

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
AT ITS THIRD MEETING, 28 JANUARY 1946, BY
THE DELEGATION OF IRAN

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>Section I</u>	:	Memorandum read by H.E. Seyed Hassan Tadjizadeh at the third meeting of the Security Council	p.p. 1 - 20
<u>Section II</u>	:	Particulars of Interferences on the part of Soviet Authorities	p.p. 21 - 27
<u>Appendix A</u>	:	[List of relevant documents]...	p.p. 28 - 64
<u>Appendix B</u>	:	(Communications from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran to the Soviet Embassy, Teheran and other papers.)	p.p. 65 - 95

SECTION I.

In the preamble to the Tripartite Treaty of 1942 (Appendix A. No. 1) the Iranian Government declared its complete agreement with the principles of the Atlantic Charter which had been announced by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on the 14th August 1941, and which had been endorsed by the Government of the U.S.S.R. on the 24th September, 1941.

Under Article I the Three Powers undertook to "respect the territorial integrity, the sovereignty and political independence of Iran".

Under Article III the Iranian Government undertook to co-operate in every way possible with the Allied Powers in securing the passage of troops and supplies from one Allied Power to the other and to secure to the Allied Powers the use and control of all means of communication throughout Iran together with the necessary labour facilities and censorship control.

Under Article III (a) it was specifically provided that "the assistance of the Iranian forces shall however be limited to the maintenance of internal security on Iranian territory".

Under Article IV, the Allied Powers could maintain in Iranian territory such armed forces as they considered necessary. The location of the forces was if the strategical situation allowed to be decided in agreement with the Iranian Government. It was further provided under Article IV (1) that "All questions concerning the relation between the forces of the Allied Powers and the Iranian authorities shall be settled so far as possible in co-operation with the Iranian authorities in such a way as to safeguard the security of the said forces".

It is important to notice that Article IV(1) expressly stated that it was intended that the presence of Allied forces on Iranian territory did not constitute a military occupation and would "disturb as little as possible the administration

SECTION I

and the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements of the population and the application of Iranian laws and regulations."

Under Article V the forces of the Allied Powers were to be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after the cessation of hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates.

Article VI provided that the Allied Powers should not in their relations with foreign countries adopt an attitude prejudicial to the territorial integrity, the sovereignty or the political independence of Iran. The Allied Powers undertook "to consult the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah in all matters affecting the direct interests of Iran."

Article VII provided that "The Allied Powers jointly undertake to use their best endeavours to safeguard the economic existence of the Iranian people against the privations and difficulties arising as a result of the present war".

2 On the same date, January 29th, 1942, Great Britain and the Soviet Union through their representatives stated in Notes addressed to the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Notes which form Annex 1 of the Treaty) that their Governments interpreted Article VI, paragraph (1) in which the Powers undertook in their relations with foreign countries not to adopt an attitude prejudicial to the territorial integrity, the sovereignty or the political independence of Iran and to consult the Iranian Government on all matters affecting the direct interest of Iran, as being applicable to any peace or international conference held at the conclusion of the war and that further they considered themselves bound "not to approve anything at any such Conference which is prejudicial to the territorial integrity, the sovereignty or the political independence of Iran, and not to discuss at any such Conference

SECTION I.

anything affecting the direct interests of Iran without consultation with the Government of Iran".

In further Notes addressed on 29 January 1942, to the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Annex 3 of the Treaty) it was stated that the assurance contained in Annex 1 would remain in force even after the termination of the Treaty which in accordance with Article IX is defined as the date fixed for the withdrawal of the forces of the Allied Powers from Iranian territory, in accordance with Article V, namely six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have ceased. 1

3. On 1 February 1942, Generalissimo Stalin, President of the People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. sent a message to Mr. Foroughi, Prime Minister of Iran, in which His Excellency offered his sincere congratulations to the Iranian Government and added "I am confident that the new Alliance between our countries will strengthen the friendship between the people of Iran and the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and will be developed satisfactorily to the benefit of our two countries". (Appendix A. No. 2).

In September 1941, the Iranian Government broke off diplomatic relations with Germany and on September 9th, 1943, declared war on Germany.

4. On 1 December 1943, the President of the United States, the Premier of the U.S.S.R., and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom after consultations with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran issued a Declaration concerning Iran.

After recognizing the assistance which "Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union, "it was stated that the "Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance

SECTION I.

of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran". (Appendix A. No. 3).

It is a matter of regret that the two main points of the Treaty of Alliance of January 1942, i.e., protection of sovereign rights of Iran, provided in Article 1, and non-interference in the internal affairs of Iran, namely refraining from disturbing the administration, security forces and the economic life, the normal movement of the population and the application of Iranian laws and regulations, have not been respected by the Soviet authorities and armed forces.

5. In the areas in the Northern part of Iran where Russian troops are stationed, there was constant interferences in the internal administration of Iran on the part of the Russian military and civil authorities. The result of this was that the so-called zone of Russian occupation tended to become less and less under the control of the Iranian Government.

The interferences in the Iranian internal affairs and administration by the Russian authorities was the subject of a number of representations on the part of the Iranian Government both verbally and in writing. Amongst others, these interferences covered the following items:-

- (a) Interferences with Iran's armed forces.
Preventing the despatch of security forces to areas where Soviet troops were stationed, except by Soviet permission which was seldom forthcoming.
Depriving the small Iranian security forces garrisoned in the Northern Provinces of Iran of the right of moving from one locality to another, without the prior permission of Soviet authorities. This often resulted in the impossibility of despatching at the right time security forces to places where disturbances and disorder occurred and to establish law and order there, because either permission was not granted at all or it came too late.
- (b) Interferences in the civil administration of the provinces in question. These interferences took the form of opposing appointments of Governors and other officials, dismissing and in some cases expelling officials disliked by Soviet authorities.
- (c) Interferences with the exercise of judicial authority by Iranian courts and disregarding the inviolability of judges.

SECTION I.

- (d) Arbitrary arrest and expulsion of private citizens who were not guilty of any unlawful acts but who had probably met with Soviet disfavour.
- (e) Interference with the free movement of the population, of passenger traffic and of food supplies at barriers erected at the entrance of the so-called Soviet zones in the interior of the country and examining passengers more rigorously than examinations carried out at frontiers.
- (f) Interference with the control by Iranian officials of the frontier traffic (passenger and goods). Importing goods from Russia into Iran without payment of Customs duties, as well as importing prohibited goods such as cotton, etc., and disregarding Customs formalities.
- (g) Interference in the legal formalities of crossing and re-crossing of the frontiers of Iran, facilitating the journey of Iranian subject to Soviet territory mostly for political designs, and admitting in Iran great numbers of Iranians to Soviet nationality by issuing them with Soviet passports.

Particulars of these interferences are contained in Section II of this memorandum and the Appendix B thereto.

6. As long as the war continued, the Iranian Government refrained from making protests in each case which they would have been justified in making as they thought that widespread and public protests at the behaviour of an Ally would be used as material for propaganda by the enemy and would harm the Allied cause.

7. However, it is the situation in Northern province of Iran which has led the Iranian Government to draw the attention of the Security Council to the present dispute with the Soviet Union.

Towards the end of the war and in particular after the cessation of hostilities when the time approached for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, in accordance with the terms of the Tripartite Treaty, preparations for large scale incitement of the inhabitants of the Northern Provinces against the Government became apparent behind the scenes. Soviet military and civil agents in the Northern Provinces and particularly in Azerbaijan began to encourage and support turbulent elements against the Government and hindered more openly than hitherto the Iranian

SECTION 1

authorities from exercising their duties.

8. It is the present situation in Azerbaijan which has brought matters to a head contrary to Article IV (1) of the Treaty of Alliance which stated that the presence of Allied forces on Iranian territory should not constitute a military occupation, the Soviet authorities in fact established a military occupation of the severest kind in the northern provinces of Iran and in particular in Azerbaijan. Further these authorities encouraged and supported the few disloyal agitators who were launching the so-called movement for autonomy in Azerbaijan. Agents employed by the Soviet authorities to carry out this rebellion against the Central Iranian Government are composed of very doubtful elements of mixed origin comprising many Causasians from beyond the frontiers of Iran who, though Soviet citizens, were able to come over the border freely and on account of being Moslems pass as Azerbaijanians. All measures taken by the Iranian Government to bring the agitators to order were met with the opposition of the Soviet authorities, who protected the insurgents and prevented the Iranian security forces from taking the necessary steps to establish order. A long series of successive interventions of this nature in different parts of Azerbaijan in the latter half of 1945 were the forerunners of the black-out when the rebellion of last November was staged in that Province.

9. On the outbreak of the rebellion, the Iranian Government despatched reinforcements to Azerbaijan to help the small contingent of troops in the Northern Provinces to restore order. These reinforcements were halted at Sharif-Abad (80 miles from Teheran) by the Soviet Army authorities who prevented them from proceeding to their destination.

The consequence of this intervention by the Soviet troops was that the rebels were in a position successfully to intimidate the civilian population and proceeded to declare the districts under their control as being autonomous; they served their

SECTION 1

relations with the Central Government and besieged the Army garrisons stationed in different towns of Azerbaijan and forced them to surrender and disarm them. Government offices and railroads were captured and an illegal Government was established in Tabriz in defiance of the constitution of Iran and the Central Government. A legislative Assembly was convened and only official candidates of the rebels were elected.

At all times the Soviet Government never concealed their support for the rebels. Intensive and vociferous propaganda supporting the insurgents was sent out from Moscow and Baku radios and from the Soviet press. A Soviet Consul himself attended in his official capacity the opening assembly of the insurgent Assembly at Tabriz.

The request of the Iranian Government for even a small party of troops to be allowed to proceed without hindrance to the disaffected areas has been refused by the Soviet Government. The whole area has been cordoned off so that the Central Government has been unable to exercise any authority or in many cases, even to get in touch with their own officials. Even diplomatic representatives of the Allies of Iran have been often unable to obtain facilities from the Soviet authorities to proceed to Azerbaijan. A recent incident is the case of the head of the Eastern Section of the State Department in Washington who arrived in Teheran with the intention of visiting Tabriz, and applied to the Soviet authorities for the necessary permit. This did not arrive and after waiting some twenty days in Teheran, this gentleman had to give up his proposed trip to Azerbaijan and returned to Washington.

10. It is clear that the refusal of the Soviet authorities to allow the Central Government to deal with the rebellion within its own territory is a breach of international law and of the Treaty of Alliance and is contrary to the Declaration at Teheran.

By preventing Iranian forces from maintaining internal

SECTION 1

security, the Soviet Government is committing a breach of Articles 1, III (a) and IV (1), of the Treaty of Alliance of 1942. By encouraging and allowing these districts to set up an autonomous government, the Soviet Union is not respecting either the territorial integrity or the sovereignty or the political independence of Iran which it undertook to respect in Article 1 of the Treaty.

11. On the 18th November, 1945, the Iranian Government decided to despatch two battalions of infantry, one company of gendarmes to reinforce the Army of Azerbaijan to help establish law and order in that province. On 19th November, 1945, this contingent reached Karaj and at 9.p.m. on that evening arrived at Sharif-Abad near Kasvin. There the advance guard was met by a number of Soviet soldiers with a few armoured cars and tanks, and prevented from proceeding to their destination. The rest of the contingent which had been held up by Soviet armed forces at Karaj, had difficulty in joining their advance guard, but after due explanations by the Iranian Army Staff to the Commander of the Soviet armed forces that the remaining forces at Karaj carried tents and foodstuffs for the whole contingent, they were allowed by Soviet army authorities to proceed to Sharif-abad, where the whole contingent was prevented from moving further.

As a consequence of a communication from the Iranian Government to the United States Government, that the Soviet Government were preventing the Iranian troops from proceeding to Azerbaijan to re-establish law and order, on 24th November, 1945, the United States Ambassador in Moscow acting under instructions from the Secretary of State delivered a Note to the Soviet Government covering the situation in Iran. In this Note (Appendix A. No.7), it was stated that the Government of Iran had informed the government of the United States that armed uprising had taken place in areas of Northern Iran where Soviet troops were stationed and that Soviet military commanders had refused to permit

S/3

108

SECTION 1.

Iranian forces sent to Northern Iran to re-establish internal security to proceed. The Iranian Government had stated that consequently it had been unable to carry out its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order in Iranian territory.

The United States Note recalled the Declaration signed in Teheran and expressed confidence that "the Governments of the Soviet Union and Great Britain are just as zealous as the Government of the United States meticulously to abide by the assurances contained in this Declaration". It was further the view of the United States Government that the fulfilment of the assurances given at Teheran required that "the Government of Iran should have full freedom, without interference from Soviet, British or American military or civil authorities, to move its armed forces through Iran, in such a manner as it may consider necessary in order to preserve its authority and to maintain internal security".

The Government of the United States went on to say that if the Soviet Commanders who had been preventing the free movement of Iranian forces had acted without instructions, then it was assumed that the Soviet Government would be issuing to them instructions in keeping with the Declaration of Teheran. The American Government was convinced that "it would be in the common interest for all Soviet, British and American troops to be withdrawn immediately from Iran". It was pointed out that incidents and misunderstanding were likely to occur as long as these troops remained. In view of this and although the withdrawal of the remaining American troops who were engaged in activities exclusively of a service nature, would cause considerable inconvenience to the United States Government, nevertheless the American military authorities had been instructed to effect the complete withdrawal of all American troops from Iran by 1st January, 1946.

