautious policy of Spain was not only in the interest of Spain but also in the interest of Germany ... a neutral Spain which was furnishing Germany with wolfram and other products was, in his opinion, more valuable for Germany at the present than a Spain which would be drawn into the war. Of course Spain would not go beyond the comparatively trivial concessions mentioned..." (Document 15 of American "White Book").

On 10 March 1945, President Roosevelt wrote Mr. Norman Armour, who succeeded Mr. Hayes as U.S. Ambassador to Spain, a letter which was made public, saying that the Franco regime "had been openly hostile to the U.S. and had tried to spread its Fascist party ideas in the Western Hemisphere." He

"... Most certainly we do not forget Spain's official position with and assistance to our axis enemies at a time when the fortunes of war were less favourable to us, nor can we disregard the activities, aims, organizations, and public utterances of the Falange, both past and present. These memories cannot be wiped out by actions more favorable to us now that we are about to achieve our goal of complete victory over those enemies of ours with whom the present Spanish regime identified itself in the past spiritually and by its public expressions and acts."

The U.S. Government Memorandum submitted on 18 May 1946 to the Subcommittee gives a number of details of Spanish pro-axis and anti-Allied activity.

A large number of Spaniards associated with the Falange or other Spanish official or semi-official agencies worked as Axis agents in the Western Hemisphere, and in some cases, specific arrangements were made to that end by German and Spanish authorities. A large part was played by Spanish shipping in the conduct of Axis espionage and in the smuggling of strategic materials. The E.F.E. Overseas News Agency, a semi-official organization of the Franco Government, acted as a propaganda agency for the Falangist and Franquista viewpoint and contributed to German Intelligence. On 12 March 1941, the German Ambassador in Madrid and the E.F.E. signed a secret agreement by which the E.F.E. would set up a news service to serve Spanish and German ends, with Germany financing the equipment. Radio-broadcasts and printed propaganda evidenced the essential hostility of Spain to the United Nations and to their democratic ideals. Although after 1943, when Axis chances of victory declined, greater caution was employed in propaganda attacks on the United Nations and its members, nevertheless up to the present time, radio propaganda of this character has been beamed directly to the American republics by a powerful Spanish Government station.

The U.S. Memorandum concludes that "Nationalist Spain from its beginning to the present day has fomented foci of Nazi-Fascist influence in the Western Hemisphere." It added that even at the present time the same applies with respect to the Philippine Commonwealth.

ITEM 3

(The extent to which the Franco regime continues to harbour German assets, enterprises, and personnel, Nazi agents, organizations and war criminals and to tolerate their contact with Nazi and Fascist organizations outside of Spain.)

German Assets and Enterprises.

In the United States Government Memorandum of May 17, 1946, German property is estimated at approximately \$95,000,000. This figure includes assets of which the United States Government has definite knowledge, and a possibility that there is a large amount of hidden property of which the United States Government is not informed is not excluded. The decision of limiting the figures in the total estimate to the assets of which the United States Government is positively aware might have, among other factors, caused the revision of its previous estimate of \$100,000,000 to \$200,000,000 (Foreign Economic Administration - United States Government report of 6 August 1945).

The total figure of \$95,000,000 is subdivided into two groups:

- 1) \$80,000,000 invested in Spanish industry. Out of this
 - a) \$45,000,000 privately owned enterprises
 - b) \$35,000,000 state-owned "Isofindus" organization
- 2) \$15,000,000 official assets consisting of diplomatic, consular and associated properties.

In connection with the latter figure the United States Government is also cognisant of the fact that prior to the defeat of Germany large amounts of currency, (approximately \$1,250,000) have been turned over by German officials to German nationals.

From the study of F.E.A. report and the U. S. Government Memorandum the following facts emerge clearly:

- a) German holdings are of many years' standing, and many of them have been created with war purposes in mind.
- b) Germans openly concentrated in the following industries: electrical

equipment, chemical and pharmaceutical, mining and minerals, machinery and machine tools, agriculture and also in the field of insurance.

c) The German grip over Spanish industries is strengthened through the use of patent licences, agreements, and the presence of a considerable amount of German technicians, managers and administrators.

d) Some investments were hidden through the use of bearer shares, dummy and other devices.

e) Some plants of German companies are readily adaptable for use in experiments which could be the basis of a new war industry.

In the appendix which is attached to this paper only those individual industries are listed where a substantial German public or private interest and influence are in existence. This list is compiled primarily from the United States Government Memorandum and supplemented in a few instances (e.g. photographic, printing industry, shipping and banking) from a similar table in the F.E.A. report. This list serves as a good illustration of the facts mentioned above.

Efforts of the Allied Authorities to gain control over German assets and the attitude of the Franco Government.

The United States Government Memorandum of May 17, 1946 thus summarizes this problem:

Since the summer, 1944, the British and American diplomatic missions began to exercise their pressure upon the Franco Government in order to gain control over German assets in Spain. All efforts, however, did not produce any result until 5 May 1946, when the Franco Government passed a law by which all German assets (official and private) were blocked and a census of these assets was to be prepared. The Spanish Government, however, failed to act efficiently in accordance with this law and only the determined insistence of the Allied authorities brought most of the known official assets under the control of the Joint trusteeship, which was established in the summer, 1945, for the purpose of administering and taking possession of German property in Spain on behalf of the Allied Control Council for Germany.

As a result of constant pressure, the Joint Trusteeship recovered,

by February 1, 1946, official funds, gold, etc. valued at about \$4,300,000 and parastatal funds at about \$1,000,000, and also took control over 22 companies of the "Sofindus", 11 German official buildings, and valuable equipment belonging to the German official services. It also undertook some other steps leading to obtaining full control over the "Sofindus".

In April, 1946, the Spanish Government, by openly refusing to agree to the sale of the parastatal properties already taken over by the Joint Trusteeship brought the Allied program in this field to a virtual standstill.

The Franco Government has also consistently refused to cooperate with the Allies in a program of unmasking German dummies, and in the field of \$45,000,000 private capital. It had either failed to cooperate or obstructed the measures of the Trusteeship by advising Spanish nationals not to cooperate with the Allies or by informing Germans of the allied measures.

After the Trusteeship has nominated their Directors on the boards of German companies representing about 20% of the German private capital, the Franco Government, in April 1946 officially protested against this action of the Trusteeship, and stated that it recognized the Allied Control Council only as de facto government for Germany, but it has not recognized its de jure status, nor did it recognize the Law No. 5 of October 30, 1945 which vested the title to all German external assets in the Allied Control Council. This action of the Franco Government brought this branch of the Trusteeship's work also to a standstill.

At present the Joint Trusteeship hopes to open negotiations soon for an overall agreement regarding German official, parastatal, and private property and associated questions.

The British Representative at the 35th Meeting of the Security Council summed up the attitude of the Franco Government in regard to all these matters, stating that: "Indeed the attitude of the Spanish Government in the matter of German assets has so far been co-operative and compares favorably with that of other neutral Governments." And again in his communication of 30 May, 1946, a repetition of this statement appears, together with an explanation that all official and semi-official German assets had already

been handed over on a de facto basis to the Allied Missions and that the arrangements were proceeding for obtaining control of all private German assets.

The French Representative, however, in his communication of 27 May, 1946, states that the Spanish Government has been much less cooperative in the field of semi-official or parastatal property and that in regard to private German property it proved to be uncooperative and sometimes misleading.

Obnoxious Germans, Organizations and war Criminals.

According to the United States Government Memorandum of May 17, 1946, the total number of Germans in Spain, including families, is 10,000 - 12,000. Out of that figure the following categories of Germans are named as those whose presence in Spain is likely to perpetuate Nazi doctrines and activities:

- 1) Officials
- 2) Agents
- 3) Others as those who come under the classification of "Safe Haven"

In addition to these, two more categories form a part of the same problem:

- 4) Vichy French Militia
- 5) War Criminals and other obnoxious individuals of a foreign nationality other than German.

In order to arrive at some conclusive figures embodying the first three categories, it is necessary to compare a number of sources: The F.E.A. United States Government report gives the figure of technicians, managers and administrators as, "perhaps a few thousand", the United States Government Memorandum of May 17, 1946 gives under the "Safe Haven" category the number of 450, but on p. 26 it states that no German had been named for repatriation (450 is the number of those, merely, who are scheduled for repatriation as quickly as possible), solely on the basis of his scientific potentialities and that persons in this category are virtually all at liberty in Spain and are continuing their activities to the extent that

* "Safe Haven" in this case means scientists, technicians, financial and managerial experts, propagandists and any other persons who are likely to devote their skill and energy for preserving and extending enemy influence abroad.

circumstances permit.

As to the first two categories the following figures are mentioned:

1) United States Government Memorandum - 1755 (931 officials, 799 agents, 30 border guards).

2) Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons on May 6, 1946 - 3300 (860 officials, 2440 Nazi agents, Gestapo members and former soldiers (150-200)).

3) The United Kingdom Representative's communication of May 30, 1946 - 1400 officials of whom 121 were repatriated, leaving the figure of 1279; out of that figure 300 were believed to be also agents and will be left out in this category and will be added under "agents" making the final figure here 979. 444 agents, 500 Germans whose repatriation was considered desirable for economic reasons. (It may be assumed that the latter would include technicians, managers, administrators, etc.)

4) Sidney Wise in "The Nation" of 25 May 1946 - 2,200 Nazi agents classified as "dangerous" and representing only the top layer of German agents in Spain.

On the basis of this comparison the figures which would have to appear under these categories would be:

1. Officials 860 to 979
2. Agents 734 to 2240
3. Safehaven 450 to a few thousand

Total: 2044 to 3219 plus a few thousand

On the subject of the Vichy French Militia three sources are on the record: The Polish Representative at the 34th Meeting states "that Franco's Government is harbouring approximately 100,000 Vichy French Militia and German frontier guards and gives Barcelona, San Sebastian, Madrid and Saragossa as the main centres in which they are stationed" and the Spanish Republican Government in its Memorandum gives the same figures. The British Representative in his letter of 4 May 1946 estimated the strength of the Vichy Militia in the following way: "the exact numbers of Vichy-French militia are unknown, but are not more than a few thousand on the outside.

In absence of any other sources which might have bridged this rather substantial discrepancy, the above-mentioned figures would have to appear under this heading:

4) Vichy French Militia - a few thousand to 100,000

In view of the statement by the United Nations War Crimes Commission that it has no knowledge of any war criminal being at large in Spain, no entry can be made under this heading, although the Polish Representative mentioned the presence of war criminals in Spain. His statement may be, however, explained by the following passage from the Brazilian Representative's communication of 24 May, 1946: "According to the British and American Embassies, it may well be that among these Germans (agents) some individual will be found who will admit after interrogation that they have committed such acts as may be deemed war crimes." It would seem warranted, however, to include under this heading the names of various traitors of foreign nationalities, whose extradition from Spain in some instances has been requested by the interested Governments, in the clear understanding that this is being done as a result of a similar nature of their offences and is not due to an expanding interpretation of "war criminal".

The Belgian Government stated in its communication dated May 8, 1946 that the Belgian traitor De Grelle was given refuge in Spain, and the Spanish Republican Government in Annex 3 of the 3rd part of its Memorandum, added a few names. In No. 15 of the "Boletin de Informacion", organ of the Spanish Communist Party published in Toulouse a few other names are given.

5) War Criminals and other obnoxious individuals of a foreign nationality other than German:

1. Leon de Grelle
2. Francois Pietri (Former Vichy Ambassador in Madrid)
3. Sanary - Captain of the Anti-Bolshevist militia and one of the assassins of Geroges Mandel.
4. Lieutenant Knipping
5. Muraille - of Laval's French police and one of the assassins of Max Dormoy.
6. Louis Ferdinand Celine - French collaborator

7. Abel Bonnard - Former Minister of Education of the Vichy Government
8. Paretti de la Rocca - Prefect in the police
9. Sabolde - of Laval's French police
10. M. Bodiguet - former chief of the Perpignan Militia
11. Monsieur Darquier de Pellepoix - Prominent French Fascist.

Activities of Nazi agents in Spain at the present time.

