




Economic Commission
for Africa

International Migration and Development: Implications for Africa





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ECA/SDD/06/01 - INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICA

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Preface

In its resolution 58/208 of 23 December 2003, the General Assembly decided to devote a high-level dialogue to international migration and development during its sixty-first session in 2006. The purpose of the dialogue is to discuss the multidimensional aspects of international migration and development in order to identify appropriate ways and means of maximizing its development benefits and minimizing its negative impacts. It is also expected to strongly focus on policy issues, including the challenge of achieving the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Accordingly, the high-level dialogue takes place on 14 and 15 September 2006 in New York at UN Headquarters.

For Africa, this meeting and the process leading up to, and following it are important since international migration plays a critical role in the continent's struggle to develop and improve welfare, peace and stability for its growing population. International migration impacts development in Africa in a wide range of ways, such as loss of human capital, remittances --- migradollars --- and skills acquisition. Also, African countries, already facing serious human resources shortage, have to learn to cope with yet another challenge: skills migration or 'brain drain'. But the goal, as this report argues, must be how to achieve a win-win situation for all ---for the migrants, their countries of origin and destination.

Therefore, during the high-level dialogue, African countries must take stock of these key issues, come up with a common position on international migration and development, and join the international community as equal partners to forge a mechanism for efficient management of international migration. This can be enhanced through Africa's active participation in the preparatory process and by accessing a wide range of information on the subject. This report was prepared to serve this purpose.

The report aims to contribute to the ongoing discussions on migration by providing background data and analysis from the African perspective. Drawing on the ongoing debate about migration and development, the report argues that maximization of the benefits for Africa requires better

management of international migration, and sound political and economic governance in the context of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

ECA hopes that as its member States continue the discussions on migration and development, they will find the information in this report useful in providing different reference points to the way forward, especially in adopting and implementing policies, programmes and strategies for meeting the 2005 World Summit Outcome goals, the MDGs, the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD-PoA) and other related frameworks.

Josue Dione
Director, Sustainable Development Division

Acknowledgement

This report was prepared under the guidance of Israel Sembajwe, leader of the Population and Social Development (PSD) team of the Sustainable Development Division (SDD), and the overall supervision of Josue Dione, Director of the Division. The professional members of the PSD team-- Bjorg Sandkjaer, Amson Sibanda, Hassan Yousif and Israel Sembajwe -- contributed to the chapters in the report, while Asfaw Yitna, the team's research assistant, and Sofanit Abebe, the team's secretary provided valuable support. SDD Intern, Tsitsi Amanda Mtetwa, did the layout and graphical illustration.

We wish to acknowledge the contributions of many colleagues within and outside the ECA who provided valuable constructive comments to the quality of the report. In particular, we wish to acknowledge Strike Mkandla, Charles Kwenin, Robert Okello, Kasirim Nwuke, Antonio Pedro, Isatou Gaye, Pancrace Niyimbona, Charles Akol, Jean Luc Mastaki, Tacko Ndiaye, Paul Belanger, Mohamed Timouli, Kampion Banda, and Semia Guermas de Tapia.

The team benefited from a great deal of encouragement from our partners in the region grappling with population and development issues. These include the African Union, the International Labour Organization, the International Organization for Migration, the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) as well as the United Nations Population Fund and its Country Support Team in Addis Ababa. To all of them we extend our gratitude.

Yinka Adeyemi, the Communication Officer of SDD, played a pivotal role in ensuring the timely production of the report by carrying out its substantive editing and overseeing the design, layout, translation and printing. In addition, we thank the entire members of the Communication Team of ECA, in particular Lorna Davidson, for their professional support in producing the report.

Any shortcomings observed in the report, however, remain the responsibility of the authors.

List of Acronyms

| | |
|----------|---|
| AIDS | Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome |
| AMU | Arab Maghreb Union |
| AU | African Union |
| CENSAD | Community of Sahel-Saharan States |
| CFA | Communauté Financière Africaine Francs |
| CHGA | Commission on HIV/AIDS and Governance in Africa |
| COMESA | Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| EAC | East African Community |
| ECCAS | Economic Community for Central African States |
| ECA | Economic Commission for Africa |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community Of West African States |
| EU | European Union |
| FDI | Foreign Direct Investment |
| GCIM | Global Commission on International Migration |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| HIV | Human Immuno-deficiency Virus |
| ICPD | International Conference on Population and Development |
| ICPD-PoA | International Conference on Population and Development Programme of Action |
| IDPs | Internally Displaced Persons |
| IGAD | Inter-Governmental Authority on Development |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| IMADAR | International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| LDCs | Least Developed Countries |
| MDGs | Millennium Development Goals |
| NEPAD | New Partnership for Africa's Development |
| NGOs | Non-Governmental Organizations |
| OAU | Organization of African Unity |
| OCHA | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| OECD | The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development |

| | |
|---------|--|
| PRSPs | Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance |
| RECs | Regional Economic Commissions |
| SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| SSA | Sub-Saharan Africa |
| TICAD | Tokyo International Conference on African Development. |
| UEMOA | West African Economic and Monetary Union |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNAIDS | Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS |
| UN/DESA | United Nations Department of Economic Development and Social Affairs |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commission for Refugees |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| WHO | World Health Organization |

Executive Summary

Migration of people across national borders and continents is crucial for peace, stability and development at the national, sub-regional and regional levels. The potential for migrants to help transform their native countries has captured the imagination of national and local authorities; international institutions and the private sector. There is an emerging consensus that countries can cooperate to create triple wins -- for migrants, for their countries of origin and for the societies that receive them.

On 14 and 15 September 2006, high-level representatives of all member States of the United Nations will gather in the General Assembly to explore the relationship between migration and development. For Africa, this meeting and the process leading up to and following it is important as international migration plays an important part in the continent's struggle to develop and improve welfare, peace and stability for its growing population.

This report, **International Migration and Development: Implications for Africa**, aims to contribute to the ongoing discussions on migration by providing background data and analysis from an African perspective. Drawing on the ongoing debate about migration and development, the report argues that maximization of the benefits requires better management of international migration, and sound political and economic governance in the context of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). The report expounds this argument in six analytical chapters covering the dimensions, and economic and social implications, impacts on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), harnessing remittances for development, and security aspects of migration. The report's final chapter charts a way forward, providing suggestions for better management of international migration in Africa.

Migration streams are larger within Africa

Migration flows within and out of Africa display a wide range of patterns, modulated by strategies to cope with factors such as economic and ecological problems, intra-regional disparities in economic well-being, political instability, and restrictive migration policies. African international migration involves a wide range of voluntary and forced cross-border movements within the continent, as well as regular and irregular migration to destinations outside the continent. Migration streams within Africa are much larger than those out of

Africa, and forced migration plays a significant part. African nations, already struggling to provide for their own populations, were harbouring about one-third (three million) of the world's refugees at the end of 2005. The first three chapters of the full report expand on African migratory patterns and their social and economic implications, particularly for attainment of the MDGs.

Depletion of Africa's human resource pool

I nternational migration impacts development in Africa in a wide range of ways such as loss of human capital, but also remittances and the acquisition of skills. A key challenge for African States who already face serious human resource shortages is skills migration or 'brain drain'. The African human resource pool is continuously depleted as the educated choose to emigrate and apply their skills abroad. In the case of the health sector, where African countries are facing increasing demand as a result of HIV/AIDS and other diseases, several countries experience a net depletion of their health work force. For example, 926 Ghanaian doctors practice in the OECD alone, representing a much-needed 29 percent of the doctors still practicing in Ghana. In Chapter 4, we examine these trends, and suggest mitigation strategies such as setting up mechanisms for compensation for lost skills.

African migrants contribute to African development through a number of channels. Diaspora remittances and the income multipliers they create are becoming critical resources for the sustenance strategies of receiving households as well as agents of local and national development. In 2004, remittances to Africa amounted to \$14 billion, with Egypt, Morocco and Nigeria being the largest recipients. Based on existing research, Chapter 5 describes how households that receive these migradollars tend to use the proceeds primarily for current consumption (food, clothing) as well as investments in MDG-related areas such as children's education, healthcare and improvement in household food security through investments in agricultural technology.

Migration and security

C hapter 6 examines how migration is closely linked to security concerns, at the individual, national, and global levels. Conflicts and violence spur population movements, while migrants can experience threats to their individual security while in transit, as well as at their points of destination. Some countries are

concerned that migrants may constitute a security threat. Importantly, unlike goods and services, the movement of people abroad involves a wide range of social issues, such as human rights, family unification and social integration, that would need to be efficiently and appropriately managed, to increase human security, ensure respect for people and human rights, and harness resources for development.

The response of African Governments to migration challenges has been very limited and fragmentary. Few countries have implemented international conventions and related policies on migration. International migration barely features in national development plans and strategies, and has not been adequately addressed in any of the regional development frameworks such as the NEPAD, MDGs, and PRSPs. However, international migration is increasingly gaining the attention of African leaders. In this regard the African Union (AU) has put in place a policy framework to stem the brain drain through the creation of employment opportunities, and to mobilize the African diaspora for the development of their countries.

In the concluding chapter of the report, we argue that the way forward should be based on sound management of international migration, which requires capacities for greater collaboration within and between countries and regions. However, in Africa, this is largely constrained by lack of data/information and knowledge on international migration and development. These are issues that would need to be addressed in order to understand the scale and dimensions of international migration and the labour market for development in Africa.

Based on available knowledge, the report proposes a range of actions and policies necessary for minimizing the harms and maximizing benefits and opportunities of international migration. Key among the recommendations is the promotion of all human rights, particularly the rights of the international migrants and their families, through ratification and implementation of the relevant international conventions, and through bi-lateral and multilateral agreements between sending and receiving countries.

Coercive policies work against peace and security

International migration involves diverse cultures. Therefore there is a need for action to bring about tolerance and coherence to nurture integration and support multiculturalism. Coercive policies in both sending and receiving countries work against peace and security at all levels, and against the maximization of the benefits of international migration. Therefore, governments will need to cooperate more to eliminate the coercive policies and to enhance the contribution of the migrants and their families to international development.

The contributions of international migration to development extend beyond economic gains to encompass cultural enrichment, social welfare, health and education, and political stability. Therefore, it is imperative that these neglected dimensions be harnessed for sustainable development. There is need for constructive engagement between countries to bring international migration more to the arena of international development cooperation.

Also, it is necessary for countries to harmonize their national policies and the roles of various ministries and agencies involved in international migration. Finally, human and institutional capacity building is important for maximizing the benefits of international migration.

Continuous investment in education and health will bring about long-term benefits that would need to be realized through the creation of employment opportunities and commensurate wages.

Way forward

In an increasingly globalized world, the way forward in managing migration for increased benefits of sending and receiving countries, and of migrants and their families may be found in:

- Promoting the ratification of international conventions and protocols and aligning national policies to such international obligations;
- Promoting advocacy and awareness creation, especially in the receiving countries and highlighting the positive contributions of migrants to sending and receiving countries;

- Emphasizing that the contribution of international migration to development touches many dimensions of development including economic advancement, social welfare and cultural enrichment, health promotion, and political stability;
- Supporting bi-literal and multi-lateral agreements between sending and receiving countries as channels of enhancing the contribution of international migration to international development;
- Promoting coherence among different national policies and increasing the capacity of all stakeholders to implement policies geared towards improvement of legal and statistical systems on international migration;
- Building human and institutional capacity for maximizing the benefits of international migration and minimizing perceived disadvantages;
- Promoting regularized consultative processes on international migration at global, regional and sub-regional levels;
- Providing improved social and economic conditions in the sending countries to minimize factors that make people leave their countries in search of self-improvement;
- Promoting international, regional and sub-regional partnerships, including those organized in the diaspora;
- Focusing investment into areas which optimize the generation of jobs for available skills; and
- Continuing the dialogue on global trade, with emphasis on complementing the notion of open markets with complete elimination of subsidies.

Chapter 1:

The Dimensions of International Migration in Africa

Introduction

Currently, nearly 191 million people or three per cent of the world's population live outside the country of their birth. In 1960, an estimated 75 million or 2.5 per cent of the world's population lived outside their country of birth (United Nations, 2006a). This increase in the flow of international migrants is affecting the composition of communities and societies in both developed and developing countries. More importantly, international migration is now a pervasive socio-economic and political phenomenon. It has become intertwined with national, global and human security (Castles and Miller, 1993). Consequently, there is renewed interest among Governments to examine how the benefits of migration can be maximized for sending, transit and receiving countries as well as for the migrants themselves, while minimizing its negative effects.

This chapter examines the scale and scope of African migration, the composition of African migrants, and why Africans migrate. In this report, an international migrant is defined as any person who lives outside his or her country of birth (United Nations, 2006b). Since policy and legal instruments increasingly circumscribe the free movement of people, the final part of the chapter provides an overview of global as well as regional and subregional policies and frameworks for the management of migration flows.

Scale and scope of African migration

Africans account for a large proportion of migrants globally, and migration is a critical issue for African development. In 2005, there were 17.1 million international migrants within Africa. Africans also migrate out of Africa. Currently, about five million Africans live in OECD countries, and Africans have migrated to other parts of the world as well. A large proportion of Africans are, therefore, migrants, and the volume of migration between African countries is far greater than the movement out of the continent altogether.

Migration flows within and out of Africa tend to display the following characteristics: internal and cross-border migration as strategies to cope with ecological and economic problems; movements towards areas of relative prosperity and stability that are triggered by intra regional disparities as characterized by the Southern Africa migration system (Zuberi and Sibanda, 2004); increased transit migration through North Africa, the gateway to Europe; increased clandestine and irregular migration as a result of restrictive immigration policies of the North, but also involving trafficking of persons from within Africa; higher international mobility of qualified and skilled persons from sub-Saharan Africa to developed countries, and increased feminization of migration (IOM, 2005).

Data sources and challenges

A major obstacle to furthering the understanding of the dimensions of international migration in Africa is the lack of adequate data (Zlotnik, 2003). In addition, there is a policy and research vacuum on the linkages between international migration and development in Africa. Analyses of the social and economic impacts of emigration require accurate and detailed data and information, which is currently not available in the great majority of the African countries. This is evidenced in the limited capacity to undertake scientific research and to formulate and implement effective international migration policies. Paucity of data, therefore, is the first step that would need to be addressed if African countries are to appropriately evaluate and situate their positions and policies in the regional and global context of international migration for development.

Censuses represent a unique opportunity to gather much-needed data, and African countries are currently preparing for the 2010 round of population and housing censuses. A critical component in the preparation process is to increase the capacities of the national statistical agencies to undertake the comprehensive


exercise that a census represents, and to ensure that questions are constructed to ensure comparable data across countries. At the February 2006 Africa Symposium on Statistical Development, 43 of the Economic Commission for Africa's member States committed to working together towards the 2010 round of population and housing censuses, supported by the ECA and other multilateral organizations.

Data and information capacities are needed not only for the purpose of analyses and policies, but also to promote and manage the international labour market for development. Unlike the movement of goods and services, the movement of people abroad involves a wide range of social issues, such as human rights, family unification and social integration, that would need to be efficiently and appropriately managed. Therefore, management of the international migration requires capacities for greater collaboration within and between countries and regions.

African migrant stock and flows

By the late 20th century, the fast population growth that most African countries had experienced, together with the protracted stagnation that had characterized most of the African economies, left few countries in need of foreign labour. Within Africa, the proportion of migrants to total population varied from 1.0 per cent in northern Africa to 2.9 per cent in western Africa. Between 1960 and 2005, Africa's migrant stock increased from about 9 million to 17.1 million (see figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1 Migrant stock, Africa and subregions (millions)



Data source: United Nations, 2006b

At the sub-regional level, the number of migrants decreased slightly between 1995 and 2005 except in western Africa, which saw an increase in the number of migrants from 6.7 million to 7.5 million (United Nations, 2006b). Much of international migration in the continent occurred and still occurs outside a regulatory framework, partly because few African countries have a well-articulated policy on international migration and even fewer seem to enforce their laws and regulations on migration rigidly. Furthermore, a very sizeable proportion of international migration in Africa is related to forced migration and particularly to the movement of refugees in search of asylum. These types of flows have been affecting a growing number of countries in the continent (Zlotnik, 2004).

Women migrants

Ninety-five million women currently reside outside their countries of origin, representing close to half of the world's international migrants (United Nations, 2006b). Between 1960 and 2005, the proportion of female migrants increased slightly from 42 per cent to over 47 per cent (Table 1.1). This is quite a significant change compared to a change from 47 to 49 per cent for the world as a whole; from 49 to 51 per cent for more developed regions; and stagnancy at 45 per cent for less developed regions.

Table 1.1. Number of female migrants: Africa and sub-regions, 1965 – 2005

| Year | Eastern Africa | Middle Africa | Nothern Africa | Southern Africa | Western Africa | Total Africa |
|------|----------------|---------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------|
| 1965 | 3,326,420 | 1,761,032 | 1,009,424 | 1,018,871 | 2,326,184 | 9,441,931 |
| 1975 | 3,422,653 | 1,811,584 | 1,031,689 | 1,049,076 | 3,699,081 | 11,014,091 |
| 1985 | 4,582,098 | 1,574,417 | 1,031,698 | 1,049,076 | 3,899,511 | 14,434,494 |
| 1995 | 5,007,638 | 2,734,063 | 2,232,302 | 1,303,522 | 6,665,783 | 17,943,307 |
| 2005 | 4,516,232 | 1,574,417 | 2,402,186 | 1,976,283 | 3,899,511 | 14,434,494 |

Source: United Nations, 2006b

The gender segregation of labour coupled with high demand for some professional categories dominated by women, such as nursing, as well as increased levels of feminized poverty and gender disparities in access to social and economic opportunities and political power have all played a key role in increasing women's share in international migration.

Female migrants, therefore, now increasingly include women who are no longer just following their husbands or fathers, but migrate independently.

A significant proportion of contemporary African female migrants are blue-collar workers (housemaids, factory workers, etc.). However, most migrant women tend to fill low-end jobs, and are extremely vulnerable to physical, psychological and sexual abuse, as well as non-payment or underpayment of wages.

Forced migration

Forced migration is an important component of international migration in Africa. Conflicts, environmental catastrophes, such as droughts and famines, have all forced people to flee their communities and countries. In 2004, Africa had more than 30 ongoing armed conflicts, mostly intra-state. However, these conflicts force people away from their homes and across borders in search of refuge. Environmental factors also force people to migrate. In sub-Saharan Africa, almost two-thirds of the population lives in ecologically vulnerable areas. Current land degradation, freshwater mismanagement, pollution, biodiversity loss and natural disaster, all force people to migrate. The poor are especially vulnerable to degradation of natural resources, as this group will have fewer resources to withstand shocks caused by environmental changes and diseases related to the state of the environment (UNEP 2002).


With the exception of southern Africa, refugee populations have constituted a significant proportion of all international migrants in most parts of Africa. The number of refugees in Africa increased from 79,000 in 1960 to 6.4 million in 1995, before dropping to 3.6 million in 2000 and 3 million in 2005 (UNDP, 2004; UNCHR, 2005, United Nations, 2006a). This represents 33 per cent of the refugees under UNHCR's mandate globally*, and with just over 14 per cent of the global population, Africa therefore still has a disproportionate share of the world's refugee population.

The geographical distribution of refugee source and destination countries has shifted over time. In the 1970s and 1980s, the bulk of the refugees originated in the eastern African region. Droughts, famines and other environment-related disasters, in combination with wars in countries such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and the Sudan, gave rise to large movements of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the region. During the 1990s, the momentum shifted towards western and central Africa, where the bulk of the present-day refugee and IDP population is found (see Figure 1.2). In 2004, five African countries (Sudan, Burundi, DR Congo, Somalia, and Liberia) were among the ten countries in the world where most refugees originated.

