

**CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT**

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REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX II

VOLUME III

Verbatim Records of the 1989 session

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV. 514  
4 July 1989

ENGLISH

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 4 July 1989, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart

(Mongolia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 514th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. At the outset, may I extend to the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - on the Conference's and my own behalf - our sincere condolences on the passing away of His Excellency Andrei Gromyko, former Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and Minister for Foreign Affairs, a distinguished statesman who had remarkable influence on developments during the post-war period, and made outstanding personal contributions to the maintenance of peace and international security. He participated in the opening meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the predecessor of this Conference, on 14 March 1962, and was closely involved in the most important issues of disarmament. Allow me also to request the Soviet delegation to convey to its Government and the family of the deceased our sympathy in such trying circumstances.

I should like now to extend a warm welcome in the Conference to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, His Excellency Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, who will be the first speaker at this plenary meeting. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is well known to all of us, since he has periodically visited the Conference to present the views of his Government on subjects on our agenda. His interest in our work led him to preside over the Conference at the opening meeting of the Iranian presidency on 1 September 1988.

I wish also to extend warm thanks, on behalf of the Conference, to Ambassador García Robles of Mexico for his effective and able presidency during the month of June, the responsibilities of which he discharged for the second time during his tenure as representative of Mexico to the Conference. His experience as dean of the representatives to the Conference and his diplomatic competence and skill were determinant elements in the success of his presidency.

Before continuing with our business for today, allow me, distinguished delegates, to make a brief opening statement in my capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July.

Exactly 20 years ago, at the first 1969 meeting of the enlarged Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament - the predecessor of our Conference - my country, the Mongolian People's Republic, began to participate in the work of this sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. By coincidence, on the anniversary of our 20 years' participation, I have the great honour and privilege of presiding over the Conference on Disarmament. The statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic on 2 July 1969 pointed out that Mongolia, as a member of the then Committee on Disarmament, would spare no efforts to strengthen universal peace and security by promoting the implementation of effective disarmament measures and patiently exploring ways and means of bringing the various positions closer together. Today, we reaffirm that my country remains true to what it pledged on the day of its admission to this highly important disarmament negotiating body.

(The President)

In assuming the presidency of the Conference for the month of July, I should like to assure you that with your co-operation and kind assistance I shall do my best to accomplish the tasks before the Conference.

In view of the positive international developments which have taken place in the past few years, the Conference on Disarmament is duty-bound to intensify its work on a number of issues before it. In that connection, I wish to recall the importance of the efforts undertaken by the representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada, in his consultations to develop an organizational arrangement for agenda item 1, entitled "Nuclear test ban". I would venture to say that Ambassador Yamada has gone a long way towards reconciling all positions. I am sure that we can count on the co-operation of all members to bring the consultations to a positive conclusion, and I should like to invite Ambassador Yamada to continue his dialogue with the item "Co-ordinators and other delegations". I remain available, of course, to assist in those consultations. I intend also to continue the consultations to find appropriate organizational frameworks to deal with items 2, 3 and 7 of our agenda, namely, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", and "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons". With regard to other items of the agenda where the Conference has established subsidiary organs, I wish to draw the attention of the Conference to the fact that July is a demanding period of substantive work before we all proceed to the drafting of our annual report. Hence, I ask the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees to do their utmost to intensify the work on substance in their respective Committees during this part of the session. We should also not lose sight of the need to continue our consideration of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, as well as of the question of expansion of its membership. I will pursue consultations on these important topics with the group Co-ordinators.

I wish to recall also that, on 18 July, the Conference will hold an informal meeting to consider further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. This informal meeting will continue on 20 July if additional delegations would like to express views at the end of the first discussion devoted to the matter. Invitations to States parties non-members of the Conference are now being sent out by the Secretariat.

That concludes my opening statement.

I should like now to proceed to other business. The Conference starts today its consideration of agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the German Democratic Republic.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, His Excellency Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati.



Mr. VELAYATI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, at the outset, allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July. I assure you of my delegation's full co-operation with you and other members of the Bureau.

In recent years, it has been a pleasure for me to present the views of my Government in this august body. This is a commitment which stems from our belief that international peace and security can be enhanced only through reduction and elimination of the causes of insecurity, namely, armaments and belligerency. The Conference on Disarmament and its predecessors were founded to fulfil humanity's resolve to prevent wars after the bitter experience of the two world wars. My country's special commitment to disarmament is also rooted in the experience of our people during the war of aggression waged against us by our neighbour and its collaborators. We share the experience of the victims of world wars and thus share their belief in the necessity of peace and disarmament.

The year 1988 marked rising hopes and expectations throughout the world both in the field of disarmament and resolution of conflicts, with the ratification of the treaty for elimination of a category of nuclear weapons, the establishment of a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and sustained efforts to bring to an end debilitating regional conflicts in southern Africa and Indo-China.

In 1989, however, the momentum has not been kept up and prospects are not bright and encouraging. In the field of conflict resolution, almost one year has elapsed since the establishment of a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq, and other provisions of Security Council resolution 598 adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter remain unimplemented. Even withdrawal to the internationally recognized boundaries ordered by the Council along with a cease-fire as a mandatory "first step towards a negotiated settlement" has not yet materialized, and Iraq continues to occupy, in defiance of Security Council resolution 598 and international law, more than 2,000 square kilometres of Iranian territory. The failure of Iraq to comply with the most prominent provision of resolution 598 has escalated tension. The Security Council shoulders great responsibility not only to ensure compliance with resolution 598 as called for under paragraph 10 of the resolution, but also in its capacity as the primary organ of the United Nations charged with maintenance of international peace and security.

The process of disarmament has undergone a period of resurgence in recent years. Indeed, the disappointment and scepticism that had relegated arms control to the back-burner of international politics in the early 1980s has been replaced by public optimism and even a small dose of euphoria. This development has led to, and is fuelled by, the first nuclear arms elimination agreement in the history of mankind, namely, the INF Treaty. Other agreements such as the Stockholm Accord, an offspring of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), or the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centres by the two super-Powers underline the new dynamic in arms control. The expression of satisfaction over the conclusion of the INF Treaty was a reflection of an earnest hope for immediate realization of more substantial

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achievements in the field of disarmament. Because INF by itself, even if implemented completely, will only eliminate up to 4 per cent of the present nuclear arsenals. Here, I wish to express concern arising from talks about modernization of nuclear weapons as well as strengthening of conventional forces.

One of the most significant items on the agenda of this negotiating body is the elimination of chemical weapons. The horrors of chemical warfare were hardly remembered in 1980. Yet, the 1980s became a turning point in the banalization of chemical weapons and their treatment as conventional ones. The almost unabated and indiscriminate use of these weapons of mass destruction by Iraq in the course of its war of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran added yet another frightening dimension; that is, even this despicable method of warfare and genocide can be employed almost with impunity in a world dominated by political expediency. Repeated warnings by the Islamic Republic of Iran, reports by international mass media, and even eight reports produced by United Nations teams of experts did not create any genuine reaction by the international diplomatic community, or even the States parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. And in this atmosphere of silence and acquiescence, the world witnessed a quantitative and qualitative intensification of chemical warfare by Iraq.

Chemical warfare started with sporadic use of chemical weapons in limited areas and developed into a regular method of warfare. The victims, who in 1981 were a limited number of Iranian soldiers, grew in numbers, and finally engulfed innocent Iranian civilians in Sardasht. The emotional report of United Nations specialists witnessing the martyrdom of chemically wounded children did not move the custodians of international peace, security, law and human rights. Had they reacted differently, the Iraqi régime might have been deterred from resorting to such a massive chemical attack in its genocide in Halabja. The chemical agent with which Iraq started its chemical warfare was simple mustard gas. However, they gradually moved on to technologically sophisticated nerve gas and agents such as Sarin and Soman. This development is not only significant because of the vast difference in toxicity, but also because of the significant change in the required technology. Sarin cannot be produced with the normal equipment of pesticide plants. It is evident, therefore, that the technology for the production of these agents was supplied to Iraq, regrettably, in the course of the war and certainly after the Iraqi policy of chemical warfare had become public knowledge.

The delivery system of chemical weapons had an even more dramatic development. According to the report of the United Nations team, in 1984, the delivery system was so imperfect that many of the chemical bombs did not even operate. By 1986, this shortcoming had already been overcome. In addition, spray tanks, and more importantly surface-to-surface missiles carrying chemical agents, were introduced, once again proving the complicity of others in the criminal development of the Iraqi chemical war machine.

The Halabja chemical massacre shocked international public opinion and created the expectation that effective measures would be taken in order to reverse the conventional approach of indiscriminate use of chemical weapons. Against this background, and following the establishment of a cease-fire

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

between Iran and Iraq, the Paris Conference was announced. But in a bid to pre-empt any action against the culprit, the Iraqi Foreign Minister in an interview with a Kuwaiti paper on the eve of the Conference threatened that he would reveal the names of European suppliers of chemical agents and technology to Iraq, if those countries persisted in their pressure against Iraq. The blackmail was so effective that the Conference did not even name the culprit. It is, therefore, not surprising to see that although the Paris Conference called on the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts for the speedy conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons, no agreement has been reached in CD even for minor improvements such as changing the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee to add "prohibition of use" in the title of the convention being negotiated.

What is really needed for the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive, global and effectively verifiable convention is a strong political will by all parties. Our collective efforts should be directed towards total and absolute elimination of chemical weapons through the early conclusion of a convention enjoying universal adherence. Interim measures such as non-proliferation of chemical weapons will not serve the objective of abolishing chemical weapons and preventing their use. In this connection, the order of destruction envisaged in the convention should include qualitative and quantitative aspects of these weapons. The order of destruction should give priority to destruction of the most lethal ones such as nerve gas, and not start with mustard gas, which because of its obsolescence will have to be destroyed sooner or later. The big Powers should prove their genuine will by acting indiscriminately in this direction. The Canberra Conference should also refrain from acting towards non-proliferation of chemical weapons, since that will adversely affect the work of our Conference in Geneva. In order to ensure the universality of the convention, it is necessary to provide incentives, and in this respect article 10 plays a key role. Assistance to victims of chemical weapons should be automatic and mandatory, because any delay in providing assistance such as antidotes, medical care and first aid would cost human lives. Another area which still needs to be specified is punitive measures against States parties which may breach the convention.

The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that it is of paramount importance for international peace and security to free the Middle East from nuclear arsenals. The General Assembly has, every year, called for the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. However, the Zionist entity, which has developed its nuclear capability in collaboration with South Africa and certain Western Powers remains an obstacle for the realization of the common objective of the people of this region.

The Indian Ocean and its natural extensions should also be free from nuclear weapons and from the rivalry of outside Powers. The attack on an Iranian civil airliner exactly a year ago, as well as other acts of aggression by the United States fleet in the Persian Gulf against the Islamic Republic of Iran, are sad manifestations of a foreign presence in our important region. The security of the Persian Gulf is the sole responsibility of the littoral States, and foreign navies, which have brought nothing but disaster and insecurity, should abandon their self-assigned role as policemen of the region.

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

The mandate of the Conference on Disarmament includes adoption of effective international measures to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. But so far, there has been no progress in arriving at a legally binding common and substantive negative security assurance of a global nature. The Ad hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurance has not been able to reach any common ground in its worthy objective. This situation may give rise to a perception that by signing the NPT, countries have left themselves without protection against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In fact, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT have honoured their obligation, while the nuclear-weapon States have failed to fulfil their commitments. The consequence is the current race to obtain nuclear weapons capability by semi-developed States, with all its adverse social and economic effects on these States.

The realization of the lofty and vital objectives for which this Conference was established requires more political will, insight and multilateral efforts and less double standards and political expediency. The destiny of mankind, which is increasingly threatened by these inhuman weapons of mass destruction, requires no less.

The PRESIDENT: I thank his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his important statement and for the kind words that he addressed to the Presidency. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): At the very outset, I should like to join others in expressing our deep condolences to the Soviet delegation on the passing away of Andrei Andreevich Gromyko.

Sir, allow me to congratulate you upon your assumption of your high office. I do this with particular pleasure as you represent a country with which the German Democratic Republic, throughout its existence, has enjoyed close and friendly relations. Your accession as President of the Conference reflects the active part Mongolia is playing in the development of peaceful international co-operation between States. Your accession to this post also mirrors the personal commitment you display in the quest for arms limitation and disarmament. Highly valued are your determined efforts, as Chairman of the Outer Space Committee, to make headway in the prevention of an arms race in outer space. I wish you much success in the discharge of your responsible duties and can assure you of my delegation's fullest support in this endeavour.

Having the floor, let me also take this opportunity to commend the former President, Ambassador García Robles, your predecessor. I think he deserves our appreciation and gratitude for his competence and special negotiating skills, which helped create the necessary conditions for resuming the work of our Conference.

At today's plenary debate, the prevention of an arms race in outer space is at issue. This problem justifiably occupies a central place in our work. The commitment to the pursuit of peace makes it necessary to end the arms race on earth and to prevent it from spilling over into outer space. The recently resumed Soviet-American negotiations must for our point of view make a

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

contribution to this end - while strictly adhering to the ABM Treaty as it was signed in 1972. We, too, have to pull our weight in order that the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space may be achieved. For eight years now the prevention of an arms race in outer space has been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. The Outer Space Committee established for this purpose has been dealing with this question for almost five years. A good many efforts have been undertaken to get things going. A quite considerable number of proposals are on the table. We all know of the problems which urgently call for a solution. We feel that it is time to get down to business notwithstanding all the obstacles, i.e. to set about concrete work with regard to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The German Democratic Republic is in favour of concluding effective and verifiable agreements on the prohibition of the development, testing and deployment of weapons in space. No doubt there do exist reservations, and differences on the roads to be followed to this end have not been bridged. But should this hinder us from fully harnessing the potential for agreement and searching for a step-by-step solution to the existing problems?

The consideration of confidence-building measures, in our view, offers the chance to impart strong momentum to the Outer Space Committee. We think that it would serve confidence-building if the international exchange of information was expanded. The concrete discussion of the proposal advanced by France concerning the "code of conduct" and that of the Federal Republic of Germany regarding the "rules of the road" would also help build confidence. What is of interest, in our opinion, is Poland's idea of considering a separate protocol to be appended to the 1975 Convention on Registration providing for the extension of data exchange and ad hoc inspections of announced launches into outer space. The German Democratic Republic also endorses the appeal made by Argentina to all States to declare whether they have any weapons deployed in outer space. The implementation of the Soviet proposal concerning the establishment of an international system of verification of the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space would eventually constitute a significant confidence-building measure from our point of view. In so doing, it would, in fact, be possible to forestall the introduction of important categories of weapons in space as well as their components. In our opinion, such confidence-building measures augur well for bringing about mutually acceptable agreements.

It is along these lines that the German Democratic Republic and the Mongolian People's Republic tabled in 1987 a document containing the main provisions for a treaty on the prohibition of antisatellite weapons and on ways to ensure the immunity of space objects. To follow up this initiative, I should like to submit today a proposal specifying ASAT components and ways of verifying their prohibition. Here we are drawing on the debate so far conducted concerning ASAT weapons. In this context, I especially have in mind the suggestions made by Sweden, and I also have in mind the proposal advanced by India, with respect to an outline of an agreement that would commit all States not to develop, produce or acquire, test or deploy ASAT weapons.

The document before us, which was presented by my delegation, document CD/927, "ASAT components and ways of verifying their prohibition", comments on the problems of definition and categorization of ASAT weapons. At the same time, it indicates possibilities for effective verification of

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

future agreements. This proposal stems from the fact that the technological development of so-called conventional ASAT weapons is highly advanced and the prohibition of these weapons is of particular urgency. For this reason, document CD/927 deals with important categories of that group of ASAT systems, such as: space-based chemical rockets and mass accelerators; ground-based chemical rockets and mass accelerators; and space mines and collision bodies. We believe that the considerations pinpointed in this paper could help advance the discussion of: the kinds of space weapons or components; the measures required to prevent such weapons; the description of the weapons and their stage of development; and the type of verification. These are undoubtedly comprehensive and complex issues, for the discussion of which the involvement of scientific experts from our point of view is imperative. The proposals for setting up an expert group to look into relevant scientific and technological questions will therefore receive our unqualified support also in future.

For a long time the pros and cons of international organizations and institutions have been deliberated which could help verify compliance with disarmament accords by means of outer space technology. We think that the Soviet initiative on the setting up of an international space inspectorate, the Canadian PAXSAT concept, the French proposal on the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency and the proposal of the USSR to establish a world space organization deserve to be discussed in depth with the aim that an overall structure be finally created.

At this juncture, let me refer to the proposal for joint European satellite observation, which is contained in the joint initiative of the Socialist Unity Party of the German Democratic Republic and the Social Democratic Party of the Federal Republic of Germany for the creation of a zone of confidence and security in Central Europe. It is likely that it could form part of an international satellite monitoring agency. Interesting in this context would, finally, be the ideas advanced by the United Nations Secretary-General in terms of a multilateral international alert system.

After all, it is obvious that there is indeed no lack of substance in the work of the Outer Space Committee. As for the agenda item "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" our delegation deems it important that the gap between general debates and a more structured and intensive work be bridged. We feel that substantive discussions leading us to negotiations should be started in fields where common ground could probably be found. Political will and readiness for compromise, together with an accommodating approach by all parties, are certainly required in this endeavour. My delegation is prepared to make a distinctive contribution to this effect.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the cordial words he has addressed to me and to my country.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? I recognize the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): Thank you, Comrade President. The Soviet delegation will have another opportunity, when it makes its planned statement shortly, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference, and also to thank Ambassador García Robles, who was President of the Conference in June. I have asked for the floor today to express our gratitude to you, Comrade President, and to all the distinguished delegates who have offered us their condolences on the death of Andrei Andreevich Gromyko. We will pass these words of sympathy on to Moscow.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. Are there any other speakers? That does not seem to be the case. That concludes our business for today. I intend now to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 6 July at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 10.55 a.m.

**CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT**

CD/PV.515  
6 July 1989

ENGLISH

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**FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH PLENARY MEETING**

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 6 July 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart (Mongolia)



The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 515th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I should like to extend a cordial welcome to the participants in the United Nations programme of fellowships, training programmes and advisory services on disarmament who are attending this plenary meeting today. As you know, the first part of the programme is being held in Geneva, and the participants are invited to visit some countries which are members of the Conference, the United Nations Office at Vienna and United Nations Headquarters in New York. I should like to wish all the participants success in their studies here in Geneva, during which various members of the Conference on Disarmament will be giving them an account of current disarmament problems.

The Conference will today continue its consideration of agenda item 5, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Hungary and Peru. I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Varga.

Mr. VARGA (Hungary): Mr. President, speaking for the first time during your tenure of office, I offer my congratulations to you on your succession to the presidency for the month of July. I wish you the best of success in discharging your responsible duties. I also express the appreciation of my delegation to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador García Robles, who guided the proceedings of this body in June with wisdom and professional skill. The Conference on Disarmament has profited a great deal from his vast experience and prestige in multilateral disarmament. I also extend a hearty welcome to our new colleague, Ambassador Serguei Batsanov, the new head of the delegation of the USSR. My delegation will continue its close co-operation with him as we did with his distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Youri Nazarkin, to whom I wish the best of success in discharging his new responsibilities. I take this opportunity to bid farewell to our distinguished colleagues Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy and Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina and wish them all the best in their future careers.

The Conference on Disarmament has resumed its work under a continuing auspicious international climate. Events which have taken place since the closure of our spring session testify to a growing awareness - particularly in Europe - that results achieved in the field of political co-operation should be reinforced with tangible results in disarmament. The proposals put forward by the member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization augur well for a speedy and fruitful outcome of the Vienna negotiations. The proposals put forward by the two sides come close together concerning the radical cuts in the conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe. It shows not only a genuine desire to achieve an agreement but also holds out excellent chances of success. We hope that will be the case in the foreseeable future, perhaps within the time-frame suggested.

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

The Conference on Disarmament has its own share to contribute to the positive general trend in world events. Negotiations on the comprehensive and total ban of all chemical weapons are definitely one of the areas where the Conference on Disarmament is in a position to make a significant step. The work resumed in the five working groups under the dynamic guidance of Ambassador Morel, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, in the view of my delegation, should be directed towards the solution of the remaining problems which have been identified so far, and the agreements achieved should be fixed in the rolling text. When I speak about the remaining problems, I mean those of considerable political importance. The five working groups in our view should give their attention to resolving the problems which may facilitate the earliest completion of the convention on the global ban of all chemical weapons.

My delegation considers that the Conference has done useful work with the accomplishment of quite a number of national trial inspections. The practical experience gained and the conclusions drawn will facilitate the final elaboration of the verification system of the future convention. I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to the Swedish delegation for the excellent work it has accomplished.

While in Geneva the Conference on Disarmament is engaged in the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban and an increased significance is attached to the problems of verification, a number of countries are busy in their efforts aimed at contributing to the solution of that key issue.

Hungary was one of the first to conduct a national trial inspection late last year. As declared on several occasions Hungary does not possess chemical weapons, nor an industrial establishment for their production. It does not conduct any sort of research on chemical weapons, nor does it intend to acquire such weapons in the future. Furthermore no other country stores any kind of chemical weapons or conducts any kind of related activity on the territory of Hungary. Our participation in trial inspections serves purely political purposes: to promote negotiations and help create mutual confidence.

The objectives of the first trial inspection were limited: to provide opportunities for a Hungarian team to learn and practise the basics of inspection. In view of the favourable experience gained, and the desire to maintain the momentum of the negotiations in Geneva, we think it useful to give consideration to following up - at the appropriate time - the national trial inspections by different types of multilateral activities including multilateral verification experiments.

Another area of vital importance, where it is absolutely essential for the Conference on Disarmament to make definite progress, is the issue of nuclear disarmament. During the spring session Ambassador Yamada of Japan generated momentum for the setting up of the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban. My delegation fully supports his efforts and sincerely hopes that Ambassador Yamada will soon succeed in overcoming the remaining difficulties - in practical terms, a couple of disputed words - and that the Ad Hoc Committee

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

will be able to start practical work still during this session. In view of the forthcoming Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty the importance of such a development could hardly be overestimated.

In my today' statement I would like to dwell on the issue of the prohibition of radiological weapons in some detail. This may also be considered an area where the Conference on Disarmament could achieve tangible results within a comparatively short period. That would have a significance of its own even if the issue may not be considered by some a high-priority task.

My delegation has traditionally taken particular interest in this subject and has been doing its utmost to make its contribution. I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador de Rivero of Peru, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, for his efforts to maintain the momentum of the negotiations.

The value of the subject for arms control and disarmament has also given rise to lengthy debate in relation to the prohibition of radiological weapons "proper" or "in the traditional sense", as well as the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. In the bulky material accumulated during the last decade various arguments have been put forward for or against various aspects of the question. Taking stock of this discussion, it can be concluded that there is a general consensus that radiological weapons should be banned irrespective of the fact that such weapons may not be in existence. One may trace also an "almost-consensus" that appropriate international measures are warranted on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities.

I prefer to refrain from going into details on the arguments I was referring to a minute ago. However I would like to amplify an aspect rarely mentioned so far. Apart from the value of the subjects for disarmament and arms control - which my delegation thinks is there - the prohibition of radiological weapons and the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities can be regarded also as global, world-wide confidence-building measures. Practical experience shows the vital importance of appropriate confidence-building measures as indispensable steps to prepare the basis for more far-reaching disarmament measures. What adds to this importance is that in one way or another both tracks are concerned with particular aspects of nuclear activities. Results in this area would be of considerable political importance in view of the forthcoming 4th Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The non-proliferation régime is worth preserving and strengthening. This can be achieved through a series of measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, working out appropriate collateral measures - such as the ones under consideration - could also have a beneficial effect, especially if we consider the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities.

Since 1979 an enormous amount of work, of intellectual and professional input, has been invested in the negotiations on the subject. One cannot but pay respect to the work accomplished and wish to maintain and use the results achieved so far. Being aware of the difficulties encountered in the substance

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

and in the way of handling the two aspects of the issue, the Conference on Disarmament recommended in 1986 that "the ways and means of how best to proceed further" should be considered by the subsidiary body dealing with the matter. By implementing that decision and following a new working method it has created a good textual basis for work in relation to both tracks. We hope that developments in the Ad Hoc Committee and in the contact groups on tracks "A" and "B" will prove that this way of proceeding is feasible.

The "rolling texts" drawn up on tracks "A" and "B" respectively contain most of the basic elements required for the elaboration of the final text. Whatever is still missing can easily be recovered from documents containing the results of previous consideration of the issue. The method of drawing up alternatives in relation to particular central issues has the advantage of clearly showing the different approaches to the subject matter and also indicates the possibilities for resolving them.

Looking into the matter in a more concrete manner one comes to the conclusion that the major stumbling block in both tracks is that no agreed solution has been found for the scope of prohibition. It comes as no surprise that because of this a number of other main elements, including the question of verification, are hard to settle. In a way this is a reflection or the "fall out" of the unresolved questions on the scope.

The possibility of any further move therefore - in our view - depends on whether or not the issue of the scope of prohibition can be finally settled. Assessing the negotiations carried on in the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, my delegation considers that an adequate amount of material has been accumulated in connection with the elements on the scope of prohibition of both tracks "A" and "B". The elements which could be included into the scope of the future instrument or instruments appear at present in the form of alternatives. At an appropriate stage of negotiations it becomes inevitable to start drawing up a single formulation for the scope of both subject matters. The working paper, an advance copy of which has been distributed today under the symbol CD/928, represents an attempt - for purposes of illustration - to suggest a practical solution for working out a single formulation for the scope of tracks "A" and "B" respectively, based on the elements appearing in the working documents under consideration in the contact groups of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons.

As far as track "A" or "radiological weapons proper" is concerned, two distinct approaches can be identified, which - fortunately - are far from being irreconcilable, much less mutually exclusive. One of them, the one proposed by the original authors, advocates the prohibition of radiological weapons as such and subsequently the prohibition of the hostile use of radioactive material. The proposal is supplemented by an appropriate definition on the radiological weapons, incidentally giving rise to prolonged controversies. The alternative approach calls only for the prohibition of the use of radioactive materials for hostile purposes. This approach calls into question the military feasibility of radiological weapons as such and holds the definition of radiological weapons unnecessary and ambiguous.

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

The common feature in the two approaches is that both of them recognize the necessity of the prohibition of the use of radioactive material for hostile purposes. This common feature perhaps can be used as a basis for designing a scope which could amalgamate the substance of the two conceptions. Once there is agreement in principle that the hostile use of radioactive material is prohibited, it follows logically that the military hardware specifically designed for the use of radioactive material for hostile purposes should also be banned. It is equally logical, further, that the production, stockpiling, acquisition or possession of radioactive material specifically prepared, configured or designed for use for hostile purposes should also be banned.

My delegation is aware of the fact that such an approach involves a certain change in the original positions. But in order to achieve a change something has to be changed.

Turning to track "B", the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, I would like to say as an introduction that it has become during the last years an independent subject in its own right, thanks to the idea originally introduced into the proceedings by the Swedish delegation.

Addressing myself to the issue I would like to start from the fact that the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 already offered some protection to nuclear facilities, saying in paragraph 1 of Article 56 that installations containing dangerous forces such as nuclear generating stations "shall not be made the object of attack even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among civilian population". This general prohibition is weakened however with considerable numbers of restrictions.

The question may be raised whether or not further international legal protection is called for in relation to nuclear facilities. The nuclear industry has gone a long way since 1949. And here I would like to highlight somewhat an aspect that has comparatively seldom been referred to in our proceedings. The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency adopted in 1986 in the framework of the IAEA were worked out in practically no time after the Chernobyl catastrophe. The spirit of the two conventions suggests that States are indeed aware of the dangers of nuclear accidents which may result in an international transboundary release of radioactive material that could be of significance with regard to radiological safety for other States also. It is evident that these States do not desire man-made nuclear accidents, since they strive to prevent or avoid the consequences of those caused by the caprices of technology. Further elaboration of this idea is hardly necessary.

Returning to the subject matter after this short historical review, I would like to say that the conventions referred to above may have a practical value for our negotiations together with the message their basic spirit conveys to us.

(Mr. Varga, Hungary)

Contact Group "B" of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons has also succeeded in accumulating a considerable amount of material on the possible elements relevant to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. However - as was the case with track "A" also - the positions cluster around two distinct but contradictory approaches, which differ from each other in quantitative and qualitative terms. The approach based on the so-called "mass destruction criteria" stresses the avoidance of the release and dissemination of radioactive material and would apply the prohibition of attack to a relatively narrow range of facilities specified according to technical specifications dealt with in the sections on Definitions and Criteria. The other, occasionally referred to as the "sanctuary approach", stresses the "non-attack" aspect and applies the prohibition of attack to a broader, or unlimited range of facilities.

To work out a common approach - in our view - poses a twofold task. The first is basically of a political nature, to devise an appropriate combination of the non-attack clause and the avoidance of the release of radioactive material. The second, and more technical one, is to describe and define the facilities to which the scope will be applied. The latter involves deep professional understanding of the related nuclear technologies and of the potential dangers involved in practical terms. The heart of the matter is anyway the issue of the scope. The version suggested in our working paper illustrates the way of thinking I was describing above. At this stage my delegation is not putting forward any suggestions as to the second part of the task in view of the difficulties mentioned.

Closing my statement, I would like to emphasize that at the present and forthcoming stages in the negotiations it is indispensable to make efforts to reconcile the differing approaches, which are clearly visible. An agreement on the scope would definitely facilitate the harmonization of positions on other main elements too. If a realistic, consensus-based approach could be worked out, it might help convince also those who at this stage may have reservations on the issues as such.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words that he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Peru, Mr. Calderón.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Allow me to address my first words, Sir, to you, to express the pleasure with which we see you in the Chair. You can be assured that you will find my delegation ready in every way to contribute to the success of our work. Likewise, I should like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador Alfonso García Robles for the admirable way in which he conducted the work of this sole multilateral negotiating forum in June. Ambassador García Robles, who has close links with Peru, is an eminent figure in the area of disarmament and his tireless devotion to this work is for us a daily challenge and an outstanding example. This is a good opportunity for my delegation to convey its best wishes to the distinguished Ambassadors of Sri Lanka, Mr. Rodrigo, of Italy, Mr. Pugliese, and of Argentina, Mr. Cámpora, who we hope will come back to us soon, if only for a while.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

I should like to refer first of all to agenda item 7. As was stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru, Mr. Guillermo Larco Cox, in the statement he made to the Conference on 25 April this year, "the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities could be dealt with in a brief, forceful agreement of a basically political nature". It is therefore fully consistent with this position of my country that today I have pleasure in introducing a draft convention on the subject. Aware as my delegation is of the series of implications of a political and technical nature that are involved in the negotiation of a convention of this type, we are not claiming that with this draft convention we shall resolve the disputes that have arisen over the last six years, nor do we think that we have taken care satisfactorily of all the different facets of the positions adopted in this body. But we do seek to put forward a new approach in dealing with this major question of attacks on nuclear facilities, guided by the conviction that through the political will of the States represented here we could reach agreement on this subject within a short space of time.

When you try to prohibit attacks on nuclear facilities, what you are seeking to do is to ban a type of act of aggression that has the particular characteristics of entailing an additional risk of the possible release of radioactivity to the detriment of neighbouring populations and the environment. In other words, what we want to do is to single out attacks on nuclear facilities, precisely because of the additional threat they pose, and I say additional threat because it is not, of course, a fact that in all cases this would produce indiscriminate release of radioactivity. If we sought to focus our attention solely and exclusively on those attacks against nuclear facilities that would produce an effect of mass destruction, then by interpretation a contrario we should have to accept discrimination amongst attacks on nuclear facilities, which is quite unacceptable from the standpoint of international law. Indeed, it would be paradoxical if an attack on a nuclear facility of 0.5 megawatts were to be outside the scope of the future convention, despite the flagrant violation of international law and the serious harm that this attack could cause the country attacked, merely on the grounds that the radioactivity released had not reached the required number of becquerels. The point is that this question of attacks on nuclear facilities cannot be considered in isolation from the principles clearly and categorically established in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter, concerning the obligation of Member States to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or legal independence of any State or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. This basic rule, which falls within the category of jus cogens, does not allow us to differentiate between acts of aggression, because that might endanger its full effectiveness. The only reason which justifies singling out attacks on nuclear facilities as compared with other acts of aggression is the latent risk of the spread of radioactivity, with possible implications of mass destruction. But from the legal point of view there is absolutely no basis for differentiating between attacks on nuclear facilities, unless what we are trying to do is not to have a universal type of convention but rather a partial and localized one for highly populated areas or for countries with a large number of reactors and nuclear facilities.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

Now if what would allow us to single out attacks on nuclear facilities from the rest is the risk or threat, and not the actual or imminent fact, of causing an uncontrolled release of radioactive material, another problem raised by the experts is whether one can differentiate between nuclear facilities that are designed for military purposes and those designed for peaceful purposes. It should at least be borne in mind that alpha, beta and gamma rays do not differentiate between persons or things, and once out of the plant they are just as harmful whatever they were made for. To paraphrase what was once said by General Gallois, this is a reflection of the equalizing power of the atom or in other terms, it is an indication of the fatefully egalitarian nature of nuclear fission: even if it was originally devised for the opposite purpose, once nuclear fission is out of control, it is equally harmful for man and his environment. Despite what I have said, we have to agree that it is not easy to draw a line between military and non-military uses of nuclear facilities, especially if we bear in mind that the use may be either direct or indirect, but it is not indispensable or obligatory for us to decide this question. To tell the truth, it is perfectly possible to draw up the convention without going into this problem. In the end what we have to do is to exclude once and for all the risk or threat that could menace defenceless people if acts of aggression were directed at nuclear facilities.

Another problem that sometimes complicates our handling of this question is whether in the planned convention the emphasis should be on safeguarding installations in time of peace or in time of war. Now strictly speaking, what we are trying to do is to ban attacks on nuclear facilities at any time and in any place. It is, of course, legitimate that there should be additional concern when the possibility of attack arises in time of war. Nevertheless, this would be something incidental or contingent, which should certainly not be shirked by the future convention, but has no reason whatever to be regarded as the decisive element. What is essential is to prohibit those acts of aggression, which do not always occur in wartime. What is more, they are likely to occur in a situation other than open conflict, as happened a few years ago. So if what is wanted is a universal convention, serving everyone's interests, it will have to establish general rules rather than exceptions. In the case of war, what we have to try to achieve with this comprehensive prohibition is to introduce a limitation in international law on the military targets or objectives that may be selected by the adversaries, apart from strengthening humanitarian law with reference to Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

To sum up, my delegation thinks of the future convention as being a set of rules derived from jus cogens with the purpose of prohibiting certain acts of aggression because of the specific characteristic they have of involving a risk of mass destruction. That is to say, the prohibition is confined to attacks, whatever their nature. The property we want to protect is nuclear facilities, in that they have this inherent possibility of releasing radioactivity indiscriminately. Finally, the justification for making this commitment is that it is in the interests of States to avoid unnecessary or intolerable injury from radiation to their peoples and to the environment.



(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

In the view of my delegation, this is the legal, political and moral framework within which the future convention should be drawn up. It is on these principles that we have prepared the convention that today we are submitting for the consideration of the distinguished delegations represented at the Conference. Working document CD/929, which we have submitted this morning, takes due account of the main elements that appear in the annex to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee submitted to the Conference last year. It also includes useful elements that were contained in the bilateral agreement signed a few months ago by India and Pakistan. Finally, it introduces new elements in an effort at conciliation and at rationalization of the rewarding debate that has been taking place for several years in this Conference. As we said at the beginning of this statement, we do not think that with this new draft we have managed to resolve all problems or dispel all doubts, nor do we think we shall have satisfied everyone, but what we want to do is to prompt thought and stimulate debate with an unorthodox, fresh and general approach based on a desire to provide for the different situations, all equally legitimate, raised by the question of attacks on nuclear facilities. At all events what we should not forget is that if we want to have an agreement that is universal in its scope and participation, then we shall have to accommodate the concerns of all, including those States that without having nuclear facilities on their territories find themselves threatened by the release of radioactivity caused by an attack on a nuclear facility in their neighbourhood. It is the wish of my delegation that document CD/929 should be submitted to Contact Group B of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, which is co-ordinated by Mr. Givers of the Netherlands, with a view to its being used as a basis for discussion and analysis. I do not think I need now explain the provisions that appear in the eight articles of the draft convention. My delegation considers it preferable to go into that matter in more detail at an appropriate time in the Ad Hoc Committee. Meanwhile we are at the disposal of other distinguished delegations that are interested in holding consultations with a view to arriving at a more generally acceptable text.

I should now like to make one or two comments on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. My first words of course are to Ambassador Morel, to congratulate him, and also the Chairmen of the five working groups, for the dedication and brilliance with which they are conducting their work. Bent as we all are on concluding the negotiations as soon as possible, in accordance with the spirit of the Paris Conference, my delegation cannot but salute the great effort that is being made by the Conference on Disarmament to fulfil its responsibilities in this field. As you know the negotiations taking place in the Conference on Disarmament with a view to arriving at the total prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons are unique in post-war multilateral negotiations, and that is worth remembering. In the first place, we are faced with negotiations that have no deadline; that is to say, we attend them and take part in them without any time-limit, remaining exposed to changes in the international environment, and hence liable to go over the same ground year after year. If we had a deadline for completing our work, or at least a particular year accepted by everyone, then our work might take on a different pace and a different look. The lack of such a date might make an unkind observer think the conclusion of the convention could be put off ad infinitum.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

Another factor that makes these negotiations unique is that so far the mandate still does not explicitly refer to the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. Obviously, this is in everybody's mind, but when it is a matter of establishing the relationship of the future convention with the Geneva Protocol of 1925, a divergence appears. Obviously, nobody is thinking of a total prohibition, but of a limited prohibition of use, whether it is first, second or whatever use. But the fact is that this is still not clear.

Another factor has to do with the proliferation of provisions and texts, all of them related to the future convention, which would also make it unique, because it would be necessary to agree not only on the basic provisions but also on all the regulations and subsidiary aspects connected with the application of the various articles of the convention. We are therefore faced with a situation in which we have to concern ourselves with both legislating and regulating, sometimes finding that the regulatory aspect prevails over the legislative. The interrelationship that in the end exists between them, their value from the legal point of view and the differences that could arise as a result of different régimes in domestic law do not allow us to rule out the possibility of new and unwelcome complications in the future.

Related to this last factor is the question of the "rolling text" - a good term coined some time ago - which has made it possible to maintain continuity over the past few years. Nevertheless, it is worth asking whether we should keep that term. Perhaps the time has come to give a new name to the text coming out of the Ad Hoc Committee, because it could happen that continuity comes to mean continuing for continuing's sake, which is not at all the same thing. We could think of a preliminary draft convention for next year, and that would appear to be the most logical thing if we wish to be consistent with the Final Declaration of Paris.

Finally, another factor that makes these negotiations special is the method of work. At first sight, it would appear logical to try to make specific progress in all areas related to the future convention, and yet when the pace and progress of the work is not smooth and even in all areas, that is to say, when there are ups and downs, we do not see why we cannot choose to defer until a later stage those subsidiary questions that need to mature further so that we can concentrate our attention and efforts on the major subjects that are interdependent and indispensable, in order to give the convention its final form. A popular saying is "Jack of all trades, master of none", and it might be advisable not to disregard that advice, incidentally making it easier for everyone to get a grasp of all the really substantive issues that will shape the future convention. I think it is very good to redouble on efforts and hold all kinds of meetings, but only in the knowledge that we are not going to disappoint expectations and that we are going to have a final text of the convention within our reach.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

(The President)

The Secretariat has circulated today, at my request, an informal paper containing the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during next week. As usual, the timetable is indicative and can be changed, if the need arises. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt the informal paper.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for today. I shall now proceed to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 11 July, at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 10.55 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.516  
11 July 1989

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 11 July 1989, at 10 a.m.

President:            Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart            (Mongolia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 516th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I learnt with deep regret the news of the passing away last week of His Excellency Janos Kadar, former Prime Minister of Hungary, who for a long time exerted considerable political influence in his own country and had a significant role in the development of European co-operation. On behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I wish to extend our condolences to the Hungarian delegation and request it to transmit our expressions of sympathy to its Government and to the family of the late leader.

I should like to extend a warm welcome in the Conference to His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Ambassador Aarno Karhilo, who will be our first speaker today. In so doing, I should like to stress the important contribution that Finland, a non-member, has been making to the work of this Conference on a number of agenda items. I am sure that all members will follow his statement with particular interest.

The Conference begins today its consideration of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Sweden. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of Finland, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador Aarno Karhilo.

Mr. KARHILO (Finland): Mr. President, first of all I would wish to express my great appreciation for the fact that I have the possibility of addressing the CD under your chairmanship.

I shall devote my statement today to the issue of chemical weapons, although Finland attaches great importance to all items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. A complete ban on chemical weapons has clearly become one of the foremost priorities of international disarmament efforts. It is an issue of today, not of any undefined later day in the future. The negotiations for a comprehensive chemical weapons convention within the Conference on Disarmament are where our efforts should be concentrated. The global approach is the only one that can have durable results. At the same time Finland is ready to participate in complementary international efforts as long as they truly uphold the main objective and do not lead to any diversions from it. It was in this spirit that we participated in the Paris Conference last January. It is in this spirit that we support the United Nations Secretary-General's role in investigating reports of possible use of chemical weapons and the work of the qualified experts' group in developing this procedure. It will be in this spirit that we shall go to Canberra next September.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

In Paris last January the world community, practically in its entirety, condemned once again these sinister weapons of mass destruction, and gave strengthened impetus to the on-going negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. The Paris Conference called for the redoubling of efforts in these negotiations; and redoubled they were. The Conference also called for all States to make their contribution to these negotiations. As a result new countries joined the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons as observers. Despite these positive developments one can sense widespread disappointment after the spring session of the CD as to the concrete results achieved in the aftermath of the Paris Conference. We acknowledge the fact that an effectively verifiable chemical weapons convention is both technically and politically complex and no quick breakthroughs are to be expected. During the spring session several issues which had not been discussed for some years were taken up again. This was helpful as a reminder of the wide scope of issues that still have to be addressed. Lengthy discussions were dedicated to other issues, which, although relevant to the final outcome, could now be left aside for the time being in order to have more time for tackling the major problems.

We share the concern of several other delegations that the impetus created by the Paris Conference will wither away in the absence of meaningful concrete results on the major questions. We strongly feel that the time has come for shifting the main emphasis in the negotiations to the politically problematic aspects. This would also help the technical experts to correctly focus their work on the real needs of the convention. Otherwise the technical discussions will become a never-ending story of new gaps and new theoretical possibilities to be covered. The basic information available to the negotiators is already sufficient for this shift to take place.

I will now turn to some of the issues at hand in the negotiations which we consider to be of major significance.

First, there is the issue of existing stocks of chemical weapons and their destruction. It is of cardinal importance for the credibility of the convention that all existing stocks be declared from the very beginning and that their destruction be promptly initiated. The order of destruction needs to foreclose any possibilities for proliferation of chemical weapons once the convention enters into force. It goes without saying that the verification measures covering this issue have to be the strictest possible under the convention. We have welcomed the information the two major possessors of chemical weapons have provided about their destruction programmes already under way. As was pointed out during the spring session the safe destruction of the existing stocks is both technically difficult and costly. We hope that the technology that has been developed for this purpose by the Soviet Union and the United States could be made available in due course to any interested country. This would ensure that all existing stocks were disposed of safely within the lime-limits set in the Convention.

Secondly, effective verification that no new chemical weapons will be produced once the convention enters into force is of essential importance. Unlike the arrangements for the destruction of the existing stocks, these

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measures have no fixed time-limit. When approaching this issue one has to keep constantly in mind the purpose of the convention, which sets the limits to the verification measures. The main task is to verify non-production of chemical weapons. We have not undertaken to monitor the whole production of all the chemical industries of the world. Not even the production of dangerous or lethal chemicals as such. We are interested in the weaponizable chemicals, in weaponizable quantities, and, in making sure that they are not being used to produce weapons. Beyond that, the verification of non-production of minor quantities in a cost-effective way will become increasingly difficult. The best we can strive for is to create a régime that can be used to clear any doubts of non-compliance. If possible, that should be done even before such doubts become serious. In practical terms that would mean a régime that allows selective intrusiveness, includes a factor of surprise, and uses technically and scientifically sound methods. We are convinced that all the main elements required are already in existence. The technical methods have been developed to the extent that non-production of the named chemicals can be verified. The further tuning of these methods now depends on clear definitions of all parts of the régime.

The concept of mandatory short-notice on-site inspections and the details of that part of the verification régime should be taken up as a matter of priority during this summer session. The challenge inspections and the different proposals concerning ad hoc procedures should be moulded into a consistent régime which allows for a flexible application of measures to the variety of situations that may arise. Without going into the details of such a régime we feel that the inspections should always be conducted by the Technical Secretariat. There should also be a possibility for the Technical Secretariat to initiate the process. The most important feature, however, is that the inspections falling under this category should constitute a normal procedure under the convention. Their role should be regarded as preventive and not as offensive or as a last resort. Care should also be taken to create reasonable safeguards against abuse of the régime. The inspection activities should not decrease the confidence of the country being inspected or its industry in regard to the overall usefulness of the convention.

The third part is the relationship between the chemical weapons convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In our opinion the convention will have to supersede the provisions of the Protocol, including the reservations made to it. The convention bans chemical weapons from the day it comes into force. The destruction period of 10 years is there to create a realistic timespan to get rid of the existing stocks safely. When the use of chemical weapons is prohibited by the convention there can be no excuses for circumventing that obligation. The maintenance in force of the reservations to the Geneva Protocol would maintain the option of the second use of chemical weapons. This would clearly undermine the convention.

Fourth comes the right of every nation to strive for the normal and legitimate development of its own industrial base including the chemical industries. The convention cannot compel the Governments of the States parties on behalf of the individual enterprises to transfer technology when it

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

is against the interests and will of the owners of that technology. However, nothing in the convention should prevent the transfer of technology for permitted purposes. Under the convention the verification régime is for the purpose of ultimately verifying that the technologies and chemicals are not used illegitimately.

We clearly understand that the inclusion of this kind of a provision in the convention is important to the nations whose chemical industry is in the early stages of development. As a confidence-builder it is comparable to the value some other countries, including my own, attach to the verification provisions. The export controls that many countries are preparing or already imposing on relevant chemicals and technologies should be regarded as necessary provisional measures. In the absence of a global ban the spread of chemical weapons and the widening availability of long-range delivery systems for them is everyone's concern. The spectre of long-range chemical warfare should not be allowed to go free. After the chemical weapons convention has come into force the importance of these controls will diminish. Their application to trade between the States parties could then be relaxed.

Universal adherence to the Convention is of utmost importance for it to be effective. The legitimate concerns and interests of all nations should be given equal attention during the negotiations. This can be done in two parallel ways without hampering the effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament as the negotiating body. First, all countries willing to make an active contribution should be encouraged to do so. The observer countries here in the CD should make full use of this opportunity to put forward their views and have them duly reflected in the process. The number of observers has grown considerably since earlier years, and we hope that this trend will continue. Secondly, efforts should be made to inform those countries which, for different reasons, cannot participate in the negotiations even as observers. In this field we acknowledge the valuable work done by Australia in promoting regional awareness about chemical weapons issues.

I would like to turn now to some more detailed and technical aspects of the convention. Earlier I touched upon some general aspects of the verification of compliance with the convention. However, verification does not only involve working out the necessary procedures in the convention itself. The development of reliable technical methods and instruments to carry out the specific verification tasks that those procedures entail is equally important. Moreover, this work is continuous and requires constant attention, testing, research and improvement in all the fields connected with the inspection activities.

It is precisely these aspects of CW verification to which Finland has devoted considerable efforts and resources since 1973. Our research project is conducted by a team of scientists and financed by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Project develops instrumental methods for detection, identification and analysis of chemical warfare agents. The results of this work, as we know, have been presented to the Conference on Disarmament in the form of handbook-type annual reports, the Finnish Blue Books. The latest



(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

report, the fourteenth of the series, will be introduced here in the very near future. The new Blue Book is a revised version of Report D.1, "Standard Operating Procedures for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament" which was presented to the CD last summer. Revisions have been made on the basis of experience gained in applying our procedures to 40 chemicals. A chapter on liquid chromatography has been added, and all experimental data have been presented in the Appendix.

During the last years the Finnish Project has devoted considerable efforts to some of the basic elements of the inspection activities directly connected with the verification régime of the Convention. These are: instrumentation, standard operating procedures and computerized data base for the identification of the scheduled chemicals.

The instrumentation of the verification laboratories has been described in the recent working paper submitted by Finland (CD/CW/WP.253) which was introduced in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons during the meeting with the representatives of chemical industries two weeks ago.

So far there is no generally accepted method for CW verification analyses. The standard operating procedures designed by our Project try to fill that gap. The need for generally accepted procedures is evident. All the analyses of the samples taken by the inspection teams should be carefully handled by identical procedures and analysed by exactly the same methods. Only then can the results become comparable. Only, then can they be universally relied upon, and leave no doubts about the scientific value of the findings. The importance of this cannot be over-estimated, as any violation will immediately become a political issue of large international dimensions. There must be no uncertainty about the soundness of the results.

Moreover, such precision combined with total impartiality can only be guaranteed if there is a network of qualified laboratories especially accredited to conduct the analyses. On one hand, the scientific and operational quality of these laboratories would have to be constantly tested and verified. On the other hand, the origin and nature of the real samples would have to be concealed from the laboratories. This would guarantee the impartiality of the analyses and minimize the risk of the disclosure of confidential information.

In order to guarantee world-wide distribution of the accredited laboratories, training in the analytical methods and in the use of the instruments is crucial. Also the inspectors of the International Inspectorate will have to be trained in these skills. Finland announced at the Paris Conference last January that it would be willing to provide this type of training for chemists from developing countries. I am now in a position to give more details of this training programme. It will be made available at this first stage to the interested member States of the Conference on Disarmament belonging to the Group of 21. The training course will have a duration of four months, and three analytical chemists can be trained at each course. We envisage organizing two courses a year, and thus six qualified

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chemists can be trained annually. Originally we had hoped to be able to offer training for a larger number of chemists at a time. However, doing that would necessarily have meant a considerable loss of quality in the instruction. The real instructor/trainee ratio of our programme of about one to one during the entire four-month period also reveals the dimensions of the training efforts that are required internationally well before the entry into force of the CW Convention. During our course the participants will be trained in sample collection, preparation of the samples, chromatographic methods, laboratory automation and the use of the computerized data base. Also, the basics of mass spectrometry and its use as the detector of a chromatograph will be taught. All the instruction is designed especially for the purposes of the CW verification. The cost of the training, travel from home country and back, accommodation as well as a daily allowance will be provided by Finland. The only financial implication for the sending Government would thus be the basic salary during the time of the course. We hope that this offer will meet the interests of several of the members of the Group of 21.

The computerized data base was first introduced to the CD a year ago, during the summer session of 1988. It will enable any analyst anywhere in the world to compare the results of his analysis with the characteristics of the scheduled chemicals stored in the data base. In an instant he will be able to tell for sure whether the compound he has been analysing is one of the scheduled compounds or not. This is an indispensable tool for the inspectors. To achieve the desired result, only one condition has to be met: the sampling, the handling of the samples, their analysis, and the instrumentation should follow the same detailed procedures that were followed when the data base was prepared. Again the need for the standard operating procedures is evident. Another prerequisite for the functioning of the data base is that the chemicals that are to be monitored must be individually defined. Broader definitions like families of compounds will not suffice. Furthermore, every one of these compounds must be synthesized and analysed for data storage. As of today the data base of the Finnish project includes 40 compounds. Here we should like to thank both the United Kingdom and Switzerland for having supplied us with the necessary material to get us where we are now in this work. In order to make it easier for everybody to visualize the functioning of the data base, a live demonstration of it will be arranged here in Geneva during the second week of August, to which all the members and observers of the CD will be invited.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland for his statement and for the kind words that he addressed to the presidency. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

Mr. von STÜLPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, let me first congratulate you on your assumption of your important office.

My statement today relates to item 5 of our agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". It will be very brief. Its main purpose is to comment on the expert contribution which will be provided at this afternoon's

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meeting of the Ad hoc Committee. As already announced in my plenary statement on our basic views on the matter on 11 April this year, we had asked an independent research institute in the Federal Republic of Germany to examine our positions and proposals introduced so far and to come up with a comprehensive view on the question of space-related confidence-building measures. Today Dr. Hubert Feigl from the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik will share his findings with the members of the Committee. He will - in particular - deal with "objectives, realizable possibilities and problems of a multilateral protection régime for outer space" and related questions. Dr. Feigl will provide us with the independent view of a scientist. His arguments will speak for themselves. His paper is based on non-classified sources and its contents are subejct to verification. In the belief that more profound discussion will bring more progress my delegation would like to stimulate debate in the Ad hoc Committee on the basis of a well founded set of interrelated expert views.

Dr. Feigl's contribution will draw a kind of road map in this regard, pointing out which roads from his point of view are impossible or almost impossible and possible as far as a weapons-related ASAT ban is concerned and the implications this has for the objective of an ASAT ban itself. He will also be pointing out the roads which may more easily lead to the intended improvement of the protection of space in general and the protection of stability-related satellites in particular.

When, in 1986, my delegation introduced the subject of space-related confidence-building measures, including a "code of conduct" and "rules of the road", as an idea which could substantially contribute to attenuating the effects of unintended escalation and to limiting the risks arising from misunderstandings in crisis situations, the corresponding proposals seemed to be too technical and too complicated to be dealt with in the Ad hoc Committee at that juncture. In the meantime the Committee has gained experience and achieved a much better understanding of the many questions involved. My delegation feels encouraged to reiterate its former proposals as contained in PV.345 of 6 March 1986 and developed further in my plenary statement of 11 April this year and the corresponding contributions to the work of the Ad hoc Committee. We know that we shall have to convince the Conference of the usefulness and adequacy of these proposals. The presence of an independent expert is a welcome opportunity to re-examine them in a critical common effort.

It may be useful and necessary to briefly describe the background against which this effort should be seen. There is no doubt that certain space objects - such as satellites with verification, observation, communication and command functions - are vital components of strategic stability. Accordingly, it would be counterproductive to prohibit, per se, all military activities in outer space. Multilateral arms control and disarmament matters in the outer space area cannot be considered independently of basic developments at the bilateral level. Many of the space-related problems will - by their nature - remain the domain of the two main space Powers. The prevention of an arms race in outer space by adequate and appropriate arms control measures touches

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upon basic questions of strategic stability between these Powers. The related questions have still to be solved in the bilateral talks. We believe that nothing should be done that would hinder the success of these negotiations.

On the other hand, it is widely agreed that in view of dynamic technological developments, many aspects of a future outer space order inevitably necessitate comprehensive regulation by the international community as such. It is rightly recognized, too, that more and more States are becoming space Powers or participating in important programmes for the exploration and utilization of outer space. Furthermore, all States could be threatened by a possible misuse of that environment. Thus there are good reasons for an approach requiring greater participation by the international community. The creation of a robust, stable future space order is a task ahead. My delegation will continue to actively contribute to preparing the ground for its realization.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words that he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Let me first of all congratulate you, as representative of a friendly nation, Mongolia, on your assumption of the responsible post of Chairman of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July. Your great diplomatic experience, including your experience of the work of the Conference on Disarmament, gives us every assurance that your efforts to organize the Conference's work during this important period of its summer session will be attended by success. At the same time we wish you every success in performing your duties as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space, a position you are now occupying for the second time. Since today, 11 July, is the national holiday of the Mongolian People's Republic - People's Revolution Day - I should like to take this opportunity to extend our sincere congratulations to Ambassador Bayart and the whole Mongolian delegation.

I should also like to thank our doyen, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, for presiding over the work of the Conference in June with his customary wisdom.

We welcome among us today Mr. Karhilo, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, whose important statement we listened to with great interest. Mr. Karhilo's presence here and his statement confirm once again the active position taken in disarmament matters by Finland, with which my country has traditionally maintained close goodneighbourly relations.

We should like to convey our deep sympathy to the Hungarian delegation on the death of Comrade J. Kadar, who was leader of his country for many years. We would ask the delegation to pass on our heartfelt condolences to the Government of Hungary and to the deceased's family and friends.

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The Soviet delegation in its previous statement of 22 June expounded the basic approach of the Soviet Union to a broad range of disarmament issues in a wider context of creating a secure democratic world. Today I would like to elaborate in more detail on the problem which is in our view central to the work of the Conference, that is, the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. It would hardly be an overstatement to say that we are living through a critical turning point in the negotiations, with all the controversies that are to be expected at such times.

To speak of the positive aspects, there is in particular the fact that the draft convention is in an advanced state of preparation. At the Conference held in Paris earlier this year, virtually all States assumed, at a high level, moral and political commitments in relation to the earliest conclusion of the convention. Many countries and groups of countries have recently stated, individually or jointly, their support for the cause of banning chemical weapons. The relevant provisions of the comprehensive arms control and disarmament concept adopted at the NATO summit in Brussels are very much welcome in this connection, and particularly the intention expressed in it by the NATO leaders of concluding at an early date a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable treaty banning any chemical weapon, its development, production, storage or transfer. We also notice that the most recently published NATO documents seem to suggest that chemical weapons are not regarded as an integral element of deterrence, which in view of NATO's general philosophy of arms limitation raises hopes of a truly complete renunciation by all its members of this gruesome means of extermination. As for the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the leaders of the allied countries at their summit meeting held literally a few days ago in Bucharest called for efforts to speed up the preparation of an international convention on the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of their stocks.

Finally, among the positive elements we have are the restructuring of the negotiating process carried out under the skilful leadership of Ambassador Morel, the presence of a significantly greater number of observers at the negotiations, and the fact that progress towards a convention has gone beyond the limits of pure negotiations and reached a stage when a whole number of countries have started practical preparations for their participation in the future agreement.

On the other hand, during the spring session of 1989 and in the early days of the summer session, the multilateral negotiations failed to reach the desired tempo. We get the impression that external political stimulus is taking too long to be transformed into progress in negotiations which necessarily requires the readiness of every participant to take resolute steps and make bold compromises. A considerable portion of time this year was consumed by the discussion of technical details. In itself, this might be no bad thing, but even then we were often going round in circles. The devil is in the details, they say, and exorcizing him from wherever he might be always requires an extreme effort of will, which in our case, naturally, means political will. It is also needed to resolve some of the still outstanding

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basic issues. The foregoing does not necessarily imply that nothing has been achieved recently. One positive example in the area of technical details is the adjustment of the schedules of chemicals covered by the convention on the basis of limiting the radicals of alkyl and o-alkyl fragments in the respective chemicals, undertaken by the Chairman of Group 4. In the realm of political problems the efforts undertaken by Ambassador Morel on the composition of the Executive Council and challenge inspections (article IX) are highly commendable.

However, we can and must move ahead faster than we are now doing. Many representatives, in giving their analysis of the state of negotiations, stressed that any loss of time or momentum now is extremely dangerous and that the impetus generated in Paris would fail to be a long-term factor if not supported in Geneva. The Soviet delegation fully shares this opinion. Delay in the negotiations is all the more unacceptable in that it takes place against a background of dangerous trends in chemical weapons proliferation. Being decidedly opposed to the spread of chemical weapons, we lend our support to international efforts to counteract this threat and we are improving our national measures in this field. In doing so, we are fully aware that the only thoroughly effective solution to this problem is a comprehensive convention concluded at the earliest date and without any linkage to other disarmament measures.

Negotiations are not the only way we use to pursue this goal. In the USSR the appropriate agencies are preparing recommendations on the order and time of construction of chemical weapons destruction facilities, including their location. Their capacity will ensure the destruction of our entire CW stock in the Soviet Union in the time period set by the draft convention. This will demand the solution of a whole set of problems related to the transport of the weapons, their disassembly and destruction. Priority attention is given here to environmental protection.

We are also engaged in active bilateral discussions with a whole range of countries on the problem of a chemical weapons ban. In particular, during the recent visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to Bonn, a statement on a chemical weapons ban was adopted at the level of the ministers for foreign affairs. At the request of the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the USSR, this statement, together with the joint statement of the leaders of the two countries on the results of the visit, are being distributed as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/930 and CD/931).