In the Annex of the Spanish Republican Government Memorandum besides giving 61 names of German agents, the area of their activities and their functions, a number of the following charges have been made:

1. Gestapo leaders direct the external services of "2nd Bureau" (Franco's espionage service) and of SIME (Franco's Military Intelligence).
2. Gestapo utilized Spanish and German agents.
3. Gestapo agents are being sent on missions to France and other countries of Europe and are furnished with Spanish papers.
4. Many leaders of the Gestapo and of the S.I.A. (German Information Service) have taken refuge in Spain.
5. The Abwehrstelle has its network throughout the Catalanian province with posts along the French-Spanish border.
6. The secret army in Germany is directed straight from Spain by radio service and by liaison agents of the Abwehrstelle with the collaboration of Spanish agents and French collaborationists in France.
7. Franco's consulates are being used as bases for agents sent on missions to France.
8. YASINE Committee is installed in Madrid and directed by German agents. It maintains contact with Nationalist Arabian League which is being used for provoking incidents in French North Africa.
9. Agrios Exportacion "Agrox" - Headquarters in Madrid, with subsidiaries in Bordeaux and Barcelona under directorship of PRIAS BELTRAN who during the war was engaged in purchasing wolfram for Germany, and

service penetrating France, Belgium and German.

10. Cultural German-Spanish Association - Schools in Barcelona and Figueras for the training of agents.

In reply to a question addressed to him during the public hearing held by the Sub-Committee on May 23rd, Dr. Giral reaffirmed these charges and added that information on this subject comes from the Spanish Republican Intelligence Services and is of a recent date, not older than two months. He also revealed that the fact that these Nazi agents are using radio transmitters in different parts of the country for liaison work with agents in Spain and outside of Spain, was discovered by the Spanish Republican secret agents while operating their own radio stations and the encountered interference in the air.

These charges made by the Spanish Republican Government, find a considerable support in the French Representative's communication of 27 May, 1946, in which it is stated that:

1. Nazi agents, after a certain lapse in their activities, have begun to regroup themselves and maintain a liaison. The big shots in the organization are being camouflaged, while the "small fry" are sacrificed.
2. Nazi agents maintain contact with Germany and the clandestine organizations there by sending reports through a) repatriates, b) radio and c) liaison agents.

Possibilities of evading Repatriation by Nazi Agents.

1. enlistment into Seguridad (Security Police). The Polish Representative mentioned at the 34th Meeting of the Security Council that some 2000 Gestapo agents have been incorporated into Seguridad. The British Representative in his letter of May 4, 1946 stated that "according to our information very few cases, if any, have occurred of members of the Gestapo being incorporated into Spanish Service" and the United States Government memorandum states that no specific case is known of any Gestapo agent of German nationality who had been taken into Seguridad or any Spanish Intelligence, but it was quite probable that the Spanish intelligence service is still using numerous Spaniards formerly employed by the Germans.

2. Enlistment into the Spanish Foreign Legion - The United States Government Memorandum states: "Following the receipt of reports that Germans were seeking to escape via enlistment into the Spanish Foreign Legion, the Embassy took the question up with the Spanish Foreign Ministry which indicated that such an enlistant would be in full accord with the practises governing such legions, where under past histories of candidates are not required to be closely scrutinized." The United States Government did not accept this attitude of the Foreign Ministry and reserved its right to demand the delivery of any such fugitives from Allied justice. On March 24, 1946, the Embassy informed the State Department that, although the possibility exists, there was up to date no positive evidence of enlistments. The French Representative in his communication of 27 May 1946, states that some agents in Spain succeed sometimes in entering the Foreign Legion.

3. Granting of the Spanish Nationality to German Nationals - The United States Government Memorandum reports that: On September 29, 1945, 5,000 applications for naturalization were then pending, and that no action had been taken by then by the Spanish Foreign Ministry. It also stressed the danger which exists in connection with the prolonged process of repatriation which offers to the applicants an opportunity to appeal to friendly Spanish officers first for residence and work permits, which are the first steps toward the naturalization, and then, for completion of the naturalization.

Allied efforts at repatriating "obnoxious Germans" and the attitude of the Franco Government.

On September 10, 1945, the Allied Control Council formally recalled among other countries from Spain, all German nationals who were German officials and their families; all German agents and their families, other obnoxious Germans and their families.

According to the United States Government Memorandum, up to May 10, 1946, 1,659 Germans have been repatriated from Spain:

1377 customs guards and war prisoners

382 officials and agents (including families)

1659 Total

Soon after the German surrender the Allies requested the repatriation of German nationals from Spain. The Franco Government raised, however, various objections, among others, the authority for such a request. On October 19, 1945, when the resolution of the Allied Control Council was already in existence, the Spanish Foreign Ministry promised cooperation, but again raised a number of principal objections, emphasizing the fact that at first the repatriation should be on a voluntary basis.

On November 12, 1945, the United States authorities presented to the Spanish Foreign Ministry a list of 255 agents and officials and requested that these persons be made available for repatriation at the specified time when the air-transport was arranged. Due to the dilatory tactics employed by the Spanish authorities, the scheduled flights had to be cancelled. On the ship "Highland Monarch" which sailed on March 7, 1945, over 600 places were available for the German repatriates, and only 206 were utilised. Out of the Allied list of 252 only 8 persons reported for repatriation; and out of 100 Germans at Bilbao promised by the Foreign Ministry only 16 were provided.

Out of 75 Germans in Madrid who were to be removed by air in April 1946, the Spanish police did not produce anybody and the flight had to be cancelled.

Reporting on the general attitude of the Spanish authorities, the United States Government Memorandum states that the Franco Government has been dilatory at rounding up repatriates and that the Seguridad in particular was uncooperative, and in some cases obstructive. The Seguridad informed Germans in Spain, according to reports received by the United States Embassy, that no one would be arrested in connection with the repatriation program and nobody will be forced to return to Germany.

The United Kingdom Representative in his communication of May 27, also expressed His Majesty's dissatisfaction with the Franco Government's attitude towards this problem and quoted some of the instances in which

that Government did not cooperate with the Allied authorities.

Sidney Wise in "The Nation" of 25 May 1946 illustrates the position of Nazi agents in the following manner: "German espionage agents like Colonel Edmond Niemann, Otto Heinrichsen and Alfred Gesworsky find Spain a comfortable refuge. For the brothers Hubert and Oscar Wilner, munitions agents and active members of the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Police), the dregs of Nazi defeat must taste like champagne, for they are still among the most lavish spenders in Madrid's night clubs. Dr. Karl Albrecht, the number one Nazi in Spain, is so far making good a boast to his Spanish friends on V-E day that the Allies would never be able to get him out of Spain."

The Belgian Government stressing in its letter of May 8, 1946 the unwillingness of the Franco Government to surrender De Grelle, thus describes the attitude of this Government in the matter: "The attitude of the Spanish Government with regard to De Grelle is striking testimony of a policy which is tending to make Spain a haven of refuge for former Axis agents and their confederates."

APPENDIX to Item 3.

Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industry.

In almost all sections of this industry in Spain, there is some evidence of control by I.G. Farben Industrie, the most powerful foreign influence in this field. It controls a number of Spanish firms directly or through Unicolor S.A. (capital \$364,000). It is an I.G. Farben subsidiary which was allowed before the end of the war to produce several patented products. I.G. Farben owns 51 percent of the stock in Sociedad Electro-Química de Flix (capital \$545,000) and the manufacturing processes of this company are held under I.G. Farben license. The other German firms are:

1. Unicolor, S.A. (capital \$361,000). There are thirty-five Germans employed by the company, the majority of whom are members of the Nazi party. At the end of 1944 Unicolor's total assets were \$4,400,000.

2. La Bayer Química Comercial y Farmacéutica (capital \$273,000). Most of the management and technical employees are German. May 1945 assets of the firm totaled \$5,640,000.

3. Electro-Química de Flix S.A. (Capital \$1,100,000). It is owned 51 percent by I.G. Farben.

4. Cloratic S.A. (capital \$91,000) completely owned by I.G. Farben.

5. Fabricación Nacional de Colorantes y Explosivos (capital \$2,720,000). It is closely connected with Unicolor through which it is controlled by I.G. Farben, holder of 50 percent of the capital. At the end of 1944 assets totalled \$5,700,000. Technical matters are in the hands of German experts.

6. Union Química del Norte de España (capital \$5,450,000). It is closely associated with Farben to which it gives technical assistance.

7. Productos Químicos Farmacéuticos (Merck) (capital \$141,000). The house of Merck has 100 percent interest in the company. All important technical and business personnel are German.

8. Boehringer S.A. (capital \$91,000). It is completely owned by Boehringer Brothers of Mannheim. Assets at the end of 1944 were \$564,000. Two German managers are on the firm.

9. Productos Quimicos Schering S.A. (capital \$227,000). It is a major Schering subsidiary in Spain. The management of the company is German as are most of the technicians.

10. S...L.I.A. (Productos Quimicos Pharmaceuticos S.A.) (capital \$60,000). SALLA is 80 percent owned by Diwig Chemische Fabriken A.G. Berlin. The vice-president, two directors and the manager are German.

Electrical Equipment Industry.

1. Siemens Industria Electrica, S.A. (capital \$636,000). The management is in the hands of Germans, as are the most important technical positions.

2. Siemens Reiniger Veifa S.A. (capital \$110,000). Total assets in April 1945 were \$700,000. The firm is managed by Germans and at the end of 1943 it had 83 employees of whom 11 were German.

3. Industrial Latina de Electricidad Aplicada S.A. (ILDEA). (capital \$24,000). It is a manufacturing subsidiary of Siemens Reiniger Veifa S.A.

4. A.E.G. Iberica de Electricidad S.A. (capital \$682,000). It is owned by A.E.G. in Berlin. The president and technical director, the administrative director, chief engineers, director of personnel, and several of the sales managers are German.

5. La Electra Industrial S.A. (capital \$550,000). Net asset value of the company is about \$1,100,000. The most important positions are in the hands of Germans.

6. Electrica Rubi, S.A. (capital \$9,000). This firm is a subsidiary of La Electrica Industrial.

7. Telefunken Radiotecnica Iberica S.A. (capital \$454,000). It is a subsidiary of the Telefunken Company of Berlin. The two managers and the chief engineer are German.

8. Osram Fabrica de Lamparas S. A. (capital \$273,000). It is a subsidiary of a German Company (Osram). Most administrative and technical personnel are German.

9. Equipo-Boesch S.A. (capital \$140,000).

Mining and minerals Industry.

The most influential German firm in Spain dealing with mining and minerals is:

1. Sofindus mining companies: It is estimated that mines purchased by this company during the war cost the German government about 310,000,000 and their present value is about one and a half that amount.
2. Lipperheide y Guzman S.A. (capital 31,820,000). It is owned by two of the leading German families in Spain.

Machinery and Machine Tool Industry.

1. Otto Deutz (Compania Espanola de Motores Deutz S.A.), The capital is 70,000 and this company is owned by the German Otto Deutz Motoren at Hanberg.
2. Maquinas de Escribir Olympia S.A. (capital 600,000). The management of this company is German.
3. Aceros Finos Roechling S. A. (capital 44,000). The firm is a subsidiary of Roechling Stahl A.G. of Saarbrucken. The management of this firm is German.
4. Maquinaria J.M. Voeth S.L. (capital 90,000). It is a subsidiary of the German J.M. Voith of Heidenheim. Of the three employees of the subject company, all are German.
5. Aceros y Metales S.A. (Rheinmetall) (capital 23,000). This company has a German manager.
6. Demag S.A. Maquinaria (capital 9,100). It is owned by Demag of Duisberg. Until recently the directorship and management were German.
7. M.A.W. Diesel Iberica S.A. (capital 91,000). Its capital stock is held by Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg. The Board of Directors and management are German.
8. Wilhelm F. Mallet (capital 55,000). At present he is attempting to import a large quantity of military equipment from Switzerland on behalf of the Spanish Government.
9. Elster S.A. (capital 27,000). It is believed that a majority of the capital stock is owned by the Elster company of Germany. Some fifteen

people are employed, one of whom, a technician, is German.