The United States Government proposed that the British and Soviet Governments should make similar arrangements for the

SECTION 1.

withdrawal of all foreign troops by 1st January, 1946, so as to dispel any doubt regarding the intentions of the three Powers to carry out the assurances given by them. The Government of the United States stated that it was well aware that there was no undertaking that these troops should be removed from Iran before 2nd March, 1946, but it seemed to them that as hostilities had ceased, there was no compelling reason for the troops to remain until that date. The United States Government was of the opinion that the withdrawal would not only obviate possible misunderstanding but would also be a fitting recognition of the notable contributions by Iran, a member in good standing of the United Nations, had made to the common war effort.

In conclusion the United States Government stated:-

"Nations such as Iran were encouraged at the United Nations Conference at San Francisco to place full trust in the friendly intentions and good will of the permanent members of the Security Council. The Government of the United States is confident that the Soviet Union, and Great Britain are no less anxious than the United States, in dealing with nations such as Iran, to follow a line of action which will make it clear that the trust of these nations in the permanent members of the Security Council has not been misplaced. Similar proposals are being made to the British Government.

On 27th November, 1945, the British Ambassador in Moscow handed to Mr. Molotov the Soviet Commissar for foreign affairs a letter, (Appendix A. No. 10) in which he informed Mr. Molotov that he had been instructed by his Government to say that they had been disturbed to learn that Soviet military authorities had stopped certain armed forces which the Persian Government wished to send from Teheran to the Province of Azerbaijan. The letter stated that it seemed entirely reasonable to the British Government that the Persian Government should wish to maintain order in their own

SECTION 1.

territory and legitimate that they should move their security forces about their own country to do so.

The letter proceeded to recall the pledge given in Article 1 of the Treaty of Alliance that the Allied Governments would "respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Persia", and also that Article IV of the Treaty laid down that the presence of Allied forces on Persian territory did not constitute a military occupation.

After reference to the Three-Power Declaration issued at Teheran, the letter stated that the British Government further felt that the action of the Soviet military authorities in stopping Persian forces on their way to Azerbaijan must be due to some misunderstanding of the position and that they trusted that the Soviet Government would feel able to instruct their Commander in Persia not to obstruct the movement of Persian forces or to interfere with the Persian Government, in the exercise of their sovereign right of maintaining order in their own territory.

13. On the 29th November the Soviet Government replied to the American Note of 24th November, 1945. (Appendix A. No. 11), by stating that according to information at the disposal of the Soviet Government the statement made in the United States note concerning the armed uprising in Northern Iran did not correspond to reality. The Soviet Note stated that the events which had taken place did not constitute an armed uprising and were not directed against the Shahinshah Government of Iran, on the contrary it was evident that this was "a matter of aspirations with respect to the assurance of the democratic rights of Azerbaijanian population of Northern Iran which is seeking national autonomy within the limits of the Iranian state and which has its particular language, different from the Persian language".

The Note stated that undesirable incidents which had taken place had been caused by reactionary elements which "have opposed the extension of national rights to the populations of Northern

SECTION I.

Iran, although there is nothing in the desires of the local population which is unusual for democratic style".

It is unnecessary to reverse in detail the allegations of the Soviet Note that the incidents in Azerbaijan are not rebellious against the Central Government and are merely the expression of the population for democratic rights, since these matters being the internal affairs of Iran are not the concern of the Soviet Government and are certainly not a justification for the Soviet authorities to prevent the Iranian troops and forces from entering Azerbaijan. In fact, the troubles in Azerbaijan have been marked by acts of violence and murder perpetrated by armed bands who have set themselves up against the Government of Iran. Nor is it true as the Note states that the so-called popular Assembly based itself on the Iranian Constitution. In fact, the so-called "elections" and the formation of "its popular assembly" violates the constitution and is inconsistent with the fundamental laws of Iran. The so-called "Popular Assembly" of the rebels has no connection with an no similarity to the provincial councils provided for by the Iranian Constitution and the re-establishment of which was waiting the withdrawal of the foreign troops.

The "democratic rights" of the population of Azerbaijan are assured by their duly elected representatives sitting in the Majlis. It is strongly denied that the incidents have been caused by "reactionary elements", on the contrary, rebel forces assisted by Soviet authorities have taken towns and villages by force and put to death, landowners, governors and gendarmes.

The Soviet Note of 29th November continues by stating Categorically that the Soviet military command has not hindered and is not hindering the movement of Iranian military forces and the gendarme police units which are at present in northern Iran. This statement is disproved by the actual facts:-

"Over and over again the Iranian Government has had to make

SECTION 1.

local commanders of the Red Army for the movement of military and security forces from one district to another. In Official Notes by the Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Embassy (as examples may be cited the communications dated 17th November, 1945, November 23rd, 1945, December 1st, 1945). (See Appendix A. Nos. 4, 6 and 12), it has been pointed out that for the maintenance of law and order it is essential that Iranian security forces be moved "from localities where they are not required to places where their assistance is needed".

After giving the information in the possession of the Soviet Government as to the strength of Iranian forces in the district in question, the Soviet Government state that "they opposed the despatch of new Iranian troops to northern districts of Iran and informed the Iranian Government that the despatch of further Iranian forces to Northern Iran could cause not the cessation but the increase of the disorders and likewise bloodshed which would compel the Soviet Government to introduce into Iran further forces of its own for the purpose of preserving order and of assuring the security of the Soviet garrison. In as much as the Soviet Government considers the further introduction of Soviet forces into Iran undesirable, it took the position that the introduction of new Iranian forces into the Northern Provinces of Iran at the present time would serve no useful purpose".

It is contrary to the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance and to the Teheran Declaration that the Soviet Government should seek to decide what forces are required to assure internal security in any particular portion of Iranian territory.

There can be no question of the presence of Iranian reinforcements in Northern Iran causing any threat to the security of the Soviet garrison who were fully equipped with up to date weapons and were from five to ten times as numerous as the Iranian troops in Northern Iran, plus the intended reinforcements. The admission in the Soviet Note that the Soviet Government opposed

SECTION 1.

the despatch of Iranian troops to the Northern districts of Iran on the grounds that it would serve no useful purpose is an admission by the Soviet Government that they have acted contrary to any right given to them by the Treaty of Alliance in that it constitutes an unwarranted disturbance of the security forces of Iran and of the application of Iranian laws and regulations contrary to Article 1 in which the Allied Powers undertake to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Iran.

The remainder of the Soviet Note tells that the request of the United States Government that all foreign forces on Iranian soil should withdraw by January 1st, 1946, the Soviet Government maintain the position that this question is regulated by the Tripartite Treaty of 1942 and that the question was decided at the Council of Foreign Ministers in London in September, 1945. On those grounds the Soviet Government sees no reason for removing the consideration of the question of the time limit for the removal of its forces from Iran.

14. While this exchange of Notes between the United States Government and the British Government with the Soviet Government has been proceeding, a number of communications from the Iranian Government to the Soviet Government has brought the representations of the Iranian Government directly to the notice of the Soviet Government.

15. On the 17th November, 1945, a Note was forwarded by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Teheran to the Soviet Embassy.

(Appendix A. No.4). After reciting a number of individual instances in which Russian officials had interfered with the normal movement of the population to the Northern provinces and with the transportation of food stuffs from the Northern Provinces to the capital, and other acts in which the application of Iranian laws and regulations had been prevented or interfered with by Russian officials, the Iranian Note stated that orders

SECTION 1.

had been given for the despatch of the Governor-General, Governors as well as other officials to the posts in the northern provinces which had hitherto remained vacant because of obstacles placed in their way by the Russian authorities. At the same time troops in sufficient numbers to cope with the situation and to re-establish order and tranquillity were being despatched. The Iranian Government requested the Soviet Government to issue necessary instructions to the Soviet military authorities asking them to **refrain** from interfering with the freedom of action of the Iranian Army and constabulary.

16. On the 22nd November, 1945, a Note was sent by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, (Appendix A. No. 5), informing the Soviet Government that Iranian troops had been halted on their way from Tehran to Tabriz. It was pointed out that these reinforcements had been obliged to remain at Sharif-Abad and that their arrival in Azerbaijan was urgently required to maintain law and order in that region. The Iranian Government alluded to verbal representations which had been already made on this subject and asked that immediate telegraphic instructions should be given to the Soviet military authorities that no obstacle be placed in the way of the progress of this Iranian detachment. It was emphasised again that tranquillity could only be restored in Azerbaijan by the early arrival of this expeditionary force.

17. On the 23rd November, (Appendix A. No. 6) a further Note was sent by the Iranian Government to the Soviet Embassy in which the request was urgently renewed that telegraphic instructions should be issued to the Soviet military authorities no longer to hold up the Iranian detachment actually stopped at Sharif-Abad. The Iranian Government drew the attention of the Soviet Government to the responsibility and duty which are incumbent upon the Iranian Government to maintain order and security within their

SECTION 1.

own territory. It was stated that the assurances in the Tripartite Treaty and the guarantees contained in the Declaration of Teheran made it necessary that the Soviet Government should pay especial attention to the fact that the Iranian forces must maintain security on Iranian territory and must safeguard the communications between the north west Province where Soviet troops still remained, and the Central Government.

On the 26th November, the Soviet Embassy in Teheran replied to the communications of the Iranian Government (see Appendix A. No. 8). In the first place the Soviet Government denied all accusations that Soviet authorities interfered in the internal affairs of Iran. After traversing in detail the allegations contained in the Iranian Note of November 17th, referred to above, the Soviet Government stated that no responsibility attached to them for the absence of Governors or other officials in the Northern Province.

As regards the despatch of armed forces to Azerbaijan, the Soviet Government stated that their arrival at this juncture would cause disturbance and bloodshed and that in the event of the outbreak of disturbances, the Soviet Government would be constrained in order to maintain security in the areas in which Soviet troops were stationed, to send further troops, the Soviet Government therefore being unwilling to send such further armed forces did not consider advisable the arrival of any further Iranian forces.

It is the Iranian Government's contention that the stand taken by the Soviet Government on this question is inadmissible. It is a breach of Iranian sovereignty and independence and far from being justified by the Treaty of Alliance is directly contrary to its provisions.

19. On the 26th November 1945 the Iranian Government addressed a note to the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Government (Appendix "A" No. 9) in which it was stated that disturbances and disorder had occurred in parts of Azerbaijan; that in view of the cessation of all communications the Central Government had lost touch with its officials and was unable to issue the necessary instructions to the authorities concerned. After stating their willingness to examine any complaints which did not constitute acts of disobedience towards the Central Government, the Iranian Government announced that in order to establish security it was necessary to take steps against these rebel elements. In view of the friendship of the Three Powers and in particular having regard to the Declaration of Teheran, the Iranian Government expected that the Allied Powers whose military forces were still in Iran and who did not have the right of interference in the internal affairs of Iran would show a favourable and friendly attitude to the steps taken by the Central Government. The Iranian Government pointed out that in order to establish public security they must utilise the security forces of the country in such a way that troops would be sent to the localities in need of reinforcements. The Iranian Government drew attention to the fact that the question was of the utmost importance and urgency and asked that the powers should give the necessary instructions to their respective authorities.

20. On the 1st December 1945, an answer was sent by the

Iranian Government to the Soviet Note of November 26th referred to above. The Iranian Government stated that they did not wish at this juncture to give further explanations in the matter of the charges of interference of Soviet officials in the past in the internal affairs which the reply of the Soviet Government of November 26th had stated were unfounded. The Iranian Government took note with satisfaction of the purport of the statement of the Soviet Government to the effect that henceforth such incidents would not repeat themselves. The Iranian Government stated that it was a source of gratification to them that the Soviet Government had given the assurances that the officials of the Soviet Union had full respect for the provisions of the Tripartite Treaty and of the Teheran Declaration. The Iranian Government expressed the hope that with the assistance of the Soviet military authorities in the Northern Provinces would no longer take place.

The Iranian Government pointed out that the presence of Iranian officials in the disaffected regions could only be useful and effective if Iranian security forces were placed at the disposal of these officials and if it were possible to move these forces from localities where they were not required to be placed where their assistance was needed.

The Iranian Government was hopeful that in accordance with the assurances given by the Soviet Embassy interferences in the affairs of the Northern Provinces would cease and that the security forces of Iran would be able to move about freely, as only in this way could order and tranquillity be restored in those regions.

The Iranian Government further stated that the strength of the security forces in the provinces could not give rise to anxiety on the part of the Soviet Government and could not in any way be an occasion for bringing fresh troops from the Soviet Union to Iran. In fact the Iranian Government expected the evacuation of Iranian territory by the Red Army with the least possible delay.

SECTION 1.

As the object of the security forces of Iran was not to quarrel with the local inhabitants but rather to prevent disturbances and indiscriminate shooting, it would seem be possible to bring about the appeasement of the Northern regions when officials of the Iranian Government would be able to attend and investigate the legitimate grievances of any individual.

The Iranian Government ask that the Soviet Embassy should inform them of the measures to be taken by the Soviet authorities to ensure freedom of movement and the request was repeated that all obstacles be removed and that the detachment at Sharif-Abad should be allowed to proceed to the Northern Provinces.

21. ² / --- On the 15th December, 1945, a further Note (see Appendix A. No. 9), was addressed to the Three Powers in which the Iranian Government stated that in view of the fact that the presence of foreign troops in Iran had caused dislocation in all the affairs of the country, it was essential that the question of putting an end to the situation should be discussed at the Foreign Ministers' Conference to be held in Moscow. After pointing out that the presence of these foreign troops had weakened the sovereignty of Iran and had caused regrettable incidents and hardships especially in connection with Azerbaijan, the Iranian Government requested that troops of the three Allied Powers be withdrawn. Pending this withdrawal, the Iranian Government asked that the foreign military authorities in Iran should abstain from interfering with the freedom of action of the Iranian Government and the free movement of security forces in the country in order that security should be re-established and the present disaffection should not be extended.

In the circumstances the Iranian Government asks that the Security Council should recommend that the Soviet Government should cease from interference in the internal affairs of Iran and should give orders to its military and civil authorities in Iran

S/3.
Page 20.