*Globally, there are about 9 million refugees under the mandate of UNHCR, and an additional 4 million under the mandate of UNRWA (UN 2006b).

Since most refugees flee to neighboring countries, the pressure on receiving countries is huge. For example, in 2004, Chad received 131,000 refugees from the Sudan at a time when the country is struggling to provide decent livelihoods to its own population (UNHCR, 2005).

Figure 1.2 Refugees by sub-regions in 2004 (thousands)



Source: Data from official sources in receiving countries, accessed through database available at <http://www.migrationinformation.org/GlobalData/>


Where do African migrants go to?

The significant outflows of African migrants are mainly directed towards Western Europe, but also to North America (see figure 1.3) and the Gulf States. Many were traditionally directed towards former colonial powers, which had provisions that simplified entry for nationals of former colonies. For example, Congolese would emigrate to Belgium, Senegalese to France, Nigerians to the UK, and Cape Verdeans to Portugal (IOM, 2005).

An important aspect of intra-continental movements is the flow of sub-Saharan Africans towards the Maghreb States. This trend dates back many centuries, and remains a significant feature of African population movements. Nevertheless, distance and the cost of migration have largely limited sub-Saharan African movements to the north. But this has changed rapidly since the end of the 1980's, and sub-Saharan Africa movements northwards are growing as a result of the deterioration of living conditions in parts of sub-Saharan Africa due to,

conflicts political instability and desertification, against which the Maghreb is an area of relative prosperity and stability. The increasing revenue and wealth differentials between the two regions; and restrictive immigration policies adopted by European countries in the last decade have compelled sub-Saharan Africa nationals to find illegal ways of migrating and/or alternative destinations (IOM, 2005).

Figure 1.3. Migrant stock by origin and destination (thousands)



Source: UNHCR 2006

Some of the intra-African migrant flows are the first part of what many migrants hope will become an intercontinental journey, legally or illegally. A growing number of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa transit through the Maghreb region enroute to Europe. Their struggle to reach the shores of Spain or Italy is fairly well documented, as many pay their life's savings to traffickers who promise to take them to the shores of southern Europe.

Less well documented is the flow from the Horn of Africa to the Gulf States, particularly the flows of Somalis and Ethiopians hoping to reach Yemen (Box 1.1). Between January and April 2006, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees registered more than 5,000 Ethiopians and 5,500 Somalis as new arrivals in Yemen.

These refugees pay between US\$30-50 to be ferried across in crowded vessels, risking their lives, as they are not taken all the way to firm land, but have to swim ashore in Yemen. Yemeni authorities estimate that 1,000 people drowned while attempting to cross between September 2005 and April 2006 (OCHA, 2006).

Box 1.1. Ethiopians stuck on their way to Yemen

In the first few months of 2006, the Puntland authorities (Somalia) reported between 200 and 300 Ethiopians were arriving in the town of Bossaso every day to attempt the sea voyage to Yemen. Many become stuck in Bossaso as they lack the money to pay the smugglers, who charge between US\$ 30 – 50 for the trip. As a result, up to 3,000 to 4,000 Ethiopians were living in appalling and wretched living conditions in Bossaso – unable to afford to travel onto Yemen or having changed their minds - and unable to afford to return to Ethiopia.

Source: OCHA, 2006

What motivates Africans to migrate?

The factors that motivate Africans to migrate have not changed significantly over the last few decades. A study by ECA in the late 1980s found that a very large number of skilled Africans were working in western countries at a time when their national economies were in need of their services (ECA, 1986). Among the causes identified for this brain drain were: the decline in real incomes at a time when prices were constantly rising forcing professional and salaried workers to seek employment in other countries that pay much higher salaries; lack of merit-based promotion practices; political interference; inadequate higher education facilities and opportunities; and political upheavals and general instability.

To address these factors, many actions were proposed, including: reviewing incentive systems with a view to providing realistic levels of remuneration; promoting job satisfaction and self-actualization by improving working conditions; strengthening capacities and capabilities to ensure that

production of goods and services becomes indigenized and that the development and operation of institutions emanates from within the continent; and expanding and improving education services to obviate the need for large numbers of Africans to seek educational opportunities abroad.

A number of attempts have been made to capture and explain the different motivations and processes related to a decision to migrate. However, the complex interaction between varying perceptions of push and pull factors, individual decision-making processes, and the different migration destinations, make it very difficult to create a unified theory of African migration. In other words, current patterns and trends in international migration suggest that a comprehensive understanding of what drives and sustains international migration processes cannot be adequately captured by any one theoretical perspective.

Although a large proportion of migration is clearly related to the strive for economic betterment, economic disparities are not enough to explain international movement. It seems that factors such as perceptions of the situation in the receiving country, as well as the policies and legislation that enable or complicate movement, play a very important role in shaping migratory streams. Also, these theories do not explicitly address the gender aspects of international migration, and we would suggest that more work be done to investigate whether traditional theories also help to explain the increased migration of women.

Policy frameworks for migration

Migration is currently at the center of debates between the mainly poor sending countries and the richer receiving nations. While the industrialized countries are promoting easier flows of capital, goods and services, they are at the same time restricting the movement of labour, which comes mainly from developing countries (United Nations, 2006a; Mutume, 2006). Across Western Europe, liberal immigration policies came to a halt in the 1970s. More recently, hostility towards immigrants seems to be growing again and immigration is increasingly seen as having negative consequences for the host country. Africa, which in the global context is a sending region, therefore finds that her migrants face severe restrictions in movement to North America and Europe, sometimes on the basis of unfounded cultural dilution or national security concerns. The shift towards more restrictive immigration policies is being accompanied by discrimination against immigrants, which is usually in the form of “equal pay for equal work, but unequal work” (Muller, 1997; Hammar, 1985).

Major receiving regions for African labour migrants are OECD countries and the Gulf states, where rapid economic growth and a shortage of labour creates labour markets for migrants from the northern and eastern parts of Africa in particular.

International legal frameworks on migration are designed for various objectives such as protecting the human rights of migrant workers and their families, or restricting immigration. Although immigration is helping to mitigate the effects of falling and aging populations in Western Europe, legal and policy responses to the immigration of Africans is a contentious issue even though solutions to preventing immigrants from swamping the European Union are still the responsibility of individual states. For instance, the Hague programme explicitly recognizes the need for closer cooperation between member States in the area of migration and asylum, including, among others, exchange of information and further harmonization of legislation.

Legal frameworks for female migrants

Legal frameworks for protecting the rights of female migrants are mainly provided by the Human Rights Conventions and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). These instruments afford women and men the same rights regardless of migrant status. Other relevant frameworks include the International Conference on Population and Development Programme of Action (ICPD PoA) and its review processes, international instruments for asylum seekers. ICPD also highlighted the issue of universal access to reproductive health, including for migrant communities.

With regard to trafficking in women, the Beijing Plus Five document, article 70 (b), calls upon States to 'devise, enforce and strengthen laws on all forms of trafficking in women and girls through a comprehensive anti trafficking strategy consisting of, inter alia, legislative measures, prevention campaigns, information exchange, assistance and protection for and reintegration of the victims and prosecution of all the offenders, including intermediaries'. A trafficking protocol is also in place to supplement the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime. It calls States to adopt legislative and other measures to establish criminal offences relating to trafficking, as well as pass laws to assist and protect victims of trafficking, their repatriation and for prevention measures.

Labour migration frameworks

Increasingly, governments of both sending and receiving countries are developing regulatory mechanisms to manage labour migration. These include selective recruitment policies by countries needing labour, and strong marketing and overseas employment strategies by countries supplying labour.

On the part of receiving countries, restrictive admission policies condition the character and volume of international migration. The imposition of qualitative and quantitative limits on entry creates different classes of migrants with differently selected traits who ultimately occupy different positions in the socio-economic structure of the receiving society. In general, most countries classify immigrants as legal immigrants, undocumented migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, students, trainees, business executives and 'temporary' workers. As policies become more restrictive, the costs and risks of all kinds of migration rise, and so do the odds of failure with the consequent loss of resources invested in the move.

The legal admissions policies of developed countries are highly selective, and certain personal traits such as education, skills, wealth, and family connections are also essential in assuring success, or even putting a person in a position to be a realistic candidate for entry. For many aspiring migrants who cannot meet the legal requirements, a reasonable expectation of economic improvement is therefore enough to promote movement. Given that immigration policies remain under the responsibility of individual countries, national immigration policies are thus central to explaining contemporary migration for theoretical as well as practical reasons. Border controls reduce the applicability of standard economic models by impeding the free circulation of labour as a factor of production, and consequently, preventing the development of international migration to its fullest potential (Massey et al., 1998).


Prior to the 1990s, there was little international coordination and cooperation regarding the formulation and application of national migration and asylum laws and policies. Since then, however, progress in multilateral cooperation on migration has been tremendous. Within the European Union, for example, migration and asylum matters progressively entered the agenda during the 1990s. The Schengen agreement, which includes some of the EU as well as non-EU countries, represents a new level of collaboration on border control (Lahav, 2003; Koslowski, 2004)

The African response to migration

The response of African Governments to international migration has been limited, as is reflected in the limited adoption of migration policies and the convention on migrant workers (Zlotnik, 2003). Also, while critically important, migration as a multi-sectoral issue barely features in national development strategies, and has not been adequately addressed or mainstreamed in the various development frameworks prescribed for Africa such as the MDGs, PRSPs, or TICAD (IOM, 2005).


One reason for the lack of migration policies could be that African governments regard the immigration levels as satisfactory in all the sub-regions of the continent. Data collected by the UN Population Division show that the proportion of governments that regarded immigration levels as satisfactory actually increased between 1990 and 2000. The exception is the Southern African sub-region, where, during the same decade, progressively fewer countries regarded the immigration levels as satisfactory (see Figure 1.4). Consequently, countries taking a position of no intervention on immigration were in the majority (see Figure 1.5) (Sembajwe, 2005).

Figure 1.4. *Percentage of African Governments viewing migration as satisfactory, 1990 and 2000*



But for Southern Africa, where countries are on the whole experiencing political transformation, stability and steady economic progress (especially in the case of South Africa), about one-third of countries adopted policies to reduce immigration. Northern Africa was one other sub-region enjoying almost the same political and economic conditions as Southern Africa. It is, therefore, not surprising that it was the only other sub-region where countries decided to take action on immigration (Sembajwe, 2005).

Figure 1.5. Percentage of African Governments with a policy of no intervention on immigration, 1990 and 2000



International migration frameworks and their status in Africa

A plethora of agreements, commitment, conventions and declarations guide international migration. Recently, in the UN Millennium Declaration, (Section V. Human rights, democracy and good governance), UN member States resolved “to take measures to ensure respect for and protection of the human rights of migrants, migrant workers and their families, to eliminate the increasing acts of racism and xenophobia in many societies and to promote greater harmony and tolerance in all societies.”

All human rights instruments also apply to migrants. In addition, there are instruments that particularly focus on migrants’ rights. In the case of honoring international instruments on migration, older instruments, naturally, have more signatories than younger ones.

For example, for Africa, 48 countries are parties to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees; one country is party only to the Convention, and one country is party to only the Protocol (see Annex 1 and sub-regional breakdown in table 1.2).

Table 1.2. Parties to United Nations instruments on migration, Africa and sub-regions (number of countries that have ratified)

| Instrument | Africa | Eastern Africa | Middle Africa | North Africa | Southern Africa | West Africa |
|--|--------|----------------|---------------|--------------|-----------------|-------------|
| 1951 Convention relating to the status of Refugees | 48 | 14 | 9 | 5 | 5 | 15 |
| 1967 Protocol relating to the status of Refugees | 48 | 13 | 9 | 5 | 5 | 16 |
| 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families | 13 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 6 |
| 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children | 31 | 8 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 11 |
| 2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air | 27 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 9 |

Only 13 countries were parties to the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and their Families; while 31 countries have ratified the 2000 Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children; and 27 countries have ratified the 2000 Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air, with the Northern African region having the highest percentage of countries ratifying these instruments.

In the 2003 ECA Survey to review the implementation of the 1994 ICPD PoA, it was revealed that less than 50 per cent of the governments in the region (21 out of 43 responding countries) had taken measures or adopted strategies including changes in legislation to facilitate the reintegration of returning nationals in their communities and development activities (ECA, 2004). In addition, less than one third of the governments (12 out of 43 countries) had ratified the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families at the time of the survey.

What is encouraging, however, is that more countries in the region have started the process of taking international migration seriously in their policies and programmes. This is strengthened by the initial steps being taken to discuss migration within the ambit of the regional economic communities (RECs), as well as moving “Towards the Establishment of a Strategic Framework for a Policy of Migration in Africa” (ECA, 2004).

Regional and sub-regional migration frameworks

In its Preamble, the new Constitution of the African Union recognizes the role of migrants, who are considered to be an integral part of national human resources, regardless of their place of residence (IOM, 2005). The former OAU and the present African Union have made several decisions that directly or indirectly relate to migration. These include policies and frameworks to minimise push factors by furthering African development, including through employment creation, conflict prevention and mitigation. AU member States are also encouraged to stem ‘brain drain’. Drawing on these decisions, the AU developed a Strategic Framework for a Policy on Migration in Africa in 2004.

The Strategic Framework states that “well-managed migration has the potential to yield significant benefits to origin and destination States. For instance labour migration has played an important role in filling labour needs in agriculture, construction and other sectors, thus contributing to economic development of many destination countries in Africa. Conversely, the beneficial feedback effects of migration such as remittances, knowledge and skills transfers, and return migration have in some cases made major contributions to economies of origin countries. However, mismanaged or unmanaged migration can have serious negative consequences for States’ and migrants’ well-being, including potential destabilising effects on national and regional security.” (AU, 2004:3-4).

The Strategic Framework further notes: “progressively, migration in Africa is increasingly being recognized as an engine for regional corporation and integration as well as socio-economic development of the Continent. Therefore, it is fundamental that African states elaborate conjunctively objective migration policies to better deal with this phenomenon and prevent the negative effects associated with migration, such as the exodus of skilled labour. Policies for socio-economic development need to be implemented but now in a broader context – regional and continental- and not only national level, with the participation of stakeholders (civil society, privates sector, migrant associations, etc.)” (AU, 2004:4).

The Strategic Framework covers a wide range of themes on labour migration, border management, irregular migration, forced displacement, human rights of migrants, internal migration, migration data, migration and development, interstate cooperation and partnership, and other policy considerations relating to health, environment, trade, gender and children. Under each of these sub-themes, the Strategic Framework proposes a consolidated set of actions to be undertaken by governments.

For example, on the theme of migration and development it proposes actions relating to the African Diaspora, the brain drain and remittances. It encourages international organizations to foster relationships between African countries and the African Diaspora to create an enabling environment for the participation of the emigrants in the development of their home countries. In this regard, the vision of the AU calls for mobilization of the African Diaspora for the development of the continent, particularly the technical skills, resources and expertise of the Diaspora.

Recognizing the detrimental effects of the brain drain on the economies and societies in Africa, the Strategic Framework calls on the countries to take actions to counter and mitigate the brain drain effects through, for example, providing gainful employment and educational opportunities. Africa's full development requires human capital that would have to be developed and retained. Therefore, "the immigration issue and the question of retention of African human resources on the continent will continue to claim the attention of the African Union".

The Strategic Framework also calls on countries to establish labour exchanges to facilitate the employment of skilled labour of one member State in other member States, harmonize labour migration policies, and adopt employment policies that allow for free movement of people, particularly through protocols to be implemented by the Regional Economic Commissions. Allowing for regional circulation of skilled labour, such policies will mitigate against the negative impacts of the brain drain.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)

NEPAD, which is underwritten by Heads of State, illustrates the ability of governments to come up with innovative, combined solutions for the development of the continent, including better use of migrants' know-how as a means of enhancing national human resources. This applies especially to the revival and improvement of social sectors like health and education, but also other areas such as conflict resolution and border control (IOM 2005).

While NEPAD does not have an explicit action plan on migration, the action plans to improve education and health both incorporate the need to stem 'brain drain' by promoting measures such as 'ethical recruitment' by receiving countries, and the need to harness the human and financial resources represented in the Diaspora for African development. NEPAD therefore makes important linkages between the resources of migrants and African development.

A general framework for progress is thus in place, aimed at sound economic and social governance, and the Diaspora has a role to play in its implementation, by making their know-how available and by contributing a proportion of their repatriated funds to development projects.

Regional Economic Communities

Among the Regional Economic Communities (RECs, see Box 1.2) the new awareness of the need to discuss migration has already led to formal and informal dialogues, involving member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Several cooperation agreements already concluded are facilitating information exchange, joint training programmes and political consultations. Regional cooperation on migration can, in combination with other actions, contribute to the return of peace and stability in areas of unrest, as shown by several cases within ECOWAS. This system of exchange and dialogue is now being applied, at different stages, among all the Regional Economic Communities of the continent (COMESA, EAC, IGAD, SADC, ECOWAS) as well as among member countries of the CENSAD and AMU (IOM, 2005).

Box 1.2. The role of the Regional Economic Communities

Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are key to facilitating cooperation on labour mobility at the intra-regional level. Regional protocols on free movement of persons have made some progress in the ECOWAS and EAC communities. In the Southern African Development Community (SADC), however, member states have formulated and ratified several protocols but made little progress in developing appropriate policies and legislation. The reservations in SADC about free movement are illustrative of a dilemma faced by most governments: that more liberal policies could result in a one-way flow to countries with a stronger economy, whereas more restrictive policies could, in turn, lead to an increase in irregular migration. Labour migration is likely to increase as the regional economic communities move towards further integration, and it is important that RECs address the issue in that context, as this requires harmonization of national and regional migration policies.

This can contribute to socio-economic development by maximizing migration benefits in both sending and receiving countries, and enhancing the free movement of people as agreed in the Abuja treaty establishing the African Economic Community. (IOM 2005, p. 41).

Some measures to promote labour mobility and free movement of people between countries have also been undertaken by some of the RECs. COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, SADC and UEMOA have protocols and treaties that address the free movement of people and the right of residence between their member countries. However, cooperation between countries and economic communities on free mobility of labour has been obstructed by security considerations, lack of employment opportunities and competition for limited job opportunities.

Conclusions and policy implications

The foregoing analysis has highlighted the paucity of data and the importance of a solid empirical basis for policy development. African countries are currently preparing to undertake the 2010 round of Population and Housing Censuses, and it will be important to ensure that this unique opportunity for relevant data collection is fully utilized. African countries are already organized to harmonize approaches, and as the 2006 Africa Symposium on Statistical Development identified, at this stage, capacity building is crucial. The capacity building carried out by countries with the support of the ECA and other multilateral partners, should focus on (i) the capacity of national statistical agencies, (ii) ensuring that future skills are available through appropriate undergraduate and graduate university programmes, and (iii) increasing the broad public awareness and understanding of the role and importance of data and statistics in society.

Currently, a number of legal frameworks guide African migration policy. To a large extent, African countries have ratified international legal frameworks at the global, regional and subregional level. However, more can be done to increase the capacity to implement the ratified instruments, as well as the capacity to draw up harmonized and relevant migration policies that also take into account women, children and forced migrants.