10. H. & O. Wilmer (capital \$54,000). This firm is owned by Germans in Spain.

11. Orenstein & Koppel A.G. (capital \$45,000). The head offices of the company are located in Germany. The members of the Board of Directors are resident in Germany, and the general manager for Spain and his assistant are also German.

12. Motores Deutsche Werke S.A. (capital \$9,100). Total assets in 1945 were \$71,000.

13. Carl Zeiss (capital \$25,000). Assets are \$91,000. This firm has no German employees.

Agriculture.

The official German trading company in Spain SOFININDUS. (Sociedad Financiero Industrial LTD), has strong interests in agriculture. Through Agro S.A., and Productos Agrocolas S.A. (capital \$225,000) Sofindus maintains an active interest in Spanish agriculture.

Photographic Industry, etc.

The photographic industry in Spain relied heavily on German supplies and is using "Agfa" processes for production. There are other numerous German or German controlled companies in the printing business (capital \$239,000), tires (capital \$271,000) and various German general and commission agents in all branches of Spanish trade.

There are in Spain ten registered German insurance companies receiving premiums of almost \$5,000,000 a year. Some of these companies are:

1. Plus Ultra S.A. (capital \$454,000)
2. La Constancia (capital \$182,000)
3. Victoria de Berlin: Victoria is the largest branch office of any German insurance company in Spain.
4. Nord Deutsche
5. Lloyd Aleman

Two German-owned Banks possess total assets amounting to \$20,000,000.

They are:

1. Banco Germanico de la America del Sur, S.A. (capital
\$273,000)

2. Banco Aleman Transatlantico

In shipping the firms Saquera, Kushe y Martin S.A. (capital \$45,000 - \$90,000) and Deposito Espanol de Tenerife S.A. (capital \$90,000) and Deposito Espanol de Carbonera S.A. are either German subsidiaries or are controlled by German interest.

ITEM 4

(The numerical strength of the armed forces of the Franco regime, including police and security forces, in relation to the population and resources of Spain; the strategic aims and other purposes and activities of these forces).

STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCE OF THE FRANCO REGIME

Numerical Strength

The figures of Franco's Military strength have been differently estimated. At the thirty-fourth meeting of the Security Council on 19 April 1946, the Polish representative stated that:

"Under the Franco regime Spain continues to be an armed camp. The former American Ambassador in Madrid, Norman Armour, on his return on 22 December 1945, declared that the Franco Government maintained a standing army of 600,000 to 700,000."

The United Kingdom representative in a Memorandum dated 30 May, gave his Government's estimate as a sum total of just over five hundred thousand men in the Spanish Army.

The French Memorandum submitted to the Sub-Committee gives the total strength of the Army as five hundred and fifty thousand men.

In his letter to the Sub-Committee the Brazilian Representative informed that according to information received from his Embassy in Madrid, the armed forces in Spain total four hundred and fifty thousand.

The Memorandum submitted by the United States Government says:

"The present strength of the Spanish armed forces is currently estimated to be slightly more than 600,000 with some 570,000 in the Army (exclusive of 120,000 of the class of 1943 now on indefinite furlough), about 15,000 to 19,000 in the air force, and the balance, some 20,000 to 25,000 in the Navy. The Spanish Air Force is estimated to consist of slightly over 300 operational aircraft of which about 65 percent are fighters and 25 percent bombers. The planes and other aerial equipment now being used consist almost entirely of Italian, Soviet and German types, obtained during the Civil War and now in poor condition".

In the Memorandum submitted by the Spanish Republican Government to the Sub-Committee of the Security Council it gives the total armed strength of the Franco regime as eight hundred and forty thousand men. They are divided as follows:

(a) Standing Army	600,000
(b) Volunteer Corps (Most foreigners)	150,000
(c) Indigenous forces	50,000
(d) Foreign legion	<u>40,000</u>
Total	<u>840,000</u>

At the thirteenth meeting of the Sub-Committee, on 23 May 1946, in answer to a question of the Chairman regarding the discrepancies in the information from various sources, Mr. Giral stated that:

"As regards the figure of 450,000 exclusive of the 1945 class of recruits, I would draw the attention of the Committee to the fact that if you add this 1943 class to the figure of 450,000, you have a total of 600,000, which is the figure that we gave in Annex XI of our report. The difference between 450,000 and our figure of 600,000 is explained by the exclusion of this class of recruits of 1943".

Mr. Giral's explanation has cleared the discrepancies between different figures. The figure given by the British Delegate in his first letter at four hundred and fifty thousand excluded the 1943 class, which he said had been released, the civil guard and the police. Other estimates have placed the total figure at six hundred thousand excluding the civil guard and police. Now from what has been said it would appear that that figure of six hundred thousand corresponds with the figure given by the Spanish Republican Government excluding the Colonial Forces and the Foreign Legion.

The United Kingdom Memorandum alleges:

"The production of war materials of all kinds in Spain is negligible".

The French Memorandum confirms this view:

"The technical deficiencies of Spanish industry absolutely exclude the existence of a modern war industry of great production in the peninsula".

Spanish Navy and Naval Production

In the Annex of the Spanish Republican Government Memorandum, it says the naval strength of the Franco regime consists of the following:

- 4 Heavy cruisers, 2 in service, 2 under construction
- 9 Light cruisers
- 4 Anti-Aircraft light cruisers
- 32 Destroyers
- 28 Submarines
- 25 Large U-boats (torpedo boats)
- 5 Coastguard boats
- 200 Small torpedo boats
- 4 Mine-layers
- 2 Oil Tankers

The total tonnage of the Spanish Navy is three hundred and forty one thousand, three hundred and ninety five.

The French Memorandum gives the present Spanish naval strength as 6 Heavy, 3 Medium and 2 Light Cruisers, 19 Destroyers, 2 Submarines and 6 Mine-layers besides smaller craft.

Mr. Giral in his remarks before the Sub-Committee stated that:

"As regards the Navy, details of present construction are given in Annex XI of our report. This construction includes one battleship - hitherto Spain has not possessed a battleship - a number of heavy and light cruisers, a number of destroyers and submarines, and many other auxiliary craft. During the years of Republican Spain the country was very modest in its Navy construction. It had not a single battleship and only a few cruisers. Now, however, construction and manufacture is being intensified and many powerful Naval units are being built".

The United States Memorandum did not give detailed information as to the Spanish Naval strength but only mentioned that:

"The effective Spanish Naval establishment consists of perhaps five cruisers and fourteen destroyers. In addition there are a small number of submarines and miscellaneous vessels many of which are believed not to be in operational condition. The effectiveness of this force may be judged by its numerical relations up to the naval forces of other countries and the fact it has had little opportunity for training and manoeuvres".

As to the Naval personnel, the United States Memorandum put it between twenty thousand and twenty-five thousand.

The United Kingdom Memorandum sets warship production at 9 destroyers and 9 torpedo boats laid down in 1945, and 8 gunboats, 2 submarines and 7 minesweepers already launched but awaiting armament. It alleges, however, that these vessels are unlikely to be in commission for a considerable time as a result of equipment shortage.

In his Memorandum to the Sub-Committee, Mr. Abel Plenn, author and

chief of propaganda analysis attached to the American Embassy in Madrid, says:

"Reports are current that naval construction has been intensified in Spain, especially the building of new submarines. According to Pueblo of Madrid, April 2, 1945 (as reported by the Research Department of the British Foreign Office):

"Three cruisers of the Almirante Cervera type have been modernized; the former ship Reina Victoria now the Navarra, has been rebuilt; the cruiser Mondos Nunez was being transformed and made into a training ship for anti-aircraft personnel. All destroyers have been modernized. New ships already completed were 6 mine-layers (4 being of 2,000 tons, with a capacity of 150 mines; the other 2 of 1,500 tons), and various gunboats. In El Ferrol 9 destroyers of 1,500 tons were being built, and in Cartagena the armaments of new submarines of the "D" class (1,050 tons) were in the making. Between this year and next, construction was to begin on 2 flotillas of large destroyers, nine in each, units of 2,500 and 3,500 tons displacement respectively".

Air Force and Aircraft Production

In the United States Memorandum it mentioned that of the armed forces there are about fifteen thousand to nineteen thousand in the air force and the aircraft production in Spain is limited to outmoded types, and all evidence to date indicates only limited production even in such types. (Estimated composition of the Air Force has been described in Page 1).

The United Kingdom Memorandum sets the total strength of all operational types at less than four hundred and fifty. It mentions that recent Allied interrogation of German technicians in Spain has confirmed that aircraft production has been very small. Spares are, in general, unobtainable and none of the modern radio or electronic methods of control are available.

The French Memorandum puts the figure for aircraft at five hundred to six hundred, of which one hundred and fifty are of first quality.

"Spanish aviation does not seem under these conditions in any way adapted to the conditions of modern warfare".

The Spanish Republican Government Memorandum and statements did not mention anything with regard to the Air Force of the Franco regime but that Spain has possessed factories which are producing airplanes.

Training and Equipment

The United States Memorandum asserts that:

"The training status of the Spanish Army is at present rather low, due to the fact that the 1946 class has just been called up and the 1943 class, which has been in the service over two years was placed on an indefinite furlough status early this spring. Most of the smaller units have had fairly good unit training but there have been few exercises for regimental or higher units. The fuel shortage has severely limited training during the past four years. In general, the Spanish Army is rather poorly equipped. Only small arms and light material are adequate in quantity and quality for a modern army. Heavy equipment is reported obsolete and in rather poor state of maintenance. Spain has had little direct experience in modern warfare. In view of the above limitations, the combat efficiency of the Army is estimated to be only fair. Motor transport, armoured artillery and air units are believed incapable of sustained operations, with but little or no offensive capability against a modern force and defensive capability sufficient only for internal security and for protection of Spanish frontiers against small scale attacks".

The United Kingdom Memorandum confirms this opinion:

The quality and war potential of this force must be considered as far below that of a modern European army. At best it could be capable of putting up a fair resistance in defence and of giving a good account of itself in guerilla warfare within its own territory. The Spanish army, ill-trained and almost completely lacking in armour and other modern essential equipment, with insufficient transport and petrol and with a negligible air force, must be considered incapable of undertaking offensive operations on a large scale.

The French Memorandum states that the Spanish Army is normally equipped with individual arms and campaign artillery, but material is old-fashioned.

Mr. Giral did not say anything regarding the training status of the Spanish Army, but as to the equipment, he made the following statement:

"For a long time past, Spain has possessed factories producing arms and munitions. It has also had shipyards for the

construction of warships and factories producing airplanes. In the Franco period, however, very large credits constituting the greater part of the national budget were devoted to production; it was not only that the old plants were developed; it was also that new plants were built and new technical direction installed in those plants. The technical direction was largely in the hands of German experts. German experts have been in Spain for a long time and gave a very great contribution to this perfection and intensification of arsenals and factories including a rifle factory in Oviedo, a gunpowder factory in Seville, a cartridge factory in Toledo, and other important plants of this kind. The whole of the production had been enlarged and new plants built which are now producing airplanes, tanks, machine guns in large quantities, rifles and cannon".

Mr. Giral also added that:

"There are at present in Spain 27 divisions of infantry, 10 mechanized and armoured, 10 of cavalry, 10 divisions and 3 groups of sappers, 12 brigades of artillery, as well as other specialized formations for chemical warfare, signals, field hygiene, and so on".

Police Forces

The United States Memorandum says:

"The Civil Guardia and Policia Armada constitutes the principal Spanish police forces. The Civil Guardia has a strength of about 60,000 men, equipped with army type small arms, machine guns and mortars. This force is organized generally in regiments distributed throughout the country in small units. Its principal duty is internal security. Its morale is rather low, due in part to low pay. The Policia Armada has a strength of approximately 25,000 men. Its principal duties are highway patrol and traffic control. It is equipped with small arms and a fair amount of motor equipment. It is believed to be organized in small groups and incapable of effective military operations. Its morale appears to be somewhat higher than the Civil Guardia but is also influenced by low pay".

The United Kingdom Memorandum puts the total of the Civil Guardia and Police Forces at one hundred and twelve thousand five hundred men, and the French Memorandum at one hundred and ninety thousand men, as well as twenty-five thousand in the Falangist Militia.