In June, beginning right on the very first day of this summer session, the eleventh round of Soviet-United States discussions on a chemical weapons ban took place here in Geneva. This has been one of the most productive rounds since we began meeting with the United States delegation in pursuance of the agreement reached in Geneva in November 1985 by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. Substantial progress was made as a result of intensive work at the plenaries, restricted meetings between the heads of delegations, and meetings of experts. This relates in the first instance to the draft paper on procedures for challenge inspections, which we believe might soon be submitted

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for examination to Working Group 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Considerable progress was also made in preparing proposals on the order of destruction of chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities, though some questions relating to certain numerical parameters and terminology still need to be resolved. A useful discussion was held on permitted production and synthesis of Schedule I chemicals as well as on toxins. Finally, although no complete agreement has been reached as yet, we have made progress on a whole range of bilateral measures of confidence-building, openness and mutual inspection. These measures are to be implemented even before the future convention is signed. All in all, we are encouraged with the results of the round and hope that after some time they will have a favourable influence on the multilateral negotiations as well - the subject which I would now like to turn to.

We believe that by now the conditions are ripe for us to finish putting together the essential verification system. The basis for such a system is there - it is the combination of systematic and challenge inspections. Yet unresolved issues still remain in every area. We are convinced that challenge inspections without exemptions or the right of refusal, extending equally to any site or facility, be it military or civil, State-owned or private, are an essential element of the future verification system. We urge all those who have not yet done so to make an unequivocal statement that they accept the principle of such inspections. Should any members have specific difficulties, let them openly state where such difficulties lie.

We do not share the opinion which has sometimes been voiced here that challenge inspections are excessively confrontational. (By the way, I should like to ask whether it might not be as well for us to stop using the word "challenge" and say "request" instead.) At the same time we would be prepared to give an attentive look at the arguments of those delegations which believe they would be more comfortable if alongside the mechanism of challenge inspections the convention contained procedures which did not involve expressing suspicions about any State.

The proposal of the United Kingdom on ad hoc inspections which could, as we understand it, be carried out at any site or facility could form a good basis for such an additional verification sub-system. True, we would prefer that quota limitations should only apply to the number of inspections which a State would be obliged to receive on its territory within a given period of time. The so-called active quota would not then be introduced. Otherwise, States would always have to be afraid of exhausting their quotas too quickly, and this in its turn could limit their real possibility of exercising the right of request. As for the passive quota, we believe it could amount to about five inspections per year. Provisions should also be worked out containing specific requirements for requests to make ad hoc inspections, namely, an indication of the location and the specific type of activity to be verified. This is necessary if such inspections are to be effective.

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The issues of what should be the starting point for challenge inspections and what their scope should be are of fundamental importance. Of equal importance is what the end result of these inspections should be. In our opinion, for the sake of having an effectively functioning convention mechanism there is everything to be said for taking no decisions as to compliance by a State with the convention when reports on challenge inspection results are discussed in the bodies of an international organization established under the convention. Instead, where necessary, recommendations would be adopted on measures to ensure compliance with the convention. Among such measures certain sanctions could also be considered. We believe that a similar procedure could also be applied to the consideration of reports on routine inspection results.

Recently, there have also been signs of progress in working out a régime of systematic verification, in particular within the framework of article VI of the draft convention. In this context we take note with satisfaction of the support given by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf to the idea of including Schedule 2B in the convention.

We also support the idea that in addition to the so-called "régime" schedules of chemicals, on the basis of which certain measures of limitation or verification would be taken, a "marker" list - or as it is called - a "waiting and warning" list should be envisaged for substances capable of posing a risk for the purposes of the convention. The scientific and consultative council which would be established within the framework of an international organization under the future convention and which would perform the function of keeping track of innovations in chemistry would also participate in drawing up the list. A part of the council's membership could be elected from candidates proposed by international scientific organizations.

Taking into account the view of a number of States that laboratory synthesis of Schedule I chemicals should be permitted not only for medical and research purposes, but also for the purposes of protection, we would be prepared to agree to such synthesis being carried out at a State's discretion either at a small-scale facility or at one laboratory synthesizing not more than 100 g of Schedule I chemicals, with its location and the names of the chemicals synthesized being declared. We do not propose that either this laboratory or any other laboratory synthesizing Schedule I chemicals should be subject to systematic international verification. At the same time we believe it is important to envisage approval and declaration by States parties of all laboratories synthesizing Schedule I chemicals for permitted purposes. A positive solution to this problem would considerably facilitate agreement on this section of the convention in general. As for production of Schedule I chemicals for pharmaceutical purposes outside a small-scale facility, we would be prepared to agree to the proposal that their annual quantity should not exceed 10 kg for each facility in question.

A number of delegations have recently expressed concern that with the verification systems under article VI as they now stand, multi-purpose facilities, as well as facilities which are not producing chemicals posing a



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risk for the purposes of the convention but whose characteristics would make it quite possible to organize such production, would not be covered. To a certain extent the solution to this problem would be facilitated if thresholds for declaration and verification were determined on the basis of the design capacity of facilities, rather than their production levels. It would also be useful for the Technical Secretariat to be entitled to submit independently a request for inspection if in the exercise of systematic verification activities by the Technical Secretariat a need arises to clarify certain obligations. We are also ready to consider constructively other proposals aimed at increasing the effectiveness of verification of non-production of chemical weapons in industry and will support any verification measure leading to greater security. The solution of the problem of non-production of chemical weapons in industry is possible on the basis of a balance between the need to have the most stringent verification and the legitimate industrial and commercial interests of States parties to the convention.

Finalization of work on the system of verification would be much facilitated by the early introduction of international trial inspections under the experiment launched last year to test procedures for the verification of non-production of chemical weapons in industry. As far as we see, some delegations have certain apprehensions over the idea of international trial inspections. I believe these apprehensions are somewhat exaggerated. The Soviet Union would be prepared to hold such an experiment at a facility in Dzerzhinsk as soon as the procedures for it are arranged and agreement reached on starting such inspections in other countries. The Soviet delegation believes that it would be appropriate to agree on the most important problems to be studied in the experiment. We propose that this work should be begun as soon as possible. In our view, the membership of the international group of inspectors and observers for visits to facilities should be limited and should not exceed 10-20 persons.

The Soviet Union is strongly in favour of having a truly global convention. The ultimate goal should be universal participation of States in the convention. Naturally, it is for each State to decide, by weighing all the pros and cons, whether participation in the convention would or would not be in its national interest. Hence the conclusion that for the widest possible participation of States in the convention, it should provide certain benefits in terms of protection against chemical weapons for its participants who have renounced chemical weapons, as compared with other countries. In this context we attach great significance, in particular, to article X of the convention, dealing with assistance and protection against chemical weapons. The Soviet delegation would be prepared to support the idea of establishing a voluntary fund to render assistance to any State party against which chemical weapons were used. The fund would be an integral part of a mutual assistance mechanism within the international organization set up under the convention. We believe that financial resources and appropriate material facilities, including means of chemical protection, could be contributed to that fund.

In conclusion, a few words on the topic which has been repeatedly discussed both inside and outside the conference room - the forthcoming conference on chemical weapons to be attended by representatives of

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Governments and industry at Canberra in September. The Soviet Union has decided to participate in this Conference. We are particularly satisfied with the fact that it will focus on joint action by Governments and industry aimed at the early conclusion and implementation of the convention banning chemical weapons. We believe, as I have already said, that taking into account legitimate interests of industry is essential for the success of the Geneva negotiations. From this standpoint the significance of the Canberra Conference is very great. The Soviet delegation at that conference will be prepared to make a constructive contribution to the discussions on the agenda items and to help it arrive at positive results.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. I thank him also for the warm congratulations to my delegation on the occasion of our national day and the very kind words addressed to my country and to me personally. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius.

Mr. HYLTEINIUS (Sweden): Let me first of all warmly congratulate you not only on the occasion of your national day but also on your assumption of the presidency during the month of July. I am confident that our work will greatly benefit from your diplomatic skill. That skill has been shown, inter alia, in your chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. It is therefore particularly appropriate to devote a plenary statement to this question under your presidency. I also take this opportunity to express the gratitude of my delegation to Ambassador García Robles of Mexico for his experienced guidance of the Conference during the past month. I have listened with great interest to the statement by His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State of Finland and to the other distinguished speakers before me.

In my statement today I will exclusively address the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Useful work has been carried out in the Conference on Disarmament, and in particular in its Ad Hoc Committee, in existence since 1985. The time should now be ripe to take stock of the extensive discussions and the many proposals which have been made. Our continued deliberations should be structured with a view to defining measures on how to prevent an arms race in outer space. An extension of the arms race into outer space could have profoundly destabilizing consequences. Deeply conscious of these risks, an overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations have in recent years urged the Conference on Disarmament to take resolute measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space.

Although the civilian exploitation of outer space is increasing, the vast majority of satellites perform military functions. There is a great variety in their missions. Some of them play, or have a potential to play, a vital role in verifying compliance with arms limitation or disarmament agreements, or carry out crucial early-warning and communication tasks. These satellites thus have stabilizing functions. Some are in geosynchronous orbit, or in eccentric earth orbit, and others are in lower earth orbit. Mention could be made of reconnaissance satellites with photographic, electronic or

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ocean-surveillance tasks. In principle, all these satellites can have important functions in connection with weapons systems on earth. Their military role, however, is of a passive nature. Military support satellites may, nevertheless, be given more active assignments, for instance regarding target acquisition and identification, or other active support functions for military operations. The various types of satellites are becoming increasingly sophisticated and manoeuvrable.

In time of war, satellites could thus be important military targets. Consequently, there has long been a military interest in developing means for anti-satellite warfare. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have tested dedicated ASAT systems. Their actual deployment is, however, limited. One of the concepts comprised an interceptor launched into the same orbital plane as the target. The other system was an air-launched miniature vehicle with a terminal homing warhead. Both systems were reportedly capable of reaching targets in low earth orbit only.

There may be reason to recall the diversity of means of carrying out ASAT warfare. A satellite can be disrupted, either by being physically destroyed or through interference with some of its vital functions. A satellite could for instance be destroyed by impact with space debris. Ballistic missiles could be modified for ASAT purposes. ABM-interceptors could have an inherent ASAT capability. To be effective, however, these weapons would have to be tested in an ASAT mode. Some potential ASAT weapons could in addition perform anti-ballistic-missile defence tasks. They could thus lend themselves to a circumvention of the ABM Treaty. Moreover, the functions of a satellite could also be impaired by jamming or spoofing operations. Command and control communications could be interfered with in a similar fashion and the satellite's sensors incapacitated by laser radiation. Electronic warfare or high-power microwaves could also be used for such functions.

A whole literature has developed regarding technological research on potential earth-based or space-based weapon devices, related to kinetic energy or directed energy principles. One example is clusters of homing vehicles equipped with infra-red guidance. As to directed energy weapons, various lasers under consideration are the chemical laser, the free electron laser, the excimer laser, and the X-ray laser. The last is for obvious reasons the most controversial concept, since such a laser would have to be "pumped" by a nuclear explosion. Whereas some of the concepts referred to may carry a flavour of science fiction, others could have a more realistic potential for ASAT tasks, although the context in which they are being considered apparently concerns ballistic missile defences. Satellites could be considerably easier to attack than missiles, because of their overall features as well as of their static orbit positions.

It may sometimes be difficult to make a clear distinction between dedicated ASAT weapons and non-dedicated capabilities to interfere with the normal functioning of a spacecraft. Any spacecraft capable of manoeuvring in orbit could be programmed to interfere with another space object. Even if a

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satellite can by itself function as an interceptor, to be considered as a dedicated ASAT weapon it should inter alia be equipped with interceptors aimed at destroying other satellites.

It goes without saying that many counter-measures could be conceived of against various contemplated or existing means of interfering with satellites. A satellite could, for example, be hardened against directed-energy weapons, if such devices were to be developed for ASAT purposes, infra-red sensors could be blinded by lasers, a satellite could be shut off, and satellites could be deployed in large numbers, etc.

Questions pertaining to the strategic balance are subject to bilateral negotiations between the two major Powers. However, the issue of ballistic missile defences is, along with the ASAT question, of relevance also to the Conference on Disarmament. All nations would be affected by a ballistic missile defence (BMD) system, as well as by other possible destabilizing developments that are implied.

One contemplated BMD system would contain both space-based and so-called "pop-up" systems, based on the new "exotic" technologies I have referred to. Several counter-measures could be expected against such systems. Thus, to mention just one example, a warhead decoy could by simulation be made to respond like a re-entry vehicle and, conversely, a re-entry vehicle to respond like a decoy, etc. In accordance with a familiar pattern, counter-measures could indeed proliferate. At the same time, the decision-making process to a large extent will have to be assigned to supercomputers, etc. By such a development the survival of mankind would increasingly be getting into the grip of machines.

The many critics of ballistic missile defences have underlined the destabilizing implications. There is a great risk that an adversary with less efficient ballistic missile defences would be tempted to resort to a pre-emptive strike. Furthermore, if the two major nuclear and space Powers were really capable of developing ballistic missile defences, other nuclear-weapon States might feel incited to live up to their doctrine of effective deterrence by significantly increasing their nuclear weapons potential.

Both the leading nuclear and space Powers continue to devote considerable resources to research on ballistic missile defences, which may have adverse implications for the ABM Treaty, and probably also for the ongoing nuclear and space talks. However, a shift in emphasis seems to be under way in favour of ASAT programmes. One reason for such a development may be attributed to the fact that, as pointed out by SIPRI in its 1989 Yearbook, a major increase has taken place in the number and capabilities of operational military satellites in several categories. This expansion also involves an increased integration of various space-based systems with land, sea and air forces, thereby enhancing their capabilities in several respects.

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Given the fact that it may be relatively easy to develop various types of ASAT weapons, other States, too, may consider strengthening their military capacities by acquiring such weapons. Already the spread of advanced missile technology could promote such a development. Increased dedicated or non-dedicated ASAT capabilities represent new risks already of accidental interference with satellites, which could have serious implications for international security.

The risk of an arms race in outer space has been partly attributed to the fact that the existing body of international law is not sufficient to effectively prevent such a development. The relevant provisions are both of a general and a specific nature. I do not intend to go over existing agreements pertaining to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, since this has been done by my delegation on previous occasions, as well as by several other delegations. It may be sufficient to touch upon a few examples.

Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations outlaws the use of force and the threat of use of force. In certain cases some might argue that an attack on a space object would be a measure of self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. It is, however, inconceivable that this Article could be interpreted as permitting attacks on non-military space objects. The Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in Earth orbits and on celestial bodies, but no other weapons systems. The Moon Treaty, which aims at entirely demilitarizing outer space, with the exception of the proximity of the Earth, has been signed by very few States indeed and has not yet entered into force. The Registration Convention may have some confidence-building functions, but, as pointed out by many delegations, would need to be more effectively complied with. It would also have to be strengthened by additional provisions.

As to various pertinent bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, emphasis should be given to the significant stabilizing role of the 1972 AMB Treaty. It is conceived of as a crucial building block in the strategic relationship between the two major nuclear and space Powers. Many States have therefore repeatedly urged the two Parties to the Treaty to secure its continuation.

Other bilateral disarmament agreements, which are relevant in this context are, for example, the 1971 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War and the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, which secure a protection for early warning satellites, thus indicating the vital stabilizing function attributed by the two major Powers to such satellites. There may also be reason to recall the unratified SALT II Treaty, which prohibited the testing and deployment of Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems (FOBS). Relevant parts of the provisions of these Treaties can be of interest also for multilateral purposes.

My delegation has consistently been in favour of a comprehensive solution to the ASAT question. Even if a comprehensive ASAT ban may not be achievable in a short-term perspective - given the wide-ranging issues involved,

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pertaining inter alia to definitions and dual functions - it is, however, of the utmost importance that we start work on delineating measures that would at least provide for basic legal provisions with regard to ASAT systems. We should also aim at strengthening the confidence-building régime, and introduce measures aiming at the prevention of accidents with satellites. In the opinion of my delegation, the approach will have to build on a combination of confidence-building and functional measures, together with a ban on anti-satellite weapons.

As an immediate measure the Swedish delegation has proposed that the present de facto moratorium by the two major space Powers on testing of existing dedicated ASAT systems be formalized. Production as well as deployment of dedicated ASATs should be prohibited without delay, and existing ASAT systems should be dismantled. Furthermore, the testing of non-dedicated systems in an ASAT mode should be prohibited. I have previously touched upon various types of non-dedicated systems, which would have to be addressed here. This approach would thus in a functional way comprise all convertible ASATs.

Furthermore, rules aiming at diminishing the risk of accidents should be introduced. Given the relatively large number of satellites in low earth orbit, measures to prevent accidents in that area are urgently called for. But also satellites in the geostationary orbit should, obviously, be covered, since they are of crucial importance for international stability and security.

Several proposals have been made in the Conference on Disarmament concerning the question of indirect protection of satellites, including rules of the road, keep-out zones, codes of conduct, immunity for satellites, etc. These proposals should be discussed in a systematic way with a view to defining relevant measures. It will also have to be established to what extent various proposed measures should be dealt with in the Conference on Disarmament, or should be referred, for instance, to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).

Sweden has proposed that an expert group be established under the auspices of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Such a group should discuss the feasibility of relevant measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. It should also consider verification of compliance with such measures, as well as focus on questions pertaining to the establishment of an international satellite monitoring system.

Verification could be carried out by many different methods, in particular on-site inspection, as well as satellite tracking and data collection. Inspection of a satellite from the ground could, at least in the case of low earth orbit, be performed by the help of telescopes with modern electro-optical sensors. Other means could be various radar devices. These new systems can give detailed accounts of satellites. Fly-by or co-orbiting can be used for observation. In the context of verification by means of satellites the Canadian PAXSAT concept is of great relevance. Consideration should also be given to the establishment of an international satellite

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

agency, taking into account the various proposals that over the years have been made in the United Nations and in the Conference on Disarmament. Such an agency could have at its disposal a network of observation stations and make use of common data bases.

The question of how to prevent an arms race in outer space is often referred to as an unusually complex one. We should, however, not let ourselves be overwhelmed by the difficulties. As I have tried to illustrate, there are several measures that the Conference on Disarmament could usefully negotiate, namely: dedicated ASAT weapons could be comprehensively banned; an agreement could be made on banning the testing in an ASAT mode of various types of non-dedicated systems; appropriate verification régimes could be scheduled, and an international satellite monitoring system be established; confidence-building measures, including rules of the road, could be adopted.

My delegation holds that these measures should be introduced as a matter of urgency, given the risks of vertical and horizontal proliferation of dedicated and non-dedicated ASAT capabilities, as well as the dangers posed by possible non-intentional harmful interference with satellites. These measures should be subject to multilateral negotiations in the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, that is to say the Conference on Disarmament, and more precisely in its Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

My delegation is fully aware of the fact that the least common denominator in the CD has hitherto not allowed for a more measure-oriented approach. As stated at the beginning of my intervention, however, Sweden is of the view that time is now ripe for more structured work in the subsidiary body of the Conference, allowing us to more purposefully address the task before us.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for his statement and for the congratulations and kind words that he addressed to the presidency.

We have reached the end of the list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I recognize the distinguished representative of Hungary, Ambassador Varga.

Mr. VARGA (Hungary): The Hungarian delegation expresses its thanks to you, Mr. President, and also to the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Batsanov, and at the same time to all other delegations which have acted similarly in the course of the past few days for the sympathies and condolences addressed to the Hungarian Government and our delegation on the occasion of the passing away of Mr. Janos Kadar, a prominent politician and outstanding State figure of my country for more than 30 years. My delegation will not fail to convey the expressions of condolences to the Hungarian Government and to the family of the deceased.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement. Are there any further speakers? That seems not to be the case.

You will recall that, at its 513th plenary meeting, the Conference decided to hold an informal meeting on Tuesday, 18 July, immediately after the plenary meeting, for consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. It was understood that if the debate was not concluded at that informal meeting, another informal meeting would be held on Thursday, 20 July, also after the plenary meeting scheduled for that date. Keeping in mind those dates, non-members of the Conference parties to the Sea-bed Treaty were invited to transmit their requests for participation not later than today, 11 July, so that members might consider such requests in accordance with the rules of procedure and the secretariat might have time to process the relevant draft decisions. Accordingly, I hope that non-members Parties to the Treaty wishing to participate in the informal meeting on 18 July will communicate their requests to the secretariat not later than today at 4 p.m. For your information, the secretariat has already received eight requests, which will be circulated after 4 p.m. today in delegations' boxes for consideration by members. I shall put the relevant draft decisions before the Conference at the end of the list of speakers at the plenary meeting on Tuesday, 18 July, before we open the informal meeting devoted to the subject to be discussed. In connection with the informal meeting, I should like to inform you that immediately after we adjourn this plenary meeting, the secretariat will open a list of speakers wishing to address the informal meeting. Of course, members intending to do so may ask for the floor without putting their names on the list first, in accordance with the practice followed for informal meetings of the Conference.

There is no other business for today. I shall now adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 13 July at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.



# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.517  
13 July 1989

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Thursday, 13 July 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart (Mongolia)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 517th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will today continue its consideration of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". However, under rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Nigeria, Iraq and Finland. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): We have just entered into the second third of the summer part of the Conference. Four weeks still remain for effective negotiation. Time is pressing if we are to reach tangible results in the negotiations on the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Together we have made a fresh start following the Paris Conference. In the Paris Declaration all States came out in favour of concluding a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction. All States advocated that the prohibition of chemical weapons should be global and comprehensive as well as effectively verifiable. All States pronounced themselves in favour of concluding the negotiations on the convention banning chemical weapons at the earliest possible date. This is from our point of view the substance of the agreements reached in Paris, and this is our view of their interrelationship - you cannot do one thing without the other.

Have not the events of the recent past visibly shown that the use of chemical weapons prohibited under the Geneva Protocol can only be precluded in future if they are completely banned with global effect at the earliest possible date? To stop the production of chemical weapons, to advance towards their destruction, to prevent their proliferation - these are, no doubt, significant moves for their comprehensive prohibition. Do not measures against the proliferation of chemical weapons however, lose something of their positive impact if they are deprived of their character as an interim measure? Is it not urgently necessary to finalize work on the verification system without allowing any further delays in the negotiations? Otherwise, we think, a situation could arise where the existence of ever more sophisticated chemical weapons in ever more hands would render effective verification of their prohibition extremely complicated or would even make it impossible.

The verification system for a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons has a key role in the present negotiations. Permit me, therefore, to offer a few comments on this problem. Article VI of the draft convention together with the annexes thereto already contains a sound system of provisions for effective verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. This system is being supplemented at present in Working Group 4. The final touches are being put to the régime attached to list 1. The lists of chemicals are being amended and defined.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

As regards verification of compliance with the prohibition of chemical weapons production outside the framework set by article VI, this should, in our view, be ensured, in the first place, by means of challenge inspections. A provision to this effect, however, has not been agreed upon so far. The basic ideas set forth in the "Ekeus Paper" (document CD/881, pages 141 and 142) have not been developed further since 1987. Therefore, the next logical step would be to seek understanding in principle on challenge inspection and to include relevant provisions in article IX of the draft convention. All efforts undertaken by the Chairman of the Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Morel, to this effect deserve our unqualified support.

It is, in fact, high time in our view for delegations to disclose their positions on such questions as: the right to request an on-site inspection at any time and anywhere; the mandatory character of such an inspection without a right of refusal; the procedure to be applied in case agreement on arrangements alternative to full and comprehensive access cannot be achieved; and the procedure after submission of the inspection report. In this way, it would be possible to bridge existing differences of opinion which have surfaced on this matter and to draft a mutually agreed text of article IX, part 2.

The question whether additional verification provisions are necessary beyond the framework established by article VI and the means of challenge inspection has been discussed to date without conclusive results being attained. If the general opinion tends to deem it necessary that the verification system be supplemented, we, for our part, will join in efforts to search for a generally acceptable and effective solution. It is our understanding that such measures shall correspond to defined additional verification needs and shall require no disproportionate additional costs.

I am underlining this since we should avoid formulating additional measures in the form of a costly and detailed mechanism similar to the one applied with articles IV, V and VI. On the basis of the provisions set out in article VI, it would suffice to outline the general framework for supplementary measures. It should be incumbent upon the organs of the future organization to render the procedure most effective by making use of the experience gathered in the implementation of the Convention. Here we need to clarify which supplementary measures would be eligible, routine inspections or inspections initiated by member States. Two possible approaches have been outlined in the working paper of the Federal Republic of Germany (CD/869) and in the working paper of the United Kingdom (CD/909).

At the present stage of negotiations, we believe the discussion ought to be focused on practical problems. What we have in mind in this context is to consider the possibility of concentrating additional routine verification measures, for example, ad hoc checks, on a relatively small number of facilities which on account of their technological parameters pose a risk to the convention. In this way, the available financial resources of the future Organization could be efficiently used for particularly sensitive facilities. To select such facilities would be the task in our view of the Technical Secretariat of the Organization.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

It would be advisable to apply an objective selection mechanism. The application of advanced methods which are common practice in the chemical industry, for example, work with computer-aided synthesis banks and screening schemes, could serve as a suitable means to identify facilities which have a significant potential to be misused for CW production. Applying such a method, it would be possible to cover an important area where violations of the convention may occur, for example, facilities for organophosphorus chemistry.

Other facilities not accessible by this approach could, however, also be misused for the production of certain chemical agents. Verification on the basis of objective selection methods would not be an appropriate means of deterrence in this respect. The question is legitimate, we think, whether it would be possible to effectively make use of challenge inspection against potential violations of the convention which might occur in such facilities. If there is, however, a need for additional verification provisions, then it could, in our opinion, only be something rather different from challenge inspection. This could be done by means of a verification procedure for which the Organization would be responsible but which would be initiated by a member State.

From all this it can be gathered that the development of the verification system will be a permanent task in the implementation process of the convention. With the present system of verification provisions, which encompasses data reporting and monitoring, routine on-site inspection and challenge inspection, a reliable basis has been created to this end. It must be expandable and flexible. The provisions on the organs of the future Organization should ensure that the viability of this system is guaranteed on an institutional basis.

Those were a few comments on our part concerning the settlement of still pending essential issues in the negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons. We have made these observations in the conviction that given the requisite will and readiness of all parties, it will indeed be possible in the remainder of the session to reach an understanding on these issues and on other essential subjects under negotiation. The committed, creative and methodical guidance of the negotiations by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Morel, and his bureau encourages us in this endeavour. If we work energetically to bridge the remaining differences in a flexible manner and display the necessary sense of determination, it will be possible that the outcome yielded so far in the negotiations will be fixed in the "rolling text" and that the summer session will produce positive results. A good many things quite certainly remain to be done in order to bring about a solution on those issues where there is a possibility of promising results during the summer session. We should centre our efforts on these questions in the course of the intersessional period of work if agreed upon. Along these lines, our delegation will play an active part in compliance with the recent declaration of the Warsaw Treaty States.

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria): Mr. President, it is a great pleasure for my delegation to join those who have already congratulated you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

Your wealth of experience and diplomatic skill will no doubt assist the Conference to advance its work. Your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles, deserves our appreciation for the very able manner in which he successfully steered the work of the Conference in the month of June. Let me seize this opportunity to welcome the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Batsanov, to the CD.

Before addressing myself to some of the specific items on our agenda, permit me to comment briefly on the subject of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation is increasingly getting worried at the slow pace of negotiations in the various Ad Hoc Committees. Regrettably the Conference has so far not achieved tangible progress on any of the first three items on nuclear disarmament. Yet this inaction has not been due to any lack of texts or proposals. Nor was it due to a lack of serious sense of concern and urgency about the expensive and wasteful arms race. The world cannot however wait for a passive CD, although it would be wrong to blame the lack of progress on the relative passivity alone.

The increasing shift of responsibility, of emphasis and attention, from the CD to other forums where more credible disarmament negotiations are taking place has continuously denied the Conference the much-needed political will which forms the basis of our work. Of course, it may not be realistic to expect that every effort in the field of disarmament, nuclear or conventional weapons, should await the pleasure of the Conference. To do so would be to exaggerate the importance and role of the CD. This notwithstanding, its actions or inactions are having telling effects on its credibility, thereby leading to serious diffusion of responsibility for disarmament negotiations. My delegation believes there is a point in all this. As the single world forum for multilateral negotiations in the field of disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament must profess and defend its relevance by being aware of its responsibilities and obligations. It must set its house in order by being responsive to the aspirations of mankind. The impression must not be created that the Governments represented in the CD are less committed to it than they are to the other forums. In short, the CD must confront its 1989 approved programme of work and adopt a more realistic, flexible and rewarding method of accomplishing it.

The current international situation should be seen not as a deterrent to disarmament negotiations, but rather as a catalyst to those negotiations. The yearning of the international community to remove the danger of nuclear war should find expression in the realization by the Conference of the urgent need for all nuclear-weapon States to cease the testing of nuclear weapons. There is a need for all delegations to confront in a more constructive manner the two central and priority issues before this Conference, namely - the nuclear test ban, and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The intensity of the consideration of these items on our agenda underscores their importance not only as indicated in the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, but also as the direct response to the legitimate concerns of the international community over the increasing arms race. We cannot deny the importance and the urgency attached to these questions, and to the need to initiate substantive multilateral negotiations as indicated in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

Despite the concern of the international community about the irrationality of the race for the development of sophisticated nuclear weapons, the arms race continues unabated. Admittedly, by signing the INF Treaty, both the Soviet Union and the United States have demonstrated their recognition of the advantages of seeking security through disarmament and co-operation. The INF no doubt constitutes a milestone in international disarmament efforts. This however represents one step in a journey of a thousand kilometres to establish a just and lasting peace in the world.

Certain basic factors have already been accepted by all as prerequisites for effective nuclear disarmament negotiations. Among these factors are: the undiminished security of all States at progressively lower levels of armaments; account to be taken of the relative quantitative and qualitative level of existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States; an adequate measure of verification to be part of each agreement; and the special responsibility devolving on the two nuclear-weapon States with the largest arsenals. We should, however, bear in mind that the ultimate goal of negotiations is for a total and complete elimination of nuclear weapons such that the undiminished security of all countries, nuclear as well as non-nuclear alike, will be disassociated from nuclear weapons. In this respect, my delegation believes that the question of a comprehensive test ban falls more appropriately within the competence of this Conference. We believe that the time is now ripe for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the item, with appropriate mandate to commence practical work. A comprehensive test-ban treaty should be recognized as an indispensable step on the road to positive nuclear disarmament.

It will be recalled that in the absence of a mandate, six members of the CD launched an initiative last August, proposing an amendment conference for the Partial Test-Ban Treaty as a way of putting the issue of a comprehensive test-ban treaty back on the international agenda. My delegation has always felt that the CTBT is absolutely essential for the preservation of the régime of non-proliferation embodied in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. CTBT is potentially less restrictive and might open the way for the non-NPT signatories to become members. We do not share the view that such a bold initiative could be regarded as irresponsible.

Nigeria was one of the first States to sign and ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We did so because we believed that nuclear weapons were more than weapons of warfare. Indeed, they are too lethal to be used in the game of power politics. As I mentioned in my statement last February, the NPT was conceived as an important instrument to be complemented by other collateral measures for an effective régime on non-proliferation. We knew it was not perfect and that to some extent it was discriminatory and fraught with inequalities of rights and obligations. But we had hoped, perhaps too innocently, that it would arrest the qualitative and quantitative improvement of the existing nuclear arsenal. Was our hope in the Treaty misplaced? Even though we have been denied the economic and scientific benefits of its articles IV and V, where has the lack of progress, the inaction, on the part of the nuclear Powers with respect to the ninth and eleventh preambular paragraphs and article VI of the Treaty led us? Was it too much to expect that the nuclear Powers had the same fears of a nuclear holocaust as we did?

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

Do they not also have some obligations to fulfil under the Treaty? This notwithstanding, let me emphasize that Nigeria believes in the Treaty, and similarly, we still believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a few States increases the insecurity of other States.

No State has the right to play dog-in-the-manger in an arms race, to limit the number of nuclear States, as long as it cannot show that it fulfils its obligations towards mankind. It is an unfortunate irony that to become a major Power today, one must possess nuclear weapons.

The year 1990, which is the year for the Third Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, places an added responsibility on the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation believes that the NPT is a vital ingredient in a nuclear non-proliferation régime. However, if a greater global consensus is to be developed, it will be essential to preserve the advance towards that goal represented by the NPT and to ensure further progress through other instruments. Non-proliferation in the 1990s based exclusively on the NPT may receive a severe set-back in the light of the criticisms of the parties and non-parties alike. If the Conference on Disarmament is not to contribute to that set-back, no obstacle should be put in its way in negotiating an instrument of such vital importance for horizontal as well as vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

As the distinguished head of the Swedish delegation, Mrs. Theorin, rightly observed in her statement last June, and I quote: "For the credibility of the NPT régime, and in order to reinforce it, it is imperative that also the nuclear weapon States now fulfil all their obligations - they should promptly agree to start negotiation on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty". We fully share this concern.

Nigeria continues to attach considerable interest to the question of negative security assurances, pending the elimination of nuclear weapons. The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on this item with a full negotiating mandate is commendable. From all indications, time had blurred our vision to the extent that what commenced over two decades ago, as a legitimate concern for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States has now come to be associated more with the security of nuclear-weapon States almost to the total exclusion of the former. If we may cast our minds back, the question of negative security assurances came into being about 24 years ago, during the negotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, when the non-aligned countries in the ENDC specifically sought assurances that renunciation of nuclear weapons would not place them at a permanent military disadvantage and make them vulnerable to nuclear intimidation.

Nigeria had on many occasions made observations on the unilateral declarations and had expressed the position that they were only helpful to the extent that they expressed the concern of nuclear-weapon States involved in the negotiations. The declarations by themselves do not and cannot constitute firm, credible and binding agreements since they were not negotiated and are unverifiable, conflicting in character and subject to divergent interpretations. Above all, the declarations sought to assure the security of nuclear-weapon States only.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

We remain convinced that the most effective measure to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament. Until this is achieved, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. My delegation feels that all nuclear-weapon States should show greater commitment and understanding on this issue. Otherwise, the impression could be created that the nuclear-weapon States only seek to perpetuate their present military superiority and deny others the right to undiminished security. My delegation believes that the nuclear-weapon States have a responsibility to assure non-nuclear-weapon States of their commitment by attending to these legitimate concerns. Unless this is clearly demonstrated, those who have acceded to the 1968 NPT cannot be expected to feel vindicated, and those who did not accept the Treaty would justifiably even move further away from its objectives. The notion that there are two categories of States, one endowed with a sense of responsibility to manage nuclear weapons, while the other cannot be trusted, and must be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons, should be discouraged.

Let me emphasize that the conclusion of an agreement on negative security assurances should not be made conditional upon the implementation of other collateral measures. All other measures should be treated separately on their own merit. Nigeria believes that the States which have demonstrated by renouncing the nuclear option in a legally binding international instrument should also be eligible for negative security assurances, despite the questions being raised about the level that some of them have actually reached in developing their nuclear capability.

Let me briefly comment on the ongoing negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the wise guidance of Ambassador Pierre Morel of France. Nigeria does not possess chemical weapons and has no such weapons from other States stationed on her territory. As has been rightly stressed several times before in the Conference, the credibility of the convention will depend to a large extent on the effectiveness of the verification régime that will finally be elaborated for the convention. The verification régime should therefore give very convincing assurance of compliance with the purposes and objectives of the convention, or that non-compliance will be detected. Such a régime would indeed strengthen the convention.

The many trial inspections undertaken so far are very vital for the elaboration of the verification régime. I wish to place on record our appreciation for the very commendable contribution by the Finnish delegation through its work in developing some basic elements of the inspection activities directly connected with the verification régime of the convention in the area of instrumentation, standard operating procedures and a computerized data base for the identification of the scheduled chemicals. We note with satisfaction the delegation's offer to train analytical chemists in the methods of analysis and instrumentation.

My delegation welcomes the intense discussions held by experts from industry on the question of confidentiality. The need to ensure effective verification by obtaining adequate information from industry was pitted



(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

against the demand of industry to severely restrict the information that may be demanded for verification purposes. It is reassuring that although the experts were all too anxious to ensure that industrial secrets were given sufficient consideration and protection, as well as compensation if breached, they were also aware of the need to strengthen the convention.

This brings me to the question of sanctions. This issue received limited attention during the spring session. It is however now receiving serious consideration in Working Group 2 of the Ad Hoc Committee. We welcome any measure that can strengthen the convention that is currently being elaborated. The provision of sanctions or penalties for violations of the convention, is one such measure which my delegation attaches great importance to. The nature of the sanctions or penalty should be determined by the extent of the violation. Minor violations should attract automatic and mandatory sanctions while major violations should, after prompt investigation, be dealt with speedily first by the Conference of States parties and thereafter by the Security Council. Once a decision is taken to penalize a violation of the convention, the sanctions should be mandatory, effective and collectively undertaken by all States parties. It is equally important that sanctions should also be applied to non-States parties who violate the convention. By signing the convention a State party will be denying itself the right to produce or acquire this weapon, which a non-State party may produce and even use freely if there is no such deterrent measure. States parties will therefore be at a disadvantage, and also placed at the mercy of the non-States parties which may be tempted to use such weapons against them. Collective action by States parties against such violations of the convention would deter non-States parties from possible breach.

Let me conclude my statement with a brief comment on the forthcoming Canberra Government-Industry Conference Against Chemical Weapons. The involvement of experts in the work of the Conference on Disarmament has proved to be very useful in our negotiations. It is hoped that the Canberra meeting will enable the chemical industry to appreciate the need for a chemical weapons convention. However, my delegation is constrained to urge that the Canberra meeting should not be used to promote non-proliferation of chemical weapons, export control of chemicals to developing countries and restriction on transfer of technology to developing countries. To do otherwise would undermine the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament and indeed put in jeopardy the work that has so far been done on the convention.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and for his kind words to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Iraq, Ambassador Barzan Al-Tikriti.

Mr. BARZAN AL-TIKRITI (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): First of all, I should like to express my appreciation to the President and to the secretariat of the Disarmament Conference for their untiring efforts to organize our work and enable the Conference to attain its objectives. The people of Iraq share the aspirations of other peoples for a world where peace and security prevail. This is essential for freedom and the furtherance of progress in the spiritual and material spheres of life. Iraq is part of the Arab nation, which believes in peace, equitable relations among peoples and respect for international law and is seeking to ensure that the values of charity, peace

(Mr. Barzan Al-Tikriti, Iraq)

and justice prevail throughout the world. Without such relations among States, durable peace cannot be established, and the disarmament process cannot therefore follow its due course, since an uneasy peace that is liable to be breached forces States to remain constantly on their guard to protect their sovereignty and security and exercise their right to self-defence. International relations have recently been characterized by a relaxation of tension, and this has allowed the international community to find solutions to several regional and international problems and conflicts. However, this relaxation of tension has not so far had the desired effect on the work of the Disarmament Conference, this body which is the sole multilateral negotiating forum in the disarmament sphere. As you are all aware, disarmament requires real international co-operation based on good faith with a view to the formulation of universal principles on the basic issues facing the international community, such as the prevention of nuclear war, the banning of tests, the total prohibition of chemical weapons, the achievement of disarmament and the cessation of the arms race. The strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States is of particular importance in some regions of the world, especially the Middle East, where there is no doubt that nuclear weapons have appeared, since they have been acquired by Israel. Israel also has chemical weapons and long-range missiles. This necessitates the adoption of appropriate and effective international measures, to denuclearize the Middle East, strengthen peace and security and promote an arms balance there.

The delegation of the Republic of Iraq supports Peru's draft resolution designed to prevent any attack on nuclear facilities because the effects of such an attack would not be confined to the target country but would have far-reaching consequences. The whole of mankind would be affected. In this connection, we remind the Conference of the Israeli aggression in 1981 against the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which was intended for peaceful purposes, and placed under international supervision. This year we have an opportunity to reaffirm in the Conference Iraq's firm commitment to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and its unswerving support for international endeavours in the field of disarmament. Iraq was one of the first States to accede to the international conventions and treaties in this field.

I should have liked to end my statement here, but for the ill-considered declaration made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran last week, the form and substance of which constituted an unjustified attack on my country. As you are aware, the Conference on Disarmament is the only international body established to conduct negotiations on disarmament and formulate effective measures to control the arms race and to rescue humanity from the spectre of total disaster brought about by the stockpiling of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This Conference is not responsible for finding solutions to regional conflicts; that is the task of other bodies. However, the Iranian régime's representatives are in the habit of taking advantage of this Conference for purposes of propaganda, thereby involving it in matters that are not within its purview and detracting from its credibility as a body in which the whole of humanity has placed its hopes for significant achievements in the field of disarmament.

(Mr. Barzan Al-Tikriti, Iraq)

The representatives of the Iranian régime are well aware that this Conference has no mandate to implement Security Council resolution 598, nor does it have competence to intervene in, or seek solutions to, regional conflicts. However, by raising the subject of the war here, they are attempting to evade their responsibilities in regard to the implementation of resolution 598 and justify their reluctance to comply with the agreement of 8 August 1988, under which the two parties have an obligation to hold direct negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations immediately after the entry into force of the cease-fire, with a view to reaching a common understanding on all the other provisions of resolution 598, including the measures and timetables needed to that end.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran feigned dismay at the lack of progress in the implementation of resolution 598, although it is he who has so far refused to enter into direct negotiations, insisting on a selective approach to the implementation of the resolution, which of course commits his Government to absolutely nothing. If the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran is really eager for peace, it might justifiably be wondered why he refuses to enter into direct negotiations, when his Government has undertaken to do so in a document signed by the Secretary-General? If he really believes in the binding nature of resolution 598, has he perhaps forgotten that his country agreed to that resolution only after the collapse of its military front, a whole year after its adoption by the Security Council. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran drew your attention to the question of withdrawal and misconstrued the letter and spirit of the resolution, treating it as a first step towards a comprehensive settlement, although the detailed provisions of the cease-fire have not yet been agreed, nor have they been embodied in any signed document. There is only a moral undertaking to respect the cease-fire, but Iran still refuses to acknowledge that state of affairs. Iran is also refusing to exchange prisoners, despite the effective cessation of hostilities, thereby violating the Geneva Convention of 1949, and has paid no heed to the repeated appeals of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

As I have already said, it does not fall within the purview of this body to examine details of negotiations concerning the implementation of resolution 598, but it is clear that the Iranian Minister has sought to take advantage of this forum solely for purposes of propaganda and in a desperate attempt to raise the question of chemical weapons in the usual misleading Iranian manner. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran seems to forget his Government's intensive endeavours to purchase weapons, including chemical weapons by all legal and illegal means, and the international information media are still talking about the scandals concerning the smuggling of chemical substances in which the Iranian régime was involved. In the most recent scandal, substances smuggled from a European country were seized in a port in the Arabian Gulf. The country concerned expelled the Iranian diplomats involved in these contraband operations. On this point, I should like to remind everyone that Iran was condemned for having used chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, as can be seen from the reports of the Secretary-General of the United Nations referred to by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran. He selected extracts to use for his own propaganda purposes and set aside everything that condemned his régime. These are the methods of equivocation and prevarication which have become a well-known behavioural characteristic of the Iranian régime. The Iranian Minister's

(Mr. Barzan Al-Tikriti, Iraq)

lamentation over the fate of children is the height of hypocrisy on the part of a régime that used children as human mine detonators, regarding such activities as feats of heroism.

Iraq played a constructive role in the Paris Conference, as everyone knows, and co-operated with other delegations objectively, but the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran has ventured to accuse all the countries which participated in that Conference at Paris of having succumbed to alleged blackmail by Iraq. Everyone knows how the Iranian régime is blackmailing the international community through terrorism and hostage-taking. During the war, Iraq challenged Iran in every international forum, including the United Nations, through the Non-Aligned Movement and the Islamic Conference, proposing that both parties should undertake without reservation, to respect all international treaties and conventions, as well as the rules of international law. The Iranian régime refused to enter into such commitments. Within the context of these endeavours, Iraq affirmed its full willingness to abide by the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 vis-à-vis any country that would for its part comply with the same Protocol, together with the provisions of all treaties, conventions and laws of an international nature. Finally, the most striking aspect of the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran is that it reflects neither a political will to seek peace nor a sincere intention to achieve it. At a very time when endeavours are being made to achieve peace, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of that régime should realize that everybody is aware of what goes on under its rule. Accordingly, his Government should respect present-day rationality, as well as the rules of international relations and civilized behaviour, and abandon its policy of prevarication, deceit and duplicity so as to ensure security, peace, stability and progress for the region and all its peoples. Otherwise the Iranian régime will merely bring distress and ruin on itself.

Mrs. RAUTIO (Finland): We have asked for the floor today to introduce the latest Finnish Blue Book entitled "Standard Operating Procedures for the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, Second Proposal for Procedures Supporting the Reference Database". The first chapter of the report has already been presented about two weeks ago as a separate working paper on the instrumentation needed in the verification laboratory.

The starting point for our proposal of standard operating procedures as contained in this report is that the CW convention will include lists of chemicals and that laboratories must be able to monitor these chemicals reliably from real samples. The selection of the analytical instrumentation for a verification laboratory will entirely depend on the listed chemicals. Our methods have been developed for the monitoring of compounds at present listed in the annex on chemicals. At this stage the emphasis is on the chemicals listed in schedule (1), most of which date back to the two world wars. Although our techniques are intended to be universally applicable to a wide array of chemicals, novel agents might require new techniques.

(Mrs. Rautio, Finland)

The present annex contains large families of compounds. The usefulness of monitoring methods depends on the number of compounds to be monitored and on the availability of prerecorded identification data. If the number of compounds is large, they need to be grouped into subgroups to allow monitoring with specific methods. Monitoring of known chemicals, it may be added, is very much easier and speedier than structure elucidation of unknown chemicals.

The general-purpose definition of a chemical-warfare agent - that a chemical is a chemical-warfare agent if it is used for that purpose - will be useful in securing that the convention cannot be circumvented by claiming that an unlisted chemical is not covered by it. The definition can reasonably be applied in cases of alleged use. Owing to the rarity of such occurrences, the samples can be analysed with great care and in detail although the concentrations may be low. In cases of chemicals found in military arsenals there is plenty of the chemical available to enable a thorough analysis to be made quickly. But the general-purpose definition would be unwieldy as a basis for routine inspections of chemical facilities. In those cases the analysis must be based on named compounds whose absence rather than presence is verified. In a plant producing organophosphorus compounds, for example, the samples collected during routine on-site inspections should be monitored for their contents of listed organophosphorus compounds. Without a defined list of banned compounds and prerecorded identification data, the analyst would be faced with the task of identifying all compounds containing phosphorus, including intermediates, by-products, and impurities, in order to decide whether or not they belonged to the families covered by schedule (1). Using the computerized database the identification of a named chemical takes a fraction of a second, even on-site. The structure elucidation of an unnamed chemical could require weeks of hard work.

Accordingly, at least the chemicals in schedule (1) need to be individually defined, to allow the analytical laboratory to sign a report stating that no banned chemicals are present in the samples. The analyst must know exactly what chemicals to look for. The other alternative could be that the chemical industry declares and justifies all production, including raw materials, intermediates, by-products, impurities and so on. And these data would be included in the database of the verification laboratory. While it would succeed in revealing the production of undeclared organophosphorus compounds, I am afraid that it would be unacceptably intrusive and an unwieldy exercise for the Technical Secretariat. Moreover, it would not reveal novel agents whose structural properties were completely different from compounds listed in the schedules, unless declarations and justifications were expected of the whole chemical industry.

One of the tasks of the future Organization will be to follow chemical research and identify new chemicals to be included in the lists and placed under production control. To make implementation easier in the early days of the convention, as much development of analytical methods as possible should be done beforehand. The acquired expertise would also facilitate development and testing of analytical methods for possible novel agents.

(Mrs. Rautio, Finland)

To ensure confidence among the States parties, the verification analyses will have to be done by methods accepted by the Organization. In our view, what this entails is the establishment of standard operating procedures and an analytical database accessible to all participating laboratories. The Finnish Research Project has been working toward this end for 15 years now.

The present report is a revised version of the proposed standard operating procedures for verification analyses presented in Report D.1 last year. Increased emphasis is now placed on quality control. Testing procedures are presented with a view to achieving good repeatability and reproducibility of results in different laboratories, which is needed to guarantee the reliability of analysis. It is essential that the quality of the analyses be demonstrated when the results must hold up in a court of law. Reproducibility also maximizes the advantages of an analytical database as a reference.

For this report we investigated 40 chemical warfare agents and their homologues. All relevant data including the spectra are annexed to this volume. As of now, all new data will be included in the VERIFY database immediately after analysis of compounds.

The methods we describe are written separately for each technique, so that each technique can exist independently. The eventual selection of equipment can be expected to vary from laboratory to laboratory and we wish to show what can be achieved with each technique separately.

The analytical procedure in each laboratory can be chosen on the basis of the combination of techniques available to the laboratory, the type of sample, and the nature of the task. During routine inspections the task may be the identification of known compounds. Challenge inspections may require also structure elucidation of unknown compounds.

It is our earnest hope that the basic work we are doing will prove useful to the Preparatory Commission and Technical Secretariat as they commence their arduous task of developing verification methodology and data in the first years after the convention has been opened for signature. In the meantime we will be happy if our efforts support and facilitate the ongoing negotiations in Geneva and the work of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in investigating the alleged uses of chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Finland for her statement. There is no one else on the list of speakers. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? No.

The secretariat has today distributed at my request an informal document giving the timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary organs for next week. As usual, it is merely indicative and can be modified later if the nature of our work makes that necessary. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference accepts the timetable.

It was so decided.

(The President)

I would remind you that immediately after the plenary meeting next Tuesday, the Conference is to hold an informal meeting to consider new measures in the field of disarmament to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and ocean floor and the sub-soil thereof. I will now adjourn this meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be on Tuesday, 18 July, at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.

**CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT**

CD/PV.518  
18 July 1989

ENGLISH

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**FINAL RECORD OF THE 518th PLENARY MEETING**

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 18 July 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart (Mongolia)



The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 518th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will today continue its consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons". However, under rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of France, Ambassador Morel, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, let me say first of all how pleased my delegation is to see you acting as President of the Conference for the month of July. We are sure that the experience and skill you have long displayed will help us to make significant progress in our work. Let me add that your knowledge of our language and your vigilance with regard to the use of French are highly appreciated and are for me personally additional grounds for satisfaction. May I also say, as I have already had occasion to do, that it is a further source of satisfaction to see you in the Chair during the month in which both the Mongolian and the French national holidays fall.

I should also like to pay a tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador García Robles, for the exemplary way in which he presided over our work in June during the important period when the Conference was resuming its work.

Mr. MOREL (France): All delegations have stressed, from the very beginning of this session, how much the recent improvement in the international situation is helping to revive the negotiations on arms control and disarmament. We, of course, share that view. But how can we fail to notice at the same time that there is no reason at all for euphoria? We can see still more clearly in these favourable circumstances that disarmament will not come about by itself. Now that we have got past the stage of breaking the political deadlock, we have entered upon another period which may be, which ought to be, a period of consolidation. If I hesitate, it is because we realize every day that an unceasing effort is required to equip ourselves for future success. This applies to the major negotiations under way in the nuclear, chemical and conventional fields, but also to space, and to the other items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

Nothing can be gained in the field of disarmament without stubborn effort. The international community is too big, the challenges of security are too complex and the progress of technology is too disconcerting for us merely to sit back and say the wind is in our favour. Let me add here that being at present Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, I am made very directly aware of the chances and risks involved in disarmament negotiations. The process of drafting the future convention banning chemical weapons, which I will not discuss today, speaks volumes, more perhaps than might be thought, on the opportunities and difficulties involved in the present situation. The Paris Conference has given an unprecedented boost to our negotiations. But it has not freed us from the difficulties inherent in

(Mr. Morel, France)

this unique exercise, and we realize every day that to "redouble our efforts" is not just an empty phrase or a useful formula, but a practical necessity. In a little over a month I shall be introducing the Committee's report to the Conference, that is to say, the new version of the "rolling text", and at that time I shall have to review all aspects of the chemical negotiations. Today I will just say that the remaining month's work we have to do on the substance is of the greatest importance. I believe all delegations are aware of the fact. They have all in various ways indicated their availability, and the Committee has put itself in a position to make progress. It is now up to each of us to play his part.

But I should like today to range further afield and begin by pointing out that the major disarmament negotiations are marked by one and the same imperative, one and the same urgency. How indeed could we fail to meet the challenge of the extraordinary combination of circumstances before us?

In the field of nuclear disarmament, first of all, the bilateral negotiations on Soviet and United States strategic arms and on space have just started up again. We all know their aims, which are ambitious ones, particularly the 50 per cent cut in stockpiles, and my country supports those aims. Even if no specific deadline has been set, everybody agrees that these negotiations cannot go on for ever without producing any results. The two partners wanted to reach a conclusion by the end of 1988. Circumstances prevented them from doing so, and we all know that the matter is a particularly difficult one. But the international community can and should remind the two most heavily armed Powers of its legitimate impatience to see them achieve the goal they themselves have set.

As far as conventional disarmament is concerned, these negotiations are also ambitious ones, since to find a stable level that would be adequate for the conventional armed forces in Europe of the countries belonging to the two alliances would end the overarming which has dominated our continent's history for more than 40 years and impeded its free development. For those who negotiated the terms of reference in Vienna the aim was to succeed in the near future, within a few years. The top leaders of the Western countries meeting at the NATO summit last May decided to reduce the period still further. My country, which launched the proposal for a disarmament conference in Europe 11 years ago, at the first special session, a proposal that has now become a reality, expects a great deal from the stimulus thus given to these major negotiations. First reactions from the East seem to be promising. What now has to be done is to draw the practical consequences in Vienna.

Returning for a moment to the negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons, I note that without fixing a deadline, the Paris Conference emphasized in its debates, and also in the Final Declaration of 11 January, how essential it was to achieve success within the next few years.

What all this means is that we are faced with an exceptional set of circumstances implying the conclusion within a brief stretch of time of major negotiations in three fields - nuclear, conventional and chemical - and three separate exercises - bilateral, regional and multilateral. The most remarkable thing, perhaps, is that this is not a prearranged plan; this triple

(Mr. Morel, France)

rendezvous is first and foremost an indication of the impatience of both Governments and peoples, which are now resolved to break the vicious circle of ruinous overarming.

If the disarmament negotiations are today seeking with one bound to advance the course of history, they must more than ever remain within the limits of what is reasonable. Since there are now various real opportunities for us to seize, clearly identified by agreement between States, we should be particularly suspicious of utopias and guard against disputes of an ideological nature. It is not by assailing the present state of affairs in international security that we shall improve it. It is not the practice of deterrence that is to be condemned, but war in all its forms, which must be made ever more impossible. It is not by attacking a country's legitimate defence options as a matter of course that we shall get progress in disarmament negotiations.

As far as my own country is concerned, I would remind you that it is ready to participate in nuclear disarmament when the time comes, once three well-known conditions are fulfilled, namely, a radical change in the present gap between our strategic resources and those of the United States and the USSR, a halt to the race in defensive technology, whether space, anti-missile or anti-submarine, and the implementation of conventional disarmament and total prohibition of chemical weapons. For the time being, France notes that the two super-Powers' stockpiles are still growing, even if the recent Treaty on intermediate nuclear forces has for the first time committed its signatories to genuine destruction of some weapons. While waiting for this trend to be followed up worldwide, France will therefore continue to maintain forces of a quality and quantity just above the credibility threshold, in the belief that strict sufficiency is the golden rule in security.

I would remind you in this connection of France's position on the cessation of nuclear tests. We consider that it is not a real priority in nuclear disarmament, and, for reasons I have just mentioned, we cannot accept a total ban imposing programmed obsolescence on our forces, which would undermine our security capacity. The two super-Powers are free to set their own rules themselves. Whatever agreements they may reach, it is clear that the considerable experience they have accumulated in this field over the past 40 years puts them in a different situation from us. Our criterion is and remains the sufficiency necessary to maintain our security.

As far as the work of the Disarmament Conference on these matters is concerned, we shall not stand in the way of any procedural agreements that may be reached, but, as in the past, we shall refrain from participating in any exercise which corresponds to a conception of nuclear disarmament that we do not share.

If there is another aspect of nuclear disarmament in which we have to be reasonable, it is the question of short-range nuclear missiles stationed in Europe. I will merely say that we do not believe it is possible to change the order of priority that emerges clearly from the negotiations now under way.

After mentioning chemical, conventional and nuclear weapons, I should now like to deal at greater length with space, which is not given the importance it deserves in multilateral forums. Rather than attribute this to ill-will on

(Mr. Morel, France)

the part of States, it would be better to recognize the special nature of space activities, which makes them complicated to deal with. Space differs from other sectors of disarmament in that the main kinds of equipment involved, i.e. satellites, use technology that is still evolving. A state of continuing uncertainty as to their future development prevents us from weighing all the strategic implications and thus limits the possibility of negotiating on such systems. Hence it is difficult to distinguish in advance what is important in security terms from what is secondary, and what is dangerous from what is effective.

Faced with such complexity, we should avoid over-simplification and look the facts clearly in the face, which means in effect recognizing certain points: it would be both illusory and inopportune to envisage complete demilitarization of outer space; the present legal régime for space is not adequate by itself to prevent an arms race there; an absolute ban on anti-satellite systems appears to be unverifiable in practice, because no general régime can effectively cover very different kinds of devices; finally, the anti-satellite and anti-missile fields are closely linked, and no multilateral regulation exercise aimed at prohibiting the permanent placing of weapons in space could advance independently of the United States-Soviet bilateral negotiations, nor a fortiori more rapidly than those negotiations.

These few considerations thus lead us to rule out measures which, however attractive they seem, would in reality be delusive or unsuitable for multilateral treatment.

Does this mean we should give up and regard the prevention of an arms race in space as too much for the international community? Certainly not. The multilateral bodies, and first and foremost the Conference on Disarmament, have a special role to play, alongside bilateral efforts, in promoting further thought on these subjects and resolving the deadlock we are faced with at the moment.

We should first of all continue to improve our technical knowledge of the issues and difficulties of disarmament in space, without which it will not be possible to reach any specific agreement on the means to be applied. The Conference on Disarmament can and should also identify pragmatically the fields in which a consensus seems possible here and now. From this standpoint, France notes that there has been a welcome change of attitude in two important fields, on which I should now like to dwell: firstly the increasing recognition of the usefulness of space for monitoring and verification; and secondly, the growth in many countries' interest in the subject of the legal immunity of satellites.

As regards the first, the development of facilities for observation shows that space is not just an area for disarmament; it is also a potential tool of disarmament, given the possibility of satellite verification of agreements. Recent trends, marked in particular by growing recognition of the stabilizing role of observation satellites and the appearance of high-resolution satellites other than those of the United States and the USSR, mean that one can envisage a greater contribution by space facilities to the verification of disarmament agreements and confirms in the event the validity of the course France has been proposing since 1978.

(Mr. Morel, France)

After submitting at the first special session on disarmament a proposal for an international satellite monitoring agency (ISMA), which was thoroughly studied by a United Nations group of experts from 1979 to 1981, France proposed at the third SSOD in June 1988 that the first phase envisaged under the ISMA should be implemented, in the form of an agency for the processing of satellite images, or APSI.

Without giving up the more ambitious objective set in 1978, we have since realized the need in present circumstances to distinguish very clearly between monitoring and verification. The latter is only possible within the framework of a specific agreement, in order to ensure that the agreement is being complied with, and it can only be carried out by the countries parties to that agreement.

It would certainly be conceivable, in the long term, to develop, for the benefit of the whole international community or of the parties to a particular treaty, either general observation satellites or specialized satellites for the verification of compliance with a particular provision. That is one of the things envisaged for the third phase of the agency we proposed in 1978.

But it seems to us preferable at the present stage to set as the objective for the initial phase the pooling of existing data. The space image processing agency proposed in 1988 would not cost very much, but it would enable national experts to be given the necessary training in the interpretation of space images and above all would make it possible to assess what could actually be achieved with satellites later on in the fields of monitoring and verification. This preliminary phase should thus provide an opportunity to determine the specific requirements for new systems and possible future applications.

It must however be clear that such an agency would merely be a confidence-building device and would not be designed to form the embryo of a verification system attached to the United Nations with universal competence. The principle of the specificity of verification in fact argues against the idea that the international community as a whole should be responsible for verifying any disarmament agreement, whatever its nature and whoever the parties, and seek to employ one single instrument for that purpose. The way to achieve the best possible use of space facilities for purposes of security, stability and disarmament is thus for the time being to establish as clear a distribution of responsibilities as possible. If we try and mix everything up together, we shall not make progress anywhere.