SECTION 1.

that the Iranian forces and officials should not be prevented from proceeding in and about Iran to carry out their functions of maintaining law and order and in particular should recommend that the Soviet Government should put no hindrance in the way of Iranian forces and officials carrying out their duties with complete freedom.

SECTION II

PARTICULARS OF INTERFERENCES ON
THE PART OF SOVIET AUTHORITIES.

1. The Iranian Government complained on many occasions to the Soviet Government of the interferences of the Soviet Army in Iranian internal affairs. The various Notes addressed by the Iranian Government to the Soviet Government are contained in the Appendix B. Many of the complaints of the Iranian Government dealt with interferences with the Iranian security forces which were not allowed to move freely between various parts of Iranian territory. (See Notes Nos. 5604, 2999, 3152; Appendix B Nos: 63, 68, 23)

The forces could not leave one town for a neighbouring town, or even village, and sometimes they could not actually move out of their own barracks. (See Note No. 4922, Appendix B No: 51).

The Soviet's insistence that all movements of military personnel meant that even the Commander of an Iranian Army division could not move within his own area without a written permit from the Soviet forces.

The Soviet authorities also prevented ammunition and military equipment belonging to the Iranian army being moved from one place to another on Iranian territory. The Soviet officials stated that permission for this should come from Moscow. For instance, Army divisions numbers three and eight were in need of certain consignments of ammunition which were sent every year from Tehran for their training. Although the question was discussed beforehand with the Soviet authorities and no objections were raised by the latter, yet they made the lorries carrying this ammunition return after they had travelled some distance from Tehran and other starting points. Soviet officials on numerous occasions disarmed Army officials and troops

whilst the latter were performing their duties. These officials were then sometimes re-arrested or placed in positions where they would be an easy target for armed bands of insurgents. On other occasions the Soviets disarmed Iranian officials when they went out of their own barracks for which purpose Soviet armed soldiers were placed at the entrances to Iranian barracks. Soviet officials also summoned loyal Iranian officials who were dealing with the insurgents in the course of their duty and obliged them to leave the district immediately. Soviet officials have declared that if insurgent bands should resort to arms, the Iranian security forces had no right to shoot.

Soviet authorities had from August 1941 completely taken over the Docks of Bandar-Shar and had totally disrupted the work of the Iranian Customs authorities in the control of merchandise and passengers. The Iranian Government felt that after the end of the War this disregard of custom formalities would cease so that the administration of the customs could return to normal. (See Note No. 5608, Appendix B - No. 66).

2. The following important occasions upon which Soviet officials have so interfered with freedom of action of Iranian officials in the course of the latter's performance of duty are given:-

1. The maintenance of order and security in the Northern provinces has been jeopardised for lack of sufficient garrison forces; it is, on the other hand, impossible to reinforce the troops already on the spot owing to the fact that the sending of even one gendarme requires the sanction of the Soviet Authorities, and this entails such protracted formalities that the object in view is defeated before anything can be done. Even the dispatch of two gendarmes or soldiers for a prisoner was prevented by the Soviet for a prisoner was prevented by the Soviet forces. (See Note. No. 5370-13, Appendix B. No. 53).

2. On the Irano-Turkish border Iranian officials have been unable to exercise vigilance and make their authority felt because they have been deprived of all freedom of action (See Note No. 5370-13, Appendix B No. 53).
3. Due to interference on the part of Soviet officials the prosecution of individuals in the Northern provinces has been rendered difficult. The Soviet officials have sent into exile those whom they do not favour and by preventing the punishment of seditious elements they have created a state of unrest and confusion. (See Note No. 5370-13, Appendix B. No. 53).
4. The Commander of the Russian forces in Azerbaijan asked the Azerbaijan Gendarmerie to collect all the weapons issued on permits to persons, but the execution of this demand was impossible because, on the other hand, the Soviet authorities themselves did not allow free movement of soldiers and gendarmes for the performance of these duties. (See Note No. 3748, Appendix B No. 38).
5. Soviet officials at Tabriz have prevented the police from guarding the prisons; while members of the "democratic party" have been allowed to engage freely in arming people and inciting them to create disorder. Representations to the Soviet officials are not heeded. The same situation prevails in Khoy (a town North-west of Azerbaijan), Maku and Rezaieh. (See Note No. 5370, Appendix B No. 53).
6. On the 10th September, 1945, the Counsellor to the Soviet Embassy accompanied by the Soviet Vice Consul in Ardabil, (a town east of Azerbaijan) went to the Governor's office in that town and stated that, he had been informed of an increase in the number of the Iranian military police in that district. He stated that he did not at all approve of this action and threatened that the Soviet forces would surround the Iranian Garrison in Ardabil as had already been done in Maragheh. (See Note No. 3944, Appendix B, No. 39).
7. In Maku, in the Azerbaijan province, the Soviet Vice-Consul and the Soviet local Commander obliged Captain Ali Sana'i the Director of the Police Department of the district to leave his post and go out of Maku (a town north-west of Azerbaijan). (See Note No. 2797, Appendix B No. 5).
8. The Soviet Consul in Rezaieh accompanied by eleven Soviet officers and Namaz-Ali stayed in Mahabad for three days and summoned a number of Kurdish chieftains, in order to provoke them against the Iranian Government. (See Note ... Appendix B No. 63).

9. In order to prevent and stop certain disorders in Maragheh a military governor was appointed in that town and the latter arrested a man called Kabiiri as one who was responsible for a disturbance. The Soviet authorities intervened immediately, arrested the Military Governor for twelve hours, freed Kabiiri from detention, maltreated a Major Safvat, forbade the Iranian soldiers to leave the barracks. As a consequence, not even the police authorities of the town were able to perform their duties and irresponsible elements depending on the power of Soviet authorities took over all power in the city (See Note No. 3085, Appendix B No. 23).
10. M. Yakoubov, Counsellor to the Soviet Embassy in Teheran, suggested to the Iranian Commander at Maragheh (a town south of Azerbaijan) that the collection of certain owners shares from the peasants should be stopped, and also suggested that Razzaghi, a member of the Agricultural Bank should be expelled immediately from Maragheh. (See Note No. 2966 - Appendix B No. 21).
11. A local magistrate called Kabiiri who was closely in touch with Soviet officials distributed arms and munitions to a large number of people in Maragheh. In Adjabehir (a village north-west of Maragheh the gendarmes were surrounded, arrested and deprived of their weapons, being afterwards cast into jail. In Qolikandi (in the same province) the constabulary arrested a number of insurgents and brought them to Maragheh but Soviet officials interfered and insisted that they were to be set at liberty because they were communists. (See Note No. 5370, Appendix B No. 53)
12. M. Yakoubov in Shahrpou (North west of Lake Rezaieh) summoned the local Mayor in the presence of the Assistant Consul and the Commander of the Russian garrison and another officer, and told him "you have no right to collect the owners' shares"; furthermore he said that Esmail, a member of the Iranian Parliament could no longer be elected to the Parliament from a constituency lying anywhere north of Kazvin (a town west of Tehran). (See Note No. Appendix B, No. 64)
13. On the eve of 1st October 1945, policemen and gendarmes were ordered to arrest a man called Hosayn who had participated in the creation of a disturbance on 4th Mehr 1324 (26th September 1945); but the Soviet authorities arriving on the scene, disarmed the policemen and the gendarmes and had them removed to the Russian Commander's headquarters in Zandjan (a town south-east of Azerbaijan. (See Note No. 4423, Appendix B No. 44)

14. When there was a dispute between the workmen of the factories in Mazandaran (a province in northern Iran) and the farmers of Ghaidi-Kala in the same province, Soviet military authorities interfered in contravention of regulations by ordering the arrest of seven persons, one of whom was a judge of the Sari Court, who they themselves accused of being the cause of the disturbance (See Note No. 4429, Appendix B No. 42).

3. The Soviet authorities have on many occasions illegally arrested Iranian citizens on Iranian soil.

- A. In Kojur the Russians arrested the chief of the Kalarestagh and Kojur Workers Union and forcibly transported him to Bushehr. (See Note No. 4829, Appendix B No. 49)
- B. The Commander of the Saari gendarmerie battalion accompanied by two other officers and nine gendarmes, went in pursuit of armed robbers to Pol-e-Sofid when they were taken to the Soviet Commander's headquarters, disarmed and detained there. (See Note No. 4395, Appendix B No. 45.)
- C. The Soviet Commander in Shahpur had, on 15th October 1945, Dr. Sa'idi, Director of the Health Department arrested by several armed Soviet soldiers, taken to the Commander's headquarters detained along with several other Iranians in a stable and left there without food until next morning. (See Appendix B 67, Note No. 2884)
- D. On the 5th June 1945, Akhtar-e-Shomaa, the Tabriz newspaper, published a news item to the effect that the Foreign Ministers discussed the possibility of the evacuation of Iran by the Allied armed forces. The same evening the Soviet Commander asked the Iranian authorities to arrest the Editor of the said paper; eventually since the editor was not to be found, his son, Seyyed Hecsyn the sub-editor, was arrested; all copies of the day's paper were collected. The next day in the town of Shahpur several people who had obtained and read the copy in question of the said paper were arrested and detained for four hours (See Note No. D 3598, Appendix B No. 13)
- E. At 3 a.m. on the 22nd July 1945 Soviet Officers accompanied by two armed soldiers went to the house of Mirfazli, the Director of Chuchan Education department, placed him forcibly in a closed car and took him to the Chuchan Soviet garrison headquarters. He was subsequently removed the next day to Mashad and was forced at the headquarters of the Iranian Military police to sign a document agreeing to leave Khorassan immediately. The same afternoon armed officials took him along with Seyyed Hashem Tabataba'i, a judge, and another Iranian official to Shahrud and thence to Tehran (See Note No. 2995, Appendix B, No. 20)

- F. It is a principle of Iranian law that no judge can be arrested or put under arrest unless he has been deprived of immunity by the Supreme Disciplinary Court, which is composed of the highest judges in the country. In September 1945, the Soviet authorities detained Mr. Fasih Khal'atbari, judge of Saari Court, in Saari police prison in spite of the fact that he was ill, and his prison damp. Later on, disregarding official notes they insisted on continuing to keep Mr. Khal'atbari under arrest and furthermore, refused to allow him to proceed to Tehran although the matter had been referred by the Supreme Court to Tehran (See Note Appendix B, No.43)
4. The Soviet authorities have no right to carry out mining in Iran without the consent of the Iranian Government; despite this they have shut off a large area between Shahi and Pol-e-Sbfliid and are busy carrying out excavations (See Note Appendix B No.45...?...).
5. Some Iranian Army officers and men, numbering 20, of the Meshed garrison staged a rebellion and taking arms and ammunition with them, escaped. The gendarmerie contingent dispatched by the Government caught up with them at Gonbad-Qabus. After a pitched battle a number were killed and some arrested. A number of gendarmes were sent from various directions to take over the place. The Soviet army authorities, however, notified the gendarmes in question that they must return to their original position and that they had no right to use their rifles and arms; moreover they prevented the transport of the arms and ammunition which had been confiscated from the insurgent officers at Gonbad-Qabus and which had been sent to Tehran. (See Note No. 3152, Appendix B No. 28)
6. Throughout the Iranian Government notified the Soviet Government of disorders which had taken place in Northern Iran and warned that these disorders would spread unless reinforcements of troops and further gendarmes were sent

to these localities.

(See Note No. 1346	Appendix B No.
" " " 1346	" B No.
" " " 2083	" B No. 16
" " " 3152	" B No. 28
" " " 3281	" B No. 31
" " " 3945	" B No. 37
" " " 4749	" B No. 50
" " " 4922	" B No. 51)

7. The above information could be greatly supplemented when the northern area is again open to the Central government. At the moment there is an almost complete black-out over news or information from that area by reason of the reluctance on the part of the inhabitants in that area to report the true facts.

APPENDIX A
(LIST OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS)

- No.1 Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 29th January 1942
- No.2 Messages of congratulations on occasion of signing the Tripartite Treaty
- No.3 The Three Power Declaration at Teheran concerning Iran
- No.4 17/11/45. Note from Iranian Government to Soviet Union
- No.5 22/11/45. Note from Iranian Government to Soviet Union
- No.6 23/11/45. Note from Iranian Government to Soviet Union
- No.7 24/11/45. U.S.A. to Soviet Union
- No.8 26/11/45. Note from Soviet Union to Iranian Government
- No.9 26/11/45. Note from Iranian Government to Soviet Union, U.S.A. and Great Britain.
- No.10 27/11/45 Note from Great Britain to Soviet Union
- No.11 29/11/45. Note from Soviet Union to U.S.A.
- No.12 1/12/45. Note from Iranian Government to Soviet Union
- No.13 13/12/45 Note from Iranian Government to Soviet Union, U.S.A. & Great Britain

APPENDIX A. NO. 1

TRIPARTITE TREATY OF ALLIANCE ^x

His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah of Iran on the one hand,
and His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the
British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and the
Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the other:

Having in view the principles of the Atlantic Charter jointly
agreed upon and announced to the world by the President of the
United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom on the 14th August, 1941, and endorsed by the Government
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 24th September,
1941, with which His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah declares His
complete agreement and from which he wishes to benefit on an equal
basis with the other nations of the world and:

Being anxious to strengthen the bonds of friendship and mutual
understanding between them and:

Considering that these objects will best be achieved by the
conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance:

Have agreed to conclude a treaty for that purpose and have
appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah of Iran:

His Excellency Ali SOHEILY,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British
Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India; for the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

Sir Reader William BULLARD, K.C.M.G., C.I.E.,
His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary
and
Minister Plenipotentiary in Iran,

^x This Treaty was signed on 29th January 1942 at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs during the late Mohammad Ali Foroughi's
tenure of office as Prime Minister.