The French Memorandum adds that:

"The Falange would be capable of mobilizing in the whole of Spain almost a million men".

In answer to a question from the Brazilian delegate at the thirteenth meeting of the Sub-Committee regarding the strength of the Falange, the Militia and other military organizations, Mr. Giral said:

"As regards the Civil Guard, I can only give a very approximate figure as the total number varies from time to time. I should say very approximately the number would be in the neighborhood of 100,000. As regards police, too, I am not able to give the exact figure. The police includes several different kinds of bodies of armed and uniformed men. As regards the Falangists, these forces are always armed and they number something in the neighborhood of half a million men. They come under the authority of the Army and the Police but their exact number is not known. These forces are always armed and they have publicly proclaimed themselves to be armed. There are other categories of forces which can be likened to the Falangists, these include the *Tercios Rurales* and mixed bodies like the *Carabinieri* who act as frontier guards and who are under the military bodies concerned with the protection of the frontiers. These forces are military organized and partly under military authority."

Military Manpower

"As regards the armed forces at present in the Peninsula, I would like to add that in view of a recent provision of the Franco Government, all citizens who desire arms are entitled to bear them. The pretext for this provision is that the civilian population should be armed in view of a possible attack upon Spain by Soviet Union. The number of armed civilians therefore is quite indefinite since the population is entitled, under that law, to be armed if it desires." (Mr. Giral's statement at 13th Meeting.)

"Spain, with a population of approximately 25,000,000 has an estimated maximum of less than 4,000,000 men between the age of 18-45, fit for military service. Approximately half of this number have had some form of military training." (U.S. Memorandum.)

FRANCO'S MILITARY STRENGTH IN RELATION TO THE POPULATION AND RESOURCES OF SPAIN

The Spanish Republican Government give the following figures:-

The Spanish military forces have been greatly increased in the last few years. In 1936 the armed forces were only 100,000 and in 1939, they were increased to 300,000, and in 1946 the Spanish Government maintained a standing army of 600,000.

The increase of military expenses, in the ordinary state budgets from 1942 to 1946 is as follows:

Year	Army	Navy	Air
	In Millions of Pesetas		
1942	1,253	256	397
1943	1,817	296	410
1944	1,990	341	432
1945	2,087	377	471
1946	2,104	417	475

The military expenses in relation to the total national income and expenditures for 1944 to 1946 in ordinary state budgets are as follows:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Revenue</u>	<u>Expenditure</u>	<u>Military Expenses</u>
1944	10,330	10,330	3,344
1945	10,544	10,564	3,504
1946	11,298	11,298	3,608

The figures of extraordinary budgets are not available except those for 1944, which are 2,626,557,000 pesetas. Of this the allocation of military expenses is 1,303,000,000.

Police expenses in the budgets for 1945 and 1946 show substantial increase.

1945	1,295,400,000 pesetas
1946	2,087,200,000 "

Mr. Giral commented, "In the latest budget on which we have information that of 1946, the proportion devoted to military expenditure is over 62 percent of the total".

The United Kingdom Memorandum, however, gives a decrease in the budget figures for the Army of 800,000,000 pesetas between 1945 and 1946, and the French Memorandum gives a decrease of 765,000,000 pesetas for the Army, Navy and Airforce combined:

The foregoing analysis has yielded the following points.

1. Spain, a country with a population of 26,000,000, possesses an armed force of 600,000.
2. The police expenses in the budget for 1946 have an increase of 791,000,000 pesetas over those of 1945.

The Strategic Aims and Other Purposes and Activities of Franco's Military Forces

The Polish representative, at the thirty-fourth meeting of the Security Council stated that:

"....For Franco's regime in Spain continued to maintain and to serve the purpose of the Axis, after Italy, Germany and Japan have been defeated by the United Nations. It continues to exist as a centre of Fascist infection and a jumping off place for war which once more may spread all over the world.

After mentioning that "200,000 men are massed" in the Pyrenees region, the Polish representative continued:

"The constant intrigues of the Franco regime against the French Republic which last year regained her freedom from the double oppression of German tyranny and of internal fascist traitors, finally compelled the Government of Franco, the distinguished representative who sits among us, to close the frontier between France and Spain".

The representative of the Netherlands on the other hand maintains that:

"I cannot say that on the basis of the evidence that has been placed before us, much of which is purely conjectural, a case has been made out justifying a verdict that the Franco regime is endangering international peace and security. If the French Government chose to close the frontier that surely is not sufficient evidence. It only shows that the French Government has been moved to stop traffic across the frontier inasmuch as the movement of Spanish troops has admittedly taken place after and not before the closing of the frontier. I have not heard the Polish Delegation say one word which pointed with any degree of certainty or even probability to fundamental offensive action on the part of the Spanish armed forces, and I must say that what ever my feeling concerning the Franco regime, I do not think it is so foolish as to take offensive action."

The representative of the United Kingdom also held that:

"I had expected the Delegate of France might have filled this gap and might have expressed on behalf of his government apprehension regarding Spanish military preparation. But on that point he was silent."

Regarding the purpose of the troops movement in the frontier regions of the Pyrenees, the United States Memorandum says:

"Fortifications in the Pyrenees area are essentially defensive, consisting of improvised field works and a limited number of concrete pill boxes. Undoubtedly they would be of considerable help against attack of lightly armed forces but of doubtful effect against well equipped armies."

"The deployment of the Spanish Military forces appears to be of a defensive nature, suitable for internal security and defense against frontier incidents or border infiltrations along the 200 mile boundary with France."

The United Kingdom Memorandum agrees with this assertion. It places the strength in the frontier area at one hundred and seventy thousand men and seventy aircraft and alleges that:

"During the past six months the total strength of the Spanish Army on the Pyrenees had considerably decreased....."

The Memorandum goes on to say that:

"As regards fortifications, the Campo area near Gibraltar is the only one which could be said to have fortifications of a possibly aggressive character."

"The dispositions (of the Air Force) opposite France are entirely defensive and could not be turned to offensive use for lack of forward airfields."

The French Memorandum asserts that since the guerilla attack during the winter of 1944 - 1945 the Spanish decided to take on the construction of certain works of fortification on the Pyrenees frontier.

(Production of uranium and war materials; military, naval and aeronautic installations; research on methods of war and mass destruction; atomic research; fortifications erected by the Franco regime and the strategic disposition of its armed forces; and other preparations for war by the Franco regime.)

Production of Uranium and War Materials

On 5 October 1945 the Franco Government decreed government control of all uranium producing territories as a measure for national defense. The Estadística Minera y Metalúrgica issued by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce in 1944 stated that Spain has six uranium mines, two in the province of Badajoz, and four in the province of Cordoba.

The U. S. Memorandum states that there are known to be deposits of uranium ores in Spain and that an unconfirmed report states that one mine may be in production.

The U. K. Memorandum of 30 May 1946 stated that the production of uranium in Spain was negligible and that there are no known rich or extensive deposits of uranium ore in Spain.

Mr. Giral stated, when giving oral evidence to the Sub-Committee at its meeting of 27 May 1945, that uranium deposits exist in Spain at Barca de Alba near Salamanca, at Pico de Europa in northern Spain, in the Asturias and in the province of Cordoba. At the present time the uranium mines are being exploited (pp. 1 and 21 of S/3CS/P. V./2)

As to the production of war materials, Mr. Giral stated in his oral evidence to the Sub-Committee on 23 May 1946 that Spain has factories producing arms, munitions and airplanes. The old plants were developed and new plants were built largely under the technical direction of German experts. At the present time, these new plants are producing airplanes, tanks, machine guns, rifles and cannon. Spanish shipyards are also constructing a battleship (for the first time in Spain's history), a number of heavy and light cruisers, a number of destroyers and submarines and many auxiliary craft.

The U. S. Government in its Memorandum to the Sub-Committee did not give specific facts or figures respecting Spain's production of war

materials, but it stated (page 46) that "Production, not only in the armament but also in other industries, has been unimpressive." Spain's 1943 steel production was about 700,000 tons. Aircraft production in Spain was "limited to outmoded types, and all evidence to date indicates only limited production even in such types."

Sir Alexander Cadogan in a letter on 4 May 1946 stated that, so far as could be discovered by His Majesty's Government, no tanks or armoured cars were being produced in Germany, and it seemed most unlikely that large quantities of war materials were being produced clandestinely, as Spain's present steel output was only 30% of normal capacity. He added that Spain was short of 12,000 tons of ships' plates and Spanish built destroyers have had to wait for over two years for armaments.

The U. K. Memorandum of 30 May 1946 stated that the production of war materials of all kinds in Spain was negligible and that the Spanish armed forces were dependant upon imports from abroad. Although there were at present under construction 9 destroyers, 9 torpedo boats, 8 gun boats, 7 minesweepers, 2 submarines and 5 armed tugs, as a result of shortage of materials, armaments, instruments and other equipment, most of the vessels were unlikely to be commissioned for a considerable time. There are 5 air-frame, 2 engine and 1 instrument factories in Spain working under German licenses granted during the war, but they have failed to produce more than a very small number of flyable aircraft. There are also 12 factories and arsenals and some 20 small installations in Spain capable of producing war materials, but they, too, are producing very little.

The Memorandum of the French Government, dated 27 May 1946, stated that factories producing automatic weapons and machine guns were located at Oviedo, Toledo and Eibar. Artillery was produced at Plasencia, Reinosa, Trubia, Seville, Cadiz and Segunto. Gunpowder and munitions factories were located at Guernica, Biscaye, Catalinca, Galaducamo, Mongoya and Lugones, El Faroue, La Norn, Carthagena and Saragossa. Optical equipment and poison gases were produced at Madrid. Production was confined to old fashioned types, and the technical deficiencies of Spanish industry excluded the existence of a modern war industry of great output. Spanish industry was incapable of producing or repairing modern airplanes in large quantities.

Although it has not been possible to verify or disprove the information, a dispatch by Charles Menton to the Overseas News Agency on 13 March 1946 contained some interesting allegations regarding Spanish munition production. He stated:

"The automatic weapons made at Eibar are second to none in the world. The Trueba works are turning out Krupp-type 155 mm. guns on a Detroit schedule. The Estrella plant is making 1946-type Mausers from blueprints smuggled out of Germany after the Nazi defeat. The Toledo factories, formerly specializing in light arms, are now geared to produce automatic (Eren type) weapons, and a plant near Granada, founded by a Nazi concern in 1943, is daily turning out between two and six thirty-ton tanks."

Another unconfirmed report states that the "Constructores Naval" of Reinosa forges fifteen-inch cannon. The "Enskilduna" of Bilbao produces all armoured material needed by the Army and Navy, and the "Maquinaria Terrestre y Maritima" of Barcelona fabricates all the machinery needed by the war factories. Factories of special equipment at Saragossa manufactured all optical equipment required for three battleships.

On 11 June 1941 Franco created a body known as C. O. M. E. I. M. (Consejo Ordenador de Minerales Especiales de Interés Militar - Regulating Board for Special Minerals of Military Interest) to integrate the economic system and the war machine. Various decrees were made bringing the following minerals under the control of the State - lead, hydrocarbons, bituminous rocks and petroleum, tin, wolfram, copper, zinc, aluminum, magnesium, tungsten, molybdenum, chrome, vanadium, titanium, mercury and uranium. (Memorandum of Spanish Republican Government, page 27, and oral evidence of Mr. Giral, S/GCS/P. V./2, page 31)

Research on Methods of War and Mass Destruction; Atomic Research

The Giral Memorandum stated (pp. 27-28) that a polytechnic has been created to supply personnel for military industries and to integrate civilian production when necessary. A specialized branch was set up in Madrid to deal with chemical and anti-gas production, also centers of research on military tactics and schools for military, naval and air training.

Dr. Lange at the meeting of the Security Council on 17 April 1946, referring to the statements of the U. S. State Department on 10 and 11 April

regarding 2,200 obnoxious Germans remaining in Spain, some of whom were scientists identified by the U. S. A., stated that the Spanish Government sheltered and promoted the preparation by Nazis of new means of warfare.