The same applies when we make a combined effort to guarantee the security of space activities that deserve to be protected, which is the second component of our proposals in this field. We should continue our efforts to arrive at a consensus on measures acceptable to everyone in order to prevent the arms race in space. But the present difficulties show that the legal approach, through satellite immunity, is the one most in keeping with the Disarmament Conference's capacity for action. We observe with interest, moreover, that this theme is coming up more and more often in statements made at this Conference. The idea of immunity is at the heart of the proposals submitted by France in recent years. We should like today to propose that the

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international community's work in this field should be organized around three points, which will be developed this afternoon in the statement to be made to the Ad hoc Committee by Mr. de La Chapelle, an expert from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The first point we propose, and there are three of them, is the principle of non-interference. Recognizing to start with that the only effective criterion for identifying satellites deserving protection is whether or not they have the capacity to interfere actively with another satellite, we can arrive at a precise definition of the principle of non-interference with non-aggressive space activities, which should apply to all devices that are not themselves equipped for such interference. For the time being, this principle is not mentioned explicitly except in United States-Soviet bilateral agreements. It has the merit of being much more precise than the provision in the Charter of the United Nations on the simple non-use of force and should therefore, in our view, be given fully explicit recognition by the international community as a whole. Such confirmation might not be enough on its own to give space objects absolute protection. But it would at least enable the States to make a precise commitment on a common rule already formulated and designed precisely for space activities.

The second point we are proposing in order to organize the work is the space code of conduct. It is clear that adoption of the principle of non-interference will not have any effect unless it is accompanied by definite rules to facilitate compliance, in two ways.

Firstly, implementation of the principle of non-interference requires first of all a better knowledge of the characteristics of space objects, and hence a strengthening of the Registration Convention of 1975. The degree of precision that would be adequate remains to be determined and the legal framework to be adopted for the new régime has not been established. Should we revise the 1975 Convention or adopt a new document? It is still too early to decide. On the other hand, it should be possible to determine in an initial stage the possible content of such a strengthened registration régime with a view to promoting greater security for space activities.

Secondly, as far as this code of conduct is concerned, however reliable the future registration régime may be, it should be accompanied by precise rules of behaviour for space objects in order to reduce the risk of incidents, and above all to avoid their misinterpretation. Ignorance of the space environment and the diversity of possible kinds of interference with equipment in orbit might at a time of tension cause cessation of the operation of one of these satellites to be misinterpreted as being the result of hostile action justifying retaliation. The aim is thus to have a better knowledge at all times of the immediate environment of each space object, and hence of the dangers to which it is exposed.

These two components, the registration system and the rules of behaviour, should constitute an initial code of conduct, which would be expanded later as space activities developed. This pragmatic approach, based on confidence-building measures, could in our view constitute an acceptable working basis for all States. It does not prejudice their readiness to sign

(Mr. Morel, France)

prohibition or limitation agreements later on and does not in any way impede the bilateral negotiations. It is not designed to achieve by roundabout means the equivalent of prohibition, but at the same time it does leave room for adjustment to developments in technical capacities and to increases in confidence so that more binding measures could be worked out if States came to want them.

The third point for organizing work on the prevention of an arms race in space is the trajectography centre. The strengthened registration system and the formulation of rules of conduct will have to be based on an appropriate instrument reconciling the requirements of technological and military confidentiality with the need to gather all the requisite information concerning the trajectories of all satellites. After an initial consideration of this question, my country takes the view that a centralized data system could store and process, without publishing them, the parameters communicated at the time of registration and on subsequent updatings. The trajectography centre would be permanently engaged in calculating all the available trajectories and as such would have a double role: under normal circumstances it would spontaneously issue a warning if satellites were getting too close on the same orbit or were liable to pass too close; in the event of an accident leading to allegations of deliberate collision, it would be able through consultation machinery to furnish proof of good faith. Such a system could be run discreetly and simply. It would be attached, like the agency for the processing of satellite images, to the United Nations Secretariat and would be open to all States possessing or using satellites that wanted to take advantage of it.

Those are the main proposals that our expert will be submitting to the Committee this afternoon.

I should like, finally, to turn briefly to three other items on our agenda, namely, negative security assurances, radiological weapons and the comprehensive programme of disarmament. On the first of these items, my country has already indicated on a number of occasions, in the appropriate Ad hoc Committee, that it was ready to join with other delegations in trying to find a common arrangement by which the nuclear Powers would give the non-nuclear-weapon countries assurances against the use or threat of the use of such weapons.

But here again we must be careful not to be unrealistic. Working out such a formula is not just a matter for the nuclear Powers, which have already given credible assurances in the form of unilateral declarations. This will have to be a joint effort, which cannot disregard the existence of those declarations. Any partial or unbalanced approach, any kind of accusation, can only hinder this effort.

I should like to make it plain to the Conference here that I cannot pass over in silence the remarks made recently on this matter by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Both because of their substance and because of the fact that the representative of that country to the Conference on Disarmament is acting this year as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances, I have to say that to present a caricature of the situation does not help us to arrive at the compromise solutions we all want.

(Mr. Morel, France)

As far as radiological weapons are concerned, my delegation has noted with interest the ideas put forward by the representative of Hungary on the scope of a convention banning such weapons in the traditional sense. These ideas deserve careful study in Contact Group A of the Ad hoc Committee. As far as the prohibition of attacks on civilian nuclear facilities is concerned, on the other hand, we understand the interest in this subject, but we must say once again that we still think the Conference on Disarmament is not competent to negotiate an agreement in this field. As the representative of Peru has pointed out, nuclear facilities are already protected by the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and if strengthening of the system is necessary, it is within that framework that it would have to be negotiated.

Finally, on the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, my delegation has constantly sought to indicate its willingness to contribute to the efforts being made to find generally acceptable solutions to the questions that are still outstanding. It hopes that here too a spirit of compromise will prevail and that a consensus can emerge on the whole range of complex fields covered by the comprehensive programme. The time already spent on drafting the document is in itself a sign of the difficulty of the exercise. Let us therefore beware of simplistic or over hasty formulas; let us prefer pragmatism to dogmatism.

Throughout this statement, I have tried to stress that disarmament will not come about of its own accord and that we cannot bring it any nearer by means of slogans or clichés. Developments in this field in recent years, and indeed in recent months, have been very instructive: where a genuine opportunity has been duly identified and there is a real desire to succeed as soon as possible, there can be rapid, substantial, and I would even say exceptional progress. That is true in relations between two States, or at the level of a region, but also for the whole international community, that is to say, in particular for the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of France, Ambassador Morel, for his statement and for his kind and generous words for the Chair.

I have no further speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to speak? I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. ARDAKANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Since the distinguished Ambassador of France referred to the statement by our Foreign Minister here regarding the work of the Conference, I think it is not a matter of dispute, but rather that both are speaking for the same goal, probably from a different angle, and I think this is a healthy way of conducting the work. As Ambassador Morel has stressed again, all of us are trying to find a common formula in the areas that we think are important for the work of the CD and ad hoc committees have been established for it. I think we would take what Ambassador Morel has said as a way of offering further collaboration rather than raising a point of dispute.



The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to speak? That does not seem to be the case.

I now turn to the requests made by non-member States to participate in the informal meeting for consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the sub-soil thereof. The relevant draft decisions have been circulated today in working paper CD/WP.369 and Add.1-10. The States parties to the sea-bed treaty which are asking to participate in the informal meeting are the following: Austria, Ireland, Republic of Korea, Viet Nam, Spain, Malaysia, Finland, Turkey, New Zealand, Norway and Denmark. Since there has been no objection to the idea of inviting the non-member States concerned to participate in the informal meeting, I suggest that we should now consider all the requests together. It is of course understood that that will not constitute a precedent for the work of the Conference. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decisions.

It was so decided.

I would remind delegations that immediately after today's plenary meeting, the Conference will hold an informal meeting for consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the sub-soil thereof. There are no further items to consider today, and I shall therefore adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 20 July, at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.519  
20 July 1989

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 20 July 1989, at 10 a.m.

President:                      Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart                      (Mongolia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 519th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Italy, the German Democratic Republic, Belgium and Romania. I take particular pleasure in welcoming to the Conference Ambassador Aldo Pugliese, an old friend, who will be addressing the plenary meeting today as representative of Italy. I now give the floor to Ambassador Pugliese.

Mr. PUGLIESE (Italy): Thank you, Mr. President, for the nice words you have addressed to me. At the outset, allow me to express to you my warmest congratulations upon your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for this month. I am fully confident that under your skilful and effective guidance the Conference will be able to achieve decisive progress in its deliberations. I also wish to extend my delegation's deepest appreciation to your predecessor, the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, for the experienced and able manner in which he presided over the Conference on Disarmament during the month of June.

The Conference on Disarmament has resumed its activities at a time when disarmament prospects hold great promise and the international climate, in general, seems to favour a successful outcome of endeavours aimed at a drastic reduction of the military confrontation and at a consolidation of peace and stability.

In the context of the East-West dialogue, the recent summit of the Atlantic Alliance in Brussels announced new proposals in the field of conventional force reductions, with the precise aim of imparting a new and decisive impulse to the CFE Vienna negotiations. Such proposals have already been introduced in treaty form, following the elaboration of some essential details, at the negotiating table in Vienna, two months in advance of what had been foreseen by the summit itself.

This is - in our view - another example of a definite willingness to promote the rapid achievement of concrete results in these negotiations, which hold exceptional importance for stability and peace in Europe and which have already allowed an unprecedented conceptual rapprochement in the mere four months since they started last March. Recently, the Soviet-United States negotiations on START and on space questions, and other bilateral talks between the United States and the USSR, have been resumed in a very constructive atmosphere, enhancing the prospects of conclusive developments in a not too distant future.

The Italian Government welcomes these developments and believes that they should constitute an encouragement for us to face our tasks with a renewed sense of commitment and with a firm will to succeed.

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

The Geneva Conference on Disarmament has so far largely proved its effectiveness as a distinct multilateral laboratory of intents and concepts relevant to the disarmament process; our essential task is to go further and to address our efforts towards the achievement of decisive concrete results on extremely important issues which can influence the future of mankind itself.

It is thus imperative, in the light of the increasingly dynamic international framework, that the Conference on Disarmament live up to its real objectives and play a major role in providing a substantive contribution to the international disarmament process and to the search for strengthened stability and peace in the whole world.

Mr. Andreotti, our Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his statement here on 2 March, along with Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, stressed again the priority importance and the urgency that the Italian Government attaches to the conclusion of a convention on the total ban of chemical weapons.

In this context, I must clearly express Italy's strong wish that progress on this issue be much quicker than proved possible during our last session and that, therefore, our work may take on a faster pace and greater dynamism.

Indeed, after the success achieved by the Paris Conference, the call for an intensification of efforts for the achievement of early results has found particularly in Ambassador Morel's competent guidance and dedicated resolve the most reliable and committed interpretation of its requirements.

However, the stronger impetus imparted to the negotiations has not been rewarded so far by the corresponding substantial developments we were expecting. Whereas we feel that, while some progress on certain specific, quite significant, issues has been achieved, on the whole, not enough advance has been made, and most important issues remain unsolved.

Italy is concerned that we might lose the momentum to proceed towards the complete elimination of these hideous weapons and to prevent the existing risks of proliferation. We are firmly convinced in this regard that the only way to stop a possible catastrophic spread of chemical weapons is to conclude a total and global ban as soon as possible.

In this spirit we shall also participate in the Canberra conference, trusting that it will help to give a concrete turn to the efforts aimed at the conclusion of a chemical weapons ban and to a realistic comprehension of the background against which the convention is being elaborated.

With all appreciation for the many and useful national contributions on specific and highly detailed questions, we think that delegations should now try hard to concentrate and direct their efforts towards the solution of crucial issues that are still pending in the way of an early conclusion of negotiations. In spite of endless efforts to regulate in advance the future convention to the utmost detail, it might in fact prove illusory to aim at too

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

detailed perfection in the search for ideal solutions to extremely complex problems. The ban is bound to bear some kind of imperfection or other at the outset and will have to be submitted to a constant fine-tuning on the basis of subsequent implementation and experience: there should be no doubt that the same political will and sense of commitment that will allow the finalization of the convention should enable parties to co-operate to ensure full compliance.

Verification issues are clearly central to an effective ban and on many aspects they still present us with unsolved complexities. However, we are convinced that the definition of a reliable verification system along the lines identified through our work is not only possible, but even within reach, given the political will to overcome the remaining obstacles and a sufficient spirit of compromise. We are encouraged by the results of the trial inspections that have been carried out by various countries in the last few months, which, in our opinion, should contribute to a conclusive turn towards the solution of verification problems. Challenge inspections, in our view, will remain the essential element of a verification régime which is capable of deterring violations and establishing compliance.

We are certainly open to other suggestions and we have considered with interest the proposals of the United Kingdom and of the Federal Republic of Germany, envisaging additional means of verification. At the same time, we believe that the most urgent task is to concretely address the main aspects and to avoid academic debates that might distract our attention.

We also think that an advance data exchange with provisions for its verification will significantly contribute to a general increase of confidence and thus constitute an important element to facilitate the adoption of a ban.

In this context, Italy is heartened by the fact that a growing number of countries are taking a direct interest in the negotiations for a ban, which, to be really effective, must be supported by all countries concerned and - ideally - should be of a universal character.

We wonder whether it may be feasible to contemplate a methodological approach aimed at disposing of the solution of the most important issues in the shortest possible time while setting temporarily aside the cases of less vital character. These might indeed be tackled at a later stage. A prolonged lack of success in finalizing any instrument on the global prohibition of chemical weapons may in fact be interpreted as a failure in preventing an unchecked dissemination of militarily relevant chemical technologies around the world: a prospect casting an historic responsibility upon this body.

Another important element of the convention is certainly related to the institutional aspects. In fact, it will be essential, in the Italian view, to ensure a balanced and satisfactory representation in the organs which will have competence for implementing the convention and ensuring compliance.

Italy is convinced that universal and loyal participation in the future convention will only be ensured through a widespread feeling that all legitimate interests are protected through fair representation.

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

With this in mind, we believe, as regards participation in the executive council, for example, that it will have to be wide enough and to adequately reflect regional, political and industrial realities, with no provision for unjustified differentiated membership.

As regards other items on our agenda, allow me first of all to state the satisfaction of my delegation at the positive contribution provided by the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) in devising a general and effective verification régime for the monitoring of seismic events. Unfortunately, we can hardly speak of any other significant progress on the three nuclear items on our agenda during the spring session. We support efforts currently being made by Ambassador Yamada of Japan to secure a consensus on a specific mandate for the resumption of the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban. It is regrettable that obstacles prevent more substantive activity from being carried out. Even in the absence of a negotiating mandate, the Conference could still make a useful contribution to the progress of this item.

My Government remains deeply committed to the final objective of a verifiable and comprehensive test ban, as one of the main issues on our agenda. We recognize, however, that a comprehensive test ban cannot be isolated from other issues concerning the disarmament process at large and the evolution of the strategic balance. Thus our support, as previously stated before this forum, goes to a step-by-step approach, favoured by a more flexible attitude by all members of the CD and assisted by progress achieved in the separate, but very relevant, forum of the United States-USSR negotiations on progressive limitation of their nuclear tests.

Lastly, in the field of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, we welcomed the announced resumption of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union at Geneva, on 19 June, on START and space matters; it is to be hoped that progress on all space-related items at a bilateral level will stimulate more substantive progress on the same item here at the CD: this may take place through the clarification of issues, such as a correct and uniform terminology, the relationship between bilateral and multilateral forums, improved access to information, the strengthening of the existing régime governing outer space, as well as the promotion of an appropriate set of confidence-building measures consistent with technological innovations.

In this framework, growing stability in space relationships can greatly benefit from closer co-operation also in the civil exploitation of space, given the close interconnection between the civil and military uses of outer space.

The military use of outer space poses serious problems of verification, but these are not impossible to solve: technical problems connected with verification procedures can be tackled when there is a strong political will. My delegation believes that significant progress can and should be achieved in the field of outer space verification and of the identification of means to ensure compliance with existing agreements.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words that he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): Already at the beginning of this month, I had an opportunity to set forth in detail our viewpoint on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. As you know, the German Democratic Republic advocates that effective and verifiable agreements be concluded on the prohibition of the development, testing and deployment of weapons in outer space. On several occasions we have advanced proposals to this end. Today I should like to briefly touch upon another issue of the work of the Outer Space Committee, i.e. an analysis of existing agreements relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The delegations of socialist countries have repeatedly elaborated on the special aspect of the protection of objects in outer space. Therefore I should like to submit to the Conference today on behalf of Bulgaria, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic a working paper CD/933 (CD/OS/WP.34) entitled "Survey of international law relevant to immunity and protection of objects in space and to other basic principles of outer space activities". This document shows in particular that the existing legal régime for outer space is adding to the protection of outer space objects. Against this background, it is crucially important that all States strictly comply with these agreements and apply their specific provisions. The working paper comprises a review of international law regarding immunity of objects in outer space. It is structured, as you will see, in the following manner: first - basic norms; second - norms concerning national jurisdiction over and ownership of objects after their launch into outer space; third - other main principles of activities in outer space. The survey contained in document CD/933 clearly indicates that the existing legal régime does not guarantee all-embracing protection of objects in outer space. Therefore, we think, additional measures are needed to this effect. What would also serve this aim is the further codification and development of existing rules of international law relating to the protection of space objects, which would constitute a major step towards preventing an arms race in outer space. These measures could encompass steps providing for confidence-building and for prohibiting the weaponization of outer space. In our opinion, these two aspects are interlinked.

So much for the introduction of the document before the Conference. I should like to add some other remarks.

During the last meetings of the Outer Space Committee it was possible to listen to interesting scientific contributions on the subject of arms control, which were delivered by outer space experts from the Soviet Union, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. It has become obvious once more that the knowledge and expertise of experts is indeed helpful in this context. On the part of our delegation it is envisaged that an expert from the German Democratic Republic will address the meeting of the Outer Space Committee next week. As regards the involvement of experts in the work of the Outer Space Committee, we hold the view that tangible progress has been achieved in this

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respect. The explanations made by experts have been substantial in nature and focused on expounding the proposals of their countries in a more detailed way. We would welcome it very much if in July 1990 delegations would facilitate the appearance of outer space experts. We feel that it would be suitable, in this connection, to co-ordinate the activities of experts and organize a direct exchange of opinion among them first. We think this could help to make the future work of the Outer Space Committee more concrete and more effective. As far as my delegation is concerned, we are prepared to make a distinctive contribution to this effect.

Mr. HOULLEZ (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. President, though I shall be speaking on behalf of the Group of Western States, I should like first of all, on behalf of the Belgian delegation, to express our profound satisfaction at seeing you presiding over our work. Your experience and your sense of diplomacy, conveyed so subtly thanks to your linguistic knowledge, will guarantee you success in your task.

I should also like to pay tribute to your predecessor, our doyen, Ambassador García Robles, for the remarkable way in which he guided our work.

Finally, I am particularly pleased, as a former Ambassador to Warsaw, to congratulate the Polish delegation on the occasion of their national day.

The delegations of the Western countries, on whose behalf I have the honour to speak today, have consistently stressed the special significance they attach to an in-depth consideration of the nuclear items on our agenda. This interest derives from the overriding necessity of avoiding war and strengthening international security and stability in the nuclear age. The prevention of nuclear war is a global concern and not merely the responsibility of certain States or military alliances. Our current efforts in this regard take place at a time of unprecedented change and opportunity. Developments in East-West relations suggest that real progress is possible in the field of arms control and disarmament. The changes that are taking place in some regions are bringing us closer to the vision of a just, humane and democratic world. Western countries welcome increased openness, greater respect for human rights and active participation of the individual in shaping foreign policy. If sustained, these trends will strengthen the prospects for fundamental improvements in international relations, a prerequisite for real progress in the disarmament field.

The basic goal of Western arms control and disarmament policy is to strengthen security and increase stability at the lowest balanced level of forces and armaments consistent with the requirements for the prevention of war and for defence. Current prospects notwithstanding, we face an immediate future which is both promising and uncertain. Peace must always be striven for, it can never be taken for granted. With this background in mind, military security and policies aimed at reducing tension and resolving underlying political differences are not contradictory, but on the contrary complementary. In their determined efforts to reduce the relative importance of the military component and in trying to replace confrontation with co-operation, the Western countries will, both in East-West relations and



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globally, exploit the opportunities for arms control as an agent of change. We will spare no effort to ensure that these positive trends and developments result in greater security and stability for the benefit of all States. The Western countries members of the Atlantic Alliance adopted on 29 and 30 May a comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament which provides a way ahead in this respect and sets an agenda for the future. This concept, which was circulated as document CD/926, represents a comprehensive approach to the CD agenda items "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" and "Prevention of nuclear war including all related matters" as interrelated issues. The Western Group of countries believes that these issues can only be dealt with satisfactorily in a broader context of prevention of war in general. It is with this objective in mind that the Western countries are continuing their active and constructive approach to these items.

In the field of arms control we have already expressed our satisfaction about the progress made. The INF Treaty has eliminated a whole category of weapons, while providing for stringent verification measures. We reaffirm our desire for the conclusion as soon as possible of an agreement significantly reducing the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear Powers by eliminating destabilizing offensive capabilities. Although the members of the Western Group are actively working for further progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, they nevertheless stress that in their view the reduction of nuclear arms cannot be fully dissociated from other disarmament measures and that it must take place within the context of a strengthening of international stability and security. In this respect they welcome with satisfaction the general improvement in relations between the two main nuclear Powers, their respective allies and other European States, which has led to the opening of negotiations on conventional disarmament and on confidence-building and security measures in Europe, on which they hope to see rapid progress. Agreements in this field and in the START negotiations already mentioned would constitute, both in themselves and through interaction among different arms control elements, major contributions to stability. The Western countries members of the Atlantic Alliance have stated that the implementation of such agreements could facilitate further reductions in substrategic nuclear forces, although it would not obviate the need for such forces. Once implementation of an agreement on conventional forces in Europe has begun, the way could be opened for negotiations on partial reductions in United States and Soviet land-based short-range nuclear missiles to equal and verifiable levels.

Noting that it is incumbent upon all States to intensify their efforts and take steps to promote disarmament, all members of the Group of Western countries observe with growing concern the acquisition or the development of ballistic missiles by an increasing number of States. The elimination of this potential source of international instability and insecurity would seem to call for action, whether at the bilateral, regional or international levels, especially if this development were to be accompanied by national nuclear programmes. Delegations of the Western Group consider that the establishment of a subsidiary body for item 2 is inappropriate at the present stage and that in current circumstances it would be better to work on the cessation of the

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nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in plenary and informal meetings. However, in our view the most appropriate tool for dealing with these problems is plenary debate, where views of delegations are put on final record.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Belgium for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now call on the distinguished representative of Romania, Ambassador Dolgu.

Mr. DOLGU (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to associate myself with previous speakers in conveying to you our warmest congratulations on the occasion of your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and for your most able and dynamic conduct of our work so far during this month of July. In you, we hail a representative of a country with which Romania enjoys close links of friendship and co-operation as well as a diplomat and colleague whose experience and tact are well known to all.

Our congratulations go as well to your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Alfonso García Robles, for the exemplary manner in which he discharged his duties. I take this opportunity to express our best wishes for the future to those colleagues who have left us - Mario Campora of Argentina, Aldo Pugliese of Italy, Nihal Rodrigo of Sri Lanka and Youri Nazarkin of the Soviet Union - and to assure them that our warm wishes go with them throughout their future career. It is a pleasure to welcome and greet an old friend whom we all esteem, in the person of Mr. Batsanov, the new representative of the Soviet Union to the Conference on Disarmament.

In the view of the Romanian delegation, the international community is entitled to expect more substantial results from the Conference on Disarmament. Firstly, while the international situation is still complex and contradictory, the fact remains that developments in international affairs, the progress made in the settlement of regional disputes, the signing of the Soviet-United States treaty on the elimination of medium and short-range nuclear missiles, followed by steps to implement it, and the beginning of the Vienna negotiations on conventional weapons are so many positive elements conducive to progress on the issues on the Conference's agenda. Secondly, there is no lack of competence and expertise in this forum. A large number of proposals and suggestions have been put forward with respect to the first item on the agenda, namely, "Nuclear-test ban". The draft submitted by Czechoslovakia remains on the table, and Ambassador Yamada of Japan is continuing his efforts to find a formula that is generally acceptable. In another sphere, Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, after his remarkable efforts in preparing for the success of the Paris Conference, is continuing to show inexhaustible energy and imagination in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. In the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, thanks to various initiatives, including your own, Mr. President, we have got a better grasp of the substantive issues to be discussed and to be settled in the framework of a legal régime that could meet our aims. Finally, with respect to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, I would

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mention the remarkable efforts made by its distinguished Chairman, Ambassador García Robles. In this area as on other items on the agenda, many delegations of member and non-member countries have come forward with contributions or proposals of great interest and usefulness.

Despite all these efforts progress has been modest. We have repeatedly examined issues relating to the question of expanding the Conference's role and increasing its efficiency, but as we have already stressed, the fundamental problem in our view is still to find the political will necessary to give the multilateral forum its proper place in any disarmament process. A particular responsibility falls to the major nuclear powers in this respect, but the process cannot be sustained and carried to a successful conclusion without the involvement and active participation of all countries concerned. We too wish to emphasize the necessary complementarity of efforts in the bilateral, regional and multilateral spheres. It is high time for all our capitals to understand that the single multilateral forum this Conference represents ought not to be barred from dealing with certain subjects which are in fact central, such as nuclear disarmament. The Conference ought to be in a position to engage in substantive discussion and negotiations on all of the priority questions on its agenda, to play its role in full and to contribute very specifically to a real disarmament process.

Allow me now to make a few brief comments on certain aspects of our work that we consider particularly important and topical. One objective that is now accepted for ensuring international security and building lasting peace is the achievement of general and complete disarmament, and first and foremost, nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament first, because, by their power of destruction and the size of the existing arsenals, nuclear weapons today are capable of destroying mankind and civilization on our planet. Nuclear disarmament first, because so long as these arsenals exist the danger of sliding into disaster cannot be ruled out. Nuclear disarmament first, because we are talking about a threat that weighs upon the security of all States whether they possess nuclear weapons or not. Given this situation and despite the fact that there is more and more talk of the need for a new approach to problems of international security in disarmament, the concept of nuclear deterrence continues to provide the basis for the military doctrines of certain States. For our part we can only regret this situation and reiterate our firm conviction that nuclear weapons, far from assuring or consolidating the security of States, diminish and jeopardize it, because nuclear deterrence and the military doctrines associated with it in fact assume the possibility of using nuclear weapons and give rise to the steady qualitative and quantitative growth of nuclear arsenals. Trusting in nuclear deterrence and all that implies is one of the last clichés of the arms race. Like other clichés, it is doomed to disappear, but how long will we have to wait? If we compare present approaches with those which prevailed in previous decades we observe that disarmament in general, and nuclear disarmament in particular, apart from certain difficulties inherent in comparability and verification remains a problem of political will. As was pointed out by Ambassador Theorin of Sweden, it took 20 years from the signature of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the nuclear Powers to take a first

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step in fulfilling the undertaking they had assumed to continue their negotiations in good faith and implement effective nuclear disarmament measures. We share the view that mankind cannot afford the luxury of waiting another 20 years for the next step. Substantial steps aimed at the reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons should take place at an ever faster pace so that mankind can hope to enter upon the next millenium without this sword of Damocles threatening its existence. Of course in the sphere of nuclear disarmament one can imagine various scenarios and priorities. Common sense would suggest acting simultaneously along several avenues, for the denuclearization of the European continent, the 50 per cent reduction in the strategic weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States and the cessation of all nuclear tests.

As far as tactical nuclear weapons are concerned, I would have two comments to make. The first is that nuclear arsenals are continuing to grow, and implementation of NATO's proposed decision to modernize its tactical nuclear weapons can only strengthen that trend. The second is that a conflict in Europe with the use of tactical nuclear weapons would lead not only to the destruction of the countries within the area of deployment on either side of the line separating the two blocs, but would also inevitably degenerate into a generalized nuclear exchange. This is why the NATO countries should seize the opportunity provided by the Soviet Union's recent proposal. In this context, I should like to remind you that my country has systematically spoken in favour of all measures which may ultimately be conducive to denuclearizing the European continent. Thus during the "missiles in Europe" crisis, Romania came out in favour of the withdrawal of the Soviet SS20s and the abandonment of the decision to deploy United States Pershing II and Cruise missiles in Europe. Then after the beginning of deployment of these missiles, my country appealed to both countries to show restraint, appealed to them not to take retaliatory measures and argued vigorously for measures of reciprocally acceptable de-escalation. At the same time we expressed the hope that Soviet-United States negotiations in Geneva would not be interrupted, and after they were that they should be resumed without preconditions. Our approach has not changed. It is therefore only logical that we should express our concern at the reservations of certain nuclear Powers that in fact oppose measures aimed at freeing the European continent from all nuclear weapons. The bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations on a 50 per cent cut in their strategic nuclear weapons are particularly important. The agreement on medium and shorter-range nuclear missiles was important especially because of the new approach it involved and its symbolic value in eliminating a whole category of nuclear weapons. But a 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear arsenals would mark a decisive commitment to nuclear disarmament and would be likely to accelerate the disarmament process as a whole.

As for the prohibition of nuclear tests, I must reiterate our basic position, which is that in conditions where the existing nuclear arsenals are enough to destroy mankind, there can be no justification for continuing these tests. To pursue nuclear tests is not only to heap new burdens on the present and future of mankind and to open up new and possibly irreparable wounds in our fragile environment, it is also to consolidate the material basis for a continued and accelerated arms race, for the creation of new types and new

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systems of weapons, which could cancel out the effects of nuclear weapon reductions. In our view, the continuation of nuclear testing is at odds with the spirit and the letter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and can only weaken the credibility of that Treaty. It is an element that we must bear in mind with a view to the 1990 conference, and especially the fifth review conference in 1995, meetings that will be decisive for the fate of this international legal instrument. The initiative to convene an international conference to amend the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear tests in the three environments by extending this ban to tests underground already enjoys the support of 40 States including Romania. The conditions for convening such a conference have thus been met. This demonstrates a strong political will and increasing insistence by the international community that nuclear tests must be permanently banned. We cannot share the doubts expressed here as to the timeliness and validity of this initiative, because it is not likely to hamper the performance by the Conference on Disarmament of its role, and even less the achievement of the specific mandate entrusted to it. Like other delegations, we see in this a complementarity, not a substitution. It goes without saying that the success of the Conference requires adequate preparation both in terms of substance and in terms of organization so that it may make a positive and clear contribution to the disarmament process. As to the responsibility of the Conference on Disarmament, my delegation continues to favour debates on substance and negotiations within an appropriate working structure created on the basis of the proposals put forward under the Conference's first agenda item, "Nuclear-test ban". It ought to be possible to have structured debates, if not negotiations, within the appropriate working structure on the other two points of the agenda concerning nuclear issues.

Romania participates with the other States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, the members of NATO and other countries of Europe in the Vienna negotiations on a radical reduction in conventional weapons under strict international control, and remains determined to make its contribution to the achievement of an agreement as soon as possible. Our country firmly favours a reduction of at least 50 per cent in these weapons and a balance between the two blocs which rules out any possibility of military aggression. Under present circumstances the fundamental problem of international life remains for us the abandonment of nuclear weapons and of the programme for their modernization, the achievement of new agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on a 50 per cent reduction in offensive nuclear weapons and a general agreement on the total liquidation of nuclear weapons. It is necessary that all States give up nuclear tests forthwith, that they give up militarization of space, that we reach an appropriate agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons in close relationship with the elimination of nuclear weapons. Likewise we firmly favour a reduction in military expenditure, by at least 50 per cent in an initial stage, with the financial resources thus released being used to meet various economic and social needs of the countries in question as well as to support the developing countries.

To conclude, I wish to quote the words of the President of my country, Nicolae Ceausescu: "Socialist Romania is firmly resolved to participate actively in the achievement of disarmament, in the establishment of new international relations that rule out force and the threat of force."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Romania for his statement and for his kind words about me. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? That does not seem to be the case.

I have requested the Secretariat to circulate today an informal paper containing the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during next week. As you will notice, provision is made for the meetings of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, which starts its twenty-eighth session on 24 July. The timetable for other meetings has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of subsidiary bodies and, as usual, is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt the informal paper.

It was so decided.

You will recall that, at the end of the informal meeting held by the Conference last Tuesday, we agreed that any member wishing to advance a proposal relating to the forthcoming Third Review Conference of the Sea-bed Treaty should signify that wish to me, so that we might meet again in informal meeting this morning, to allow the delegation or delegations concerned to present their suggestions and other delegations to express views on them, if necessary. I wish to inform you that I have not received any requests for consideration today at an informal meeting on further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. Accordingly, there will be no need to hold such a meeting today.

As I have no other business for today, I intend now to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 25 July, at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.05 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.520  
25 July 1989

ENGLISH

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND TWENTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 25 July 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart (Mongolia)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 520th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will today continue its consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons". However, under rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Romania and Poland. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Dolgu.

Mr. DOLGU (Romania) (translated from French): As you know, a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, took place in Bucharest on 7 and 8 July. The decision was taken that my country, as the host country, should be entrusted with the task of circulating the documents of the Meeting, to this Conference on Disarmament among others, as official documents of the Conference. The communiqué of the Meeting and the document entitled "For a stable and secure Europe free of nuclear and chemical weapons, for a substantial reduction of armed forces, armaments and military spending", which will be circulated shortly, speak for themselves. They constitute an appeal to the member countries of NATO, to the other States in the world, to act together in order to establish a new policy of peace, co-operation and perfect equality of rights that will guarantee the free and independent development of all nations. On behalf of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania, I have the honour to submit these documents to you today.

At Bucharest the participants in the Meeting held an exchange of views on developments in the international situation and discussed the main directions of action by the allied States in the interests of the consolidation of peace and stability in Europe, of disarmament and of a broader international co-operation and dialogue. It was noted that owing to the active policy of the socialist countries and to the activities of all peace-loving and realistic forces, there had been certain positive developments in international affairs - the lessening of tension and confrontation, confidence-building, a development of political dialogue and greater contacts between States at various levels. The first steps have been taken in disarmament, a control mechanism has been created and is functioning effectively. The beginning of the Vienna negotiations is encouraging. Co-operation is broadening in the economic, technical, scientific and human rights fields. Progress has been made in the political settlement of regional conflicts. There is a growing readiness on the part of the international community to co-operate in the field of security and in solving global issues.

Nevertheless the world situation continues to be complex and contradictory, since the favourable processes have not yet become irreversible. The build-up of weapons and their modernization has not stopped. Nuclear tests continue, as does work on the militarization of outer space. The concepts of confrontation, of reliance on force, born in the years of the "cold war", are being overcome with difficulty. The nuclear-deterrence



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strategy, reaffirmed at the recent session of the NATO Council, is a dangerous anachronism, one which runs counter to the interests of general security. The practice of interference in the domestic affairs of other States and attempts to destabilize them, as well as human rights violations continue.

The participants in the Meeting confirmed the attachment of their States to the ideal of ridding mankind of the danger of war by doing away with nuclear and chemical weapons and drastically reducing conventional weapons. They consider disarmament the cardinal issue of our time, the decisive factor for strengthening peace, security and confidence, deepening détente, developing broad international co-operation and solving global problems. The States represented at the Meeting reaffirmed their determination to do their utmost to reach new agreements in the sphere of disarmament, which should become a continuous and irreversible process.

They declared themselves resolutely in favour of ensuring security not by military but by political means, affirming the primacy of international law in inter-State relations, maintaining normal relations and developing co-operation between States irrespective of their social and political systems, renouncing the policy of confrontation and hostility in favour of one of partnership, mutual understanding, mutual confidence and goodneighbourliness in the interests of all States and all peoples, and co-operating in the sphere of human rights and in the humanitarian field in keeping with the obligations assumed by States. The Bucharest documents note that the promotion of a policy of security, mutual understanding and co-operation among States requires strict respect for national independence and sovereignty, for the equal rights of peoples and the right of each people to self-determination and to a free choice of its path of social and political development, non-interference in others' internal affairs, unconditional renunciation of the use or threat of force in whatever form, the settlement of any disputes between States exclusively by peaceful means, strict respect for today's territorial and political realities, the inviolability of existing borders and the territorial integrity of States, the implementation in every country of human rights and fundamental freedoms in their entirety for all irrespective of race, sex, language, religion or nationality, the development of co-operation between States in various fields on the basis of mutual advantage, conscientious fulfilment of obligations under international law, observance of all the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and all other generally recognized rules of international relations.

In the context of the growing interdependence of today's world, the implementation of all of these principles and provisions will help to consolidate common human values and rules of conduct in international relations. Basing themselves upon the need for a global approach to problems of security, the participants in the Meeting called for security to be achieved through the maintenance of the military balance at the lowest level, sufficient only for defence and excluding the possibility of sudden attack or the conduct of large-scale offensive operations. The objective aimed at by the States parties is the reduction of armaments to a level which completely eliminates the threat of an outbreak of war.

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The participants are ready to continue to seek, together with all interested countries, agreements leading to the progressive reduction and subsequently to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, the radical reduction of conventional armed forces, the prevention of an extension of the arms race into outer space, the gradual curtailment of military production and the substantial reduction of military spending. In that connection, they proceed from the assumption that disarmament measures must ensure equal security for all States with strict respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of every State within its existing borders, and must exclude the possibility of the use of force or the threat of force in inter-State relations.

Expressing their satisfaction at the resumption of Soviet-United States negotiations on major disarmament issues, the allied States express the hope that they will soon lead to practical results. They consider one of the priority objectives to be the completion of work on the treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in the offensive strategic weapons of the USSR and the United States subject to observance of the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972. The States represented at the Meeting called for the immediate cessation of nuclear tests and for detailed examination of this question, including examination at the multilateral level, at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. They called for the rapid finalization of the verification protocols to the Soviet-United States agreements of 1974 and 1976 and for the entry into force of these agreements as a step towards the complete prohibition of nuclear tests.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty support the idea of the possible extension to underground tests of the applicability of the Moscow Treaty of 1963 banning nuclear tests in three environments as one of the ways of speedily achieving the prohibition of all nuclear tests. The participants in the Meeting expressed their concern at the danger to peace and international security represented by the use of chemical weapons, as long as they exist and spread. The participants call for the speedy preparation of an international convention on the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles.

A key question of security and stability in Europe, in the view of the participants, is the reduction of conventional armed forces and weapons, the reduction and subsequent elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, and confidence-building on the continent. The participants felt that the immediate objective of talks on conventional armed forces in Europe was to arrive, as previously agreed, at collective ceilings, which will be the same for both the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty States, on the number of troops and the quantities of the main types of armaments in Europe and its various regions. The new levels would be significantly lower than the lowest levels of either side at present. The proposals made in this regard by the allied socialist countries in Vienna provide for a drastic mutual reduction of troops and armaments. This would also solve the problem of eliminating the existing imbalances in conventional weapons. These reductions and limitations of armed forces and armaments should take place under strict international control.

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At the Meeting it was noted that additional proposals relating to conventional forces in Europe submitted at the recent summit meeting of the NATO Council constituted a movement towards the position of the allied socialist countries. The participants in the Meeting expect that these proposals will be detailed and submitted at the Vienna negotiations in the near future. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty reaffirmed their determination to do everything possible for the speedy achievement of results at the Vienna negotiations and expressed the view that the situation at the talks was now such that, given a constructive approach by all participants, it would be possible to arrive at initial arrangements as early as 1990.

In the declaration it is stressed that the practical steps taken by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty in implementation of their defensive doctrine for unilateral reduction of their armed forces and armaments, giving them an obvious non-offensive structure and reducing armaments production and military spending, are aimed at the creation of material and political conditions for a steady continuation of the arms' limitation process and a lowering of the level of military confrontation. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty expect the NATO countries to take similar steps with respect to their armed forces, armaments, military expenditure and military activities. The participants in the Meeting called for the observance of the Stockholm agreements, the adoption at negotiations among the 35 States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe on confidence- and security-building measures of new measures designed to develop them, and the extension of notification, observation and limitation measures to all States' military activities, including the activities of their naval and air forces. The establishment of a centre for reducing the military danger and preventing a surprise attack in Europe, a body with informational and consultative functions, could make an important contribution to building confidence and security and increasing stability on the continent. A major step, capable of raising the process of disarmament and of strengthening European security to a qualitatively new level could be the convening of a meeting of the leaders of the 35 States participating in the CSCE at which the results achieved on the continent in these fields would be examined and future tasks determined.

The participants felt that stability and security in Europe could not be fully reliable without a solution of the problem of tactical nuclear weapons. It is beyond doubt that as conventional weapons are reduced, the destabilizing effect of tactical nuclear weapons will inevitably increase. In this respect, the declaration stresses that NATO's plans to modernize tactical nuclear weapons are causing great concern. Noting a certain development in the positions of the NATO countries with respect to the negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty call on these countries to solve the problem of tactical nuclear weapons not by modernization but by separate negotiations, aimed at their step-by-step reduction. They reaffirmed their proposal made in that regard. The participants in the meeting expressed their support for the Soviet Union's intention to proceed to further unilateral reductions in tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe if the NATO countries were prepared to begin negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons. The participants in the Meeting also supported the Soviet Union's decision to unilaterally withdraw 500 warheads for tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of allied

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socialist States this year as well as its declaration that it is prepared to withdraw all nuclear weapons from the territory of its allies during the period 1989-1991 on condition that the United States takes a similar step.

Referring to the role of naval forces and their armaments and naval activities capable of exerting a destabilizing influence on the situation and creating a threat to security in Europe and other regions, the participants in the meeting advocated a more active dialogue on the problems and considered it necessary to begin separate negotiations for their consideration between the States concerned and first of all, between the major naval Powers. It was emphasized that a reduction in military spending allows the resources released to be directed to the needs of economic and social development. Accordingly, an effective solution to the problem of reconverting from military production acquires importance, and that might become the subject of international consultations, including consultations within the framework of the United Nations. Stress was also placed on the importance of joint and individual initiatives for promoting the solution of security problems in various regions of the continent. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty consider that disarmament measures must be accompanied by appropriate measures to ensure strict and effective control. They are prepared to join in the most effective solutions leading to the creation of a comprehensive system of disarmament control. A positive role could be played in this connection by the United Nations.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty reiterate their appeal to the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance to utilize the opportunities now emerging to overcome all the consequences of the "cold war" in Europe and worldwide. The participants in the Meeting expressed support for the idea that relations between the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Alliance should evolve along non-confrontational lines, for the establishment of a constructive dialogue between them on political and military matters, for the development of that dialogue into a factor for security and co-operation on the continent. They maintained the position of principle of the Warsaw Treaty countries in favour of ridding Europe of military blocs, simultaneously disbanding both alliances and eliminating their military organizations as a first step. The strengthening of peace and security in Europe would contribute to the solution of many serious social problems faced by the peoples of the continent, thus guaranteeing their right to life and to work.

The participants in the Meeting stressed the need to give a firm rebuff to any manifestations of revanchism and chauvinism, to any attempts to sow discord among peoples. They share the concern of public opinion in the Western European countries by all manifestations of neo-fascism in those countries.

The allied socialist States attach prime importance to ensuring military, political and territorial stability in Europe. They start from the fact that each people has the right to determine its own country's future, to choose its own socio-political and economic system, the State system it thinks fit. There can be no single standard for the organization of society. Stability presupposes a renunciation of confrontation, and the policy of force and a rejection of direct or indirect interference in others' internal affairs. No country has the right to dictate events in another country, to set itself up

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as arbiter and judge. The meeting was in favour of strengthening the solidarity and co-operation of the allied States and further developing their multilateral co-operation on the basis of equal rights and mutual respect for the benefit of their peoples of these countries and in the interests of universal peace. It was decided to continue efforts to strengthen the political character of the Warsaw Treaty and to improve the machinery for co-operation under the Treaty on a democratic basis. The participants in the Meeting informed one another about developments in their countries, about the progress and problems of socialist construction. They stressed the strong influence of socialist ideas, the importance of the changes taking place in the allied States aimed at improving and renewing socialist society, giving a new dynamism to its political and economic system, developing democracy, raising the standard of living and improving the quality of life for their peoples, promoting the self-realization of each individual, and safeguarding fundamental human rights and freedoms. They base themselves on the idea that there is no universal model of socialism, that no one has a monopoly of the truth. The building of a new society is a creative process which proceeds in keeping with the traditions, the specific conditions and the needs of each country. The participants reiterated their common desire to work in the interests of socialism and of improving collaboration between the allied States and preserving their lasting security. They expressed confidence in the capacity of the socialist States and the leading forces in society to resolve the problems that had arisen at the present stage of their development. The need was also stressed to develop relations among them on a basis of equality, independence and the right of each of them to work out its own political policy, strategy and tactics without outside interference.

To conclude, I should like to stress that the efforts of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty continue to have as their central goal the task of ensuring stability in Europe and the consolidation of a new type of relations on the continent, based on the elimination of confrontation and the strengthening of confidence and goodneighbourliness. The participants are in favour of broad co-operation on a mutually advantageous basis in a variety of areas and of the participation of all countries and peoples in settling the pressing problems of the continent. The common European process remains a key element in the construction of the new Europe.

These are some of the chief ideas in these important documents that I recommend to your attention.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Romania for his statement, and now I have the pleasure to give the floor to the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. President, allow me to express my particular pleasure at taking the floor under your presidency. You represent a brotherly socialist country with which Poland enjoys close and friendly relations. Your personal experience and skill are greatly contributing to the smooth proceeding of our work. I assure you of my delegation's fullest support.

Let me also express my gratitude to your predecessor in the Chair, Ambassador García Robles, for all his efforts to move our work forward. I would also like to extend my warm welcome to all the new colleagues who have

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joined us in the Conference on Disarmament during this session and to assure them of my personal and my delegation's full co-operation. To their predecessors, I extend our best wishes for success in their new assignments.

In my today's statement I should like to concentrate on the chemical weapons ban. The Conference on Disarmament has started this year's consideration of this agenda item in very favourable conditions created by the successful conclusion of the Paris Conference. One hundred and forty nine countries expressed in the form of a final declaration their unequivocal demand for the conclusion at an early date of a convention aimed at total elimination of all chemical weapons. The Paris Declaration contains something we have been seeking for so long - clearly expressed political will, which is a decisive prerequisite for progress in our negotiations. This fresh political impetus generated by Paris was accompanied by the creative and competent guidance of the present Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Pierre Morel. And, indeed, important steps were undertaken to intensify the pace of negotiations. I wish to pay our tribute also to Ambassador Morel's closest collaborators in this endeavour, the chairmen of the five working groups.

An organizational restructuring of the Committee aroused expectations of fulfilling the mandate of the Paris Conference to concentrate our redoubled efforts on resolving expeditiously the remaining unsolved issues. This approach offered additional opportunities to enter into the decisive stage of our negotiations towards finalizing the convention. Did we take full advantage of these opportunities? It is very difficult to give a fully satisfactory answer.

Undoubtedly, in the course of long years of negotiation we have made considerable progress. Ten years have passed since the year when an ad hoc subsidiary body for chemical weapons was established for the first time. It has been re-established in each of the subsequent years. We have been through several stages in the process of negotiations on the convention: starting from identifying its scope, outlines and structure, shaping its skeleton, through consecutive steps of fleshing it out with appropriate formulas reflecting the positions of the negotiators on different aspects of the convention, particularly on the scope of obligations, their substance and their structure, on different types, measures and mechanisms of verification of compliance with the convention, and on legal, technological, economic and financial aspects of the implementation process and its consequences. The present "rolling text" in fact contains agreed substantive material and an inventory of negotiator's positions on all envisaged articles of the convention. They differ in the degree of detail or in the scale of convergence. Nevertheless, we have a clear picture of the various problems and their ingredient elements, even those which need further elaboration or on which divergences still exist. We call them "outstanding issues".

The harvest of 10 years of the Committee's work is really rich and significant. It is especially so in view of the complexity of the subject of the negotiation, unprecedented from the point of view of its scope as well as the number of participants. What is more, in many cases the output of our work actually exceeds the requirements of the process of drafting the convention. The collected material can not only be used for the elaboration

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of the draft text of the convention, but will be valuable in creating the necessary understanding for a process of preparing for its entry into force as well as during the whole implementation period. A question arises whether this collected material constitutes a sufficient basis for the final draft of the convention. I think that in principle the answer could be positive.

What do we have at our disposal now? Firstly, clearly expressed political will; secondly, statements of position by negotiators on all the principal problems and, to a large extent, on specific aspects of the draft, including technical details; thirdly, a large convergence in the positions of the negotiators, extensive areas of agreement; fourthly, awareness of existing loopholes, their scale and interrelationships existing between them; fifthly, necessary negotiating experience gathered during these 10 years; sixthly, well-disposed attitude of the chemical industry to the convention; seventhly, effective engagement of various scientific and research institutes in the search for possible solutions to different technical problems; eighthly, pressure of world public opinion, justifiably concerned on well-known grounds. Then what is lacking? The answer is not so easy. We can assume that each of us has his own recipe for speeding up the process of negotiations. These recipes have been put forward in this forum. To various remarks presented here I would like to add just one, and in the form of a question - are the methods applied in our negotiations during the last three or four years adequate to the present advanced stage of negotiations? Or to put it in another way - whether penetrating more deeply into different problems - so to say, entering further into the forest, we do not concentrate too much of our attention on discovering and studying wonderful new trees. Could we not start in the coming session with sorting them out and selecting only those which are necessary as elements to be used in raising our building? After all, not all of these wonderful trees we come across are suitable and in fact necessary for our construction. Otherwise we can be lost in the forest.

Let me illustrate this with an example of the complex problem of verification. In the course of the process of negotiations we have made considerable progress. Exchanges of views on this subject during the present session, both in plenary meetings and in Group 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee, as well as during very intensive consultations of the Chairman of the Committee, have contributed further to this progress. We are also looking forward to the results of the eleventh round of USSR-United States bilateral consultations.

Taking into account the scale of progress, should not we ask whether our efforts to finalize negotiations on outstanding technical and procedural elements of the process of verification would not be facilitated if we tried to approach them from the point of view of their place and functions in a general pattern of verification? To reach an understanding on such a pattern is - I firmly believe - the crucial point for us now. This understanding could possibly help us to realize more clearly the borderline between the necessary level of guarantees to ensure that there is no breach of the convention and the level of intrusiveness of the envisaged systems and types of verification. To the same extent it could enable us to see the necessity of a proper balance between the required level of effectiveness of verification and its costs, as well as the preservation of confidentiality to

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meet the requirements of the chemical industry's interests. This approach, it seems, could also help us to find the proper place in the verification system as a whole for one of the outstanding verification issues, namely, the most relevant production capabilities.

Let me add a brief comment on this very issue. It becomes evident that concentrating upon the most relevant chemicals does not automatically ensure that the capabilities are covered. During one of the industrial experts' meetings an interesting sentence was uttered: "The modern chemical facility which cannot produce a tabun is just not a modern one." It is not difficult to imagine that possible breach is more likely in undeclared facilities than in declared. It is therefore important to consider possible measures to cover at least to some extent facilities that do not produce or process any of the scheduled chemicals but pose a risk to the convention. In this very context we are also prepared to discuss further the United Kingdom's proposal for ad hoc inspections.

I should like to take another example from a different part of the "rolling text" - namely, articles X and XI. We are to try here another approach, namely, to narrow different views towards reaching a compromise solution. We can use here in this context a rule of logic which draws a kind of measure from the purpose. Although these articles deal with rights and obligations of States in two different spheres, their common function should be to stimulate positive interest in the convention so as to ensure its universality. We are to look for a solution of the divergences so clearly exposed in the text such as could make possible a compromise between the need to make the convention attractive and the desire of States to keep their chemical industries competitive.

Another element which is to be taken into consideration in our negotiations is the need for a cautious approach to the "rolling text". It is troubling that there should be more and more frequent returns to consideration of tentatively agreed parts of the text, returns which are justified neither by a change of position on a given aspect nor by progress on another, related part of the text. I would not like to be interpreted as implying that my delegation is wholly against renewed discussion on provisions on which convergence of views has been achieved. Nevertheless, at this stage of negotiations it is preferable not to take a step back if it would not result in making two steps ahead, so as to have at least a step-by-step progress. Otherwise we contribute ourselves to prolongation of the negotiating process.

I have touched upon only some aspects of agenda item 4. My delegation strongly believes that conditions have been created to undertake decisive efforts on this issue. I fully agree with all preceding speakers who have expressed their concern that we might lose momentum towards achieving the complete elimination of chemical weapons. There are legitimate reasons for critical assessment of the pace of negotiations on this item. The more so as in the rather quiet waters of our Conference the negotiations on this agenda item constitute a kind of "island of hope" for the Conference not to be in the deep arrièrè-garde of present disarmament efforts. It is an "island of hope" because an agreement seems to be within reach and because one can expect a positive impact of this agreement on other parts of our agenda.



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At the end of my statement let me turn briefly to the more general question of the effective and improved functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. This issue has been occupying our minds for a long time. In present circumstances, however, it is becoming more and more urgent. My delegation regrets that the Conference has not been able to undertake a serious discussion on this subject during this session.

There is a significant transformation of the traditional pattern and atmosphere in East-West relations. Confrontation is giving way to co-operation. Ideological differences are yielding to growing understanding of common responsibility for our common future. Substantial positive changes have appeared in many regional conflicts which for a long time had been a source of tension and mistrust. The United Nations is becoming an efficient instrument in resolving these regional conflicts. There is a visible improvement in its peace-keeping potential. Increased confidence in the United Nations system is creating new opportunities for further co-operative efforts. New rounds of European negotiations on the reduction of forces and armaments and on confidence- and security-building measures seem to open up a new and promising chapter for this continent. Last but not least, experience of the INF treaty negotiations and its implementation encourage high hopes for a positive outcome to the crucial bilateral United States-USSR talks. Significant changes have appeared not only in the practice of international disarmament negotiations but in the very approach to this problem. A revolution in our thinking about verification issues, traditionally a stumbling block in many disarmament endeavours, is a good example of this point.

Comparing these developments with our results we must very seriously ponder upon the place and role of this Conference in the major processes at present taking place in the world. Let me add to this that there is also a great disproportion between the outcome of our efforts and the political will demonstrated in our debate; between the slow progress of our work and the great diplomatic and intellectual potential gathered in our Conference, represented by highly qualified diplomats surrounding this table and the many highly experienced experts present in or visiting our delegations. This situation does concern my Government. In fact, "time is working against us" - as the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jaroszek, stressed in April this year in this hall. The inability to make any visible and concrete progress not only contributes to growing concern on the part of public opinion, but - let us honestly face this fact - undermines the credibility of this forum.

The intention of these remarks is not to drive us to despair but rather to stress the need for a candid and sober look at our Conference. What can be done to prevent it from being moved to the margin of world politics? How to ensure that this Conference responds better to new situations, new opportunities and requirements? My delegation strongly believes that the issue of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference deserves our serious consideration and should stay permanently on the agenda of our formal and informal consultations, both here and in our capitals, before the end of this session as well as in the forthcoming break.

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Let me present to you some considerations of my delegation related to only one aspect of this question. Taking into account the importance of the questions discussed at the Conference our principal aim should remain the elaboration of new agreements establishing international legal obligations upon States. Because of the complexity of those problems, their delicacy and their direct impact on the security of States, this work is - and will continue to be - laborious and time-consuming.

This basic approach need not, however, prevent the Conference from undertaking other measures, particularly in situations where the stage reached in negotiations or other considerations could make them advisable and the only ones feasible. Different situations may require different approaches and responses. And one of these responses could be confidence- and security-building measures. They must not necessarily have the character of legal instruments, but should reflect political commitment and provide some political guidance, which, if followed, would prompt further co-operation in the matters under consideration and facilitate further discussion. Such measures could, for example, be registered and approved by the Conference as a part of its annual reports.

The CD rules of procedure provide that negotiations can be conducted on draft treaties and other draft texts. They provide also that reports of the Conference can contain inter alia conclusions, decisions and other relevant documents. Thus, there is nothing to prevent the Conference from agreeing on some documents which are not intended to be treaties yet, but which - when it becomes possible - could evolve into, or be part of, binding international rules. This approach could make our work more flexible and more productive. One can assume also that a growing number of such measures will have an important impact on international confidence and security and help in our treaty-making endeavours, which remain of course our main responsibility.

The Polish delegation notes with attention increasing interest at this Conference in this category of measures. CSBMs have played a useful role in other international negotiations, particularly in the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. We believe that they can also make our Conference a more flexible and live instrument, responding better to different needs and allowing it to use all opportunities to make its contribution to international peace and security. Having this in mind, my delegation has proposed for further consideration a set of measures related to our discussion on prevention of an arms race in outer space.

To conclude, Poland is strongly attached to this forum of disarmament negotiations. We consider the Conference as an important and, in fact, indispensable instrument of world-wide disarmament efforts. It has proved its usefulness and there are important tasks before it. We understand the complexity of issues on its agenda. We believe, however, that to solve them more determined efforts are needed. If we are not able to undertake such efforts, there will be growing frustration inside this Conference and increasing criticism from outside.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Poland for his statement and for his kind words about my country and the presidency.

I have no more speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to speak? That does not seem to be the case. There are no more matters to be considered today, and I shall therefore adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be on Thursday, 27 July, at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 27 July 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart (Mongolia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 521st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 4 entitled "Chemical weapons". However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Norway and Chile. I now give the floor to the representative of Norway, Ambassador Huslid.

Mr. HUSLID (Norway): Mr. President, let me first congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference for the month of July. I am confident that your skill and experience will guarantee efficient leadership of our negotiations during this month.

I am not going to make a policy statement today, as State Secretary Helga Hernes did so at the end of the spring session. My contribution will be limited to the presentation of two working papers which have been circulated to delegations. One of these, CD/936, deals with verification of alleged use of chemical weapons and contains the main result of the past year's research at the Division for Environmental Toxicology of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment at Kjeller, near Oslo. The other, CD/935, deals with verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban and gives an account of recent developments in the Norwegian seismic verification programme. Both of these documents concern research programmes which have been the subject of Norwegian contributions to this Conference for quite some time.

The working paper on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons gives a summary of this year's research report, which will be presented to the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in the near future.

This year the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment introduced a new technique of analysis for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. This is known as the headspace gas chromatography technique, which permits analysis directly on samples without prior cleaning procedures. Based on this simplified method, research is being continued with a view to further developing procedures to be followed by an international inspection team.

In 1989 the research has focused on the application of this new technique. Two series of field trials have been carried out: one in February, the other in June. In the first exercise, four different sample materials were contaminated with 1 mg each of the nerve agents sarin and soman and left outdoors for exposure to the prevailing weather conditions. Samples were collected for analysis at different time intervals in order to get an idea of the deterioration rate of the agents. In the second exercise the number of agents was increased to five: tabun, sarin, soman, mustard gas and diisopropyl methylphosphonate. The number of sample materials was increased to 10. Analysis was carried out after two and four weeks. A separate exercise was conducted to evaluate the influence of various temperatures during the transport of samples.

I will not go into the results of these experiments here, as that would go too far, but will confine myself to referring to the working paper and the

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research report. In this context, I would like to underline the close link between this research programme and the negotiations on article IX of the chemical weapons convention. Together with Canada, Norway has, as you know, submitted a proposal for a text concerning general procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons as an annex to this article (document CD/766 of 2 July 1987). In the light of the progress in the negotiations on the guidelines for the International Inspectorate, the time should now be ripe for a discussion on how the specific problems concerning verification of alleged use should be incorporated into the convention.

Before leaving the subject of our negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, I would like to inform the Conference that the Norwegian authorities intend to carry out a national trial inspection of a production facility towards the end of the year.

Since 1982 Norway has been contributing to the work of the Conference on Disarmament on seismological verification measures for a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In particular, these documents have addressed various aspects of a future global system for international exchange of seismic data as envisaged by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

Norway has consistently maintained that such a global system must take advantage of the rapid, ongoing technological developments in seismic instrumentation, data communication and computer systems. We therefore welcome the consensus which has now been reached on this issue in the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE). I refer you to the recently published fifth report by that Group (CD/903). This report, which marks yet another milestone in the work of the GSE, describes how recent technological and scientific developments can be applied in designing a modern international seismic data exchange system. The aim of this work is significantly to enhance the confidence with which a future comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty can be monitored.

The working paper we are presenting today as document CD/935 contains a brief summary of recent developments in the Norwegian seismic verification programme. The paper outlines the results of the operation of the two regional arrays in Norway, NORESS in southern Norway and ARCESS in northern Norway. These two arrays incorporate the most recent achievements in seismology and have shown outstanding capabilities in detecting small seismic events, both at close distances and in remote areas. This underlines the importance of the Norwegian proposal that the global network should, in so far as practicable, encompass small-aperture seismic arrays. In addition, the working paper deals with the Second Technical Test which will be conducted by the Group of Scientific Experts, views on an integrated processing system for networks of arrays, and information on the new Norwegian National Data Centre.