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Chapter 2:

Economic and Social Implications of International Migration and Development in Africa

Introduction

The movement of people across national borders and continents is crucial for peace, stability and development at the country, regional and global levels. International migration and development are intertwined. In Africa, they involve a wide range of voluntary and forced cross border movements within the continent, as well as regular and irregular migration to destinations outside the continent, such as the United States of America, western Europe and the Gulf States. Although international migration in Africa involves all categories of people, skilled and unskilled, men and women, usually the young and well educated have the highest propensity to move elsewhere. Undoubtedly, these diversities of international movements arise from several interrelated factors and will therefore variably impact on development in Africa. They are often provoked by conflict, economic and political instabilities, income inequality and maldistribution of wealth, inappropriate exploitation of natural resources, among other complex factors. Indeed, Africa has witnessed various forms of voluntary and forced international population movements, making the economic and social consequences extremely complex to analyze.

This chapter identifies some of the complex social and economic impacts of international migration on development in Africa. The focus is on the impacts of the movement of skilled and unskilled people, across borders in Africa and to other parts of the world, on social and economic development in the continent.

The great majority of African countries face severe human capital problems. Particularly, the stock of skills in specializations such as medicine, nursing, engineering, information technology, mining, is limited. Given this state of affairs, it is pertinent to understand where Africa stands to gain or lose from different international migration regimes.

International competition for human capital

Globalization and escalating demand for human capital at the country, regional and global levels characterize the modern era. Indeed, the continuously increasing demand for human capital, in spite of security restrictions relating to the war on terror, will greatly influence the economic and social conditions worldwide. One factor underlying the trends in global human capital flows is that a large proportion of the demand for labour in the developed countries will have to be met from developing countries' labour resources (GCIM, 2005). The reasons are firmly based on the labour market conditions and on the aging populations of the developed countries. The demand for international human capital in the industrialized countries is greatly influenced by increasing local demand for skilled and unskilled labour, as well as by the expansion of business and corporate activities across countries and continents.

On the demographic side, below-replacement fertility and rapidly ageing populations are typical characteristics of most of the industrialized countries. Escalating demand for health care workers in the health sector has led to increased demand for workers who provide care to the aging populations of western societies. The taxed earnings of these health care workers are also helping pay for pensions and health care costs of the domestic population. However, attracting foreign labour to meet these high demands might be a temporary solution to the long-term costs of rapidly ageing populations because of the possibility of return migration whenever conditions in the home country improve. In addition, the immigrants themselves will be entitled to such benefits as they move upward the age scale (Kapur and McHale, 2005).

The global competition for human capital is greatly influenced by the developed countries' immigration policies, which focus primarily on attracting skilled labourers. Their policies are skills' selective, deliberately targeting well educated and experienced human capital in fields such as science, engineering, economics, research, health and medicine, biotechnology and information technology (Docquier and Marfouk, 2004; Kapur and McHale, 2005).

The policies are often supported by an attractive employment package, in addition to a good working environment. Though not unlimited, the response to this high demand is often positive and greatly facilitated by low wages and poor work environment in the sending countries.

In the global competition for human capital, where does Africa fit? Generally the literature projects Africa as a source of skilled and unskilled labour. It is true that the continent's share in the global demand for human capital is low, because Africa has not yet experienced structural economic transformation. However, the continent is rapidly urbanizing and witnessing greater regional integration. Growing at an annual rate of about 4.5 percent, urbanization will add more value and importance to the issue of international migration and development in Africa. It will heighten the needs for services such as water, sanitation, housing and shelter, consequently leading to greater demand for investment in the social and physical infrastructure (Yousif 2005). Therefore, rapid urbanization will increase the demand for labour, the majority of which will have to come from the rural areas as well as from neighboring countries. Investment opportunities in social and physical infrastructure will consequently heighten the demand for skilled and unskilled labour. These and other factors will increase pressure on labour markets, and, thereby, lead to more movement of labour between African countries.

In the area of regional integration, the continent is witnessing increasing cooperation on trade, services and infrastructure. ECA defines regional integration as a framework through which obstacles to trade liberalization, markets, and the free movements of people are alleviated (ECA 2004, 2005). Africa embraces the pillars of regional integration in the charter of the African Union, and seeks their implementation through the Regional Economic Commissions (RECS) such as SADC, UEMOA, ECOWAS and COMESA, and through the NEPAD initiatives. The free movement of people and skilled labour, and the right of residence and establishment are enshrined in the Abuja Treaty, and the treaties of the RECS, with the aim of achieving them in phases.

Social and economic impacts of emigration

Little is known on the socio-economic impacts of international migration, in contrast to the wealth of knowledge, information and analyses of the flow of goods and services across countries and continents. Movement of people across borders impose economic and social consequences on the emigrants as well as to the people and members of family left behind. With regard to the consequences, the literature is overwhelmingly biased towards the skilled labour migrants, neglecting the low and medium skilled labourers.

Also, overall impacts on development and the economy receive more attention than impacts on specific sectors of the economy such as agriculture, health and education.

For Africa, data and knowledge on this subject are improving. The most well known body of knowledge is available in the brain drain literature, which generally places Africa at the losing end on the international migration and development stage (Kaba, 2004). The global demand and competition for human capital will affect development in poor countries through four channels:

- **Prospect channel**, meaning the ways through which emigration “alters the level and form of human, social and financial capital accumulated by a forward-looking individual”;
- **Absence channel**, referring to the ways in which human capital flight “affects the domestic factor markets and institutions at home”, particularly “missing institutions builders” is a high cost that is often neglected;
- **Diaspora channel**, referring to the impacts of “emigrants on the home economy from afar.” Such impacts include trade, investment, remittances, knowledge, reducing international barriers to business, trade and networking, etc.; and
- **Return Channel**, referring to the impacts of “emigrants returning with augmented skills, social networks, and wealth, now better equipped to contribute to their home economy than if they had never left” (Kapur and McHale, 2005:7).

The brain drain literature draws attention to the potential harm that can be done to a poor country’s development when its scarce talent and skilled resources are continuously depleted through international migration. The impacts of skilled emigration on the African economies are felt in the area of reduced gross domestic product, particularly if the emigrants’ contribution to the economy is high and if government financed their education and training. Empirical evidence to document the negative impact of emigration on the GDP is rare.

The impact of emigration on development is visible at the sector level where the loss of skilled human capital is more felt. For example, in the health sector emigration of doctors and nurses often causes severe shortages, straining the already overstretched health services.

However, the classical argument on the negative consequences of the brain drain has been reformulated in the context of endogenous growth and human capital formation (Docquier and Marfouk 2004). Part of the losses caused by the brain drain can be offset by some positive prospects in fostering human capital formation either to fill the domestic high demand for skills or as investment in human capital in anticipation of higher returns abroad. The literature is replete with studies on a wide range of positive feedback effects in the form of remittances, acquisition of knowledge and skills, as well as formation of trade and business networks (Adams, 2003; Dos Santo and Postel-Vinay, 2003; Mesnard and Ravallion, 2001).

The argument on human capital formation is particularly intriguing. It is based on a preposition that if the return to education is higher abroad than at home, emigration will increase the expected return to human capital thereby enhancing domestic enrollment in education. Therefore, emigration of skilled labour will contribute positively to the growth of the economies, by fostering internal human capital formation. In Africa's context, this argument means that emigration of skilled labourers is expected to induce investment in human capital formation as a response strategy for higher returns to education abroad than at home. However, investment in human capital development in Africa is much below the level of meeting local demand. For example, enrollment rates in tertiary and high level education in Africa, which is necessary for providing teachers, nurses, doctors, engineers, social scientists, civil servants, lawyers, etc. is the lowest worldwide. In sub-Saharan Africa the tertiary enrollment rate was 1 percent in 1965 and stood at only 5 percent in 2003/2004.

Moreover, the literature points to the very low investment in higher education in Africa, and the linkage to the brain drain. For example, Kubler (2005) contends that the higher education sector in many African countries does not meet the sizeable and increasing demand for vocational and higher training. "This trend not only perpetuates deficits in human capital but also means many of the best students, and those most able to invest financially in their education, are lost to institutions in the North. ... Higher education in Africa has an image problem born out of years of decline, lack of resources and lack of investment which needs to be challenged head on if the flow of the most able students and academics from the continent is to be curtailed." (Kubler, 2005: 12).

Empirical Evidence

Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show emigration rates in 1990 and 2000 from Africa to the OECD countries. Each rate is derived by dividing the number of emigrants at each level of education by the number of people with the same level of education at home, including the emigrants themselves. For lack of information and appropriate definition, the education attainment of the emigrant is considered a good proxy for his/her level of skill: low, medium or high. It is important to note that the rates are for emigrants 25 years and older, residing in the OECD countries in 1990 and 2000. African emigrants to the USA and the Gulf States, and emigration within Africa are not included in the calculation of these rates.

The overall emigration rates for Northern Africa are the highest in the continent primarily because of its proximity to Europe. No wonder that in 1990 the rate for Northern Africa (2.4 percent) is higher than for the other sub-regions combined. And in 2000, the overall emigration rate increased by 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points in Southern, Eastern, Western and Central Africa, in contrast to only 0.1 percentage point in Northern Africa.

Migration trends from Africa to OECD countries have increased during the 1990's, as Table 2.1 shows. However, the magnitude and trend are much more pronounced among highly skilled African emigrants. Particularly, Western Africa showed a significant increase of 6 percentage points, followed by Central Africa (3.5 percentage points) and Eastern Africa (2.9 percentage points). For Northern and Southern Africa sub-regions, the rates are much lower and slightly declined during the 1990-2000 period. These are in contrast to the very low and almost constant emigration rates among the unskilled and medium skilled workers (see Table 2.1).

There is evidence indicating that the loss of skilled labour in Africa is much higher now than it was three to four decades ago. For example, Haque and Jahangir (1999) indicate that the number of highly skilled emigrants from Africa increased from an average of 1,800 a year during 1960-75 to 4,400 during 1975-84, and 23,000 during 1984-87. Docquier and Marfouk (2005) indicated an annual number of 50,000 skilled emigrants from Africa each year during 1990-2000. These increasing numbers of skilled emigrants from Africa are partly due to the working conditions in their home countries. Not only is the remuneration package not commensurate with their qualifications, but also the work conditions are not conducive to their experiences and skills level. Many other factors, including conflict and political unrest, push the skilled out of their countries. Their propensity to move is further supported by their knowledge and accessibility to information.

Table 2.1. Emigration rates of African nationals (25+ years old) to OECD countries

| | 1990 | | | | 2000 | | | |
|-----------------|----------------|--------|------|-----|----------------|--------|------|-----|
| | Level of skill | | | | Level of skill | | | |
| | Low | Medium | High | All | Low | Medium | High | All |
| Western Africa | 0.3 | 1.1 | 20.7 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 2.8 | 26.7 | 0.8 |
| Eastern Africa | 0.2 | 1.0 | 15.5 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 1.6 | 18.4 | 0.6 |
| Central Africa | 0.5 | 1.0 | 9.8 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 1.3 | 13.3 | 0.8 |
| Northern Africa | 2.2 | 1.8 | 6.8 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 1.5 | 6.2 | 2.5 |
| Southern Africa | 0.1 | 0.5 | 6.9 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 5.3 | 0.9 |

Low skilled = primary education 0-8 years of schooling

Medium skilled = Secondary education 9-12 years of schooling

High skilled = Tertiary education 13+ years of schooling

Source: Extracted from Docquier and Marfouk (2004).

In addition to the sub-regional variations in emigration rates, the results in Table 2.1 clearly reflect skill selectivity of the emigrants. The emigration rates are consistently higher for the highly skilled than for the medium and low skilled workers in all of the countries and for years 1990 and 2000 (see Table 2.2). Worldwide, the emigration rates of skilled workers averaged 4.72 per cent in 1990 and 5.47 per cent in 2000. Forty-five African countries in 1990 and 53 in 2000 exceeded these world averages. These high and increasing rates reflect rapid depletion of the scarce stock of skilled human capital in Africa. The impact is more pronounced in countries like The Gambia, Madagascar, Cape Verde, Somalia and Seychelles where the emigration rates are above 50percent. The same is true for African emigrants to the USA. For example, the 2000 USA census gives a total of 109,160 Nigerian immigrants aged 25 years and above. Of these 83 percent were highly educated. Egypt, Morocco, The Sudan and Tunisia have similar high percentages. Hence, Africa is losing its best and brightest to other parts of the world.

The emigration rates for medium skilled workers also increased in 35 countries. Nine countries had emigration rates of 2.2 per cent and above in 1990 and by 2000, the number of these countries had increased to 20. Similarly, the rates for low skilled workers increased in 27 countries, and the number of countries with emigration rates of 2.2 per cent and above increased slightly from 9 per cent to 10 per cent during the 1990-2000 period.

Table 2.2. *Emigration rates of African nationals (25+ years old) to OECD countries by level of skill and country of birth*

| Country | 1990 | | | | 2000 | | | |
|-------------------|----------------|--------|------|------|----------------|--------|------|------|
| | Level of skill | | | | Level of skill | | | |
| | Low | Medium | High | All | Low | Medium | High | All |
| Cape Verde | 20.1 | 55.9 | 54.4 | 23.8 | 14.7 | 60.9 | 69.1 | 23.5 |
| Gambia | 1 | 0.9 | 76 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 7.8 | 64.7 | 3.1 |
| Somalia | 11.4 | 10.8 | 48.9 | 14.2 | 9.7 | 10 | 58.6 | 14.6 |
| Seychelles | 11.4 | 0.8 | 48.9 | 14.2 | 9.7 | 10 | 58.6 | 14.6 |
| Mauritius | 3.8 | 4.3 | 37.2 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5 | 48 | 7.2 |
| Ghana | 0.8 | 0.9 | 33.7 | 1.2 | 0.7 | 2.2 | 42.9 | 1.9 |
| Mozambique | 0.8 | 1.1 | 18.2 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 5.8 | 42 | 0.9 |
| Sierra Leone | 0.1 | 1.9 | 31 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 5.3 | 41 | 1.4 |
| Liberia | 0.1 | 2.2 | 27.7 | 1.1 | 0.4 | 7.4 | 37.4 | 26 |
| Nigeria | 0 | 1.6 | 34.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 3.7 | 36.1 | 0.4 |
| Madagascar | 0.1 | 3.1 | 55.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 1.8 | 36 | 0.2 |
| Sao Tome | 6.6 | 0.7 | 4.3 | 0.2 | 2.9 | 6.4 | 34.1 | 4.1 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 0.1 | 0.7 | 4.3 | 0.2 | 2.9 | 6.4 | 34.1 | 4.1 |
| Guinea - Bissau | 0.8 | 0.6 | 5.9 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 9.3 | 29.4 | 1.8 |
| Kenya | 0.1 | 0.8 | 26.9 | 0.5 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 26.3 | 0.7 |
| Senegal | 1.4 | 2.2 | 11.1 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 5.9 | 24.1 | 2.6 |
| Mauritania | 0.6 | 0.2 | 3.5 | 0.6 | 1 | 3.9 | 23.1 | 1.4 |
| Uganda | 0.1 | 0.4 | 29.9 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 1.2 | 21.6 | 0.5 |
| Burundi | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 2 | 19.9 | 0.3 |
| Gabon | 0.2 | 1.3 | 21.2 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 1.1 | 19.3 | 0.8 |
| Congo | 0.6 | 0.6 | 11.7 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 2.1 | 19.1 | 2.6 |
| Rwanda | 0 | 1.7 | 9.4 | 0.1 | 0 | 2.1 | 19 | 0.2 |
| Djibouti | 0.2 | 0.9 | 9.4 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 1.3 | 17.8 | 0.5 |
| Ethiopia | 0.2 | 1.1 | 13.9 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 2.8 | 17 | 0.5 |
| Tanzania | 0.1 | 0.8 | 14.8 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 1 | 15.8 | 0.3 |
| Cameroon | 0.2 | 1.1 | 15.2 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 1.4 | 14.6 | 0.7 |

| Country | 1990 | | | | 2000 | | | |
|----------------|----------------|--------|------|-----|----------------|--------|------|-----|
| | Level of skill | | | | Level of skill | | | |
| | Low | Medium | High | All | Low | Medium | High | All |
| Comoros | 0.8 | 1.4 | 6.4 | 1 | 1.9 | 2.6 | 14.5 | 2.2 |
| Togo | 0.3 | 0.6 | 8.9 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 2.3 | 13.6 | 1 |
| Mali | 0.7 | 0.6 | 6.6 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 1.7 | 11.5 | 0.7 |
| Guinea | 0.2 | 0.2 | 5.1 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 11.1 | 0.5 |
| Morocco | 6.1 | 3.7 | 9.3 | 6 | 7.8 | 3.8 | 10.3 | 7.1 |
| Zambia | 0 | 0.3 | 12.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 10 | 0.3 |
| Tunisia | 4.6 | 3.4 | 12.3 | 4.7 | 4.2 | 3 | 9.6 | 4.3 |
| Malawi | 0 | 0.3 | 7.5 | 0.1 | 1 | 0.8 | 9.4 | 0.1 |
| DRC | 0.1 | 1.1 | 8.3 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 7.9 | 0.3 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 0.2 | 1.2 | 6.1 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 1.8 | 7.8 | 0.6 |
| Zimbabwe | 0.1 | 0.4 | 5.1 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.7 | 7.6 | 0.8 |
| Benin | 0.1 | 0.4 | 6.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 7.5 | 0.3 |
| Chad | 0 | 1 | 8.7 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.8 | 6.9 | 0.1 |
| Angola | 2.8 | 1.3 | 7.1 | 2.7 | 3.6 | 1.3 | 6.5 | 2.7 |
| Algeria | 4.5 | 1.8 | 6.7 | 4.4 | 3.6 | 1.3 | 6.5 | 3.3 |
| Niger | 0 | 0.6 | 8.3 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.5 | 6.1 | 0.1 |
| Swaziland | 0.1 | 0.3 | 3.6 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 5.8 | 0.5 |
| Sudan | 0 | 0.4 | 5 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 5.6 | 0.2 |
| South Africa | 0.2 | 0.5 | 7.2 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 5.4 | 1 |
| Central Africa | 0.1 | 0.5 | 4.4 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 4.7 | 0.2 |
| Egypt | 0.2 | 1 | 5.3 | 0.7 | 0.2 | 0.7 | 4.2 | 0.8 |
| Libyan Arab | 0.3 | 1.7 | 13.9 | 0.9 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 3.8 | 0.9 |
| Namibia | 0 | 0.1 | 2.9 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 3.4 | 0.3 |
| Burkina Faso | 0.1 | 0.1 | 2.6 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 3.3 | 0.2 |
| Lesotho | 0 | 0.1 | 6.2 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.1 | 2.4 | 0 |
| Botswana | 0 | 0.1 | 1.7 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.8 | 2.1 | 0.3 |

Source: Docquier and Marfouk (2004).

Impacts on the sectors of the economy

The social and economic impacts of emigration within Africa and abroad are most obvious at the sector level. The most well-documented impact patterns are (a) emigration of skilled workers impacting primarily the social services sectors such as health and education, and (b) emigration of unskilled workers impacting the production sectors, particularly mining and agriculture sectors.

For many countries in Africa the emigration of skilled and well-educated professionals impacted variably on the sectors of the economy. The departure of professionals, such as medical doctors and nurses, engineers and university professors created critical skills' gaps and adversely impact the quality and delivery of vital services to the public. Also, the departure of such professionals increases the pressure on those left behind. Such adverse impacts have been highlighted in the report of the GCIM: "In many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the departure of essential workers has seriously impeded the delivery of health services to local populations, especially those living in remote rural areas. If this trend continues unabated it is likely to undermine the progress that has to be made in achieving the health related objectives of the Millennium Development Goals." (GCIM, 2005:24).