The U. S. Government Memorandum stated (page 47) that the U. S. Government "has no confirmed evidence . . . that there has been significant progress in the development in Spain of new weapons or methods of mass destruction." At page 25 of the Memorandum it states that the "American Embassy at Madrid reported in April 1945 that it had no specific information that there were any Germans in Spain who might be capable of directing the manufacture of new implements of war or of high-grade scientific research." At page 27 of the Memorandum it states that of the 2,205 obnoxious Germans still remaining in Spain, 450 are of the "safehaven" category - technicians, scientists, engineers, etc.

Sir Alexander Cadogan stated in his letter that of the obnoxious Germans remaining in Spain "careful investigation has revealed the presence of 100 technical experts . . . of whom only a small number can be classified as scientists in the strictest sense of the word."

Although at first glance there appears to be a discrepancy in the estimate of the number of Nazi technical experts in Spain, it is possible that the apparent difference is due to differences in terminology and classification.

It has not been possible to confirm or disprove his allegations, but it is noteworthy that Mr. Abel Plenn, who was employed as a Propaganda Analyst by the U. S. Government from 1942 to 1945, and who spent seven months in Spain in 1944 as Chief of Propaganda Analyses attached to the U. S. Embassy in Madrid, in his book, Wind in the Olive Trees (published 1946), stated (page 334) that experimentation and extensive research projects are being carried out by Nazi scientists and technicians in Spain in the fields of jet propulsion and atomic energy. He refers to "periodic reports from Spain, Sweden and other sources" that Nazi scientists in Spain "are not only busy perfecting the system of robot bombs - V1 and V2 are two commonly known types - which were said to have been tried out and launched first from Pamplona, near

with the secrets of the atomic bomb." Mr. Plenn in a memorandum to the Sub-Committee, dated 27 May 1946, also referred to reports current in Spain of experiments in germ warfare in Spain.

Dr. Lange stated at the Council meeting of 17 April 1946 that Dr. Herman von Segerstady, a heavy water specialist who worked on nuclear energy at the Nazi plant in Norway was reported to be director of a similar Spanish project near Ocana, south of Toledo.

Sir Alexander Cadogan's letter stated that the British Embassy in Spain could find no sign of the plant and could trace no information about von Segerstady in British, United States or German records in Madrid.

The U. S. Government Memorandum stated that "apart from the unconfirmed report that one uranium mine may be in production, the U. S. Government has no evidence confirming rumored activities in Spain relating to the production of atomic energy."

In answer to a United Press report on 10 April 1946 that a U. S. State Department spokesman stated that "it was known that a plant at Bilbao had adequate facilities for atomic research," the State Department on 11 April issued a statement that "The Department has no information that German-owned factories in Spain are working on atomic research. The Department does know of German-owned factories in Spain, particularly in Bilbao, but has no information that these or any other plants in Spain are being used in connection with atomic energy projects."

The French Government Memorandum of 27 May 1946 stated that their information did not reveal any evidence of atomic research in Spain. However, the Security Services of the French Military Government in Austria revealed that from 1 January 1945 to 24 April 1945 the Nazis probably transferred scientific equipment to Spain via Northern Italy. The scientific equipment included a cyclotron, 10 Aston-type spectrometers, radio-active minerals either uranium or radium in 4 lead boxes of 200 kilograms each, and the plans of V1 and V2 weapons and of jet-propelled airplanes of the Me 262 type.

The U. K. Memorandum of 30 May 1946 stated that the British Embassy reported in January 1946 that there was no evidence to suggest

that German scientists in Spain were engaged in scientific research on new methods of warfare. The British Consul at Bilbao reported that there was no foundation for a press report about an atomic research station staffed by German scientists near Bilbao.

Mr. Giral in his oral evidence to the Sub-Committee on 17 May 1946 (S/SCS/P.V./2, pp. 21-30) stated that Spain possessed all three elements necessary to exploit atomic energy - uranium, electrical power and technicians. He had no precise information on the Spanish research into atomic energy but stated that such activity was possible. A number of German technicians in the field of atomic research are present in Spain, most of them under disguise. On 2 May 1945, three German scientists from the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin entered Spain under an order signed by Martin Bormann. Several other groups of specialists in research on heavy water and radar, small groups of from six to twenty people, including Mr. Gruenmann of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, came to Spain. These people have carried on their work in the province of Almeria where strange phenomenon, such as "kind of fire waves," had been observed.

In a statement by the Franco Government on 28 May 1946 (reported in the New York Times of 29 May), it was alleged:

"Although the Spanish Government . . . has a perfect right to provide adequate means for national defense, including research on atomic energy, diplomatic missions accredited to Madrid have had proof of the falseness of the assertion that such research is being carried on."

Military, Naval and Aeronautic Installations

No evidence was submitted of any important recent installations of this nature.

Fortifications Erected by the Franco Regime and the Strategic Disposition of its Armed Forces

The Memorandum submitted by the Spanish Republican Government states that the armed forces of Spain constitutes "the most powerful war machine of the whole Western part of the continent of Europe." Of the total armed forces of 840,000, 250,000 are stationed in Burgos, Saragossa and Barcelona - i. e., near the French frontier and in a position threatening France. The frontier garrisons are being steadily reinforced by troops

brought from other parts of Spain, and 80% of the Spanish air force is concentrated in Saragossa, Reus, Burgos and Victoria.

In Catalonia (4th Military Region) there are concentrated about 200,000 men comprising nine infantry divisions, fifteen artillery regiments, seven engineering regiments and eight other regiments.

About 100,000 Germans and French militia have their headquarters in Sitges about twenty miles from Barcelona.

A detailed statement of the disposition of Franco's armies is set out in Annex 11 of the Memorandum of the Spanish Republican Government.

In his oral evidence before the Sub-Committee on 23 May 1946 and in Appendix 12 of his Second Report, Mr. Giral emphasized that the concentration of troops along the French frontier was prepared and executed prior to the closing of the frontier by France. He also pointed out that Spanish troops in these zones have been put into civilian clothes and were ordered to hide their arms in the woods in order to mislead a British American commission that visited the area.

Sir Alexander Cadogan in his letter, dated 4 May 1946, disagreed with the figures quoted in the Giral Memorandum. He stated that the total number of men concentrated in the frontier region of Pyrenees was less than 150,000, of which only 100,000 were in the frontier zone. The total number of divisions in this zone was two infantry and four mountaineering divisions, plus twelve "Grupos de Combate," which are much smaller than divisions. He stated further that in Catalonia there were only 60,000 men and not 200,000. The U. S. Government Memorandum to the Sub-Committee stated (pp. 43-44) that there are about 150,000 men stationed in the Pyrenees region, about 325,000 in the rest of Spain and the remainder in Morocco, the Canaries and the Balearics.

It may be that the apparent differences in figures is due to a difference interpretation of the meaning of "frontier zone" or "region." It is also possible that Franco succeeded in disguising a number of his troops as civilians.

The U. K. Memorandum of 30 May 1946 stated:

"According to information dated March 21st, the strength of forces in the frontier area north of the line Barcelona-Zaragoza-Burgos consisted of 16 divisions, viz 8 infantry divisions and 8 mountaineer divisions. There were no cavalry or armoured formations on the frontier. The average divisional strength was 10,000. The estimated total strength of forces on the frontier was around 170,000. . . . The Air Force (concentrated at Zaragoza and covering the whole frontier) consisted of three fighter squadrons and one mixed squadron, comprising a total of seventy aircraft.

"Each division deployed on the frontier had two regiments on the frontier itself and one in tactical reserve. The whole layout and disposition of the force was essentially of a defensive nature and its role was primarily to prevent infiltration across the frontier. Active work on fortifications and field defences of all types was being carried out by engineer units to a depth of sixty kilometres.

"The quality and war potential of this force must be considered as far below that of a modern European army. At best it would be capable of putting up a fair resistance in defence and of giving a good account of itself in guerilla warfare within its own territory. The Spanish army, ill-trained and almost completely lacking in armour and other modern essential equipment, with insufficient transport and petrol and with a negligible air force, must be considered incapable of undertaking offensive operations on a large scale.

"During the past six months the total strength of the Spanish army on the Pyrenees had considerably decreased owing to the release of the 1943 class and the disbandment of the provisional divisions."

The Spanish Republican Government furnished a document, "Franco's Secret Military Plans against France, Secret Instruction No. 27," containing secret orders by General Aizpuru to the Pyrenees Army for occupation of designated points in the Pyrenees. The U. S. Memorandum (page 44) states that the document may be part of an order issued in September 1945 which was specified as of a defensive nature. No further information regarding the nature of the document could be obtained except that it was apparently issued by the Chief of Staff of the 6th Army Corps (Navarre) commanded by General Yague in September 1945.

The U. S. Memorandum (page 45) states that the deployment of the Spanish Military Forces appears to be of a defensive nature. The Army is poorly equipped and its combat efficiency is only fair. Motor transport, armoured, artillery and air units are believed to be incapable of sustained operations and to be capable of only defensive functions for internal security and for protection of Spanish frontiers against small scale attacks.

With respect to the fortifications erected by the Franco Regime, the Memorandum of the Spanish Republican Government stated that an extensive network had been constructed along the Pyrenees frontier within the last few months. Annex 11 of the Memorandum gave a very detailed description of the system of frontier fortifications which included artillery emplacements for 155 mm. cannon, anti-tank guns, concrete pillboxes, machine gun nests, mortar posts, mining of roads, etc., so that the Franco forces can command all strategic roads and passes in the frontier area.

The U. S. Memorandum (page 44) gives its opinion of these fortifications as follows:

"Fortifications in the Pyrenees area are essentially defensive, consisting of improvised field works and a limited number of concrete pill boxes. Undoubtedly, they would be of considerable help against attacks of lightly armed forces but of doubtful effect against well equipped armies."

The U. K. Memorandum of 30 May 1946 stated:

"As regards fortifications, the Campo area near Gibraltar, as stated above, is the only one which could be said to have fortifications of a possibly aggressive character. It is believed that during the last nine months some guns have been removed from the Campo area to Barcelona for distribution along the Pyrenees frontier, and it is known that fortification regiments have been working there. The fact that work is proceeding on gun emplacements of such a permanent nature is a pointer towards defensive rather than offensive preparations."

The French Memorandum of 27 May 1946 made the following remarks about Spanish fortifications:

"Until 1944 no modern fortifications existed on the Pyrenean frontier. Only very old structures existed. After the guerilla attack during the winter of 1944-1945 it was decided to undertake the construction of certain works of fortification. In the VI region (Burgos, Saint-Sebastien), they were satisfied to build on some natural positions based on old fortifications. The difficulty of the terrain in the Vth region (Center) proved it to be useless to establish fortifications, the frontier having been judged already sufficiently impenetrable.

"A little more complete plan seems to have been established by the IVth Region (Catalonia)."

Other Preparations for War by the Franco Regime

No significant evidence of other preparations for war by the Franco Regime was submitted.

ITEM 6.

(Persecution of Republicans and other political opponents, execution, imprisonment and police supervision of large numbers of the Spanish people).

DECREEES AND LAWS.

Decree of September 1936: The suppression of political opponents was provided for by a decree of September 1936, the first article of which reads:

"All parties and political or social movements which, since the election held on 16 February, have formed part of the Popular Front and all organizations that took part in opposition to the forces of the National Movement are declared outside the law."

Law of 9 February 1939: On 9 February 1939, a law was issued:

"Be it known that all persons, corporate or individual, who since October 1, 1934, and before July 18, 1936 helped to create or aggravate the repression of all order, by which Spain became the victim, are held politically responsible as are those others who since the latter date have opposed the National Movement by concrete acts or by vexatious passivity".