As announced by State Secretary Hernes in April, Norway plans to arrange a workshop in Oslo in February 1990 on the subject of regional arrays and their use in seismic verification research. The workshop will be hosted by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NORSAR.

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Among others, experts from the Group of Scientific Experts will be invited to this workshop, which will address a number of the most important technical problems in the field of seismological verification. A report on the proceedings from the workshop will be made available to the Conference on Disarmament, and will also be distributed to the scientific community.

In closing, let me just reiterate the great interest of Norway in the efforts being made in this negotiating forum. We hope that the two documents we have presented today will constitute a useful contribution to the work of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Norway for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Chile, Mr. Romero.

Mr. ROMERO (Chile) (translated from Spanish): At the outset of this first statement by Chile in the Conference on Disarmament, allow me first to congratulate you, Mr. President, and the distinguished representative of Mexico in his capacity as the previous President for the way in which each of you has conducted the work of the Conference during this second session of 1989. At the same time, I wish to thank all the delegations that made it possible at the beginning of the year for Chile to join the Conference as a non-member.

The decision of Chile to participate in these debates has its basis in the permanent respect my country has shown in its foreign conduct for fundamental legal principles such as non-intervention, self-determination of peoples and abstention from the threat or use of force in international relations. Accordingly, Chile favours peaceful settlement of all conflicts and considers that through disarmament it is possible to achieve the progress and well-being of mankind.

Moreover, my country notes with satisfaction that at the end of the 1980s, which were largely marked by stagnation, not to say setbacks, in virtually every area related to disarmament, there has taken shape a promising process affording a real and concrete chance of maintaining peace and security and international justice. That is an encouraging result of the steps taken by many States to re-establish mutual confidence between the various members of the international community. An eminent role has been played in this respect by the great Powers, which, in a renewed spirit of bilateralism, have reached important agreements that have helped to form the new climate in which present-day international relations are developing.

All of this, in addition to gratifying us and filling us with optimism, gives us cause for thought in view of the virtually unique opportunity of making progress in solving the varied and important problems that we still face in the sphere of disarmament. Therefore, my country believes that the bilateralism to which I have referred should be accompanied by renewed impetus in the multilateral negotiations, since these are the ones which, with no discrimination or objectionable exceptions, can succeed in representing the overall interests of the members of the world community.

(Mr. Romero, Chile)

In this regard, Chile reaffirms the urgent need to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, and it is this Conference that constitutes the most suitable forum for discharging that important function. Hence our interest in being present in these negotiations and our willingness to co-operate in all initiatives that may require our support; as of now we place ourselves at the disposal of the Bureau and the chairmen of the various working groups, the secretariat and the other delegations here present to co-operate in all relevant matters.

Unfortunately, for financial reasons closely linked to our position as a developing country, we cannot have the same kind of delegation to the Conference that many other countries do. But that will not be an obstacle to our expressing our views and presenting for the consideration of the Conference working papers that we consider capable of contributing to the analysis of the various items on our agenda as we have already done with respect to the item on outer space. Along with this we are training officials in specialized areas and that is why we wish to make special mention of the opportunity given to one of them this year to participate in the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme.

The new atmosphere I have referred to has also had a positive influence at the Latin American regional level. Our peoples and Governments have been able to see that disarmament and peace can be achieved if there is real political will on the part of the decision-makers. But it is not enough for international agreements to increase security and guarantee peace. Chile believes further that the substantial financial resources released by these agreements should be oriented towards international co-operation, especially towards the developing countries which today are facing extremely grave problems of indebtedness and economic stagnation. Measures of such a nature would contribute to laying the foundation for real solidarity and international justice.

Allow me in the following minutes to express my country's general views on various matters on the agenda for the Conference.

Firstly, the nuclear danger, by its nature and the risk it involves, should have a prime place within the negotiations in this forum. My country has resolutely supported the agreements reached by the two major military Powers culminating in the signing in December 1987 of the Treaty on the elimination of shorter-range and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. It has also supported the negotiations on reducing strategic weapons. We think that initiatives of this nature not only help to reduce the risk of a world-wide conflagration but also strengthen international confidence and make possible concrete steps towards the limitation of conventional weapons. In this respect, we view positively the development there has been in the concept of "strategic deterrence", which was basically being used as a valid argument for the qualitative and quantitative improvement of the capacity of weapons, with the consequent untrammelled arms race between the said Powers.



(Mr. Romero, Chile)

As to the demilitarization of outer space, my country favours the complete elimination of every type of weapon, whether nuclear or not. In this respect, it should be noted that Chile signed the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in 1963 and is therefore subject to its provisions. We have not signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, because we do not agree with the formula agreed for verification, but we do undoubtedly uphold the lofty aims that were taken into account in concluding it in 1971.

For its part, the conventional arms race is of deep concern to us. This applies in particular to the nuclear countries, which, being unable to use those weapons, have proceeded with sophisticated technological advances in conventional weapons, attaining a high degree of efficiency that has at the same time entailed an extremely costly arms race. Moreover, the competition between the major Powers has spread to the rest of the developed countries, a process in which the less developed countries have subsequently become involved.

The possibilities of moving forward on the road to disarmament are, then, negatively affected by this competition, which has both qualitative and quantitative aspects, since the decisive factor in the forecasting of possible future conflicts is the search for more efficient military technology and that in turn brings about premature obsolescence of military technology.

We therefore believe that greater emphasis must be placed on the adoption of concrete measures to limit the qualitative aspect of the arms race. We also feel that, to succeed in stopping the arms race in qualitative terms, the work should be carried out within a framework that guarantees the security of States without forgetting their right to national and collective self-defence as enshrined in the United Nations Charter.

I have left for the end of this statement a brief analysis of the question of chemical weapons, which has taken on vital importance in this Conference and is currently the subject of discussion in the plenary. The relevant Ad Hoc Committee has achieved progress that is insufficient in the light of the mandate conferred upon it by the Final Declaration adopted by the special conference on chemical weapons held in Paris last January. Chile took part in that meeting because it is convinced that chemical weapons must be prohibited definitively and eliminated as soon as possible in view of their particularly cruel toxic and environmental effects, their indiscriminate nature, the difficulty or impossibility of controlling their spread or direction and the risk of their use by terrorists or irresponsible persons.

Moreover, the mere suspicion that a State possesses chemical weapons immediately creates in other States a perception of a threat that promotes the escalation of mistrust and the heightening of international tension.

It is not our intention to engage in a detailed technical study of the draft convention the Conference is negotiating, but we believe that the future treaty, as well as guaranteeing the establishment of effective, universal,

(Mr. Romero, Chile)

mandatory, equitable and non-discriminatory verification machinery, should be sufficiently explicit about the point that the inspections necessary to prevent chemical weapons production should not constitute any obstacle to the development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes or a pretext for action having other ends. Inspection must, moreover, be harmoniously combined with State sovereignty.

Similarly, it should be laid down that States that use chemicals, even for purposes not prohibited by the convention, will be subject to a régime of strict liability, whether the harm that may be caused is direct, indirect or delayed. There should also be rules to cover the problem of transboundary pollution which, in the event that it occurs, should be subject to the principle that national territory cannot be used to the detriment of third States. Finally, consideration should be given to aspects such as the commitment of all parties to destroy the chemical weapons in their possession or under their control and the establishment of a more precise framework for the use of chemicals in the maintenance of public order within each State. This concept must be more clearly defined in order not to leave the door open for the use of certain substances which, while not lethal, can have extremely injurious consequences for people's health. It is urgent to redouble the efforts to reach definitive agreements in this sphere as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Chile for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I have no other speakers listed to address the Conference today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? That does not seem to be the case.

I have requested the secretariat to circulate today the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, the chairmen of subsidiary bodies have been consulted. The timetable is merely indicative and we may change it if the need arises. On that understanding, I propose that we adopt the timetable.

It was so decided.

Distinguished delegates, as today's meeting is the last plenary meeting for the month of July, allow me to make a brief concluding statement in my capacity as President of the Conference, at the end of the presidency of Mongolia for this month.

As you are aware, I have had consultations during July on various issues pertaining to organizational arrangements for agenda items 1, 2, 3 and 7 as well as to the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament and expansion of its membership.

I should like to mention especially the on going consultations with a view to facilitating progress on item 1 of our agenda, "Nuclear test ban". As you will recall, on 6 July I stressed the importance of the efforts undertaken by Ambassador Yamada of Japan and encouraged him to proceed with his informal individual consultations.

(The President)

Although differences still exist, it seems to me that at last we are close to developing an adequate and acceptable organizational arrangement for consideration of this agenda item. In their plenary statements during the month of July a number of delegations touched on this vital issue and expressed individual and group positions of States. I do hope that Ambassador Yamada will continue his consultations and I wish him every success in his endeavours.

As regards the consultations on how to deal with agenda items 2, 3 and 7, it has unfortunately not been possible so far to reach agreement on these questions. I think, however, that it might be worth while for us to look again, in the case of agenda item 2, to the 1987 arrangement. As you may recall, during that annual session, we were able usefully to discuss matters relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

I also held consultations with the chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees concerning the time-frame for submission of the various sections of the annual report. It was emphasized that reports of the subsidiary bodies would have to be submitted for processing in a gradual way so as to avoid delays in documentation. Accordingly a schedule for the submission of draft reports was adopted. I am sure that the chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees will make every effort to meet this schedule.

The Conference also held an informal meeting to consider further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, in response to the invitation addressed to it by the Preparatory Committee of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Sea-bed Treaty. I believe that the discussion was useful and provided a good opportunity for those addressing the issues to present their views on such an important question.

A number of delegations, while stressing the pivotal role of the Conference on Disarmament, expressed their concern regarding the credibility of this forum in view of the gap between the declared objectives and the results achieved. I cannot but share this concern. The question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament thus deserves our serious consideration.

The remaining month before the end of this year's session should be used to the fullest for the search of appropriate solutions to the above-mentioned outstanding issues. I likewise hope that the subsidiary bodies which will be working during August will redouble their efforts in order to accomplish more substantive work during that month.

I wish to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to all delegations for their kind support and co-operation, which made my task easier. This month has been, for me personally, a memorable and highly rewarding one. I wish success to my successor, Ambassador Benhima of Morocco, and to assure him of my delegation's full co-operation.

(The President)

I would also like to thank most sincerely the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Komatina, and the Deputy Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, for their co-operation and invaluable assistance. My thanks go to the other members of the secretariat and the interpreters, translators and staff members of Conference Services for their dedication and assistance.

That concludes my closing statement.

Before adjourning, I should like to recall that the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will meet immediately after the plenary in this conference room.

As there is no other business, I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 1 August, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.40 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.522  
1 August 1989

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 1 August 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. El Ghali Benhima (Morocco)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 522nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

My country has always attached special importance to disarmament. Today this importance is reflected in an initiative taken by His Majesty King Hassan II, who wished to mark Morocco's assumption of the presidency of this Conference formally by addressing a message to it. Consequently, I have the great honour to read it to you:

(continued in Arabic)

"On the occasion of Morocco's assumption of the presidency of your distinguished Conference during this month, we have pleasure in sending you this message to express the esteem that we feel for the ongoing efforts that you are making to achieve the objectives to which the international community is aspiring in the field of disarmament.

"The task entrusted to your Conference, as the sole international body assigned to conduct multilateral negotiations, is undoubtedly a major responsibility in view of the ramifications of disarmament issues and their close bearing on the questions of international security and development.

"No one can contest the extreme importance that all Governments, regardless of their political and economic ideologies, should attach to the question of the security of their peoples. However, this should not blind us to an equally important fact, the truth of which has been borne out by international experience in the field of disarmament, particularly during the last three decades, namely the evident fact that every advance in weapons technology increases the sense of uneasiness and the feeling that there is a need to acquire more weapons.

"This obvious fact should induce us to abandon the dictum that intensive armament is the best guarantee of the security of States and, consequently, should prompt us to seek not only arms control but also full and comprehensive disarmament.

"Quite apart from the fact that the volume of weaponry in the world has today reached a level which makes it impossible for any belligerent to gain a clear victory over his opponent, the devastation that would result from the use of the stockpiled weapons, and particularly nuclear, chemical and radiological weapons of mass destruction, places us under an obligation to avert the danger of extinction of the human race.

"We were delighted to learn that, at the Geneva summit conference in November 1985, the two super-Powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, had mutually agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and therefore should never be fought.

(The President)

"We are aware of the technical complexities of disarmament negotiations, connected with the precise assessment of the various types of weapons in the possession of the parties and the verification measures needed to ensure respect for agreements in this field. Nevertheless, we remain convinced that a demonstration of political will by all the parties and the creation of a climate of mutual trust among them constitute the fundamental requirements for the removal of the obstacles impeding general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

"The agreement on intermediate-range missiles that was concluded in December 1987 between the United States of America and the Soviet Union offers cogent proof of the ability of the two parties to overcome many of the technical difficulties.

"In this connection, we wish to commend the endeavours made and the initiatives taken during the past four years. The resumption of negotiations between the two super-Powers on the reduction of strategic weapons and underground nuclear tests, as well as the negotiations on conventional arms in Vienna, the measures taken at the Stockholm Conference and the results of the work of the Madrid Conference within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, truly constitute important steps that have opened broad horizons and created a new dynamism which will have a positive effect in enhancing all international relations.

"It is our fervent hope that your Conference, which includes all international political tendencies, in addition to the five permanent members of the Security Council, will be able to take advantage of this new climate in the near future, since it now has no excuse to continue in the state of barrenness that has characterized its work during the last decade. Your Conference, which has formulated a realistic and positive 10-point programme, should certainly be able to achieve the progress that the international community expects of it.

"No one is unaware of the extent and importance of the material and human resources from which mankind could benefit as a result of the adoption of practical measures to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament. If we recall that more than \$1,000 billion is spent every year on the arms race, we will be able to visualize the number of projects that could be implemented in all fields by diverting part of the resources released for the benefit of development.

"In our view, the concept of development includes helping the countries of the third world to overcome the various socio-economic problems with which they are beset, and averting all the dangers that are threatening the human race. Mankind is today waging a battle of a type that it has not previously known. The new epidemics that have begun to spread in many regions, in addition to the previously known epidemics that have not yet been totally eliminated, the impending environmental dangers and the multitude of social problems with which we are faced all constitute challenges that force us to take a broader view of security to encompass the health, intellectual and environmental security of mankind.

(The President)

"Accordingly, it is evident that the question of disarmament is a matter of concern to the whole world, since the continuation of the arms race would threaten the security of mankind and deprive it of extensive resources that could be used for purposes of development. This is why the international community has entrusted the United Nations with the central role and the primary responsibility in the field of disarmament. We are confident that, through concerted endeavours by all the parties, our Organization will be able to discharge this task in the most effective manner.

"In conclusion, we wish to affirm that our Kingdom, which had the honour to become a member of your distinguished Conference in 1979, is committed to a diligent and responsible endeavour, with the other members of the international community, to achieve full and comprehensive disarmament in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and in keeping with the programme of action contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

"We pray Almighty God to bless your work and grant you success in your endeavours."

(continued in French)

So reads the message sent by His Majesty King Hassan II to the members of this Conference.

As you know, today the host country is celebrating its national day: 1 August. On behalf of the Conference, I should like to express our sincere congratulations to the delegation which represents Switzerland in our Conference, and at the same time pass to it our wishes for prosperity. I would also like to thank our Swiss colleagues for the efficient way in which they perform their functions as hosts to the Conference.

I cannot begin my term of office without paying tribute, on your behalf, to my predecessors in the presidency during this session - Ambassadors Pugliese of Italy, Yamada of Japan, Bullut of Kenya, Robles of Mexico and Bayart of Mongolia. I hope they will take it as a mark of our consideration and our gratitude for the quality of their personal contributions to the work of this Conference. I would like to take this opportunity to request the delegation of Mexico, on behalf of all the members of the Conference, to pass to our most senior colleague, Ambassador García Robles, our wishes for a prompt recovery.

Taking up the presidency of the Conference is not only a heavy responsibility for the person occupying the Chair, but also an appeal, an appeal for support and co-operation from all the members. The collective motivation in the quest for necessary compromise and the commitment to accomplish a major undertaking together give me grounds for thinking that your support and your assistance will not be lacking. In this context, it will be agreed that agenda item 1, concerning a nuclear test ban, has the greatest call on our attention. Unfortunately, the consultations carried out by successive Presidents of the Conference, which are continuing actively through the efforts of Ambassador Yamada to identify the terms of a mandate for an



(The President)

ad hoc committee on this item, have not yet produced any results. It is true that divergences arise when the demands of some parties come up against the specific political preoccupations of others. In such circumstances dialogue and negotiation constitute the best path to the common goal. The readiness of the parties to acknowledge one another's positions and work together is a prerequisite for a fair solution to the difficulties. In this context, I wish to urge Ambassador Yamada to do his utmost to achieve a convergence of views on the mandate in question. It is my hope that, thanks to his wisdom, his efforts will be crowned with success. The Chair hastens to assure him of its readiness to assist at any time.

Other consultations are also to be held with the aim of seeking the most appropriate way for the Conference to tackle items 2 and 3, which deal respectively with nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. It seems to me that the Conference desires a speeding up of the negotiations on chemical weapons and the intensification of work on radiological weapons and outer space. The adoption of a report by the Ad hoc Committee on negative security assurances is a good omen for the other committees. Similarly, the Conference wishes finally to adopt the comprehensive programme of disarmament, in accordance with the recommendation set out in resolution 43/78 K. Since the Conference has on several occasions found it impossible to comply with the deadlines laid down by the General Assembly, it must do all in its power to secure the adoption of the programme at the end of this session.

There is no doubt that we are all aware of the need to accomplish our task, the extent of which no longer needs underlining, within the deadlines laid down. We are to adopt our report on Thursday 31 August, the date of the closure of the present session. We will all see to it that this imperative is respected. The Chair, which has taken the measure of the task with which it has been entrusted, is mobilized in the service of the Conference, which it assures of its availability and dedication. It knows that it can count on everyone to contribute to the success of our work. The support of the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, the Deputy Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, and all the members of the secretariat will, I am sure, be most valuable.

Today the Conference begins its consideration of item 6 on its agenda, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", and item 7, entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative who so wishes may raise any matter relating to the work of the Conference. I have no speakers on my list for today. However, in accordance with normal practice in the Conference, I shall ask whether there are any delegations wishing to take the floor. I give the floor to the representative of Switzerland.

Mr. OCHSNER (Switzerland) (translated from French): I thank you for your warm wishes addressed to my country on the occasion of our national day. I should also like to thank the Chairman of the committee on chemical weapons, Mr. Lüdeking of the Federal Republic of Germany, who, out of consideration for this day, has cancelled this afternoon's meeting, a gesture by a neighbour that we fully appreciate.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Switzerland for his kind words. Are there any other speakers who would like to take the floor? It seems not. I would like to inform the Conference that the Group of 21 has presented draft mandates for ad hoc committees under agenda item 2 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". The documents in question were distributed yesterday and today in the delegations' pigeon-holes in the official languages with the symbols CD/819/Rev.1 and CD/515/Rev.5. I should like to inform you that the Group of 21 has asked me to put these draft mandates before the Conference for decision. The Group of 21 has also asked me to begin with the draft relating to agenda item 2, contained in document CD/819/Rev.1, during next Thursday's plenary meeting. In keeping with our usual practice, I shall suspend the meeting after the speakers on the list have spoken, and convene an informal meeting to determine whether there is consensus on the proposed draft mandate. Immediately afterwards, as requested by the Group of 21, we shall resume the plenary meeting so that the Conference officially has before it for decision the text issued with the symbol CD/819/Rev.1. The same procedure will be followed with the draft mandate under agenda item 3, contained in document CD/515/Rev.5, at the plenary meeting to be held on Tuesday 8 August.

There are no other matters to be considered today, and I now intend to close the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday 3 August 1989 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.30 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.523  
3 August 1989

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 3 August 1989, at 10 a.m.

President:            Mr. El Ghali Benhima            (Morocco)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 523rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

First of all I should like on behalf of the Conference to welcome His Excellency the Secretary of State in the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, Mr. Klaus Jacobi. Our host country, which is not a member of the Conference, takes an active part in our work, I am sure that all representatives will be very interested to hear what he has to say. It is also my pleasure to welcome to the Conference the new representative from Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rasaputram. I am sure that his experience as a diplomat will make a major contribution to our work.

Today the Conference continues its consideration of agenda item 6, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", and agenda item 7, entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative who so wishes may raise any matter relating to the work of the Conference.

As I told you at the last plenary meeting, the Group of 21 has asked me to submit to the Conference for decision today the draft mandate that appears in document CD/819/Rev.1, concerning the establishment of an ad hoc committee to deal with agenda item 3, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". You will also remember at the same plenary meeting I informed you of how I would proceed today. First we shall hear the representatives on today's list of speakers. Immediately thereafter, we shall meet informally to consider document CD/819/Rev.1. We shall then resume the plenary meeting to continue consideration of that paper and hear any representatives who wish to take the floor on the subject. On my list of speakers today, I have the representatives of Switzerland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and Pakistan. I now call on the Secretary of State in the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, His Excellency Mr. Klaus Jacobi.

Mr. JACOBI (Switzerland) (translated from French): Allow me to begin, Mr. President, by congratulating you on taking up the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August. I wish you every success in your task of leading the business of this summer session to a constructive conclusion. I am sure that as a representative of a country that values and practises compromise, you will be perfectly placed to cope with this heavy responsibility.

In the field of arms control and disarmament, unprecedented changes and transformations are taking place. The Soviet-American Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear forces, which marked the beginning of this new era, is historic and symbolic at one and the same time. Clearly, these developments constitute a good sign. It would, however, be a mistake to expect a rapid reduction in military potentials. This can only come about through a sustained effort over several years. Yet this should not discourage us from making a start on the forthcoming stages as quickly as possible. Hence, we hope that the Vienna negotiations on a reduction in conventional forces in Europe, the aim of which is to achieve equilibrium at a lower level, will be successful, that an agreement on the

reduction of strategic forces will be concluded, and that, within this Conference here in Geneva, a convention on the comprehensive and total prohibition of chemical weapons will be drawn up.

All these agreements will help to strengthen security and stability in Europe and around the world. Switzerland properly values this process of arms control and disarmament and its importance for strengthening mutual trust internationally. However, no one can expect a small neutral State whose armed forces are purely defensive in nature to give up its defence capability as long as huge imbalances in conventional weapons, and particularly offensive forces, remain. Furthermore, I should like to inform you that Switzerland is ready to host international conferences and negotiations as well as international organizations that intend to play their part in the monitoring and verification of arms control and disarmament agreements.

It is a privilege and honour for me to address this multilateral disarmament forum. Although our status as non-member of the Conference necessarily restricts our role, we have endeavoured to take up the opportunities to make a contribution repeatedly made available to observer States in recent years. This, together with the strengthening of our delegation, has enabled us to make a concrete contribution to the work and better follow the demanding and technically highly complex negotiations on a total ban on chemical weapons, as well as the work of the Group of Experts on detection and identification of seismic events. We have also sought to co-operate with other observer States in the Conference, and thus in recent months have been able to make a contribution, though a modest one, to the Finnish draft on verification of chemical weapons. We are resolved to step up this co-operation and to have closer contacts.

It is the hope of Switzerland that the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons will have led all countries totally to renounce the use of these weapons against civilians and military personnel. The 149 countries which met at Paris unanimously recognized "the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the" total and comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons and called on the Conference on Disarmament "to redouble its efforts" to that end. Hence this convention should be concluded as soon as possible. It is true that attaining this objective is no simple matter given the technical and political complexity of the problem. Although we are aware of the long road that still has to be covered, we welcome the fact that the negotiations have been stepped up this year. And we should like to pay tribute to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Morel and his delegation for their untiring efforts, energy and personal dedication to see that the work goes forward.

Switzerland rejects chemical weapons in every form and manifestation and condemns any use of them. That is why we are highly concerned at the fact that they are proliferating. This is not only a growing threat to international security and stability but might also seriously hamper the work being done here in Geneva, by calling its value and timeliness into question. This danger led the Federal Council and the Swiss chemical industry to place export controls on products associated with the manufacture of chemical weapons and to study the possibility of applying the same controls to chemical plants and some equipment that can potentially be used to manufacture such weapons. But these unilateral and temporary measures do not lead to the elimination of the CW arsenals that are still in existence, nor can they give

a certain guarantee that chemicals and equipment supplied for inoffensive purposes will not be directed to other purposes. Such measures are meaningful only if they lead to the conclusion of a convention on the comprehensive and total prohibition of chemical weapons and on their destruction. In the same line of thinking, and for the same reasons, we consider all regional disarmament and arms control measures in this sphere as inadequate and ineffective given the fact that CW arsenals are highly mobile.

Verification of the non-production of chemical weapons is without a doubt one of the most thorny problems still to be resolved. The provisions necessary to settle this problem should rule out any possibility of cheating, should be technically appropriate and should fit perfectly with the existing structures in the chemical industry. Finally, such provisions should strictly protect the confidentiality of the information provided during inspections. The guarantee of confidentiality is the essential prerequisite for the vital co-operation we must maintain with the chemical industry. And in this regard we welcome the efforts made by the Conference on Disarmament in recent years to maintain constructive dialogue with the industry. We also welcome the initiative taken by the Government of Australia in convening an international conference in Canberra to bring together governments and industry representatives.

Early, this year, further to a proposal made by the Ad hoc Committee, we carried out a national trial inspection in a facility belonging to our chemical industry. What we were seeking to do in particular was to determine what were the commercial documents, technical data and software of a confidential nature that would have to be communicated to the inspectors so that they could carry out their job properly. Furthermore, we wanted to know whether a modern multipurpose facility could be checked under the existing provisions. Our trial inspection clearly demonstrated that the inspectors must have extensive access to confidential data in the company being inspected if the inspection is to be effective. The results of the experiment also confirmed that the provisions which appear in the "rolling text" are not yet sufficiently developed for the verification of a modern multipurpose facility. In particular they do not take into account the technical sophistication flexibility of use of such facilities, which mean that not only can production be changed in very short order but also that it can be transferred from one facility to another. In order to take account of such a possibility, a régime will have to be devised that will make it possible to verify multi-purpose facilities which might pose a threat to the convention.

Our trial inspection had been designed as a routine inspection. None the less we consider that the future convention should also provide for spot checks such as challenge inspections and ad hoc inspections. These two types of inspection should constitute an effective tool to dissipate any doubt as to compliance with the convention. The resumption of Soviet-American consultations on this issue seems to us to be a good sign.

Is it desirable to draw up a convention that covers the slightest detail and every eventuality? In seeking to do our work too well we might hamper the conclusion of an agreement or arrive at a very rigid treaty setting out burdensome and complicated procedures. Such a text would have to be constantly updated to take account of technological developments and scientific evolution. The drafting of detailed rules for this purpose should be left to the preparatory commission, which would thus have a most important job to do.

Lastly, I wish to say that we are willing to make a special effort to support the work of this commission, and to make the necessary infrastructure available to it in Switzerland.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank His Excellency the Secretary of State in the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all, Sir, I should like to congratulate you warmly on taking up the post of President of our Conference. We are convinced that during this very important period of its work, a period during which the session's results will be reviewed and a report prepared for the United Nations General Assembly, success will go with you. The Soviet delegation for its part, will do everything to help you. I should also like to express our deep gratitude to Ambassador Bayart, your predecessor, for his skilled guidance of the work of the Conference during the month of July.

The Soviet delegation sincerely welcomes among us today the Secretary of State in the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, Mr. Klaus Jacobi. We listened most attentively to his important statement. Switzerland though not a member of the Conference on Disarmament, has made a major and concrete contribution to its work, particularly in the field of a chemical weapons ban. The statement by Mr. Jacobi, and the specific considerations it contained, once again prove this point. We also value the hospitality of the Swiss, on whose territory the work of the Conference on Disarmament takes place.

We also would like to welcome our new colleague, the Ambassador of Sri Lanka, Dr. Rasaputram, and we hope that we will enjoy relations of co-operation with him as close as those the Soviet delegation had with his predecessor, Ambassador Rodrigo.

We were sad to hear that two of our outstanding colleagues are leaving - the Ambassador of the Netherlands, Mr. van Schaik and the Ambassador of Japan, Mr. Yamada. This sadness may be selfish in a way, because we are losing very highly qualified colleagues and good friends, but nevertheless we wish them every success in the future.

As the distinguished delegates know, along with the work of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva is the venue for Soviet-American talks on a number of key disarmament issues. Bearing in mind the great interest of the members of the Conference and the entire world community in these negotiations - as evidenced in particular in a number of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations - the Soviet side would like to outline the state of affairs in the talks on nuclear and space weapons. The Soviet delegation at the negotiations is headed by Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin, who is well known to the distinguished delegates, since for two years he headed the Soviet delegation at the Conference on Disarmament. With your permission, Mr. President, I should now like to turn the microphone over to Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all, Sir, I should like to express my satisfaction at once again having an opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament, and to do so under your presidency. I should like to wish you every success in your very important post at this final stage of the Conference on Disarmament session.

I listened with interest today to the statement by the Secretary of State in the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, Mr. Klaus Jacobi, the representative of the country whose hospitality we enjoy. I am pleased to see the familiar faces of my old colleagues and friends in this room, and I am happy also to welcome the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rasaputram, who has been appointed since the time when I left the post of representative of the USSR at the Conference on Disarmament. I would ask the delegations of Cuba, Argentina, Sri Lanka and Italy to extend to their former heads who have left Geneva - Ambassadors Carlos Lechuga, Mario Cámpora, Nihal Rodrigo and Aldo Pugliese - my best wishes for their future life and work. In view of the forthcoming departure the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Robert van Schaik, and the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Chusei Yamada, I should like to express my gratitude to them for the friendly contacts and business-like co-operation that became established among us. I wish them every success in their new and important posts. I was distressed to hear of the illness of the dean of the diplomatic corps in the field of disarmament, that outstanding political figure and diplomat, Alfonso García Robles. I wish him a speedy recovery.

You will recall that on 15 January 1986 the Soviet Union put forward a programme for ensuring security through disarmament, whose pivotal element is a plan for a stage-by-stage transition to a non-nuclear world, the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction and a drastic lowering of the levels of military confrontation in the world as a whole. The reaction to that programme was not unequivocal: some people supported it, while others were sceptical. We were also accused of saying one thing and doing another. It is not my intention now to take stock of the implementation of this programme. Yet already we can safely say that humanity has succeeded in overcoming a major psychological barrier: nuclear disarmament has ceased to be just a slogan, and has become a reality of today's world.

Less than two years separate 15 January 1986 from the date of signature of the Soviet-American INF Treaty. For the first time in the entire history of nuclear weapons the Soviet Union and the United States of America were able to agree on the elimination of two categories of their nuclear missiles. This first and therefore particularly significant step towards building a nuclear-free world created preconditions for further, still more profound and comprehensive cuts, both in nuclear and in other types of armaments. The conclusion of the INF Treaty established a methodological as well as a political basis for settling the difficult problems that arise in the course of the Soviet-American nuclear and space talks.

The question of 50 per cent reductions in the Soviet and American arsenals of strategic offensive arms continues to top the agenda in our relations with the United States. On the other hand, such reductions are not only of interest to these two countries. The nuclear and space talks which are bilateral in terms of the participants and the arms they cover, are of vital importance to mankind as a whole since they involve elimination of huge



amounts of nuclear weaponry with a vast destructive potential which represents a danger for the whole world. Indeed, it would be hard now to divide the disarmament process into "bilateral" and "multilateral" disarmament; this is a single process which touches on the interests of all and everyone and requires joint purposeful efforts by the world community as a whole. The nuclear and space talks and the activities of the Conference on Disarmament and other international forums are integral parts of that process. One manifestation of this approach is to be seen in the now traditional statements with which the heads of the Soviet delegation to the nuclear space talks make to the Conference on Disarmament to brief its participants on progress in the talks. We note with satisfaction that this time the head of the American delegation has also joined in this useful and indispensable exercise. We view this as a positive sign.

In recent years we have seen the situation in the world gradually but steadily improving. New horizons are opening up; real opportunities are emerging for the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security through the construction of a nuclear-free and non-violent world. Many obstacles along that road remain but our progress has already been marked by many milestones. The Delhi Declaration, in which India and the Soviet Union proclaimed the principles of a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world, is of great significance. In his address to the United Nations on 7 December 1988, M.S. Gorbachev said: "We are present at the birth of a new model of ensuring security, not through the build-up of arms, as was almost always the case in the past, but on the contrary through their reduction on the basis of compromise". The favourable changes that are currently taking place in the world soon had a positive impact in the field of disarmament. The Vienna talks on conventional arms reductions in Europe have got off to a promising start. Prospects are bright for the early conclusion of an international convention on the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons. The new political thinking is clearly asserting itself and has already yielded its first fruits.

The eleventh round of the nuclear and space talks, which were resumed after a lengthy seven-month recess, comes to an end in three days' time. This round was preceded by a change of Administration in the United States and the subsequent "strategic review". It was naturally important, then, to find out what ideas the American delegation brought along to this round and how the "strategic review" affected the United States position at the nuclear and space talks. I can tell you that work at the talks resumed on the basis of the texts that were on the negotiating table on the last day of the previous round, which recessed last November. Of course, the starting-point for work to resolve the outstanding issues remains the understandings reached and reflected in the joint statements adopted at the summit meetings held in Washington (1987) and Moscow (1988). In this way continuity has been ensured in the talks, which is a positive factor since it allows the negotiators to draw on all that has already been accomplished, and on the understandings and formulations that were tentatively agreed to by the sides in the past. In this respect the talks which took place in May this year during United States Secretary of State J. Baker's visit to Moscow were highly significant. This enabled us to embark without wasting time, practically from the outset of this round, on the main tasks, namely the search for solutions to major outstanding issues and continued drafting work on the texts of the documents being prepared.

The current status of that effort is as follows: agreement to observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972 and not to withdraw from it for a specified period of time certainly remains the key issue, which has continued to be the focus of keen attention throughout this round. Regrettably I am unable to note any significant progress towards its resolution. The positions of the two sides remain far apart. The Soviet side bases its position on the fact that the parameters for agreement on this issue were laid down in Washington in December 1987. This is what is known as the Washington formula, which appears in the joint Soviet-American summit statement. As the Washington statement indicates, the leaders of the two countries instructed their delegations in Geneva, taking into account the preparation of a treaty on strategic offensive arms, to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time. It was also agreed that intensive discussions of strategic stability should begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action. In line with that understanding, we view our task at the nuclear and space talks as being to prepare an agreement on observance of the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972 and non-withdrawal from it for a specified period of time. We do not suggest any artificial linkages, but in view of the fact that there is an objective interrelationship between defensive and offensive strategic arms, 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive arms are possible only in the context of non-emplacement of weapons in outer space and observance of the ABM Treaty. The task is to give treaty status to the Washington formula and couch it in appropriate legal language.

It is our view that the provision on observance of the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972 is sufficiently clear in itself. At the same time, to avoid disputes over the interpretation of the Treaty, we have proposed a pragmatic solution that calls for agreement on a list of devices whose launching into outer space would be prohibited if their specifications exceeded an agreed threshold limit. At the same time the parties could draw up appropriate confidence-building and verification measures, including exchanges of data and on-site inspections to be carried out prior to the launch of certain devices into outer space, so as to rule out any unclear situations which arouse concern on either side as regards compliance with obligations under the ABM Treaty.

Another outstanding issue concerns possible actions by the parties after the period of non-withdrawal. Our position is that the agreement to be worked out in the current negotiations should not include a provision authorizing the deployment of large-scale ABM systems, including space-based systems, immediately after the period of non-withdrawal. In our view, such an approach would prejudice the outcome of the future talks on strategic stability which, in accordance with the Washington agreement, are to start three years before the end of the period of non-withdrawal. There is an understanding that an agreement regarding ABM defences should include a protocol that would provide for predictability and confidence-building measures. And despite the fundamental differences which still exist regarding the substance of the agreement proper, there is a certain measure of proximity in the parties' approaches to the nature of certain measures that would be included in the

protocol. These are predictability measures with respect to ABM activities carried out by the parties (data exchange on activities, regular meetings of experts, visits to test ranges).

Work continued during this round to produce agreed language for this protocol on predictability measures. At the same time I wish to recall that the Soviet side continues to hold that in addition to predictability measures, the protocol should also provide for measures to verify compliance, including inspections of facilities that arouse concern on either side. Moreover, the protocol should certainly make provision for consultations to discuss situations which either side considers as jeopardizing its overriding interests. In the course of the consultations the sides would make use of all the measures at their disposal to settle situations on a mutually acceptable basis. This would realistically ensure compliance with the obligations regarding non-withdrawal from the Treaty for a specified period.

In order to reflect the objective interrelationship between reductions in strategic offensive arms and limitations on ABM systems, we propose that the text of the treaty on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive arms should include a provision that the treaty can be terminated in the event of a breach of the ABM Treaty or of the agreement to observe that Treaty. Unfortunately, we have not been able so far to achieve mutual understanding on that subject.

Since I have already turned to the contents of the Treaty on strategic offensive arms, I would like to mention limitations on long-range SLCMs as one of the most complicated problems involved in this treaty. Regrettably, we have not succeeded so far in breaking the deadlock on this issue. The Soviet side bases its efforts to identify possible ways of doing so on the Washington agreement, which provides for a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs. Although such limitations would not involve counting those SLCMs against the 6,000 limit on the number of warheads and the 1,600 limit on strategic offensive arms delivery vehicles, the parties committed themselves to ceilings on such missiles and to a search for mutually acceptable and effective measures to verify compliance with such limitations that could include the use of national technical means, co-operative measures and on-site inspections.

It is our view that long-range nuclear SLCMs constitute an important component of strategic offensive arms. Of course, the problem of verifying limitations on them does exist. It is related, among other things, to the need to distinguish between nuclear and non-nuclear SLCMs. Yet we feel this problem can be overcome. We have submitted proposals concerning a set of measures which would ensure the necessary verification of long-range SLCMs. The process would look like this: a specially equipped permanent monitoring post would be set up at a production facility to verify the number of missiles being produced, so that treaty constraints are not exceeded. Unique tamper-proof identifiers scanned by special devices ruling out their use for treaty-unrelated purposes would be tagged on the finished product. Special facilities would be set up to verify whether a given missile is nuclear-armed or conventionally armed as it is transported to a port for installation on a naval vessel. Installation of SLCMs would be restricted, subject to appropriate verification, to agreed and strictly limited types of submarines and surface ships. The installation of such missiles on other surface ships or submarines would be banned. This would facilitate verification, and the

entire process, including the possibility of inspections on board submarines and surface ships, would in our view offer a full assurance that dodging or circumventing verification procedures would be impossible.

To meet the objections levelled against the system, related primarily to the feasibility of visits to naval vessels, we have proposed the use of a remote-contact verification method to ascertain the presence of nuclear weapons on board a particular vessel and thus lessen the need for on-site inspections. In order to develop such a method we suggested an intergovernmental experiment; as the United States turned down the suggestion, we recently conducted the experiment on a non-governmental basis - under an agreement between our Academy of Sciences and the United States Natural Resources Defense Council. The experiment was carried out on the Black Sea on board the missile cruiser Slava. One of its missile launchers contained a missile with a nuclear charge, while the others stood empty. Instruments measuring neutron and gamma radiation of the passive type, sensing but not emitting radiation, were used. All the data registered by Soviet and American instruments proved virtually identical down to minor details. The presence of a nuclear warhead in one launcher, and the absence of such warheads in the others, were clearly established.

Essentially the experiment confirmed the viability and efficacy of both the Soviet and the American contact methods to verify the presence of nuclear weapons. In addition, our devices carried on a helicopter clearly demonstrated the feasibility of reliable remote verification from a distance of 60 to 70 m from a vessel. Both the American and the Soviet experts concurred that even employing currently available technologies, the methods used during the experiment offer good prospects for the development of instruments for the remote verification of the presence of nuclear weapons at sea.

Although work is still in its initial stage, it is proceeding in the right direction. The sensitivity of the instrument may be enhanced or the processing of the data speeded up, thus making the process more reliable. Sceptics point out that there was no nuclear propulsion unit on the cruiser Slava, so that there was no background radiation that could hamper radiation detection. In addition, the launcher was on deck and lacked any shielding. Of course, if a launcher were placed below decks and shielded with lead, say, detecting it would be more difficult. However, in the view of our experts a more sensitive device could be developed on the basis of the existing method which would detect the presence of nuclear weapons in any environment. It is a matter of technological improvement. We feel that the problem of verifying SLCMs can be resolved, but that this will require businesslike and detailed discussion. We hope that at the next round the two sides will find it possible to get down to this task in earnest.

The discussions at the current round on counting rules for long-range ALCMs on heavy bombers proved more encouraging. We have submitted new ideas which in our view should pave the way for a solution to this question. The basic proposition underlying these ideas is the desire to ensure that the agreed overall limits in future agreements - in this particular instance the ceiling of 6,000 warheads - include everything that should be included, no more and no less. In accordance with the approach we propose, the entire quantity of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which heavy bombers are actually equipped would be subject to counting. Of course, appropriate verification

would also be arranged. Our view is that there are no reasons at all to abandon the agreement reached earlier between the United States and the Soviet Union on a 600-km threshold, above which cruise missiles would be classed as long-range missiles and be considered as strategic offensive weapons. We look forward to a constructive response from the American side once it has properly studied the approach we propose.

Continuing its active search for mutually acceptable solutions to the problem of mobile ICBMs, the Soviet delegation has submitted several fresh ideas which, in our view, could help resolve the issue of verification of limitations on this type of strategic offensive arms. These ideas are based on the relevant understandings included in the 1988 Moscow "areas of agreement". We look forward to a productive dialogue on this issue.

A few words now on heavy ICBMs. As a result of the 1987 Washington summit, the two sides agreed to cap heavy ICBMs at 154 and their warheads at 1,540. This agreement was reaffirmed at the Moscow summit meeting in 1988 and is not open to question. To meet certain United States concerns on the subject of heavy ICBMs, we have however taken a number of steps bearing in mind these concerns. Work has continued on provisions in the future treaty and the accompanying documents related to the verification issue. The Soviet side calls for the broadest and most effective possible verification of compliance with limitations and prohibitions covering all types of strategic offensive arms that will be covered by the treaty. In particular, in this round, we have considered in detail the issue of "suspect site inspections" (these are more or less the same as challenge inspections under the chemical weapons convention). Indeed, the difficulties we have encountered in this area are similar to those existing in the area of a chemical weapons ban. Similar, but not identical. Here too the Soviet side has taken steps to narrow down the differences separating the two delegations.

So much for the outline of the situation regarding the major issues that remain pending at the nuclear and space talks. Concurrently with the effort to find a solution to those problems, work went ahead throughout the round on drafts of the treaty on strategic offensive arms, the data base memorandum, the inspections protocol and the protocol on the conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms. I have in mind the drafting and formalizing of treaty provisions that do not require a political decision. This involves editorial improvements, agreement on details which in many cases are technical or stylistic in nature. Nevertheless this constitutes an essential and very laborious part of the overall process of drafting the future instruments. I am happy to note that in the course of this round we have made significant progress on all these instruments, especially on verification provisions and the inspections protocol, since the two sides have shown willingness to seek mutually acceptable language, as a result of the constructive and businesslike atmosphere at the talks.

I wish to mention yet another issue, which is not directly related to the content of the documents being negotiated at the talks. This is a proposal we have received from the United States side for the devising and implementation of certain verification and stability measures prior to the conclusion of the treaty on strategic offensive arms. Essentially the proposal deals with trial measures, and in some instances trial inspections, which would facilitate the preparation of the treaty. In the course of this round we sought clarification on the details of these American proposals, and we are now

studying the clarifications. Generally speaking, the idea of test-running verification methods is a useful one, and it is for that reason that in the course of deliberations on a chemical weapons ban at the Conference on Disarmament, the Soviet Union proposed a series of trial inspections to be carried out at facilities producing certain chemicals. I should like to recall that in the past we have made similar proposals with regard to strategic offensive arms.

Earlier I mentioned our proposal for a joint experiment dealing with verification of long-range SLCMs. In addition, we have proposed trial inspections to check on the number of ALCMs that should be attributed to heavy bombers. Essentially, the proposal would make it possible, prior to the conclusion of the treaty, for Soviet inspectors on American heavy bombers, and American inspectors on ours, to test-run verification methods designed to determine the actual number of Cruise missiles a given heavy bomber is capable of carrying. Regrettably, neither proposal has been accepted by the American side. I should mention that as part of the implementation of the INF Treaty, what amounts to test runs of continuous monitoring methods are being conducted at the missile production facilities at Votkinsk in the USSR and in the United States at Magna, with the American inspectors checking not just the medium-range SS-20 missiles but also the strategic SS-25 ICBMs manufactured at the Votkinsk plant.

Returning to the American proposal, I wish to state that we are currently carefully analysing all of its aspects. First and foremost we wish to draw attention to the fact that the elaboration and implementation of such trial measures should not hold up progress in efforts to complete drafting work and conclude the treaty on strategic offensive arms, a view we believe is shared by the American side. We feel that we can move ahead on parallel tracks, elaborating on the provisions of the treaty while test-running those of them that have to do with verification systems. It is important that the testing of verification methods should not be used by either side for the purpose of collecting information on the weaponry of the other side. In other words, the principle of reciprocity must be observed. If trial verification measures are to be applied to some Soviet weapons, then similar measures should be applied to American weapons. On the whole, it would be useful to apply the idea of trial inspections to all the provisions that will form part of the future agreements.

Tomorrow the final plenary meeting at the nuclear and space talks will be held. The exchange of the updated texts of the documents being negotiated will take place on 7 August, marking the conclusion of the round. No precise date has yet been set for the start of the next round, but it is understood that it will start immediately after the meeting of the foreign ministers of the USSR and the United States in September this year. We look forward to taking full advantage of the coming recess so as to make the next round of talks as productive as possible.

In conclusion, I should like to express our satisfaction at the fact that there is a good businesslike atmosphere at the nuclear and space talks, and that close working contacts have been established between the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union, both at the level of heads of delegation and at other levels, which is one of the preconditions for successful negotiations.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the head of the Soviet delegation to the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms, Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin, for the information he has given us on the state of the negotiations. I should also like to thank Mr. Batsanov for his introductory statement and for the kind words that he addressed to the Chair. I now to call on the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, the United States delegation would like to join those who have already congratulated you upon your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for August. Under your wise and capable guidance, we can certainly expect a productive session which will further our work in the various areas of the Conference's endeavours. It is particularly gratifying that the Conference will have such experienced leadership during the important period of report-writing. It goes without saying that you will have the full co-operation of my delegation in every respect.

I would also like to take this opportunity to express appreciation to Ambassador Bayart for his efficient leadership of the Conference during his presidency in July. During your tenure, Mr. Ambassador, you elicited many useful contributions to our work and provided insights of great interest for the development of our agenda. And I would also like to thank the first speaker at our plenary today, Mr. Klaus Jacobi, for his thoughtful intervention. A highly regarded former ambassador to our country and now the honourable Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, Mr. Jacobi is the host for all of us at the Conference. I and my delegation very much appreciate the great efforts which the Swiss Government makes to facilitate the work of this Conference both physically and administratively. And Mr. Secretary, as your intervention demonstrates, you and your Government are also greatly interested in making a substantive contribution as well. We have listened carefully to your words and will consider them in the most thoughtful way regarding the Conference's work. I would also like to join the others in welcoming our new colleague from Sri Lanka, wish him well and pledge our co-operation to him and to his delegation. Also to take note of the departure of our good friends and colleagues, Ambassadors van Schaik and Chusei Yamada.

We have just heard the report of our friend and former colleague, Ambassador Nazarkin, concerning the Soviet view of developments in the latest round of talks in the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR on nuclear arms reductions, and on defence and space issues. At this time, I would like to introduce to you and to our colleagues Ambassadors Richard Burt and Henry Cooper. Ambassador Burt, the head of the United States delegation to the nuclear and space talks, is just completing his first round as chief United States negotiator. He comes to Geneva following a distinguished foreign policy career at the senior levels of our Government, most recently as Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany. Ambassador Cooper, the United States negotiator at the bilateral talks on defence and space issues, has had lengthy experience in dealing with these matters at high levels in the Air Force and in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. A veteran of these negotiations since they began in 1985, he brings to his work a profound understanding of the political and technical ramifications of this complex subject.

The first speaker will be Ambassador Burt, who will present the United States views of the about-to-be-completed round of talks on reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. Ambassador Cooper will then discuss our view of the latest developments in the defence and space negotiations. with your permission, Mr. President, I would first like to introduce Ambassador Burt.

Mr. BURT (United States of America): I would like to thank Ambassador Friedersdorf for his introduction, and to say how pleased I am to be here today to review with the members and non-member participants of the Conference on Disarmament the latest developments regarding our bilateral nuclear and space talks. President Benhima, I gather you have just assumed the role of President of the Conference for the month of August. You have my hopes and best wishes for a successful and productive session during your tenure. I am also pleased to see some old friends around the table, including State Secretary Jacobi, who served as a brilliant Swiss Ambassador to the United States. I would also like to add a personal note. Unlike my Soviet counterpart, this is only the second time in my life that I have been in this room - the first time was accompanying then Vice-President George Bush in 1984, when he laid down the United States proposal for a world-wide ban on chemical weapons, and speaking personally, I am sure that George Bush would like to return to this room some day to hail the conclusion of such an important agreement.

Round XI of the START negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union has been a useful and constructive endeavour. The United States approached this round as a reconnaissance mission and sought to clarify the policy positions of both parties and to reaffirm the central structure of our joint draft treaty. In fact we feel we have accomplished more than that in many areas, including the very important area of providing for effective verification.

I have conducted a thorough review of key treaty provisions and outstanding issues with my Soviet counterpart. He is an experienced negotiator and leads a professional team, characterized by well-grounded expertise. I believe we have established a solid, working relationship, despite the fact that he has decisively demonstrated during this round that he is a far more accomplished tennis player than I. There has also been a good give and take at the working group level related to the treaty and protocols which together comprise the START joint draft text. The two sides have held worthwhile discussions and debates of various alternatives. Together, we have improved the text and cleared brackets and narrowed our differences in small but significant ways.

The process in my view has been business-like, non-polemical and oriented to substance not rhetoric. Useful exchanges have taken place in all areas. While some significant differences continue to separate the United States and the Soviet Union in these negotiations, I believe after this round the two sides more clearly understand and better appreciate the rationale underpinning each other's negotiating posture. I thus believe that my Soviet colleague and I have been able to lay the groundwork for what I hope will be a productive discussion on START between Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze next month in the United States.

Before I address some of the issues which were the focus of my discussions with Ambassador Nazarkin, I would like to comment on the



overriding principles which guided the United States negotiating team in round XI and which will be of equal importance in future rounds. The United States returned to the Geneva talks with President Bush's firm pledge that "we will work vigorously to achieve fair and far-reaching agreements that strengthen peace. Nothing has higher priority".

In its early days, the Bush administration conducted a comprehensive review of American security and arms control policies. As a result of this review, the President concluded that the primary objective for strategic arms control is to achieve verifiable agreements that reduce the risk of war. The risk of nuclear war can be reduced by creating a more stable nuclear balance, in which deterrence is strengthened and a condition of crisis stability prevails. Such a condition exists when each side is dissuaded from a first strike because the costs and risks associated with such an attack clearly outweigh any conceivable benefit. Therefore, an essential ingredient to maintaining crisis stability is having survivable, retaliatory forces. In this sense, it is important to remember that arms control can only complement, not replace, unilateral measures that must be taken to maintain effective deterrence.

We believe deep reductions in strategic forces can enhance stability if they are properly applied. Provisions that could produce greater stability are those that would: first of all, reduce force vulnerability, since, as I have just said, survivable forces reduce the incentives to strike first; secondly, enhance transparency, since stability is enhanced by greater openness about the size and nature of each other's strategic forces and activities; and thirdly, foster predictability, since stability is enhanced by reducing uncertainties about the future evolution of the forces of both sides.

The START negotiations to date have produced a lengthy joint draft treaty text that reflects the areas of agreement and disagreement. At the beginning of this round, we reaffirmed our intent to proceed on the basis of the existing joint draft text. In particular, we reaffirmed our continued acceptance of the structure of limits and sublimits that have already been agreed. That is, 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems; 6,000 accountable warheads; 4,900 warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles; 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy ballistic missiles; and a reduction of approximately 50 per cent in Soviet ballistic missile throw weight. While we reaffirm our support of the basic agreed numerical limits and other United States positions in the joint draft text, we have reserved the right to suggest new ideas and other changes that we believe would contribute to force survivability and stability.

To ensure that improvements in force survivability remain valid over the long term, they must be balanced with the requirement that the size and nature of current and evolving strategic forces be transparent and predictable, and that agreements be effectively verifiable. Mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles provide a case in point: the same aspect of mobile ICBMs that makes them more survivable - the fact that they move - clearly also complicates effective verification.

The United States position on banning mobile ICBMs remains unchanged for now. Our decision on mobile missiles depends in part, of course, on support in the United States Congress for the President's ICBM modernization programme. Nonetheless, we have indicated to the Soviet side that we are

willing to reconsider our position on seeking a ban, in light of the 100-plus mobile ICBMs that the Soviets have deployed over the past several years, if the sides can agree upon a régime that would allow the effective verification of numerical limits on mobile ICBM systems. Though much remains to be done, round XI has produced significant clarifications of the requirements and restraints to be placed on both road and rail mobile systems.

As part of our overall negotiating effort, and a prominent example of the new ideas the United States brought to round XI, the United States has proposed that the United States and Soviet sides make a special effort to agree on, and begin implementing as soon as possible, certain verification and stability measures drawn from proposals previously advanced by both sides. I do not need to underscore to this group the central role verification plays in modern arms control agreements. Our verification and stability initiative is a recognition of that fact.

Specifically, at the direction of the President, I proposed to the Soviets that the START negotiators focus now on the following verification and stability measures, which would be reflected in one form or another in the ultimate START treaty. First, we would want to see the immediate, reciprocal establishment of perimeter and portal continuous monitoring of certain ballistic missile production facilities in the United States and the Soviet Union to improve our confidence in the accuracy of declared mobile ballistic missile inventories. Second, prompt, reciprocal exchange of selected data on each country's nuclear forces to help us design appropriate inspection procedures to assist verification of the START treaty. Third, cessation of ballistic missile telemetry encryption and data denial of certain ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic missile launches, so that each country has a better understanding of new developments in the forces of the other. Fourth, reciprocal practice inspections to demonstrate procedures for verifying that the number of re-entry vehicles on specific existing ballistic missiles does not exceed the number that the United States and Soviet Union have agreed to attribute to that type of missile. A mutual demonstration, in our view, could help the negotiators to develop sound inspection provisions for these unprecedented intrusive inspections. Fifth, reciprocal demonstration of technologies for unique identifiers on ballistic missiles, a process often referred to as "tagging" in order to facilitate technical exchanges on promising approaches.

In addition to these five measures, the United States believes that both countries can benefit by agreeing to two additional measures that, while they have not been previously discussed in our negotiations and would not themselves be part of the START treaty, would enhance strategic stability as separately agreed measures. First, following the Soviet Union's suggestion to Secretary of State James Baker last spring, we are prepared to address the problem of submarine-launched ballistic missiles with short times of flight, which would include what some refer to as depressed trajectory flights. Second, we also suggest the two countries implement a proposal, discussed in a previous exchange of letters, in which the United States and the Soviet Union would notify each other of one major strategic exercise each year.

The President's verification and stability initiative complements the work done to date in Geneva. This initiative is designed to expedite, not delay, the START negotiations. The START treaty will contain unprecedented verification provisions. It is important to understand early on what the

problems are, so that the negotiations are not prolonged by unresolved technical verification issues. Early implementation of these measures will help the two countries to gain experience in verification procedures so we can draft realistic provisions in Geneva.

The United States does not intend our initiative to be a take-it or leave-it package. While we would like to reach agreement on every measure, we are prepared to address only those that the Soviets are ready to discuss. Furthermore, the United States intends that each measure be fully reciprocal and therefore apply equally to both countries. To date we have held exploratory discussions with the Soviet side which have allowed us to describe our initiative in greater detail. We expect the initiative to figure prominently in the meetings next month between the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister.

I have had detailed discussions with my Soviet counterpart on prominent areas where the sides differ - an ICBM warhead sublimit, heavy ICBMs, air-launched cruise missiles and heavy bombers, sea-launched cruise missiles and the linkage of START to the ABM Treaty. These discussions have been candid and substantive rather than stale, rhetorical recitations of familiar themes.

We continue to believe that the START agreement should be reached on a sublimit of between 3,000 and 3,300 warheads on deployed ICBMs. Both countries would benefit from the added predictability such a limit would provide since ICBM systems will remain uniquely suited for use in a pre-emptive attack and, thus, more destabilizing than other types of offensive strategic arms.

Heavy ballistic missiles are particularly destabilizing. Therefore, the United States continues to maintain its position that the START treaty should ban the production, flight-testing, or deployment of new or modernized types of heavy ICBMs, as well as the production or deployment of additional heavy ICBMs of existing types. Both countries should also undertake not to conduct flights of existing types of heavy ICBMs and not to produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy SLBMs. The United States position on heavy missiles would effectively provide for equality by resulting eventually in the phasing out of the Soviet SS-18 force, the single most destabilizing weapons system in the world today.

Regarding bomber weapons, the United States has reaffirmed our past positions on air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), that is, air positions on counting, on range and on distinguishability. Thus, we continue to propose that these ALCMs be counted under an attribution rule that would credit each heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs with an agreed number of warheads against the 6,000 limit, regardless of the number actually carried. The United States also continues to maintain the position that only air-to-surface cruise missiles which are nuclear-armed and capable of a range over 1,500 kilometres should be subject to START limits.

The United States position on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) remains sound. Conventional SLCMs are not an element of the United States-Soviet strategic nuclear balance and therefore should not be part of this agreement. After considerable review, the United States has concluded that the Soviet proposals for sea-launched cruise missile

verification would not provide for effective verification. Available technologies allegedly suitable for detecting nuclear SLCM warheads remotely and distinguishing them from other nuclear sources cannot do either reliably. The recent Soviet demonstration in the Black Sea has not altered this conclusion. Consequently, circumvention of provisions based on these technologies would be easy. Even if the technologies could detect and distinguish nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles reliably, however, it still appears highly doubtful that a régime of effective verification could be designed. The United States still knows of no way to verify effectively limits on the production and storage of SLCMs, arguably the core of the SLCM verification problem.

Consequently, the United States envisions a non-binding declaration of plans for nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles by both countries. Because nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles are neither suitable for, nor vulnerable to, a first strike, the United States believes that our proposal provides both countries with the most practical means to build confidence that nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles will not circumvent treaty limits.

I would like to conclude by addressing the relationship between START and other negotiations. Some have recently questioned whether the conclusion of a START treaty is a lower priority for the Bush Administration than the conclusion of a conventional force treaty, or whether we want to delay START pending progress in CFE negotiations in Vienna. Let me say that neither is true. Both the START and CFE negotiations are high, but independent, priorities for the Bush Administration. Although President Bush has expressed his hope that a CFE agreement can be finalized in 6 to 12 months, he has not linked progress in START to progress in CFE.

Because stabilizing reductions are in the interest of both countries, we also believe that completion of a START agreement should not await resolution of difficult defence and space issues. Since 1972 when the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty entered into force, the magnitude and power of the offensive nuclear threat has grown several fold. Yet a key premise of that Treaty was that strategic offensive arms reductions would soon follow. Thus we believe the Soviet Union should join with us in concluding a START treaty, when it is ready, without any preconditions. A separate defence and space treaty, a subject that Ambassador Cooper will address in more detail in a moment, should likewise be negotiated on its own merits and at its own pace.

The conclusions of our strategic review and the history of negotiations on these issues have convinced the United States that the task ahead is large. Much has been accomplished already - and I know my Soviet colleague would agree with me - yet a great deal of work lies ahead. I believe that through serious, constructive negotiations we will be able to make significant progress. The United States is committed to building on our achievements thus far to reach agreements that fulfil our objectives of reducing the risk of war, moving beyond containment and enhancing global security and stability.

Mr. COOPER (United States of America): I am pleased to appear before the Conference on Disarmament to discuss the status of the defence and space talks. Let me begin with some background material.

Since our talks began in March 1985, the United States has sought to facilitate a possible future co-operative transition to a stabilizing balance

of offensive and defensive forces, should effective defences against strategic ballistic missiles prove feasible. President Bush has directed us to preserve United States options to develop and deploy advanced defences when they are ready. We believe that stability and the security of all nations can be enhanced by such defences, especially if they are introduced at a measured pace and in a co-operative way.