The impacts on the health sector can be illustrated by some specific examples. Zimbabwe and Zambia have both experienced high exodus of health professionals, with serious implications for delivery of health services (see Boxes 2.1 and 2.2). Studies undertaken under the auspices of The Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) indicate massive exodus of medical professionals (Tevera and Jonathan, 2003; Chikanda, 2005). In addition to the repercussions of the political situation, dissatisfaction with the economic and living conditions are among the most important forces driving out medical professionals and others from Zimbabwe. The effects of this trend are manifested in increasing pressure on those left behind, with the pressure at maximum in the public health sector and in areas with lower level of development (see Box 2.1). Also, they are manifested in falling standards of health care emanating from increasing workload, pressure, stress, etc.

Box 2.1 Exodus of medical professional from Zimbabwe

“Zimbabwe has been experiencing a significant brain drain of doctors and nurses with two dimensions. First, within the country, health professionals have been moving from the public to the private sector. Symptomatic of the growing staffing crisis in Zimbabwe’s health sector is the fact that the public health system only had 28.7 percent of the required number of doctors in the late 1990s. Dentists, pharmacist and even nurses were also in short supply. Of the 1,634 doctors registered in the country in 1997, only 551 (33.7 percent) were employed in the public sector. As many as 67 percent of the public sector nurses are considering moving to the private sector”.

“Second. . . there has been an accelerating movement of professionals out of the country primarily to the United Kingdom, South Africa and Botswana. Some professionals use the private sector as a stepping stone between public and sector and leaving the country”.

“The exact numbers and whereabouts of Zimbabwean health professionals working overseas is unknown but the Health Minister noted in 2000 that Zimbabwe was losing an average of 20 percent of its health care professionals every year to emigration and that each of the country’s five main hospitals was losing 24 senior nurses and three doctors every month. He also claimed that 100 doctors and 18,000 nurses had left since 1998. In 2002, in the United Kingdom alone, 2,346 work permits were issued to nurses from Zimbabwe.”

Source : Chikanda, A..2005 :1.

Box 2.2 Emigration of medical staff from Zambia

“Our goal is to have 1,260 doctors, 16,000 nurses, 2,600 clinical officers and 3,000 paramedics. Our current status is 600 doctors, 8,000 nurses, 1,000 clinical officers and 1,500 paramedics. We can not guarantee quality health care to our people unless we get the numbers to inspire health professionals right” President Levy Patrick Mwanawasa SC, The Post, No. 3213, 4th August 2005.

“In 2003, former Minister of Health Dr. Brian Chituwo said that 2,000 Zambian nurses were in the UK, crippling the health delivery services at the University Teaching Hospital. The number of nurses who had gone abroad was enough to run the hospital!” Sunday Times of Zambia, 14th August 2005

“A critical shortage of medical staff in Zambia is compromising the quality of public healthcare as doctors and nurses continue to leave the country in search of more lucrative employment. Zambia has about 10,000 registered nurses for a population of around 10 million, according to statistics released by the health ministry in 2004. Poor working conditions and meager salaries are seen as the main push factors behind the country’s medical brain drain.”

Source: IRIN Africa News, Lusaka, 7th June 2005

The experience of these two countries reflects the far-reaching impacts of emigration as reflected in quantitative and qualitative inequalities in the delivery of health services. Did the countries take any policy actions to stem the emigration of their skilled professionals? Zimbabwe offers some good answers to this question. The government adopted a wide range of coercive measures “including compulsory national service and bonding” (Tevera and Jonathan, 2003:3). However, such measures, as Tevera and Jonathan cautioned, “will not work and that the best way to curb the high rates of skilled labour migration lies in addressing the economic fundamentals of the country which will ultimately improve living standards.” (Tevera and Jonathan, 2003:3). To address the loss of medical professionals from the SADC region, a new protocol came into effect in 2006 barring other SADC member State from “disadvantaging” another by “luring health professionals using economic superiority”. However, this protocol has been criticized for seeking to tie health professionals to unprofitable employment in their home countries in the name of stemming intra-regional brain drain.

Social and economic impacts of remittances

Remittances provide a good tool for studying and understanding the social and economic impacts of migration. However, such an exercise requires detailed data on the sources of remittances and their use in the receiving countries, as well as information on the formal and information channels through which the remittances are transmitted. A more detailed discussion of the linkages between remittances and social and economic development is the focus of Chapter 3.

Impacts on institutional capacities

Establishment and development of institutional and physical infrastructure, such as public and private hospitals, schools, factories, farms, etc., is important for development. The efficiency of institutions can be judged through their role and capacity to manage the development process, including the resources and execution of projects; the capacity to deliver services, products and income to the people; the capacity to develop and sustain human capital; and the capacity to build and develop knowledge and information. Emigration variably impacts on all these four facets of institutions. Skilled workers are institution builders, and their absence is a major deterrent to institutional capacity building in their home countries. Emigration of skilled workers heightens the local competition for the few ones left behind. In such a situation of scarce internal human capital,

the public sector is likely to lose to private business and informal sector activities since the public sector generally offers less competitive wages and holds limited future prospects for human capital development. Also pensions provided by public service are lower than those offered by the private sector.

Conclusions and policy implications

The foregoing analyses show that emigration impacts development in Africa in complex ways. Hence, African countries need to adopt policies and strategies to mitigate the social and economic impacts of emigration on the sectors of the economy. If African countries are to maximize the gains from international migration, they would have to invest heavily and continuously in human capital, and to adequately value their scarce human resources. Investment in higher education is essential for increasing human capital formation to alleviate the brain drain problem.

In this vein, the report of the GCIM calls for maximization of the positive impacts and outcomes of international migration (GCIM 2005). It is important to view international migration as a win-win process in a global environment of human capital circulation. The sending and receiving countries are expected to benefit from international labour flows. In order to realize the potential opportunities presented by the international migration, the GCIM report calls for the implementation of the following recommendations:

- Migrating out of choice: Migration and the global economy;
- Reinforcing economic and developmental impact;
- Addressing irregular migration;
- Strengthening social cohesion through integration;
- Protecting the rights of migrants; and
- Enhancing governance: Coherence, capacity and cooperation.

Many scholars have argued for the consolidation of migration policies. For example Kapur and McHale (2005) have called for a four-pronged policy response to the effects of emigration on the welfare of those remaining behind. They argued for balancing the effects through a consolidated policy package of control, compensation, creation and connection to be adopted by all countries. Control policies relate to efforts to directly stem skilled inflows or outflows. Compensation policies relate to efforts to share the often considerable spoils of emigration with those remaining behind in poor countries.

Creation policies focus on the implications for the human capital policies of both rich and poor countries. And connection policies are concerned with strengthening economically valuable diasporic interactions and increasing the possibility of capital-enhanced return.” (Kapur and McHale 2005:177). However, successful implementation of these policies requires collaboration between the developed and developing countries.

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Chapter 3:

International Migration and the Achievement of MDGs in Africa

Introduction

Achieving the MDGs represents a concerted effort to improve the lives of people across the globe. This chapter reviews the evidence on the role of international migration on the achievement of MDGs in Africa with a particular focus on the channels through which migration impacts development. Africans in the Diaspora transfer resources across time and space that can be effectively used to reduce poverty and enhance economic development. However, the impact of international migration on the achievement of MDGs in Africa is not easy to quantify since there is no simple cause and effect relationship between international migration and the achievement of the MDGs.

Although the debate on the impact of international migration on development in Africa has largely been shaped by the loss of skilled Africans to the developed world, growing evidence shows that international migration has positive effects on social and economic development in Africa. The millions of Africans living outside their countries of birth are directly and indirectly contributing to the achievement of the MDGs. Diaspora remittances and the income multipliers they create are becoming critical resources for the sustenance strategies of receiving households as well as agents of local and national development. In 2004, remittances to Africa amounted to US\$14 billion. In 2005, sub-Saharan Africa received US\$8.1 billion while the Middle East and North Africa together received US\$21.3 billion (World Bank, 2005; 2006). Households that receive these migradollars tend to use the proceeds primarily for current consumption

(food, clothing) as well as investments in MDG related areas such as children's education, health care and improvement in household food security through investments in agricultural technology.

The idea of people moving to other countries in search of a better life is not new. What has however changed is the increasing voluntary movement of both low-skill, low-wage workers and high-skill, high-wage workers from less developed countries to developed countries that is fueled by the dynamics of globalization, in particular the structural needs of industrialized markets (Portes, 1997). At the same time, the decision to migrate is taking place as a household portfolio diversification strategy, as households seek to protect their welfare and pride by absorbing transitory shocks like drought-induced food crises or illness as exemplified by the behavior of Soninke migrants from the Kayes region of Western Mali (Azam and Gubert, 2005, 2002; Stark, 1991).

In the case of Africa, recent and contemporary African immigrants with a divergent range of skills (research and education professionals, doctors, nurses, engineers, etc) are increasingly establishing themselves in North America, Europe and the Gulf States. It is estimated that there are 17.1 million international migrants in Africa (United Nations, 2006). In addition, there are at least five million Africans living outside the continent. According to the 2000 United States census, 1,781,877 people living in the United States identified themselves as sub-Saharan Africans. An additional 3 million Africans are living in the European Union (IOM, 2004).

Like most immigrant communities, the process of transnationalism has allowed these African migrants to build and maintain multi-stranded relations that link together their communities of origin and settlement (Basch et al., 1994). Facilitated by the developments in telecommunications and transportation, an increasing number of these immigrants as well as their hometown associations, investment groups, religious groups and others, are involved in transnational activities that integrate communities of origin with Western economies, thereby providing a contribution to the economic, social and cultural development of their countries of origin. Consequently, these African immigrants have become a key factor integrating African countries into the global economy.

Although the contributions from the African Diaspora are largely in the form of financial remittances, considerable amounts of social remittances are also finding their way to local communities across the continent. However, in spite of these significant transfers, most African countries are still struggling with how to effectively harness the social and economic capital created by Diaspora networks for the purposes of national and regional economic growth through

migrant initiated business investments, transfer of knowledge and skills as well as the exploitation of migrant ethnic markets and enterprises. In the case of ethnic markets and enterprises, the demand for home-made goods, products and services among Africans in the Diaspora has led to the formation of transnational enterprises as well as vibrant African enclave markets in host societies that rely on selling local products. The financial goodwill of such groups can be tapped to help eradicate extreme poverty and hunger if African governments put in place the right policy frameworks aimed at attracting the private migradollars and skills of these communities.

International migration and the fight against extreme poverty and hunger

Migration can have both positive and negative effects on economic development and the level, depth and severity of poverty at the household level. At the national, regional or local level, remittances can spur development either in total or at the margin (Adams, 2006). In addition, brain gains in destination countries can spur economic dynamism (e.g. the role played by immigrants in the U.S. technology sector) and add to the plurality of thinking and problem solving. African researchers, academicians and health professionals also contribute to human capital development in Western societies. On the other hand, brain loss from poorer countries affects their ability to develop and fight poverty. And at the household level, remittances can reduce the level, depth and severity of poverty. Remittances sustain livelihoods through increased purchasing power for food, education, health, consumer goods/durables, housing and other essential services.

According to Adams and Page (2003), international migration has a strong impact in reducing poverty. Using data from 74 low and middle income developing countries, Adams and Page contend that on average, a 10 percent increase in the share of international migrants in a country's population will lead to a 1.9 percent decline in the share of people living in poverty (US\$1.00 a person a day). The study also found that on average, a 10 per cent increase in the share of international remittances in a country's GDP will lead to a 1.6 percent decline in the share of people living in poverty. In the Kayes region of Western Mali, the mean amount of remittances received per household from immigrants in France in 1996 was CFA F 740,145. This translates to about CFA F 2,027 a day, far exceeding the World Bank's poverty line of \$1 a day or CFA F 700 a day (Azam and Gubert, 2005). In rural Egypt, Adams (1991) found that the number of

poor households declined by 9.8 per cent when household income included international remittances. Other empirical studies have also shown that Kenyan families receiving remittances had more productive capital than non-remittance receiving families (Collier and Lal, 1984; 1986). And in Burkina Faso, the poverty headcount, which is the percentage of the population living beneath the poverty line, was reduced by 7.2 per cent in rural households as a result of international remittances (Lachaud, 1999). Gustafsson and Makonnen (1993) also note that poverty would increase by about 15 per cent in Lesotho if migrant workers in South African mines were to stop sending money home. Sorensen (2004) also found that remittances from the Somali Diaspora are playing a key role in the post-conflict reconstruction efforts of the country. As much as 25 to 40 percent of the population benefits from remittances (Hansen 2004).

The civil war virtually destroyed the public sector, leaving the remittances to play an important role for meeting consumption and other needs. Remittances from Somalis abroad are usually invested in construction, housing, establishment of small businesses, and in large investment projects in health and education. According to Hansen, the remittances to Somalia are structured around the destinations of the resourceful Diaspora in Europe and North America, and the less fortunate ones in the Gulf States and the neighboring countries such as Kenya, Yemen, and Ethiopia.

Similar relations have also been observed in Latin America. For instance, Adams (2006) found that remittance-receiving households in Guatemala tend to spend more considerably on housing, education and health than non-remittance receiving households. Therefore, expenditures on education and health at the household level contribute to national human capital development, which is an important component of national economic growth.

Besides increasing mean household incomes, private remittances can also reduce the proportion of people living in poverty through investment induced multiplier effects. Although there is limited information on how remittances are spent in most African countries, there is no doubt that having a large, flourishing, influential and skilled Diaspora is an asset for any country. Investments, venture capital and technology transfers from Diaspora populations have the potential to stimulate local and national development efforts (Sriskandarajah, 2005). There exists today in many African countries hundreds of small and medium-scale factories, commercial businesses and agricultural enterprises that were established and operated by returnees and circular migrants. In many cases, these enterprises are established and operated using the wealth of ideas and skills learned in the Diaspora.

These enterprises allow knowledge spillovers from migrants to non-migrants, create employment opportunities, generate wealth and contribute to the tax base of local and national governments. Hence they help reduce extreme poverty.

On the negative side, the loss of human capital due to unstable political and macroeconomic environments has adverse effects on national development. The United Nations Commission for Trade and Development estimates that each professional leaving Africa costs the region US\$184,000 (Marchal and Kegels, 2003). The emigration of these professionals also represents significant tax losses, which could have been used to support government programmes aimed at poverty alleviation, schooling and other demographic/public sector investments by African governments.

International migration and children's schooling

Progress towards attaining the MDGs requires rapid economic development, a process that can only be set in motion when high levels of educational attainment spread throughout entire societies. However, for most African countries, expanding access to basic primary education for both boys and girls is still a major challenge (ECA 2005). Many factors account for this, including poverty, diseases such as HIV/AIDS, inadequate educational financing, brain drain-induced teacher shortages, and conflicts. On the positive side, financial transfers from migration are also known to equip boys and girls in recipient households and communities with essential literacy and numeracy skills. For instance, Lachaud (1999) found that Zimbabwe families that managed to diversify their household portfolios through migration tend to have higher levels of educational attainment as compared to households without migrants. And in South Africa, children living in households with a migrant worker and that received remittances were significantly less likely to drop out of primary or secondary school than children living in a household without a migrant worker (Sibanda 2004).

Empirical research on the links between international migration and children's schooling in Latin America and Asia has also shown that remittances from Diaspora populations tend to increase the ability of households to pay for schooling, thereby increasing school attendance and completion rates in home communities. In addition, this body of research has also shown that communities with higher migration experiences have higher literacy levels (McKenzie, 2006; Cox Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Yang, 2004).

International migration, gender equality and women's empowerment

As shown in Chapter 1, feminized migration is increasing in importance in Africa. An increasing number of women are joining migration streams previously dominated by men as they migrate to the Gulf States, Europe and North America. Although a majority of the women end up working in low-skill and low-wage occupations (health care, household and commercial service sectors), a growing number of skilled and professional women are also migrating to these regions in response to expanding employment opportunities in business, education, health and other sectors. For instance, approximately 33.7 per cent of sub-Saharan African physicians currently practicing in the United States are women. In contrast, only 10 per cent of the cohort of physicians trained in Africa in 1969 and practicing in the United States were female physicians (Hagopian et al., 2005).

The growing feminization of migration is a key pathway to reducing gender inequality, reducing poverty and enhancing women's economic security. For instance, by drawing them away from their usual social networks and exposing them to more open societies, migration tends to produce positive and empowering experiences for women; hence it can promote changes in gender roles (Yamanaka and Piper, 2005).

Traditional power structures that impact negatively on the status of women also tend to be weaker among Diaspora populations given the existence of modern legal frameworks in destination places that female immigrants have a recourse to and also because of exposure to different cultural practices. As a result, spouses of female migrants are more inclined to do household chores that are traditionally done by women in the places of origin (Portes, 1997). More importantly, the feminization of international migration is providing a means of economic sustenance for families left at the places of origin as well as the future economic sustenance of female immigrants themselves. Some of the values obtained in more open societies are often transmitted to communities left behind, thereby altering the landscape of gender relationships. Across much of Africa, the momentum or impact of such ideational change is probably still in its infancy. However, the growing links between migration and women's empowerment are an encouraging development. More research is therefore required in order to understand how gendered migration promotes gender equality and women's empowerment.

International migration and the health MDGs

Although Africa had 906 million or 14 per cent of the 6.5 billion inhabitants of the world in 2005, the region has 24 per cent of the global burden of disease (United Nations, 2005; WHO, 2006). Poorly funded and equipped health care systems, poor governance and the loss of health care professionals through emigration, retirement and illness are undermining efforts aimed at tackling this disease burden. International migration has important consequences for all health-related MDGs – from reducing child and maternal mortality to combating the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. On the positive side, remittances can improve child and maternal health by allowing the purchase of additional nutritional and medical inputs. In addition, African communities that are linked to hometown and other associations in the Diaspora can significantly gain from transnational investments in clinics, hospitals, and public works projects in water and sanitation made by such groups.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, the impact of such “transnational aid” on the development of local communities is well documented (Landolt, 1997; Portes, 1997). But in Africa, very little research has been undertaken to document the scale and impact of such development projects that have a direct bearing on child and maternal health. However, anecdotal evidence from Somaliland seems to indicate that part of the remittances from such groups is channeled towards hospitals (Sorensen, 2004). In the Kayes region of Mali, the World Bank (2005) estimates that the Malian Diaspora in France has helped build 60 per cent of the infrastructure. In general, one can assume that remittances allow households left behind to buy food (leading to higher nutritional inputs) and to pay for medical services and other health inputs. In addition, studies in Mexico have found a strong effect of migration to the U.S. on maternal health among families left behind. This is because immigrants are more likely to pass health knowledge gained in the U.S. to household members back in Mexico (McKenzie, 2006).

On the negative side, asymmetrical international movements of health workers from Africa to richer countries has led to significant hemorrhaging of essential skills in the health sector, thereby affecting the current levels of doctors and nurses in Africa (WHO, 2006; Bundred and Levitt, 2000). This impedes the delivery of essential health services such as immunizations and outreach of other primary health care services, thereby undermining efforts to improve infant, child and maternal survival. Reversals in gains in mortality, particularly infant and child mortality in some parts of Africa are partly attributable to the loss of health workers. For instance, South Africa, a country with some of the highest HIV/AIDS

prevalence rates in the world has 6,208 doctors on the United Kingdom register and in 2003/2004, it lost 1,689 nurses to the United Kingdom alone (Mensah et al., 2005).

Such massive losses put a severe strain on the ability of any country to deliver quality and comprehensive health services. Other countries with a high disease burden, such as Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Ghana, Kenya and Botswana, have also been severely affected by the loss of skilled health service professionals to OECD countries (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). In addition, approximately 5,334 non-federal physicians trained in sub-Saharan Africa were working in the United States in 2002, with 86 per cent of these practicing physicians come in from three countries - Nigeria, South Africa and Ghana. (Hagopian, et. al., 2004).