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

His Excellency André Andreévitch SMIRNOV,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Iran,

Who having communicated their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter referred to as the Allied Powers) jointly and severally undertake to respect the territorial integrity, the sovereignty and political independence of Iran.

ARTICLE II

An Alliance is established between His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah of Iran on the one hand and the Allied Powers on the other.

ARTICLE III

(1) The Allied Powers jointly and severally undertake to defend Iran by all means at their command from all aggression on the part of Germany or any other Power.

(2) His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah undertakes:

- a) To cooperate with the Allied Powers with all the means at His command and in every way possible in order that they may be able to fulfil the above undertaking. The assistance of the Iranian forces shall however be limited to the maintenance of internal security on Iranian territory.
- b) To secure to the Allied Powers for the passage of troops or supplies from one Allied Power to the other, or for other similar purposes, the unrestricted right to use, maintain, guard and

in case of military necessity, control in any way that they may require, all the means of communication throughout Iran, including railways, roads, rivers, aerodromes, ports, pipelines and telephone, telegraph and wireless installations.

- c) To furnish all possible assistance and facilities in obtaining material and recruiting labour for the purpose of the maintenance and the improvement of the means of communications referred to in paragraph b)
 - d) To establish and maintain in collaboration with the Allied Powers such measures of censorship control as they may require for all the means of communication referred to in paragraph b)
- (3) It is clearly understood that in the application of paragraphs (2) b), c) and d) of the present article the Allied Powers will give full consideration to the essential needs of Iran.

ARTICLE IV

(1) The Allied Powers may maintain in Iranian territory land, sea and air forces in such number as they consider necessary. The location of such forces shall be decided in agreement with the Iranian Government so long as the strategic situation allows. All questions concerning the relation between the forces of the Allied Powers and the Iranian authorities shall be settled so far as possible in co-operation with the Iranian authorities in such a way as to safeguard the security of the said forces.

It is understood that the presence of these forces on Iranian territory does not constitute a military occupation and will disturb as little as possible the administration and the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements of the population and the application of Iranian laws and regulations.

(2) A separate agreement or agreements shall be concluded as soon as possible after the entry into force of the present treaty regarding any financial obligations to be borne by the Allied Powers under the provisions of the present article and of paragraphs (2) b), c) and d) of article 3 above, in such matters as local purchases, the hiring of buildings and plant, the employment of labour, transport charges etc. A special agreement shall be concluded between the Allied Governments and the Imperial Iranian Government defining the conditions of any transfers to the Imperial Iranian Government after the war of buildings and other improvements affected by the Allied Powers on Iranian territory. These agreements shall also settle the immunities to be enjoyed by the Allied forces in Iran.

ARTICLE V

The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her Associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices, or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is the earlier.

The expression "Associates" of Germany means all other Powers which have engaged or may in future engage in hostilities against either of the Allied Powers.

ARTICLE VI

(1) The Allied Powers undertake in their relations with foreign countries not to adopt an attitude which is prejudicial to the territorial integrity, the sovereignty or the political independence of Iran, nor to conclude treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present treaty. They undertake to consult the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah in all matters affecting the direct interests of Iran.

(2) His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah undertakes not to adopt in his relations with foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the Alliance, nor to conclude treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present treaty.

ARTICLE VII

The Allied Powers jointly undertake to use their best endeavours to safeguard the economic existence of the Iranian people against the privations and difficulties arising as a result of the present war. On the entry into force of the present treaty discussions shall be opened between the Government of Iran and the Governments of the Allied Powers as to the best possible methods of carrying out the above undertaking.

ARTICLE VIII

The provisions of the present treaty are equally binding as bilateral obligations between His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah and each of the two other High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE IX

The present treaty shall come into force on signature and shall remain in force until the date fixed for the withdrawal of the forces of the Allied Powers from Iranian territory in accordance with article 5.

In witness whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Tehran in triplicate in Persian, English and Russian, all being equally authentic, on the twenty ninth day of January one thousand nine hundred and forty two.

	A. Soheily
Signed by:	R.W. Bullard
	Andre A. Smirnov

THE U.S.S.R. EMBASSY IN IRAN

Tehran, 29th January 1942.

Monsieur Le Ministre,

With reference to Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Alliance signed today, I have the honour, on behalf of My Government, to assure Your Excellency that my Government interpret the provisions of this clause as being applicable to any peace conference or conferences held at the conclusion of the present war or other international conferences. Consequently they consider themselves bound not to approve anything at any such conference which is prejudicial to the territorial integrity, the sovereignty or the political independence of Iran, and not to discuss at any such conference anything affecting the direct interests of Iran without consultation with the Government of Iran.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. will further do their best to secure that Iran will be represented on a footing of equality in any such peace negotiations directly affecting her interests.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

Signed: A. SMIRNOV

His Excellency
MONSIEUR ALI SOHEILI,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
TEHRAN

Annex 1.

British Legation

Tehran, 29th January 1942

Monsieur Le Ministre

With reference to Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Alliance signed today, I have the honour, on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, to assure Your Excellency that my Government interpret the provisions of this clause as being applicable to any peace conference or conferences held at the conclusion of the present war or other international conference. Consequently they consider themselves bound not to approve anything at any such conference which is prejudicial to the territorial integrity, the sovereignty or the political independence of Iran, and not to discuss at any such conference anything affecting the direct interests of Iran without consultation with the Government of Iran.

His Majesty's Government will further do their best to secure that Iran will be represented on a footing of equality in any such peace negotiations directly affecting her interests.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

Signed: R.W. BULLARD

His Excellency
MONSIEUR ALI SOHEIFY,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
TEHRAN

S/3
Page 36

Annex 2.

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
No. 4952

29th January 1942

Your Excellency

With reference to Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Alliance signed this day, I have the honour on behalf of the Iranian Government to assure Your Excellency that the Iranian Government would consider it contrary to their obligations under this clause to maintain diplomatic relations with any state which is in diplomatic relations with neither of the Allied Powers.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

Signed: A. SOHEILY

His Excellency

Mr. Andre A. SMIRNOV,

Ambassador of the U.S.S.R.

TEHRAN

Annex 2.

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
No. 4952

29th January 1942

YOUR EXCELLENCY

With reference to Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Alliance signed this day, I have the honour on behalf of the Iranian Government to assure Your Excellency that the Iranian Government would consider it contrary to their obligations under this clause to maintain diplomatic relations with any state which is in diplomatic relations with neither of the Allied Powers.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

Signed: A. SOHELLY

His Excellency

Sir READER W. HULLARD,

His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary,

TEHRAN

S/3
Page 38.

Annex 3.

THE U.S.S.R. EMBASSY IN IRAN

Tehran, 29th January 1942

Monsieur Le Ministre

I have the honour on behalf of the Government of the U.S.S.R. to transmit to Your Excellency the following assurances :-

- 1) With reference to Article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Alliance which has been signed today: the Allied Powers will not require of Iran the participation of her armed forces in any war or military operations against any foreign power or powers.
- 2) With reference to article 4 (2):- it is understood that there is no provision in the Treaty which requires that the Iranian Government shall bear the cost of any works which the Allied Powers carry out for their own military ends and which are not necessary for the needs of Iran.
- 3) It is understood that Annex 1 will remain in force even if the Treaty ceases to be valid, in accordance with the provisions of article 9, before peace has been concluded.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

Signed: A. SMIRNOV

His Excellency
MONSIEUR ALI SOHEILI
Minister of Foreign Affairs
TEHRAN

ANNEX 3

BRITISH LEGATION

Tehran 29th January 1942.

Monsieur Le Ministre

I have the honour on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, to transmit to Your Excellency the following assurances.

1) With reference to Article 3 (2) of the Treaty of Alliance which has been signed today: the Allied Powers will not require of Iran the participation of her armed forces in any war or military operations against any foreign power or powers.

2) With reference to Article 4 (2):- it is understood that there is no provision in the Treaty which requires that the Iranian Government shall bear the cost of any works which the Allied Powers carry out for their own military ends and which are not necessary for the needs of Iran.

3) It is understood that Annex 1 will remain in force even if the Treaty ceases to be valid, in accordance with the provisions of Article 9, before peace has been concluded.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) R. W. Bullard

His Excellency
MONSIEUR ALI SOHEILI
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
TEHRAN

31 Jan. 1942

His Excellency Mr. Stalin,
President of the People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.
MOSCOW

Allow me to express my full gratification and my heartfelt appreciation on the occasion of the signing of the Treaty of Alliance between Iran and the U.S.S.R. and England. I am confident that this Treaty will strengthen the friendly relations and good understanding between our two Countries and that Iran and the U.S.S.R. will benefit from the advantages of co-operation firmly established on the basis of reciprocity.

M. A. Foroughi

Prime Minister of Iran

His Excellency Mr. Foroughi,
Prime Minister of Iran.

1 Feb. 1942

His Excellency the Prime Minister. On the occasion of the signing of the Treaty of Alliance between the Union of the Sovietic Socialist Republics, Great Britain and Iran I offer my sincere congratulations to you and through you to the Iranian Government.

I am confident that the new Alliance between our countries will strengthen the friendship between the people of Iran and the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and will be developed satisfactorily to the benefit of our two countries.

I. V. Stalin

President of the People's Commissars
of the Union of the Soviet Socialist
Republics.

31 Jan. 1942

His Excellency Mr. Winston Churchill,
Prime Minister,
LONDON

On the occasion of the signing of the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain, the Union of the Sovietic Socialist Republics and Iran, I express my confidence and trust that the Treaty will prove to our mutual benefit and conduce to the strengthening of the friendly relations and good understanding between the two countries. Allow me to offer my deep and cordial appreciation for Your Excellency's co-operation in safeguarding the interests of Iran.

M. A. Foroughi

Prime Minister of Iran

1 Feb. 1942

H.E. Mohammad Ali Foroughi,
Prime Minister of Iran

I am most grateful to your Excellency for your telegram of good wishes on the occasion of the signature of the Treaty of Alliance. This is the first occasion on which Iran, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. have come together and pledged themselves in a common aim and for their mutual benefit. The distinguished part which your Excellency played in bringing about understanding is a happy augury for the future.

Winston Churchill

APPENDIX A. NO. 3

THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE
THE THREE-POWER DECLARATION
CONCERNING IRAN
December 1945

The President of the United States, the Premier of the U.S.S.R., and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

The three Governments realize that war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

Winston Churchill

(Signed) J.V. Stalin

Franklin D. Roosevelt.

S/3
Page 44

Appendix B,
No. 53.

TRANSLATION

Note from the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs to the
Soviet Embassy, Tehran.

No. 5370
Date. 26 Aban, 1324 (17 November, 1945.)

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of U.S.S.R. and pursuant to numerous Notes and discussions concerning freedom of action of the Iranian Army and security forces in the Northern Provinces wherein the non-agreement of Soviet authorities has placed the aforesaid forces in such a position that within a long period they have not been able to take the slightest step towards establishing law and order and preventing the activities of undesirable elements, has the honour to state that reports received from the Ministry of War and Ministry of Justice indicate that:-

1. A number of Kurds in the fourth province (i.e. Western part of Azerbaijan including Rezaieh) and Mahabad area have been actively engaged in obtaining arms and amunitions by various means so as to threaten Iran's integrity.
2. The leaders of the Kurds have obtained a printing machine and a lot of newsprint for their purposes from Soviet Russia.
3. A number of the Kurdish chiefs, without going through lawful procedure have gone to Paku and returned.
4. Mulla Mustafa Barzani, who has fled from Iraq and come to Iran, now resides with his men in Kurdish districts and, being armed, has created a state of disorder and confusion in the fourth province (western section of Azerbaijan).
5. The going and returning of ordinary travellers from Tehran to the Northern provinces is being controlled and inspected by Soviet officials no admission being granted without inspection on the part of the latter.
6. The transportation of foodstuffs from the Northern provinces to the capital and southern areas has been stopped, and as a

result prices have gone up, while the peasants in the Northern province through lack of a market for their produce are in distress.

7. The maintenance of order and security in the Northern provinces is jeopardized for lack of sufficient garrison forces; It is on the other hand, impossible to reinforce the troops already on the spot owing to the fact that the sending of even one gendarme requires the sanction of the Soviet authorities, and this matter entails such protracted formalities that the object in view is defeated before anything can be done.

8. With no Governor General and local governors in the Northern provinces the administration is disturbed. Meanwhile obstacles are placed in the way of Iranian officials who attempt to proceed to their respective posts to fulfil their duty.

9. On the Irano-Turkish border Persian officials are unable to exercise vigilance and make their authority felt because they are deprived of all freedom of action.

10. Due to interference on the part of Russian officials, the prosecution of individuals in the Northern provinces has been rendered difficult. This Soviet attitude is in direct violation of Iran's jurisdictional freedom. The Russians are sending into exile those whom they have created a state of unrest and confusion. Moreover they have not allowed reinforcements to be sent in time to localities where their presence was urgently required.

The following are some of the reports received to date:

a. On the night of the 23rd Aban (14 November) a number of villagers affiliated to the so-called democratic party met in a locality situated at a distance of 12 kilometers from Mishbeh. Some fifty of them were armed and these men blocked the road to two army trucks, beat a warrant officer in the truck, disrobed him and then held meetings and afterwards took possession of Mishbeh, disarmed all the local gendarmes and railway guards, then took possession of government offices, interned

all government officials.

b. Kabiri (a local magnate closely in touch with Soviet officials) has distributed arms and munitions to a large number of people in Maragheh. In Adjabehir the gendarmes have been surrounded, arrested and deprived of their weapons, being afterwards cast into jail. In Qolikandi, the constabulary had arrested a number of insurgents and brought them to Maragheh but Russian officials interfered and insisted that they be set at liberty because they were communists. Kabiri actively engaged in gathering men and arming them, is making preparation to attack Maragheh. Arms and ammunition are being distributed among members of the so-called democratic party in Sarab. Armed groups pretending to take part in meetings want to go to Sarab and occupy government offices.

c. Reports received from Tabriz state that Russian officials prevent the police from guarding the prisons; meanwhile members of the "democratic party" are allowed to freely engaged in arming people and inciting them to create disorder. Representations to the Soviet officials on the spot do not give fruitful and positive results. The same situation prevails in Khoy, Makau and Rezaieh.