Under Article 4 of this law, the following are concretely accused of political responsibility:

"(a) those who have been condemned under military jurisdiction for rebellion, or for adherence to, aid, provocation or agitation for rebellion and for treason; (b) those who have held executive office in the above-mentioned parties; (c) the rank and file members before July 18, 1936; (d) those who have held executive office of political or administrative character in civil status to which they were appointed by the government of the Popular Front as well as those who have held office previously did not submit their resignation; (e) those who have declared themselves publicly in favor of the Popular Front; (f) those who called the elections of 1936 for deputies to the Cortes or who filled offices of the Government, or were candidates, proxies, supervisors or presidential electors for the election of the President of the Republic; (g) the deputies; (h) Free Masons; (i) those who since July 18, 1936 have participated in the Tribunals of Justice; (j) those who have agitated for or induced the realization of the above-mentioned events (k) those who participated in any manner in creating the condition in which Spain found herself in July 1936; (l) those who had opposed the National Movement; (m) those who have resided abroad since July 18, 1936; (n) those who left the red zone after the movement and have not entered the National zone; (o) those who have changed their Spanish nationality for some foreign one since July 18, 1936; (p) those who have accepted missions abroad in behalf of Red authorities; and (q) those who as presidents, counselors, or managers of private organizations, have helped the Popular Front economically."

Law of 1 March 1940:

"Article 1. It constitutes a crime, punishable according to the provisions of the present Law, for any person to belong to Masonry, Communist or any other clandestine societies referred to in the following articles.

The Government has power to add to the said organizations any auxiliary branches or cells which it may consider necessary and to apply to them the same provisions of the Law, duly adapted."

"Article 2. The organizations in question having been dissolved, they are prohibited and outlawed, and their property will be declared confiscated, and it is understood that it will be placed at the disposal of the jurisdiction of politically responsible bodies."

"Article 4. All those persons who have joined a masonic society and have not been expelled from it and have not resigned from it, or have not explicitly broken off all relations with it, are considered as masons, and those persons are still considered as masons to whom the sect has given authorization, consent or agreement, under whatever form of rules, to simulate a withdrawal from it. For the purposes of this Law, those persons forwarding, directing or actively collaborating in Soviet work or propaganda, Trotskyists, Anarchists and others, will be considered as Communists."

Law of 29 March 1941: Provisions read as follows:

"Article 25. He who should communicate or circulate false rumors or disfigures or seditious news or should commit acts directed to hurt the credit and authority of the Spanish Nation shall be punished with a prison sentence of from 3 to 10 years and with the disqualification from Public Office tenure for from 5 to 10 years."

"Article 28. He who should establish, organize or direct groups formed for violent subversion or the destruction of the political, social, economic or judicial organization of the state shall be punished with from 12 to 16 years in prison."

"Article 37. The printing of all kinds of books, pamphlets, handbills, posters, newspapers and all types of typographical publications or of other kinds which might provoke the commission of any kind of acts against the security of the State and hurt the credit and authority of the same or should compromise the dignity and interests of the Spanish Nation, shall be punished with imprisonment of from 1 to 5 years and a fine of from 10,000 to 50,000 pesetas. The same sentence shall be given for its distribution or its possession for distribution."

PRISONS AND PRISONERS.

The exact figure of the political prisoners varies. The French government reports the Director General of Prisons as stating the existence of 35,000 prisoners of which only 10,000 were political prisoners. The delegate of the Republic of Panama spoke before Committee III of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 4 February 1946, and asserted that:

"There are 30,000 political prisoners in Barcelona, 1,500 in Madrid, 12,000 in Asturias, 10,000 in Valencia, 7,000 in San Miquel de los Reyes, 8,000 in Malaga, 6,400 in Ocana, 7,500 in Astorgas and thousands and thousands of others live under the constant threat of death."

The Spanish Republican Government's Memorandum says:

"In the Spanish Prisons there are 10,000 persons who have for a long time been awaiting trial and 30,000 sentenced to 30 years. There are 8,000 in the Labour Groups."

The supplementary documents submitted by the Spanish Republican Government put the total political prisoners at 200,000.

"According to reliable information from the inside and outside of Spain, there were more than 200,000 Republicans in Spanish jails in 1944. It is significant that the number of large jails in Spain has increased to 150, with approximately 1,500 in each jail.

"The number of arrests in Madrid exceed 20,000. There are in Madrid a number of jails, all of them congested. They include the Provincial Prison, built in Carabanchel to accommodate 7,000 prisoners formerly interned at the Prison of Porlier; Yoserias Prison with 4,980 prisoners; and Torrijos, Santa Rita, San Anton, San Carlos, Cisne, Torero, Ventas Comandadoras, Vallecas and Tetuan. All of these prisons are exclusively for men.

"There are three prisons for women, including Ventas with 2,000 internees; Claudio Coello and Quincoas, with hundreds of women each. Besides, there are many prisons of lesser importance in small towns of the Madrid Province, including Alcala and Getafe. During the second half of December 300 persons were arrested alone in Madrid.

"At Barcelona, there are approximately 10,000 prisoners distributed throughout a number of jails. There are 1,500 at Gerona; 250 at Olot and 300 at Figueras. In Tarragona, the number of prisoners exceeds 2,000.

"There are over 20,000 prisoners in the region of Asturias. Of this total, 8,000 are in the Coto Prison, in the former Matches factory and in the Gijon building.

"Thousands of other persons are detained in the jails of Oviedo, Aviles, Trubia, Tiera, Sama de Langres, La Felguera, Ilanes, Sotroadio, Llaviana, Lluarca, Infliesto and others of lesser importance.

"A countless number of persons involved in the disturbances of July and August 1945 were sent to jail.

"When Allied armies liberated Paris, thousands of persons met to express their satisfaction with this victory and a great number of arrests were made by the Civil Guard in Gijon.

"In Valencia, there are over 10,000 prisoners, 7,000 at San Miguel de los Reyes and 2,000 in the Cellular Jail. Hundreds of persons are also detained in many small towns of Valencia."

The Report concluded that:

"Notwithstanding the enormous amount of prisoners mentioned herein, it must be said that these figures do not reveal the whole story. In many other provinces, such as Zaragoza, Huesca, Teruel, Alicante, Castellon, Guadalajara, Huelva, Seville, Santander, Valladolid, Caceres and Badajoz, thousands of persons are subjected to cruel treatment in the hands of Franco's jailors."

Of all the communications received between 1 January and May of this year by the Secretariat of the United Nations from private individuals and non-governmental bodies, relating to the Franco regime in Spain, more than half deal with the persecution and suppression of the Spanish people under the Franco Government. In most cases, these communications give information with regard to persecution of Franco's political opponents, arrest and imprisonment, and treatment of prisoners. They give also details of such acts and the names of the persons concerned.

Information was also received to the effect that on 14 April 1946, the anniversary day of the proclamation of the Republic, 450 Republicans held in the Model Prison at Barcelona, were put to secret tortures, 60 were in special punitive cells completely nude and 25 are likely to die as a result of the tortures inflicted upon them.

In the Memorandum of the Basque Government it charged the Franco regime with persecution against the Basque Clergy. The Bishop of Victoria was exiled by the Fascist authorities, 15 priests were shot or assassinated, 3 condemned to death, 7 condemned to life imprisonment and 403 condemned to different prison sentences or exiled.

Information submitted by the French government states that the extremely rigorous suppression which followed the nationalist victory in 1939, although still very severe, has been moderated in the last three years. The estimated number of executions for 1944 is under a thousand, and for 1945 several hundreds only, which is still considerable and does not correspond to the statements of the Spanish government officials who give only a very low number of death sentences carried out.

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS.

The supplementary report of the Spanish Republican Government gave an account of the treatment of prisoners as follows:

"One of the most horrible features of the drama of Spanish penal population is the treatment received by prisoners. Many of the prisoners who are not shot outright, undergo a prolonged agony in the Falangist prisons.

"Terrible plagues exterminate slowly a great number of women and children. Tuberculosis has claimed a great toll and other diseases are claiming new victims among undernourished prisoners.

"In most Spanish jails men are packed like beasts. In the Madrid Yescaria Prison there are 5,000 persons distributed in 11 wards with cells eight meters long by ten meters wide. Prisoners are assigned 40 cms. each to which to add...

"Naturally there are no beds. This accounts for the thousands of internees under the grasp of tuberculosis. At Burgos, 1,500 internees have contracted this terrible disease.

"The same applies to the Figeroide Prison, in Galicia, where 200 former Republican combatants have fallen victims of T.B. contagion.

"This situation is also attributed to the method adopted by Spanish authorities, to detain thousands of internees in jails originally designed for a few hundred prisoners.

"Besides tuberculosis, a considerable number of cases of spotted typhus have been registered in each of the principal prisons of Salamanca, Santa Rita (Madrid); Miranda del Ebro and Coman.

It is also said that in the prison of Perlier 1,500 were condemned to death in 1944. At the Fort de San Cristobel in 1943, out of 400 prisoners, 35 died and in 1944, out of 300 prisoners, 40 died. In this prison each cell contains four prisoners. Conditions are so cramped that while two of the prisoners sleep, the other two have to remain standing.

Jean Paul Penez, in a dispatch from Paris on May 14, 1946 to the New York Post, gave an eye-witness account of the treatment of prisoners in Spain today. During his last visit to Madrid, he was arrested "for carrying papers addressed to terrorists". The day after his imprisonment, the guards rushed in a man who was covered with blood and exhausted, and told him what went on in the "interrogation room".

"His name was Pablo Alvarez. He was just 19 and had served with the French Maquis. He had been arrested a month earlier because he was carrying anti-Falangist tracts.

"He told me that 20 steps led down to the Chamber of Confessions where a dozen guards, in the Blue shirts of the Falange, waited for their victims. Handcuffs are removed, hands and legs are tied, and the prisoner becomes a plaything of the guards. They hit him with truncheons, kick him from one to another with hobnailed boots. The prisoner usually faints.

"When he revives, he is laid on an iron table; his ankles and wrists are locked in a vise and twisted. Small chips of wood are inserted under his nails and ignited. Some prisoners are scarred with electric current, others are plunged into icy baths.

"Crippled children go to concentration camps, or to special hospitals from which they never return.

"Pablo had undergone four nights of torture. He was sent for again that night. He did not come back."

By a decree of 22 September 1937, the prison supervisors were preferably to be recruited from "orphans of fathers killed during the campaign or assassinated by the reds."

There are also seven labour battalions with three in Africa, commanded by General de Curta and four in the peninsula, notably in Andalusie, Lorci del Rio and San Lucar de Barrameda. There are 8,000 in these labour groups.

POLICE SUPERVISION OF THE SPANISH PEOPLE.

In Spain today, apart from those in prisons and labour battalions, there are many people under "provisional liberty" whereby a political suspect is allowed to go "free", provided that he reports every week or fortnight to the police, while in most cases, he is forced to stay away from what is his normal town of residence or home.

The memorandum submitted by the Spanish Republican Government says:

"There are 300,000 released on probation who are compelled to report to the Falangist authorities every week, fortnight, or month, as political prisoners".

Mr. Samuel Wainer, editor and publisher of a Brazilian daily, "Beritrizas" says:

"In Spain, one gets the impression of a country fully mobilized for war. All roads leading to the interior are closely watched by the Guardia Civil. These guards walk around in pairs. The people call them 'the sinister pairs'. In the streets of the cities you see thousands of uniforms of all types. Even in the aristocratic quarter of Salamanca, I saw soldiers, rifle in hand, watching the passers-by."

Mr. Wainer continues:

"Even the streets of Spain are jails; for back in 1941 the prison experts of Franco decided that it would be a great burden for the state to feed the large number of prisoners whose sentences varied from 20 to 30 years. The idea of 'watched liberty' was developed. Eduardo Aunós, Franco's Minister of Justice from 1941 to 1943, told me that he alone put about 200,000 prisoners into 'watched liberty'. Today there must be more than 300,000 of such 'free prisoners'." (New Republic, 20 May 1946).

The French government memorandum also gives the following information on prisoners given "provisional liberty."

"Thus, since the month of December, some 10,000 Spanish prisoners will have been set at supervised liberty. They will have joined the 200,000 who have been liberated (statistics advanced by the General Direction of Prisons, and doubtless, underestimated) since 1939, and who remain, in point of fact, under police surveillance. In case of trouble or local strain, the first act of the authorities is to rearrest an often large number of these subjects, who are in reality, prisoners in control."