Table 3.1. *Number of doctors trained in sub-Saharan Africa working in OECD countries and selected health indicators*

| Source Country | Population (thousands) ^a | Total no. of doctors in home country ^b | Percentage of home country workforce ^b | Selected health indicator in home country | | |
|----------------|-------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------------------------|---|
| | | | | Under five mortality rate | Life Expectancy at birth ^b | Adult HIV prevalence (percentage of adults ages 15-49) ^c |
| Angola | 13,841 | 811 | 19 | 254 | 40.7 | 3.9 |
| Cameroon | 14,856 | 3124 | 3 | 163 | 45.8 | 6.9 |
| Ethiopia | 68,525 | 1936 | 17 | 172 | 47.6 | 4.4 |
| Ghana | 19,867 | 3240 | 29 | 102 | 56.7 | 3.1 |
| Mozambique | 17,911 | 514 | 4 | 182 | 41.9 | 12.2 |
| Nigeria | 117,608 | 34,923 | 12 | 200 | 43.3 | 5.4 |
| South Africa | 45,610 | 323,973 | 37 | 74 | 49.0 | 21.5 |
| Uganda | 24,309 | 1,918 | 16 | 139 | 46.8 | 4.1 |
| Tanzania | 34,763 | 822 | 6 | 164 | 46.0 | 8.8 |
| Zimbabwe | 12,595 | 2,086 | 11 | 117 | 37.2 | 24.6 |
| Total | 369,885 | 82,417 | 23 | - | - | - |

a Source: United Nations (2005)

b Source : WHO (2006)

c Source: United Nations (2006).

Although these numbers might appear small relative to the total numbers of physicians practicing in the OECD countries, the impact of their emigration on the health systems they left behind is profound. In the case of Zambia for instance, Sims (1997) estimated that only 50 of the 600 medical graduates trained in the 23-year history of the medical school in Lusaka still work in the Zambia public health service. Thus, the emigration of African trained health professionals has plunged most sub-Saharan African countries below the threshold in workforce density that is essential to achieving health related MDGs (WHO, 2006).

Table 3.2. *Number of nurses and midwives trained in sub-Saharan Africa working in OECD Countries and Selected Health Indicators*

| Source Country | Population (thousands) ^a | Total no. of nurses and midwives in home country ^b | No. of nurses and midwives working in 7 OECD recipient countries ^b | Percentage of home country workforce ^b | Maternal mortality rate in home country (deaths per 100,000 births) ^c |
|----------------|-------------------------------------|---|---|---|--|
| Angola | 14,841 | 13,627 | 105 | 0 | 1,700 |
| Cameroon | 14,856 | 26,032 | 84 | 0 | 730 |
| Ethiopia | 68,525 | 20,763 | 195 | 0 | 850 |
| Ghana | 19,867 | 17,322 | 2,2267 | 13 | 540 |
| Mozambique | 17,911 | 6,183 | 34 | 0 | 1,000 |
| Nigeria | 117,608 | 201,306 | 5,375 | 3 | 800 |
| South Africa | 45,610 | 184,459 | 13,496 | 7 | 230 |
| Uganda | 24,309 | 17,472 | 21 | 0 | 880 |
| Tanzania | 34,763 | 13,292 | 37 | 0 | 1,500 |
| Zimbabwe | 12,595 | 9,357 | 3,183 | 34 | 1,100 |
| Total | 369,885 | 505,186 | 24,797 | - | - |

a Source: United Nations (2005)

b Source : WHO (2006)

c Source: United Nations (2006)

Throughout history, the spread of communicable diseases has often been blamed on migrants and external populations. For example, each of the European nations tried to pin the blame for the spread of syphilis on another (Handsfield and Hoel, 1997). It was called the French disease in England; English and Italian disease in France; and the Spanish disease in Italy; while the Russians called it the Polish disease, and the Arabs called it the disease of the Christians. While mobility certainly furthers the geographical spread of infection, it is important to carefully analyze the complex linkages between mobility and infection. In southern Africa, for example, some researchers contend that South Africa has been turned into an HIV/AIDS hot spot primarily because of the nature and magnitude of circular labour migration in the region (Barnett and Whiteside, 2002). The structure of the labour market, where spouses are separated for long periods of time, facilitates concurrent sexual networking (for example having a partner at the place of work in addition to the spouse back home), which, in turn, provides a fertile ground for the spread of HIV. However, there is no automatic link between migration and HIV infection (see Box 3.1).

Box 3.1 Complex linkages between mobility and vulnerability to HIV infection

The relationship between vulnerability to HIV infection and mobility is far more complex than the often-heard broad assertion that all migrants are at increased risk of HIV infection, or that migrants are 'vectors' of HIV transmission. What seems clear from available documentation is that different mobile populations have certain characteristics, which render their individual members more (or less) vulnerable to HIV infection. For example, social, cultural and linguistic barriers may increase the difficulty that mobile populations and migrants have in accessing information and services from the host community, and therefore increase the vulnerability to HIV infection through lack of information, lack of treatment for other STIs, barriers to access prevention methods such as condoms, and other channels. However, UNCHR has documented examples where migrant and refugee populations have been more knowledgeable about HIV than their host populations, and have been successfully employed as resource persons in their host communities.

Other linkages between HIV vulnerability and mobility include the socio-economic vulnerability of refugees and displaced persons, as well as some labour migrants who find no work at their destination, which may force these mobile persons into transactional sex or commercial sex work.

Thus having multiple partners who themselves probably have multiple partners increases their vulnerability to HIV infection, particularly if methods to reduce the risk of transmission such as condoms are not used. Traders, merchants and truckers may not be able to access relevant information and health services, and may simultaneously feel less bound by social norms that restrict sexual relations while away from home, therefore increasing their number of sexual partners and vulnerability to infection.

In complex emergency situations, factors that both increase and decrease vulnerability to HIV infection are at play. Emergencies may lead to reduced mobility, reduction in sexual partners, and increased access to information and services in camps, all of which decrease risk of infection – while at the same time an emergency may induce behaviour change and increase in sexual partners, induce or increase transactional sex, and reduce access to information and health services, all of which will increase vulnerability to infection.

Source: Mork, 2006

International migration and environmental sustainability

Africa is today faced with a multitude of environmental challenges, from land degradation and desertification to destruction of tropical forests and loss of biodiversity. These environmental problems can in many cases be linked to 'local-level population-livelihood-environment dynamics' as well as the impact of internal and cross-border population movements, for instance, the impact of refugees and internally displaced persons on local environments (de Sherbinin 2006; Benedick, 2000). On the other hand, the overuse of natural resources and degradation of ecosystems can also be the cause of migration. These environmental disasters are contributing to the growth of environmental refugees in many parts of Africa, particularly in ecological zones bordering desert areas.

However, given the lack of appropriate data, the potential positive and negative environmental externalities associated with international migration are not well known even though international migration contributes to changes in population concentration, distribution and globalization (Curran, 2002). Thus, the impact of

international migration on environmental sustainability should be analyzed within the context of globalization, taking into consideration the size, composition, and distribution of affected populations as well as the organization of production and consumption of goods and services in both sending and receiving countries.

Unlike in the pre-19th century era, today's international migrants do not have expansionist attitudes that have long-term consequences for land-use and resource exploitation. Large multinational corporations have assumed this role. However, the exodus to other countries, just like the exodus to urban areas, can reduce pressure on natural resources in the sending communities. In some cases, this demographic shift can have serious impacts on ecologically vulnerable areas and urban agglomerations through increased levels of pollution, waste disposal, and congestion. And in the case of forced migration, the influx of people into a neighboring country can impose a huge burden on the environment, particularly on land and water resources (Renner and French, 2004). For instance, refugees fleeing Rwanda's civil war seriously impacted local ecosystems in the Goma region of the Democratic Republic of Congo as they harvested forests for firewood and timber for building shelter (Ertegun, 2002).

It can also be argued that by improving the livelihoods of families in the sending communities through the transfer of remittances, international migration can indirectly contribute to ameliorating the negative links between poverty and natural resource exploitation. For instance, Lucas and Stark (1985) noted that remittances were positively related to the degree of drought in Botswana- the worse the drought, the higher the level of remittances. Under such a scenario, remittance-receiving families might not overexploit the environment just to stay alive. On the other hand, remittances might induce receiving households to invest in environmentally destructive activities (de Sherbinin 2006). And on the other hand, the transfer of appropriate technologies from the Diaspora to communities of origin can lead to the sustainable exploitation of natural resources and land use.

International migration and global partnerships

In order to enhance the benefits of migration for development and to reduce the negative side effects, global partnerships are essential. Such partnerships can facilitate data sharing between stakeholders and improve the knowledge base on international migration through research on migration and development issues. In addition, global partnerships in the areas of trade and financial systems can

enhance the development impact of migration (IOM, 2004). For instance, transfer costs for remittances can be reduced through the development of agreements and an integrated payment infrastructure where national borders no longer matter, such as the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) initiative (European Central Bank, 2006). Another area where global partnerships could promote migration for development and poverty alleviation is the promotion of the movement of persons under Mode 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). For the 41 African countries that are members of the World Trade Organization, improving the movement of persons under GATS will enhance the employment opportunities of their nationals.

Through private-public partnerships, the African Diaspora can also facilitate the return of production factors (labour and capital), skills and new technologies. The African Diaspora can also facilitate trade and investment links between their countries of origin and countries of destination.

Conclusions and policy implications

While the achievement of the MDGs in Africa will require a broad development agenda such as that articulated in NEPAD, the retention of African trained health workers, teachers, and other professionals is essential. It is pointless for an African household to receive remittances to pay for school and health care costs when there are no teachers and nurses. Therefore, African countries, in partnership with Western countries and Gulf States, should find joint solutions to the massive brain loss that the region continues to face that is driven by free market forces and increasing globalization. The debate about social justice and the ethics of recruiting professionals, particularly physicians from poor African countries should also address some of the underlying push factors – from inadequate working conditions and remuneration packages to poor governance. The role of non-State actors in the recruitment of African health professionals also needs to be examined since they tend to abuse ethical recruitment programmes of health professionals.

Another challenge facing many African countries with significant numbers of citizens living in the Diaspora is how to harness migradollars into development programmes that benefit society as whole. Hence, African countries need to put in place mechanisms, strategies and policy frameworks that can promote the creation of a more conducive environment to leverage the financial and social remittances of the African Diaspora. African immigrants should be encouraged

to establish Trusts and Charities for education and health projects in their communities of origin. Since the achievement of MDGs is also threatened by natural disasters (drought, famine, pest invasions, etc.), mechanisms should also be put in place to allow African migrants to raise and channel disaster related financial and non-financial contributions to affected communities. Such strategies have been effectively deployed in countries like India in areas affected by earthquakes and cyclones (Sorensen 2004) as well as in most parts of Asia that were affected by the tsunami disaster. Of course, for such programmes to have the complete participation of the African Diaspora will require good governance and transparency on the part of African governments.

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Chapter 4:

Globalization and the Migration of Skilled and Unskilled African Labour

Introduction

Globalization involves the growing movement of capital, goods, and information as well as the controlled movement of people. It is reshaping the identity of nation States and the world we live in. More importantly, globalization is exacerbating inequalities between nations. Consequently, it is impacting the scale, scope and complexity of international migration.

Globalization impacts migration in various ways, including: unencumbered movement of capital accompanied by capitalists across state borders; formation of regional trading blocs as a logical response to the imperatives of globalization which promote the free movement of people within regions; deepening of disparities between countries which spawns the movement of people from the poor to the more affluent countries; growing tendency for diminishing environmental resources (resulting from the impact of globalization on Africa's already fragile environment) to generate conflicts between user constituencies, displacing people and exerting migratory pressures; and increasing tendency for most African states, especially the relatively affluent, to close their borders to immigrants because of a variety of reasons, including the fear of migrants engaging in criminal activities (Akokpari, 2000).

Therefore, as posited by Mutume (2006), in the face of globalization, how can a system that leads to freer and fairer flows of people, skills and remittances be designed? How can policies acceptable both to industrial and developing countries be developed? How can jobs creation policies on the continent be focused on labour-intensive sectors such as agriculture? How can migrant receiving countries be encouraged to open up their farm sector by removing protective subsidies? How can the incentive to invest in developing countries be designed in such a way that it should not only be driven by expected profits, but also by the need for jobs to reduce emigration? How can illegal immigration networks be broken? And how can financing Africa's economies through the NEPAD, increasing aid and providing lasting debt solutions provide effective antidotes to Africa's development? This chapter will discuss these issues after some light has been thrown on the current nature of skilled and unskilled migrants.

Skilled and unskilled migrants

Despite attempts to limit the number of skilled and unskilled migrants from moving across borders especially between rich and poor countries, international migration is increasing over time and is going to continue to do so. The majority of international migrants originate from developing countries. Yet, it is not exclusively a south to north phenomenon. There are also strong migration flows between developing countries, in particular between low-and middle-income countries (IOM, 2003). In Box 4.1, the changing patterns of migration are discussed.

Box 4.1 Globalization and changing patterns of migration

Patterns of migratory movement have changed considerably. With globalization – especially in relation to trade liberalization, global economic integration and electronic communication – has come a more heightened awareness of life and work opportunities in other parts of the world coupled with developments in international transport. This has led to greater population mobility. Although progress in liberalization of the movement of persons has not proceeded at the same pace as the liberalization of trade in goods and capital, regular and irregular labour migration plays an important role in the international economy. Migration which historically has been relatively uni-directional and permanent in nature, is now increasingly temporary and circular. Nationals of more countries are on the move and more countries are affected by migration than ever before. The growing feminization of migration, with global estimates that 47.5 percent of all migrants today are females, has been widely reported, although the implications of this for policy-makers have not yet been fully developed.

Source: Mckinley 2003:2

It is estimated that since 1990, some 20,000 skilled professionals leave Africa every year, depriving the continent of the doctors, nurses, teachers and engineers it needs to break the cycle of poverty and under-development (Tebeje, 2005). Box 4.2 gives further illustration on the flight of African professionals. As highlighted in Chapter 2, the rate of skilled migration exceeds 50 percent in countries like Cape Verde, The Gambia, Seychelles, and Somalia. Conflicts, poverty, poor health services and corruption make it difficult for Africa to compete with richer countries that usually promise bigger salaries, better working conditions and political stability.

On the other hand, there are cases of well-trained African professionals moving to the north and ending up with jobs below their qualifications. This constitutes a loss, both to the sending and host countries when well-trained personnel are not fully utilized.

Box 4.2 The exodus of Africa's best from the continent

At a time when African governments are desperately seeking technical skills from agronomy to economics to health care, we estimate that more than 20,000 African professionals leave Africa every year to settle in the West. More than 40,000 Africans with a Ph.D work out of Africa, and for every 100 professionals sent overseas for training from Africa between 1982 and 1997, only 65 returned to Africa. At the same time, one estimate suggests that more than 100,000 expatriates are employed in Africa at a cost of \$4 billion each year to offset the annual migration from Africa by its own skilled professionals.

Source: US Department of State, 2003.

As these efforts are being made, it is unfortunate that there are skilled or well trained African migrants who are unable to find suitable jobs in western countries. Recent reports indicate that, for example, in the UK many African PhD holders are employed as parking attendants, street vendors, taxi drivers, private security guards, road cleaners and community carers. This is the same situation in the rest of Europe, North America and the Middle East. These jobs are, however dominated by unskilled migrants (see Box 4.3).

A growing number of unskilled Africans are also migrating within Africa and to western countries and the Gulf States. In the case of South Africa, Maharaj (2004) notes that despite the numerous problems that face the majority of Blacks in South Africa, for Africans from other parts of the continent, the country is perceived as a land of better economic opportunities and hope, especially after the 1994 elections. Hence, the high performance of the South African economy has been a major attraction for unskilled and skilled immigrants alike. Thus, as long as the widespread poverty and high levels of inequality prevail on the continent, South Africa will continue to attract migrants. While migrants to South Africa after independence had a higher proportion of skilled workers, the stream is still dominated by unskilled workers largely targeting the agricultural and mining sectors. This is an extension of the historic tradition when the mining and agricultural sectors were largely reliant on migrant labour from the Southern African countries, with the catchment area sometimes running as far north as Tanzania.

Box 4.3 "Second slavery" snares migrants

Unable to find work in their fields of expertise, they reluctantly take up the unskilled jobs that many Britons are no longer prepared to do. Anyone living and working in London cannot help but be struck by the number of immigrants working in the city as street vendors, taxi drivers, private security guards, road cleaners and community carers. They often work long hours and night shifts, forming a kind of twilight underclass, and while many are unskilled and unqualified, some are highly educated. Not only are they failing to put their own talents to use, but their absence from their home countries is contributing to the "brain drain" which economists say is shackling Africa's development.

Source: Long, 2006.

In North Africa, unskilled migration within the Maghreb countries as well as migration to Europe and the Middle East is common. This has been augmented by unskilled migration from sub-Saharan Africa using North Africa as a transit area *enroute* to Europe. For example, mass media reports of unskilled Africans losing their lives while crossing the border between Morocco and Spain, or on the open seas have been recently broadcast with estimates of thousands of Africans perishing at sea, especially between Mauritania and the Canary Islands.

In the case of West Africa, migration occurs, especially from the Sahelian countries to countries such as Ivory Coast and Ghana. This was particularly common during the boom periods of the cocoa and coffee industries. Migration streams in this region still persist, but frequent conflict also means that people migrate or flee from conflict to more stable parts of the region.

Overall, the movement of unskilled workers from Africa does not necessarily constitute a net loss for the continent. In most cases, unskilled migrants tend to earn substantially more in host countries than they would normally earn in their places of origin. Hence, the debate about net loss versus net gain is different when one considers the movement of skilled and unskilled migrants from Africa.

To increase border restrictions or not to?

Whether it is better to promote or restrict the mobility of people across national borders is a central question in the migration debate. Proponents of migration contend that migration can be a positive experience for those who move, for the societies they move to and for the societies they leave behind (Mutume, 2006). A cooperative approach to migration management could help developing countries to limit and reverse unsustainable forms of migration and receive the support of countries of destination for the sustainable development of their human resources. It is an important strategy to help developing countries break out of the poverty trap, and secure a share of the benefits of globalization. As shown in the previous chapter, remittances have the potential to reduce the poverty levels of most households in Africa.

In fact, many negative aspects stated about migrants and the need to increase border controls are usually contrary to realities. In the context of South Africa, McDonald, et al (1998) noted that statements like 'flood of illegal migrants' who bring 'disease and crime to the country', and 'threat to social and fiscal stability' represent the unreal. A survey conducted in Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe showed that most of the negative stereotyping of cross-border

migrants from Southern Africa to South Africa are unfounded (McDonald et al. 1998).

In the case of South Africa, Klotz (1997) argues that the evolution of immigration policy has substantial implications for the Southern African region. South Africa is no longer insulated and isolated. It needs to develop new policies that are sensitive to international normative constraints, and to the regional context.

Policies acceptable to both sending and receiving countries

Migration involves both sending and host countries (and sometimes transit countries). Therefore, it is in the interest of the parties involved to adopt harmonized migration policies to maximize its benefits and minimize its negative effects. Box 4.4 gives an elaboration of the two ends of the migration spectrum.

Box 4.4 The two ends of the migration spectrum

In an increasingly globalized world where the movement of people is not only possible but desirable and even necessary for various social, economic and cultural reasons, the ultimate goal is not to obstruct or prevent mobility but to better manage it for the benefit of all. In order to reinforce the potential of international migration for development, it is necessary to understand the interests and needs of countries at both ends of the migration spectrum – that is countries of origin and destination. Policy choices made now will serve to determine whether migration is managed to maximize its benefits or whether migration will remain a source of concern and potential tension between States.