Such being the state of things and the anxiety of the Government, instructions have been issued to the departments concerned to send out as soon as possible the Governor General and Governors as well as other officials to the posts which have hitherto remained vacant for the reason already specified. At the same time orders have been given for the dispatch of troops and gendarmes in sufficient numbers to cope with the situation and re-establish order and tranquility. Consequently the Ministry for Foreign Affairs request the Soviet Government, who as a signatory of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance (January 29 1942) undertook to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Iran and to abstain from disturbing the administration and the security forces of

Iran and the economic life of the country, to issue the necessary immediate instructions to the Soviet military authorities enjoining upon them to refrain from interfering with the freedom of action of the Iranian Army and constabulary. If urgent attention is not paid to these matters, the situation in the Northern regions is such that disastrous consequences might ensue which most certainly will be contrary to the wishes of the two Governments and to the expressed desire of the U.S.S.R. to consolidate their relations with Iran. Should the Iranian Government not succeed in preventing unfortunate incidents owing to the lack of freedom of movement of its armed forces, it will have the right of imputing responsibility for this failure to the Soviet Military authorities. In conclusion the Ministry for Foreign Affairs informs the Soviet Embassy that the Iranian Government has decided to send for the moment two infantry battalions, one light tank battalion, and one gendarme battalion with arms and ammunition from Tehran to Mianeh and Tabriz via Ghazvin and Zanjan. It is requested that the Soviet authorities be notified of these decisions at the earliest possible moment so that they might be informed of the matter in advance.

S/3.
Page 48.

Appendix A. No.5

Dated, 22/11/45.

NOTE

FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE SOVIET
EMBASSY, TEHRAN

The halting of the Iranian troops on their way from Tehran to Tabriz by Red Army forces is a matter for surprise and requires an explanation. These reinforcements have been obliged to remain at Charifabad near Kazvin whereas their arrival and presence in Azerbaijan is urgently required to strengthen the hands of the defenders of law and order in that region.

Following verbal representations recently made, the matter is now brought to your attention in writing so that immediate telegraphic instructions might be given to the Soviet military authorities to the effect that no obstacle be placed in the way of the progress of this Iranian detachment. It is most important, at this critical juncture, that tranquillity be restored in Azerbaijan and this can only be done by speeding up the departure of these expeditionary forces.

TRANSLATION

Note from the Iranian Government
to the Soviet Embassy, Tehran.

Date. 2 Azar 1324 (23 November, 1945.)

The Persian detachment which left Tehran to reinforce the garrison of Azerbaijan has been halted by the Red Army for some days on the road to Charifabad near Kazvin. It is waiting without any shelter, for freedom of movement and passage to its destination. On the other hand the wave of lawlessness and rebellion in the northwest province of Iran is daily increasing in strength and according to recent reports, on the 30th of Aban (21 November) some unknown individuals were gradually arriving at Zandjan ostensibly for the purpose of creating incidents and trouble in that city similar to those prevailing at Mianeh. It appears that arms have also been distributed among these people and the competent local authorities remind us of the urgent necessity of hastening reinforcements.

Consequently whilst laying clearly before you the situation and drawing your attention to the responsibility and duty which are incumbent upon the Iranian Government in the maintenance of order and security within their own territory, I refer to my repeated requests which have hitherto remained without result or response and request you again to issue immediate telegraphic instructions to the effect that the Soviet military authorities no longer hold up the Iranian detachment actually stopped at Charifabad. No hindrance should be placed in the way of the freedom of movement of our forces on reaching their destination and enabling the officer commanding the Iranian troops in Azerbaijan to strengthen the garrisons wherever necessary and re-establish tranquillity in our northwestern provinces. I shall be grateful to hear with as little delay as possible the result of the steps taken by you. The friendship and unalterable good feeling between the two neighbouring countries, the promises and engagements subscribed to in the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance and the guarantees contained in the Declaration of Tehran, render it necessary for the Embassy of the Soviet Union to pay special attention to the maintenance of security by Iranian forces in Iranian territory and to the safeguarding of communications between the northwestern province, where Soviet troops still remain, and the Central Government.

S/3.
Page 50.

Appendix A.
No. 7.

NOTE FROM THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW TO THE
SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON NOVEMBER 26th, 1945.

The Government of Iran has informed the Government of the United States that armed uprisings have taken place in areas of northern Iran where Soviet troops are stationed; that the Iranian Government has directed certain of its armed forces to enter those areas for the purpose of re-establishing internal security and its own authority; that Soviet military commanders have refused to permit these forces to proceed; and that consequently the Iranian Government has not been able to carry out its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order in Iranian territory.

It will be recalled that on December 1st 1943, Marshal Stalin, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt signed in Tehran a declaration in which they stated that their Governments were "at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran". This Government has entire confidence that the Governments of the Soviet Union and Great Britain are just as zealous as the Government of the United States meticulously to abide by the assurances contained in this declaration. In the view of this Government the fulfilment of these assurances requires that the Government of Iran should have full freedom, without interference from Soviet, British, or American military or civil authorities, to move its armed forces through Iran in such a manner as it may consider necessary in order to preserve its authority and to maintain internal security.

The Government of the United States realizes that any Soviet commanders in the areas concerned who may have prevented

the free movement of Iranian forces may have been acting without the sanction of the Soviet Government. If the Soviet commanders have been acting without instructions in this matter, it is assumed that the Soviet Government is issuing to them instructions in keeping with the declaration referred to above. In any event the situation which has arisen has convinced the American Government that it would be in the common interest for all Soviet, British, and American troops to be withdrawn immediately from Iran. As long as any of these troops remain in the territory of a friendly government, incidents and misunderstandings are likely to occur. The Government of the United States has already reduced its forces in Iran during the present year from a maximum strength of approximately 28,000 to less than 6,000. There are no American combat troops in Iran. Those who remain are engaged in activities exclusively of a service nature connected with the liquidation and disposal of military supplies and the operation of certain important communications connected with demobilization. While the immediate withdrawal of these troops will cause considerable inconvenience to this Government, nevertheless instructions are being issued to the American military authorities in Iran to take immediate steps to effect the complete withdrawal of all American forces from Iran by January 1st, 1946. This Government proposes that the British and Soviet Governments issue similar instructions to their commanders and that arrangements be made immediately for the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from Iran by January 1st 1946. Immediate steps to effect such withdrawal would dispel any doubt regarding the intentions of the three Governments to carry out the assurances given by them. In making this suggestion the Government of the United States is aware that no undertaking has been given that these troops are to be removed from Iran before March 2nd 1946. On the other hand, now

that hostilities have ceased, it sees no compelling reason for them to remain until that date. It is of the opinion that immediate steps to effect withdrawal by January 1st not only would obviate possible misunderstandings but would also be a fitting recognition of the notable contributions which Iran, a member in good standing of the United Nations, has made to the common war effort.

Nations such as Iran were encouraged at the United Nations Conference at San Francisco to place full trust in the friendly intentions and good will of the permanent members of the Security Council. The Government of the United States is confident that the Soviet Union and Great Britain are no less anxious than the United States, in dealing with nations such as Iran, to follow a line of action which will make it clear that the trust of these nations in the permanent members of the Security Council has not been misplaced.

Similar proposals are being made to the British Government.

TRANSLATION

Appendix A. No.8

26th Nov: 1945.

NOTE FROM THE SOVIET EMBASSY, TEHERAN TO THE MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

All accusations that Soviet authorities interfere in the internal affairs of Iran are refuted. Soviet authorities have not intervened or assisted in the political activities of Iranian groups in the third or fourth Ostans, and have not aided Kurdish chieftains in their political activities. Soviet authorities have not interfered in the case of the crossing over of Mustafa Borzani from Iraq territory into Iran; they have not asked for the release of persons arrested by the Iranian gendarmerie; they have not prevented the passenger traffic of Iranian subjects to the Northern Ostans; they have asked for permits for passengers travelling to localities where Soviet Army are stationed solely in the case of subjects of third parties; not only they have not interfered in the economic life of inhabitants of the Northern Ostans, but by importing necessary materials into Iran, even in the most difficult stages of the war, they have rendered assistance, such as the 25,000 tons of wheat with which they helped the inhabitants of Teheran in the year 1943, as well as assisting in regard to motor vehicles and aeroplanes for the travels of Iranian Government officials to the Northern Provinces. If some of the Northern Ostans are still without governors or that certain heads of administrations or officials of frontier posts have not been chosen and dispatched no responsibility is attached to the Soviet Government. In the events resulting from political activities of the Iranians in the aforesaid Ostans, matters which are of the internal affairs of Iran, Soviet authorities have not intervened and will not do so; similarly, they have not interfered in the judicial affairs in Iran and have constantly requested that, in accordance with the laws and regulations of Iran anti-Soviet

S/3.

Page 54.

activities and the murder of Soviet subjects should be regularly pursued.

With regard to the fact that the Iranian Government have deemed it necessary to dispatch armed forces to Azerbaijan for the purpose of maintaining security, as their arrival there at this juncture would cause disturbances and bloodshed, and in the event of the outbreak of disturbances the Soviet Government would, to maintain security in the areas stationed by her armed forces, be constrained to complement her armed forces, and the Soviet Government is not willing to do so, therefore, the arrival of supplementary forces of Iran are not, in view of the presence of the Army and Gendarmerie in these localities considered advisable.

Appendix A.

TRANSLATION

No. 9.

NOTE FROM IRANIAN GOVERNMENT TO THE SOVIET,
UNITED STATES AND BRITISH EMBASSIES, TEHRAN

26th November, 1945.

As you will be aware in the Third and Fourth Provinces (Western and Eastern Azerbaijan) a limited number of persons have begun creating trouble and putting forth fantastic claims and have in this connection even published declarations which have been completely against the Constitution of the country and against the security, tranquility and public welfare of the districts in question. The extent of disturbances and disorder is thereby continuously spreading. In many localities these persons have attacked security forces, have occupied many localities, interfered on the roads and have completely disturbed traffic and security on the highways. In view of the cessation of telephonic and telegraphic communications, the Central Government have lost uninterrupted contact with its officials in these provinces, and are unable to issue necessary instructions to the authorities concerned and to have any confidence in the execution of the orders given.

The view the Government holds is that any individual, group or faction of the people of the country who have any complaints to make, which do not come under acts of disobedience towards the Central Government and are not against the Constitutional law of the Country, the Government will examine their justifiable complaints and will provide the means of public tranquility and welfare of every locality. At the same time, in order to establish security, the Government is constrained to take necessary steps against elements which set contrary to the authority and prestige of the country, so that the Central Government may be in a position to safeguard and maintain public security and welfare.

FORNEX "A", No. 10

TEXT OF LETTER SENT BY THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW
TO M. MOLOTOV, SOVIET COMMISS R FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
27TH NOVEMBER 1945

Dear Mr. Molotov,

I have been instructed by my Government to inform you that they are disturbed to learn that certain armed forces which the Persian Government wishes to send from Teheran to the province of Azerbaijan have been stopped on the way by the Soviet military authorities.

It seems to my Government entirely reasonable that the Persian Government should wish to maintain order in their own territory, and legitimate that they should move their security forces about their own country to do so.

In accordance with Article I of the Treaty Alliance between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Persia, of January 29th, 1942, the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom are pledged "to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Persia", and Article 4 of the same treaty lays down that the presence of Allied forces on Persian territory "does not constitute a military occupation and will disturb as little as possible the administrative and security forces of Persia".

Moreover, in the Three-Power declaration concerning Persia issued at Teheran on December 1st 1943, the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States expressed their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Persia.

" My Government therefore feel that the action of the Soviet military authorities in stopping Persian forces on their way to Azerbaijan must be due to some misunderstanding of the position.

My Government trust that the Soviet Government will feel able to instruct their commander in Persia not to obstruct the movement of Persian forces or to interfere with the Persian Government in the exercise of their sovereign right of maintaining order in their own territory.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

TRANSLATION

Appendix A.
No. 11.

Note addressed by the Peoples
Commissar for Foreign Affairs
of the U.S.S.R. to the Embassy
of the United States at Moscow.

Date. November 29, 1945.

"The Statement made in that communication concerning the armed uprising in Northern Iran does not, according to information at the disposal of the Soviet Government, correspond to reality. The events which have taken place in recent days in Iran not only do not constitute an armed uprising but also are not directed against the Shahein Shakh Government of Iran. Now that the declaration of the Popular Assembly of Northern Iran has been published. It is evident that this is a matter of aspirations with respect to the assurances of the democratic rights of Azerbaijanian population of northern Iran which is seeking national autonomy within the limits of the Iranian State and which has its own particular language, different from the Persian language. It is also apparent from the contents of the above-mentioned declaration of the Popular Assembly which took place in Tabriz November 20 to 21 that the popular Assembly addressed the expression of its wishes to the Shah, the Majlis and the Government of Iran, basing itself in this on the Iranian Constitution. The undesirable incidents which have taken place in conjunction with these recent events at various points of Northern Iran have been caused by reactionary elements which have opposed the extension of national rights to the populations of Northern Iran, although there is nothing in these desires of the local population which is unusual for democratic state.