"Finally, these conditional liberations have certainly been compensated for by the arrests that have taken place since the beginning of the year: a first wave evaluated at 1000 persons in

in February; another in April, in Madrid, which reached communist, republican and military leaders who were former members of the Republican army; a third in the region of Sevilla, a fourth, finally, which seems to be developing in Catalonia.

Mr. Sidney Wise in his dispatch from Paris on 14 May 1946 to his Overseas News Agency, summarized the police activities in Spain as follows:

"There is in Spain today a very special police espionage or counter-espionage force to counteract any possible kind of opposition. Almost all police forces in Spain are under the jurisdiction of the Minister of the Interior. Blas Perez Gonzalez, its Chief, is considered by many as No. 2 in Spain, as well as the most powerful official of the present regime, after Generalissimo Franco. In its influence in civil life in Spain, and its control of the same, the Ministry of the Interior is even more powerful than the Army, and the active part it takes in support of the present regime is more vital than that of any other civil organization.

"There are three principal branches of the police under the orders of the above-mentioned Ministry, including the Direccion General de Seguridad, (Police Headquarters) with the Guardia Civil (Civil Guard) and the Seccion de Politica Interna (Section of Internal Politics).

"The first-named exercises more ample powers than the other two owing to its elaborate system of espionage and its security branches.

"The Chief of the Direccion General de Seguridad is Lieutenant-Colonel Francisco Rodriguez Mariné who holds in Spain a position similar to that of Heinrich Himmler in Germany before the war.

"The General Headquarters of the Security is situated in the Puerta del Sol in the heart of Madrid, where a five story red brick building harbours that vast organization which spreads itself over all parts of Spain, through local branches in all the cities and villages.

"Political, the General Social Police Court, is one of the less known branches of espionage. Its agents are dressed in plain clothes and frequent bars, theatres, cafes, and all places where the opposition is suspected of engaging in political activities; these agents are commissioned to put an end to clandestine press. They share with other branches of the Police, the duty of localizing and capturing the members of clandestine organizations. The greater part of these agents are trained in special police schools under the control of the 'Security'. These blood-hounds, arrest people on grounds of alleged expressions of political opposition, which they may have overheard in public places.

"The 'Comisaria General de Orden Publica', is also conducted on a National scale, and is constantly alert to smother any movement of opposition to the present regime. In addition to these organizations there are the regular police and several offices of internal espionage which also function under the 'Seguridad'. The importance attributed to them may be judged by the size of the vote made for it in the 1946 budget, which is far greater than the combined vote of the Ministries of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce.

"Whilst the 'Seguridad' concentrates in the cities and on the lines of communication inside Spain, the 'Direccion General de la Guardia Civil', is Franco's mainstay in the villages and rural districts. There are innumerable 'Guardia Civil' barracks throughout Spain, and that body has a special patrol section watching the frontiers and putting down the smuggling, as well as pursuing people who try to enter the country illegally. Thousands of them are now mounting guard along the French frontiers, which are at present closed, with specific orders to prevent

Spanish Republican 'guerrilleros' from entering Spain. The vote for the 'Guardia Civil', in the budget is still larger than that of the 'Seguridad', and amounts to more than 560,000,000 pesetas, or \$50,000,000. Nevertheless, it is the scale, as well as the way in which Police System operates, which converts it into such a dreaded and efficient organization. This vast and complex machinery of 'Security', employs, directly or indirectly, hundreds of thousands of agents, and its work of completely dominating all forms of opposition.

"The Spaniards who are most strictly watched are those who have previously been in jail for their anti-Franco feelings, or because they fought on the Republican side during the Civil War. This vigilance is carried out through the 'Servicio de Libertad Vigileada' (a ticket-of-leave system) by virtue of which all those who are freed from prison can only enjoy 'watched freedom', and must give a regular account of all their activities to the authorities. With the exception of those who are still imprisoned, these elements are considered as potentially the most dangerous, and are therefore incessantly watched."

Item 7

(Detention by the Franco regime of nationals of other countries)

The only information submitted up to 1 June, 1946 on this subject was the following report in the memorandum of the United Kingdom, dated 30 May, 1946.

"His Majesty's Ambassador in Madrid has been assured by the Spanish Minister of the Interior that (apart from any common criminals) there are only 66 foreigners detained in Spain; the Spanish Government, it was stated, are anxious to get rid of these people but could not do so because the Governments concerned either did not recognise their nationality or would not take them back."

PRO-FASCIST ACTIVITIES OF THE FALANGE PARTY AND OTHER FRANCO
ORGANIZATIONS OUTSIDE SPAIN.

This paper cannot be regarded as a full report on the pro-fascist activities of the Falange and other Franco organizations as detailed evidence requested from Members of the United Nations did not reach the Sub-Committee except in a few instances. The United States Government in its Memorandum stated that it had acquired considerable information during the war concerning Falange activities in furtherance of Axis influence in the American republics, but it anticipated that such information would be given to the Sub-Committee by the Government of those States in which these activities took place.

This report will therefore limit itself to an indication of the type of activities carried on by the Falange and whenever possible give an instance of such activities.

1. Espionage and other Activities by Franco Agents and Organizations for the purpose of assisting the Axis in the War.

The United States Government Memorandum stated that Spanish citizens associated with the Falange worked as Axis agents in co-operation with the German authorities, that Spanish ships were used to smuggle strategic materials and information to the Axis and that the Spanish Overseas News Service, E.F.E., which was a semi official organization of the Franco Government contributed to German Intelligence and worked closely with the German News Agency operating Axis espionage.

Mr. Abel Plenn, Chief Propaganda Analyst of the United States Embassy in Madrid 1944, in his memorandum asserts that the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other United States Government Agencies contain revelations on the role played by the Falange in Porto Rico, Cuba and elsewhere, in actively aiding German submarines to sink American and other Allied ships.

The Government of Venezuela has submitted evidence to the Sub-Committee relating to the clandestine activity of the diplomatic representative of the Franco regime, Senor Sengroniz, during 1942 to 1943 which was aimed at supplying the Axis with the war materials. This activity

led to the recall of Sangroniz and a resolution passed by the National Congress on the gravity of the situation..

2. Association of Spanish official representatives with exterior Falanges and other pro-Fascist groups abroad.

In this connection the French Memorandum alleges:

During the entire duration of the war, the Falangist sections abroad collaborated actively with the German S.R. It likewise appears that Spanish Consulates abroad lent themselves to an activity of this order. Even at the present time, certain Spanish officials outside Spain granted their facilities to subjects of the Axis, anxious to escape Allied investigation principally by delivering passports and visas." The memorandum submitted by the United States Government asserts that Spanish diplomatic officials and persons in Spanish quasi official organizations have for years been encouraging groups in other American Republics which opposed inter-American unity against the Axis during the war and which still continue to perpetuate the principles of the Axis system in the New World."

Admission of the close connection between the exterior Falanges and official representatives is given in a book called "La Falange Exterior" published in 1938 by the National Delegation of the Exterior Services. It contains the following sentence: "the National Syndicalist Doctrine cannot accept classifications into classes among Spaniards nor can it allow their spiritual separation from the Motherland. That is why it had to create an organization of unity and cohesion for expatriate Spaniards called to collaborate in different spheres with actions of our diplomatic or consular agents. These organizations were to be the Exterior Falanges".

This is in conformity with a decree establishing the Council of the Hispanidad in 1940 which would have the "responsibility for the activities that tend to the unification of the culture and economic interests and power related to the Spanish world." This decree authorized the Minister of Foreign Affairs to regulate all associations of the Spanish Public

Mr. Alan Chase in a book entitled: "Falange : Axis secret army in the Americas" gives many instances of Spanish diplomatic and consular representatives incriminated in Falangist and pro-Axis activity, such as the Spanish Consul-General : Cuba in 1941 expelled as a consequence of his organization of Falangist activities, the Spanish Minister to Guatemala, Colonel Sang Agew, who was Military Chief of Spanish espionage and Head of the Falange, Central America, and the Consul-General at Manila when Japan occupied the Philippines, Senor del Castano, who was previously National Delegate for Foreign Service, directing exterior Falanges.

3. Political activity of the Falange and other Franco groups against the "United Nations."

In speaking of the activities of the Falange and other Franco organizations in the Philippine Commonwealth, the United States Memorandum asserts: "these were in the past sympathetic to Axis objectives and thus contrary to the interests of the United Nations."

The Fascist nature of the exterior Falanges and the identification with Franco is evidenced in the proceedings of the Federal Court of Puerto Rico in 1942 when 21 Spanish residents, members of the Falange, asked for American citizenship. During that hearing they admitted that the aim of Falange exterior was to aid the cause of Fascism and that it was natural to maintain a liaison with other Fascist organizations.

Mr. Chase mentions that the Cuban police came into possession of a report sent by the Colombian Falange to Spain intimating that the former chief of the Colombian Falange, Lauriano Gomez, had petitioned Franco for aid in accomplishing a revolution in Colombia and that "the Caudillo had answered them that they will have everything they wish after our own war finishes."

Typical propaganda put out by the Falangists is an extract from one of the Falangist papers in Mexico, "Omega": "A democratic government is a thousand times more dangerous than a dictatorship like Hitler's or Mussolini's. The democracies are protecting us

from Hitler by throwing us into the arms of Roosevelt, who is the greatest danger of all those that menace Latin America today."

4. The Franco Government's Propaganda to the Western Hemisphere,
at present.

The United States memorandum alleges that radio broadcasts from Spain, audible in the Western Hemisphere, and printed propaganda widely distributed in the American republics emphasised the inevitability of defeat for the United Nations, the superiority of Nazi-Fascist social principles, and the dangers of Anglo-American imperialism. It adds that "now for some months radio propaganda of this character has been beamed directly to the other American republics by a powerful Spanish government station."

(The reactions which have already resulted, in the relations between Spain and other countries, from the existence and policies of the Franco Regime.)

At the conclusion of the Civil War of 1936-1939 in Spain, despite the defeat of the Republican Forces, the Franco Regime was not recognized as the Government of Spain by all States. China, Mexico, and the U.S.S.R. have never recognized the Franco Regime. From 1939 to date relations between the Franco Government and other States have been strained. A number of states which recognized Franco in 1939 have allowed their recognition to lapse, others have formally severed diplomatic relations, and some have recognized the Spanish Republican Government of Mr. Giral. Throughout these years the story of the relations between the Franco Government and other States is one of increasing friction.

A brief chronological outline of the reactions of other Governments to the Franco Regime is attached at the end of this item:
A Summary of Franco Spain's present diplomatic relations is as follows:

1. States with which the Franco Government maintains diplomatic relations of one kind or another

Argentina	Netherlands
Belgium	Norway
Brazil	Peru
Chile	Portugal
Colombia	Sweden
Cuba	Switzerland
Denmark	Turkey
Dominican Republic	Union of South Africa
Eire	United Kingdom
El Salvador	United States of America
Greece	Uruguay
Italy	Vatican

2. Members of the United Nations that have no diplomatic relations with the Franco Government:

Abyssinia	Mexico (never recognized Franco Government)
Australia	New Zealand
Bolivia	Panama
Byelo Russia	Poland
Canada	Saudi Arabia
China (never recognized Franco Government)	Ukraine
Czechoslovakia	U.S.S.R. (never recognized Franco Government)
Guatemala	Venezuela
Lebanon	Yugoslavia
Liberia	

3. The following States, non-members of the United Nations, have formally severed diplomatic relations with the Franco Government:

Rumania	-	5 April 1946	(Recognized Giral
Hungary	-	April 1946	Government 21 May 1946).
Bulgaria	-	27 April 1946	

4. Members of the United Nations that have recognized the Spanish Republican Government of Mr. Giral:

Mexico	-	30 August 1945
Guatemala	-	March 1946
Panama	-	March 1946
Venezuela	-	March 1946
Poland	-	5 April 1946
Yugoslavia	-	13 April 1946
Czechoslovakia	-	Government has approved and official announcement is expected shortly.

5. The legislatures of the following Members of the United Nations have requested their Governments to sever relations with the Franco Government:

Costa Rica	
Cuba	
Ecuador	
France	
Peru	
Uruguay	
Norway	- The Storting (Parliament) adopted a resolution calling on the Norwegian Government to support the re-establishment of the democracy in Spain.