There is clearly a growing likelihood of effective, non-nuclear defences against ballistic missiles. Great advances in data processing, sensors, micro-electronics, materials, propulsion, and directed energy have opened a window to a potentially new and safer era. Over the past six years the creative talents of our scientists and engineers have extended these advances. Now, innovative non-nuclear defensive concepts are emerging from laboratories and will undergo testing. If our hopes are realized, the nuclear- or chemically-armed ballistic missile, by far the most dangerous instrument of war to use the medium of space, will no longer be an "absolute weapon".

Our Soviet colleagues and others suggest there should be great concern regarding these developments. I want to address their arguments head-on. In effect, various spokesmen suggest that publics should believe that responsible leaders ought not use technological advances to defend against ballistic missiles. In other words, advancing technology should be used only to enhance the effectiveness of the threat posed by offensive ballistic missiles - even if it were technically possible to defend against and devalue that threat, and thereby make deterrence more stable. Of course, Soviet spokesmen do not make their arguments in these terms. Rather they divert attention into misleading disputes about the ABM Treaty.

For example, the Soviets inaccurately charge that our SDI programme, because of its openly declared purpose, violates the ABM Treaty. They, of course, know better - and have known better since the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972. Marshal Grechko, then the Soviet Defence Minister, told the Supreme Soviet during its ratification process that the ABM Treaty "imposes no limitations on the performance of research and experimental work aimed at resolving the problem of defending the country against nuclear missile attack".

So we and the Soviets both understand that there are no limitations on ABM research and experimental work to determine if effective defences are feasible. And the Soviets are, themselves, very interested in strategic defences and are conducting their own related research and experimental work. In November 1987, General Secretary Gorbachev, on American television in answer to a direct question about Soviet activities in this field, said that "practically, the Soviet Union is doing all that the United States is doing". Although he also said that the Soviet Union would not build or deploy its SDI, it is capabilities rather than declared intentions that count.

In fact, the Soviets are already doing far more than the United States on strategic defences. The magnitude of their civil and air defences is unequalled anywhere else in the world. They also have the world's only deployed ABM system, which they are modernizing - as is their right under the ABM Treaty. And certain of their activities clearly go beyond the limits of the ABM Treaty. So Soviet actions make clear they do not oppose all defences, only United States defences.

Beyond their attack on SDI, the Soviets argue that the ABM Treaty specified, for all time, the only possible stable strategic régime: one which severely limits the deployment of strategic ballistic missile defences. They cannot explain why effective defences against the most threatening offensive weapon, the strategic ballistic missile, would be destabilizing - whereas their defences in other areas, such as air defences, are stabilizing. Furthermore, it is simply not true that the ABM Treaty politically established, for all time, a particular strategic régime. To the contrary, the ABV Treaty explicitly acknowledged that the future strategic situation could change. Accordingly, its provisions provide for discussions and amendment.

The ABM Treaty also provides an explicit mechanism that makes clear that neither side can veto the other's decision to withdraw for its own stated reasons of supreme interest and deploy defences beyond its terms. The United States made clear in 1972 that such a reason might be failure to achieve agreement, within five years, to significantly limit strategic offensive arms. Such an agreement was not achieved. Now, 17 years later, the Soviets are seeking to apply reverse linkage to this fundamental premise of the ABM Treaty. They say there must be strict compliance with the ABM Treaty or there cannot be a START Treaty. Meanwhile, since 1972 Soviet strategic offensive nuclear weapons have quadrupled and ours have doubled. So, even the significant reductions anticipated in START will leave more strategic weapons than existed in 1972. It is long past time to conclude a START treaty, as promised in 1972, without further restrictions on strategic defences.

At the same time, we do understand the Soviet interest in assuring predictability as both sides' research and experimental work proceeds and as reductions in strategic offensive arms take place. We, too, wish to assure predictability - not only now, and in the near future, but also into the more distant future when advancing technologies may enable effective defences to play an increased role in the strategic forces of both sides. Therein lies a basis for agreement on a defence and space treaty. And although key differences remain, and the pace has been slower than we would wish, there has been some progress toward such an agreement.

Specific United States proposals have indicated how such predictability measures might be assured. In part, at Prime Minister Thatcher's suggestion, we began in 1986 proposing "predictability measures". Then, in 1988, the United States formally proposed a predictability measures protocol to a defence and space treaty. While there is not yet agreement on the specific purpose for the protocol, both sides are constructively drafting a joint draft text. Notably, both sides agree that, under this protocol, they would use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres to exchange data each year on their activities regarding the development, testing, deployment, modernization and replacement of strategic ballistic missile defences. The United States also wishes to exchange data on research activities conducted prior to the commencement of the formal development stage.

In working on this protocol, the sides have also agreed to have experts meet and, on the basis of the data exchanged each year, plan subsequent activities that could include visits to each other's test ranges to observe certain tests where the inviting party determines the agenda. Again, the United States would go further and include in the exchange visits to laboratories not necessarily at test ranges, the observation of tests not

necessarily at test ranges, and activities not necessarily observable by national technical means. The United States believes these measures are practical only if they are carried out on a voluntary, reciprocal, and comparable basis.

While accepting the idea of such confidence-building measures, the Soviets also emphasize developing new verification measures, including on-site inspections unacceptable to the United States. Of course, the United States supports co-operative means of verification when they can be effective without compromising United States and Allied security interests, when they are necessary and tailored to the circumstances, and when they are appropriate to the systems being negotiated. But, in this instance, verification of the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, is provided by national technical means. While the United States-proposed predictability measures would provide more transparency into activities of the sides and thereby enhance some verification goals, they are primarily confidence-building measures.

In any case, the significant progress on this protocol has not received much public attention. Rather, the emphasis has been on Soviet threats that there can be no START treaty without an agreement not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time.

The fact is that, since 1986, the United States has made clear that it would agree to conclude a separate treaty of unlimited duration, including such a non-withdrawal period - but not as payment for a START treaty that should be concluded on its own merits. Rather, the United States is prepared to meet the Soviet demand for a non-withdrawal period provided the Soviet Union meets three United States conditions. First, after the non-withdrawal period, the United States will be free to deploy defences without further reference to the ABM Treaty, after giving six months' notice. Second, withdrawal and termination rights under international law, other than those associated with deployment per se, will be retained. And third, there must be no disputes during the non-withdrawal period about research, development, and testing - including in space. In this regard, I would reiterate that the United States is conducting, and will continue conducting, the SDI programme in compliance with all international agreements, including the ABM Treaty.

Two of these three United States conditions were dealt with in the 10 December 1987 Washington summit joint statement, an important benchmark in our negotiations, which directed us in Geneva to work out an agreement with the same legal status as the ABM and START treaties.

First, it was agreed in Washington that "intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified non-withdrawal period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action". Thus was acknowledged a new régime after the non-withdrawal period in which either side could decide to deploy ballistic missile defences without further reference to the ABM Treaty. The United States position is that, unless and until a party exercises this "right to deploy", ABM Treaty restrictions will remain in force.

Second, it was also agreed that the sides would "observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as

required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty". General Secretary Gorbachev accepted this United States language which, over the preceding 18 months, the Soviets had rejected in Geneva because they said they understood the United States meant it to mean that space-based ABM systems based on other physical principles and their components could be tested in space.

The Soviets here in Geneva have sought to discount these Washington summit understandings. In the first case, they have sought to terminate the defence and space treaty at the end of the non-withdrawal period, nullifying the agreed new régime after the non-withdrawal period. The United States-proposed defence and space treaty is of unlimited duration and preserves the agreed "right to deploy" along with appropriate notification procedures. In the second case, the Soviets have argued that they did not agree to the "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty even though the Geneva negotiating record clearly shows they understood that the United States meant the "broad interpretation" by the language the General Secretary accepted at the Washington summit.

Consequently, the United States has made clear that concluding a defence and space treaty is contingent upon clarifying this language from the Washington summit joint statement to assure an unambiguous mutual understanding of the permitted testing activities. To accomplish this, and to move the discussion beyond disputes about ABM Treaty interpretation, the United States has taken three initiatives. First, we proposed the predictability measures I cited above. Second, taking into account unsolvable verification problems and the importance of developing new, stabilizing space-based sensors, the United States proposed that the sides agree not to object, on the basis of the ABM treaty, to the development, testing or deployment of each other's space-based sensors. Third, taking into account Soviet-stated concerns about deployment of ABM systems in space, or the preparation of a base for such deployment, we provided last October a "space testing assurance". In that assurance, the United States pledged that it will test only from a limited number of designated ABM test satellites components of space-based ABM systems based on other physical principles and capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles to counter ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. The number of United States-designated ABM test satellites in orbit simultaneously will not exceed a number well short of that associated with any realistic deployed capability. In conjunction with this assurance, we proposed notification procedures relating to testing activities of ABM test satellites.

While the Soviets do not yet accept them, we are satisfied that these United States initiatives build on solid technical and political foundations, and deal fairly with the concerns of both sides. They will provide predictability to both sides concerning all strategic ballistic missile defence activities. They assure that there will be no deployment of advanced defences beyond the terms of the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time, and even then assure that there will have been extensive prior discussions of strategic stability in the United States-Soviet strategic relationship.

But these United States initiatives are also designed to achieve a safer, more secure, and more stable future régime in which the security of both sides, and the whole world, is based upon an ever increasing role for effective non-nuclear defences against the most threatening weapon of modern technology, the offensive ballistic missile - whether armed with nuclear,



conventional, or chemical warheads. This future seems entirely consistent with recent Soviet statements that the USSR is altering its overall military strategy to be defensive in nature. And this future is entirely consistent with the well-known Soviet interest in defences, generally speaking. Thus, we will be patient and wait for a positive Soviet response.

In this regard, I want to observe that we are concluding a useful round in our negotiations. The United States side has emphasized the continuity of the United States position on defence and space, and provided some new material related to the protocol. Although the Soviets have provided no new material and have refused to incorporate both sides' positions in the joint draft text of the defence and space treaty, they have worked constructively on the protocol joint draft text.

There also seemed to be a modest shift in this round toward more discussion of the offence-defence relationship, based upon a mutual recognition that there is no absolute weapon - offensive or defensive. Where such a discussion will lead, in view of the advancing technical possibilities, is unclear, but it would seem most unlikely to conclude that effective defences, should they prove feasible, should not be deployed. The United States believes it makes sense to develop effective defences if advancing technology makes this feasible, and to deploy them when they are ready - preferably at a measured pace and in a co-operative way.

Before I close let me take note of the work of the outer space Committee here at the Conference on Disarmament. As you can tell from my description of the defence and space talks, work in this area is exceptionally complicated. Building understanding in this area is not an easy process, and I congratulate the outer space committee for its work in developing greater understanding on this subject. While a fundamental framework must be first established on a bilateral level, the United States remains interested in and willing to continue examining issues associated with space arms control at the Conference on Disarmament. But the United States has not yet identified any practical outer space arms control measures that can be dealt with in a multilateral environment.

Let me conclude by stating that I am honoured to have had the opportunity to address this Conference. I follow your work attentively and I wish the Conference every success.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I would also like to thank the head of the delegation of the United States of America to the bilateral talks on nuclear and space weapons, Ambassador Richard Burt, as well as Ambassador Henry Cooper, for the information they have provided to us on those negotiations. Finally, I would like to thank Ambassador Friedersdorf for his introduction, and for the wishes he addressed to the Chair. Let me also emphasize how I appreciate the fact that the ambassadors involved in the bilateral negotiations have come to outline to the Conference, as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, the views of their Governments on issues of vital importance for the international community.

I give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): Mr. President, allow me first of all to congratulate you on your assumption of the office of President of the Conference on Disarmament, and to express our appreciation for the manner in which your predecessor, our distinguished colleague from Mongolia, fulfilled his onerous duties during the previous month. Allow me also to welcome Ambassador Batsanov of the Soviet Union and Ambassador Rasaputram of Sri Lanka in our midst.

I take the floor today to deliver the following statement on behalf of the Group of 21 on the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Conference on Disarmament, which is the single multilateral negotiating forum in this field, has the potential to make a significant contribution in promoting international security and in arresting and reversing the arms race, leading towards our goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. This potential has not been exploited to the fullest; hence there is a need to make the Conference on Disarmament more responsive to our present requirements.

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the Conference on Disarmament. We feel that this provides us with additional justification to continue to explore and identify measures which would contribute to its improved and effective functioning in the future.

In the past, the task of suggesting measures relating to the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament was entrusted to the informal group of seven members established in 1987. The Group of Seven, whose members were appointed in their personal capacities, submitted two reports (CD/WP.286 and CD/WP.341) which contained some important suggestions and ideas on the subject. Unfortunately, the consideration of these reports at last year's session of the Conference on Disarmament could not be finally concluded.

The Group of 21 is of the opinion that, in view of the commendable work done by the Group of Seven in the past, it should be re-established and re-constituted at next year's session of the Conference on Disarmament, and, as a follow-up to the two reports already submitted by it, charged anew with the task of identifying and suggesting measures relating to the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. We have now come to the end of the list of speakers for today. Do any other delegations wish to speak at this stage? I seems not. I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting and, in keeping with the practice followed by the Conference, to convene an informal meeting to examine the draft mandate contained in document CD/819/Rev.1, submitted by the Group of 21. On the basis of the outcome of the informal meeting, the Conference will resume the plenary meeting in order to continue consideration of this draft mandate and hear any representatives who may wish to make statements on this subject. Consequently I now suspend the plenary meeting; we shall meet in informal session in approximately five minutes.

The meeting was suspended at 12.10 p.m. and resumed at 12.25 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 523rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. The Conference now continues its consideration of the draft decision submitted by the Group of 21, as contained in document CD/819/Rev.1. Are there any delegations wishing to take the floor before I put this document before the Conference? I call on Ambassador Fan of China.

Mr. FAN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, the Chinese delegation would like to extend its warm congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August. August will be a busy month for the Conference; I am confident that with your rich diplomatic experience and talent you will guide the proceedings to a successful conclusion. The Chinese delegation for its part would like to assure you of its close co-operation.

I would also like to thank the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Mr. García Robles, and the distinguished Ambassador of Mongolia, Mr. Bayart, for their excellent performance in guiding the work of the Conference in June and July respectively. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome our new colleague, Ambassador Rasaputram of Sri Lanka, with whom I offer to maintain and develop close co-operation. I was sorry to learn of the departure of Ambassador Yamada of Japan and Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands, and wish them success in their new posts.

Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is an item to which the Chinese delegation has consistently attached great importance. We have systematically expounded our position and ideas on this item and have tabled relevant working documents. The Group of 21 has all along shown great interest in this item and has made great efforts to promote progress on this issue. This year the Group of 21 has once again put forward a document on this issue, namely CD/819/Rev.1. This document does not pose any problem for the Chinese delegation, nor do we take exception to it. At the same time we are ready to consider other formulae which would enable the Conference to play its role on this matter.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Fan of China for his kind words addressed to the Chair. Now I put before the Conference for decision document CD/819/Rev.1, submitted by the Group of 21 and entitled "Draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 2 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament - Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". Are there any objections to this draft decision?

Mr. HOULLEZ (Belgium) (translated from French): At the beginning of my statement I too would like to congratulate you warmly on taking up the presidency of the Conference, and to assure you of my delegation's full co-operation. I should also like to take the opportunity of thanking your predecessor, Ambassador Bayart, for the efficient way he accomplished his duties as President in July, to welcome our new colleague from Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rasaputram, and to express special regret at the departure of two Ambassadors and friends, Messrs. van Schaik and Yamada.

On the matter under discussion, the delegations of the Western countries, on whose behalf I have the honour to speak, wish to express their surprise

that the Group of 21 has distributed document CD/819/Rev.1 containing a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 2 of the agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". They are sure that the tabling of this text at this stage of the session is not conducive to progress in the consideration of this item. For the reasons set out in detail in the statement I made on behalf of the Western Group on 20 July, in which I stressed the importance the Group attaches to the "nuclear" items on our agenda, I wish to reiterate here that as far as our Group is concerned, the most appropriate instrument for dealing with the problems under item 2 is a plenary debate where delegations' views are set forth in a final verbatim record. The countries of the Western Group are not convinced that in present circumstances the establishment of a subsidiary body would serve the cause of nuclear disarmament, and therefore are not in a position to associate themselves with a consensus concerning the proposed mandate.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Houlliez for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. After hearing the statement which has just been made by the representative of Belgium, I note that at present there is no consensus on the draft decision contained in document CD/819/Rev.1. Do any other delegations wish to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to Mr. Sood of the delegation of India.

Mr. SOOD (India): Mr. President, let me first take this opportunity of joining others in congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for this month of August, which, as we all know, is a difficult month. My delegation assures you of its full support and co-operation in the effective discharge of your responsibility.

I have asked for the floor today to make a statement on behalf of the Group of 21. The significance which the Group of 21 attaches to agenda item 2 - Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament - is well known, and its views are already reflected in documents CD/64, CD/116, CD/180, CD/526 and CD/819. In keeping with its consistent position, the Group of 21 presented to the Conference the draft mandate contained in CD/819/Rev.1. It is a mandate that reflects the two crucial aspects of this issue - the urgency attached to it by the Group of 21 and the need to deal with it in the multilateral negotiating framework of the Conference on Disarmament. The Group regrets that despite the preliminary work carried out on this subject during previous years, it has still not been found possible to set up an ad hoc committee on this item. In fact, prolonged discussions on procedural details have prevented us from carrying forward our work in the most appropriate manner possible.

In keeping with the discussions that took place on this item last year, and as reflected in the report of the CD contained in document CD/875, the Group of 21 is convinced that the need for urgent multilateral action on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, leading to the adoption of concrete measures, has been amply demonstrated. In its opinion, multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament are long overdue. It welcomes the progress achieved in the bilateral negotiations, but reiterates that because of their limited scope and the number of parties involved, these can never replace or nullify the genuine multilateral search for universally applicable nuclear disarmament measures. The Group of 21 believes that all nations have a vital interest in negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The existence of nuclear weapons and their quantitative and qualitative

development directly and fundamentally jeopardize the vital security interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. It is an accepted fact that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and the survival of civilization. It is essential, therefore, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avoid the danger of nuclear war. As was stated in the Harare Declaration adopted at the eighth Non-Aligned summit, "since annihilation needs to happen only once, removing the threat of nuclear catastrophe is not one issue among many, but the most acute and urgent task of the present day".

It is clear that global security cannot be based on doctrines of nuclear deterrence. On the contrary, the advent of nuclear weapons obliges us to undertake a re-examination of the basic relationship between armaments and security. The belief that security can be enhanced through possession of nuclear weapons must be challenged because accumulation of nuclear weaponry constitutes a threat to the very security that it seeks to protect. In the nuclear age, the only valid doctrine is the achievement of collective security through nuclear disarmament. The INF Treaty, as the first disarmament agreement which eliminates an entire class of nuclear weaponry, is a further vindication of the fact that reduction of nuclear arsenals leads to an enhancement of global security.

The Group of 21 is convinced that the doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the ongoing arms race and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover, such doctrines, which in the ultimate analysis are predicated upon a willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, a war which would affect participants and innocent bystanders alike. The Group of 21 rejects as politically and morally unjustifiable the idea that the security of the whole world should be made to depend on the state of relations existing among nuclear-weapon States.

In the task of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States bear a special responsibility. In keeping with respect for the security concerns of the non-nuclear nations, and refraining from action leading to intensification of the nuclear arms race, the nuclear-weapon States must accept the obligation to take positive and practical steps towards the adoption and implementation of concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament.

The realization that nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought is a significant step forward, which must be translated into practical measures. Paragraph 50 of the Final Document of SSOD-I sets out guidelines for the Conference on Disarmament to provide an effective and complementary process within the multilateral framework. The Group of 21 remains firmly committed to the implementation of this paragraph, and considers that the establishment of an ad hoc committee provides us with the best means to achieve this objective.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of India for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. Does anyone else wish to take the floor? I recognize the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, like previous speakers, I should like to congratulate you warmly upon the assumption of your high and responsible office. We have confidence in your great diplomatic experience and skill to bring this year's session of the CD to a conclusion bearing positive results. I wish you much success in the performance of your duties, and can assure you of my delegation's support in all endeavours in the search for a solution to the still pending issues. I should also like to express our appreciation to Ambassador Bayart for his efficient stewardship as the President of the Conference in the month of July.

In the light of this morning's informal plenary session, I feel induced, as Co-ordinator of the Group of Socialist Countries for agenda item 2 of the Conference, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", to say a few words. The socialist countries on behalf of which I am speaking have repeatedly expressed their will and readiness to finally press ahead with the issue of nuclear disarmament. Which forum would be better suited than the Conference on Disarmament to mould the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free world into shape, the more so since all nuclear-weapon States are represented here?

Any measure aimed towards the discussion of this issue in terms of substance at the CD deserves our support. This can be gathered from the consent given by the socialist countries to the proposed mandate of the Group of 21 for an ad hoc committee to be established on agenda item 2 of the Conference. It can also be gathered from our preparedness to resume the informal meetings of the plenary on nuclear disarmament and to conduct a structured debate on this cardinal subject of the CD. Furthermore, it is borne out by the joint proposals advanced by delegations of socialist countries for a serious and substantive dialogue on questions of nuclear disarmament. Only recently the Warsaw Treaty member countries, at their meeting in Bucharest, underscored their readiness "to continue to seek, together with all interested countries, understandings leading to the staged reduction and subsequent complete elimination of nuclear weapons". Details in this regard are set forth in document CD/934.

All this is in agreement with the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament (para. 50). This document was adopted by consensus.

Of course, everybody is looking at things in his own way. Opinions can also differ as to how the disarmament process should be set in motion. However, what is needed is a joint resolve to deliberate seriously on these issues within the CD. Anyhow, this is the way we are looking at things. We believe that the time is ripe to take practical steps on the road towards establishing an ad hoc committee on agenda item 2. This would constitute a genuine contribution to translating the improved political conditions into concrete action. We too regret very much that we were unable to reach agreement to establish an ad hoc committee, and we hope that these will not be the last words of the group concerned.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Dietze for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. Are there any other delegations wishing to speak? It would seem not.

I now wish to turn to another matter. At my request, the secretariat has distributed a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its

subsidiary bodies during the coming week. This timetable was drawn up in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, the timetable is purely indicative and subject to change if necessary. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada.

Mr. ROBERTSON (Canada): As Co-ordinator for the Western Group, I would like to question the secretariat on the inclusion of the proposed meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space for Friday, 11 August. Our understanding was that now that we will have completed this Friday substantive work on the subject, this date would be too early for us to begin to take up consideration of the report.

Mr. BERASATEGUI (Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference): As you rightly pointed out, Mr. President, the informal paper circulated today is merely indicative and we can change it as we go along. The reason for including this meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space is very simple. We might have the draft report ready earlier than we thought at the beginning. In that case, the report might be circulated in time so that its consideration could start at that particular meeting on 11 August. If, for any technical reason, this is not possible and the report is not ready with some advance notice, then we would cancel that meeting.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Berasategui for the clarification. Does anyone else wish to take the floor? It would seem not. Consequently I shall take it that the Conference adopts the proposed timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): As we have come to the end of the agenda for this plenary meeting, I now intend to close the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 8 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.524  
8 August 1989

ENGLISH

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 8 August 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. El Ghali Benhima (Morocco)



The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 524th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

Today the Conference begins its consideration of item 8 on its agenda, entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative who so wishes may raise any matter relating to the work of the Conference.

As you will remember, the Group of 21 has asked me to put before the Conference today for decision document CD/515/Rev.5, concerning the establishment of an ad hoc committee under item 3 of the agenda, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". Once we have heard the speaker on the list for today's plenary meeting, we shall hold an informal meeting to consider document CD/515/Rev.5. We will then resume the plenary immediately to continue consideration of this document and hear any representatives who wish to make statements on this subject.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who, in his capacity as Chairman, will present the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, contained in document CD/938. I now give the floor to Ambassador Ardekani.

Mr. ARDEKANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August. I am sure that your special negotiating skill will prove invaluable to the Conference in this month of adoption of its reports. I should also like to congratulate Ambassador Bayart for the excellent way in which he presided over the work of the Conference during the month of July.

Ever since the nuclear age began, non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those that do not belong to one of the major military alliances, have emphasized the need for effective measures to ensure their security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. During the 1989 session the Committee on negative security assurances held 10 meetings at which States expressed their views on the issues. Although differences in approach persisted, there was a general feeling among delegations that the issue should be kept under active review, especially in the light of the fourth NPT review conference.

I would like to thank the delegations that participated in the work of the Committee, and especially the co-ordinators of the groups and China for their collaboration during the work and for the approval of the report of the Committee as well as for the efforts that made possible the adoption of the report within the time frame which had been agreed by the Conference. I would also like to extend my special thanks to the Secretary of the Ad hoc Committee, Mr. Gerardi-Siebert, and his associate, Miss Wilma Gibson, for their excellent co-operation with us during the course of our work.

(Mr. Ardekani, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Today I have the honour to submit the text of the Committee's report, contained in document CD/938 of 27 July 1989. As you can see, in the conclusions and recommendations the Committee agreed that an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances should be re-established at the beginning of the 1990 session of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee for introducing the report distributed as document CD/938, and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I should also like to congratulate Ambassador Ardekani and the members of the Ad hoc Committee on adopting the report one day before the date laid down in the timetable agreed with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees.

I have no more speakers on the list for today. However, in accordance with the Conference's usual practice, I will ask whether there are any representatives who wish to take the floor. I see that there are none. I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting and, following the practice of the Conference, to convene an informal meeting to consider the draft mandate contained in document CD/515/Rev.5 submitted by the Group of 21. The Conference will then resume the plenary meeting to continue consideration of this draft mandate and hear any representatives who may wish to speak on this subject. Accordingly, I suspend the plenary meeting; we shall continue in an informal meeting in approximately five minutes.

The meeting was suspended at 10.15 a.m. and resumed at 10.30 a.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 524th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. The Conference will continue its consideration of the draft decision submitted by the Group of 21 in document CD/515/Rev.5, concerning the establishment of an ad hoc committee under item 3 of the agenda of the Conference.

Are there any delegations that wish to take the floor before I put this document to the Conference? I give the floor to Ambassador Yamada.

Mr. YAMADA (Japan): Mr. President, I would like first of all, to extend my most sincere felicitations to you upon your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for this important month in which we conclude the summer session. I am convinced that under your leadership we will have fruitful meetings. I would also like to express my deep appreciation to your predecessors, Ambassador García Robles and Ambassador Bayart.

The Group of Western Countries, on whose behalf I am speaking now, is disappointed to see that the mandate contained in document CD/515/Rev.5 is being proposed once again for decision by the Conference. We do not share the view that the submission of this draft mandate, which calls for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", will facilitate our work on this subject. We are therefore, unable to associate ourselves with the proposed draft mandate. The Western Group has consistently stressed the special significance it attaches to in-depth consideration of agenda item 3. This interest grows from the overriding necessity of avoiding war and intimidation and strengthening international security and stability in the nuclear age.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

We believe that the problem of the prevention of nuclear war can only be dealt with satisfactorily in a broader context of the prevention of war in general. The arms control process, which encompasses nuclear as well as conventional and chemical weapons, should enhance stability in all its aspects, promote confidence and advance by stages which are both stabilizing and verifiable. It is with this objective in mind that we continue actively and constructively to approach this item.

In conclusion, I would like to stress that the Western Group attaches the greatest importance to concrete policies and actions aimed at preventing all wars, including nuclear war. Equally, we continue to be willing to search jointly for and define an appropriate framework for the consideration of this agenda item within the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): First of all I should like to thank Ambassador Yamada for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. After listening to his statement on behalf of the Western Group, I note that there is at present no consensus on the draft decision contained in document CD/515/Rev.5. Do any other delegations wish to take the floor now? I give the floor to Ambassador Fan.

Mr. FAN (China) (translated from Chinese): The prevention of nuclear war is an item that relates to the security of every country in the world. The member States of the Conference on Disarmament share a common interest in it. The Chinese delegation, for its part has attached great importance to the item and has made its views known in many of its interventions and working papers. This year the Group of 21 has once again tabled document CD/515/Rev.5, which deals with the establishment and mandate of an ad hoc committee on the item. The Chinese delegation supports the Group of 21 in its endeavour and can accept the formula it has proposed. Naturally we will not rule out other formulae which are acceptable to all and will enable the Conference to commence work on this item.

Mr. SHARMA (India): Mr. President, as I take the floor for the first time during this month, let me express my delegation's satisfaction at seeing you presiding over our work during August, which, as we know, is perhaps a demanding period as we have a deadline to meet. I have no doubt that under your wise chairmanship the Conference is in good hands, and my delegation would like to assure you of its full support in the discharge of your responsibilities. Let me also compliment Ambassador Bayart and Ambassador García Robles, who presided over our work during the previous months of the summer session. We will miss the wise presence of Ambassador Yamada and Ambassador van Schaik, who are leaving us shortly. I wish them success and happiness in their new assignments. I would also like to welcome Ambassador Rasaputram of Sri Lanka and assure him of my delegation's full co-operation.

We in the Group of 21 would like to express regret at the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to set up an ad hoc committee on agenda item 3. We have shown ourselves ready to exchange views on this subject, here or in the General Assembly. But some delegations have not agreed with this, as their priorities seem to be different.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

I do not need to emphasize the importance that our Group attaches to this item. We believe that the greatest peril facing the world is the threat of destruction from a nuclear war, and that consequently the removal of this threat is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. While nuclear-weapon States possess the primary responsibility for avoiding nuclear war, all nations have a vital interest in the negotiation of measures for prevention of nuclear war, in view of the catastrophic consequences that such a war would have for mankind. As far back as 1961, General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) declared that the use of nuclear weapons, besides being a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, would be contrary to the laws of humanity and a crime against mankind and civilization. The Harare Declaration adopted at the eighth Non-Aligned summit also emphasized this point and, accordingly, "urged nuclear-weapon States to agree, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, to the conclusion of an international treaty on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

It is a matter of concern for all delegations present here that no progress has been possible on this item since its introduction as a separate item on the CD's agenda in accordance with General Assembly resolution 38/183 G. During these years the arms race has accelerated, leading to the expansion and introduction of still more lethal warheads into the nuclear weapon stockpiles.

The United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly requested the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on this subject. During the 1988 Assembly session there were three resolutions on this subject, which were adopted with overwhelming majorities. Two of these resolutions, 43/76 E on a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and 43/78 F on prevention of nuclear war, were introduced by members of the Group of 21.

I would like to recall here the results of recent atmospheric and biological studies which indicate that in addition to blast, heat and radiation, a nuclear war, even on a limited scale would trigger an arctic nuclear winter, freezing the Earth into a darkened frozen planet. The conclusions of the studies have already been compiled in a report by the Secretary-General. In view of the irreversible consequences, it is clear that conventional wars cannot, under any circumstances, be equated with nuclear war since nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. In view of this unique destructive power, invoking the Charter to justify the use of nuclear weapons in the exercise of the right of self-defence against conventional armed attack is neither legitimate nor justifiable. We remain convinced that the shortest way to remove the danger of nuclear war lies in the elimination of nuclear weapons, and that pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited. We have welcomed the declaration by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in November 1985 that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", as also its reconfirmation in the joint statements issued subsequently. Now is the time to translate this will into a binding commitment.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

In deference to the position of the other delegations, the Group of 21 has put forward, in CD/515/Rev.5 dated 27 July 1989, a non-negotiating mandate that will permit thorough consideration of all aspects - legal, political, technical, military - of all the proposals before the Conference. We believe that such consideration will not only contribute to better understanding of the subject but also pave the way for negotiations for an agreement on prevention of nuclear war. Such an objective cannot be achieved only through discussions in the plenary or informal meetings. We are disappointed, therefore, that despite the urgency accorded to this subject and the flexibility displayed by the Group of 21, the CD is not able to discharge its own mandate, which is reflected in paragraph 120 of the Final Document of SSOD-I. We would like to hope that the importance of the matter will lead to a rethinking on the part of those who have expressed reservations on the mandate proposed by the Group of 21.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Sharma of India for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): Mr. President, may I take this opportunity to extend to you the felicitations of my delegation on your accession to the presidency of the Conference for the month of August? We are confident that your well-known diplomatic skills and long experience will help you to give the Conference the necessary direction and momentum to do its work in the concluding phase for this year. I would also like to express our gratitude to your predecessors, Ambassadors García Robles of Mexico and Bayart of Mongolia, for their excellent work as presidents of the Conference during the months of June and July respectively. I would also like to express a heartfelt welcome to Ambassador Rasaputram of Sri Lanka and offer him the co-operation of my delegation.

On behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries I would like to make the following statement in connection with document CD/515/Rev.5, submitted by the Group of 21 for decision by the Conference.

First, socialist countries continue to attach great importance to item 3 of the Conference's agenda - "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". In its appeal to NATO member States adopted in Sofia on 30 March 1988, the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty stated:

"There is a growing conviction throughout the world that nuclear war should never be unleashed and that there can be no victors in such a war, that all wars, whether nuclear or conventional, must be prevented, that the creation of a secure peace calls for the manifestation of new political thinking, a new approach to the issues of war and peace, and presupposes the total elimination of nuclear weapons, renunciation of the concept of 'nuclear deterrence' and of a policy of the use or threat of force in relations between States."

This year's meeting of the Warsaw Treaty member States which took place in Bucharest on 7 and 8 July confirmed the position of the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries, underlining their "attachment ... to the ideal of

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

riding mankind of the threat of war by doing away with nuclear and chemical weapons and drastically reducing conventional weapons". This is the reason why socialist countries have for years now insisted that the Conference should proceed to practical work on its agenda item 3.

Second, the draft mandate contained in document CD/515/Rev.5, presented by the Group of 21, is a goal-oriented one. It provides for the establishment by the Conference of an ad hoc committee under agenda item 3. While socialist countries have been open to any procedural arrangement that would allow the Conference to commence concrete work on item 3, they still believe that the establishment of an ad hoc committee offers the best available machinery for the conduct of its activities on agenda item 3.

Third, in our submission the draft mandate is both flexible and comprehensive. It provides that the Conference should request the ad hoc committee to "consider all proposals relevant to agenda item 3", and "take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives".

Fourth, the draft mandate deals on an equal footing with all aspects of agenda item 3. It would allow the ad hoc committee to consider both the issue of prevention of nuclear war and the issue of all related matters.

It is for these reasons that socialist countries support the draft mandate proposed by the Group of 21, and we regret that it is not possible to adopt it.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Before turning to another subject, I should like to thank Ambassador Kostov for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. In accordance with the agreement reached by my predecessor with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees concerning the timetable to be followed for the adoption of the reports of the subsidiary bodies, I intend to put before the Conference for decision at our next plenary meeting the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, contained in document CD/938, which has been introduced today by the Committee's Chairman.

Today the secretariat has distributed the English version of document CD/OS/CRP.6, which contains the draft report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. We hope that the report will be available in the other languages for the meeting of the Ad hoc Committee.

If there are no other matters to be considered at this plenary meeting, I will close the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 10 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.

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# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.525  
10 August 1989

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 10 August 1989, at 10 a.m.

President:                      Mr. El Ghali Benhima                      (Morocco)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 525th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

Today the Conference continues its consideration of item 8 of its agenda, entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative who so wishes may raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference.

As I announced at our last plenary meeting, I intend to put before the Conference today for adoption, once we have reached the end of the list of speakers, the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, which is contained in document CD/938.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Austria, the Netherlands, Algeria, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China. I now give the floor to the representative of Austria, Ambassador Ceska.

Mr. CESKA (Austria): It is not just a matter of polite routine, Mr. President, that leads me to express to you my sincere and personal pleasure at seeing you presiding over this Conference. Traditional relationships of friendship between our two countries as well as the long-standing interest of Morocco in matters of disarmament are, I believe, excellent reasons for my considering it a privilege to take the floor under your presidency.

The need to achieve results through the negotiations which take place within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament proves to be ever more pressing as time goes by. The long-expected breakthrough towards a global convention on a chemical weapons ban still seems beyond reach. We therefore share some of the feelings of disappointment emphasized by those who have rather soberly analysed this year's spring session of the Conference. After all, 17 years have elapsed since the last multilateral convention in the field of arms control and disarmament, namely, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, was adopted in this forum.

And yet, had I made this statement two months earlier, I would have been even more pessimistic about the prospects of significant progress in the field of chemical weapons. Today as we approach the end of this year's summer session, some modest hopes seem justified in this respect. Positive developments, among them progress in bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR on the technicalities of verification, are to be noted. It is at present not easy to assess the importance of these bilateral understandings for a future multilateral convention. But though immobility appeared, as so often before, to be this Conference's fate, some movement towards concrete results can now be discerned.

Many unresolved questions, both of a technical as well as a political nature, will require renewed efforts and strong determination, particularly on the part of the main actors in the field of chemical weapons, in order to finally achieve a meaningful global convention. But, with all necessary



(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

caution - for we have been disappointed several times in the past - we actually believe that hope might have a real chance. In particular, we are satisfied with the preliminary results achieved by the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which has visibly stepped up the intensity of its work under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Morel of France. In this context, we would like to stress the importance of, and express our gratitude for, his efforts in convening informal meetings with non-member delegations. These meetings provide such delegations with a good opportunity to exchange views in a direct dialogue with the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. Moreover, they should be further encouraged to voice their interest and thereby contribute to the future convention. At the same time, these meetings constitute a useful step on the way to the indispensable universality of the future convention.

In this connection I also wish to underline the remarkable efforts undertaken by Finland in providing the Conference with expertise and particularly valuable technical input, as proven once more by the interesting presentation of this week. It is a source of satisfaction for us to see how a non-member of the Conference can contribute seriously and decisively to the progress of its work, and we welcome the establishment of the Technical Group on Instrumentation under Finnish guidance. Austria will endeavour to ensure adequate participation by experts in the work of this Group.

We have taken due note of the finalization of the deliberations on a special annex on confidentiality, and see therein a positive signal for expecting similar results in other areas dealt with by the different working groups. Likewise, we welcome progress achieved in the working group dealing with technical questions. In continuing its work the Ad hoc Committee will increasingly have to concentrate on the essential elements of a future convention and to continue streamlining the present version of the "rolling text".

Let me now state some preliminary views on the ongoing discussions on challenge inspection, which we follow with great interest. In our understanding, the definition of the mandate, the conduct of the challenge inspection and the evaluation of its outcome have to remain in the hands of a future international organization. We do see, however, a need to provide for a precisely defined role on the part of the requesting State in its capacity as initiator of an inspection. The requesting State should have its views adequately reflected and taken into account whenever the mandate of an inspection is to be changed, or in the case of any ambiguous conclusions resulting from such an inspection.

With regard to the concept of providing information necessary for the inspection at two different stages, we doubt whether such a procedure is likely to add substantial benefits to the foreseen modalities. The element of surprise, which is the aim of the two-stage procedure, would seem diminished by a factual announcement of any such challenge inspection. Any violator of the convention could, from that moment on and before the actual inspection, attempt to remove evidence. Likewise, the still foreseen possibility of delaying the actual on-site inspection procedure for another 24 hours could well offer additional time for corrective measures. Therefore, such a two-step challenge inspection procedure provides very few advantages - if any at all.

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

In the context of the further elaboration of inspection procedures, I have pleasure in informing you that Austria conducted a national trial inspection on 8 and 9 August 1989. An initial visit took place on 13 July. A preliminary report will be submitted to the Conference before the end of the summer session. Let me just state that, thanks to the co-operative attitude shown by the chemical industry and the enterprise representatives, some quite interesting findings were reached.

Turning to the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons scheduled to take place in Canberra from 18 to 22 September this year, I wish to underline that my Government welcomes the Australian initiative to host such a conference and will participate therein. This will be an opportunity for an exchange of views between representatives of Governments and chemical industry. Such a dialogue is indispensable, since co-operation by the chemical industry in the implementation of a future global convention will be essential. The chemical industry must at the same time realize that it is in its own interest to assume a fair share of responsibility within the framework of an overall ban on these weapons. It is imperative for the chemical industry to be made aware of its responsibility in this field, and we thus view the convening of the Canberra Conference as most timely.

At the same time, there must not be any misunderstanding about the roles to be played in the preparation of the global convention. The main responsibility in this respect lies with those countries which possess chemical weapons or the industrial structure and know-how to produce them. Chemical enterprises as well as industrial companies will hopefully be partners in this process. As stated, their role in the implementation, national surveillance and enforcement of a convention, once adopted, is vital to the functioning of such a régime. This involvement of the chemical industry calls for an ongoing and constant dialogue between Governments and industry, yet this role will be determined by international treaty obligations - obligations which can only be undertaken by States. Therefore, in line with international law governing the conclusion of international agreements, only Governments can and shall negotiate a convention.

I take this opportunity to inform you that Austria has - within the framework of the Australia Group - joined in the efforts of other States in controlling its exports of certain chemical substances which can play a role in the production of chemical weapons. We are well aware, however, that this initiative is but an interim measure which would be abandoned once a global convention banning all chemical weapons has been concluded.

The twentieth anniversary of the day when man first set foot on the Moon reminds us dramatically of the enormous technical evolution that has taken place in this century. As in all spheres of human activity, we are not only faced with the positive outcome of such endeavours, but also with their adverse effects. I wish to take the opportunity offered by this anniversary to underline Austria's interest in the purely peaceful use of outer space, an interest reflected, inter alia, in our country's chairmanship for many years of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The prevention of an arms race in outer space is therefore one of our major concerns in the field of arms control and disarmament.

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

As far as the Conference on Disarmament is concerned, we do see considerable importance in scientific presentations within the outer space Committee, but we regret that no substantial progress has resulted so far. It seems necessary that particular issues in which progress could be achieved, should be identified and duly considered. We neither share the opinion of those who affirm the adequacy of the existing legal régime governing outer space, nor do we believe that it must be regarded as insufficient. Rather, we are of the opinion that the legal régime governing outer space can and should be reinforced so as to render it flexible yet at the same time strict enough to prevent undue military spin-offs now and in the future.

A particular area for further work concerns the elaboration of definitions for such concepts as space activities, space objects, ground activities having a direct impact on outer space and, in particular, space weapons. In this regard, we must agree on defining such military activities in space as are instrumental in furthering confidence-building measures designed to enhance international security, as well as those activities which do not correspond to this overall objective. Among the latter, space systems which endanger international security, even if they appear to be within the framework of existing international law and regulations, should clearly be banned under the future convention.

The 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament has not brought all the dynamic progress which we anticipated at the beginning of the spring session. Nevertheless, we are confident that the required momentum will be regained in due time as East-West relations continue to improve and regional conflicts increasingly approach settlement. In this regard, we wish to refer specifically to the favourable example presented by the first rounds of the conventional arms reduction talks and the talks on confidence-building and security-building measures in Europe taking place in Vienna. The advances made in these negotiations are testimony to the fact that, given the good will of all participants, major progress can be achieved in a remarkably short time-frame even on highly sensitive issues.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Austria for his statement, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador van Schaik.

Mr. van SCHAIK (Netherlands): Let me start by saying how pleased I am to see you in the Chair, Mr. President. Your abilities are well known, the relations between our two countries are excellent and relations between our two delegations have always been close. I trust they will remain close, even after being separated physically by the arrival of the delegation of Myanmar on my right side, whom we, of course, welcome. We thank Ambassador Bayart and the delegation of Mongolia very much for the excellent way they guided our work last month. We also greet the new Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rasaputram, and wish him well.

This year the negotiations on chemical weapons started on a new footing. The Paris Conference boosted confidence. Many countries expressed their interest by participating in the work, bringing the total number of participating countries, I believe, to 66. The able Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Pierre Morel, gave impetus

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

to the work by introducing a stiff time schedule, by organizing informal consultations and in many other ways. The Conference indeed owes a lot to Pierre Morel for reinvigorating the negotiating process.

It is perhaps too early to take stock of progress made. We find ourselves in the middle of a negotiating process, the outcome of which is partly uncertain. But it is clear that important work has been done and that we are moving forward. However, we cannot deny that some major outstanding issues have not been resolved and that we have not yet reached the "point of no return".

Let me first mention some of the achievements. On important details we have made progress, and on some substantial issues the road has been paved for later success. The structure of the convention has improved, consisting now of a shorter main body with core provisions and separate annexes with detailed specifications. Protocols on confidentiality and inspection procedures have been worked out. A new annex on chemicals covers all questions related to chemical agents under international monitoring. We hope progress will be made by consolidating the text and inserting all results in appendix I or Appendix II of the "rolling text", for further consideration during the inter-sessionals.

National trial inspections, carried out on a broad basis, have deepened our insight into the complexities and pitfalls of the inspection régime and have, at the same time, strengthened confidence that all of this will in the end be feasible. A useful special working group on instrumentation has been set up under Ms. Marjatta Rautio of Finland; a non-member of the CD that has done outstanding work on developing the technical tools for the future inspectorate.

We also draw courage from the successful outcome of the eleventh round of bilateral consultations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and we look forward to more detailed information on the results. We welcome the fact that this month the next round of these consultations will take place. We have noted that in that context the Soviet Union offered on-the-spot inspection of existing stocks and facilities before the initialling of the convention, be it supposedly under a certain time constraint. We look forward to more information from the two delegations on these issues too. Indeed, they should not hide their light under a bushel.

In spite of such commendable achievements, we have not yet witnessed breakthroughs on remaining major issues. It sometimes appears to us that inspiration is still lacking to tackle the formidable hurdles that lie on the road towards definite success.

Of course, we should not become impatient. In particular for those who have been associated with the negotiations for a long time - in my delegation one has participated for 20 years - it is sometimes difficult to accept the slow pace at which we proceed. But what is more important, the momentum in the negotiations should not be lost. Therefore, these weeks are crucial, not only for the overall assessment of progress made, but also for the perspectives of our work when it continues in the inter-sessional period.

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"Momentum" is a notion that seems to evaporate on close inspection. The dynamics of these negotiations are complex. The ever greater risk of proliferation is at the same time an incentive and an increasingly formidable obstacle to successful completion of these negotiations. We believe that the time has come to strengthen the momentum in the CD negotiations. Next year we must really cut the knots in all major outstanding issues.

What we need is a consensus in which all or practically all relevant countries participate. A precondition for achieving such broad consensus is that chemical weapons must not, like a computer virus, spread all over the world. A definite halt to proliferation is only possible if there is at least a credible perspective of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable, global ban. Lingering doubts on whether or not such a ban is in the end politically and practically feasible may encourage threshold countries to "go chemical". The fact that these horrible weapons have recently been used, that the taboo was broken, may indeed lower the threshold ominously, that is of course if countries do not heed the Paris appeal and shy away from the ban.

It has been said before: the acquisition of chemical weapons is not a justifiable response to the possession or acquisition of nuclear or conventional weapons by other States. Chemical weapons do not provide reliable deterrence in a regional conflict situation. As Minister of State William Waldegrave of the United Kingdom said in his speech on 15 June, chemical weapons are likely to have a destabilizing effect on the local balance of power. An effectively verifiable ban is a matter of first priority, not only for obvious humanitarian reasons, but also because the world, as well as any subregion within it, will be safer without the destabilizing impact of these weapons.

It is against this background that we attach the greatest importance to full and effective participation in these negotiations by all countries. It would be a grave mistake if, contrary to the consensus conclusions of the Paris Conference, where all countries were invited to join the work, some countries were not admitted to the Conference.

Full participation in the negotiations means also that all delegations speak up. It is, for instance, important that all countries make clear whether or not chemical weapons are produced on their territory, whether chemical weapons belong to their weapons arsenals, or whether for other reasons chemical weapons are stocked on their territory.

I believe that the moment has also come for each and every delegation to take a position on important issues such as challenge inspections. Of course, it is understood that definite commitments can only be made when all pieces of the jigsaw puzzle have been put in place. But that is, in our view, not a reason to refrain from agreeing on a provisional basis on the main elements of a challenge inspection régime.

This leads me to ask two related questions. First: should we not, after important work still to be done on structure and details in the inter-sessional period, next year focus on resolving the major outstanding issues? And second: can we this year give expression to our consent more

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clearly on issues upon which we do appear to agree? Or, as Italian Ambassador Aldo Pugliese said in his speech of 20 July, should we not seek an approach "aimed at disposing of the solution of the most important issues in the shortest possible time while setting temporarily aside the cases of less vital character"?

In this context, we strongly endorse the efforts of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee to incorporate in appendix I of the "rolling text" the essentials of the challenge inspection régime. We also hope that the essentials of an ad hoc verification régime can soon be developed. It is, as Ambassador Bogumil Sujka of Poland, said in his statement of 25 July, the overall pattern of the verification régime that, most of all, should be consolidated.

But there is also the question how agreement should be nailed down. On the basis of the text adopted in February this year, we have agreed that the "rolling text", and in particular appendix I, may be used for further negotiations, but not more. We believe that the Conference could take one further step and accept a recommendation that appendix I should be adopted as a design acceptable to members and "as a basis for further negotiations on the convention".

In spite of progress made these last months, the verification régime remains the main stumbling-block and, in that context, the proposed challenge inspection régime constitutes the major challenge with which we are faced. It is important for the main elements of a challenge inspection régime to find their proper place in the "rolling text", before we adjourn in the last days of this month. Main elements are, in our view: the right to request a challenge inspection, "anywhere, at any time", in order to dispel doubts about compliance; the challenge inspection should be mandatory and the country to which the request is addressed should be under the obligation (and therewith have the right) to demonstrate compliance; access to the site should be granted at very short notice; the report of the international inspection team should be considered in an appropriate way by the Executive Council. These are, in our view, the major characteristics of challenge inspections, which, together with routine inspections under article VI, form the backbone of "strict and effective international control".

In addition, attention must be paid to ambiguous situations, not covered under the present article VI, which would not necessarily require a high-profile challenge inspection. We support in principle suggestions made for other types of inspection, ad hoc and at short notice, apart from the procedures to clarify ambiguous events that are at present foreseen under article IX, part 1.

Permit me for a moment to touch upon the results of the national trial inspections in the Netherlands, on which I made a brief introductory statement on 27 June this year. The trial inspections conducted in the Netherlands demonstrated not only that specific chemical substances cause a risk, but also that certain facilities, with or without modification, are capable of producing chemical weapons. Under the present régime of article VI these facilities do not have to be declared. We would be in favour of extending the scope of article VI so as to cover facilities that, due to the nature of the

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equipment, are particularly suitable for the production of relevant very toxic chemicals. We also think that the routine inspection régime should permit inspectors to carry out checks in other sections of the plant visited, in particular to ensure that the declared chemicals are not being used for the production of chemical warfare agents in those sections of the plant that are not the primary target of the inspection.

This year the Committee also paid attention to the question of sanctions, or punitive measures, where it is demonstrated that a State party has not fulfilled its obligations under the convention. It is clear that the prospect of being branded as a violator will in itself provide a deterrence. But, as recent history has shown, resolutions to that effect, such as those adopted by the Security Council, may not be sufficient. Therefore, deterrence should be strengthened by creating a credible risk that in such situations clear language will be spoken and punitive measures indeed taken. Such punitive measures may be the outcome of a decision by the Executive Council. In particular, in the case of very serious violations of the convention, specific measures must be taken, including the suspension of all rights of membership and export control measures.

However, we should frankly face the fact that a foolproof guarantee that the deterrence will be credible enough cannot be given, nor that the necessary punitive measures will follow once the ban has been violated. A summing up in the convention of possible types of action to be considered will be of limited value, as a decision by the Executive Council will at any rate be required. Therefore, the option should remain open that individual countries may take punitive actions, in case of serious violations of the main obligations.

A few words on the future Organization. We consider a discussion on the major outlines of the Organization, on some of its critical features, useful, indeed indispensable. But we believe it would be unwise to try to settle details that clearly fall within the competence of the Preparatory Committee and of the organs to be established under the convention. Generally speaking, some rules have to be worked out now in order to ensure the proper and effective functioning of the convention, but many details are better left for later. Otherwise, we may not see the wood for the trees, get unnecessarily entangled in bureaucratic brushwood and set in stone patterns that ought to be adaptable to unforeseen situations.

One of the issues that needs to be clarified concerns the character and scope of the tasks of the secretariat, both in the phase before the entry into force of the convention and immediately thereafter. This applies to inspectors as well, most of whom must be trained in advance. We should also assess the order of magnitude of the financial consequences of the future international machinery.

We are faced with the unique problem that conditions should be such as to permit the Organization to begin working in full swing right from the start. In the interim phase between the signature and the entry into force of the convention, a provisional core secretariat must be set up. We suggest that directly after the entry into force of the convention, inspection should focus on chemical weapons stocks and facilities rather than on the civilian industry.

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It is clear that, as long as countries have not ratified and the convention has not entered into force, national constitutions may not always permit governments to make financial commitments related to the implementation of the convention. There are certain precedents for the pre-financing of international organizations in statu nascendi, but not on the scale required in this case. We cannot, for instance, expect the United Nations to pre-finance a significant share of the funds needed, which in total would amount to tens of millions of dollars, if not more. We may therefore have to consider the option of a special interim financial agreement between countries willing to participate, with fewer hurdles to ratification at the national level.

Other crucial issues in relation to the Organization to be addressed concern the management of financial and human resources and salaries and allowances for qualified personnel. It should be kept in mind that the annual budget of the Organization may reach hundreds of millions of dollars. Therefore, proper management of resources, a vigorous fight against undue bureaucratization and an excellent personnel policy are prime requirements. In view of the high calibre of part of the technical staff to be recruited, we may also wish to consider what sort of remuneration system is appropriate.

I now turn to radiological weapons, a subject that recently has been out of the limelight, but to which my Government continues to attach importance and in which my delegation has been actively involved this year. It concerns in the first place what may be called a pre-emptive strike against radiological weapons proper; pre-emptive because these weapons do not yet actually exist. In our view it also concerns the prohibition of an existing risk, that of an attack on nuclear facilities that contain large amounts of radioactive materials. It is clear that the release of radioactivity caused by such an attack would be a form of indiscriminate warfare, possibly leading to loss of human lives on a massive scale and to the making of large areas uninhabitable for a long period.

The difficulties - conceptual and otherwise - that for years have prevented us from making more progress are well known. They are related, inter alia, to the question of the link between the two themes, the competence of the CD and the question of whether present international law does not represent a sufficient basis to cope with the issues. My Government continues to believe that international legal instruments are required in order to deal adequately with these issues. We also believe that the risks, even if limited, are of such a serious nature that we should make an extra effort to resolve these differences. Moreover, if the risk of "traditional" radiological warfare is considered remote by some because specific radiological weapons do not exist, it may be pointed out that radiological warfare by other means is not inconceivable. And if others believe the risk of attacks on nuclear installations is covered by existing humanitarian law, they may be reminded of the common wisdom in armaments control: what may have been adequate a decade ago may just not be good enough today.



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Well-established principles of international humanitarian law prohibit this type of warfare. Those principles have found expression in several international instruments, such as the additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions. These instruments are in our view a source of inspiration, not an obstacle to working out a more effective agreement.

Some countries favour a prohibition of attacks on all types and parts of nuclear installations. My delegation believes that if that course were followed we would skate on thin ice. Why, in that case, not prohibit attacks on any industrial complex? Where would the line be drawn?

We wish to focus on attacks that are disastrous for the civilian population, may make large areas uninhabitable, are related to indiscriminate warfare and cause mass destruction. It is attacks on those installations, or part of them, and with those possible consequences, that, although prohibited in principle, need to be treated in an operational agreement to ensure the implementation of existing humanitarian law.

This year, the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons has worked out a set of elements setting out different positions that have been expressed. The document clearly reflects major differences in the conceptual approaches of individual delegations. We hope that the document will enable countries to reflect thoroughly on their own positions. We also hope that next year delegations will demonstrate a greater sense of reality, allowing for bridging present differences. In short, next year, after a long period of preparatory work, let us make clear choices and agree on a text that need neither be long, nor too complicated to be settled in a reasonably brief period. In this way the CD would make a modest but certainly not insignificant step forward.

A few words on agenda item 1, a comprehensive nuclear test ban. A few words only, not because the issue is unimportant, but because I did not wish to repeat myself. For years we have found ourselves deadlocked on the issue of the establishment of an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. Ambassador Yamada of Japan has made great efforts to find a solution on the basis of the "Vejvoda mandate". We hope Ambassador Yamada's endeavours will be successful, and we look forward to the moment when the ad hoc committee, with a proper mandate, starts its work again. A good start in the ad hoc committee would certainly help to set a favourable climate for the NPT review conference in 1990.

Of course, the work of the ad hoc committee will be difficult, and results cannot be achieved quickly. The substance is complex in a technical sense and also - even more so - because of its strategic implications. It would seem more fruitful if an ad hoc committee concentrated on practical aspects related to test ban issues. Part of that work would be based on the excellent reports and practical experiments organized by the Group of Seismic Experts, so ably chaired by Dr. Dahlman of Sweden and so well assisted by another active non-member of the CD, Norway. Indeed, the Group may also draw profit from the work of the ad hoc committee, which, directly or indirectly, could give clearer guidance for the future work of the experts. Another major technical input could be provided by the Soviet Union and the United States, once they are in a position to present to the CD the results to date of their bilateral talks on testing issues.

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I would finally like to turn to an issue which in Conference jargon has acquired the title of "effective and improved functioning of the Conference on Disarmament". Several speakers have expressed the wish that in one way or another the discussion on this topic should be resumed. The two reports submitted by the Group of Seven so ably chaired by Ambassador Fan, a group of which I had the honour to be a member, might be a starting-point.

My delegation believes that a selective approach to this subject would be appropriate. Many of the issues addressed by the Group of Seven in fact concealed controversies with a political overtone. You cannot resolve such problems just by disguising them as organizational or procedural topics. For the resolution of differences with a political background, procedural short-cuts, such as the automatic establishment of committees for each item on the agenda, do not provide a way out.

We therefore wish to suggest that the CD should focus on a few issues that seem to draw broader interest. These should be identified during the President's consultations with group representatives and, perhaps, also in a new series of informal discussions in the Conference itself. My delegation believes that three issues in particular deserve our attention. They concern the agenda of the Conference, the allocation of time spent on different types of activities and the spreading of the sessions of the Conference over the year.

With respect to the agenda of the Conference, we propose that a certain streamlining be considered. In recent years we did not wish to touch on the agenda for fear of losing time and still ending up with an unchanged agenda. Perhaps the situation is no different now. But we believe that this forum would show itself to be lacking in vitality if, at a time of fundamental breakthroughs in the world of disarmament as a whole, we could not even discuss an agenda that, apart from item 5, has not changed for more than 10 years.

In the weeks to come delegations may wish to express ideas on possible adjustments on the agenda. The issue could also be addressed during the usual consultations organized by Secretary-General Komatina in New York this autumn. One of the more modest changes could be a shortening of the list of "nuclear" agenda items, on which, as we all know, very little progress has been made up to now. We also wonder whether, on the basis of the outcome of this month's discussions on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, we may wish to decide on the follow-up to this exercise, and perhaps also on a suspension of the present type of detailed discussions for a certain period.

The second topic, concerning the allocation of time, is a matter that is also related to the scarce budgetary resources for the CD. Do we, indeed, make optimum use of our time? We assume that next year at least as many hours as this year, and probably more, will have to be spent on chemical weapons. We expect that, in the final phase of the negotiations on chemical weapons, ambassadors may wish to have an opportunity, more than at present, to participate in person in negotiations, for instance in the Ad hoc Committee. Moreover, in particular for smaller delegations, it appears increasingly difficult to participate in all the work of the CD.

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It is against the background of such considerations that we wonder whether we need to meet twice a week throughout the entire period in which the CD is in session. My delegation would consider it acceptable to meet only once a week in some months, which would give us more time to spend on concrete work at the committee level and elsewhere. This might, at the same time, make some of us more resistant in the plenaries to the temptation of becoming repetitive in our eloquence.

The third question we would like the CD to explore concerns the spreading of the sessions over the year, a subject I also touched upon on 31 March 1988. In various informal discussions with colleagues we have noted that there is a rather widespread interest in the question of a rescheduling of the 24 working weeks over the year. Different delegations have different motivations for seeking another time schedule than the present one, and each, in fact, seems to have his or her own preference. On the other hand, arguments against any drastic changes leading to frequent breaks in the sessions are also advanced, for instance, in relation to travel costs.

Briefly, the arguments in favour of a change in the duration and spread of the sessions seem to be the following. Firstly, it is more effective to spread the work more evenly over the year. It is difficult to process and respond to all the documents that pile up during one session of 12 weeks. If sessions are shorter, there is time in the interval for preparing positions, both in capitals and within delegations. The time that may be lost at the beginning of each session to "get up steam" would be shorter than the time gained by better preparing the sessions. Secondly, about 30 of the heads of delegations to the Conference have other obligations outside the CD, arising from their functions as permanent representatives or otherwise. Therefore, an important majority will continue to have an interest in a schedule that permits them, at least in some periods, to devote more time to other meetings going on in the Palais. Thirdly, there are the summer holidays, in particular for those of us who have children at school. Powerful as the CD may be, we cannot change the holiday schedules of schools. Should it not be for us, therefore, to consider adjusting our programme to allow for a free period in the summer?