As far as the Soviet military command is concerned it has not hindered, and is not hindering, the movements of the Iranian military forces and the gendarme police units which are

in the districts of Northern Iran. According to information at the disposal of the Soviet Government there are in these districts of Iran one infantry regiment two infantry brigades, two regiments of gendarme police units, the presence of which can secure order and calm in these parts. The Soviet Government opposed the despatch of new Iranian troops to Northern districts of Iran and informed the Iranian Government that the dispatch of further Iranian forces to northern Iran could cause not the cessation but the increase of disorders and likewise bloodshed, which would compel the Soviet Government to introduce into Iran further forces of its own for the purpose of preserving order and of assuring the security of Soviet garrison. In as much as the Soviet Government considers the further introduction of Soviet forces into Iran undesirable, it took the position that the introduction of new Iranian forces into the northern province of Iran at the present time would serve no useful purpose.

As to the reference in the communication of the Government of the United States to the Three-Power declaration concerning Iran December 1, 1943, the Soviet Government as far as it is concerned must state that it adheres unwaveringly to the principles of that declaration. The declaration in question, however, does not affect questions of the number of Soviet armed forces on Iranian territory just as it does not affect the question of the period of the stationing of Soviet troops in Iran. This latter is determined by another document, namely, the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Tripartite Treaty of 1942, and in connection with the stationing of its troops in Iran notwithstanding the fact that the right of introduction of Soviet troops in the territory of Iran was envisaged by the Soviet-Iranian treaty of February 26, 1941. Furthermore, as the Government of the United States is aware, the question of the time for the

removal of Soviet and British troops from Iran was subject of consideration at the Council of Foreign Ministers in London as little as two months ago and was decided by exchange of letters between the Soviet and British representatives which was brought to the attention of the above-mentioned Council of Ministers and which did not find objection in any quarters. In connections with the above it should also be noted that the British Government, in its note on the Iranian question received by the Soviet Government on November 25, does not raise the question of the removal of Soviet troops from Iran.

"On the strength of the consideration set forth above with relations to Soviet troops, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic does not see grounds for renewed consideration of the question of the time limit for the removal of these forces from Iran."

Appendix A.
No. 12.

TRANSLATION

Note from the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs to the Soviet Embassy,
Tehran.

Date: 10 Azar, 1324.
(1 December, 1945.)

"In answer to the communication in which you reply that the charges made concerning the interference of Soviet officials in our internal affairs, in the Northern Provinces, are unfounded, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs does not wish at this time to give further explanations in this matter and to throw more light on the antecedents of the case. It takes note with satisfaction of the purport of your statements to the effect that henceforth such incidents will not repeat themselves.

Your assurance that the officials of the Soviet Union fully respect the provisions of the Tripartite Treaty and the Declaration signed in Tehran by the three great Powers (and who are the allies of Iran), is also a source of gratification.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs hopes that, with the assistance of the Soviet Embassy, and with the immediate and complete evacuation of Iranian territory by the Red Army - and we expect the same of the two other friendly and allied governments - such actions on the part of the Soviet military authorities in the Northern Provinces will no longer take place. In this way the friendship between Iran and the Soviet Union will be increased.

As regards your statement that the Soviet Union cannot be held responsible for the grave consequences of the absence of Iranian officials in the Northern Provinces, we are compelled to point out that the presence of officials in those regions can only be useful and effective if Persian security forces are placed at their disposal and if it is possible to move those forces from localities where they are not required to places where their assistance

is needed. When the hands of Government officials are tied whereas irresponsible turbulent elements move about freely, and when the security forces of Iran are deprived of liberty of action and communication with the Central Government, it is not to be wondered at that the situation becomes troubled and that Government officials share the lot of the inhabitants of the Northern Provinces and are exposed to the danger of being assaulted, wounded and murdered. Such unfortunate incidents have in fact frequently taken place.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is hopeful that, in accordance with the assurance given by the Soviet Embassy, the interference in the affairs of the Northern Provinces will cease and that the security forces of Iran will be able to move about freely; only in this way can order and tranquillity be restored in those regions.

At the same time the Ministry wishes to inform the Embassy that the strengthening and reinforcement of the security forces of the country in the provinces cannot, as would seem to be the contention of the Soviet Embassy give rise to anxiety and should not in any way afford an excuse for bringing fresh troops from the Soviet Union to Iran. Indeed, the Iranian Government's request and expectation are that the detachments of the Red Army still remaining in Iran as well as those of other allied countries shall evacuate our territory with the least possible delay and return to their respective countries so as to enable the Imperial Government of Iran to provide for the well-being and tranquillity of all its people.

The object of the security or military forces of Persia has not been and is not to quarrel or to resort to strife with the local inhabitants, but rather to prevent incitement to disturbances and indiscriminate shooting and abuses. The purpose of these forces

is to exercise vigilance in maintaining law and order.

In this way, it will soon be possible to bring about the appeasement of the Northern regions of Iran and officials of the Government will be able to attend to and investigate the legitimate requests or grievances of any individual in conformity with the Constitution and their laws of the land.

In view of what has been said, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in conclusion, requests the Soviet Embassy to be good enough to inform it of the urgent steps which the Embassy will be taking to ensure freedom of movement for the Military and civil authorities in the Northern provinces as well as the unhindered transportation from one locality to another of the security and military forces of Iran in general. It is requested, in particular, that all obstacles be removed in the way of the detachment which has been waiting at Charifabad with orders to proceed to the Northern Provinces.

S/3.
Page 64.

Appendix A.
No. 13.

TRANSLATION

Note Dispatched by the Iranian
Foreign Minister to the
Ambassadors of Great Britain, U.S.A.
and the Soviet Union, at Tehran

Date. 15 December, 1945.

In view of the fact that presence of foreign troops in Iran has caused dislocation in all the affairs of the country, and has prevented the Iranian Government from carrying out necessary reforms and reparations of damages suffered by Iran during the war and deprived them from freedom of action in the execution of their programmes and plans prepared for the welfare of the nation, it is most essential and urgent that the question of putting an end to this situation should be discussed at the forthcoming Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow.

As in accordance with Article VI of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of January 29th, 1942, Great Britain and the Soviet Union have undertaken to consult the Iranian Government in all matters affecting the direct interests of Iran, the Government of Iran expect to be fully consulted during the aforesaid Conference and all decisions affecting Iran made with their agreement.

In the opinion of the Iranian Government the fundamental principle on which the deliberations of the Conference, in so far as they affect the interests of Iran, must be based, are that with due regard to the spirit of the Three Power Declaration on Iran, dated 1 December, 1943, the Conference should consider and decide the complete and immediate evacuation of Iranian territory from the forces of the three Allied Powers concerned; because the presence of foreign troops in Iran has weakened the sovereignty of the country, and has caused regrettable incidents and hardships and has disturbed in a marked way the public opinion as well as order in the country and tranquillity of the people, as witnessed by the unfortunate incidents of Azerbaijan which are clearest evidence of the dismal results of the stay of foreign troops in the country. No military or non-military reasons exist any more which justify the further stay of the three Allied Powers, even for one day, in Iran.

Appendix B.
E.S.

COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(IRAN) TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY, TEHRAN,
AND OTHER PAPERS

Letter from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to the
Soviet Embassy, Tehran.

No. 2797.

Date 2nd May 1945.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their
compliments to the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. and have the honour
to state that according to information received from the General
Administration of Police, the Governor Maku (a town north west of
Azerbaijan) in compliance with the request of the Soviet Vice-
Consul and Governor of the town, on 20th Tir 1324 (20th July,
1945) asked Captain Ali Samad of the Police of Maku to leave
the town. The latter thereupon abandoned his duty and left
Rezaieh (a town in the West of Azerbaijan).

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs request the Embassy
to enquire from the Soviet authorities concerned the reasons for
asking Captain Ali-Samad to leave his post of duty.

As such actions affect his civil service status, it
is requested that this Ministry be informed as soon as possible
of the results of investigation.

TRANSLATION

Appendix B.
No. 13.

Note from the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs to the Soviet
Embassy, Tehran.

No: 3590

Date: 2 Shahrivar, 1324
(24, August, 1945)

According to information received from the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of War on 15 Kordad, 1324 (5 June, 1945) when the question of evacuating Iran from Allied troops was published in an extra edition of "Akhtar-Shomal", a Tabriz newspaper, the Soviet Commander summoned the Editor of the paper, later in that afternoon.

As the editor did not appear, his son, Sayed Hossein, the Assistant Editor of the newspaper was summoned. The Commander also ordered that all issues of the newspaper be collected.

Furthermore, next morning the following persons who had obtained and read the newspaper, were summoned by the Soviet Commander and were detained in the Commander's headquarters for four hours after which they were released:-

1. Dr. Seldi, Director of Health, Ministry of.
2. Lotfy Azar, an employee of the Ministry of Finance.
3. Meini, of the Police Department.
4. Ali Behnia, correspondent of "Ettelast" newspaper
5. Wa'ez-Zadeh.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs request the Embassy to enquire from Soviet authorities concerned the offences of the above-mentioned persons who were prosecuted, and arrested without regard to laws and regulations of the country.

TRANSLATION

Appendix B.
No. 10.

M. E. from the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs to the Soviet
Embassy, Tehran.

No. 2093.

Date. 6 Shahrivar, 1324. (28 August, 1945)

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their
compliments to the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. and beg to inform them
that, according to report of Ministry of War and telegram from
the Gorgan (town West of Esterabad) gendarmerie, the situation
in Gonbad-Qabus (Town West of Esterabad) is such as to necessitate
speedy measures in order to prevent the occurrence of probable and
unfavourable incidents, and to necessitate the preservation of
security. It seems imperative that effective means to this end
should be obtained as soon as ever possible.

The Ministry of War are informed that gendarmerie
officials in the town in question lack freedom of action necessary
for the performance of their duties in preserving security, and
state that in Gonbad-Qabus Russian military authorities have
informed the gendarmerie that the latter should order reinforce-
ments that have recently reached them to return to their original
station. Furthermore, the gendarmerie in the said town have been
informed that they should not fire their rifles no matter what
happens. Such a declaration and instruction necessarily means
that if, any elements attack the small garrison stationed in
Gonbad-Qabus the latter will be unable to defend itself and to
maintain security. We, therefore, request you to issue
instructions that: 1. The movement of gendarmes as dictated by
the needs of the locality should not hindered. 2. The gendarmes
sent as reinforcements to Gonbad-Qabus should be able to remain
there so long as their stay is considered necessary by the
Commander of the gendarmerie of the afore-said town.

Appendix B.
No. 21.

TRANSLATION

Note from the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs to the Soviet
Embassy, Tehran.

No. 2966.

Date. 12 Shahrivar, 1324.
(3 September 1945)

The Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of U.S.S.R., and have the honour to state that the Ministry of War inform us that, according to the reports they have received from Maragheh (a town South of Tabriz) on 29th Mordad 1324 (27th July, 1945), Mr. Yacub-off, Counsellor of the Embassy, at Adl-el-Dowleh's house, has recommended to the Governor that certain taxes which landowners collect from peasants should be abolished. He has also emphasized that Razzagi, an employee of the Agricultural Bank, must immediately leave the town of Maragheh.

The Iranian Government consider these steps of the Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy an interference in the internal affairs of the country. The Embassy is, therefore, requested to point out to M. Yacub-off that such matters are solely the duties of competent Iranian authorities.

Appendix B.
No. 23

TRANSLATION

Note from the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs to the Soviet Embassy, Tehran.

No. 3085

Date. 13 Shahrivar, 1324 (4 September 1945)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of the U.S.S.R., and have the honour to state that as the Embassy will be aware, in view of recent occurrence of rebellion and disorder in Maragheh (town south of Tabriz), Martial law was declared in that town.

According to information received, to put an end to the disturbances the Military Governor arrested one insurgent named Kebiri. But Soviet military authorities immediately intervened, ordered the arrest of the Military Governor who was detained for 12 hours and released Kebiri and his servant, returning to them the arms which were taken from them at the time of the arrest.

Soviet authorities have also maltreated Major Safavi and have instructed that Iranian soldiers must not leave their barracks. Hence police authorities are unable to carry out their duties and to patrol the streets. Irresponsible elements relying upon Soviet armed forces have thus taken into their own hands the administration of the town.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs protest against the intervention of Soviet authorities in the affairs of the aforesaid town and the arrest of the Iranian commanding officer. It is requested that the Ministry may be informed expeditiously of the results of the investigation and instructions issued for prevention of such steps incompatible with the friendly and good-neighbourly relations between the two countries.

There are other matters of which the Soviet Embassy will be informed at a latter stage.

No. 22.

Note from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to the Soviet Embassy,
Tehran.

No. 3152

Date. 19 Shahrivar 1324,
(10 September, 1945)

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. and with reference to previous notes regarding the outbreak of disturbances by undesirable elements in the towns of Province of Mazandaran and the necessity of the immediate despatch of 200 gendarmes to Gorgan (town in Esterabad) and Shabsavar (township on the South Coast of the Caspian Sea) beg to state that the Ministry of Interior inform them that a couple of nights ago at three in the morning an escaped gendarme from the contingent at Pishkamar arrives at Minou-Dasht and by telephone gives the information that on the noon before escaped officers, together with a number of Turcomans of Kokalan and their chiefs at Pishkamar have forced Sergeant Kiary and a number of gendarmes to surrender and are using propaganda to persuade the Turcomans to the aforesaid group to join up with them and to perpetrate in the nefarious activities of creating disturbances.