Source: Mckinley, 2003: 4-5

Labour migration programmes that are jointly developed by countries of origin and destination are an important tool for managing and targeting international migration in response to the needs of both and can ensure the effective protection of the rights of migrants (Mckinley, 2003). It is important to enhance cooperation between migration authorities and development actors by moving away from the current approach of both mainly determining their strategies independently; and adopt an entirely new strategy at national and international policy and operational levels that would successfully turn migrants into agents of development.

Comprehensive migration programmes can ensure the provision of essential information and preparation of interested individuals, thereby promoting the successful outcome of individual migration endeavors (Mckinley, 2003). Individuals in countries of origin often do not have access to necessary information on migration opportunities and regulations, as well as living conditions abroad. Instead they rely on second-hand information that is not always accurate or sufficient. In many cases, they even rely upon the services of smugglers to enter developed countries, and subsequently find themselves in an irregular situation that seriously endangers their undertaking (Mckinley, 2003). In addition, migration programmes could be complemented by effective integration in the host countries to enable migrants to adapt more readily to their new environment (Mckinley, 2003).

There is, therefore, a need for policy coherence that would lead to maximization of benefits to both sending and host countries. In Southern Africa, Minnaar (2001) notes that a more effective and efficient system of border control for the region, operating in a co-operative and harmonized framework, would be to the benefit of all members of SADC.

Generally, there are limits and possibilities in policy making on state intervention, as indicated by the Global Commission on International Migration (GCM) in Box 4.5.

Box 4.5 Limits and possibilities in policy making

In the international debate on the various migration policies being practiced, the limits and the possibilities of state intervention are becoming increasingly clear. Limits, because of a view of migration that is too defensive, axed too much on domestic policy, suggests absolute state sovereignty, which in view of the institutional and legal limits as well as the global dimensions of the migration phenomenon is not feasible. Possibilities, because the combined use of the various national and international instruments could, if carefully planned, allow greater – if not decisive - room for manoeuvre in the area of migration policy. Migration partnerships make it possible to direct state intervention in such a way as to achieve a balanced and fair weighing of interests in dealing with the problems of all countries concerned by emigration, immigration and return migration. This, however, requires an all-embracing, comprehensive approach to the migration phenomenon together with a readiness to implement government intervention strategies. The real effectiveness of this approach can only be measured on the basis of concrete projects and programmes.

Source: GCM, 2005

Labour intensive sectors and creation of jobs

Africa is already affected by the current wave of globalization that is driven by lower transport and communication costs, liberalized markets for goods, services and capital and faster technical change (ECA, 2005). Because world trade in manufacturing goods increased sharply in the past decade, while trade in raw materials more or less stagnated, diversification into manufactured exports is more likely to create growth and jobs in Africa. But before this happens, there is a need to focus investment in labour-intensive sectors. Hence as a more deepened transition is made towards manufactured goods, the ECA proposes the following steps to be taken:

- First, African countries need to focus on productivity growth following Asia's example where attention to quality of education, expanded girls' education and improved vocational skills essential for technological change and growth were combined with productivity councils or centers which identified enterprises' technical problems and developed appropriate remedies and training packages to solve them;
- Second, African countries should improve their infrastructure, especially telecommunications, (emphasizing improved rural infrastructure to facilitate rural-urban integration and overall integration into the global economy). This will increase competitiveness of exports and attract more FDI;
- Third, industrial policies should be designed carefully and adapted to local conditions (including such examples from Asia as directed credit, trade protection, export subsidization and tax intervention); and
- Fourth, incentives for foreign and domestic investment should be targeted with care preferably towards labour-intensive sectors such as firms with strong backward and forward links which increase the externalities from technological upgrading.

Removal of farm subsidies

Farm subsidies in the north encourage overproduction, which leads to flooding of global markets with cheap farm products from the industrialized countries. As a consequence, countries of the south whose participation in global trade is largely dependent on primary products are cut out of the global market and the prices for the few products they can sell in the market are driven down.

The chain reaction to this is deepened poverty and increased migration to cities and to developed countries.

Unlike the 1996 Freedom to Farm law which lessened the dependence of farmers' on federal payments, the 2002 Farm and Security and Rural Investment Act added \$83 billion in new spending, on top of about \$100 billion expected to be spent under existing farm programmes, suggesting that individual farmers could receive as much as \$360,000 through direct-payment and target-price programmes (Rural Migration News, 2002) (see Box 4.6).

Box 4.6 Farm subsidies and migration

European Union leaders and agricultural exporters such as Australia and Brazil expressed severe disappointment with the new farm bill, arguing that US subsidies encourage overproduction, and thus "drive down prices paid to local farmers, reduce rural family income around the world and push farmers off the land and into overcrowded cities." Many critics of farm subsidies in rich countries argue that, if there were freer trade in farm products, there would be less migration into the rich countries.

Source: Rural Migration News, 2002

In addition, about half of the EU's annual budget (45 billion Euros) is spent on agriculture. In June 2002, the EU Commission proposed that the 7.1 million EU farmers, who are 4.3 percent of European workers, should receive a maximum 300,000 Euros a year, which would reduce payments to German and British farmers, who tend to have large farms. Instead of basing payments on production, as in the US, the EU Commission proposed that farmers receive a flat payment based on past payments; the payments would decline over time, and the money saved would be used for rural development (Rural Migration News, 2002).

This is why the ongoing Doha Round of Trade negotiations has revealed a basic divide: most developing countries want lower farm subsidies and reduced barriers to trade in farm commodities, while industrial countries want developing nations to reduce barriers to trade in goods and services such as banking and insurance (Rural Migration News, 2006).

Investment and the need for creation of jobs

In investment ventures, there is a need to lessen the drive for profit maximization at all costs, to engage in investments with a 'human face' whereby at least 50 percent of the profit would be ploughed back in job creation. In addition, profitably unattractive enterprises but with labour intensive opportunities should attract favorable support. Another approach would be to link local communities with business communities abroad and to ensure that all stakeholders are involved when community enterprises are set up (the Swedish example in Box 4.7 provides a good illustration). A third approach is to create linkages between the African Diaspora to the communities in Africa and facilitate local investment ventures, again with the involvement of all stakeholders.

Box 4.7 Farm subsidies and migration

Sweden has initiated the "Göteborg initiative". This involves various NGOs that are active in Sweden, migrant associations in Somalia and Bosnia, and representatives of the city of Göteborg. Its aim is to help those who return home to establish a livelihood. The project is also intended to contribute to the development of the source countries, including through the creation of jobs for the local population. Another objective is to promote contacts between the business communities in Göteborg and the migrants' countries of origin.

Source: GCIM, 2005

The diaspora can also play a crucial role in promoting export and import of professional services as a way of creating jobs. UNCTAD recognizes the importance of trade and development aspects of professional services. It advocates for the promotion of regulatory frameworks that would enhance the participation of developing countries in international trade in professional services through GATS Article IV (UNCTAD, 2005). A supportive environment should be developed to allow the professional services potential in developing countries contribute to their development. With appropriate instruments which recognize qualifications and temporary mobility of professionals in the multilateral trading system, the participation of developing countries could increase.

Currently the global market trends show that while trade in professional services expanded between 1995 and 2003, this did not happen in developing countries.

In fact, as shown in Table 4.1, the percentage ratio of both export and imports of professional services in GDP declined over time.

Table 4.1: Trade in professional services as of GDP

| Source Country | Export as % ratio to GDP | | Import as % ratio to GDP | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|------|--------------------------|------|
| | 1995 | 2003 | 1995 | 2003 |
| Countries | 1995 | 2003 | 1995 | 2003 |
| Developed | 0.7 | 1.0 | 0.6 | 0.9 |
| Developing economies | 1.0 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 0.7 |
| South-East Europe and CIS | 0.6 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| World | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.9 |

Source: UNCTAD, 2005: 4

Breaking up illegal migration networks

The volume of illegal migration is a reaction to the restriction of legal migration (Zohry, 2005). Given the economic imbalances between Europe and Africa, migration streams will continue in the foreseeable future, especially since economic aid as a means of reducing the volume of legal and illegal migration is insufficient. Much more requires to be done to bring about meaningful social and economic development. Hence, African and European countries have a duty to dismantle the illegal migration networks behind which lies the appalling trafficking of women and children. Together, both regions must encourage co-development that enables Africans to enjoy decent conditions for living and working in their own countries (Mutume, 2006).

Employers in countries of immigration, especially in the north, can help governments to combat illegal migration by stopping the exploitation of migrants, for example by forcing them to accept low wages under threat of being reported and deported if they complain. The private sector, therefore, has an important role to play in this area.

Financing through the NEPAD and debt relief

Successful international cooperation to spur Africa's economies will depend on adequate financing for the continental development strategy, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), including increases in aid and a lasting solution to Africa's debt burden. More focused planning and implementation of programmes that generate broad-based social and economic development for all Africans lead to reduced migration both legal and illegal. Debt relief is just one of the factors that would enable African governments and the private sector to invest more in development endeavors. Other factors include bi-lateral and multi-lateral financing arrangements involving north-south and south-south cooperation.

In Morocco, investment efforts are being carried out by the European Union (EU) to stem African migration to Europe from and through Morocco as a transit country for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa (see Box 4.8).

Box 4.8 EU investment in Morocco's development

To reduce immigration flows from Morocco, the EU is also seeking to boost Morocco's development. In 1996, Morocco signed the European Mediterranean Association Agreement (EMAA) with the EU, Morocco's most important trading partner. This should lead to the establishment of a free trade area in 2010. The EU's support for Morocco's economic transition is mainly implemented through the MEDA (Mésures d'Accompagnement or Accompanying Measures) programme, which aims to increase competitiveness by developing the private sector and promoting good governance.

Significant funds from the MEDA programme target the stated goal of immigration reduction. Of the total MEDA aid budget of 426 million euros for 2000-2006, 115 million euros (27 percent) are being spent to "break out of the circle of weak growth, unemployment, poverty, and migration" through support for the control of illegal immigration and rural development programmes. In particular, the funds target the northern provinces, which are seen as a source of poverty, drugs, human smuggling, and illegal migration.

Source: de Haas, 2005.

Conclusions and policy implications

Conventional causes of migration have been reinforced by globalization. This increases the challenge for forging ways to manage international migration. There is, therefore, a need to adjust migration policies to respond to the changing patterns, especially on how to manage migration for the benefit of sending and receiving countries, and for transit countries. The current nature of migration leaves no State unaffected. Therefore each country should develop new policies that take into account national needs and regional interests in an integrated manner.

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Chapter 5:

Harnessing the African Diaspora Migradollar

Introduction

One very important activity performed by Africans in the diaspora is sending money to their families left in their home countries. The remittances sent home by African migrants represents a substantial source of capital for those who remain. In addition, remittances are also used for the purchase of real estate, land, farm and business equipment. This chapter charts African remittance flows, and discusses ways to harness this substantial source of capital for African social and economic development.

Flows of remittances to Africa

Although the size of the average remittance transfer is small (US\$200-\$300), the World Bank estimates that cumulative worker remittances to sub-Saharan Africa jumped from \$4.9 billion in 2000 to \$6.1 billion and \$8.1 billion in 2004 and 2005 respectively (World Bank, 2005; 2006). This represents about 5 percent of the \$80 billion in migrants' remittances sent to developing countries in 2002. In contrast, North Africa received about 10 percent of global remittances to developing countries in the same year (Sander and Maimbo, 2003). The largest traditional receivers in North Africa are Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia while Nigeria, Sudan and Lesotho are the largest receivers in sub-Saharan Africa (Table 5.1). These officially recorded flows are heavily underestimated given that large proportions of remittances pass through informal channels (Yaw, 2003).

Table 5.1. Worker remittances to selected African countries (US\$ million)

| Country | YEAR | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--|
| | 1980 | 1990 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | |
| Algeria | 406 | 352 | 233 | 233 | 233 | 233 | 233 | 233 | 233 | |
| Benin | 77 | 94 | 85 | 70 | 89 | 75 | 86 | 83 | 83 | |
| Botswana | 68 | 81.3 | 43.3 | 40.9 | 36.3 | 26.4 | 26.4 | 26.4 | 26.4 | |
| Burkina Faso | 150 | 140 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 67 | 50 | 50 | |
| Cameroon | 29 | 23 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | |
| Cape Verde | - | 59.1 | 100.3 | 76.4 | 73.7 | 79.1 | 86.9 | 80.9 | 85.1 | |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 32 | 44 | 147 | 136 | 143 | 138 | 119 | 116 | 122 | |
| Egypt | 2,696 | 4,284 | 3,107 | 3,697 | 3,370 | 3,235 | 2,852 | 2,911 | 2,893 | |
| Ethiopia | 12 | 5 | 16 | 9 | 27 | 34 | 53 | 18 | 33 | |
| Ghana | 1 | 6 | 28 | 26 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 46 | 44 | |
| Lesotho | 263 | 427.9 | 387.7 | 378.7 | 294.6 | 275.9 | 252.2 | 209.4 | 209.4 | |
| Madagascar | - | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | |
| Mali | 59 | 107 | 111 | 92 | 85 | 86 | 73 | 88 | 88 | |
| Morocco | 1,054 | 2,006 | 2,166 | 1,898 | 2,011 | 1,938 | 2,161 | 3,261 | 2,877 | |
| Nigeria | 22 | 10 | 947 | 1,920 | 1,534 | 1,301 | 1,301 | 1,301 | 1,301 | |
| Senegal | 77 | 142 | 151 | 151 | 147 | 186 | 184 | 174 | 174 | |
| South Africa | - | - | 25 | 25 | 25 | 25 | 74 | 61 | 53 | |
| Sudan | 256 | 62 | 222 | 420 | 687 | 665 | 641 | 740 | 978 | |
| Togo | 10 | 27 | 29 | 26 | 19 | 23 | 34 | 69 | 69 | |
| Tunisia | 319 | 551 | 736 | 685 | 718 | 761 | 796 | 927 | 1,071 | |
| Uganda | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 233 | 238 | 483 | 365 | |

Source: World Bank 2004.

However, despite the lack of accurate data, remittances to many African countries constitute a significant share of GDP, often exceeding export revenues and foreign direct investment (IMF, 2005). Hence, they have a huge effect on the balance of payments and on foreign exchange earnings of many countries (Sander and Maimbo, 2003). For instance, it is estimated that in Lesotho and Cape Verde, workers remittances constitute about 40 percent and 18 percent of GDP respectively (IMF 2005). And in Mali, it is estimated that the approximately 100,000 Malian immigrants in France remit about 100 million euros each year, far exceeding the French official AID flow of about 60 million euros (Azam and Gubert, 2005).

The growing significance of remittances sent to Africa in terms of volume and as a share of total national income has captured the interest of policy makers in both sending and receiving countries. The need for a policy detour aimed at tapping the financial wherewithal of the African Diaspora is therefore an issue requiring the urgent attention of policy makers and African financial institutions. African countries need to devise strategies and policies that can maximize the harnessing of the African migradollar so that it can serve as a force for growth and development. Currently, a myriad of financial and monetary policies and regulations in both sending and receiving countries constitute barriers to the flow of remittances. In addition, the existing financial services infrastructure in most receiving countries is inadequate; hence it affects money transmittal methods. However, it is important to note that remittances are private transfers. They are therefore different from ODA, which is from state to state and is used for public goods. ODA projects can however enhance the poverty reducing effects of private remittances.

Money transfer service providers

Most immigrants use formal and/or informal systems to send money home. The mode of intermediation used is determined to some extent by familiarity, costs, risk and accessibility.

Formal channels

Formal money transfer providers such as banks, foreign exchange bureaus, post offices and money transfer operators such as Western Union, and MoneyGram offer migrants more cost effective, secure and efficient ways of sending money to families back home. However, the costs of sending and receiving money can often be prohibitive. It costs a significant amount of money to wire transfer money from North America or Western Europe to Africa. And on the other hand, remitting money through these credible and accountable financial institutions is the only way to minimize risk. For instance, the costs of sending money from the U.S. through formal intermediaries ranges from 4 - 20 per cent of the total amount sent (Orozco, 2003; Handlin, 2002). And in the receiving countries, limited competition among money transfer businesses also leads to higher overall transaction costs. In addition, banking institutions and money transfer services are very limited if not non-existent in rural areas across much of Africa. Therefore, there is a need to improve the geographic distribution of payout locations, including banks, retail stores and supermarkets. Implementing this at the recipient country level is now much easier, given technological advances in payment mechanisms.

Undocumented African immigrants in the OECD countries tend to operate outside formal financial streams. Because of their undocumented status, their access to formal money transfer services is limited. Consequently, this increases the transaction costs of sending money to their families back home. Within this context, Western countries should devise ways that can facilitate these undocumented immigrants to use formal financial institutions. A good case in point is how a growing number of U.S. banks are accepting identity cards called *'matricula consular'* that are offered by Mexican consulates to Mexican immigrants without U.S. issued forms of documentation (Orozco, 2003). These identity cards have attracted undocumented Mexican immigrants into the U.S. financial system. More importantly, the identity cards promote traceable transfers in a post-September 11 era where global security is of high concern. African countries with large immigrant communities in the OECD countries should be encouraged to explore the possibility of issuing similar forms of documentation to their nationals who do lack tax identification numbers or Social Security numbers. However, for such programmes to work, the cooperation of immigrant host countries is critical.

Sending money home is expensive and diverts funds that would otherwise have benefited sending communities. One way to reduce costs could be for western financial institutions to double efforts to bank the unbanked immigrants (that is, those immigrants without a transaction account with a traditional financial institution) by mainstreaming remittance programmes in their business portfolios. For instance, mainstream U.S. financial institutions such as Citizens Bank; Wells Fargo, Bank of America and Harris Bank have launched initiatives to cater for the remittance transfer needs of immigrants. In the case of Citizens Bank, it established a Cape Verdean remittance programme that allows Cape Verdean immigrants to send any amount of money from any Citizens Bank branch to families back home for only US\$10 per transaction (Samuels, 2003). In contrast, it costs US\$114 to send US\$2,000 using Western Union to Cape Verde. Thus, such tailored programmes are encouraging immigrants to open bank accounts with mainstream financial institutions. Unlike commercial services providers like Western Union and MoneyGram that charge high fees for transactions, mainstream financial institutions have the added advantage of offering immigrants several financial services and products such as opportunities to build a variety of asset base tools including interest bearing saving accounts and lines of credit (Samuels, 2003).

The International Remittance Network (IRnet), a network of credit unions operating in over 40 countries across Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the United States also offers members of its credit unions access to safe and affordable

international and domestic money transfer services. Credit union customers in its network are allowed to remit up to US\$1,000/day for US\$10. In addition, the beneficiary abroad is not charged any fee for receiving transfers (World Council of Credit Unions, 2006).

Informal channels

Informal funds transfer systems are an integral part of the international financial system. They facilitate the easy transfer of migrant remittances. A large proportion of these remittances are often carried across borders by hand by immigrants themselves, relatives and friends as well as through unregulated money transfer operators and agents such as hawala style networks.

The *hawala* system is an informal channel of transferring funds across borders through service providers called *hawaladars* (El-Qorchi, 2002). The system is popular among immigrants from the Middle East, South Asia as well as among immigrants from North and East Africa. Despite the risk of losing money and promoting money laundering activities, sending money to families back home through such informal systems is necessitated by the lack of mainstream financial institutions in some areas, strict money transfer regulations, the need to reduce transaction costs and the desire to take advantage of favorable parallel market rates for foreign currency. In the case of the hawala system, its popularity amongst immigrants is explained by its anonymity as well as its reliance on kinship and ethnic ties. It is also very reliable, cheap, and less bureaucratic than mainstream financial institutions (El-Qorchi, 2002; El-Qorchi et al., 2003). Funds collection instructions are usually passed on to recipients by telephone, fax, or email and correspondents often deliver the funds door to door within 24 hours, even in remote areas.