These are, I think, the most important reasons why my delegation would wish the CD to reconsider its time schedule. Let me add that, according to the information we have received from the secretariat, a change in the time schedule could, also be effective from the secretariat's viewpoint, to the extent that the CD may use less of the peak periods for the Palais (e.g. March, June and July) and more of the periods in which there are fewer meetings going on, such as December and January. The advantages, though difficult to measure in terms of budgetary benefits, would probably compensate for extra travel costs of temporary personnel required if more than two sessions were held.

On the other hand, we are aware of the problems posed by extra travel costs for those few delegations that have no permanent staff here in Geneva. In view of such drawbacks, interruptions should not be frequent. In previous statements we have argued in favour of a spread of the Conference sessions over five periods. This seems on reflection to be too many, and we therefore suggest looking at a time schedule with three sessions between January and

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September. In addition, we may wish to explore the merits of a brief fourth session, also for organizational purposes, which would actually be the first one after the end of the First Committee in November/December. An alternative would be to use the fourth period for inter-sessional work, on chemical weapons for example, as has been the practice over the last few years.

Of course, different variants of such a model are possible. Some of these options have been summarized in a table which I have had circulated together with this statement. We will not go into details on every option. An assessment will also depend on the feasibility and merits of changing the dates for UNDC. At first sight, my delegation has a certain preference for the first option, because it seems to combine the advantages I mentioned in an optimum way, and would also offer certain benefits to the secretariat. But we have an open mind and would appreciate it if delegations would be willing to discuss this organizational aspect of our work too.

I hope to have an opportunity to say a few more words towards the end of the session, which will also be the end of my sojourn here as Permanent Representative in Geneva. But at this stage I should already like to thank those colleagues who have addressed kind words to me in anticipation of my impending departure.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I should like to thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Ait-Chaalal.

Mr. AIT-CHAALAL (Algeria) (translated from French): Since I am speaking for the first time before your distinguished assembly, I should first like to say how touched I was by the words of welcome which were extended to me by yourself, Mr. President, and by my distinguished colleagues. Allow me in turn to express my sincere thanks to you and assure you of my keen desire to establish with each of you the best possible relations of friendship and co-operation in the service of the great ideals to which our Conference is committed.

Allow me, Mr. President and dear brother El Ghali Benhima, to extend to you my warm congratulations on your accession to the presidency. Added to my satisfaction at seeing our Conference presided over by the distinguished representative of a brother country, Morocco, to which so many human, historical and cultural links bind my country in a common destiny, is the keen pleasure of welcoming a long-standing friend whose courage and spirit I have had occasion to appreciate, and towards whom I nurture feelings of great esteem and brotherly consideration. I am convinced that thanks to your tried and tested diplomatic experience you will be able to create the atmosphere of dialogue and co-operation that is so necessary for the smooth forward march of our work, and that you will lead this Conference to fruitful results.

I should like to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Bayart, for the exemplary devotion and perfect skill he manifested in discharging his mission last month. I should also like to express a warm welcome to Ambassador Batsanov, the representative of the Soviet Union, and to Ambassador Rasaputram, the representative of Sri Lanka. I would express words

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of cordial greeting to colleagues and friends who have left us or who will be leaving us - I am thinking of Ambassadors Nazarkin, Cámpora, Rodrigo, Pugliese, Lechuga Hevia, van Schaik and Yamada, the representatives of the Soviet Union, Argentina, Sri Lanka, Italy, Cuba, the Netherlands and Japan respectively. My best wishes go to them for success in their new activities. I should also like to avail myself of this opportunity to assure our distinguished colleague, Ambassador García Robles, of our deepest sympathy and address to him our best wishes for a speedy recovery. Finally, allow me to address my sincere thanks to Ambassador Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to all his colleagues, for the remarkable way in which they ensure the smooth running of our Conference.

The past year has been marked by significant events which unquestionably constitute an important turning-point in international relations and offer grounds for renewed hope and confidence as far as détente and world peace are concerned; it was with a sense of profound relief that my country welcomed the subsiding of a number of particularly destructive and murderous regional conflicts - conflicts which Algeria has been working continuously to settle. These conflicts, which essentially affect third world countries, although apparently localized, are part and parcel of the logic of antagonism which has prevailed between the major Powers since the end of the Second World War. This is why the encouraging developments in some of these conflicts seem to us to be directly related to the positive trend in East-West relations in the past months.

But these conflicts are far from being completely and finally settled. Major stumbling-blocks still remain on the road to peace. Moreover, other conflicts offer no prospect of a solution, and some are even becoming fiercer. This is the case with the war pursued by Israel against the Palestinian people, who, through the national outburst of the intifada, have resisted murderous repression with heroism and self-sacrifice and have led an unceasing struggle for the realization of their national objectives. It is also the case for the apartheid régime, which imposes the most odious system on Earth on the people of South Africa, who are fighting at the cost of great sacrifice for their dignity and freedom. Therefore, while we should feel satisfaction at the partial progress recorded, we should be wary of excessive optimism because it is true that nothing is irreversibly settled, especially as considerable difficulties have yet to be overcome. This means that the international community will have to make sustained efforts to help to reduce the large number of differences which remain, so as to expedite the devising of fair and lasting solutions and re-establish international peace and security.

To speak of peace is obviously and primarily to speak of bringing an end to war which ravages entire regions. This in our view is the priority of priorities, because what is at stake is the fate of millions of human beings who suffer daily from the torments and cruelties of war. In this context we feel that the role of the United Nations is absolutely essential, and in this connection we welcome with respect and gratitude Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar's unstinting efforts for peace.

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International détente was given a major boost as a result of the conclusion of the INF Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This event was cause for hope and satisfaction throughout the world. Although it is of limited scope, the Treaty is of considerable significance to the extent that it is perceived as the expression of a new state of mind which appears to inspire the two major nuclear Powers, and as the beginning of a new dynamic which, if it is developed and broadened, may lead to other reductions in nuclear weapons, particularly strategic weapons, and thus open up the way to true comprehensive disarmament in which the other nuclear Powers could join. The participation and the commitment of the international community are essential so as to give to this movement a vigour and momentum which can lead it to even more substantial and significant results. This means that however decisive they may be in bringing about an international climate conducive to the search for greater collective security, the bilateral negotiations cannot push the multilateral negotiations to the sidelines, still less replace them. The United Nations and its subsidiary bodies - the Conference on Disarmament is one of the most important of these - cannot be mere recording rooms with a role reduced to that of rubber-stamping agreements which were concluded without their participation. If the States with nuclear weapons, and more especially the two super-Powers, obviously have a special responsibility and a crucial role to play in the achievement of the work of disarmament, this does not give them a monopoly over the settlement of problems relating to world security, problems which of course involve their own destinies but also have to do with the existence of all the peoples on this planet. For if there is a domain in which the common destiny of the human race and its civilization really asserts itself, it is precisely in the face of the terrifying threat of nuclear apocalypse, which by a process of levelling through total destruction would destroy all peoples indiscriminately, whether or not they were involved in the conflicts which gave rise to such a terrible world-wide catastrophe. Thus it was certainly not by chance that the United Nations, at the 1978 special session devoted to disarmament, decided to categorize nuclear disarmament as the priority of priorities, as is rightly indicated by the fact that nuclear issues are given pride of place in the "decatalogue" of our Conference.

Against this background one can only note with perplexity and regret today the absence within our Conference of genuine negotiations on the nuclear issues, which in my delegation's view continue to be of absolute priority and cardinal importance. It is more than 30 years since the United Nations recognized that stopping and reversing the arms race required that we should first of all put an end to the pursuit of the improvement of nuclear weapons by pointing to a total ban on nuclear weapon tests as an essential way of slowing down their development in qualitative terms, preventing the emergence of a new generation of nuclear weapons and preventing their vertical and horizontal proliferation. All these appeals and exhortations still remain pious hopes in the face of continuing nuclear tests and the inability of our Conference to begin structured negotiations in this regard for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

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In its recent resolution 43/63 A of 7 December 1988, the General Assembly reiterated its concern that nuclear weapon testing continues unrestrained. It also affirmed its conviction that a treaty prohibiting all nuclear test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority. To this end it urges all of us here, as members of the Conference, to embark on the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear tests, first through the establishment of an ad hoc committee on this point and secondly by giving such a committee an appropriate negotiating mandate. In this connection, my delegation remains convinced that the Conference is in a position to overcome the differences over the problematic mandate to be given to its subsidiary body, provided that all participants evince good will and give primacy to collective security over considerations of individual interest and power.

The draft mandate submitted last year by the Group of 21 in document CD/829 essentially draws inspiration from this concern and, because of its flexibility, offers a constructive basis for work under item 1. My delegation is also convinced of the urgent need for our Conference to resolutely tackle items 2 and 3 on our agenda, concerning, on the one hand, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and on the other "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". In its statements on 2 and 8 August the Group of 21 clearly expounded the moral, political and practical grounds which have led it once again to put forward its mandates for ad hoc committees on items 2 and 3 of our agenda. We very much regret the fact that a group within our Conference saw fit to oppose the establishment of subsidiary organs under these two items on the grounds that they were not sufficiently ready for negotiations, considering that these items could only be studied satisfactorily in the broader context of the prevention of war in general. It is inconceivable that the threat posed by conventional weapons for a given region of the world should be placed on an equal footing with that posed by nuclear weapons for mankind as a whole. Such an approach would place very serious obstacles before our Conference in the discharge of its mission.

I should now like to refer rapidly to the question of the ban on chemical weapons. Negotiations within our Conference on this issue are a source of relative satisfaction in view of the frustrations which we may well experience when we review the less than encouraging state of efforts on other items on the agenda of our Conference. We welcome all initiatives and contributions which help to move us more swiftly forward to the conclusion of a convention whose aim is to ban completely and for all time the development, manufacture, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. The Paris Conference unquestionably gave fresh momentum to the chemical disarmament process. In this connection I should like to pay tribute to the French Government which organized this important international meeting and congratulate Ambassador Pierre Morel for the decisive role he is playing at the head of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

One of the main recommendations of the Paris Conference was to give new impetus to the work of our Conference by inviting its members to redouble their efforts to achieve the conclusion of a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons at the earliest date. To achieve this goal it is essential for the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee to be appropriately improved so as to reflect the relevant resolutions adopted last year by the

(Mr. Ait-Chaalal, Algeria)

General Assembly of the United Nations and also the terms of the Final Declaration of Paris. It was with these recommendations in mind, and drawing inspiration from a firm determination to put them into practice, that at the very beginning of the present session of the Conference the Group of 21 proposed - alas in vain - that the Committee's mandate should contain a reference to the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. We continue to hope that the Conference will review the possibility of improving the mandate of its Committee at the beginning of the next session.

As regards the actual work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, we would mention the merits of the thematic approach in giving a new stimulus to negotiation within our Conference. This approach has made it possible, above and beyond the identification of the political and technical difficulties inherent in the future convention, to focus efforts better so as to overcome differences on some of the most contentious issues. However, at the present state of negotiations an objective assessment of results does not prompt great optimism. Much remains to be done on fundamental issues, which are certainly benefiting from great efforts and consultations, but will still require for their solution considerable perseverance, imagination and, above all, a common will to succeed. We cherish the hope that no effort will be spared to reach a convention which is comprehensive in its content, durable in its life time, universal in scope and non-discriminatory in its application. It must on no account be reduced to a simple non-proliferation treaty or place any obstacle in the path of the development of the chemical industry, the transfer of technology or international co-operation for peaceful purposes in this domain. Meanwhile, would it not be significant if the Powers which currently possess gigantic arsenals of chemical weapons of all kinds set an example by beginning the destruction of their existing stocks, thus offering concrete proof of their determination to banish such weapons? By means of such actions they would undoubtedly make a decisive contribution to speeding up the process which should lead to the conclusion of a comprehensive and global convention banning chemical weapons for ever.

The negotiations on a chemical weapons ban are certainly of considerable importance. Today the international community is fully aware of the need to eliminate such weapons. But these negotiations, however important they may be, cannot eclipse, still less conceal, the terrible dangers which weigh upon humanity because of the existence of nuclear weapons. The trees must not be allowed to hide the forest. Whatever the prevailing circumstances and the needs of the moment, the hierarchy of priorities remains exactly the same as that established by international bodies and profoundly felt by the world community because of the extent and the seriousness of the real dangers which threaten it. The negotiations on a chemical weapons ban must be properly assessed and given their rightful place in the general and overall process of disarmament in relation to the real concerns the international community, and its aspirations for the establishment of equal security for all.

Like all the peoples in the world, the Algerian people is seriously concerned at the enormous nuclear potential accumulated throughout the world, which poses a universal threat to all mankind. What is more, as an Arab country and as an African country, we have additional reasons for concern to the extent that two countries whose warlike and aggressive machinations are well known - I am referring to Israel and South Africa - possess nuclear



(Mr. Ait-Chaalal, Algeria)

weapons of mass destruction. For decades these two countries have used force with impunity to violate international law and the right of peoples to self-determination and independence. For the purpose of perpetuating their domination, they hold the threat of nuclear terror over the peoples of the Near East and Africa. This is why we are gravely concerned at the prevailing situation within the Conference on Disarmament. By a strange paradox, our Conference seems to have agreed to abandon the fundamental purpose of disarmament policy and thus give up its main mission, which is to ward off the nuclear peril. Should we not see here one of the reasons for the disaffection of public opinion vis-à-vis our Conference, whose work passes almost unnoticed in the media and prompts only minimal interest among the mass of the people? Is this not also the reflection of a certain loss of credibility on the part of the Conference on Disarmament, which after being in existence for more than a decade now has achieved nothing worthy of note? In this case, should we not think seriously about this extremely worrying situation and analyse the causes of the paralysis affecting our Conference? Is there not an urgent need to restore to the Conference its original task, to review and improve its working methods and to give it a fresh impetus which can consolidate its authority, enhance its credibility and increase its efficiency? I venture to hope that this is the deep-seated feeling shared by the membership of our Conference as a whole.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Today's statement by the Soviet delegation, in which we intend to touch on some aspects of the problem of a chemical weapons ban, will be fairly brief. The point is that recently the mass media have been putting out a number of sensational reports on the development of the Soviet-American dialogue in this field. Specifically, these reports relate to the new Soviet initiatives put forward at the meeting between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, E.A. Shevardnadze, and the United States Secretary of State, J. Baker, in Paris on 29 July this year. While the reports on the whole present an objective picture of the thrust of the Soviet proposals, they contained a number of inaccuracies. Furthermore - and this is quite understandable - we are continuing to receive questions and requests for clarification on these points. As requested, the Soviet delegation intends to respond to these today.

First of all I wish to confirm that for the Soviet Union the early conclusion of an effectively monitored convention on the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons is a priority issue. The Soviet Union is making every effort to resolve the most difficult questions standing in the way of an early ban on chemical weapons. We are making active use of our international contacts to discuss matters relating to chemical disarmament, and are doing our utmost to promote intensification of the negotiating process in order to reach agreement expeditiously.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

The Soviet Union has responded with a great sense of responsibility to the appeal of the Paris Conference for the conclusion of the convention at the earliest date and its recommendation to all States to make a significant contribution to the negotiations. The Soviet delegation has been guided by this in the multilateral talks, and our latest proposals to the United States are aimed at achieving these goals. At the meeting between Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and Secretary of State J. Baker in Paris, a memorandum was transmitted to the American side which, on the eve of the next round of the bilateral consultations, set forth the views on joint action by the USSR and the United States to bring about the speedy conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

As is well known, the Soviet-American consultations on this subject are being held in pursuance of the agreement reached at the November 1985 summit and are intended to buttress the multilateral talks on the convention and contribute to the achievement of generally acceptable solutions at those talks. However, these consultations are not a substitute for the multilateral process and, contrary to what one might conclude from certain articles in the press, it is not their purpose to produce a final draft of the convention.

Major progress was made at the eleventh and latest round of consultations, which as you know were held in June in Geneva. It proved possible to make substantial advances on the issue of the order of destruction of chemical weapon stocks and their production facilities, and proposals were developed on challenge inspection procedures. We attach major significance to the early presentation of the results of the Soviet-American consultations, in particular on procedures for challenge verification, at the multilateral talks.

We also consider that the results of the eleventh round constitute a sound basis for further efforts, and offer grounds to hope for agreement on other matters. This is the aim of the additional proposals contained in the memorandum of 29 July 1989.

We have advocated comprehensive work on one of the most complex issues at the talks - monitoring of compliance with the convention. Recently, with the guidance of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Morel, markedly more active consideration has been given to challenge inspections, with - and this should be emphasized - solid results already achieved; the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, among others, have introduced proposals on additional verification procedures; in addition, on the initiative of the USSR a series of trial inspections have been held at the chemical plants for practical testing of procedures for the monitoring of non-production. The Soviet Union and the United States have accumulated useful experience in implementing effective monitoring measures in the context of the Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. All this provides valuable background for consideration of the entire monitoring system for the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the search for a comprehensive solution.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR).

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to openness and confidence-building in the development of the convention. In Paris we reaffirmed our proposal on the expeditious exchange of information on chemical weapon stocks and production facilities. Specifically, the Soviet Union is prepared as of now to publish information on the location of its chemical weapon production and storage facilities, and also to provide detailed information on the composition of its chemical weapon stocks, if the United States on a basis of reciprocity declares the volume of its chemical weapon stocks, as the USSR has already done, and the location and composition of all its chemical weapons. Thus both sides would publish adequate information on their chemical warfare potential in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

At the eleventh round of the bilateral consultations progress was made on a special agreement between the USSR and the United States on a two-phase exchange of data and verification of such data. In order to overcome the main obstacle to such an agreement - the time frame for verification of the accuracy of the submitted data - the Soviet Union gave its consent to on-site data verification in the framework of the future agreement immediately prior to the initialling of the convention. Unfortunately, many reports inaccurately presented this Soviet initiative. It was erroneously asserted that the Soviet Union had agreed to inspections before the signing of the convention, whereas that was our earlier posture. Now, however, it is during the period prior to the initialling of the convention that we have agreed to on-site inspection. As the mass media reported, this step, in the words of the representative of the United States, will facilitate the conclusion of work on the convention and help resolve one of the main bones of contention between the two countries. If this is so, then we can say that our proposal achieved its goal. The conduct of inspections in the framework of the bilateral exchange of data while work is still under way on the convention - that is, prior to initialling - will be a very major measure to build confidence and develop openness in the military field.

So we now stand on the eve of a new round of Soviet-American consultations on a chemical weapons ban, where the Soviet delegation intends to finalize agreement on those areas where the positions of the USSR and the United States are close. We call upon all participants in the Geneva talks on a chemical weapons convention to step up their efforts both bilaterally and multilaterally. They will find the Soviet Union a constructive partner.

Mr. FAN (China) (translated from Chinese): This summer session of the Conference on Disarmament has been proceeding under international circumstances which continue to be auspicious. In international affairs the trend of confrontation moving towards dialogue, and tension turning to relaxation, has kept up its momentum. This improvement has had positive effects on progress in the field of disarmament. During this period the United States and the Soviet Union have resumed their bilateral talks on a number of important disarmament issues, and some progress has been recorded. Importance has been attached to the Vienna negotiations on reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe, where the parties concerned have submitted a series of concrete proposals leading to a narrowing down of their differences. The early conclusion of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on a 50 per cent reduction in their strategic offensive

(Mr. Fan, China)

weapons, as well as deep cuts in conventional armed forces in Europe, will not only facilitate the lowering of the level of military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union and between East and West, and contribute to security and stability in Europe, but will also be conducive to the maintenance of world peace and security. However, it is also noted that the process of relaxation of tension has not been smooth sailing. Not only has the arms race failed to come to a halt, but a tendency has emerged for the arms race to focus on qualitative aspects and spread to outer space. The danger of war still exists. Therefore, the international community must maintain its vigilance and continue to work hard to check the arms race.

China is a developing socialist country. It steadfastly pursues an independent foreign policy of peace, and the policy of reform and opening to the outside world. Never has China demanded the acceptance by other countries of its socialist system; at the same time it has always opposed attempts by others to impose on it their ideology and concept of values. We have been working hard to establish and develop friendly relations of co-operation with all other countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. In so doing, we proceed from the fundamental interests of the Chinese people and the lofty goal of maintaining world peace. China is going all out for its socialist modernization, and for that purpose we need both a stable internal environment and a peaceful international environment over a long period of time.

Opposing the arms race and promoting the realization of disarmament have been major components of China's foreign policy. We will never join in the arms race. We stand for the comprehensive prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear, chemical, biological and space weapons. We also favour deep cuts in conventional armaments. It is our hope that the United States-Soviet bilateral disarmament negotiations will achieve concrete results at an early date, benefiting world peace and security. We also hope for the early reaching of agreement in the conventional disarmament talks in Europe. We expect progress in the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

Today, I wish to set forth the views of the Chinese delegation on a number of items on the agenda. First of all, I would like to speak on item 1, "Nuclear test ban". China understands and supports the desire of the international community for a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Such a ban is a part of the comprehensive prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and is also an important measure to halt the qualitative aspects of the nuclear arms race. Over the past few years, the divergent views of the various political groups have made it impossible for the Conference on Disarmament to agree on the mandate of an ad hoc committee. The position of the Chinese delegation is flexible vis-à-vis the various proposals submitted so far on the mandate. We hope that this Conference will accelerate the consultations in a common effort to solve this problem. If and when agreement is achieved on the mandate, enabling the Ad hoc Committee to be re-established, the Chinese delegation will participate in its work.

The Chinese delegation has always attached importance to the agenda item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". China has always stood for the comprehensive prohibition and thorough destruction of

(Mr. Fan, China)

nuclear weapons, so that mankind will be free of the threat of a nuclear war once and for all. An effective way to realize nuclear disarmament is for the two nuclear super-Powers, which possess the biggest and most modern nuclear arsenals in the world, to take the lead in halting the development, production and deployment of all kinds of nuclear weapons and drastically cutting back on, and eliminating, all kinds of nuclear weapons they have already deployed in all areas, both within and outside their national boundaries. Subsequently, an international conference on nuclear disarmament with broad participation, including all the nuclear-weapon States, should be convened to consider ways and means of securing the thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons.

The limited number of nuclear weapons in China's possession are there purely for defensive purposes. China does not favour or encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. China stands firm on the promise it made on its own initiative, that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.

In an effort to promote nuclear disarmament, the United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution 43/75 E, urged the United States and the Soviet Union, which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, "further to discharge their special responsibility for nuclear disarmament, to take the lead in halting the nuclear arms race and to negotiate in earnest with a view to reaching early agreement on the drastic reduction of their nuclear arsenals". It was also pointed out in the same resolution that "bilateral and multilateral efforts for nuclear disarmament should complement and facilitate each other". In the view of my delegation, the Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, should play its due role in nuclear disarmament.

I would now like to turn to item 4 of our agenda, "Chemical weapons". China has always stood for the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons, in order to free mankind once and for all from the threat and scourge posed by this cruel means of destruction. We attach great importance to the negotiations in the Conference aimed at the conclusion of a universal convention banning chemical weapons, and we have taken part in them seriously and constructively. It is our wish that an effective, feasible and equitable convention of a universal character should be concluded at an early date. The urgency of concluding such a convention is underscored by the fact that chemical weapons have been used time and again. The spectre of chemical warfare still haunts human society. This threat stems first and foremost from the huge arsenals of sophisticated chemical weapons possessed by a few big Powers. The development and production of the new-type binary chemical weapons arouse particular concern. The threat also stems from a trend towards CW proliferation.

The high-level international conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons held in Paris last January has provided a major political impetus to our negotiations. The Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Morel of France, and the chairmen of the five working groups, have made laudable contributions. The momentum and pace of the negotiations have been enhanced. There have been more thorough discussion and varying degrees

(Mr. Fan, China)

of progress on all the specific issues. In general, however, the negotiations have failed to produce the expected major progress or breakthrough. What is now required is a joint effort from all the negotiators to translate the political and moral commitment into the necessary flexibility for compromise.

The Chinese delegation appreciates the efforts of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee in conducting consultations on the two crucial questions of challenge inspections and the Executive Council. We also attach importance to the in-depth negotiations and consultations in the working groups relating to article VI and its annex, the annex on chemicals, the guidelines on verification, sanctions and article X on assistance.

Regarding the issue of challenge inspections, the Chinese delegation believes that the working paper produced during the consultations conducted by Mr. Ekéus, the former Ambassador of Sweden, can serve as a useful basis for future work. At the same time, we are not against trying a new way. This summer session has witnessed further explorations on the essential aspects of article IX. Challenge inspection, which is intrusive and sometimes confrontational in nature, touches upon the sovereignty and security interests of each nation. While it should be implemented speedily in order to achieve deterrence, challenge inspection must not be misused or abused for the purpose of activities irrelevant to the convention. Private business's reasonable concern for confidentiality should be taken care of, and national concern to protect military secrets must also be considered. In view of the above, it is quite natural that States have different opinions on the specific content of such inspections. It would therefore be inadvisable for the Ad hoc Committee on CW to push through to a hasty decision. What is needed is more careful study and an accommodation of the reasonable proposals of various parties with the purpose of achieving a future common position.

Challenge inspection is a device for clearing doubts on compliance. In requesting its application, the challenging State is understandably motivated by security concerns. But any problem involving compliance with the convention is at the same time a matter of common concern for all States parties. The primary function of the organization to be set up under the convention is to oversee the implementation of the convention. Obviously, in its essence challenge inspection extends far beyond the scope of bilateral relations and as such should not be regarded as a means of settling bilateral concerns. In fact, it is a multilateral exercise. Once a request is submitted by the challenging State, it is the organization that will carry out verification through its relevant subsidiary organs. And it is primarily the organization which will determine the mode of inspection to be employed. As an observer, the challenging State should not assume responsibility for supervising the inspection, nor should it ever attempt to replace the organization in such cases, though it will be consulted by the organization when the need arises. To that end, the convention should not only spell out the rights and obligations of the challenging State and the inspected State: it must also ensure a primary role for the organization so as to strike a proper balance in the relations between the three parties.

(Mr. Fan, China)

We have learned that the eleventh round of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on chemical weapons, which ended on 29 June, have scored success on challenge inspection and have resulted in a joint document. It is hoped that the document will soon be made available to our Conference to allow for deliberations among its participants. I listened with appreciation to the briefing on the United States-Soviet bilateral negotiations provided by the head of the Soviet delegation, and hope that he will provide further such briefings in the future.

The Executive Council will be a major organ of the organization. During both the spring and summer sessions, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee initiated many rounds of consultations with interested parties, leading to the emergence of several proposals on the issue. The Chinese delegation believes that an equitable balance should be maintained in the composition of the Executive Council by proceeding on the basis of geographical distribution with due regard to such factors as the capacity of the chemical industry and political realities. But to put such an idea into a formula acceptable to all is a very complicated and delicate task indeed. We for our part will carefully study the various ideas and proposals in the hope of arriving at an early solution.

At this summer session some useful preliminary explorations have been pursued with regard to the issue of sanctions. In the view of the Chinese delegation, sanctions, like the verification régime, can also act to a certain degree to deter non-compliance. With appropriate provision for sanctions in the convention, we can expect better compliance and implementation and increased confidence among States parties in its effectiveness. The discussions of this issue have revealed its complexity as regards the political and legal aspects and implementation. Although many States agree on the need for sanctions, a series of problems still remain unresolved in seeking an appropriate régime in this field. The Chinese delegation stands ready to work with all the other delegations in that endeavour.

Many delegations have voiced their concern over the arms race in outer space and have tabled a number of proposals in that field. This is inseparable from the prevailing stark reality in this area. Reports keep coming in of work by the major space Powers to develop and test various systems of space weapons. It is no secret that the present danger of an arms race in outer space comes from the major space Powers, which already have space weapons in their possession, and have continued with the research and development of these weapons. As such, they bear unshirkable special responsibility for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Their readiness to commit themselves not to develop, research, produce or deploy space weapons and to destroy all those already in their possession would surely pave the way for the conclusion of an international agreement or agreements on the complete prohibition of space weapons through multilateral negotiations.

Since its establishment by the Conference, the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has achieved some success in its extensive endeavours. Regrettably, no substantive progress has been registered. The Ad hoc Committee itself has for some time been bogged down

(Mr. Fan, China)

in an endless debate over the adequacy of the existing international legal instruments relating to outer space in preventing an arms race in that arena. The crux of the matter actually lies in whether the countries concerned possess sufficient good faith and political will to prevent such an arms race. If today there was no country possessing space weapons and carrying on the research and development of such weapons, the question of the adequacy of the existing international legal instruments in preventing an arms race in outer space would not arise. Preventing an arms race in outer space would thus be like shooting an arrow without a target. It is a fact that the danger of an arms race in outer space exists, and in a sense such an arms race has begun already. Circumstances have led to a call for the reconsideration of the relevant international instruments on outer space so as to improve them and plug any loopholes. In the past I have pointed out that although the existing legal instruments are of positive significance in restraining military activities in outer space, nevertheless, with the advance of science and technology, and in particular the application by the major Powers of state-of-the-art technology to the arms race in outer space, these legal instruments can no longer meet present-day requirements. The 1967 outer space Treaty bans only the placing of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in outer space. This treaty was drawn up some 20 years ago, when the present-day space weapons did not exist. Therefore the category of the weapons to be banned should be expanded to include all space weapons so that the call to prevent an arms race in outer space may be embodied in legal language. It goes without saying that States parties to existing international legal instruments should continue to adhere strictly to them.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is a matter in which the interests of all countries are at stake. All countries have an equal right to take part in the discussion and solution of these issues. Ambassador Bayart, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on outer space this year, has tabled document CD/905 in which he reviews progress in the Committee over the past few years and lists under different headings the views and proposals submitted by the different delegations. This is most useful for the Committee's work. The Chinese delegation believes that some of these proposals are of positive significance in the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The proposals by Venezuela, Peru and others on the revision and supplementing of the outer space Treaty, if agreeable to all, will greatly facilitate work on the drafting of legal instruments to prevent an arms race in outer space.

The German Democratic Republic, Sweden and other delegations have proposed a ban on ASAT weapons. China has all along stood for the banning of all space weapons, which naturally includes ASAT weapons. In order to facilitate consideration and negotiation of the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the banning of ASAT weapons as a first step has a certain practical significance. The concept of a multilateral verification system advanced by the Canadian delegation also warrants serious study. Highly technical matters are involved in the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We therefore endorse the idea of the formation of a group of experts to advise on technical matters. During this summer session, experts on outer space matters from the USSR, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and Canada have come and given their views on questions related to outer space. This has surely facilitated the discussions



(Mr. Fan, China)

in the Ad hoc Committee. Of course, the basic task of the Ad hoc Committee lies in the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We hope the Committee will achieve concrete success in its future endeavours.

Finally, I would like to make a brief observation on the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. The item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" has been under negotiation for many years. We now have a clearer and better understanding of each other's positions. The points of divergence and convergence have also been identified. All States, particularly the non-nuclear-weapon States, have devoted untiring efforts to tackling this problem, and a host of proposals and formulae have been tabled. Despite this, the negotiations are bogged down and there has been no breakthrough yet. This is a regrettable state of affairs. In recent years, the international situation has witnessed a favourable relaxation and the two big nuclear Powers have clearly stated that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. People have every reason to expect the nuclear-weapon States concerned to adjust their positions in the light of the contemporary situation so as to promote the negotiations on security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States.

The Chinese Government has always deemed it legitimate and just for the non-nuclear-weapon States to call for assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These countries have chosen, in different ways, to give up their right to possess nuclear weapons, and thus they pose no nuclear threat to the nuclear-weapon States. They are entitled to demand a corresponding commitment from the nuclear-weapon States in order to rid themselves of the nuclear threat. We believe that the most effective assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Pending the realization of this goal, and in order to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States of their security, the nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. China has unilaterally and unconditionally undertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. We favour the conclusion of an international instrument on refraining from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. We also agree with the idea of seeking a "common formula" which meets the demands of the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States. We welcome any constructive suggestion aimed at the realization of the above-mentioned goal. Any solution favoured by the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States will receive positive consideration by China, and the Chinese delegation will as always continue to work in co-operation with all the delegations on this item.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I have no more speakers on my list. Are there any delegations that wish to speak?

I now propose that we turn to the adoption of the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, contained in document CD/938. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I should like to inform the Conference that the secretariat has distributed today in document CD/WP.370 the draft of the technical part of the annual report of the Conference to the United Nations General Assembly. The text of the document will be available in all the official languages between tomorrow and Monday 14 August in the delegations' pigeon-holes. It is my intention to invite the Conference to hold an informal meeting on Tuesday 15 August, immediately after the plenary meeting, to begin the first reading of the technical part of the report to the General Assembly.

Tomorrow the secretariat will also distribute the English text of documents CD/WP.371, 372 and 373, concerning the substantive paragraphs on agenda items 2, 3 and 7 respectively. These working papers will also be available in the delegations' pigeon-holes. On these agenda items we shall hold informal open-ended consultations starting on Thursday 17 August, immediately after the plenary meeting to be held on that day. As for item 1 on the Conference's agenda, the substantive paragraphs will be available between Thursday 17 and Friday 18 August. I will keep you informed of the date when they will be considered.

The timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week provides for an informal meeting on Tuesday 15 August, immediately after the plenary, to consider the technical part of the draft annual report. In keeping with the practice followed by the Conference, the timetable indicates the opening meeting for the informal consultations on the substantive paragraphs relating to agenda items 2, 3 and 7. Additional meetings will be decided on by the participants themselves in the light of progress in our work.

As usual, the official document containing the timetable which the secretariat has distributed today is purely indicative and can be changed as the work of the Conference demands. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference agrees to this timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I have no other business on the agenda, and I therefore intend to close the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday 15 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 15 August 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. El Ghali Benhima (Morocco)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 526th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

First of all I would like on behalf of the Conference to welcome the new representative of Kenya, Ambassador Thomas Ariba Ogada, who is with us for the first time since he took up his duties as head of his country's delegation to the Conference. I would like to pledge to him the close co-operation of the delegation of the Kingdom of Morocco in the work of the Conference.

Today the Conference begins its consideration of the reports of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies, as well as the consideration and adoption of its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative who so wishes may raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representative of Peru, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, and the representative of the German Democratic Republic. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Mr. Calderón, who will introduce the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, contained in document CD/946, on behalf of the Committee's Chairman, Ambassador de Rivero.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish): First of all I should like to say how very pleased my delegation is at seeing you in the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament. Bearing in mind that August is a traditionally difficult month because it is the month when we conclude our work, I should like to reaffirm that you may count on our full and resolute co-operation in the discharge of your delicate task. I should also like to take this opportunity on behalf of my delegation to warmly welcome the distinguished Ambassador of Sri Lanka, Mr. Rasaputram, as well as the new Ambassador of Kenya; we wish them every success and a happy stay in Geneva. My delegation has also learnt of the forthcoming departure of the distinguished Ambassadors Yamada of Japan and van Schaik of the Netherlands, and hence I am happy to convey our best wishes to them and reiterate our great pleasure in their participation in this Conference.

I have requested the floor this morning on behalf of Ambassador Oswaldo de Rivero, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, in order to put before the Conference on Disarmament for its consideration the report of the Ad hoc Committee, which has been circulated in document CD/946. In general terms the above-mentioned report offers a brief description of the work done by the Ad hoc Committee during the current year, in keeping with the familiar guidelines. As planned, we re-established Contact Groups A and B to consider the two major issues which are before the Ad hoc Committee, namely the issue of radiological weapons in the "traditional" sense and the issue related to the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. The co-ordination of Contact Group A devolved upon Mr. Csaba Györffy of Hungary, and the co-ordination of Contact Group B on Mr. Max Gevers of the Netherlands. In addition, at its meeting on 20 February the Ad hoc Committee set itself the objective for this year of making the texts relating to the two issues clearer and more concise than those produced last year, as a way of facilitating understanding of various approaches that still exist in respect of the handling of the two issues.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

It has been thanks to the hard work and special skill of Messrs. Györffy and Gevers that I am very pleased to inform this Conference that the Ad hoc Committee succeeded in achieving what it set out to do. As you can see in annexes I and II to the report of the Ad hoc Committee, we now have shortened and clear versions of the various positions, with a smaller number of footnotes and alternatives or variants. It is true that differences of a substantive nature still remain; however, this new version offers a clearer idea of the scope for future negotiations on each of the issues involved. It is for this reason that the report contained in document CD/946 recommends that the Conference on Disarmament should re-establish the Ad hoc Committee at next year's session, with annexes I and II serving as a basis for future work.

I should like to take this opportunity to thank Messrs. Györffy and Gevers most sincerely on behalf of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee for the outstanding work they have done this year. I should also like to thank the distinguished delegations represented in the Ad hoc Committee for their extensive co-operation and active participation in our work. Similarly, I should like to extend our gratitude to the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament for its valuable help, and particularly to Mr. Michael Cassandra, the Secretary of the Ad hoc Committee, for his active and very wise contribution. These thanks are also addressed to the interpreters, translators and all those behind the scenes without whom the Ad hoc Committee would not have been able to fulfil its mandate satisfactorily.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Mr. Calderón for introducing the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons on behalf of its Chairman, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I would also like to congratulate Ambassador de Rivero and the members of the Ad hoc Committee on adopting the report before the date set down in the timetable agreed upon with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Dr. Ola Dahlman, to introduce the report of the Ad hoc Committee, which has been distributed as document CD/944.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): It is a pleasure to report on the Group's recent meeting, held from 24 July to 4 August, and to introduce its progress report contained in document CD/944. This was the twenty-eighth session of the Group, and experts and representatives from 26 countries and the World Meteorological Organization attended.

I will also introduce today the appendices to the Group's fifth report. This report, contained in document CD/903, was submitted to the CD in March 1989. These appendices, which are an integral part of the fifth report, contain detailed technical material of great importance for the design of the global seismological system. Due to their technical nature, these appendices are not being generally distributed but are available in the Group's working languages from the secretariat.

Four appendices provide detailed technical descriptions of the main components of the global system - the "CD stations", the national data centres, the international data centres and the global communication system. One appendix contains a list of references to almost 300 documents in all,

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

containing scientific and technical material which has been produced during the last three years. Another appendix gives a short summary of these national contributions. This quite substantial amount of work, conducted in a number of countries, is the very basis for the work of the Group. The Group's scientific secretary, Dr. Frode Ringdal of Norway, played a key role in drafting this appendix. The support of the secretariat in preparing the Group's document and throughout our meetings here in Geneva is also greatly appreciated.

Most of the efforts during the recent meeting were devoted to the further planning of the Group's Second Large-scale Technical Test (GSETT-2). This test is, as you may recall, a global effort to test the various components of the modern data exchange system specified in the Group's fifth report. The purpose is also to test the interaction of these elements in a realistic environment, that is, to demonstrate that the system is able to cope with all the earthquakes that normally occur all over the globe. To be able to handle as many as several hundred earthquakes a day is an essential requirement for a global seismological system. GSETT-2 should thus provide a good overall basis to finalize the design of the global system.

The first phase of GSETT-2 started a year ago and will be completed by the end of the year. This phase consists of a large number of mostly small-scale national, bilateral or multilateral tests of individual components of the system. The aim of these tests is to prepare each station and national and international data centres for participation in the forthcoming tests of the entire global system. A number of tests have now been concluded, others are going on at present and some have still to be conducted. A review of these start-up tests has been compiled by the Co-ordinator of the test, Mr. Peter Basham of Canada, and is annexed to the progress report.

The second phase of GSETT-2 will start on 16 January 1990. This phase is designed as a gradual build-up of the testing of the entire global system. The first part of this phase will involve testing of the global system one day per week up to and including 6 March 1990. During these eight days both parameter and wave-form data, or, as we call them, level 1 and level 2 data, should be reported for all signals that are detected at participating stations. Data will be transmitted through various means of communication from national data centres to the four experimental international data centres (EIDCs).

At the four EIDCs the level 1 data will be analysed in accordance with procedures that are well established and were tested during the Group's first large-scale test in 1984. Final procedures for the analysis of level 2 data are so far not available, and will be developed co-operatively at the four individual EIDCs during the second phase of our large-scale test.

Much of the effort during the recent meeting was devoted to the establishment of initial instructions for the next, second phase of GSETT-2. These instructions, contained in the Group's conference room paper No. 190/Rev.1, are quite detailed and extensive and cover more than 100 pages. They are based on the Group's earlier experience and on national contributions and are fairly preliminary in nature. During the forthcoming eight days of testing, they will for the first time be applied to the

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

operation of the entire global system. It is to be expected that some parts may need substantial revision when the experience of our initial testing is reviewed at the Group's next meeting.

No decision on the further schedule for GSETT-2 was taken at this meeting. It is, however, to be expected that the second phase will continue during the spring and summer of 1990. Also during this period testing will be limited to one or several days a week, and may also include a short period of full-scale testing. The purpose is to further develop the overall instructions for the system and to make sure that all participating national and international facilities are working properly. This extended period of testing will also enable additional countries which are not ready by the middle of January to join the test later during the spring of 1990.

The third phase, which will be a full-scale test of the entire system for an extended period of time, is the core of the test. It could in a way be considered the "flight-test" of the system, in which it should be demonstrated that all components can work properly together as an integral system in the actual environment of global seismicity. So far no timetable has been established for this phase, but it is reasonable to expect that it will be conducted over a period of two to three months in the autumn of 1990. The conduct of the third phase will require that all technical systems are working properly and that broad enough participation is secured.

During the fourth and last phase of GSETT-2 the result of this full-scale testing will be evaluated. The consequences of these new experiences for the design of the global system presented in the Group's fifth report have to be assessed, and modifications to the initial design may be needed.

In my view the technical preparations are well under way at the national facilities in those countries that have announced their intention of participating, and at the four experimental international data centres. Although I am sure that further tests will reveal both unforeseen technical difficulties and inadequacies in the suggested procedures, I am quite confident that the remaining scientific and technical issues will be solved through continued testing during the first half of 1990 prior to our full-scale test.

My main and serious concern relates to participation in GSETT-2. So far 21 countries have announced their intention to participate and provide data from 41 stations in all. The geographical distribution of these stations is uneven, with no station in Africa or South America and few in Asia. As stated in the progress report, the Ad hoc Group considers it most essential to achieve broader participation in order to meet the objectives of GSETT-2. In the Group's first large-scale test in 1984, 37 countries contributed data from 75 stations in all. At that level of participation, the coverage of the southern hemisphere in particular was also far from satisfactory.

The technical requirements on the participants in GSETT-2 are higher than in 1984, as the present test involves the routine exchange of large volumes of wave-form data. Seismological facilities have, however, been substantially improved in a number of countries in recent years. High-capacity communication channels are also readily available today on a global scale.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

From a technical point of view a large number of additional countries should be able to participate in GSETT-2. In some countries technical preparations for the test are well under way, but the final political decision to participate has not yet been taken. To secure participation in GSETT-2 at least similar to that of the 1984 experiment, it is important that a larger number of CD member countries should actively participate in the experiment. So far only 15 CD members have announced their intention to participate.

In the Ad hoc Group we also enjoy active participation from countries which are not members of the CD, and so far six non-members have announced their participation. Wider participation by countries not members of the CD would be important to secure adequate global coverage. It is of special importance that more countries located in or close to the southern hemisphere should join the experiment to provide observations from earthquakes all over the globe and facilitate a test of the world-wide communication channels.

Finally, I wish to re-emphasize that the second phase of the test, which will begin in January 1990, is a preparatory stage to enable participants to join the global system and overcome any technical problems they may encounter. The full-scale test is expected to start more than a year from now. There should therefore be ample opportunities for new participants to join the experiment and thereby provide the broader participation needed to meet the objectives of our large-scale test.

For countries which so far have not joined in the work of the Ad hoc Group, and who wish to participate in the test or explore possible ways of participating, the Co-ordinator of the test, Mr. Peter Basham, and myself will be pleased to offer our assistance to explore and arrive at proper arrangements.

The Ad hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 19 to 30 March 1990 in Geneva.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts for introducing the Group's report, which appears in document CD/944.

In accordance with the agreement reached by the Chair with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees concerning the timetable for the adoption of the reports of the subsidiary bodies, I intend to put before the Conference for decision next Thursday the Ad hoc Committee report contained in document CD/946, as well as the recommendation in paragraph 12 of the report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts concerning the dates of the Group's next session.

I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): I take this opportunity to warmly welcome in our midst Ambassador Rasaputram of Sri Lanka and Ambassador Ogada of Kenya. I wish them much success in the performance of their tasks. Our delegations have always maintained good co-operation, which, I am certain, will be continued in future.



(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

As I have already said on other occasions, it is a less pleasant duty to say goodbye to colleagues leaving us. Ambassador Yamada and Ambassador van Schaik intend to leave Geneva soon. With their personal commitment, great experience and diplomatic skill, as well as their well-known ability to foster personal contacts, I think they have contributed to resolving a good many issues within the work of the CD. In taking leave of our two colleagues, I wish them good health, happiness and success in their new assignments.

The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events has wound up its session. The progress report on the twenty-eighth session is set forth in document CD/944, and we have just followed with great interest the introduction of the report given by the Chairman of the Group, Dr. Ola Dahlman. On behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries I should like to express high appreciation for the qualified work carried out by the scientific experts and their Chairman pertaining to the difficult technical questions associated with a global system for international seismic data exchange.

The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts has in our view yielded considerable results during its session. The agreed comprehensive and detailed material effectively supplements the fifth report of the GSE, which was presented to the CD as document CD/903 in March this year. This material, comprising seven appendices, constitutes, in our opinion, a solid foundation for further conceptual development with regard to a global seismic data exchange system for monitoring compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Moreover, a number of the recommendations contained in the fifth report of the GSE have already been put to good use for the conduct of the global seismic data exchange test, GSETT-2. Phase 1 of GSETT-2 has been under way since Autumn last year, and its second phase is to start, as the Chairman said, in January 1990.

We think the Group has soundly reviewed the present status of phase 1, i.e. the start-up tests for GSETT-2. What is discernible are the endeavours of many countries to proceed with the development of their national facilities in such a way that they will be able to participate successfully in the later phases of GSETT-2.

One of the most important results achieved at the recent session of the GSE is, to our mind, the fact that thanks to the constructive collaboration of all parties it has been possible to elaborate initial instructions for conducting phase 2 of the second technical test. Surely, the instructions need to be formulated in greater detail at the next session of the GSE on the basis of the results reached in the course of experimental work.

The countries on behalf of which I am speaking consent to the dates suggested in the progress report CD/944 for the start of phase 2 and the convening of the next session of the Group of Scientific Experts in 1990. As for the German Democratic Republic, I can declare that it will actively participate in GSETT-2. We will do so since this international project could contribute to progress towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests continues to be a pivotal issue for us,

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

because it is the key to real nuclear disarmament. On that score, the German Democratic Republic together with the other Warsaw Treaty member countries advocated at their recent Bucharest meeting that, firstly, the immediate cessation of nuclear weapon tests should be discussed single-mindedly at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament; secondly, the verification protocols to the USSR-United States agreements of 1974 and 1976 should be rapidly finalized, as their implementation would help to expedite the complete cessation of nuclear tests; and thirdly, the applicability of the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in three environments should be extended to underground testing in order to promote the prohibition of all nuclear tests.

The date of 9 August 1945 should remain for us both a reminder and an incentive. Nagasaki must without fail be the last place which in the minds of peoples is associated with a nuclear holocaust. This observation made by 450,000 inhabitants of that sorely afflicted town has our unanimous approval. It was against that background that, one year after the significant International Meeting on Nuclear-weapon-free Zones, the German Democratic Republic convened a meeting of an International Liaison Office in Berlin with a view to deliberating on what needs to be done henceforth to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. And it is in this spirit that the German Democratic Republic lends its support to the appeal made by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the United States Congress to impose, on the basis of reciprocity, a moratorium on nuclear explosions and the complete cessation of all nuclear testing.

We advocate the holding of a conference on the extension of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in three environments to underground testing. The German Democratic Republic has signed a letter on this subject which was sent to the depositary States, since it believes that in the wake of such a conference the CD could receive decisive momentum. This would undoubtedly also have favourable impact on the strengthening of the régime governing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in our minds.

All of us bear in mind that peace, and in particular peace in Europe, is fragile if it is a peace built on weapons. The very existence of humankind is imperilled by virtue of the overkill capacity of stockpiled weapon potentials. Already enormous resources and creative potential are needed to destroy the huge arsenals of arms without inflicting damage on mankind. Is it not the logic of human thinking that bids us to halt the modernization of nuclear weapons, to stop the development of new destruction potentials? Is it not time to give up striving for superiority and clinging to doctrines of deterrence?

The Warsaw Treaty States favour doing away with asymmetries that have arisen in certain weapon systems or armed forces and giving the structure of the armed forces a strictly defensive character. They hold that while each maintains its own security, neither side should have the means to stage a surprise attack against the other side or offensive operations in general. We think it is imperative to search for solutions which make nuclear weapons dispensable for all, without interfering with the security of any side.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

It is also for this reason that the Warsaw Treaty countries offered to open separate talks on the reduction and eventual elimination of tactical nuclear arms. It is quite understandable that my country should have a vital interest in this move. There is no sound argument for postponing such talks, making them contingent on the results reached in other negotiations or limiting their scope to shorter-range Soviet and American land-based nuclear missile systems.

The danger of a surprise attack will not be eliminated as long as tactical nuclear weapons remain on the European continent. To put it another way, their early removal would facilitate world-wide nuclear disarmament. This is our point of view, and we therefore urge that negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons should be started without delay.

To wind up my statement, let me air another idea. The problem of establishing a subsidiary organ of the Conference to discuss the issue of a nuclear test ban in a businesslike manner still awaits a mutually agreed solution. In the past months many delegations, and in particular Ambassador Yamada of Japan, have undertaken great efforts with a view to arriving at such a solution, and we feel that the remaining obstacles are not insurmountable and that positive starting-points for further work on a nuclear test ban can be agreed upon in the course of this session. This would give decisive impetus for imparting further dynamism to the work of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement. I have no more speakers on my list. Does anyone wish to take the floor? It would seem not.

As I informed you at the 525th plenary meeting, the Conference is to hold an informal meeting today, immediately after the plenary meeting, to begin the first reading of the technical part of its report to the General Assembly. I would also like to inform you that working papers CD/WP.371, 372 and 373, concerning the substantive paragraphs on agenda items 2, 3 and 7 respectively, are available in the delegations' pigeon-holes. As for the substantive paragraphs on item 1 of the Conference's agenda, the text will be available in English on Thursday 17 August and in the other languages on Friday 18 August.

I should like to inform you that the informal open-ended consultations on the report of the Ad hoc Committee under agenda item 5 will be held immediately after the plenary meeting in conference room H-3.

There are no other matters to be considered, and I will therefore close this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday 17 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.

**CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT**

CD/PV.527  
17 August 1989

ENGLISH

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**FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING**

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 17 August 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. El Ghali Benhima (Morocco)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 527th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

First of all, I should like on behalf of the Conference to wish a very warm welcome to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Jaromir Johanes, who will be the first speaker today. His Excellency the Minister is an important political figure who is noted for his extensive diplomatic experience. He entered the diplomatic service in the 1950s and has represented his country as Ambassador in Canada and in the United States of America. After taking up a senior post in the Ministry, the Minister was appointed First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. I am sure the members of the Conference will listen to His Excellency the Minister's statement with special attention.

Today the Conference continues its consideration of the reports of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies, as well as the consideration and adoption of its annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative who so wishes may raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference.

As I announced at our last plenary meeting, I intend to put before the Conference for decision today the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, contained in document CD/946, and the recommendation contained in paragraph 12 of the report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts concerning the dates of the Group's next session.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Egypt and Peru. I now give the floor to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Jaromir Johanes.

Mr. JOHANES (Czechoslovakia) (translated from Russian): It is a pleasure for me to take this opportunity to address this prominent organ of the international community for disarmament negotiations. I wish you, Mr. President, much success in your work in this responsible office. At the same time, I should like to note the creditable work of the representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Ambassador Komatina, and of the Conference's secretariat.

Czechoslovakia considers the Geneva Conference to be an important component of efforts for progress in the vitally important field of disarmament, a unique mechanism thanks to which agreements have been worked out contributing to arms reductions. We all surely agree that it is high time for the Conference to reaffirm its effectiveness. That, however, requires the achievement of concrete results, particularly in the field of chemical and nuclear disarmament, where this forum must make its significant opinion known.

The work of the Geneva Conference is of considerable relevance to the ongoing process of normalizing the international situation. It is closely linked with positive changes, especially in the relations between the USSR and the United States, and generally between East and West, as well as with the peace-oriented activities of the non-aligned countries. All this is a source of momentum for the disarmament negotiations, helping to strengthen the

(Mr. Johanes, Czechoslovakia)

favourable tendencies in world development. Confidence and stability have increased. Progress has been achieved in efforts to settle a number of regional conflicts. The authority of the United Nations has grown along with the conviction that it is possible to solve international problems by means of multilateral instruments of co-operation. New approaches to disarmament are taking shape, though not without difficulty.

The transition from confrontation to dialogue and the lessening of tension have already made it possible to initiate the process of real disarmament which is a key to a safer world. The elimination of two classes of nuclear weapons - intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles - is proceeding successfully. The Soviet-American talks on 50 per cent reductions in strategic nuclear arms are continuing. Important activities such as the initiative of the New Delhi Six are leading to progress in disarmament. The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons has taken place. Negotiations on conventional armed forces and on confidence-building measures have been launched and are proceeding successfully in Vienna. However, new, resolute steps must be taken on the path to disarmament, not only bilaterally but also multilaterally, where the Geneva Conference has an irreplaceable role to play.

The turn in world events cannot be separated from the ongoing developments in the socialist countries, particularly in the Soviet Union, the policy of perestroika, political and economic reforms and the development of socialism. We in Czechoslovakia are also moving in that direction, and are implementing a profound restructuring of all spheres of life in our society. The impulses springing from this policy in the socialist countries are also markedly reflected in efforts aimed at the democratization, demilitarization and humanization of international relations.

The negotiations in Geneva cannot manage without an enhancement of mutual confidence, respect for the principle that in the nuclear age the security of any State can be reliably safeguarded only through security for all, and that solutions to the complex problems of the present time can be found only through joint efforts. In all these respects the new political thinking must continue to be palpably felt. Universal human interests and values are becoming paramount. Realizing them requires that any problems in State-to-State relations must be tackled by exclusively peaceful means, with strict respect for the right of every nation to choose freely the path of its development.

We cannot overlook the fact that negative phenomena still persist in the modern world. The burden of the past is still reflected in the continued arms build-up, relapses into power politics and interference in the internal affairs of other States. Tendencies towards confrontation continue in some regions. The external debt of the developing countries remains oppressive. The ecological threat is becoming ever more acute. The solution of these problems in the spirit of the new thinking is in the interest of the whole international community. Everything must be done to make the positive trends in the world irreversible.

(Mr. Johanes, Czechoslovakia)

It is to this end that the efforts of Czechoslovakia and the other Warsaw Treaty States are directed. At the Bucharest meeting of the supreme body of that organization, the Political Consultative Committee, last month, we took a stand on topical matters relating to disarmament and security-building in Europe and world-wide. We emphasized the need to take concrete measures both in the nuclear and chemical fields and also in the field of conventional weapons. The decisions adopted there are realistic and constructive. They open up new prospects for the attainment of mutually acceptable solutions in all respects.

In the Bucharest Declaration we emphasized that the threat of war can be eliminated only through joint efforts, together with all-round strengthening of the political rather than the military factors of security and stability. In this context, we also decided to enhance still further the political character of the Warsaw Treaty. We are convinced that the transformation of the two largest military-political groupings into politico-military alliances would make a substantial contribution towards building up confidence, stability and security.

Czechoslovakia and its allies support the continuation of the dialogue between the USSR and the United States on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive weapons. It is encouraging that in the assessment of both sides, as outlined in this forum a few days ago, the recent round of negotiations was conducted in a constructive and business-like atmosphere. It is our opinion that conclusion of an agreement thereon, along with strict compliance with the provisions of the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, would have a favourable impact not only on further talks on urgent disarmament issues, but also on the overall international climate. That would be a follow-up to the truly historic Soviet-American INF Treaty, to whose implementation Czechoslovakia has been contributing its share.

As far as tactical nuclear weapons are concerned, we deem it necessary to open separate talks about them as soon as possible. The Soviet Union's intention, as announced by M.S. Gorbachev in Strasbourg, to make a unilateral cut in this weapon system if such talks are launched deserves a constructive response from the other side.

To Czechoslovakia, a country situated on the line of contact between the two largest military-political alliances, the lowering of the level of military confrontation and enhancement of confidence and security in Europe are matters of high priority. This is why we attach such great importance to the ongoing talks in Vienna. The business-like atmosphere prevailing at both negotiating forums there is creating prerequisites for progress. In May this year we and our allies put forward significant proposals; the NATO States responded at their summit meeting in Brussels with steps of their own. We believe that given sufficient political will the first agreements at the 23-party talks can be reached as early as 1990. However, despite an overall convergence of views in principle on many important issues, much work is still to be done. We must not allow any of the as yet unresolved problems to become a cause of a slow-down or even blockage in the negotiations.

(Mr. Johanes, Czechoslovakia)

Furthermore, qualitatively new confidence-building and security-building measures should be adopted before the next CSCE meeting in Helsinki in 1992. The progress of the 35-party talks has strengthened our conviction that if use is made of the experience from Stockholm, the attainment of the jointly set goal will be feasible. However, it is necessary to surmount the principal difficulty in these negotiations and ensure the inclusion of all armed forces under the new measures. If certain classes of troops or armaments were to fall outside their scope, this could give rise to new disproportions which would be further deepened in the context of the overall process of conventional disarmament.

We have always been convinced that medium-sized and small countries, too, can meaningfully contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security. Our concrete contribution towards this objective is the proposal for the establishment of a zone of confidence, co-operation and good-neighbourly relations along the line of contact between Warsaw Treaty and NATO States, announced in February 1988 by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Milos Jakes. It is becoming increasingly evident that concrete steps in the military sphere between States along the line of contact could help greatly in furthering confidence, transparency and predictability in military activities. We intend to continue consultations on our proposal with interested countries and to submit to them concrete suggestions on how to further advance the process of building security and confidence in Europe.

I should also like to recall on this occasion that Czechoslovakia, like its allies in the Warsaw Treaty Organization, has taken unilateral disarmament steps. We are reducing the number of troops in combat units by 12,000 men, and withdrawing and gradually dismantling 850 tanks, 165 armoured carriers and 51 combat aircraft. We are transferring 20,000 troops to military construction organizations whose tasks are of a purely civilian nature. We are limiting the size of military exercises. In 1989-1990 we shall decrease our defence spending by 15 per cent. These measures constitute Czechoslovakia's concrete contribution to achieving greater confidence and security in Europe. These efforts would no doubt be enhanced if our Western partners took corresponding steps.

The growing confidence among States is creating further possibilities for the reduction of military confrontation and for disarmament. In this context, an important and indeed irreplaceable role can be played by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, as it brings together representatives of all continents and regional groups. The Conference has been entrusted with the task of drafting and negotiating multilateral instruments which will undoubtedly strengthen the legal basis of the disarmament process and its multilateral character. We would like the Conference to develop by stages into a forum that would enable all States to participate actively and effectively in solving the problems which have a bearing on their vital interests.

The proposals put forward by the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which met in Prague in October 1987, were dictated by the objective and urgent need to increase the effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament. We are pleased to note the



(Mr. Johanes, Czechoslovakia)

growing interest of States in its work, one manifestation of which is the fact that proposals and views of Governments are now increasingly presented at its sessions by Foreign Ministers and other senior political officials. These positive trends are, in our opinion, useful for the future work of the Conference.

Yet the situation requires more than that. We propose that better use should be made of the potential of this forum, and especially its working bodies, and that the procedures relating to their establishment should be streamlined. Special sessions of the Conference at foreign minister level, which would give the deliberations the necessary political stimulus, could, in our view, substantially promote progress in tackling the most acute problems.

The Conference has once again accomplished useful work this year. However, we must say frankly that we had expected more, both as to the drafting of the text of the convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and as to consideration of the complex of nuclear disarmament issues.