The chief administrator of Minou-Dasht gives the information that about 200 persons mounted and on foot have arrived in the outskirts of the city and as Soviet forces have delayed notifying their agreement with the despatch of 200 gendarmes to Gorgan and Shabsavar, resulting in the inadequacy of the number of security forces, these undesirable elements have become emboldened and the danger of attack to Minou-Dasht and Gonbad-Qabus (town West of Esterabad) and the extension of the range of disturbances is increasing every minute.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs request and urge the Soviet Embassy to cause instructions to be given in reply to relevant Notes concerning the despatch of 200 gendarmes, that consent of freedom of action of security forces of Iran, and the non-prevention of transport of arms and ammunition confiscated from escaped officers be given by Soviet authorities concerned, so that necessary number of gendarmes be despatched and the spread of disturbances in the vicinity of Gorgan and other localities of the Province of Maserud be stopped which occurrences are sure to result in bloodshed and pillage of a number of innocent people. In the meantime the Ministry for Foreign Affairs consider it essential to inform the Soviet Embassy that in the event of occurrence of unpleasant incidents resulting from these episodes, the responsibility arising out of them will be that of Soviet authorities who have not agreed to the despatch of 200 gendarmes as reinforcements for security forces of those districts.

S/3
Page 72.

TRANSLATION

Appendix B.
No. 34.

Note from the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs to the Soviet Embassy,
TEHRAN.

No. 3281.

Date. 24 Shahrivar, 1324
(15 September, 1945).

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of the U.S.S.R., and have the honour to state that in accordance with information received from the Ministry of War, Soviet authorities in Azerbaijan have not so far agreed, in any way to dispatch of the Iranian Army to Mahabad (town south of Lake Urmieh), for the purpose of establishing law and order and quelling undesirable agitators who are threatening the security of those parts. The situation in Mahabad, similar to that of Tabriz, is being threatened constantly by undesirable elements owing to lack to security forces and the restrictions placed by Soviet authorities on the freedom of action of Iranian security forces.

In view of the foregoing, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, pursuant to discussions and correspondence which have been carried out in Tehran with the Soviet Embassy and in Moscow with the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs through the Iranian Embassy there, request that necessary instructions may be issued to competent Soviet military authorities in Iran not to prevent the dispatch of armed forces to Mahabad, and generally to concede freedom of action to the Iranian army and security forces, and further to enable them to carry out their duties, relating solely to the establishment of law and order in their area of jurisdiction and the quelling of undesirable elements.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs would be grateful to be

TRANSLATION

Appendix B.
No. 37.

Note from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to the Soviet Embassy,
Tehran.

No. 3945.

Date: 7 Mehr, 1324 (29 September, 1945).

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs refer to their Note No. 3193 dated 21/6/42 regarding the movement of units of the Eighth Army and have the honour to state that, in accordance with the report received by the Ministry of War the Soviet authorities concerned have not yet agreed with the dispatch from Birjand (a town south east of Khorassan) to Meshed (Seat of the Governor of Khorassan) of two infantry companies of the Eighth Army.

It is requested therefore, that instructions be issued to Soviet military authorities not to prevent the transfer of the aforesaid companies who wish to join their regiment.

Kindly advise the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the result of steps taken.

TRANSLATION

Appendix B.
No. 38.

Note from the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs to the Soviet Embassy, Tehran.

No. 3748

Date: 8 Mehr, 1324 (30 September 1945).

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of the U.S.S.R., and have the honour to state that, according to information received from the Ministry of Interior, the Soviet military command in Azerbaijan has asked the gendarmerie there to collect all military licensed arms in possession of people by 1 October, 1945.

According to the internal regulations of Iran, the gendarmerie are not permitted to interfere in the affairs of the Army; the Regional gendarmerie Commander has therefore, passed the matter on to Tehran and is awaiting instructions in order that he may act in accordance with the views of the Government and the Ministry of War.

It is further observed that Soviet authorities give no freedom of action to the Iranian Army and Security forces, and any movement of Army or gendarmerie units in connection with the performance of their duties has so far, met with the disagreement of the Soviet authorities. The fulfilment of such duties, comprising movement of the aforesaid units before giving any freedom of action to the Iranian Army and Security forces, is rendered very difficult.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, therefore, request the Soviet Embassy to issue telegraphic instructions to Soviet military authorities in Tabriz that, pending the official notice of the Government to the gendarmerie, they suspend their demand until necessary instructions on the matter be issued in this respect by the Ministry of War.

TRANSLATION

Appendix B.
No. 39.

Note from the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs to the Soviet Embassy,
Tehran.

No. 3944.

Date: 11 Mehr, 1324.
(3 October, 1945).

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of the U.S.S.R., and have the honour to state that according to information received on Monday, 19 Shahrivar (10 September 1945), from the Ministry of the Interior, the Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy, in company with the Vice-Consul, has visited the Governor of Ardabil (town east of Azerbaijan), stating that they have received information of an increase in the numbers of Military police.

They then explicitly expressed their disagreement with this step, and their intention to limit the garrison as in Maragheh (small town south of Tabriz).

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs request the Embassy to draw the attention of the relevant Soviet authorities to the fact that increase or decrease in the small number of policing forces which are carried out in accordance with the demands of time and locality, should not be objected to, or arouse anxiety, the military police being merely concerned with maintaining peace and order in the district under their control, purely a matter of internal affairs.

TRANSLATION

Appendix B.
No. 43.

Note from the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs to the
Soviet Embassy, Tehran.

No. 4425

Date. 22 Mehr 1324.
(14 October 1945)

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of U.S.S.R., and beg to state that, according to information received from the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice, during the month of Shahrivar when disturbances and disputes occurred between factory workers and peasants Gadi-Kalini of the Province of Mazandaran, Soviet military forces intervened and without heeding the laws and regulations of Iran arrested seven persons on the accusation that they had caused the disturbances, and ordered them to be detained at Police Headquarters at Sari (seat of Governor of Mazandaran). Amongst the arrested persons was Mr. Fasih Khalatburi, a judge of the Court of Justice, who is still detained. Apparently Soviet military authorities refuse to allow the provisions of the law to be enacted in his case.

According to the laws of Iran, prosecution of a judge is contingent upon the withdrawal of his immunities by competent authorities. The arrest of this person, in accordance with the wishes of Soviet authorities, has no legal foundation, especially as no reasons have been advanced for his accusation. Moreover, in accordance with regulations, even when charges are proffered, the case must be submitted with the charge-sheet from the Judicial Dept. of Sari to the appropriate Court in Tehran. Unfortunately reports received indicate that Soviet military authorities are against this person being sent to Tehran, and are demanding prosecution of Mr. Khalatburi and other detainees on the spot.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs regret that notwithstanding numerous discussions and correspondence with that Embassy regarding the necessity of dispatch of gendarmerie to the Province of Mazandaran and prevention of outbreak of disorder, and non-prevention of Soviet military authorities from gendarmes proceeding to their assignments in Goujan and Sari and other localities in that Province their requests have not been met. As predicted in the aforesaid districts, disputes and disturbances have occurred resulting in murder and wounding and consternation of the inhabitants, even though the incidents were internal affairs of Iran.

TRANSLATION

Appendix B.
No. 44.

Note from the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs to the Soviet
Embassy, Tehran.

No. 4423

Date. 24 Mehr, 1324.
(16 October 1945)

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. and have the honour to state that, according to report received from Police Headquarters on Saturday 9th Mehr (1 October 1945) when the police and gendarmerie of the city of Zenjan (town midway between Tehran and Tabriz) were attempting to arrest a person named Hussein, known to be the chief cause of the disturbances which took place in that city on 4th Mehr, the Soviet Commander intervened, disarmed the police and gendarmes, and conducted them to his headquarters.

On the way the police and gendarmes who had already been disarmed, were attacked by a group of persons belonging to the Tudeh party who stabbed one of the gendarmes named Vahiolollah in the thigh and beat up a policeman named Nipon-Kar. Later these men were medically treated at Soviet Headquarters by a Soviet medical officer.

The chief of Police, on hearing of the matter, discussed the affair with the Soviet Commander, with the result that the men were released.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs desire to thank the medical officer for his assistance rendered to the injured men, but regrets the Soviet Commander's interference in matters connected with the duties of the Iranian Security forces, interference which leads to such occurrences and tends to weaken the authority of the Central Government.

They request the Embassy to issue strict orders to relevant Soviet authorities to cease interference with matters relating to law and order of the country which are the duties of Iranian officials solely; interference to which the Iranian Government register their protests.

S/3
Page 80

Appendix B.
No. 45.

TRANSLATION

Note from the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs to the
Soviet Embassy, Tehran.

No. 4395

Date. 26 Mehr, 1324
(18 October 1945.)

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of U.S.S.R. and have the honour to state that, according to information received from the Ministry of Interior, a telegraphic report from Pol-e-Sefid (a small town in Mazandaran) indicates that Captain Samandari, commander of the gendarm battalion of Sari (Seat of Governor of the Province of Mazandaran), together with two other officers and nine gendarmes, while pursuing a number of brigands arrived in "Pol-e-Sefid" on 23rd Mehr (15 October).

Two hours after their arrival, the Soviet Commander, together with a number of Soviet soldiers, had the Commanding Officer of the battalion and his group taken to his headquarters, where they were disarmed and retained up to 9 p.m. of the 24th Mehr (16 October), when the above-mentioned telegraphic message was dispatched.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs request the Embassy of U.S.S.R. to cause immediate telegraphic instructions to be issued to the Soviet military authorities concerned to release the aforesaid officer and gendarmes, return their arms and ensure their freedom of action so that they may be able to maintain order in the district within the sphere of their duty.

Furthermore, it is requested that strict orders be issued to the relevant Soviet authorities not to interfere in matters which are solely connected with the internal affairs of Iran, interferences to which the Iranian Government protest.

Kindly advise the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the steps taken in this respect.

Appendix B
No. 42.

TRANSLATION

Note from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to the
Soviet Embassy, Tehran.

No. 4822

Date: 1 Aban, 1324
(23 October, 1945)

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their
compliments to the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. and have the honour
to state that, according to information received from the
Ministry of Interior, Soviet authorities in Masandaran (a Province
north of Iran) have arrested Mr. RAZAFJOO; the president of the
Peasants and Labourers Association, and taken him away to
Babulsar (small port on the Caspian Sea).

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs request the Soviet
Embassy to enquire from Soviet authorities, stationed in the
Province of Masandaran, reasons of arrest and dispatch of the
aforesaid person to Babulsar without any legal ground, and to
issue instructions for his release.

Kindly inform this Ministry of the result of the
steps taken. Of course if it is found that the person in
question has committed an offence, he will be prosecuted by
competent Iranian Courts in accordance with the prevailing
laws and regulations.

TRANSLATION

Appendix B.
No. 50.

Note from the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs to the
Soviet Embassy, Tehran.

No. 4749

Date. 5 Aban, 1324.
(27 October, 1945)

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of U.S.S.R. and have the honour to state that, according to information received from the Ministry of Interior, reports from Mazandaran indicate that unexpected incidents may take place there, the prevention of which is impossible without reinforcing the security forces of that province.

It is understood that if no urgent steps are taken in this connection and if adequate numbers of gendarmes are not dispatched there expeditiously, grave and unpleasant incidents by undesirable elements would be certain to occur.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs draw the Embassy's attention to their repeated notes on the question of dispatching gendarmes to the Province of Mazandaran and urge that the approval of Soviet military authorities be given to the dispatch of security forces to that province, communicating to this Ministry their approval as soon as possible.

TRANSMISSION

Appendix B.
No. 51.

Letter from the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs to the
Soviet Embassy, Tehran.

No. 4922

Date. 6 Aban, 1324
(30 October, 1945).

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of U.S.S.R. and have the honor to state that the Ministry of War report that the situation at Khel (town about 50 miles North West of Tabriz) necessitated the dispatch of one battalion from Pazzich (town about 70 miles South of Tabriz) brigade to maintain order and to establish a garrison there.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs request the Embassy to cause instructions to be issued to Soviet military authorities of Eastern and Western Provinces of Azerbaijan to comply with the requirements of the Ministry of War and the Army of Azerbaijan on the lines which will be brought to the notice of the Soviet military Attaché, and to agree with the dispatch of the aforesaid battalion.

Kindly advise this Ministry of the result of steps taken in obtaining the above mentioned agreement.

Appendix B.
No. 53. ---

TRANSLATION

Note from the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs to the Soviet Embassy,
Tehran.

No. 5370

Date. 26 Aban, 1324 (17 November, 1945.)

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of U.S.S.R. and pursuant to numerous Notes and discussions concerning freedom of action of the Iranian Army and security forces in the Northern Provinces wherein the non-agreement of Soviet authorities has placed the aforesaid forces in such a position that within a long period they have not been able to take the slightest step towards establishing law and order and preventing the activities of undesirable elements, has the honour to state that reports received from the Ministry of War and Ministry of Justice indicate that:-

1. A number of Kurds in the fourth province (i.e. Western part of Azerbaijan including Resazich) and Mahabad area have been actively engaged in obtaining arms and ammunitions by various means so as to threaten Iran's integrity.
2. The leaders of the Kurds have obtained a printing machine and a lot of newspaper for their purposes from Soviet Russia.
3. A number of the Kurdish chiefs, without going through lawful procedure have gone to Faku and returned.
4. Mulla Mustafa Barzani, who has fled from Iraq and come to Iran, now resides with his men in Kurdish districts and, being armed, has created a state of disorder and confusion in the fourth province (western section of Azerbaijan).
5. The going and returning of ordinary travellers from Tehran to the Northern provinces is being controlled and inspected by Soviet officials no admission being granted without inspection on the part of the latter.
6. The transportation of foodstuffs from the Northern provinces to the capital and southern areas has been stopped, and as a result

prices have gone up, while the peasants in the Northern provinces through lack of a market for their produce are in distress.

7. The maintenance of order and security in the Northern provinces is jeopardized for lack of sufficient garrison forces; it is on the other hand, impossible to reinforce the troops already on the spot owing to the fact that the sending of even one gentleman requires the sanction of the Soviet authorities, and this matter entails such protracted formalities that the object in view is defeated before anything can be done.