Despite these advantages, informal systems such as the hawala system do not directly benefit both sending and receiving countries. There are no direct or indirect taxes levied against these transactions. The transfers also do not appear in the balance of payments sheets of governments and they can negatively impact macroeconomic policies (Middle East and North Africa Financial Task Force, 2005). Therefore, it is extremely hard for receiving countries, particularly conflict-torn countries such as Somalia or those with weak financial systems to regulate and harness hawala transactions for national development. Given their overall importance in transferring remittances across borders, African policymakers should therefore put in place mechanisms that encourage such informal transfer systems to be regulated or licensed. The adoption of hard line approaches might

force these systems to go underground, making it difficult to improve transaction transparency levels of these systems or to collect any taxes or fees on those transactions. This will also make anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism initiatives difficult to implement.

Initiatives facilitating the safe transfer of remittances

In response to the growing significance of the migradollar across Africa, many governments are putting in place mechanisms to ensure the safe transfer of remittances. To remove remittance transfers from the informal to the formal sector, Burkina Faso has put in place structures that allow the Diaspora to open up bank accounts at home. The Central Bank of Kenya also recently launched “The Kenyans Abroad Investment Fund”. The goal of the fund is to assist Kenyan nationals living abroad to invest directly at home or transfer money to their families. The government estimates that the Kenyan Diaspora remits close to \$600 million every year to their families and for investment purposes (Kelley, 2005). If these financial transfers are properly harnessed, they can be agents to fight poverty as well as an agent of community and national development in many African countries. This is particularly so in those countries where remittances exceed ODA flows.

In order to ensure that remittances reach their targeted destination and are used for the intended purpose, countries such as Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe are also experimenting with a new remittance strategy. This strategy allows migrants to purchase groceries, building materials, other goods as well as education and health vouchers online. The intended beneficiaries can pick up these groceries or goods from supermarkets or shops participating in such schemes. To reinforce their links to their home country, Zambia has also put in place a programme designed to attract Zambians living in the Diaspora to invest in residential real estate back home.

Conclusions and policy implications

To maximize the benefits of migradollars at the family or national level, efforts to encourage the flow of remittances should be accompanied by appropriate regulatory frameworks that are designed to reduce remittance transaction hurdles and to minimize the risk of money laundering or the financing of terrorism,

coups or civil wars. Thus, there is a need to integrate informal remittance service providers into the formal arena in both sending and receiving countries. The costs of sending remittances should also be reduced. And to significantly scale-up the benefits stemming from remittance inflows, African countries need to remove barriers to entry and competition in the remittance market. Further development of the financial services sector is therefore of paramount importance if receiving countries are to bank the unbanked population. And to maximize remittance driven investments in agriculture, small-scale enterprises and in other sectors, African countries should also strive to introduce growth-enhancing reforms. Lastly, African countries should tap into their Diaspora populations to build trade and tourism networks as well as to harness the vast skills and knowledge base of the Diaspora.

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Chapter 6:

International Migration and National, Global and Human Security

Introduction

Besides its impact on the economic, social and cultural fabric of sending and receiving countries, international migration also has profound security effects in countries of origin, transit, and destination. It is also impacting deep-seated concepts of nation and sovereignty. While globalization has led to increased movement of goods and capital across national borders, the movement of people is increasingly subject to tighter border controls. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States as well as the London and Madrid bombings have raised barriers to the movement of people, including the movement of Africans into the United States and Western Europe.

This chapter deals with international migration and human, national and global security concerns, with special reference to Africa and the African Diaspora. The term security is used both to refer to the defense of territory from external threats as well as individual or human security that includes the protection of communities and individuals from violence, human rights abuse, poverty, hunger, and health, environmental and biological threats (Thouez, 2002; UNDP, 1994).

The migration, national and global security nexus

Prior to 11 September 2001, the migration-security nexus was not at the forefront in discussions of international migration even though discussions on the security impact of irregular movement of people across borders, including human trafficking and smuggling, was on the agenda of most immigrant receiving countries. The irregular movement of people was an issue because it generally undermines a country's ability to regulate the entry and stay of immigrants. However, today, international migration is being perceived as threatening by governments of either sending or receiving communities.

As exemplified by the ongoing tensions between Sudan and Chad over the spillover effects of the Darfur crisis, where more than 100,000 Sudanese persons have crossed the border into Chad, the terrorist bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, as well as by the recent history of conflicts in the Great Lakes region, the threat can be an attack by armed refugees who cross over from bases in neighboring countries. Alternatively, migrants can be a threat to either country's political stability. In addition, the migration –security nexus is also important for Africa since the continent has a number of failed or weakened States. Failed States are susceptible platforms for transnational terrorist activities. They also serve as transit points because of their porous and corrupt borders (United States Institute for Peace, 2004).

In Western societies immigrants have been perceived as a threat to the major societal values of the receiving country as amply demonstrated by the French riots in 2005. And in times of war or heightened national security concerns, immigrants are also perceived to pose a security risk as exemplified by the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II and the detention of Muslims in the United States after September 11 (see Box 6.1). In the case of the terrorist attacks of September 11, the United States government tightened its immigration rules. For instance, President Bush issued a Presidential Directive on "Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies". The directive reaffirmed the United States' determination "to work aggressively to prevent aliens who engage in or support terrorist activity from entering the United States and to detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens who are in the United States" (Bush, 2001:1). This directive and the USA Patriot Act that followed have had a major impact on how countries link international migration to national security.

For good measure, these instruments reasserted State power and reaffirmed the importance of national security in an era when globalization processes, including the movement of people are at an all time high.

Box 6.1 September 11, 2001 and the migration-security nexus

It was the nineteen attackers in those four airplanes on September 11, 2001 that altered the public perception of immigrants, morphing them into a dire threat to national security. All of the 9/11 attackers were in the United States on temporary visas, three of which had expired. All of them were from the middle East, mostly Saudi and Egyptian, and all were Moslem. As it became clear that this was the work of the Al Qaeda network of Osama Bin Laden, a new urgency and depth to the migration security relationship began to take shape. Al Qaeda cells were revealed to exist in Germany, Italy, Malaysia, Indonesia and elsewhere. Money trails were leading to all corners of the globe. Training took place in several "failed states" and possibly in other "rogue" states. This was a worldwide operation, with no firm territorial or national base. Terrorism was, in short, a transnational security threat, and by its nature was dependent on migration of people, weapons, information and money.

Source: Tirman, 2004:1

To curtail international migration and strengthen mechanisms to control it in a post 9/11 era, North America and Europe are using a variety of methods such as advanced information technologies to track the entry and exit of individuals, accelerated procedures to depot illegal immigrants, and the use of databases such as the Schengen Information System database to quickly screen people prior to their arrival and to identify persons who should not be admitted (Koslowski, 2002; Lahav, 2003; IOM, 2003). In addition, most countries have given immigration gate-keeping responsibilities to non-state actors such as airlines, hotels and universities. These actors have effectively taken responsibility for the control of immigration (Lahav, 2003). The European Union has also entered into agreements with neighboring countries that have created a buffer zone protecting EU countries from the direct arrival of undocumented migrants and asylum-seekers. The use of non-state actors has facilitated the implementation of security checks while short-circuiting legal constraints. Public perceptions about the importance of maintaining national security have also accelerated such developments and have made it easier for lawmakers to pass laws that curtail certain civil liberties under heightened conditions of threat to national security (Lahav, 2003).

Despite these measures, a growing number of regional and international organizations such as the African Union, the European Union and the United Nations have become increasingly aware of the limits of a purely security-based strategy to regulating international migration. For instance, the 5 + 5 Group, (i.e. France, Italy, Spain, Malta, Greece + Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania) is working closely on a package regulating the flow of immigrants from the Maghreb to Europe, including development projects aimed at tackling the structural causes of migration pressure in the sending countries. The increased flow of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe through the Maghreb region has added impetus to these discussions. Although the flow of migrants between sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb have existed for centuries, contemporary flows involve human rights and security as well as a larger number of sub-Saharan African countries. For the European Union, there is a temptation to externalize part of the immigration management by having Maghreb countries establish immigrant-processing centers. Such developments are problematic since they can undermine the fundamental rights and protection of migrants. In addition, such arrangements could undermine relations between the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa.

In addition, while migration can be a consequence of security threats like human rights violations, ethnic conflict, and civil war, it becomes a threat to both state and global security when it is massive and uncontrolled; and can generate security threats such as xenophobia and racial violence (Kicinger, 2004). It is often observed that social stability may be at risk when the inflow of immigrants is combined with the rise of xenophobia and lack of integration; crime levels among the immigrants are higher than among the native population; international crime networks dealing in drugs and arms are active; trafficking in human beings is rampant; and terrorists using both legal and illegal migration channels penetrate the country, either to attack the host community or to wage war on their home countries. Similarly, economic stability can be challenged by competition for scarce resources such as land and employment opportunities and/or the curtailment of remittances, which are important sources of sustenance for members of households left behind. Box 6.2 uses the 11 September 2001 experience to illustrate what may happen to remittances to developing countries in many similar situations, albeit at a smaller scale.

Box 6.2 Remittances and the war on terrorism

The US Treasury, the World Bank, regional financial institutions and national governments have, for the last two years, focused attention on the linkage between informal remittance systems and terrorist financing/money laundering. The consensus strategy is not to drive informal remittances underground, but to regulate them to formal sector standards as much as possible and to channel a much higher percentage of remittances through the formal sector (Mellyn, 2003).

The efforts to crack down on the financing of terrorism have affected the volume of informal remittances and large numbers of migrants have begun to look for formal banking channels to remit funds (Ratha, 2003: 165). Bezaud (2002) estimates that the market share of informal transfers in developing countries will fall from 45 percent in 2001 to 34 per cent in 2006 mainly because of pressures faced by informal networks in the western world due to the war on terrorism.

The war on terrorism has disrupted a few informal remittance channels, specially those involving the Middle East, Indonesia and the Philippines. The disruption of informal Somali remittance networks is expected to have a huge negative impact on recipients in Somalia and on Somali refugees in neighbouring countries (Horst and Van Hear, 2002).

Source: Sorensen, 2004:16.

Besides the impact of migration on national security, the security spillover effects of international migration also stretch across the globe. According to Christie (1997) "States in an interdependent world have found it increasingly difficult to deal with transnational security threats in a national context (i.e. drug problems, AIDS, crime, terrorism, immigration, the problems of pollution and the environment, etc). These are problems that cut across state borders and, as such, have particular relevance where the State is facing the pressures of globalization. Whereas security has been seen in the light of relationships between states involving alliance, sovereignty, deterrence, and others, it is now being extended to include areas such as threats to the domestic economy and society-state relationships." The 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States reinforced these links between migration and security that transcends state boundaries.

In a globalized world, an attack on one nation has global financial and security ripple effects. For instance, in a post-9/11 world, poor countries have also been affected by some counter terrorism policies of western countries such as more rigorous restrictions on the movement of people, goods and capital (Treverton, 2005).

As a result of its growing scale, scope, and complexity, international migration is linked to the spread of infectious` diseases, terrorism and other threats to international security (GCIM, 2005; Leiken, 2004; IOM, 2003; Treverton, 2005). In addition, refugee flows and mass migration tend to spill over the borders of States with poor governance, especially where development has failed (USAID, 2003). These developments endanger the security of the entire global community. Hence, the growing scale of human mobility increasingly extends the scope of security concerns beyond national borders. Consequently, addressing modern security challenges such as terrorism and organized crime, trafficking in persons and smuggling of human beings requires a broader concept of security based on promoting development, and respect for human rights and the rule of law (Mckinley, 2006). More importantly, is the realization that migration-induced benefits can be maximized while the negative consequences, such as security concerns, are minimized.

Hence, the international migration security threat has evolved from mere social security issues of challenges to local jobs, language and culture, and incidences of crime and disease, to trans-national issues of terrorism, epidemics like the avian flu, and increasing networks of drug and human trafficking. Dealing with the latter issues requires intensified global cooperation and harmonization of policies at all levels (Koslowski, 2004).

Migration and human security

Besides its impact on what Treverton (2005) refers to as the big-S Security (that is national and global), international migration is also linked to small-s security (that is human or individual security).


Unlike national security, whose primary goal is the defense of the state against external threats, human security is about protecting individuals and communities from any form of violence. It also encompasses threats to human dignity, economic insecurity, disease, and natural disasters. These threats are some of the causes of the 'voluntary' movement of people across borders as well as forced migration and the irregular movement of persons.

Thus, the human security of refugees, IDPs, victims of trafficking, migrants, and residents in host and sending communities is linked to migration. For many Africans, migration is vital for the attainment of freedom from want and fear. Hence the movement of people across borders as a result of threats to human security is closely linked to state security (Commission on Human Security, 2003). To highlight these linkages, the section below discusses refugees and human trafficking.

Refugees and security

Of the 191 million international migrants in 2005, about 13.5 million were refugees, with Africa having 3 million of them (United Nations, 2006). The largest concentrations of refugees in Africa are in conflict regions (see figure 6.1). These forced migrants are often subjected to state or non-state agents of persecution such as the military or armed militia groups such as the Janjaweed militias in Darfur. These migrants also face serious discriminatory practices and other offensive acts committed by the local populace.

Figure 6.1 Refugees in selected African countries, 2005



Source: UNHCR 2006

State or non-state agents have also undermined the human security of refugees in northern Uganda, western Sudan, eastern Chad, and in eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The eastern DRC has experienced frequent infiltration of armed elements subjecting refugees and IDPs to gross human rights violations, including sexual harassment.

In the case of Eritrea and Ethiopia, the human security of tens of thousands of civilians has been undermined by the ongoing border conflict between the two countries (Africa Action, 1998). Overall, there are major socio-economic, political and security implications associated with cross border movements, including refugee flows throughout East Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes Region and other areas across Africa (IMP, 2002). Many Africans displaced from their homes face death from starvation, disease and other human rights abuses (see Box 6.3).

Box 6.3 Violence from authorities and gangs are major threat to immigrants in Morocco

A report released by the international medical humanitarian aid organization Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) describes escalating violence against immigrants crossing from Morocco to Spain. Up to 25 percent of MSF's patients are seeking medical treatment as a result of persecution and attacks.

Since early 2003, MSF has been running mobile clinics and monitoring the immigrant community for disease outbreaks. Medical data and testimonies collected from migrants reveal that of the 10,232 medical consultations conducted between April 2003 and August 2005, 2,544 are violence related. This places violence and illnesses related to poor living conditions as the two greatest health risks to these vulnerable people.

Immigrants who have been victims of violence and treated by MSF say that their injuries have been caused by Moroccan police forces (44 percent), Spanish police forces (18 percent), criminal gangs (17 percent), mafia groups or networks engaged in human trafficking (12 percent), other immigrants (2 percent), and accidents (7 percent).

Injuries include gunshot wounds, beatings, as well as from attacks by dogs as people tried to escape Moroccan security forces. Deaths have also occurred.

MSF is concerned that these findings reveal systematic violence and degrading treatment which only serve to increase the suffering and marginalisation of people who are already exposed to extremely precarious and often inhumane conditions.

Doctors Without Borders, 2005.

In West Africa, conflicts and inadequate security have affected refugees from Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire (Drumtra, 2003). For example, the effects of conflicts on civilians has been devastating, with an estimated one million West Africans forced to flee their countries within a period of one year. In addition, pervasive human rights abuses against civilian populations throughout the region are estimated to have cost up to a quarter-million deaths. In the case of Liberia, individual security risks have included exposure to health effects resulting from water shortages, measles, malaria, cholera, and other diarrheal diseases, as well as malnutrition. And in some cases, refugees have suffered violent attacks from host communities. For instance, 70,000 Liberian refugees living in western Cote d'Ivoire were attacked by locals who viewed them as a security risk (Drumtra, 2003).

Short-term solutions to these persecutions would include assurance of security and human rights in refugee camps. In the long-term, promotion of peace and stability in home countries or home regions, as well as acceptance and tolerance in host countries or host regions should be the appropriate approaches (Thouez, 2002).

Human Trafficking

The expansion of trans-national crime and drug trafficking networks into trafficking for the purpose of prostitution, child labour and other forms of exploitation has become a major concern for many Governments. It has also become a major priority for organizations working in the areas of human rights, women's empowerment, child protection, law enforcement and health and social services (Harns, 2004). Despite the growing attention given to human trafficking, statistics on the magnitude of the problem remain inadequate. It is estimated that between 700,000 to 4 million people are trafficked every year and lured into prostitution and other forms of forced labour, including domestic slavery, construction and agricultural work (Herzfeld et al., 2006; Simic, 2004; UNFPA, 2004, 2002). Although women are estimated to constitute 80 per cent of trafficking victims, a large number of children and men are also trafficked from Africa to the Gulf States and Europe as well as within Africa (Theuermann, 2005; de Regt, 2006; Herzfeld et al., 2006; Terada and de Guchteneire, 2006). Because of the large amounts of money involved in smuggling and trafficking people, a majority of trafficked persons tend to be victims of organized criminal groups or unscrupulous employment agents. These groups also find human trafficking to be less risky than smuggling drugs. Drug trafficking tends to elicit strong punitive measures in most countries as compared to human trafficking (Harns, 2004).

Generally, migrants are susceptible to xenophobia, racism, discrimination and other forms of intolerance (Thouez, 2002). To worsen the situation, as options for legal migration become limited, especially for semi-skilled and unskilled workers, irregular migration increases (Forgues, 2005). This leads to an increasing number of migrants opting for dangerous methods of travel and harsh living conditions, and sometimes willing to pay a fee to be smuggled to their destinations (see Box 6.4). Many risk their lives and perish on the way. Stories of unskilled Africans losing their lives while crossing the border between Morocco and Spain, or on the open seas, have been broadcast with estimates of thousands of Africans perishing at sea. For those who are lucky to survive, once delivered to their destinations, they become subject to uncertain and harsh living conditions, unfavorable terms of employment (low wages and no benefits), and undesirable work in industries in which they did not voluntarily choose to work (Maruja, 2005). Worse still, the insecurity of illegal migrants is intensified by their treatment as criminals by the police and immigration authorities (IMADR, 2001).

Box 6.4 Desperation fills smugglers' pockets

Desperate migrants use desperate means such as substandard boats to cross the Mediterranean Sea. But the creation of barriers in Morocco to stop migrants moving north has its limits, as there is also a lucrative business. Smuggling a single individual into Spain via Morocco costs between €5,000 and €7,000. With this money, smugglers can afford equipping themselves with the latest technology, allowing them to operate below the radar screen. Those who cannot afford the €5,000 fare often end up stuck in Moroccan towns and in camps like Bel Younech, Gourougou and other similar facilities. Their only option remains the jumping of the fence separating them to Spain's Sebta and Melilla. This has become an increasingly difficult task to achieve. The remaining alternative would be to stay in Morocco.

Source: Daoud, 2005.

And in countries like Nigeria, Ethiopia and Somalia, traffickers are taking advantage of the growing feminization of poverty, low status of women, war and conflict to recruit young uneducated women from poor families (Nwogu, 2006; de Regt, 2006; Maruja, 2005). Some of these women borrow money from traffickers to pay for their fare, ending up in debt. To get out of the debt bondage, the women are required to work long hours in involuntary domestic servitude and their passports are often confiscated.