The United Nations and Groups of its Members have also Expressed Public Condemnation of the Franco Regime.

1. United Nations Conference at San Francisco, 19 June 1945.

At a public meeting of Commission I, on which all the Members of the United Nations were represented, the Delegate of Mexico made a statement to exclude Spain from membership in the United Nations. The Delegates of France, Australia, Belgium, the Ukraine, Byelorussia the U.S.A., Uruguay, Guatemala and Chile spoke in support of the Mexican statement, and it was approved by acclamation and was ordered to be inserted in the records of Commission I: The statement is as follows:

"It is the understanding of the Delegation of Mexico that paragraph 2 of Chapter III* cannot be applied to the States whose regimes have been installed with the help of armed forces of countries which have fought against the United Nations so long as those regimes are in power."

* Reference is to Chapter II, Article 4, of the final text of the Charter.

2. The Potsdam Declaration on 2 August 1945 by the U.S.S.R., U.K., and the U.S.A.:

ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION

"The three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above.

"The three Governments feel bound however, to make it clear that they for their part would not favour any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its Origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership."

3. Resolution of the General Assembly at London on 9 February 1946.

The Delegates of Panama, France, Czechoslovakia, Mexico, Uruguay, Norway, Venezuela, Byelorussia, the U.K. and Yugoslavia spoke in favor of the Resolution on Spain at the 26th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly. The Resolution was adopted by a vote of forty-five Members in favor, with two abstentions, four delegations being absent. The Resolution reads as follows:

RELATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS WITH SPAIN.

"1. The General Assembly recalls that the San Francisco Conference adopted a resolution according to which paragraph 2 of article 4 Chapter II of the United Nations Charter cannot apply to States whose regimes have been installed with the help of armed forces of countries which have fought against the United Nations so long as these regimes are in power."

"2. The General Assembly recalls that at the Potsdam Conference the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Soviet Union stated that they would not support a request for admission to the United Nations of the present Spanish Government which, having been founded with the support of the Axis powers, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, does not possess the necessary qualifications to justify its admission."

"3. The General Assembly, in endorsing these two statements, recommends that the Members of the United Nations should act in accordance with the letter and the spirit of these statements in the conduct of their future relations with Spain."

4. Declaration on Spain by France, U.K. and U.S.A., 4 March 1946:

"The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America have exchanged views with regard to the present Spanish Government and their relations with that regime. It is agreed that so long as General Franco continues in control of Spain, the Spanish people cannot anticipate full and cordial association with those nations of the world which have, by common effort, brought

CHRONOLOGY OF REACTIONS BY OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO FRANCO REGIME

- 10 April 1939 - Mexican Government decided not to recognize Franco Government.
- 26 April 1939 - Cuban Government dissolved the Falange Espanola.
- 13 November 1940 - The British Government protested to the Spanish Government respecting the occupation of Tangier by Spanish troops.
- 15 November 1940 - The U.S. Government made representations to the Spanish Government respecting the occupation of Tangier by Spanish troops.
- 2 July 1943 - U.S. Government refused to sell arms and ammunition to Franco Government.
- 19 January 1944 - Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden announced in House of Commons that "I myself have informed the Spanish Government through the Spanish Ambassador in London of the most serious effect which this continuing unneutral assistance to our enemies in this struggle against our allies must have on Anglo-Spanish relations now and in the future."
- 28 January 1944 - U.S. State Department suspended loadings of Spanish tankers with petroleum products for Spain in view of Spanish policy.

The British Government joined the U.S. Government in oil stoopage.
- 21 February 1944 - The U.S. State Department made public a detailed indictment of the anti-democratic and totalitarian nature of the Spanish regime and its imperialistic claims.
- 4 March 1944 - The U.S. Department of State suspended issuance of export licenses for the shipment of packaged petroleum products, including lubricants, from the U.S. to Spain.
- October 1944 - Prime Minister Churchill in reply to a letter from Franco criticized the Franco regime, pointed out that Great Britain was committed to the policy of Anglo-Russian collaboration and indicated that Spain would not be invited to join a future world organization.
- 25 January 1945 - Guatemala broke off diplomatic relations with Spain.
- 10 March 1945 - Letter from President Roosevelt to the newly appointed American Ambassador to Spain pointing out that maintenance of formal diplomatic relations with Spain did not imply approval of the Franco regime and the Falange which "had been openly hostile to the U.S. and which had tried to spread its Fascist party ideas in the Western Hemisphere. Victory over Germany would carry out the extermination of Nazi and similar ideologies." The President could see no place in the community of nations for governments founded on Fascist principles.

- 15 May 1945 - Cuban House of Representatives adopted a motion expressing desire to see the Spanish people "recover their liberty" and oust the Franco regime.
- 15 June 1945 - United Nations Conference at San Francisco adopted Mexican resolution barring membership in United Nations to governments installed by help of military forces of Axis.
- 30 June 1945 - Panama severed diplomatic relations with Franco Government.
- 2 August 1945 - Report on Potsdam Conference barring Spain from membership in United Nations.
- August 1945 - Spanish Republican Cortes met in Mexico. Diplomatic representatives of the following states were present - Czechoslovakia, Colombia, Ecuador, France, Nicaragua, Peru, Sweden, U.S.S.R., Uruguay and Venezuela.
- 21-22 August 1945 - Giral Republican Government set up in Mexico.
- 23 August 1945 - President Truman denounced Franco and said that "none of us likes Franco or his Government."
- 30 August 1945 - Giral Government recognized by Mexico.
- 4 September 1945 - French, British, American and Russian delegations to Four Power Conference in Paris announced proposal for Spain's evacuation of the Tangier zone.
- 28 September 1945 - Bolivia broke off diplomatic relations with Spain.
- 10 October 1945 - Mr. Bevin announced in House of Commons that the British Ambassador in Spain had been instructed to make unofficial representations about the arrest of Alvarez and Zapirain.
- 15 October 1945 - The Cuban Senate unanimously approved a motion asking the President of Cuba to break relations with Spain.
- 12 November 1945 - U.S. and British Embassies made representations to the Spanish Government about the death sentence passed on Sigfrido Catala.
- 5 December 1945 - Mr. Bevin stated in the House of Commons regarding Franco Government, "We detest the Regime."
- 14 December 1945 - French Government sent note to U.K., U.S.A. proposing that the three Allied Governments should consult respecting their relations with the Franco Government and should consider the eventual recognition of a new regime in Spain.
- 19 December 1945 - Foreign Affairs Committee of Constituent Assembly asked the French Government to "prepare for the rupture of relations with the Franco Government of Spain" and to "enter into contact with anti-Franco political leaders."
- 21 December 1945 - Norman Armour, retiring U.S. Ambassador to Spain, criticized Franco Government. No successor was appointed to replace Mr. Armour, American representation being left to a Charge d'Affaires.

- 9 February 1946 - Resolution of General Assembly of United Nations in London condemning Franco Spain.
- 23 February 1946 - British Government protested against the execution of Garcia and nine others and the trial of 37 Socialists.
- 27 February 1946 - The French Foreign Minister transmitted a note to the U.K., U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. Governments drawing attention to the dangers of peace inherent in the Franco regime and requesting their support in submitting the matter to the Security Council.
- 28 February 1946 - French Government closed French-Spanish frontier.
- 4 March 1946 - Governments of France, U.K. and U.S.S.R. issued a joint statement on Spain condemning the Franco regime and urging the Spaniards to arrange for a peaceful withdrawal of Franco and the setting up of a provisional government.
 - British Government made representations to Spanish Government about the conviction and punishment of the 37 Socialists and the execution of the 10 Communists.
 - U.S.A. Government published "White Book" on Spain.
- 6 March 1946 - Norwegian Parliament adopted a resolution opposing Franco.
- 8 March 1946 - U.S.S.R. sent note to France accepting a proposal that the Spanish question be referred to the United Nations.
- 23 March 1946 - French Government in a note to British and American Governments urged an oil embargo against Spain.
- 5 April 1946 - Rumania broke off diplomatic relations with Spain.
- 6 April 1946 - Poland recognized Spanish Republican Government of Giral.
- 11 April 1946 - Poland brought the situation in Spain to attention of the Security Council.
- 13 April 1946 - Yugoslavia recognized Giral Government.
- 27 April 1946 - Bulgaria broke off diplomatic relations with Franco Government.
- 29 April 1946 - Security Council adopted resolution to set up a sub-committee to investigate the Spanish situation.
- 3 May 1946 - M. Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister, announced in the Chamber of Deputies that Belgium would protest to the United Nations Security Council against the refusal of the Spanish Government to surrender Leon Degrelle, Racist Fascist leader.
- 21 May 1946 - Rumania recognized the Spanish Republican Government.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS RECEIVED BY THE SUB-COMMITTEE AND
SOURCE MATERIALS EXAMINED

I. A. Declarations and Resolutions of the United Nations and Groups
of its Members:

1. Declaration of United Nations Conference at San Francisco,
19 June 1945.
2. Potsdam Declaration, 2 August 1945.
3. Resolution of the General Assembly, 9 February 1946.
4. Declaration on Spain by France, United Kingdom, and United States
of America, 4 March 1946.
5. Resolution adopted by the Security Council, 29 April 1946.

B. Statements Made by Representatives on the Security Council at the
24th to 39th Meetings of the Security Council:

1. Security Council Journals Nos. 28 to 32 containing statements
of all members of the Security Council.

C. Governmental Communications in Response to the Request of the
Sub-Committee:

1. Communication from Government of the U.S.S.R. dated 1 May 1946.
2. Communication from Government of the United Kingdom, dated 4 May
1946.
3. Communication from Belgian Government, dated 8 May 1946.
4. Communication from Spanish Republican Government, dated 14 May 1946.
5. Communication from Government of the U.S.S.R., dated 15 May 1946.
6. Communication from the Norwegian Government, dated 16 May 1946.
7. Communication from the United States Government, dated 18 May 1946.
8. Second communication from Spanish Republican Government, dated
21 May 1946, including communication from Basque Government.
9. Third communication from the U.S.S.R. Government, dated 21 May 1946.
10. Oral statements of Prime Minister of Spanish Republican Government
before the Sub-Committee on 23 and 27 May 1946.

I. C. (Continued)

11. Two communications from Government of Brazil, dated 24 May 1946.
12. Communication from Government of Venezuela, dated 24 May 1946.
13. Second communication from United States Government, dated 28 May 1946.
14. Second and third communications from Government of the United Kingdom, dated 30 May 1946.
15. Communication from Government of Chile, dated 11 May 1946 and received 30 May 1946.
16. Communication from French Government, dated 27 May 1946 and received 30 May 1946.

D. Official Government Publications submitted by Governments to the Sub-Committee:

1. Foreign Economic Administration reports (United States Government), dated 6 August 1945 and December 1945.
2. United States State Department "White Book" on Spain, March 1946.
3. United States State Department "Blue Book" on Argentina, February 1946.
4. Hearings before a Sub-Committee of the Committee on Military Affairs of the United States Senate, Parts 1 to 11, June 1945 to March 1946.
5. United States Government Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals, December 1945.
6. Selected publications of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service of the Federal Communications Commission (United States of America).
7. "The Red Domination in Spain", by Minister of Justice of Franco Government (submitted by Spanish Evidence Guild).

II. A. Non-Governmental Communications:

1. Communications from Committee of Ateneo Hispano, dated 26 April 1946.

II. A. (Continued)

2. Communication from a Sub-Delegation of the National Confederation of Labour and the General Union of Workers, representing the Spanish Workers organized in the Anti-Franco Underground, dated 27 May 1946.
3. Communication from Mr. Abel Plann, dated 27 May 1946.
4. Communication from Mr. Sidney Wise, dated 29 May 1946.
5. Communication from the Spanish Evidence Guild, dated 29 May 1946.
6. Numerous telegrams, letters and other communications received from non-governmental bodies and private individuals.

B. Non-Governmental Publications:

Numerous published books, periodicals, pamphlets and cuttings from various newspapers.