8. With no Governor General and local governors in the Northern provinces the administration is disturbed. Meanwhile obstacles are placed in the way of Iranian officials who attempt to proceed to their respective posts to fulfil their duty.

9. On the Irano-Turkish border Persian officials are unable to exercise vigilance and make their authority felt because they are deprived of all freedom of action.

10. Due to interference on the part of Russian officials, the prosecution of individuals in the Northern provinces has been rendered difficult. This Soviet attitude is in direct violation of Iran's jurisdictional freedom. The Russians are sending into exile those whom they have created a state of unrest and confusion. Moreover they have not allowed reinforcements to be sent in time to localities where their presence was urgently required.

The following are some of the reports received to date:

a. On the night of the 23rd Aban (14 November) a number of villagers affiliated to the so-called democratic party met in a locality situated at a distance of 12 Kilometers from Mischeh. Some fifty of them were armed and these men blocked the road to two army trucks, beat a warrant officer in the truck, disrobed him and then held meetings and afterwards took possession of Mischeh, disarmed all the local gentlemen and railway guards, then took possession of government offices, interned all government officials.

b. Kabiri (a local magnate closely in touch with Soviet officials) has distributed arms and munitions to a large number of people in Maragheh. In Adjabehir the gendarmes have been surrounded, arrested and deprived of their weapons, being afterwards cast into jail. In Qolikandi, the constabulary had arrested a number of insurgents and brought them to Maragheh but Russian officials interfered and insisted that they be set at liberty because they were communists. Kabiri actively engaged in gathering men and arming them, is making preparations to attack Maragheh. Arms and ammunition are being distributed among members of the so-called democratic party in Sarab. Armed groups pretending to take part in meetings want to go to Sarab and occupy government offices.

c. Reports received from Tabriz state that Russian officials prevent the police from guarding the prisons; meanwhile members of the "democratic party" are allowed to freely engage in arming people and inciting them to create disorder. Representations to the Soviet officials on the spot do not give fruitful and positive results. The same situation prevails in Kioy, Makau and Rezaich.

Such being the state of things and the anxiety of the Government, instructions have been issued to the departments concerned to send out as soon as possible the Governor General and Governors, as well as other officials to the posts which have hitherto remained vacant for the reason already specified. At the same time orders have been given for the dispatch of troops and gendarmes in sufficient numbers to cope with the situation and re-establish order and tranquillity. Consequently the Ministry for Foreign Affairs request the Soviet Government, who as a signatory of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance (January 29, 1942) undertook to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Iran and to abstain from disturbing the administration and the security forces of Iran and the economic life of the country, to issue the necessary immediate

instructions to the Soviet military authorities enjoining upon them to refrain from interfering with the freedom of action of the Iranian Army and constabulary. If urgent attention is not paid to these matters, the situation in the Northern regions is such that disastrous consequences might ensue which most certainly will be contrary to the wishes of the two Governments and to the expressed desire of the U.S.S.R. to consolidate their relations with Iran. Should the Iranian Government not succeed in preventing unfortunate incidents owing to the lack of freedom of movement of its armed forces, it will have the right of imputing responsibility for this failure to the Soviet Military authorities. In conclusion the Ministry for Foreign Affairs informs the Soviet Embassy that the Iranian Government has decided to send for the moment two infantry battalions, one light tank battalion, and one gendarme battalion with arms and ammunition from Tehran to Mianeh and Tabriz via Ghasvin and Zanjan. It is requested that the Soviet authorities be notified of these decisions at the earliest possible moment so that they might be informed of the matter in advance.

TRANSLATION

Appendix B
No. 63

Letter from the Iranian
Ministry of War to the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Immediate and Confidential

A report received from Tabriz on 29 Mehr 1324 says that the Russian Consul in Resaich accompanied by eleven officers and Numaq-Ali had been staying in Mahabad (town south of Lake Resaich) for the past three days and summoned a number of Kurdish chieftains. Among those who answered the summons of Haruf Agha, Hanize Agha, Hossein Agha, the brothers of Haji Garmi Agha, Kak Savaar Hasku and the son of Haji Hanize. Subsequently, the leaders of the Kumala party induced the inhabitants to sign a blank sheet telling them that on the said sheet the government would be asked to allow the Kurds to study in their own language and certain new powers would be given to the Kurds for the administration of their own internal affairs. Furthermore, Qazi Mohammed has declared that within three days our purpose and program will be revealed. Such action on the part of the Russian Consul in Resaich (town west of Azerbaijan) is opposed to the policy of our country and constitutes a direct intervention in our internal affairs. Such activities and provocations will result in nothing short of infringement of the independence of the country and the creation of disturbance in the affairs of the country and the loss of security in their district. It is imperative that quick action through diplomatic channels be taken. We request you, therefore, to inform competent authorities of the three allied governments, signatories to the Tripartite Treaty, and the guarantors of the independence of Iran, of the facts and inform us in turn of the result.

TRANSLATION

Appendix B.
No. 64.

Copy of the Report of the
Mr. Vaziri the Mayor of Shahpur
to the Governor of Khoy.

On the 22nd of Mordad 1324 at 1.30 p.m. (19 August, 1945)
a Russian soldier brought a note to my house from "Councillor to the
Soviet Embassy, Mr. Yacub-off was expecting to see me within half an
hour at the Russian Commander's Headquarters. I went there at 2 o'clock
he was sitting on a chair in the courtyard and Mr. Moradian and
Mr. Seyedzadeh the assistant Consuls of Mahru, together with
Major Goujaoff, the Commander of the Russian unit in the city,
another Major and a Lieutenant were with him. He received me
with the utmost indifference, allowed me to sit down, then he
began to enquire after the conditions in the town and the year's
harvest. I replied that the harvest was not so good as last
year's and would in fact be about one third less than the latter.

He said "what assistance will the government render to the
peasants who are faced with this shortage."

I replied the peasants were not so badly off as to need
an advance and no doubt if any of them ask for assistance the
government will assist them directly or in other cases the
assistance will come from the landowners. He asked whether the
landowners oppressed the peasants, and did peasants pay the
landowners shares. I would have answered that in the circumstances
it is the peasants who refuse, but he asked for an answer from the
Commander and the latter replied that peasants have suffered
losses and are not prepared to remit landowners shares. Yacub-off
then exclaimed "You have no right to oppress peasants or to
torture them for the benefit of reactionary landowners who are the
agents of Seyed, Ziaeddin, or to collect landowners shares from
peasants". Then he reprimanded me because of the condition of
the highways and asked me why we did nothing about road repairs.
I told him that the Governor and myself had asked the roads

S/3.
Page 90.

department and our Ministry to repair the roads, he replied that Etessam too was inefficient like myself, that we who collected taxes from the people and owed it to the people to spend the money in repairing roads. I said that the matter was not as simple as all that and government instruction was necessary beforehand. He said "You are not ready to work and have only been commissioned by reactionaries to torture the people. I am no longer ready to listen to such rubbish and you should go away from here before you are publicly disgraced and are still alive. We do not need you. I know that you have been commissioned to come to this town by Jamal Emani and if you wish you may join Emani, Etessam and your brother Farahram who, on the pretext of going on leave has gone to report to Seyedzadeh. Furthermore "Emani will be unable in the coming elections to be elected from any constituency this side of Kazvin." Then in great anger he turned to the Commander of the Russian forces, in the city and said "You have no right henceforth to attend to the security of the town and the surrounding districts, let them with the twenty-eight broken and bandaged ragamuffins they have to try and maintain security and should any disturbances occur the responsibility will lie with themselves."

In conclusion he turned to me again and said threateningly "You should leave this place as soon as ever you can". I could not send a report through the post, that is why I asked Captain Pourani, who was going to Khoy and was a more trustworthy means of communication, to take this letter to you. This is quite an unofficial letter and I have not time to make a clean copy of it. I intended to start coming to you on the 23rd of this month too, but as tomorrow night which is Friday eve there will be a demonstration for the society, I deferred my journey to a later date, so that I should not supply a pretext to foul minded persons. I hope to meet you on Friday and submit a verbal report.

(Signed) The Mayor of Shahpur
Vaziri.

DECLARATION

Appendix B.
No. 62

Note from the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs to the Soviet Embassy,
Tehran.

No. 2999

Date 13 Shahrivar, 1324 (4 Sept. 1945)

The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. and with reference to discussions and correspondence of the last few days with that Embassy regarding the necessity of the despatch of 200 gendarmes to the town of Gorgan (town in the Province of Esfahan) and Shahsavari (township on the South Coast of Caspian Sea in Mazandaran), beg to state that reports received from the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs intimate that owing to the inadequacy of the number of security forces in Mazandaran and lack of freedom of action, disturbances have become widespread and irresponsible elements who had staged a strike and general holiday at Chalus (port on the Caspian Sea in Mazandaran) in order to create disturbance and opposition to the Government, have closed the telegraph offices and it is probable that they will sever the line to Tehran. These people have forced the investigating commission of the Government to leave Chalus; they themselves inspect the roads and the unruly and rebellious activities have caused great consternation among the inhabitants of Kojoor and Kalarestaq (towns South of Caspian Sea in Mazandaran).

If Government security forces are not despatched expeditiously and with freedom of action to these towns to prevent disorder and establish tranquility it is possible that events may become aggravated and the extent of disturbance and conflict between the aforesaid elements and peasants of these districts may further develop.

In accordance with other information in hand these unruly elements have organized possses from amongst themselves to go up and down streets and roads of the town of Shahi (a town in Mazandaran South of Sari) and the

offices of Posts and Telegraphs and the railways investigating whatever goes on and preventing Government authorities in carrying out their duties and in establishing law and order. As a result of this state of affairs shop-keepers have shut up shop and factories are closed down.

The Ministry of Interior in accordance with the information received from Mazandaran are convinced that the outbreak of the disorder and disturbance is solely the result of the inadequacy of the number of armed forces in the towns in question. If there had been no delay on the part of Soviet Military authorities in agreeing to despatch 200 gendarmes to these localities undoubtedly these unpleasant events would not have occurred. Even now the more the delay the greater the possibility of spread of disorder and disturbances which may bring further grave consequences.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore, request and urge the Soviet Embassy to obtain and declare the agreement of the Soviet military authorities to the despatch of reinforcements to the aforesaid localities with freedom of action, so that this unpleasant situation in the towns of Mazandaran may come to an end.

TRANSLATION

Appendix B.
No. 66.

Note from the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs to the Soviet Embassy,
Tehran.

No. 5608

Date: 4 Azar, 1324 (25 November, 1945).

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of U.S.S.R., and have the honour to state that it will be recalled that since Shahrivar 1320 (August, 1941) Soviet military authorities have completely taken over the docks of Bandar-Shar (S.E. Caspian Port of Iran and terminus of the Trans-Iranian Railway), and have totally impaired the work of the customs authorities at the aforesaid port controlling traffic of merchandise and passengers.

During the war it was considered that military exigencies necessitated such steps and the Iranian Government, in view of complete fulfilment of the Tripartite Treaty and notwithstanding the fact that they sustained losses and the normal administrative work of the customs suffered, felt constrained to assent. But now that the war has ended, it is certainly no longer necessary that the above mentioned state of affairs be continued.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, therefore, request the Soviet Embassy to issue instructions to the respective Soviet authorities to remove the obstacles, if they still exist, in the way of direct control of customs administration over traffic of merchandise and passengers, so that the administrative affairs of the customs may return to normal. Kindly inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the result of the actions taken in this respect.

TRANSLATION

Appendix B.
No. 67.

Note from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to the Embassy of the U.S.S.R.,
Tehran.

No. 2884.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. and have the honour to state that, according to information received from the Ministry of Health, on Sunday morning of 17th Kordad 1324 (8th August 1945) the Soviet Commander sent several armed soldiers and had Dr. Said, the Head of the Health Department and the Director of the Government Hospital in Shahpoor (town north-west of Azerbaijan) arrested and brought over to Soviet headquarters and detained in the stables of the Soviet headquarters where they had already successively detained Mr. Abdullah Waez-zadeh, a business man, Mr. Lutfali Azar, an employee of the Finance Department, Mr. Mohamed Moini, chief of the Police Chancery, and Mr. Ali Behnia, technical inspector of Education in Shahpoor, without any charges being preferred against him, and kept him without food until 9.15 p.m. of the same day when he was dismissed without any interrogation.

He was treated as an ordinary accused person, his pockets were searched and the contents were held and returned to him after his release.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs request the Embassy that investigations be made from Soviet military authorities concerned, and that the Ministry may be informed of the reason for occurrence of the incident. It is also requested that necessary assurances be given to the Ministry that in future such incidents would not take place.

TRANSLATION

Appendix B.
No. 68.

Note from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to the Soviet Embassy,
Tehran.

No. 5604.

Date: 28 Aban, 1324.
(19 November 1945).

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of the U.S.S.R., and with reference to their Note No. 5370, have the honour to state that the Ministry of War have reported that Mulla Mostafa Barzani, together with two thousand of his confederates, of whom about five hundred are completely armed, and own a cannon, have recently entered Iran.

As it is highly probable they may disturb law and order in the Province of Western Azerbaijan and the suburbs of Mahabad (town south of Lake Urumieh), the Ministry of War have therefore issued instructions to the Iranian Army to disarm the aforesaid person and his confederates.

In view of the reasons set forth by the Ministry of War and their obligations towards the friendly and neighbourly Government of Iraq, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs request the Embassy of the U.S.S.R., to inform the appropriate Soviet Military authorities in Provinces Three and Four not to interfere in the activities in the Iranian Army concerning the above mentioned person and his confederates in order that no misunderstandings may arise.