In the case of Ethiopian women trafficked to Yemen, their situation is compounded by the fact that Yemen does not allow undocumented residents to leave the country without paying a penalty for the time they worked in the country without a residence permit, hence a large number of Ethiopian women are forced to stay in the country (de Regt, 2006). Trafficking in women and girls for prostitution is one of the most serious violations of human security. Channels to trafficking include abduction, kidnapping and intimidation into submission and the trafficked persons are subjected to poor conditions of travel. They are also physically and psychologically abused. Sometimes, threats from state actors or failure of states to take action in the face of open cases of abuse increase the individual insecurity of such victims (Simic, 2004).

North Africa is an important transit region for different types of irregular migrants. Information from Morocco indicates that all the country's "cities have their share of undocumented migrants originating from Niger, Mali, Nigeria, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Somalia, Togo, the Congo, and other nations" (Daoud, 2005). Neighboring Algeria faces a similar situation; while Niger is the biggest transit territory in the Morocco migration route. Migrants taking this route "speak of a dangerous journey characterized by violence, aggression, and rape. Although they are less than men, women are the main victims of violence. The desert is also harsh, killing an untold number of migrants" (Daoud, 2005).

Therefore, as the Global Commission on International Migration states, illegal migration "is inextricably linked to that of human security. Many of the people who migrate in an irregular manner do so because their own countries are affected by armed conflict, political instability and economic decline" (GCIM, 2005:33). But in the process of migration, they are exposed to many dangers, including death.

It is suggested that the solutions to these effects on individual security lie in increased opportunities for legal migration; fostering social integration; tolerance in host communities and increased social and economic development and good governance in the home countries.

Impact of national and global security concerns on the African diaspora

The heightened national and global security concerns of western countries are impacting the lives of the African Diaspora in many ways. For instance, the civil liberties of some African immigrants have been curtailed in the wake of the post

9/11 and 3/11 security initiatives in the United States and Spain as well as in the United Kingdom. In addition, African immigrants with technical visa violations have been removed from some countries in the name of national security while other immigrant groups have witnessed an upsurge in hate crimes and job discrimination (Tirman, 2004; Jamal and Heydemann, 2004; Cainkar, 2004).

These concerns have also elevated a host of social, economic and political tensions between immigrants and host populations. Immigrants are increasingly being blamed for high unemployment rates among host populations, increased crime, terrorism, drug problems, the spread of diseases and social disintegration. Immigration provokes fears of reduced wages and increased competition for jobs and health and social services. Some also view it as a threat to national sovereignty and to established notions of national identity. Consequently, the past two decades have witnessed a sharp upsurge in nationalist parties and xenophobic movements in Western Europe (Thouez, 2002; MacPherson and Gushulak, 2004; Anarfi, 2005).

These security concerns are not only confined to western countries. Within Africa, host communities also bear economic, social, and physical and psychological security costs. For instance, African government officials participating in an International Migration Policy Conference for East Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region “noted with concern the impact of large, spontaneous migration and refugee flows on national and regional security and stability; deteriorating environmental effects in host countries; the potential for infiltration of individuals or groups of individuals who may disregard or work to undermine national laws and regulations by, for example, acquiring and using fraudulent identification documents for passage to another country or for more duplicitous means; the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in refugee areas and its correlation with a general rise in criminality; and the potential for inter-State discord between countries of origin and destination over these and related issues.” (Thouez, 2002:8).

And in South Africa, the tens of thousands of legal and illegal immigrants from across the continent are facing a myriad of problems. Unfamiliar with their role as a refugee hosting country and a magnet for many highly skilled Africans, many South Africans are struggling to come to terms with this post-independence influx. Migration is seen as a threat to territorial boundaries and employment opportunities; and migrants are perceived as exacerbating unemployment among the majority Black population, and a drain on material and social resources (Christie, 1997; Zuberi and Sibanda, 2005).

These factors lead to xenophobia and resentment against the refugees, asylum seekers and legal immigrants at all levels and to state and non-state acts of abuse on individual security (Landau, 2004). The response to these challenges has been rather mixed. For instance, although the Refugees Act of 1998 demonstrates a strong commitment to the protection of refugees that is in line with international standards, refugees are frequently subjected to discrimination, police harassment, and xenophobic rhetoric and violence (Landau and Jacobsen, 2004).

A number of factors influence how countries respond to the national, global and human security concerns generated by international migration. These include lack of data for a clear assessment of the migration situation. Lack of statistics on migration tends to lead to misconceptions on how many illegal immigrants there are in a country. It also creates an unclear differentiation among legal immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. The situation is compounded by the lack of harmonized government responses as reflected by diverse, incoherent, inconsistent and contradictory government actions on immigration. Box 6.5 gives an example on how the Republic of South Africa is grappling with these challenges.

Box 6.5 South Africa: The migration threat: problems and responses

By mid-1994, officials estimated that illegal immigrants were entering South Africa at the rate of one every ten minutes, forming between five and eight per cent of the population. There are several problems related to the state/ immigrant situation that appears to have developed into a crisis. The threat that transient migrants pose for the new South African economy, struggling to compete at the global level, appears to be a real one.

One problem is statistics: there is simply no clarity on how many illegal immigrants are inside the country, but estimates range from anywhere between two and eight million (the latter was a police estimate quoted in the press in 1994). The Department of Home Affairs estimate is about three million, a fairly conservative and speculative figure. This also excludes the roughly 170 000 contract migrant workers (people working in mines) and another 100 000 employed in agriculture. There are also about 300 000 Mozambicans who have been accorded some kind of refugee status. Their status is unsure because it is not clear what it means to be a refugee and then be without any hope of asylum, treated like an illegal immigrant and to a large extent forcibly deported.

This situation follows an agreement between South Africa and the UNHCR in 1993. The problem is compounded by the fact that many of these migrants have entered South Africa illegally and their presence is therefore clandestine and undocumented. Moreover, many of those that are found and deported, subsequently re-enter the country. The only real data in these terms are those of the 'illegals' who have been recorded because they have been arrested and forcibly repatriated, after entering the country on temporary permits. Their departures were however not recorded when their visas expired, or they were once registered as refugees. It does not give any information about immigrants that have never been recorded.

The important point in terms of definitional context, is that the distinction between illegal immigrants, as classified by Government, and refugees (applying mainly to Mozambicans) is spurious.

Mozambicans in rural areas have previously largely been classified as refugees by the former apartheid homeland governments. Mozambicans in urban areas are identified as illegal aliens and different policies – voluntary repatriation from rural areas and forcible deportation from urban ones – have tended to reinforce this divide. Such distinctions are problematic, because the classification of these groups is completely arbitrary. Many of these illegals arrive in rural areas as refugees, but are then forced to migrate to the cities in order to find work to survive and support their households.

STATE RESPONSES

The post-apartheid Government's responses to these problems have often been diverse, incoherent, inconsistent and essentially contradictory. There has been little shift in ideological position from the past, and the current legislation is mainly informed by the Aliens Control Act of 1991. This has been described as a 'draconian' leftover from apartheid and appears more concerned with the security elements of 'control', rather than protection. Suggestions to extend and upgrade the electric fences on the Mozambican and Zimbabwean borders, and intensify the tracing, apprehension, detention and repatriation, in turn increasing the level of human rights violations, outline a policy aimed at the increasing 'securitization' of forced migration concerns.

Source: Christie, 1997

Conclusions and policy implications

It is clear from the above discussion that migration is both an outcome and a source of insecurity at the individual, state and global levels. The State, as a major actor, has a defining role in the process of nation- building. In doing so, it is faced with a series of dilemmas related to regulating legal immigration and adopting policies that deal with refugees, asylum seekers and illegal immigration and human trafficking all within the context of ensuring human, national and global security. Hence, most countries, particularly the rich countries have responded to the migration-security nexus with a variety of policies in defense and homeland security. However, a growing number of countries are also realizing the importance of global economic policies in the migration-security nexus. In particular most developed countries realize the need to invest in the development of poor countries as well as strengthening good governance institutions and practices in these sending countries. It is anticipated that the spillover from these developments will help stem the movement of people from the south to the north.

Enhanced technical cooperation and harmonized regional policies on migration, including the strengthening of border systems are also critical in addressing the challenges posed by the migration-security nexus. Such policies have the potential to provide more accurate information on the different types of migrants; their needs and the benefits they bring to the host community.

And to effectively fight human trafficking, governments need to address issues of poverty, status of women, vulnerability, and class. In addition, there is a need to provide information and create awareness about the realities of human trafficking. Protecting trafficking victims and providing them with the requisite social and health care services are also critical.

Awareness creation about the needs of the migrants and the benefits they bring to the host communities and increased government and institutional support to both migrants and the host communities may reduce the vulnerabilities felt by both the migrants and the host community.

However, individual State efforts to deal with security concerns must be buttressed by inter-State, sub-regional, regional and general international collaboration and cooperation. As the International Migration Policy Programme (2002:2) states: "---- mismanaged or unmanaged migration, and the potential for discord among states over migration concerns, makes imperative a better

understanding of the multi-faceted causes, impacts and implications of migration at the national level, and require an on-going and sustained effort to promote inter-State dialogue and cooperation between States.”

Efficient border management, institutional and human capacity building for immigration services, exchange of information and issuance of temper proof travel documents will contribute to better management of international migration in Africa.

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Chapter 7:

The Way Forward

Introduction

Better management of migration in a globalized world requires actions on a number of fronts. ECA suggests that the formulation and implementation of any regional migration frameworks should depend on the effectiveness of sound political and economic governance as reflected in the NEPAD. Regarding the regulation of the free movement of people between Africa and the rest of the world, ECA's thinking is conditioned by the need to uphold the following:

The rights of international migrants and their families

The ratification of international conventions and protocols (sub-regional, regional and global) and aligning of national policies to such international obligations, will promote the human rights of international migrants. This will minimize the conflict that arises when national pressures (due to security concerns or xenophobia) cause national policies to collide with international conventions and protocols, putting human rights of migrants immediately in jeopardy.

Bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements between sending and receiving countries will enhance respect for human rights of migrants.

Respect for human rights of refugees should be one of the priorities for the African region. Health is a human right for all, including migrants. The right to health for migrants requires affordable and accessible health services, healthy working and living conditions, and appropriate health education (UNAIDS/IOM, 2004).

Cohesion and tolerance

International migration involves multiculturalism. Therefore, cohesion and tolerance will best be nurtured through advocacy and awareness creation, especially in the receiving countries by highlighting the positive contributions of migrants to sending and receiving countries, as well as formulating and implementing programmes of integration, tolerance and multiculturalism.

Contribution to development

The gains from international migration extend beyond economic growth. The contribution of international migration to development, if harnessed properly, touches many dimensions of development including economic advancement, social welfare, cultural enrichment, health promotion, and political stability. An example based on the refugee factor in Africa clearly shows that lack of appropriate bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements on how to handle asylum seekers worsens conflicts in countries of origin and countries of refuge (e.g. the Lord's Resistance Army terrorizing Uganda, Sudan and Congo; the Banyamulenge dilemma in Rwanda and Congo; and the Darfur situation in Sudan and Chad). On the other hand, the harmonious handling of matters related to asylum seekers between Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda has, to a large extent, defused conflict and suffering on either side of the borders.

Constructive engagement of member States

International migration should be brought closer to the arena of international development cooperation and more global programmes on human capital, especially health and education, should be initiated. The regional and sub-regional constructive engagements of member States taking place in East, North and West Africa under the auspices of the ILO Project on Labour Migration for Integration and Development with the support of the EU, can facilitate bilateral and multilateral agreements between sending and receiving countries. Through such engagements, regional, sub-regional and national policies will be harmonized and the free movement of people will be enhanced.

In a more extended global environment, examples of bi-lateral agreements between the UK and African countries on migrant workers in the health sector abound (for example, in the case of Ghana and Uganda). Such agreements enhance the contribution of migrant workers to health enhancement in UK, maximize the benefits acquired by migrant workers and their countries, and provide monitoring and evaluation systems that mitigate against the undesirable effects of the brain-drain. Given the developing global world of open borders, and the ageing populations of the first world, this approach is a good example of harnessing human resources for a global market.

Coherence and harmonization of policies

Action should be taken to harmonize the migration-related work of relevant ministries such as labour, foreign affairs, trade and commerce. Policy coherence across government ministries will ease the ratification and implementation of international conventions and protocols as well as the alignment of national policies to international obligations. Efforts should also be made to adopt and implement policies geared towards improvement of legal and statistical systems on international migration. This will enhance the linkages between migration and development, and promote the free movement of people.

Member States, including the relevant ministries (labour, foreign affairs, health, etc.) should work with their counterparts in other countries/regions, to ensure harmonized policies. International organizations (including members of the UN family) could bring together relevant stakeholders including Heads of State, representatives of relevant ministries, legislators, the private sector and representatives of civil society organizations around migration issues, showing how they can be integrated into development and other relevant processes. In addition, international organizations could establish global programmes on human capital, drawing on experiences of existing initiatives.

Freedom of movement is a human right, and individuals' freedom to move out of their countries should not be subject to arbitrary restriction, within the provisions of national laws. Countries should learn lessons from many constructive schemes and consider them for scaling up. For example, there are schemes which mandate health professionals to work for a pre-determined number of years in their countries (especially where their training was funded by their governments). Other schemes require the receiving country to refund all costs incurred in training the professional, prior to departure.

Institutional issues

Human and institutional capacity building is important for maximizing the benefits of international migration and minimizing perceived disadvantages. These are vital for understanding the implications of ratifying and implementing any international convention; managing international migration with concrete facts and efficiency; and dealing with emerging issues on international migration through regularized consultative processes at all levels. At the global level an appropriate, regularized consultative process on international migration could move countries in the right direction. Such a process could be replicated at regional and sub-regional levels.

At the national level, institutional mechanisms on international migration should be promoted. For example, Uganda set up an External Employment Unit in the Employment Section of the Department of Labour to work, in conjunction with other organs, in regulating private recruitment agencies for Ugandans emigrating to work abroad. To facilitate this, Uganda put in place statutory measures on recruitment of Ugandan migrant workers abroad within the Employment Policy Department. The measures focused at promoting full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all; upholding the dignity and rights of Ugandan migrant workers; directing the deployment of Ugandans to countries which have existing labour, or are signatories to international agreements; protecting the rights of every Ugandan desiring to work abroad by securing the best possible terms and conditions of employment; and providing a mechanism for issuing licenses to recruitment agencies. These measures followed observation of a significant increase in remittances in the country's balance of payments, and a groundswell of growing demand for such measures from Ugandans working abroad. The end result was enhanced respect for human rights for Ugandan migrant workers in both Uganda and receiving countries, and maximization of individual and national economic, social and health benefits.

Overall, the future of international migration and development is in providing improved economic opportunities in the sending countries to minimize the economic "push" factors that make people leave their countries in a quest for self-improvement. The solution is not in stricter border controls, particularly in receiving countries. Indeed opening up of borders will facilitate free movement of labour and increase the potential for migrants to visit home countries as often as they want, not fearing that their return to the host country will be denied the next time they seek re-entry. This may, in fact, contribute to increased temporary migration, less permanent migration (especially to countries in the north),

and enhanced contribution to the growth and progress of developing countries by migrants.

Way forward

In an increasingly globalized world, the way forward in managing migration for increased benefits of sending and receiving countries, and of migrants and their families may be found in:

- Promoting the ratification of international conventions and protocols and aligning national policies to such international obligations;
- Promoting advocacy and awareness creation, especially in the receiving countries and highlighting the positive contributions of migrants to sending and receiving countries;
- Emphasizing that the international migration impacts many dimensions of development, including economic advancement, social welfare, cultural enrichment, health promotion, and political stability;
- Supporting bi-literal and multi-lateral agreements between sending and receiving countries as channels of enhancing the contribution of international migration to international development;
- Promoting coherence among different national policies and increasing the capacity of all stakeholders to implement policies geared towards improvement of legal and statistical systems on international migration;
- Building human and institutional capacity for maximizing the benefits of international migration and minimizing perceived disadvantages;
- Promoting regularized consultative processes on international migration at global, regional and sub-regional levels;
- Providing improved social and economic conditions in the sending countries (the south) to minimize factors that make people leave their countries in search of self-improvement;
- Promoting international, regional and sub-regional partnerships, including those organized in the diaspora;

- Directing investment into areas which optimize the generation of jobs for available skills; and
- Continuing the dialogue on global trade, complementing the notion of open markets with complete elimination of subsidies.

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ANNEX 1

Relevant policy instruments and African states that have ratified them

| Instrument | Entry into force | African states that have ratified |
|---|-------------------------------------|---|
| Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others ¹ | 1951 | Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Côte D' Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Togo, Zimbabwe. Signed, but not ratified: Liberia (1950), Madagascar (2001) |
| ILO Convention 97 on Migration for Employment Convention ² | 1952 | Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees |
| Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees ³ | 1954 (convention and 1967 (protocol | Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde (protocol only), Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bussau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar (convention only), Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe. |

¹Taken from http://untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyEvent2003/Treaty_8.htm, updated 24th March 2003, accessed 19th April 2006

²As provided by the International Labour Organization, at <http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp2.htm>, accessed 18th April 2006

³As provided by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, at <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&id=3b73b0d63>, accessed 18th April 2006

| Instrument | Entry into force | African states that have ratified |
|---|------------------|---|
| Convention on the Nationality of Married Women | 1958 | Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe Signed, but not ratified: Guinea (1975), South Africa (1993) |
| International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination | 1969 | Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Signed, but not ratified: Guinea-Bissau (2000), Sao Tome and Principe (2000). |
| Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons | 1960 | Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe. |

Taken from <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty2.htm>, accessed 19th April 2006

Taken from <http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/index.htm>, accessed 18th April 2006, last updated 26th January 2006

As of 5th February 2002, as provided by the United Nations High Commissioners for Refugees, at <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty3stat.htm>, accessed 18th April 2006

| Instrument | Entry into force | African states that have ratified |
|--|------------------|--|
| Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment | 1987 | Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Signed, but not ratified: Comoros (2000) |
| Convention on the Rights of the Child | 1990 | Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Signed, but not ratified: Somalia (2002) |

Taken from <http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/index.htm>, accessed 18th April 2006, last updated 26th January 2006

Taken from <http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/index.htm>, accessed 18th April 2006, last updated 26th January 2006

Taken from <http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/index.htm>, accessed 18th April 2006, last updated 26th January 2006

| Instrument | Entry into force | African states that have ratified |
|---|-------------------------|---|
| UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime | 2003 | Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia Signed, but not ratified: Angola (2000), Burundi (2000), Congo (2000), Côte D'Ivoire (2000), Ethiopia (2000), Guinea-Bissau (2000), Mozambique (2000), Sierra Leone (2001), Swaziland (2000), United Republic of Tanzania (2000), Zimbabwe (2000) |
| Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime | 2003 | Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Tunisia, Zambia. Signed, but not ratified: Burundi (2000), Guinea-Bissau (2000), Mozambique (2000), Sierra Leone (2001), Swaziland (2001), Togo (2000), Uganda (2000), United Republic of Tanzania (2000). |

Taken from <http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/index.htm>, accessed 18th April 2006, last updated 26th January 2006

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Taken from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_cicp_signatures_trafficking.html, accessed 19th April 2006

| Instrument | Entry into force | African states that have ratified |
|--|------------------|--|
| Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime | 2003 | <p>Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Tunisia, Zambia.</p> <p>Signed, but not ratified: Burundi (2000), Congo (2000), Equatorial Guinea (2000), Guinea-Bissau (2000), Mozambique (2000), Rwanda (2000), Sierra Leone (2001), Swaziland (2001), Togo (2000), Uganda (2000), United Republic of Tanzania (2000).</p> |

Taken from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_cicp_signatures_migrants.html, accessed 19th April 2006



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