The issue of prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons is for us a matter of top priority. We do not deny that we placed substantial hopes in the implementation of the suggestions embodied in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, at which all the participants at a high political level affirmed their readiness to conclude a global convention which would ban these barbarous weapons of mass destruction once and for all and called for the expeditious resolution of the outstanding issues with the participation of all the States concerned. Although the work on the text of the draft convention has been intensified and a certain amount of progress has been made in the consideration of the technical and legal aspects, the differences of principle in approaches to certain crucial issues have still not been overcome at this year's session of the Conference in Geneva. Therefore, we are calling once again for political will and creative efforts to find mutually acceptable solutions. The results of the latest round of Soviet-American talks on chemical weapons are a good sign in this respect.

Czechoslovakia will continue to work actively for the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The essence of our approach is set forth in the statement issued by the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on 5 January this year, in which we stressed our readiness to be one of the first signatories of the convention as soon as it is finalized; we are already undertaking steps to this end domestically.

At the end of January we successfully carried out a national experiment to verify non-production of chemical weapons in the civilian chemical industry. It demonstrated that under present conditions in our economy verification based on the already agreed measures is basically feasible. It does not disrupt the production process in any major way, and the safeguarding of commercial secrets may be incorporated into it. We informed the participants in the Conference on Disarmament of the results of the experiment as early as April last.

(Mr. Johanes, Czechoslovakia)

We have also adopted legislation limiting exports of certain types of chemicals. I wish to emphasize here that this measure is not meant to discriminate against anybody and does not impede further co-operation in the peaceful development of the chemical industry. Its only aim is to prevent misuse for military purposes of chemical products destined for use in civilian industry. We expect that the future convention will settle the question of the non-proliferation of chemical weapons so that these partial measures will lose their significance.

I can inform you today that Czechoslovakia is taking the following steps towards the speedy prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. Firstly, within the framework of the multilateral exchange of information relating to the drafting of the convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons we are making public, in an official document of the Conference on Disarmament, all the principal relevant data on our chemical potential. I wish to reaffirm once again that the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic neither possesses nor produces any chemical weapons, nor are there any such weapons on our territory. All the research and laboratory work being carried out is exclusively connected with protection against the effects of chemical weapons and is pursued for peaceful objectives.

Secondly, we are ready to receive a team of foreign inspectors within the framework of the international trial verification of non-production of chemical weapons in civilian chemical industry. The check will be carried out at a chemical plant at Mnisek near Liberec, where the national experiment has already taken place. We expect that the rules for the international phase of the experiment will be agreed upon very shortly.

Thirdly, Czechoslovakia will make available for use by the verification bodies to be established under the convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons a special laboratory designed for analysis of samples and testing of the toxic effects of new chemicals. The laboratory will be equipped to handle all highly toxic substances, including those falling in schedule I.

We hope that this contribution on our part, our openness and efforts to promote the speedy achievement of mutually acceptable compromises, will prompt similar steps on the part of other States. In this spirit, we intend to make our contribution to the success of the international conference which will take place in Canberra this coming September.

We remain convinced that partial, regional measures, too, can play an important role in the efforts aimed at limiting, banning and eliminating chemical weapons. That is why between 1985 and 1988 we and the German Democratic Republic put forward a series of constructive proposals for the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe. If they meet with a positive response, we might conduct a practical test in that sensitive part of the world of certain measures proposed in the convention, including verification. From this point of view, we continue to consider our initiative as timely. The creation of such a zone would make a substantial contribution towards lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe.

(Mr. Johanes, Czechoslovakia)

The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva currently has before it yet another momentous task - that of opening substantive deliberations on nuclear disarmament issues as soon as possible. All the States that possess nuclear weapons are represented here. We are seriously concerned at the fact that competent working bodies on the individual problems relating to nuclear disarmament have not yet been established. We share with a number of other States the view that the time has come for bilateral and multilateral talks on this subject to run in parallel and to complement one another.

First and foremost, a major step forward should be made in the talks on a general and complete nuclear weapon test ban. The progress achieved at the Soviet-American talks is undoubtedly creating good preconditions for the work of the Conference on Disarmament too. For our part, we will do everything in our power in support of this endeavour. We reaffirmed our position in the joint document adopted by the Socialist States in June 1987, containing the "basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests".

It would also be useful to discuss the structure of future machinery for verification of compliance with a ban on all nuclear weapon tests. In this respect, the work of the Group of Scientific Experts and the experience obtained through international experiments on seismic data exchange are useful. In this spirit we are in favour of the idea of expanding its mandate or establishing a special group of scientists to consider the application of other verification procedures, such as monitoring of radioactivity in the atmosphere, observation through satellites or various methods of on-site inspection.

If constructive results are to be achieved on the nuclear test ban issue and further progress made in devising a verification régime, it is necessary to establish an ad hoc committee within the Conference to deal with this subject. To this end, we put forward a compromise proposal on its mandate a year ago. We note with regret that although most delegations have taken a positive stand on it since its official presentation in August 1988, consensus has as yet not been achieved on this question. Czechoslovakia is ready to continue to take an active part in the consultations which are under way on this matter at our Conference.

In our view, one of the paths towards the early halting of nuclear tests lies in extending the scope of the 1963 Moscow Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in three environments to cover underground testing. We support the idea of convening a special conference to discuss this matter. The Geneva Conference, too, might be instrumental in bringing this initiative to fruition, as it is a suitable forum to consider the extension of the scope of the Treaty's verification procedures.

Czechoslovakia is also working actively for the negotiation of measures which would prevent the deployment of any kind of weapon in outer space. The Soviet proposal for the establishment of an inspectorate to monitor objects launched into space for the purpose of checking that they do not carry offensive weapons is important in our view. If this is done, we will be

(Mr. Johanes, Czechoslovakia)

willing to allow checking of all the Czechoslovak technical devices launched into space under the Interkosmos programme. We are also ready to consider constructive proposals made by other States for confidence-building measures and for greater openness in activities performed in outer space, which might become a guarantee precluding extension of the arms race into outer space.

Now as before, we are ready to assist in dealing with the other items on the Conference's agenda and other pressing issues in the sphere of disarmament. We are convinced, for example, that the role of multilateral diplomacy in respect of disarmament could be greatly enhanced if radiological weapons were banned, security guarantees were provided to non-nuclear States and a comprehensive programme of disarmament was discussed. Moreover, progress in any part of the disarmament process would represent a meaningful contribution to environmental protection. In this respect, Czechoslovakia and the other Warsaw Treaty States have taken up a principled position which is set forth in the document entitled "Implications of the arms race for the environment and other aspects of ecological security" adopted at last year's session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

The age we are living in requires from all of us resolute and concrete action to preserve universal human values. Disarmament is becoming a sine qua non of the peaceful and fruitful development of all nations of the world and an essential prerequisite for coping successfully with the global problems which are ripe for solution. The resources released as a result of the disarmament process should be used primarily for social and economic development. In this respect, we already face the crucial task of the practical conversion of a part of military production to the civilian sphere. The Conference on Disarmament, and especially the United Nations, might in future give considerable assistance in this direction.

Let me conclude by expressing my conviction that, given sufficient political resolve at this turning-point in the development of human society, we shall succeed, by joining forces, in reaching concrete agreements. We hope that the new political thinking, realism and far-sightedness will fully prevail and that the cause of disarmament will advance in every respect. I wish all of you much energy, persistence and success. I can assure you that we are ready to foster actively and constructively this peace-promoting endeavour which will benefit both the present generations and posterity.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Elaraby.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt): It gives me great pleasure to see you, Sir, presiding over this august body; not only because of the fraternal ties which bind - and if you will allow me to say so, very closely bind - our two countries together, but even more so because of your widely recognized personal qualities. Your wide diplomatic experience reassures us that you will be able to sail our boat safely ashore in this very crucial month of August, during which all the work of the past months boils down to conclusions.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

I wish also to recognize the significant contribution of Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia, who discharged with great distinction his responsibilities as President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July. May I also express my delegation's appreciation and gratitude to Ambassador García Robles for his continued support and boundless enthusiasm for the cause of disarmament, and for the excellent manner in which he conducted our work during his presidency? I wish him a speedy recovery.

Since I spoke last before the CD four ambassadors have left us. My delegation acknowledges the valuable contribution to our work by Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Mario Cámpora of Argentina, Ambassador Mario Pugliese of Italy, Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo of Sri Lanka and Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands, who will be leaving us soon. We wish them all success in their new assignments. In this context Egypt takes particular pleasure in welcoming Mr. Batsanov of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Ogada of Kenya and Ambassador Rasaputram of Sri Lanka.

Before I embark on today's subject, I wish to pay tribute to the distinguished Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia for the very valuable statement he has just made to us.

High on the list of priorities of the Conference on Disarmament is the item dealing with chemical weapons. I shall focus most of my remarks today on this item. At the outset, I wish to pay tribute to the tireless efforts of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Pierre Morel, and also to thank the members of his delegation as well as Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail and his assistants, for their very meticulous work. I wish also to thank the five chairmen of the working groups entrusted with the preparation of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The first session of the Conference on Disarmament to follow the Paris Conference is almost coming to an end. In Paris, 149 States, including all members of the Conference on Disarmament, solemnly called on the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva "to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date". However, a breakthrough towards a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons seems at present to be still beyond our reach.

Though Egypt recognizes that a considerable degree of progress has been achieved, we do however realize that we still have a long way ahead. Many of the remaining differences, as my delegation has stated on more than one occasion, are not confined to mere drafting refinements.

Today, I wish to put before this body my delegation's reading of the balance-sheet of this session. The first issue I will address pertains to the relation of the chemical weapons convention to other relevant international agreements. Our understanding, which has already been stated in the CD, is that in accordance with the general rules of international law, the chemical weapons convention, from the moment of its entry into force, should prevail over any existing international agreement covering the same subject-matter. In the view of my delegation, our work would be undone if unilaterally declared "rights" under the 1925 Geneva Protocol were to be transferred and

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

thereby, somehow, eternalized in a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. Such attempts should be resisted in order to establish one universally applicable convention with enhanced effectiveness.

It is clear to my delegation from the divergence of positions on this question that the problem is not of a legal character, it is political. Given the nature of the prevailing positions an acceptable compromise has not yet materialized. It seems appropriate to propose that concerned delegations should consult further on this matter.

With respect to reservations, it is the view of my delegation that there should be no reservations attached to the chemical weapons convention. If however, such a view is not accepted, my delegation believes that reservations should be confined to certain provisions only, and that they should be compatible with, not derogate from, the scope and purposes of the convention.

This year the Ad hoc Committee undertook work on another issue of importance, that of "sanctions", through its Working Group on Legal and Political Questions. The discussion of this question has clearly demonstrated the highly delicate political nature of the problem, which needs to be further addressed in order to clarify additionally the issues involved and try to find appropriate solutions to them. Egypt, for its part, would like to see provisions containing specific measures to be applied should any State (party or non-party) violate the provisions of the convention. We would also like to have guarantees to ensure that sanctions are applied effectively and without discrimination or delay. Sanctions should not in our view be construed only as a device for punishment. We believe the reference to sanctions encompasses a more comprehensive approach that could provide requisite elements of security for States.

On the question of security a clear distinction should be drawn between nuclear and chemical weapons. The nature and consequences of the use of chemical weapons are more limited in scope, and the international community should not, in our view, limit itself to negative assurances in the manner followed with respect to the NPT when Security Council resolution 255 was adopted in 1968. The chemical weapons convention should aim much higher. Positive and credible assurances should be the ultimate objective.

Another crucial part of the convention which has not been dealt with this year is the question of "jurisdiction and control". This topic is at an early stage of consideration, and we are of the view that this issue should be the subject of relevant provisions in the convention.

Another area which Egypt is following closely is the negotiations on organizational aspects. The Executive Council, which will be the principal political organ of the international organization, is of great importance. I wish once again to thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee for his efforts to conduct consultations on this very important subject.

The Executive Council remains for most members of this Conference one of the most important issues. We believe that its size should be determined on the basis of the limits of the functional requirements, that is to say the rapidity of convening meetings and the ability to undertake timely

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

decision-making. As for voting in the Executive Council, we favour the application of the rule of unanimity when it comes to substantive matters. However, we realize that unanimity may not always emerge. Consequently, we should provide for some other rule to avoid paralysis in the Executive Council. This point should be further considered. We are currently studying with great care the various ideas and proposals on the composition of this body. However, I wish to put forward some of my delegation's reflections on this question. My delegation is of the view that all States parties to the convention are entitled to serve on the Executive Council. We also consider that the fundamental criterion should be that of equitable geographical distribution. Furthermore, we do not subscribe to any approach which calls for the creation of permanent seats on the Council.

Another issue which attracts special attention is that of "verification". We do share the view expressed by many delegations that we need a credible, verifiable convention without any loopholes. It is therefore imperative that the convention should include effective verification provisions. Yet such requirements should not be abused. It should never be distorted and stretched to threaten the national security of States parties. We are inclined to consider the non-abuse of this device as being as important as the concept of verification itself. We therefore support the inclusion of detailed provisions on the procedure for verification, in particular with respect to the provisions on challenge inspection.

We have been following very closely the work on confidentiality and on the guidelines for inspections, and in our view, a degree of progress has been achieved in this regard.

Turning to another issue, I would like to refer to the question of the Canberra Conference. The Government of Australia has been in contact with my Government, and I would like to express our satisfaction at the results of these contacts. The conference, in our view, should be intended neither to create a parallel mechanism to what we have here in Geneva, nor to address the question of the so-called non-proliferation of chemical weapons or any interim measures to that end. This is what it should not do. We expect and hope the conference will endorse the objective of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, and enhance the development of chemical industry and international co-operation for peaceful purposes in this field. I take this opportunity to reiterate that Egypt considers that the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons is the objective we all should strive to attain. Any attempt at reaching interim measures on non-proliferation of chemical weapons should not be accepted. The prohibition has, in our view, now become a basic norm of international law, and therefore should be scrupulously observed.

I turn now to another issue which enjoys high priority for a great number of delegations to this Conference: the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. You will recall that following the Paris Conference, and by reason of the high political will expressed in its Final Declaration, when the participating States "solemnly [affirmed] their commitments not to use chemical weapons", there was an attempt to amend the mandate so as to refer to the prohibition of use. This amendment did not acquire consensus acceptance.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

The reasons why do not appear anywhere on the records. I must say that my delegation has difficulty in understanding this situation. Therefore, my delegation is raising this question once again for consideration. We hope that you could bring the loose ends together before concluding the 1989 session. It is our genuine hope that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will recommence its work in 1990 under a new mandate which would reflect the latest state of will and preparedness.

Now that we are approaching the very last days of the current session, and since the present state of affairs does not present an easy setting, we must make the best of the inter-sessional period to try to catch up with what we missed during the 1989 session of the Conference.

In 1990 Geneva will once more host an international conference to review the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In September of this year the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the fourth NPT review conference will commence its work. The 1990 review conference is, as we all know, of paramount importance. Next year we must decide on whether 1995 will see only an extension or a review conference as well. In six years from now we must also decide on the validity of the NPT beyond 1995 and whether the NPT is to be amended. At present, the NPT has attracted a record number of adherents for any disarmament treaty: 139 States have acceded to this important legal instrument. Egypt considers that the NPT régime, as it stands today, contains considerable advantages. The NPT also has some serious shortcomings which need to be addressed and rectified. Some of these shortcomings were addressed by my delegation in New York during the first session of the Preparatory Committee last May. Briefly, the NPT in the view of this delegation remains discriminatory in character and lacks universality. The nuclear-weapon States, which have been entrusted with special responsibilities for the preservation of international peace and security, have not fully honoured their commitments enshrined in article VI of the NPT. Notwithstanding the important contribution made by the INF Treaty, it remains modest especially if measured against a continuum of time that dates back to 5 March 1970, the date of entry into force of the NPT. More is needed.

One additional issue which will pose a serious threat, as it did in past review conferences, is the issue of concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Until today nuclear testing has continued unabated. The Palme Commission report, published in April 1989 and entitled A World at Peace, demonstrates that in 1988 alone a total of 40 nuclear tests were conducted by four countries - the USSR, the United States, France and China. This has only one meaning, namely that testing is crucial for the policy of nuclear deterrence and the continuation of an advanced nuclear arms race. While nuclear weapon testing contradicts the objective of the NPT, in our view, it is safe to argue that a CTBT will undoubtedly strengthen the non-proliferation régime.

Another additional subject which the NPT failed to deal with is the issue of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the danger of nuclear weapons. This is a subject that the CD deals with, but regrettably without making any progress to date. As my delegation has stated on more than



(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

one occasion, Security Council resolution 255 of 19 June 1968, which was adopted a few days before the NPT was opened for signature, has built-in limitations. Unilateral declarations were made by only three nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, yet they remain, in the view of my delegation, qualified, conditional and limited. This, again, is another area of serious concern to a large group of States and an area where collective efforts are needed to create a more stable, credible and durable non-proliferation régime.

My delegation will present and elaborate on these issues during the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the fourth review conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Mr. Calderón.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish): First of all, I should like to welcome His Excellency the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Jaromir Johanes, whose statement we heard with a great deal of interest and understanding.

I have requested the floor this morning to make a statement on the Canberra Conference on behalf of the Group of 21. I shall read this statement in English because that is the language in which we have worked on the text.

(Continued in English)

"The Group of 21 firmly supports and actively participates in the negotiations under way in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to conclude at the earliest date a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The Group of 21 strongly condemns the use of chemical weapons and reaffirms its commitment to an early comprehensive ban as the only effective and non-discriminatory solution to the threat posed by chemical weapons. That threat, aggravated by recent developments, cannot be removed by non-proliferation measures but only by the total elimination of chemical weapons.

"The Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons scheduled to take place in Canberra on 18-22 September 1989 must not seek to establish any alternative or parallel approach to the chemical weapons negotiations in the CD. Apprehensions of the Group of 21 about the relevance, objectives and structure of the Canberra Conference need to be clearly understood and addressed so that its outcome does not run counter to the current negotiations in Geneva.

"The Group of 21 is firmly opposed to any restrictive measures which may hamper the development of chemical industry, the transfer of technology and international co-operation for peaceful purposes in this field.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

"The Group of 21 expects the Canberra Conference to unambiguously endorse the objective of an early comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons and lend its support to the ongoing negotiations to that effect within the Conference on Disarmament."

(Continued in Spanish)

I have requested the Secretary-General, Ambassador Komatina, to distribute this text as an official document of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Peru for his statement. I believe the representative of Australia wishes to speak. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. REESE (Australia): I seek the floor today to respond briefly to the statement delivered on behalf of the Group of 21 by the distinguished representative of Peru. On behalf of my Government I would like to assure members of the Group of 21 that the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons to be held in Canberra from 18 to 22 September will support the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for a chemical weapons convention, and the conference in Canberra will do this by focusing on measures to conclude and implement the convention.

The structure of the conference in Canberra is designed to encourage discussion in support of the chemical weapons convention - and not for any other purpose, as indeed the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Evans, said in his address to this Conference on 13 June last.

The Australian Government has consulted extensively with a wide range of countries in determining the final shape of the conference. The conference format now reflects those discussions.

Australia believes that the chemical weapons convention will be a better convention and will operate more effectively as a result of the contribution which industry can make to the convention. We are conscious that the role of industry is and must remain one of providing advice to governments, which obviously retain the responsibility for concluding international agreements.

Australia looks forward to the constructive participation in its conference of the many countries which have accepted our invitation to attend.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Reese for his statement. I have no other speakers on my list. Are there any delegations wishing to take the floor? It would seem not.

I would now like to move to other matters. I suggest we take up for adoption the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, contained in document CD/946. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I now put before the Conference for decision the recommendation contained in paragraph 12 of the progress report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, which appears in document CD/944, regarding the dates of the next session of the Group, which is to be held from 19 to 30 March 1990 in Geneva. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the recommendation.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I would like to inform the Conference that today the secretariat has distributed document CD/WP.374, in English, concerning substantive paragraphs on item 1 of the Conference's agenda. The text of this document in the other official languages will be available today or tomorrow in the delegations' pigeon-holes.

I must also inform you that the informal consultations on the report of the Ad hoc Committee under item 5 of the agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", have not yet led to agreement. Consequently, the meeting of the Ad hoc Committee scheduled for this afternoon has been cancelled. The timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week provides for a further meeting of the Ad hoc Committee. I hope that the informal consultations now under way will bear fruit and that the report of the Ad hoc Committee will be adopted without delay.

I would also like to inform you that the open-ended informal consultations on the substantive paragraphs on agenda items 2, 3 and 7 will begin today, immediately following this plenary meeting, in room I.

I have asked the secretariat to circulate today the timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. Since we are approaching the conclusion of our work, the timetable is purely indicative. I would like to emphasize that the timetable provides for informal consultations on Monday, 21 August on the substantive paragraphs on agenda item 1. I hope that the consultations on the other agenda items will have been completed to enable us to begin consideration of item 1. At all events, it is understood that the consultations on this item will follow the conclusion of the first reading of the substantive paragraphs on agenda items 2, 3 and 7. A meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on item 5 is also scheduled for Wednesday, 23 August at 3 p.m. I hope that on that day the Ad hoc Committee will adopt its report to the plenary.

If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I have no other business on the agenda for this meeting, which I therefore intend to close. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 22 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.528  
22 August 1989

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 22 August 1989, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. El Ghali Benhima

(Morocco)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 528th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

Today the Conference continues its consideration of the reports of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies, as well as the consideration and adoption of its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative who so wishes may raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference. I have no speakers on my list for today, but in accordance with the practice of the Conference, I would like to ask whether there are any delegations wishing to take the floor. I give the floor to the United States Ambassador.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): I would like for the Conference on Disarmament to acknowledge the presence in the chamber today of United States Congressman H. Martin Lancaster of North Carolina. Congressman Lancaster is a member of the House of Representatives Arms Control Observer Group and we are pleased to welcome him to the Conference. He is spending three days in Geneva on consultations and observing our negotiations and we are very grateful for his interest and support for our work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Ambassador for the information he has provided. On my own behalf and on behalf of the Conference, I welcome the Congressman and offer him our wishes for success on his mission to Geneva. Are there any other speakers? It would seem not.

Allow me now to report to you on the state of progress with the annual report of the Conference to the United Nations General Assembly. Next Thursday, at 3 p.m. the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will hold its last meeting to adopt its report to the Conference. Informal consultations are continuing in the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and I hope that the Committee's report will be adopted at the meeting scheduled for 3 p.m. tomorrow. As for the informal open-ended consultations on the substantive paragraphs relating to agenda items 2, 3, 7 and 1, they will be held immediately after this plenary meeting in room I. These consultations, which will continue until midday, will be followed by informal consultations among members of the Ad hoc Committee on outer space. I should like on this occasion to appeal to all delegations to ensure that these consultations conclude as soon as possible. As you know, the secretariat requires sufficient time to prepare the draft report to the General Assembly which we are to adopt on 31 August. The adoption on schedule of the last of the documents on Thursday afternoon will leave three working days for the secretariat to distribute to delegations the reports of the two ad hoc committees and the draft annual report in all the official languages of the Conference. As usual, the latter will include the technical parts of the report, together with the substantive paragraphs on agenda items 1, 2, 3 and 7. The reports of the ad hoc committees as adopted by the Conference will be incorporated in the final text of the annual report, which will subsequently be distributed as an official CD document. The second reading of the technical parts of the report and the substantive paragraphs

(The President)

will take place in an informal meeting immediately before the adoption of the annual report by the Conference, since it will be impossible to have the documentation available before Wednesday afternoon.

I have no other matters to be considered, and I therefore intend to close this meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 24 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.30 a.m.

**CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT**

CD/PV.529  
24 August 1989

ENGLISH

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**FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING**

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 24 August 1989, at 10 a.m.

President:                      Mr. El Ghali Benhima                      (Morocco)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 529th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

Today the Conference continues its consideration of the reports of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies, as well as consideration and adoption of its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative who so wishes may raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India and Bulgaria. I now give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mr. Han.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency for this month. I believe your active role will lead to the successful conclusion of this summer session.

The positive progress in disarmament and relaxation this year encourages those of us who are trying to overcome a lot of difficulties in negotiations. I think it is one of the merits of the Conference that, although no significant progress and breakthrough has been made, discussion on major issues has become substantive, especially on chemical weapons, and many more non-member countries have participated in the Conference.

World peace and the security of mankind are of concern for all countries and for all peoples. World peace and security and disarmament, being issues directly affecting the existence of ourselves and the coming generations irrespective of the size of countries, their military power and their level of scientific and technological development, have become a growing concern of all. Now the international political situation is gradually tending towards disarmament and relaxation. It is worthy of note that the abolition of medium-range and shorter-range missiles has been started and negotiations on 50 per cent cuts in strategic weapons and on chemical weapons are under way in the talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States.

The withdrawal of foreign troops and the settlement of the regional conflicts in many parts of the world through dialogue and negotiations are catalysing international détente. It is true, however, that while major attention is being concentrated on negotiations among big countries, the worsening situation in some of the small countries is often unheeded, which should not be overlooked. The history of many small and big wars since the Second World War shows that there has never been a war among big countries, although they have had an arms race. Every war has been launched either by an armed intervention by big countries or by a dispute among small countries.

Since lots of nuclear weapons are deployed even in small non-nuclear-weapon States and regions, any war can easily lead to a thermonuclear war across the world. For this reason many non-nuclear-weapon States want early international legal measures for disarmament to end the nuclear arms race and abolish nuclear weapons from every part of the world.



(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

In this regard, the situation prevailing on the Korean peninsula demands attention. Forty-five thousand foreign troops and more than 1,000 nuclear weapons, from ultra-small nuclear shells to operational and tactical nuclear missiles and neutron bombs and various modern carriers of nuclear weapons, are deployed in the southern half of the Korean peninsula, and special nuclear arsenals are now being built. This threatens the very existence of the Korean nation and the peace and security of Asia and the world. Hence the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has designated disarmament on the Korean peninsula and throughout the globe as an important task of foreign policy, trying its best to realize it.

On 23 June 1986 our Government clarified its position on the creation of a nuclear-free peace zone on the Korean peninsula and took measures to stop the testing, production, import, storage and transit of nuclear weapons in the area north of the military demarcation line. Last November our Government initiated multilateral negotiations on disarmament to realize our proposal for phased and reciprocal arms reductions up to 1991 with a view to creating a favourable environment for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons and foreign troops from south Korea. None of our proposals were realized and, once started, the North-South dialogue was stopped; tension is growing day by day.

Should disarmament negotiations have been pursued and positive measures been taken on the Korean peninsula, the situation there would have been further relaxed, giving a feeling of relief to many countries. In fact there is no reason why so many nuclear weapons and foreign troops should remain in the southern parts of the Korean peninsula in the light of the development of today's situation. We have unilaterally reduced armed forces by 100,000 troops and put 150,000 troops on peaceful construction tasks. Time and again we have stated clearly, openly that we have no intention of southward invasion: neither have we the nuclear weapons and modern weapons that south Korea has. Even if the nuclear weapons deployed in the southern part of the peninsula are targeted at socialist countries beyond the Korean peninsula, there is no justification today when nuclear disarmament is going on. It is high time for the foreign troops and nuclear weapons to be withdrawn from that area, and to that end talks should be held. This will help eliminate another cause of world tension, help to bring peace to the Korean peninsula, Asia and the rest of the world. We believe that such realistic issues should be considered in the negotiations for a treaty on nuclear disarmament as well as bilateral disarmament talks.

Chemical weapons aimed at mass destruction pose a great threat to world peace and security together with nuclear weapons. Today the need to abolish chemical weapons completely has become one of the burning issues in international politics amid rising public concern, which constitutes a favourable environment for the Conference on Disarmament. The international conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons held last January in Paris played an important role; on the occasion of the Paris Conference the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925. On 26 January this year, in a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, our Government reaffirmed its ban on the production, storage and import of chemical weapons and its refusal to allow the transit of foreign countries' chemical weapons through our land, airspace or territorial waters.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

Our Government hopes for the expeditious conclusion of a treaty on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons covering all countries, through the Conference on Disarmament. Although there exist technical difficulties concerning the issues of development of peaceful chemical industry and co-operation, as well as ways and means of ensuring inspection and verification, they can be settled within one or two years unless there is a political intention of opposing or delaying the abolition of chemical weapons. Our delegation will continue to play its role for the fulfilment of the goal of the Conference in the future.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Sharma.

Mr. SHARMA (India): Mr. President, my delegation would like to compliment you on the effective guidance you have provided, and especially your contribution to the work relating to the preparation of the annual report for the General Assembly. We are confident that consultations under your guidance during the intervening months will enable a good beginning of the 1990 session.

As this year's session draws to a close, it is natural to take stock of developments and relate them to the anticipation that we voiced in February when our Minister of State for External Affairs addressed the Conference. 1989 has been a significant year in the field of disarmament. The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons recorded the unequivocal commitment of 149 States to rid the world entirely of chemical weapons and called upon the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts to conclude the negotiations on a CW convention at the earliest date. In Vienna, an accord of historic significance on security and co-operation in Europe was signed, resulting in negotiations in earnest on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe between NATO and Warsaw Pact member States. The initial proposals tabled by the two sides reveal a high degree of convergence of views. Later in the year, we saw the resumption of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear and space issues, as well as on issues relating to the chemical weapons negotiations. These developments are a reflection of the improvement in the current international climate for making meaningful progress, described variously as "the end of the cold war" or "a new détente". What is relevant is that there is resumption of engaged dialogue. Conflicts in different parts of the world have been arrested and negotiations are under way for their resolution. The United Nations has played an important role in this process, thereby demonstrating its unique position and singular responsibility in a multipolar world. Against this positive background, however, the assessment of our work in the Conference on Disarmament during the year is sombre.

Let us first look at the nuclear issues on our agenda. It is worth pondering that the very first United Nations General Assembly resolution of January 1946 called for the elimination of nuclear weapons from States' arsenals. Since then nuclear issues have continued to be given the highest priority by the delegations present in this Conference, yet we have not been

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able to move forward in these areas. This lack of progress is a source of grave concern to my delegation. Among these the nuclear test ban is one of the most important items on our agenda. For many years the General Assembly has adopted resolutions regarding the urgent need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty, reaffirming the responsibility of this Conference in the negotiation of such an agreement. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is the single most important measure to bring about a cessation of the nuclear arms race. Therefore, partial or gradual approaches which imply reduced testing or testing at lower yields evade the issue and cannot provide the answer to this universal concern.

In the past, technical arguments were brought up against concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty by those who perceived it only as a long-term goal. The most important one related to the absence of appropriate verification methods. However, technical developments have now made it possible to meet far-reaching verification requirements. In the Mexico Declaration, circulated here as CD/723 three years ago, the leaders of the Six-nation Initiative offered to monitor a test ban in co-operation with the United States and the USSR. It is no exaggeration to state that verification today is no longer a technical issue but has become a political one.

Ambassador Yamada has undertaken intensive consultations with all delegations during the last six months to try and resolve the procedural issue of the mandate of an ad hoc committee on this item. It is encouraging to note that there is a narrowing down of differences. We would urge delegations that have called for flexibility on the part of others in order to develop a compromise agreement, which has been responded to, also to demonstrate similar flexibility if we are to establish an ad hoc committee at the beginning of the 1990 session.

The twenty-eighth session of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events concluded on 7 August under the chairmanship of Dr. Dahlman of Sweden. The work on GSETT-2 to develop a global system for seismic data exchange has progressed slowly but steadily. The first phase, consisting of start-up tests, is well under way, and the second phase is expected to begin in January 1990. The third phase, which will be a full-scale test of the entire system for an extended period of time, is the core of the test. While the exact schedule has not been established, this phase is likely to begin during the autumn of 1990. It is very possible that, had the CD been able to set up an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban, the pace of work of the GSE would have been faster. But 1990 no longer affords the CD the luxury of inaction. An ad hoc committee must be established to provide the necessary political framework within which to consider the results of GSETT-2.

On the subjects of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, statements were made by China, by the socialist States, by the Western States and by the Group of 21 reaffirming their priority. Yet progress was not registered this year. Despite the fact that, as far back as 1985, both the United States and the Soviet Union declared that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", and that, in Reykjavik, the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free world was discussed, the nuclear arms race continues

(Mr. Sharma, India)

unabated. The existence of nuclear weapons is anathema as, of all weapon systems, it alone threatens the very survival of mankind and civilization. This threat can be removed only by the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. But on item 2 - "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" - the CD this year too was unable to establish an ad hoc committee to undertake preliminary work on this subject. The Group of 21's mandate on this item was a compromise mandate reflecting two crucial aspects of this issue - the urgency attached to it and the need to deal with it in the multilateral negotiating framework. It is a mandate that called for consideration of all aspects with a view to identifying agreements to be negotiated at appropriate stages with adequate measures of verification. The draft mandate does not lay down any time frames; it is open-ended and flexible. Yet it was not found acceptable for reasons which seem to be lost in the unconvincing theology of security doctrines based on nuclear deterrence. Though we have welcomed progress achieved in bilateral negotiations, this cannot replace the genuine multilateral search for universally applicable nuclear disarmament measures. All nations have the most vital interest possible in negotiations on nuclear disarmament, though States which possess nuclear weapons clearly bear a special responsibility. In keeping with respect for the security concerns of non-nuclear nations, nuclear-weapon States must accept the obligation to take positive and practical steps towards the adoption and implementation of concrete measures leading to nuclear disarmament.

A similar deadlock has made it impossible for this Conference to move forward on agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". Once again the Group of 21 tabled a mandate on this item calling for thorough consideration of all aspects of the subject in an ad hoc committee. This is a compromise proposal intended to take into account the reservations of other delegations; from our point of view, we would favour negotiations on a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, a proposal that has enjoyed widespread support in the General Assembly during the years. However, the flexibility demonstrated by the Group of 21 was not reciprocated.

Ever since the use of a nuclear weapon in Hiroshima, sentiment has grown overwhelmingly against any use of nuclear weapons and has today become the accepted moral guideline, almost a part of customary international law. It is accepted that nuclear weapons are not weapons of war but weapons of mass destruction and doomsday weapons. As far back as 1962, General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) described the use of nuclear weapons as a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity. During the 1980s, beginning with the TTAPS report, a number of studies have been carried out on the climatic and global effects of nuclear war, most recently by the Secretary-General's group of experts. Whatever the differences in the theoretical models used, there is clear consensus among all experts that even a limited nuclear exchange would produce catastrophic and irreversible consequences for our biosphere, consequences that would be grave for combatants and non-combatants alike. It is obvious that conventional wars cannot under any circumstances be equated with nuclear war. Invoking the Charter to justify the use of nuclear weapons in the exercise of the right of self-defence is, therefore, neither legitimate or justiciable.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

Last year, the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement establishing Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres. It was described by President Reagan as "another practical step in efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict that could result from accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding". Foreign Minister Shevardnadze described it as a "tangible step in the practical implementation of the understanding that nuclear war should never be fought". With such an agreement, the probability of an inadvertent nuclear exchange may have been reduced, but two essential facts still remain - the possibility of a nuclear war still exists, and the stakes are still the same, namely, the decimation of human civilization as we know it. It is now a truism that the surest way to remove the danger of nuclear war lies in the elimination of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the only way to eliminate the threat of a nuclear holocaust is to conclude a convention that would prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, delegitimizing nuclear weapons as currencies of power.

Let me now turn to another nuclear-related issue, that of "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" - an item on which we also set up an Ad hoc Committee this year with a negotiating mandate, the report of which has already been adopted by this Conference. Once again, the Ad hoc Committee has, despite all efforts, failed to register any significant progress on this item. If we look back, we find that, at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, all nuclear-weapon States gave unilateral security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Even then, my delegation observed that such unilateral declarations do not constitute credible and binding agreements, as these were not negotiated, were not verifiable and, above all, conflicted in character and were subject to divergent interpretations. They were also at variance with the goal of total nuclear disarmament. Ultimately, the declarations sought to assure the security of nuclear-weapon States.

We remain convinced that the one effective measure to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can only be complete nuclear disarmament. Until this is achieved, it is imperative, as an interim step, for the international community to develop effective measures to provide non-nuclear-weapon States with clear-cut and unambiguous guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, or the impression could well be created that nuclear-weapon States are perpetuating their present military superiority and denying other States the right to undiminished security.

The use of the qualifying adjective "negative" to define the security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States is also puzzling, and needs to be looked at afresh. Is this to distinguish them from the "positive" security assurances that are provided to member States belonging to the two military alliances, security assurances that are based on the possible use and threat of use of nuclear weapons? In present times, when old concepts and principles of security-related doctrines are being reviewed and reformulated, my delegation finds this distinction anachronistic, particularly if we accept the fact that one nation's security cannot be built at the cost of the insecurity of another nation, and that we have to undertake a search for security that will collectively enhance security for all States.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

Turning to the subject of prevention of an arms race in outer space, it is accepted that an extension of the arms race into outer space would have profoundly destabilizing consequences. Deeply conscious of such risks, an overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations have in recent years urged the Conference on Disarmament to take resolute measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. The international community has, for more than three decades, recognized outer space as a common preserve of mankind. To expand international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, it is essential for it to be kept free of all types of weapons and anti-weapon systems.

Since 1985, the Conference on Disarmament, and in particular the Ad hoc Committee, have carried out useful work. The time has now come to take stock of these discussions and a dozen or more proposals that have been put forward by delegations. Our future work needs to be structured and organized so as to enable us to undertake full-fledged negotiations that can strengthen the international legal régime pertaining to outer space. We have been told that the existing international legal régime pertaining to outer space is adequate, as no violation of the Charter, particularly Article II, paragraph 4, has reportedly occurred in outer space. We find such an argument insufficient. To find reassurance in the belief that, because there has not been any violation of the Charter in outer space, there will not be any in the future, would be to shut our eyes to history, the logic of research and scientific and technological developments that are taking place all around us. This Conference, at the present moment, has been charged with the responsibility of negotiating measures for preventing an arms race in outer space so that no violations of the Charter are reported in future decades and we will not have to inscribe a far more complex and troubling subject on the CD's agenda, namely, cessation of an arms race in outer space.

It is universally accepted that it is in mankind's common interest for the exploration of space to be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes. This gives every country, irrespective of its level of scientific and technological development, a stake in maintaining outer space free of all weapons. Bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union are by their very nature limited. Further, their objective too is restricted compared to the responsibility enjoined upon the Conference on Disarmament. Therefore, bilateral negotiations cannot be considered a substitute for effective multilateral action leading to universal agreements in this field.

The existing international legal régime does place some legal restraints on the placement of certain types of weapons in outer space. However, these restraints are neither comprehensive in scope nor do they apply to all kinds of weapon systems. Under the outer space Treaty, only the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Earth's orbit and on celestial bodies is prohibited. Other weapons are left outside the scope of the outer space Treaty. These are precisely the areas where research is currently being undertaken to develop directed-energy weapons as well as kinetic energy weapons. Another debate has concerned the definition of the term "peaceful purposes". The negotiating record of the outer space Treaty indicates that a great majority of delegates addressing this issue consider

(Mr. Sharma, India)

that the term "peaceful" should be interpreted as "non-military" and not merely in the narrow sense of "non-aggressive". The limitations of the existing international legal régime have become strikingly more evident in view of technological developments taking place. New legal instruments need to be developed which will reflect the political reality as well as technological developments.

The existing corpus of international law, in the form of both bilateral and multilateral agreements, indicates clearly the direction in which we have to move. Among the proposals put forward by delegations, some relate to specific aspects such as banning ASAT weapons or providing immunity to satellites, while others adopt a comprehensive approach such as amendment of the 1967 outer space Treaty or addition of a protocol to it. While supporting different proposals for negotiating concrete measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, my delegation has placed particular emphasis on a comprehensive agreement which would prohibit the development of anti-satellite weapons and provide for the dismantling of all existing systems.

Satellite technology has reached a stage where it is an important aid in economic planning and development. Communications, remote sensing, navigation and meteorology are some of the fields where developing countries enjoy great benefits from satellite technology. We therefore view with great concern the development of anti-satellite weapon systems. The existing international legal régime with respect to anti-satellite weapons is also limited. Anti-satellite weapons cannot legally be tested, installed or used on any celestial body and cannot be placed in orbit around the Earth or stationed in outer space if they carry a nuclear weapon or any other weapon of mass destruction. However, testing and use of conventionally armed anti-satellite weapons is permitted. At the same time, the bilateral treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union - the ABM Treaty - places restrictions on testing of weapons in ABM mode but permits weapons to be tested in ASAT mode. This gap has been the justification used in the past for testing of anti-satellite weapons. Nevertheless, since 1985, both the United States and the USSR have observed a moratorium on anti-satellite testing. As an immediate measure, therefore, my delegation would propose that the de facto moratorium on testing of the existing dedicated anti-satellite weapons should be formalized. What is needed now are multilateral negotiations to convert this voluntary restraint into a universally binding commitment. Production as well as deployment of dedicated anti-satellite weapons should be prohibited, and existing anti-satellite systems should be dismantled. Furthermore, the testing of non-dedicated systems in ASAT mode should also be prohibited, thereby closing the gap that exists in the relevant legal régime. Problems of definitions and verification are not insurmountable. This is evident from the fact that, since 1985, no allegations have been traded about the violation of the self-imposed moratorium on ASAT testing by either of the two States concerned, indicating that not only are national technical means of verification adequate to detect and verify testing of space weapons in ASAT mode, but a mutually agreed definition of a dedicated ASAT weapon does exist.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

In addition, other delegations have also put forward complementary proposals to provide immunity to satellites, especially those that generate opportunities for development in economic growth and international security. The immunity provided by the Charter is limited. This was soon realized by both the United States and the USSR, and in both bilateral treaties, SALT and ABM, interference with each other's national technical means of verification, namely satellite systems, was prohibited. Global peace-keeping and universal disarmament agreements need an integrated multilateral verification system, as proposed by the leaders of the Six-nation Initiative. Other proposals for international satellite monitoring have been put forward, particularly by France and Canada. Work on confidence-building measures is useful in the context of negotiations on an ASAT ban, as these would help in providing for greater data exchange possibilities. However, it must be kept in mind that confidence-building measures such as "rules of the road", "keep-out zones", etc. provide only a limited immunity; full immunity can only be provided by a verifiable, comprehensive ASAT ban. My delegation believes that work on such confidence-building measures and negotiations on an ASAT ban are not mutually exclusive, and hopes that next year we will be able to establish an ad hoc committee with a mandate that will enable progress to be registered across a broad spectrum of issues.

Let me now turn to the subject of the chemical weapons negotiations. The Final Declaration of the Paris Conference provided an auspicious beginning to our work this year. The support could not have been more clearly stated than in the commitment voiced by 149 States that urged the Conference on Disarmament to conclude negotiations at the earliest possible date. The necessary framework to deal with the pending issues was also set up through the resourceful and methodical leadership provided by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Morel, and the five working group chairmen. Yet, as the session draws to a close and we take stock of the situation, our feelings are mixed. Undeniably we have made some progress but, against the background of political will and the sense of urgency expressed in the Paris Declaration, in the negotiating framework and the resources provided to us, it has been modest.

The optimism reflected in Paris was diluted, as was seen by the inability of the Conference to reach consensus on a minor updating of the mandate in February. This cast a shadow, which is evidenced by the fact that although during the last six months a considerable amount of work has been done, we have been unable to come closer to solutions regarding a few crucial outstanding issues. My Minister, addressing the Conference on Disarmament on 14 February this year, sounded a note of caution when he stated:

"At present, we observe that far too much time in the Ad hoc Committee is devoted to technical details which divert attention from the political issues that still remain to be resolved. Such details could be identified and resolved by the preparatory commission. The time has come for us to look forward and move with vigour and decisiveness. A clear approach would in itself provide a positive thrust to negotiations in the CD."



(Mr. Sharma, India)

The volume of work done this year is clear from the fact that the report of the Ad hoc Committee runs to 242 pages. As many as 65 working papers were submitted to the Ad hoc Committee. Yet it is also clear that on the crucial issues of challenge inspection, the composition of and decision-making in the Executive Council, the order of destruction and some of the legal issues pertaining to amendments and the entry into force of the CW convention, we do not have new language included in the draft convention. After an initial discussion on the subject of verification which tackled the issue directly and squarely with regard to additional measures, the Working Group found itself in an impasse. At the same time, we have enlarged the discussions in a number of other areas such as instrumentation, confidentiality, inspection protocols, model facility attachments, etc. A number of national trial inspections have been carried out which confirm that the existing verification system developed in the draft convention is sound and reliable. All these are subjects that would help in the smooth implementation of the CW convention, but, before that, we have to ensure that we have a convention.

I do not think that it is possible to maintain the momentum in the negotiations indefinitely. We cannot let ourselves be bogged down in protracted discussions of certain details at this stage. As Ambassador von Stülpnagel reminded us, we must "make use of the 'window of opportunity' provided by the historic situation we find ourselves in". We must recognize that time is running out and accept the political fact that the only way to free mankind from all chemical weapons for all time is the conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention which ensures that all existing chemical weapon stocks and chemical weapon production facilities are eliminated and that the further development, production, acquisition, transfer and use of these weapons is prohibited. Interim measures designed to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons, apart from not being effective, also run the risk of opening up a parallel track which could easily derail ongoing negotiations and confuse the objective we are working towards. Political reality dictates that the risk does not come from the possible use of chemical weapons but from the existence of chemical weapons, and the only way to address this political reality is to find a politically viable solution. A comprehensive solution is the only viable political solution. If we want a convention that will enjoy universal adherence, then we must work on a convention that will attract universal adherence. This requires the convention to be non-discriminatory and provide for equal rights and obligations of all States, whether or not they possess chemical weapons and whether or not they have a large chemical industry. It implies that the convention must contain an effective system of verification that reassures all States parties about compliance. It implies that the Convention must ensure the unimpeded right of States parties to develop, produce, use, exchange and transfer chemicals and technology for peaceful purposes, and that the Convention must not hinder or impede international co-operation in peaceful areas of chemical industry development. These are some of the principles which need to be observed and safeguarded if we want to develop a convention which is universal and comprehensive.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

How would these principles translate into approaches to resolve the outstanding issues? The open-ended consultations carried out by Ambassador Morel on the subject of challenge inspection indicate that we are working on the right track. However, it is necessary to bear in mind that once a request for challenge inspection is received by the international organization created, the area of interest is enlarged and becomes a concern of all States parties. All States parties then are legitimately involved in seeking reassurance that the convention is being upheld. The multilateral character of challenge inspection therefore needs to be ensured if these concerns and the universal interest in upholding the convention are to be met. On the subject of the composition of the Executive Council we have also had useful preliminary discussions. It is clear that the Executive Council will be small in size, much smaller in size than the Conference of States Parties. All States parties have a right to be represented in the Executive Council, and furthermore, during the period that they are not present on the Executive Council, they must feel that the Executive Council is representative of the various interests that are reflected in the Conference of States Parties. In our view, all member States represented on the Executive Committee should enjoy equal rights and obligations. However, it is likely that in practice certain States parties will serve more frequently on the Executive Council than other States parties in the implementation of the criteria accepted, which cannot be seen to detract from the basic principle of equitable geographical balance, the principle of non-discrimination and the need for universal adherence.

I am sure we all share the sense of urgency and realize that the CW negotiations are at a critical stage. If we look at other disarmament negotiations, we realize that any slow-down can be a serious set-back to our efforts. At the same time, CW negotiations are but part of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. The nuclear issues, which enjoy the highest priority, also need to be addressed, and Conference resources allocated to them. We hope, therefore, that taking this priority into account, the Conference on Disarmament will set itself a time frame within which to conclude its negotiations on a CW convention. Setting a time frame would provide the necessary political thrust for concluding our work during the 1990 session.

I would like to draw attention to document CD/859 tabled last year by my delegation, containing an "Action plan for ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order". The action plan envisages the total elimination of nuclear weapons in three stages by the year 2010, accompanied by measures to reduce conventional arms and forces to minimum defensive levels and steps to forestall the application of emerging technologies to military purposes. It is a plan that is global and comprehensive in nature and based on the principle of multilateralism and non-discrimination. It expresses the hope that in accordance with a programme for nuclear disarmament, multilateral negotiations could be initiated for a new treaty to replace the discriminatory Non-Proliferation Treaty. We have stressed in the action plan that general and complete disarmament under effective international control is a precursor to a peaceful and non-violent world order. It also provides a seminal role for the United Nations in maintaining peace and security. I hope that during the 1990 session this document will provide a useful input to our negotiations.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

It is true that the work of the Conference cannot be detached from the political reality which conditions and surrounds it. However, on the part of the Conference this need not be an entirely passive relationship, and the Conference can also contribute to the evolution of a new mode of thinking on disarmament negotiations. We are in a very different situation today from that of even some years ago, and it will evolve more rapidly in the years to come. This fact demonstrates one truth, which may have been less apparent in the post-war decade or two, namely, that there are no barriers to human knowledge and capability. What one section of the human community can accomplish today can be achieved by other societies, and attempting to put barriers to this evolution of human capability in general will be as effective as Canute's efforts to stem the waves. In the past, agreements on disarmament have been almost entirely restricted to those between major military Powers and others devised by these Powers which the international community was invited to join. Perhaps this expressed the political reality of a bygone era, but this pattern of exclusivism is already broken, even if recognition of this central political reality is slow in coming. To be durable and to safeguard our future in the common interest, the disarmament dialogue on issues of joint concern will have to be conducted progressively on a universal basis and reflect a globalism in approach. This is the only road to true security, one where partnership in global disarmament issues is indivisible. The significance of the CW convention lies as much in the world community successfully abolishing an abhorrent class of weapons as in the successful example it would create of the universality of approach which should inform the deliberations of the Conference. In this respect it would be a historical watershed convention, and hopefully the precursor in method of other agreements on the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and threatening new areas of warfare. The observations which I have made on individual areas of concern to the Conference have been made in a spirit of seeking shared global objectives in our work here.

I do realize that I have held the floor somewhat longer than I think is customary. I think, however, that I have accumulated considerable speaking time on the credit side over the spring and summer sessions. I have only cashed it in all at once.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): The summer session of the Conference on Disarmament is coming to its end. This inevitably brings everyone of us face to face with the question: What did we achieve in the course of nearly six months' efforts in 1989? The assessment of the results is a task for every delegation, and it is undoubtedly made in conformity with the established procedures in every country and against the background of its foreign policy.

But the question also has a purely human dimension. Are we all as human beings satisfied with the work done? Do the results arrived at correspond to the amount of intellectual energy and efforts spent by all of us? Everybody probably has his own answer to that question, which may be different in the details, but in the main boils down, I am sure, to deep disappointment due to the fruitlessness of the Conference's activities as a whole.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

The only ray of hope that inspires us with some confidence for the future is the continuing movement forward in the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. The impulse provided by the Paris Conference, although it lost some force due to the lack of readiness of some delegations to switch immediately to the new reality, in the long run had a favourable influence on the pace of our work.

The new report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is an impressive document. Justice requires us to pay tribute to Ambassador Morel (France) for his energetic efforts aimed at accelerating the pace of the negotiations, which have brought some concrete results. It can now be claimed that there are no blanks in the "rolling text" as far as the inclusion of all problems and topics is concerned. We have at our disposal a more solid textual basis.

I think it is generally recognized that there are three main problems which will determine whether we will reach the end of the road leading to the finalizing of a draft convention on a chemical weapons ban. I am speaking about the system of control and verification, the order of destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles, and the Executive Council of the future organization. That is why, I think, the consultations carried out on Ambassador Morel's initiative and dealing with the challenge inspection procedures (article IX, part II) and the composition and decision-making process of the Executive Council are a step in the right direction. The inclusion of the results of those consultations in appendix II of the "rolling text" is to be welcomed. Undoubtedly, the submission to the Conference of an agreed Soviet-American document on challenge inspection procedures would make a considerable contribution in this respect.

A number of useful and important conclusions in the field of verification were drawn from the national trial inspections. The presentation of reports on these inspections by a number of key countries belonging to all groups, and the holding of an open dialogue, contributed to the identification of a number of problems that might arise in that field. We hope that the holding of the second phase of experiments - international trial inspections - will bring us still closer to a model for international verification in the framework of the convention.

Consideration of the question of the Executive Council reveals that the three aspects of the problem - composition, terms of reference and the procedure for decision-taking - are interrelated. It is evident, for example, that the wider the terms of reference of the Council, the bigger will be the interest of the countries participating as members in it, and the greater the importance of the provisions for decision-taking. Although the document entitled "Outcome of the open-ended consultations on article IX, part 2" included in appendix II of the Committee's report outlines the political contours rather than the legal content of a possible agreement, it definitely marks an important step forward.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

Notwithstanding, we have to admit that the progress achieved so far is mainly on technical matters. Therefore, we have to be fully aware that if next year we continue at this year's pace and do not succeed in solving the main problems that have a political connotation, the convention will continue to elude us. It is important that all countries, and above all the chemically most developed ones, should show their readiness to translate their political declarations in favour of banning chemical weapons into practical deeds in drafting the convention.

The movement forward in the chemical weapons negotiations cannot dispel disappointment over the lack of progress as to the remaining agenda items. I shall dwell only on some of them - the ones whose topicality is recognized by everyone.

There is an international consensus that the Conference on Disarmament is supposed to play an important role in negotiations on the cessation of the arms race and disarmament. It is to be regretted that over the past decade the Conference has been unable to produce a single multilateral agreement. It is alarming that there is a deadlock on each and every nuclear item on the Conference's agenda.

In my statement delivered last March I dwelt in detail on the nuclear test ban question, and presented the Bulgarian position on that matter. I do not want to repeat what has already been said. I shall only add that my delegation followed with great interest the efforts of Ambassador Yamada of Japan in the search for a consensus on the question of a mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. My delegation expects to hear more about the results obtained. We are in favour of the continuation of those efforts during the forty-third General Assembly session.

My delegation believes that bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations can and should complement each other if there is a political will to find ways and means of harmonizing them. For this reason, while open to any procedural arrangement, we are in favour of setting up an ad hoc subsidiary body on item 2. In our view it is high time for the Conference to commence serious and in-depth discussion on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The Conference could attempt to devise a comprehensive stage-by-stage programme, with agreed time frames for each individual stage, for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world. Another subject for consideration could be the principles on the basis of which the process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out. An important topic of discussion could be the problems of verifying multilateral measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and the order of destruction of nuclear weapons. It is to be expected that meaningful consideration of item 2 would bring to the fore several useful ideas and proposals and thus create some prerequisites for the commencement of concrete multilateral negotiations. The Conference must face its responsibilities on nuclear issues because bilateral negotiations, although of extreme importance, cannot solve all nuclear disarmament questions.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

On 8 August, in my capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of Socialist Countries, I spoke on some aspects of item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". Now on behalf of my delegation I would like to stress some points. It is generally recognized that the greatest peril facing mankind is the threat to its survival posed by nuclear weapons, and that, consequently, the prevention of nuclear war is a matter of highest priority. It is therefore lamentable that no progress has been made in the Conference on item 3 since its inclusion in the agenda. It is clear that the deadlock on item 3 is not due to procedural or organizational difficulties. The core of the problem is whether one is willing to find a common denominator on it. In a sense it could be argued that there is such a common denominator. The declaration by the leaders of the USSR and the United States that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought has been welcomed by each and every delegation in the Conference on Disarmament. This prompted my delegation to suggest in its document CD/710 that "efforts aimed at the prevention of nuclear war would be spurred on if the Soviet-United States declaration on the senselessness of nuclear war were supported by the remaining nuclear Powers and by all countries in the world, and if it were consolidated in a suitable form on a multilateral basis".

The first report approved by the Conference was the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. One more document was added to the long history of negotiations on agenda item 6 of the Conference. No assessment of the report can avoid the conclusion that this year again no progress was made in the negotiations. My delegation deeply regrets this state of affairs. In our view a lot of prerequisites are at hand for the Conference to start moving ahead on item 6. There is a clear understanding of the various positions. The points of divergence are well established. A number of proposals and formulae aimed at bringing the positions closer have been advanced. All delegations have repeatedly reiterated their readiness to search for a "common formula" which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding nature.

We live in times when East-West relations are being improved, a new type of confidence is being built, military openness and transparency is being increased, innovative solutions in the field of disarmament are being found. It seems to us that these are elements of a qualitatively new political environment for the consideration of negative security assurances. We regard the solution to the problem of providing effective and credible guarantees for the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States as part and parcel of the more all-embracing task of strengthening international peace and security, enhancing the political and legal foundations for observance of the principle of non-use of force in international relations.

The fourth review conference of the NPT is approaching. It is high time for the Conference to proceed to meaningful negotiations on item 6 of its agenda. We believe that the task of the Conference might be facilitated if the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly succeeded in adopting one single resolution on negative security assurances.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

My delegation, as a sponsor of one of the two resolutions which the First Committee has been adopting for years now, is ready to participate in the search for, and elaboration of, a single compromise solution to be adopted at the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The deliberations on the subject of the prevention of an arms race in outer space this year in the Ad hoc Committee, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Bayart, again underlined the many-sided relationship between the utilization of outer space and international security. There is now a commonly shared belief that the implementation of a wide set of confidence-building and co-operative measures in outer space could enhance transparency and predictability in this sphere of human activity, thus contributing to the main objective of ensuring the absence of arms of any kind in outer space. My delegation is convinced that the elaboration of "rules of the road" and a code of conduct in outer space could be instrumental for the cause of the prevention of an arms race there, and we are ready to participate in practical efforts to that end. The set of measures of a political character proposed recently by the delegation of Poland in document CD/941 are also conducive, in my opinion, to future progress on this item and deserve in-depth consideration in the Ad hoc Committee.

We note with satisfaction the participation of experts from various member States in the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee. This testifies to the increased interest in various aspects of the problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The contributions made by the experts provided us with better knowledge of the issues involved and demonstrated the utility of having further recourse to expert advice and opinion.

If the prevailing opinion is that it is still too early to institutionalize a permanent group of experts, a proposal that my delegation has already spoken in favour of, we could probably start by asking an open-ended expert group, on an ad hoc basis, to explore and present to the Ad hoc Committee its opinion on certain problems of a purely technical or legal nature - for example, the assessment of existing verification technologies with respect to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The elaboration of common standards, requirements and procedures for international satellite data exchange for the purpose of verification could also be taken up effectively at the expert level under the auspices of the Ad hoc Committee. In this respect it is worth mentioning the Soviet proposal for the creation of an international space monitoring agency in document CD/OS/WP.39. In our view this is an initiative of great importance not only in the sphere of disarmament, but also in the wider context of strengthening international security and co-operation.

In conclusion I would only like to note that the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, to which little attention was paid this year, is acquiring growing importance. We cannot cope with the tasks we have in front of us unless we have adequate and flexible machinery at our disposal. That is the reason why my delegation considers that problem deserves greater attention and seriousness at next year's session of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I have no more speakers on my list. Are there any delegations wishing to take the floor? I see there are none.

I would now like to inform you of the status of work on the Conference's annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. As you know, the informal open-ended consultations on the substantive paragraphs relating to agenda items 1, 2, 3 and 7 have resulted in agreement. Today the secretariat has distributed a revised version of these documents here in the conference room, as well as in the delegations' pigeon-holes, and during the day will distribute the other documents on the agenda items I have just mentioned. The distribution has been carried out in English for the moment to facilitate the work of delegations before the draft annual report is considered at an informal meeting of the Conference immediately prior to the adoption of the report. The text of the draft annual report will be circulated, as usual, in all the official languages. I hope that the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will adopt its report to the plenary of the Conference at its 3 p.m. meeting today. I have also been told that the informal consultations on the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space have reached a satisfactory conclusion, and that the Ad hoc Committee will hold a meeting to adopt its report immediately after this plenary meeting in this conference room.

However, there remains one question to be settled, which is the subject of intense consultations with the co-ordinators and other interested delegations. I will pursue my efforts to reach a solution before the end of the day, so that the secretariat can prepare the final text of the annual report.

Since the work of the ad hoc committees has virtually been concluded, we will have no need of a timetable of meetings for the coming week. I would simply remind you that we will hold two plenary meetings, on Tuesday and Thursday, and that, prior to the plenary meeting on Thursday 31 August, there will be an informal meeting for the second reading of the technical parts of the report and the substantive paragraphs. Should we reach agreement on the last points concerning which meetings are to continue today, the secretariat hopes to be able to distribute the text of the draft annual report on Wednesday 30 August in all the official languages from 3 p.m. onwards. The English text may even be distributed a little earlier, on Wednesday morning.

I have no other business for today and therefore intend to close this meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday 29 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.



**CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT**

CD/PV.530  
29 August 1989

ENGLISH

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**FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH PLENARY MEETING**

**Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 29 August 1989, at 10 a.m.**

**President:            Mr. El Ghali Benhima            (Morocco)**

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 530th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

Today the Conference continues its consideration of the reports of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies, as well as the consideration and adoption of its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative who so wishes may raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Japan, France (who will speak in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons), China, Mongolia (who will speak in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space), the Republic of Korea, and Mexico (who will speak on behalf of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament). I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada.

Mr. YAMADA (Japan): Mr. President, I have already had occasion to congratulate you upon your assumption of the presidency of the Conference. But I would like to express again my sincere felicitations for your able and skilful leadership. Under your guidance we are close to the successful conclusion of this year's session of the Conference.

As this will be my last intervention as the Japanese representative in the Conference, I would like to share with you what I think about the Conference and multilateral disarmament diplomacy. When I came to join you in the fall of 1986, the world was witnessing the beginning of a turn in the history of disarmament and arms control. In East-West relations, and in particular in relations between the United States and the USSR, things are happening one after another which, in the preceding years, we could not even dream of. The INF agreement and its smooth implementation, the joint verification experiments at the United States and USSR nuclear testing sites, the commencement of the CFE talks and their rapid progress, and the inviting of visitors to sensitive military facilities, are some of those which I have in mind.

I came here with the hope that, after a long period of hibernation, we were to see significant movements in the multilateral disarmament process. I was delighted to see the sincerity, devotion and hard work of the members of the Conference for the cause of disarmament. I have experienced ups and downs, expectations and disappointments. I must be candid and say that I leave here with the feeling that the curtain has not yet risen on the scene of multilateral disarmament. However I detect some underlying trends clearly in motion. The attention of the world public is focused more and more on the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. Progress in disarmament does not come easily. Success demands persistence, hard work and the demonstration of inspired political leadership. I am convinced that the time will soon come, and must come, when your efforts bear fruit.

The issues related to nuclear weapons are of high priority for the people of Japan, who ardently pray that nuclear weapons will ultimately be eliminated so that the nuclear holocaust is never repeated. Japan strives for the

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realization of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. International efforts for a nuclear test ban have a long history of more than 30 years. There have been times when strenuous and concerted efforts were made and agreement looked imminent. I must confess my disappointment when I hear statements which, in my view, inadvertently neglect the history of international efforts, contradict the commitment in existing legal documents and cast doubt on their credibility and good faith.

The nuclear test ban is an independent disarmament measure. It is designed to stop the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. It is designed to put constraints on the further development of nuclear weapons. The proponents of nuclear testing say it is necessary to test as long as we depend on nuclear weapons. Yes, they are right. That is precisely the reason I want the nuclear test ban. Some say that the nuclear test ban will have little effect on nuclear armament. They may also be right. But then for what purpose do they continue testing? Though Japan would like as much to see the immediate cessation of all nuclear tests, we do not advocate an unrealistic approach, nor any measure which adversely affects the security of the world, in particular that of Western countries, with which Japan shares the same political values. That is why my Foreign Minister proposed in the Conference in 1984 the step-by-step approach. That is why Japan supports the United States-USSR agreement on full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations, embodied in their joint statement of 17 September 1987. We sincerely hope that the two Governments will accelerate the implementation of their agreement and that the multilateral negotiation process will soon be linked to their undertaking.

The Conference on Disarmament has been prevented for several years past from conducting practical work on the nuclear test ban issue over the question of a mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". The deadlock was caused by the conflicting formal positions of the groups. However, I have witnessed a growing number of delegations expressing their individual wishes to start substantive work on nuclear testing issues in the Conference. When I took up the presidency of the Conference in March, I embarked on a process of dialogue in search of consensus on the question of a mandate. In an effort to disentangle ourselves from the impasse of the conflicting group positions, I consulted each delegation on an informal and individual basis. With the co-operation of all the delegations, I was able to establish that the draft mandate proposed by Ambassador Vejvoda in CD/863 could in fact be used as a basis to develop a consensus, and I believe this represents a breakthrough. Further consultations have narrowed down the difference considerably, and I see a ray of hope for agreement.

I am very grateful to you, Mr. President, for your constant encouragement of my efforts. I would also like to express my gratitude to the successive presidents and many delegates who have rendered their warm support to this undertaking. I would also like to note that Ambassador de Azambuja and Ambassador Dietze have given me valuable co-operation as item co-ordinators for their groups. I regret that I am as yet not in a position to report agreement to you. It is all my fault and not that of any delegation. I am

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confident, however, that with continued efforts during the inter-sessional period, we still have a good chance to agree to start the substantive work at the outset of the session next year.

I would like to comment briefly on the progress report on the twenty-eighth session of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, contained in document CD/944. I highly appreciate the continued excellent work carried out by the Group to finalize the design of a modern international seismic data exchange system. The GSE is now at a very important stage of its work in putting its conceptual design to the test. In this connection, I note with great satisfaction that the first phase of the Group's second large-scale technical test (GSETT-2) will be completed by the end of this year, and that its second phase will start on 16 January next year.

At the same time, I share the serious concern expressed by Dr. Dahlman, Chairman of the Group, concerning participation in GSETT-2. The geographical distribution of the 41 stations offered by 21 countries is uneven, with no station in Africa nor in South America, and only a few in Asia. Broader participation is called for, in order to meet the objectives of GSETT-2.

A global seismic monitoring system is an essential factor in a future CTB. The value of the GSE's contribution would also be enhanced by wider participation. I would like to call on those countries which have not yet done so, especially those in the southern hemisphere, to join the GSE.

The preparatory process for the last review of the NPT next year has already started. The first session of the Preparatory Committee, held in May, was attended by 95 States, 30 more than the preparatory meeting for the third review - an indication of growing interest and concern on the future of the NPT régime after 1995. For the last 20 years the NPT régime has been one of the most important legal frameworks for the security of the world. Japan's objective is to safeguard and strengthen the NPT régime. For that, we need strenuous efforts on the part of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. We need to consider the issues of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban in their interrelationship, and formulate a coherent multilateral strategy. The NPT is not an end in itself, it is an intermediate step towards a nuclear-free world. In order to maintain the NPT régime, there must be parallel genuine efforts in nuclear disarmament. We welcome the ongoing negotiations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on START, and would like to express our sincere hope for the early success of their negotiations. I would also like to call upon other nuclear-weapon States, as well as non-nuclear-weapon States at the threshold, to consider the policy of foresight for future generations. After all, what right does a country have to claim to be different from others on nuclear choice? If the others follow their course, then chaos and a catastrophe on our planet will ensue.

The success of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons at the outset of the year provided the momentum for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to conduct intensified negotiations and achieve many important results, particularly on technical issues. They are

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indispensable elements for drafting the chemical weapons convention. I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Ambassador Pierre Morel, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, for his untiring efforts, wisdom and leadership. I would also like to commend the chairmen of the five working groups for their excellent work.

We have not, however, had a breakthrough on important political issues - for instance, how to reach a common basic understanding on verification régimes including challenge inspection, the composition and decision-making of the Executive Council and undiminished security during the transition period. We must take into account the interrelated nature of those issues and others within the overall framework of the Convention.

The Paris Conference generated a global political momentum for the CW negotiations. But looking back over what took place in the Conference this year, I have a sense of uneasiness that the momentum might be slipping out of our fingers. Setting an artificial deadline for the negotiation is of course not necessarily conducive to a good treaty. On the other hand, can we just go on and on, business as usual, and get a treaty on issues like chemical weapons of such political magnitude? I am not sure if it will work. We must have a common perception of the political target of the time frame of the negotiation. We must have political determination to work with that political time frame in mind, if we are to have a CW Convention.

The Government of Australia will host the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons in three weeks' time. Japan will participate in the conference and work for its success. We hope the conference will give further impetus to the CW negotiations here. I am grateful to Ambassador David Reese for clarifying the character of the conference in response to the joint statement of the Group of 21. Japan is gravely concerned at the growing danger of the spread of chemical weapons. In this respect, Japan is taking, individually and in concert with like-minded governments, appropriate measures in conformity with paragraph 4 of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference. On the other hand, our global efforts must be concentrated on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, and not on any intermediate measures.

Verification problems are very difficult, both politically and technically. While it may be impossible to establish a watertight verification régime, we should strive for the setting up of a verification régime which is reasonably effective and reliable. It is also important to take note of the basic differences between the verification of CW destruction, which is conducted for 10 years, and the verification of "non-production", which lasts for ever.

Working Group 1 has worked out the "Annex on the protection of confidential information". It is indispensable to protect the confidentiality of both military and civil information in a proper way. For that, I believe, this annex is an important product. The Group has also addressed the "Protocol on inspection procedures", verification régimes under article VI and

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others. We find it important to discuss details of those issues in order to solve verification problems and draft a consistent text. It is hoped that the chairmen's laudable initiatives will bring about further progress.

The national trial inspections have been very useful in drafting a realistic convention and raising awareness of the convention among those concerned in capitals. As a follow-on to the report on its trial inspection, Japan has already submitted a working paper on initial visits and "step-by-step inspections". Based on the results of national trial inspections, the Ad hoc Committee should continue to follow up this useful exercise in appropriate ways.

The "pattern of verification" is an issue of basic importance to the CW convention. If we go into detailed discussions with no common understanding on a basic framework of verification, we may well be faced with more confusion. In this context, I very much appreciate Ambassador Morel's serious efforts in trying to find some common understanding on challenge inspection.

Working Group 4 has worked steadily since the spring session so as to compile the annex on chemicals. When we discuss the schedules and guidelines under article VI, we should strike a proper balance between the risk to the purposes of the convention and the necessity to make effective and efficient use of the limited resources of the technical secretariat. Though it is easily forgotten in detailed discussions, we also need to note the basic difference between schedule 1 chemicals, which are in principle banned, and those in schedules 2 and 3, which are permitted for production, consumption, etc., under appropriate controls. We still find it necessary to continue detailed study with respect to specific problems. But I greatly appreciate the chairmen's initiatives based upon technical and expert knowledge, which have enabled the Committee to make important progress in the areas under study by the Group, including the annex on chemicals.

I would also like to add that, thanks to the serious efforts of the chairmen, we were also able to deepen our discussions and produce some tangible results in other working groups. To name a few, my delegation thinks that important work has been done with respect to amendment sanctions and others in Group 2, article VIII, article VII and others in Group 3, and article X, the preparation period and others in Group 5.

As was emphasized in the Declaration of the Paris Conference, it is imperative that the CW Convention should be global. We heartily welcome the increased participation in the CW negotiations by States not members of the Conference. As we agreed in Paris, any State wishing to contribute to the negotiations should be able to do so.

Briefly on the issues relating to preventing an arms race in outer space: We acknowledge the special responsibility of the two major space Powers in this field. Progress in their bilateral negotiations has a critical impact on our discussions in the Conference. And we wish for early progress in their negotiations in Geneva. At the same time, we should proceed with our work of examining what multilateral agreements would be useful. Our work must be on the basis of three elements: that outer space does not belong to any

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country; that an arms race in outer space directly affects the security of not just the two major Powers but all other countries as well; and that rapid progress in space development is being made by countries other than the United States and the USSR.

What approach should we take in the Conference? We must know exactly how outer space is being used in practice, and examine the existing legal régime to see how it can be utilized to prevent an arms race in outer space. This approach requires discussion on how to deal with gaps between current outer space activities and the existing international legal régime, as well as on how to enhance the existing legal régime in order to prevent an arms race in outer space. It is essential to have a common interpretation in order to implement the existing legal régime. But there does not exist consensus on interpretation of these legal provisions. Steps must be taken to try to arrive at agreement on the definition of terms, taking into account recent scientific and technological advances. In this regard, I commend the analysis of terminological problems presented to the outer space Committee by Canada last year.

The Conference could play an important role in formulating confidence-building measures in outer space. In coming years, as outer space becomes increasingly crowded with space objects of various types, there will be a need to evolve "traffic rules" so as to avoid accidents. The concept of "rules of the road" in outer space might be a subject which the Conference could develop. In this regard, the presentation made by the scientific experts of the Federal Republic of Germany and France during the summer session was very useful.

Current space-based reconnaissance involves the use of several types of satellites. Scientific and technological advances make it possible to monitor military manoeuvres and military equipment. Satellite observations provide a major tool for verification, and may also be used to provide data complementary to the evidence obtained by other means of verification of disarmament agreements. Satellite verification is also a subject which the Conference might tackle from various angles.

I will be bidding farewell to you to take up my new assignment in the Arab Republic of Egypt, the greatest country of ancient culture and modern dynamism, which Ambassador Nabil Elaraby so ably represents here in the Conference. My successor, Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki, will join you soon. He is an outstanding diplomat the Japanese foreign service is proud of. May I request you to accord him the same close co-operation you have been kind enough to extend to me?

Mr. President, distinguished colleagues, Ambassador Komatina, Ambassador Berasategui, members of the Department of Disarmament Affairs, interpreters and all the members of the secretariat: My wife, who is attending the plenary today in the upper gallery in conformity with rule 20 of the rules of procedure, and myself would like to express our deepest gratitude to you all for your kindness in making our stay in Geneva most fruitful and memorable. We will treasure for ever the pleasant memories of our association with you. We now wish you every success in your noble task for the cause of multilateral disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Japan for his statement, and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. Ambassador Yamada is leaving us after two years and a half in the Conference, and will leave a remarkable memory behind him owing to his personal and professional qualities. With his special kindness and exceptional style and diplomatic skill, he has played an important role in the Conference, notably recently in seeking a convergence of positions on very delicate issues, either as President or as representative of his country, Japan, which he has represented in the Conference with great distinction. Recently we have witnessed the efforts he has made to conduct the informal consultations aimed at the re-establishment of the ad hoc committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", and we are very grateful to him. Ambassador Yamada has brought us closer to consensus on this topic, and I am sure that his contribution to the Conference will have a positive outcome. Ambassador and Mrs. Yamada have our best wishes in his new and very important diplomatic duties. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Morel, to introduce the report of the Ad hoc Committee, which has been issued under the symbol CD/952.

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): First of all, Mr President, let me say how delighted the French delegation is at seeing you presiding over our Conference during the month of August: not only because of the excellent relations which have traditionally linked our two countries, but also because we have all appreciated the skill and the competence with which you have guided our work through this delicate period which, as is the case every year, is the time when we finalize the report of the Conference. May I also congratulate Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia for the talent with which he occupied the Chair in July? Let me also say how greatly we have benefited over the last few years from the experience of Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands and Ambassador Yamada of Japan. We wish them every success in their new posts, which fortunately will not completely take them outside our disarmament community. Finally I would like to bid a welcome to Ambassadors Rasaputram of Sri Lanka and Ogada of Kenya.

The time has come to introduce to you the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, reference CD/952, which the Committee adopted on Friday, 18 August. It contains the three well-known elements: the technical section; appendix I, which is the "rolling text" proper; and appendix II, which serves as a basis for future work. Here I would like to draw your attention to a typographical error in the French version of the report. In the table of contents for appendix II, the fourth line from the bottom on page 15 should read "Articles XII, XIV et XX de la structure préliminaire...". In the same way, the heading on page 215 should read "Articles XII, XIV et XX de la structure préliminaire...". The secretariat has informed me that a corrigendum will be distributed to put this right.

Before I take you quickly through the main results achieved by the Committee since last February, I would like to start by making a few general comments. Firstly, we have done an enormous amount of work. I am well aware that the result we are all looking for is not a question of quantity but of quality, and if the Committee, together with its subsidiary bodies, organized 209 meetings in all, the idea was to make as much progress as possible towards the completion of the convention banning chemical weapons, in accordance with



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the strong and clear call made in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons. All delegations, those of the member countries of the Conference as well as those of the non-member countries - of which we have twice as many as last year - redoubled their efforts, and I take this opportunity to thank them for their readiness to work, their contributions and their encouragement.

The second comment is that as a result of this sustained work, the report I am introducing today provides you with a markedly improved draft convention. The thematic approach adopted this year by the Committee made it possible to cover all the aspects of the convention, to link them together and to put them in better order, the result being that today we have a more complete, more coherent and more methodical text. Does this mean - and here I come to my third point - that we are close to our goal? It may be tempting to note that the negotiations did not enable us to achieve the necessary "breakthrough" during this session, that the "point of no return was not reached", or that we dwelt too long on technical considerations rather than devising the "political package" which is essential for concluding our task. I am the first to regret that it was not possible to go even further, but at the same time I believe that the clichés to which I have just referred do not really give a true picture of the real state of affairs in the negotiations. The more we redouble our efforts, the more clearly we can see that we can only progress if there is a proper combination of political initiatives and technical improvements, both of which are essential and inseparable. The chemical weapons convention will be an extremely complicated document which will have to have solid scientific, technical and industrial foundations, while at the same time setting down unprecedented rules for security.

How in this light can we describe the work done by the Committee during the recent session? It seems to me that the bulk of the technical infrastructure of the convention is now in place, and that the substantial political headway we have recorded this year make it possible to properly define the general régime of the future convention.

After these opening comments, I would now like to describe briefly the principal results in terms of the five main subject categories which were covered by the five working groups. On the subject of verification in all its forms, we had a particularly heavy agenda. First of all I should mention the insertion of an annex on confidentiality in appendix I, which at a stroke allows us to deal substantively with a question which, even a year ago, was more often than not referred as "to be discussed". This document makes it possible to lighten the body of the convention and at the same time to meet the present and future concerns of Governments and enterprises, but also those of the technical secretariat. In the same way, Group 1 made progress on inspection procedures, and should be able, before the beginning of the next session, to complete the conversion of the directives for the international inspectorate, which are still contained in appendix I, into a protocol on inspection procedures which for the time being is contained in appendix II, which will give a more precise and more complete definition of the working conditions for the future inspectors.

(Mr. Morel, France)

I would also mention that this year the Committee continued a large-scale exercise which was started last year, namely the launching of national trial inspections and the consideration of national reports. This work, which was first conducted under Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, whom I would like to thank for his personal contribution, was the subject of an informal exchange of views with experts from industry at the end of June and was then pursued, as agreed, under the Chairman of Group 1. Thanks to this initial multifaceted work in the field, in conditions as close as possible to reality, the Committee was able to confirm the practicability of the provisions of article VI and make various improvements in the convention. This is already the case with the new version of the model agreement for facilities handling schedule 2 chemicals. Many more lessons can be drawn from these trial inspections, which should continue on a broader scale and be organized by other countries. I would finally add here that the Committee directly tackled one of the most sensitive issues in the future convention, namely challenge inspection. Intensive consultations conducted by the Chair made it possible to identify in a precise way those essential elements which will have to be contained in article IX, part 2, which, as everybody acknowledges, will be as it were the key stone of the general system of verification under of the convention.

Legal questions may be better defined, but are no less difficult to deal with. Appendix I now contains a series of final clauses; these are articles XV to XIX, which derive from the consultations conducted last year, together, in appendix II, with the results of the work done on the delicate issue of amendments, and elements to be taken up on relationships with other international agreements, duration and withdrawal, languages, depositaries and registration. The group also dealt with the very important question of sanctions, which had never been dealt with as such, and is of interest to a great number of delegations. The document which appears at the end of appendix II provides a good basis for further work on this subject.

The work of Group 3, on institutional matters, made it possible to update articles VII and VIII of the convention and thus to confirm the tripartite framework under the future convention, that is to say the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council and the technical secretariat. The same can be said for the document on the preparatory commission, which will have the task of establishing the future organization after signature and before entry into force. Going beyond the actual text, national trial inspections also made it possible to highlight the precise role to be played by the national authority which will be set up in each country to institute and maintain liaison with the technical secretariat. In the same way, the Ad hoc Committee started to examine very specifically, with the assistance of experts, the question of the costs and the staffing of the future organization.

Group 3 also started studying the question of the scientific advisory board, which might provide the Director-General, and where necessary the other organs of the convention, with an independent opinion on rapidly evolving areas. Consultations conducted by the group, and then by the Chairman of the Committee, also made it possible to establish a hypothetical working framework on the composition and decision-making procedures of the Executive Council. There is no need to stress that these issues, which for a long time were left on one side, are of great political importance. Agreement will no doubt only be reached towards the end of the negotiations; but to arrive stage by stage

(Mr. Morel, France)

at an agreed formula, we must first of all have specific elements to think about which will allow each delegation to clarify its position: this is the aim of the document contained in appendix II.

Turning to Group 4, it must be recognized that the "chemical annex" marks major progress. To go back to the general comment I made just now, this may be said to be a very technical issue, and thus one of secondary interest. But how can we not see that, particularly with schedules 1, 2 and 3, this annex contains the matrix of the general régime of the convention? The schedules are now clearly established, and closely tied in with specific declaration, monitoring and verification régimes. Going beyond the resulting technical improvements, regroupings, reordering and clarifications for the whole of the text, I would like to stress more broadly that this new annex strengthens the whole edifice of the convention. A year ago, at the same date, we were wondering about whether we ought to have three or four schedules because of the persistent difficulties related to the question of super-toxic lethal chemicals. The whole technical infrastructure of the convention was thus shaky. The question has been examined in depth, in all its complexity, with the valuable assistance of experts. I believe that all delegations today agree that a solution can be found in the context of the three régimes and the three schedules with the appropriate categories, giving prime attention to the revision of the schedules and thus to the identification of new products.

At the same time the group was able to substantially revise annex 1 to article VI and thus to reach agreement on the particular conditions for the very limited production of prohibited substances for research, medical, pharmaceutical and protection purposes. Work will have to be continued on this annex.

I now come to the fifth and last group, dealing with the transition, a theme which made it possible to look at the convention in a continuum of development, starting from the current negotiations and working up to the definitive régime at the end of the 10-year transitional period. Appendix II thus contains elements concerning the preparatory period, in particular relating to possible measures for co-operation even before entry into force, the role of the organization after entry into force, with the appropriate deadlines, and the exchange of data. Appendix II also contains a new text of major political importance, that is to say article X, relating to assistance and protection against chemical weapons. We need only recall that last year, in the same place, two texts confronted one another reflecting opposing conceptions, to be able to gauge the progress already accomplished in the search for solutions acceptable to all. I must also point out that on article XI, dealing with economic and technological development, consultations showed that there were no objections in principle, although for the moment it has not been possible to work on the text itself. Only one important aspect of the convention was not in fact dealt with directly this session - the order of destruction of stocks and production facilities - but for a good reason, since we can now count on the completion of the consultations conducted between the two States which have declared that they possess such stocks and facilities, that is to say the United States and the USSR.

(Mr. Morel, France)

I would also like to recall that the Committee established a technical group dealing with the instrumentation which will be necessary for the implementation of the future convention. This highly specialized group brought together experts from capitals, and will continue its work next year. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Rautio of Finland, who was kind enough to chair the group.

In accordance with long-standing practice, the Committee will hold open-ended consultations from 28 November to 14 December next with a view to holding a limited session from 16 January to 1 February 1990. Of course it will not be possible to take up all the topics which I have just spoken about. We will have to concentrate on current issues where specific results can be found for the new version of the "rolling text" which will be prepared for the 1990 session. The consultations which I have held with the group chairmen and with delegations lead me to propose the following subjects:

Group 1: The protocol on inspection procedures and the Group Chairman's working paper on article VI;

Group 2: Final clauses;

Group 3: The scientific advisory board;

Group 4: Guidelines for schedule 1 and machinery for revision of lists;

Group 5: Undiminished security during the destruction period.

I would add that I will be resuming the Chairman's consultations on the second part of article IX, that is to say challenge inspection.

In order to prepare for a sustained pace of work comparable to that maintained by the Committee throughout its session, it is my intention to conduct private bilateral consultations with all interested delegations during the week of 20 November. As has been the case since last February, the inter-sessional work will be conducted as teamwork with the five group chairmen, Mr. Rüdiger Lüdeking of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Mohamed Gomaa of Egypt, Mr. Rakesh Sood of India, Mr. Johan Molander of Sweden and Dr. Walter Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic. I would like to extend my warmest thanks to them for the decisive part they have played in the work on which I am reporting today. I would also like to extend my special thanks to the Secretary of the Ad hoc Committee, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, his deputy, Ms. Agnès Marcaillou, and his assistant Ms. Cheryl Darby for their untiring and wholly exemplary assistance.

At the beginning of my statement I tried to suggest the perspective within which the work accomplished over the last six months should be assessed. But at the moment of concluding, I cannot but turn towards the future. My words will be simple and brief because the enthralling experience I have lived through during this session has made this abundantly clear to me: let us constantly bear in mind that our time is not infinite, and that the Convention now being finalized will produce practical results only if it is universal in its application.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for introducing the Committee's report, and for his warm remarks addressed to the Chair. I congratulate him on concluding the work of the Ad hoc Committee, which has considerably intensified its efforts under his chairmanship. I note that the Ad hoc Committee will continue its work before the next annual session of the Conference, and wish Ambassador Morel and the Ad hoc Committee every success in the forthcoming meetings of that subsidiary body. I now give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Fan.

Mr. FAN (China) (translated from Chinese): Forty months ago I came to Geneva for the fourth time to head the Chinese delegation to the Conference on Disarmament. Today, I wish to inform the Conference that the Chinese Government has appointed Ambassador Hou Zhitong to replace me as the new Ambassador in charge of disarmament affairs. Ambassador Hou will soon come to Geneva and, as a member of the Chinese delegation to the coming session of the United Nations General Assembly, he will have the opportunity to meet our colleagues in the First Committee.

Compared with the history of the Conference on Disarmament, my tenure of office has been short. However, I am pleased to see that during these years great changes have taken place in the international situation, changes that mark a new trend of far-reaching significance. The highly confrontational situation where East and West faced each other with daggers drawn is easing. Confrontation is now giving way to dialogue. The conclusion of the INF Treaty by the United States and the USSR, and the various disarmament negotiations between the two major nuclear States and the two military blocs, have brought hope to people. However, people still feel worried because the arms race has never ceased and many negotiations have made little headway. The world is far from being a peaceful one. Hence there is still a long way to go and heavy responsibilities to shoulder in order to achieve disarmament for the purpose of safeguarding world peace and security and for economic development in all countries.

Many of my colleagues from different delegations have expressed such mixed feelings when talking about the work of the Conference. Disarmament affairs are no longer the monopoly of a few major military Powers. All countries, big or small, developed or developing, nuclear or non-nuclear, have the right to participate in work on disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is composed of 40 member States with equal rights. These mechanisms which were established in line with the trends of the time made one feel eager to try for prompt results. It is disheartening to note, however, that this single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, as established by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, has made no progress on the agenda items concerning nuclear disarmament and outer space. Although some progress has been made in the intensive negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, a breakthrough on key issues has yet to be made. The momentum of disarmament negotiations must be maintained and the multilateral negotiations on disarmament should by no means be weakened. How, then, can we resolve such a contradiction, which one might describe using the Chinese expression "much thunder but little rain"? It is in this context that many delegations have contributed various suggestions, including suggestions on how to continue the work of the Group of Seven.

(Mr. Fan, China)

Since 1987, when the Group of Seven was re-established to consider and make suggestions on the improvement and better functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, I have been honoured to chair the Group. The members of the Group in 1987 were Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, Ambassador Teja of India, Ambassador Nazarkin of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary, Ambassador Beesley of Canada and Ambassador Butler of Australia. The non-aligned, socialist and Western groups each had two members who took part in the work of the Group in their individual capacities. After Ambassador Beesley's departure the Western group sent Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands to fill the post.

Although the seven of us did not formally represent the different groups, we were nevertheless recommended by the various parties and commissioned by the plenary to subject issues of common concern to positive and serious study. During the summer session in 1987 the Group met seven times and, on 24 July, submitted its first report as contained in document CD/WP.286, which presented the consensus view of the Group of Seven on two issues: subsidiary bodies and the annual report of the Conference to the General Assembly. Although some delegations expressed reservations on the report in the plenary, the view of the Group played a catalytic role in the actual drafting of the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly.

During the spring session in 1988 the Group of Seven held 10 meetings and submitted its second report on 12 April. We submitted our agreed proposals to the Conference on the participation of non-member States in the work of the Conference, the participation of scientific and technical experts in the work of the Conference and contacts between the Conference and non-governmental organizations. Yet we did not have enough time to reach conclusions on questions such as a consultative council on disarmament, the time, duration and organization of the annual sessions and the membership of the Conference. During the summer of 1988 the Conference held several informal plenary meetings at which many delegations expressed the wish that the Group of Seven should continue its work. Some delegations expressed reservations. All delegations agreed, however, that the work carried out by the Group during the previous two years had been useful, and made positive assessments of its work.

Consideration of the improvement and better functioning of the Conference can be carried out in various ways, of which the continuation of the activities of the Group of Seven is a useful one. The socialist group has proposed a list of topics for further discussion, and the Group of 21 has requested the Conference to renew the Group's mandate in 1990. The Chinese delegation appreciates the above-mentioned positive suggestions.

My participation in the work of the Group left me with the following impressions. In spite of the fact that each member had his own proposals and preferences, everyone adopted a positive attitude to discussions in order to seek common ground while setting aside differences, and to try to achieve concrete results. The Group does not serve as a means to exert pressure on any party, and there is no need to worry about that. Such questions as whether the members of the Group should act in their official or individual capacities, who should serve as its Chairman, what questions should be studied and what should be its mandate are subjects to be discussed. China is ready to participate in the work of the Group at any time.

(Mr. Fan, China)

At the moment of my departure I feel rather sad to part with colleagues with whom I have been working and co-operating for three years. We have already established and developed a fundamental relationship of co-operation here in Geneva and in New York, in and outside the conference rooms, in our official as well as personal capacities. It is gratifying to me, however, that I shall continue my co-operation with many colleagues in other fields of work in Geneva. Here I wish to express my gratitude to Ambassador Komatina, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, and Ambassador Berasategui, the Deputy Secretary-General, for the valuable help and support which has been rendered to me. I should also like to thank all the staff members of the secretariat and the translators and interpreters, including of course the Chinese translators and interpreters, whose hard work is highly commendable.

Mr. President, during this important and busy month of August the Conference has scored remarkable results under your guidance. I offer my warm congratulations to you. May the Conference on Disarmament achieve new progress. I wish all my colleagues good health and further success.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of China for his statement and his wishes addressed to the Chair. We are all happy to know that Ambassador Fan is to continue his work in Geneva. We will certainly miss his friendship and his wise professional advice in the Conference. A diplomat of remarkable kindness and competence, Ambassador Fan occupied the Chair of the Conference during the opening month of the 1987 annual session, a period which is always difficult as it involves the organization of the Conference's work. He did so with authority and wisdom. His allusions to Chinese proverbs will stay in our memories as a source of good counsel.

In addition, he took on the responsible task of chairing the Group of Seven, in which he also demonstrated his professional qualities as an experienced diplomat. Moreover, he can be proud of the work he accomplished as representative of China in the Conference, to which he made a valuable contribution. I am sure that all the members of the Conference offer Ambassador Fan their best wishes for personal and professional success in his future tasks. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Ambassador Bayart, to introduce the report of the Ad hoc Committee, contained in document CD/954.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to congratulate you on the occasion of your taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August, a particularly difficult and busy period owing to the preparation and adoption of the Conference's annual report, and in that regard I would like to congratulate you doubly on the effective and skilful way in which you are discharging your heavy responsibilities. It is a pleasure for me to welcome the new representatives of Sri Lanka and Kenya and to assure them that my delegation will continue to co-operate with theirs. I learned with sadness of the forthcoming departure of the Ambassador of the Netherlands, Ambassador van Schaik, Ambassador Yamada of Japan and Ambassador Fan of China,

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

colleagues for whom I have great respect. Consequently, I wish them every success in their new duties in the future, and offer them my best wishes in their personal lives.

I now have the pleasure of presenting to the Conference on Disarmament the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, which I have had the honour to chair during this 1989 session. The report, as you indicated a moment ago, appears in document CD/954. This report reflects in a concise manner the work carried out by the Ad hoc Committee during its 1989 session, and it was adopted in its entirety by the Committee at its 17th meeting on 24 August. During the current session the Committee has worked on the basis of the same mandate by which it has been governed, in principle, since the time of its establishment. As was agreed at the outset of the current session, the Committee allocated equal time to all three subjects covered by its mandate and the programme of work.

I believe that the discussions we have had during this session crystalized the positions of various countries still further and facilitated the search for ways and means to reach our ultimate goal - that of preventing an arms race in outer space. In this sense, the Ad hoc Committee made further progress in the implementation of its mandate. In my opinion, the discussions in the Committee were constructive, rich in substance, as well as in content, and added valuable new material to the already impressive amount of proposals and initiatives it had before it. I should like to point out that it was the opinion of many delegations that there exists a sound basis for activating a multilateral negotiating process aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space. They believe that step-by-step advancement towards comprehensive agreements through implementing a wide range of specific and mutually acceptable measures would promote greater confidence, thus opening up promising prospects. In this regard, a number of concepts of confidence-building measures were introduced in the Ad hoc Committee, such as the proposal to develop a multilateral code of conduct for States operating in outer space, and proposals on the use of space-based remote sensing techniques for monitoring compliance with international agreements. This year alone more than 10 working papers were submitted containing concrete proposals on ways of tackling various aspects of the problems related to the peaceful uses of outer space and the prevention of an arms race. I believe that this is evidence of a deep commitment and keen interest by member States in keeping the province of all mankind - outer space - free of arms of any kind. These proposals represent significant collective efforts by the Committee members, and I am confident that they will, in their own way, promote in-depth analysis of this highly complicated problem. The Committee gave preliminary consideration to a number of them.

Statements made both in plenary and in the Ad hoc Committee clearly demonstrate that delegations consider the problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space as one of the priorities of the Conference on Disarmament. In this connection it should be noted that many delegations expressed their impatience and dissatisfaction at the fact that, after five years' consideration of this vital issue, no tangible result has been attained.



(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

The current session of the Committee was also highlighted by presentations by outer space experts from the USSR, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the German Democratic Republic and Canada. Many believed that the contributions from scientific and technical experts increased the Committee's technical knowledge, and continued to support the idea of the establishment of a group of governmental experts to provide technical expertise to assist in the consideration of the issues before the Ad hoc Committee. I am happy to report to the Conference the Ad hoc Committee's recognition of the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space, and its readiness to contribute to that common objective. It is recommended that the Conference on Disarmament should re-establish the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space with an adequate mandate at the beginning of the 1990 session.

The report I am presenting today is the fruit of lengthy and, at times, not very easy consultations. I am extremely grateful to all the members of the Committee for their spirit of compromise and flexibility, which enabled us to adopt the report almost on time and thus secured the continuity of the Ad hoc Committee's work. I would like to commend it to the Conference for approval. At the same time, I should like to express the hope, as did my predecessors, that next year the Committee will be able to commence more substantive work on the important issues before it. I have the feeling that more should and, indeed, could be done to prevent the arms race from spilling into outer space.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the item co-ordinators of the various groups and China for their valuable support. I would also like to extend my sincere gratitude to Mr. Valdimir Bogomolov, the Secretary of the Committee, to all other members of the secretariat staff, to the interpreters and those who assisted us directly or indirectly and provided us with all the necessary conditions for our work.

May I conclude this introduction on a personal note? This year I chaired the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space for the second time. It was indeed a very special honour and privilege for my country and for me personally.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee for introducing the Committee's report, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I would like to congratulate him on the conclusion of the work on an agenda item which is particularly important and delicate. I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Young Woo Park.

Mr. PARK (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to extend to you our sincere congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August, and wish you every success in finalizing the work of the CD this year.

My delegation is pleased that the Republic of Korea has been invited again this year to participate as a non-member State in two subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament - the ad hoc committees on chemical weapons and on the comprehensive programme of disarmament - in addition to the plenary

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

meetings. This extended participation in the work of the CD is a reflection of my Government's positive interest in the United Nations-sponsored multilateral disarmament negotiations. My delegation also wishes to express special thanks to Ambassador Miljan Komatina, Secretary-General of the CD, and his staff for their invaluable assistance in making the necessary arrangements and preparations.

Last year many encouraging developments took place. The INF Treaty signed by the United States and the Soviet Union came into force, and the long hostilities in the Gulf region came to a halt. In Asia and other regions there were positive signs of a resolution of multifaceted problems. Credit for these developments evidently was attributed to the increasing openness and the climate of co-operation in the international community. In this vein, the 24th Olympic Games held in Seoul last year was one of the significant global events, where a record 160 countries came together in an atmosphere of friendship, harmony and peace.

As the warm international climate continues this year and now stretches almost everywhere, the prospects for future development are perceived with renewed optimism. It is in this perspective that greater expectations are placed on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, which completed their eleventh round in August this year. Another area for our interest is the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe, which is under way with heightened expectations. My delegation wishes to join others in sincerely hoping that the negotiations bring about productive results in such a way as to ensure the mutually desired equilibrium and stability.

The conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons in Paris in January of this year was a timely and most significant event. The Final Declaration adopted by consensus is a testimony to its success. The conference provided a valuable opportunity to reaffirm the validity of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed on 17 June 1925 in Geneva, and to reaffirm the obligations established therein and commitments made thereto. The unequivocal support given to the United Nations and its Secretary-General underlines the world community's renewed awareness of their indispensable role in safeguarding mankind from the threat of this horrible weapon. It is a source of great satisfaction to my country that we participated in this global endeavour and were able to make constructive contributions to it. The accession to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 by my country represents a worthy addition to broadening the basis for a global chemical weapons ban.

While attending the Paris Conference, His Excellency Choi Ho-Joong, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, made clear in his address the stand my country takes with regard to chemical weapons. He said:

"The Republic of Korea has never possessed and does not have at its disposal any type of chemical weapons. Nor will we consider developing, producing or stockpiling such weapons in the future. We categorically object to keeping chemical weapons on the Korean peninsula."

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

He further proposed that South and North Korea should jointly renounce chemical weapons as a means of armed conflict with a view to freeing the whole Korean people, in both South and North, from the danger of such deadly weapons.

My delegation is impressed by the intensive efforts made under the able and dedicated leadership of Ambassador Pierre Morel of France to expedite negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. We wish to extend our deep appreciation to Ambassador Morel for the thoughtful arrangements he made for the participating non-member States of the CD to be informed of developments in the negotiations.

As understanding and co-operation by the civilian chemical industry is an integral part of an effective and verifiable chemical weapons convention, it is encouraging that the second part of the session saw the participation of representatives from the chemical industry. The Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons to be held in Canberra in September this year is an important development in this endeavour. My delegation highly appreciates the invitation extended to my country by the Australian Government, and looks forward to participation in the conference. We hope that the momentum generated by the intensive efforts made and the other ensuing pertinent developments taking place this year will contribute positively to the speedy and early conclusion of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention.

Under the comprehensive programme of disarmament, the dedication and hard work that have been demonstrated by the participating States in elaborating the programme merit our commendation. It is our sincere hope that Ambassador Alfonso García Robles will make a speedy recovery so that the work on the CPD may continue to benefit from his knowledge, experience and dedication. The programme itself, which encompasses a broad range of issues and contending approaches, is a reflection of world reality fraught with divergent interests and perceptions. The progress the Ad hoc Committee on the CPD makes in the course of engineering its task will, in my delegation's view, largely hinge upon the efforts devoted to closing the distance between the ideals envisaged and the realities faced.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones are a matter of our particular concern. It is not an easy task to make them universally applicable, because security situations differ from region to region. My delegation believes that such an approach is a matter for close consultation and co-operation among the parties concerned. We share the generally held view that the concurrence of the component members of a region, while taking due account of regional characteristics, is a prerequisite if the approach is to be considered tenable and viable.

Forthcoming in September this year is the third review conference of the sea-bed Treaty. We expect the fourth review conference of the NPT next year. The Republic of Korea, a party to the NPT since 1975, has faithfully complied with the provisions of the NPT and will continue to honour its commitments to non-proliferation. My delegation wishes to call upon those countries which have not acceded to the NPT to do so at an early date and accept the safeguard measures of the IAEA. We believe that the non-discriminatory application of

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

safeguard measures to nuclear facilities of both weapon States and non-weapon States is also essential in enhancing the confidence of the international community in the NPT régime.

As for the third review conference of the sea-bed Treaty, the Preparatory Committee met in April to organize the work of the conference. And the informal meeting held last July was a worthy exercise to give consideration to such matters as the scope of application of the Treaty and effective means of verification taking into account relevant technological developments. We hope that in-depth discussion will take place on such matters in the forthcoming review conference in September.

In connection with the question of disarmament as it bears upon the Korean peninsula, my delegation notes with profound regret that despite recent international developments towards openness and reconciliation, the tension between the South and North of Korea remains high, and that there has been little success in diminishing the distrust and suspicion that exist between the two divided halves. The restoration of trust and confidence between the two sides is, therefore, a matter of top priority, as it has a vital bearing on the consolidation of security and peace on the Korean peninsula. It is for this reason that my Government has insisted time and again on promoting dialogue and exchanges between the two sides of Korea in order to build mutual trust and confidence, which are first and foremost a prerequisite for any meaningful disarmament negotiations.

The security arrangements my country has made with our ally are no different from military alliances in other parts of the world. Our security arrangements are most effective and time-proven, as they have been a realistic deterrent against a recurrence of hostilities in the Korean peninsula since the Korean war of 1950-1953, and instrumental in maintaining peace and stability in our region.

In conclusion, the steady and step-by-step approach with determined and concerted efforts is an earnest towards the realization of the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. My delegation sincerely hopes that the current mood of flexibility and co-operation will continue to be valuable assets conducive to making progress in the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Mrs. Carvalho, who will introduce the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, contained in document CD/955, on behalf of the Chairman of the Committee.

Mrs. CARVALHO (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): First of all, Mr. President I would like to convey to you our warmest congratulations on the way in which you have conducted the work of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August. At the same time I would like to place on record our appreciation for Ambassador Bayart's contribution as President of the Conference for the month of July.

(Mrs. Carvalho, Mexico)

On behalf of Ambassador García Robles, I wish to place before the Conference for its consideration the final report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, contained in document CD/955, which was adopted by the Committee at its meeting on 24 August. Despite the numerous meetings of the Committee and its contact groups and bilateral consultations little substantial progress was made during the 1988 session. This situation cannot be attributed to the lack of efforts on the part of the great majority of participating delegations, but rather to the position adopted by one or two delegations that year after year have hampered the course of negotiations. If those delegations are not prepared to shoulder their responsibilities, efforts will be futile, causing frustration and weariness to all.

Mankind continues to long for the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, however illusory some might think it, and it is for this reason that my country will remain, as it has been in the past, tireless in pursuing this objective and persistent in making its appeals heard to achieve this noble objective. Our delegation is confident that the positive trend in international relations will generate new ideas and cause positions to be reconsidered so that our efforts may be crowned with success. In such circumstances the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee recommends to the Conference on Disarmament a period of reflection before resuming its work in the near future, as is indicated in the conclusions of the report - in other words, when the great majority of members of the Conference consider that it is imperative to continue with our endeavours. Ambassador García Robles has asked me to express his very deep gratitude to the tireless co-ordinators of the working groups - Messrs. Finaud of France, Palihakkara of Sri Lanka, Grossi of Argentina, Sood of India, Mrs. Saif of Peru and Messrs. Karem of Egypt and Aas of Norway. Our thanks also go to all the staff of the secretariat, with a special mention for our Secretary, Mr. Gerardi, and his assistant Miss Gibson for their great competence in carrying out their functions.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mexico for introducing the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament on behalf of the Chairman, and for her kind words addressed to the Chair. I would ask her to pass on to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador García Robles, our gratitude for his efforts in guiding the work of the Ad hoc Committee. I would also ask her to pass to him, on behalf of his colleagues in the Conference, our best wishes for a prompt recovery.

I have no other speakers on my list. Are there any delegations wishing to take the floor? Ambassador Friedersdorf of the United States, you have the floor, Sir.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): I would like to express our appreciation to the chemical weapons Ad hoc Committee Chairman Ambassador Pierre Morel and his five working group chairmen for the fine work accomplished this year. The report being submitted to the CD today reflects progress made this year in the many additions to the draft treaty text in appendix I and in the many useful papers in appendix II.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

The draft convention text in appendix I has been enhanced by the addition of two annexes - one on confidentiality and the other on chemicals; by new articles on ratification, accession and entry into force; and by new material on activities of the preparatory commission. Additionally, some issues in articles VIII and IX concerning the organization and procedures for clarifying concerns of States parties have been resolved.

Appendix II of our report reflects the results of many long and intensive discussions on very difficult, important issues that required a delicate balance of the security and political concerns of all countries participating in these negotiations. Discussions on the composition and function of the Executive Council have taken place for a number of years. This year, however, following intensive consultations, the Chairman has summarized, in appendix II text, various proposals for the Executive Council in order to help guide our future discussions on this subject. On the issue of challenge inspection, the Chairman made a truly commendable effort toward achieving consensus on the principle of mandatory, short-notice challenge inspection, however, delegations still do not fully agree. Difficulties remain over how to protect sensitive non-chemical-weapons military and civilian facilities while at the same time providing satisfaction with regard to compliance. The Chairman's work on challenge inspection in appendix II reflects both the progress and remaining difficulties and, along with the previous work on this subject, will serve as a good basis for further discussion.

We are deeply conscious of the need to eliminate chemical weapons from the face of the Earth as soon as possible. This is a matter of security for all countries. In the world today, security against chemical attack takes a variety of forms. During the 10-year period after the convention enters into force, a transition will take place from security based on that variety of forms to one based on the convention. A number of countries have raised concerns about how to ensure security during that period, while some chemical weapons, albeit a diminishing amount still exist in national arsenals. Many of the issues we have been discussing in the CD have dealt with security during the transition period from a variety of interrelated perspectives - the order of destruction, reservations, assistance and protection in the event of CW use, measures to deter non-compliance, and incentives to encourage all CW-capable States to join the convention. I believe we can and must find arrangements, consistent with the objectives of the convention, that will relieve the concerns of all States. In view of the complexity of the security factor, several different provisions may be necessary to resolve all the concerns.

It is the hope of the United States delegation that when our work resumes during the inter-sessional period and again in 1990, further attention will be given to these interrelated security issues and that ways will be found to address all concerns. Resolution of these issues is important in helping to achieve the necessary universality of the convention.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States for his statement.

(The President)

I should now like to report to you on the status of work on the Conference's draft annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. With today's presentation of the reports of the ad hoc committees under agenda items 4, 5 and 8, the work of the subsidiary bodies has been completed. I will put the three reports before the Conference for adoption at the final plenary meeting, which will be held next Thursday, before we take a decision on the annual report to the General Assembly. I invite the delegations which would like to speak on these three reports, either before or after their adoption, to place their names on the list of speakers. As I have already announced, at our last plenary meeting, there is one more issue to be settled, for which a solution must be found today or tomorrow. Since it is not possible to circulate a single document containing the draft annual report, I have asked the secretariat to make new arrangements for the presentation of the draft, which will be given its second reading in an informal meeting before the last plenary meeting. For the second reading of the technical parts and the substantive paragraphs on agenda items 1, 2, 3 and 7, we will have the following documentation: working paper CD/WP.370 on the technical parts, document CD/WP.370/Add.1 setting out additions and corrections made after the first reading of the technical parts, and also the second revisions of working papers CD/WP.371 to 374. You will recall that the English texts of these documents containing the substantive paragraphs were distributed in their first revised versions at the plenary meeting that was held last Thursday. The second revisions of the working papers will of course be circulated in all the official languages of the Conference.

The new documents - CD/WP.370/Add.1 and CD/WP.371-374/Rev.2 - will be distributed starting at 3 p.m. tomorrow in the delegations' pigeon-holes. The English versions will be available earlier, starting at 11 a.m., in order to give delegations time to study these texts before the second reading. As you know, the secretariat also has to prepare an index of the verbatim records by country and by subject for the 1989 annual session. I have been informed that the draft of the index will be circulated to delegations on Wednesday 6 September, and that the secretariat will accept delegations' corrections up to midday on 15 September, before the final text is incorporated in the annexes to the annual report.

Permit me now to outline to you the proposed programme we shall follow next Thursday. The informal meeting for the second reading of the draft annual report will be held from 11 a.m. Immediately afterwards, the Conference will hold a plenary meeting to adopt the reports of the ad hoc committees and then the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. I would be grateful if delegations wishing to speak at Thursday's plenary meeting would give their names to the secretariat, indicating at the same time whether they wish to make their statements before or after the adoption of our annual report.

I have no other matters for consideration today. The Conference will hold an informal meeting at Thursday, 31 August at 11 a.m., and will hold its last plenary meeting for the year 1989 immediately after the informal meeting.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.531  
31 August 1989

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 31 August 1989, at 11 a.m.

President: Mr. El Ghali Benhima (Morocco)



The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 531st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

In accordance with its programme of work, today the Conference will consider and adopt reports from its ad hoc subsidiary bodies, as well as its annual report to the forty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly. As I announced at Tuesday's plenary meeting, I will put the reports of the ad hoc committees before the Conference for adoption in the order in which they were introduced by their chairmen. I now propose that we proceed to the adoption of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which is contained in document CD/952. Are there any delegations wishing to speak before we adopt the report of the Ad hoc Committee?

If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Are there any delegations wishing to speak after the adoption of the report? I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): As this is the first time for me to take the floor this month, Mr. President, may I begin by congratulating you on your presidency and the way you have guided this last part of the session? You have brought great fairness and diplomatic skill to what is not always an easy task, and I much appreciate this.

I should like to offer some brief comments on the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. In his statement at the opening of the summer session my Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. Waldegrave, reiterated the commitment of the British Government to a comprehensive, global and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons, and underlined the need for a clear, practical problem-solving approach to remove the remaining obstacles. He stressed the importance attached by the United Kingdom to the achievement of such a ban as early as possible and the need for our approach to be marked by thoroughness and hard work.

The summer session, like its predecessor, has I think been to a large extent conducted in that spirit. The past year has been one of intense activity in these negotiations. The Paris Declaration urged us to redouble our efforts and we have done so. Our agenda has enabled us to consider the whole range of problems still outstanding. Many of us have conducted trial inspections. During the summer session my own authorities have submitted a report on our two practice challenge inspections of military installations - part of a longer series of challenge trials - and also a report on our civil national trial inspection. The result of all this work has been a good deal of solid progress. New issues have been developed, long-standing ones refined and the structure of the future convention has become clearer. Some of this progress is reflected in the report before us. More of it will, I trust, appear in the report to emerge from the inter-sessionals.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

It would of course be wrong to feel satisfied with our work. A number of difficult problems still remain to be solved, including some major aspects of our convention. Verification remains the top priority, where much has been achieved but much more remains to be done particularly as regards challenge and ad hoc inspection. The rate of progress in our negotiations sometimes seems too slow. But we are steadily increasing the areas of convergence of view.

We must sustain our efforts. The inter-sessionals should enable us to develop further a number of the items on which we have worked over the past year so that they can be brought into appendix I or II. To achieve this we shall have to focus our attention on those matters which hold out most promise of early agreement. We welcome the proposals on this given us by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. We now all have a basis for work in our capitals during the coming weeks so that we can return to the inter-sessionals well prepared.

We hope that we shall come to these inter-sessionals further strengthened by a positive outcome to the bilateral consultations between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as to the Government/Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons in Canberra.

An encouraging aspect of this year's session has been the increased involvement in the negotiations by representatives of States not members of the Conference on Disarmament. Their presence here has given our work a wider perspective. We believe that, as called for in the Paris Declaration, all States should be free to participate in the negotiations as observers if they wish. I look forward to the participation of still larger numbers of such States.

We all owe a great deal to our Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Morel, for the leadership he has given - for his energy, his enthusiasm, and his diplomatic and negotiating skills. My delegation much appreciates the very considerable contribution he has made. Our thanks go also to the hard-working chairmen of the working groups: Mr. Lüdeking of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Goma of Egypt, Mr. Sood of India, Mr. Molander of Sweden and Dr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic; as well as to Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden and Dr. Rautio of Finland for their work as chairmen of their special groups. We have learned with great pleasure that Ambassador Hyltenius is to be the next Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, and we much look forward to working closely with him. My thanks also go to the secretariat for all their dedicated hard labour. Certainly the report we have just adopted would not have been possible without them. And lastly, three distinguished ambassadors are leaving us very soon, Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands, Ambassador Yamada of Japan and Ambassador Fan of China - all three much respected colleagues whom we shall miss, and I should like to offer them my best wishes for the future.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for her comments and for her kind words addressed to the Chair. I now propose that we take up for adoption the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, which is contained in document CD/954. Are there any delegations wishing to take the floor now? I see none. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Are there any delegations wishing to take the floor following the adoption of the report? I see there are none.

We must now adopt document CD/955 concerning the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Are there any delegations wishing to speak before we proceed to adopt the report of the Committee? I see none. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Are there any delegations wishing to take the floor following the adoption of the report? I see there are none.

We have thus completed our consideration of the reports of the ad hoc committees to the Conference. Are there any delegations which wish to speak now? I give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador van Schaik.

Mr. van SCHAIK (Netherlands): First of all, Mr. President, I wish to congratulate you on your presidency. This is the first time I have spoken this month. I also wish you well in the remaining hours, if not days, of your presidency. We have great confidence that you will successfully conclude the discussions on the remaining issues that are still unresolved. I also wish to thank Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia and his colleagues for the excellent work they have done under their presidency last month. This is the last opportunity I have to address the Conference because it is the last day I will be here in Geneva, and I hope you will allow me to say a few personal words.

The more than five years I have spent in Geneva were for me fascinating, because of developments both inside the CD and outside. I had the privilege to be present in a period during which the arms control and disarmament process entered - one could say - a completely new phase, a period in which on-the-spot verification, an issue of fundamental political importance, is no longer an insurmountable hurdle - in particular between East and West. Even better, it is increasingly becoming a rather technical problem, albeit a complex one, that in principle is solvable. This transformation in our thinking will allow us to address specific arms control and disarmament measures in a way which was previously inconceivable. We are witnesses of

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

that process now in bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations. Its importance cannot be underestimated, especially when we look at its longer-term perspective. We may be on the brink of a new disarmament era.

Of course, here in the CD we have had our ups and downs, and up to now results have simply been too modest. The overall evolutionary trend, however, is encouraging. If it prevails, debates will become increasingly technical. For some this might perhaps be less spectacular than the fireworks that accompanied our dialogue in earlier years. But I firmly believe that, in the end, it will be far more constructive and productive. It will also impose another working style and working habits. An approach, which, in fact, is far distant from the quarrels unrelated to work that, up to this day, unfortunately absorb too much of our energy and time.

In my previous statements I have put forward some ideas on the organization of our work, and I shall not repeat them now. But I do hope that our approach will become more business-like. Let us call a spade a spade and not waste too much time on matters that, at least at this moment, are simply not within our reach. It is only step by step that global disarmament will earn the place it deserves amidst other - bilateral and regional - actions.

This period has also been fascinating and gratifying for the friendship and co-operation I have encountered from all sides. I thank colleagues for the kind words addressed to me. The warmth in personal relations is a unique feature of the CD, which makes the work more gratifying, in spite of moments of personal frustration. I have admired the excellent contributions and the dedication to the work of colleagues and all others directly concerned. I thank the secretariat for their essential efforts to "get things going", which incidentally are not always sufficiently rewarded. I also thank the interpreters and translators. It is with great sadness that I say farewell to you all. But I keep in mind the words of Baudelaire in "Le voyage" (Les fleurs du mal):

"Mais les vrais voyageurs sont ceux-là seuls qui partent  
Pour partir; coeurs légers, semblables aux ballons,  
De leur fatalité jamais ils ne s'écartent,  
Et, sans savoir pourquoi, disent toujours: allons!"

I wish you well, I wish the CD well. See you soon in New York.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador van Schaik for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. The Ambassador of the Netherlands, Robert van Schaik, has been entrusted with new, important functions, for which I congratulate him. In addition, I cannot refrain from expressing a feeling of sadness, as the Conference is losing in him a colleague who has left a profound mark on its work, owing to his personal qualities as well as his comprehensive knowledge of disarmament questions. As a member of the Group of Seven - which I myself would call the Group of Wise Men - he helped the Conference to find the most effective methods. All of us will remember his friendship, his advice and his ability to go deeply into problems from all angles. On behalf of us all, I wish Ambassador and Mrs. van Schaik every success professionally, and personal happiness.

(The President)

I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting in order to continue the informal consultations on the Conference's draft report to the General Assembly. I invite delegations to assemble for an informal plenary meeting at 3 p.m. this afternoon.

The meeting was suspended at 12.45 p.m. and resumed at 6.45 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 531st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. We shall continue the consideration and adoption of the report to the forty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The draft report is contained in documents CD/WP.370, CD/WP.370/Add.1 and CD/WP.371 to 374 in their second revisions, as orally amended.

The secretariat will fill in the blanks that have been left in the text of the draft report. Any minor corrections that delegations may wish to make to the text, including questions of consistency between the translations, should be brought directly to the notice of the secretariat, which will take the necessary steps.

I put before the Conference for adoption the draft report to the forty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly contained in the documents that I have just listed. Are there any delegations wishing to speak before we adopt the report? I see none. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference adopts its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Batsanov, has asked to speak. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all I would like to welcome the new head of the Kenyan delegation, Ambassador Thomas Ogada, and assure him of our readiness for close co-operation. I would also like to take this opportunity to express our great regret at the forthcoming move to another post of Ambassador Fan Guoxiang of China, whose diplomatic experience and skill we shall miss. I am eagerly awaiting the opportunity of meeting his successor, Ambassador Hou Zhitong.

Today the Conference on Disarmament is closing its regular session, and in this connection the Group of Socialist Countries, on behalf of which I have the honour to make this statement, would like to convey its judgements on some of the work we have done. In the view of the group, the results achieved cannot all be assessed in the same way. Progress in various fields was uneven. Of course, the causes of this dissimilar progress - in some cases the regrettable absence of any progress - were very varied. At the same time, the Conference on Disarmament began its work this year in more favourable circumstances than in previous years. The socialist States are making an important contribution to the development of these positive trends, seeking to

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enrich the disarmament process with new ideas. This can be seen from the documents issuing from the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty held in July in Bucharest, and in particular the document entitled "For a stable and secure Europe free of nuclear and chemical weapons, for a substantial reduction of armed forces, armaments and military spending".

In a word, hopes were high that on some questions under consideration at the Conference significant progress could be made. However - and we sincerely regret this - many of these hopes were dashed. We are convinced that an objective analysis of the causes that held back progress confirms that despite the truly complex nature of disarmament problems and the real technical, international legal and other problems involved in work on disarmament agreements, the main prime mover in the negotiations is still the political will of participants and their desire to seek mutually acceptable solutions. Unfortunately, on most of the items on the agenda of the Conference we have simply nothing to boast about. This is prompting growing concern amongst the members of the Group. Concern both about the substantive work being done in specific areas of disarmament, and about the future of the very concept of multilateral disarmament negotiations. Meanwhile, if the crisis of the global echelon of disarmament negotiations centred on the Conference on Disarmament develops, this can eventually bring about adverse changes in the global security structure, thereby negatively affecting efforts being undertaken at the bilateral and regional levels.

Whilst expressing regret at the lack of substantive results on many items on the agenda of the Conference, the delegations of the socialist countries at the same time welcome the further progress that has been achieved in the talks on a chemical weapons ban, although here too we feel that not all our expectations have been realized. The Conference on Disarmament received a strong political impetus from the Paris meeting on chemical weapons, where 149 States called for the conclusion of the convention at the earliest date. The increase in the number of observers in the Ad hoc Committee on CW this year as a result of the call made in the Paris Declaration is a positive development in our view. The creation of an appropriate organizational framework for considering questions relating to the chemical weapons ban at the Conference on Disarmament in the context of the Ad hoc Committee on CW also played a constructive role. Thanks to the able leadership of the Ad hoc Committee by Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, as well as the painstaking efforts made by the chairmen of the working groups, much valuable work was done. This not only covered important technical details which are vital for the convention, but also made it possible to expand the search for political agreement on a number of key problems. In the view of the socialist group, we now have all the requisite elements in the Ad hoc Committee on CW for a breakthrough in the very near future. We call upon all participants in the negotiations to step up their efforts, to display a constructive spirit and show reasonable compromise, and to make maximum use of the inter-sessional period in order that the many years' work on a CW ban should finally be crowned with success at the 1990 session of the Conference. In this connection the members of the group believe that an important role in speeding up work on the convention must be played by confidence-building measures.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

They welcome the continuing process of providing data in accordance with the USSR's draft memorandum of 18 February 1988 and the arrangements proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany, and also take an active part in it. Here, speaking as the representative of the USSR, I would like to inform the members of the Conference that the Soviet Union is finalizing the preparation of data for multilateral exchange along the lines proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany in CD/828, with a view to publication; information on the subject will be submitted to the Conference on Disarmament.

I would now like to return to the statement of the Group of Socialist Countries. The group also regards the prevention of an arms race in outer space as a priority issue in the work of the Conference. During the 1989 session the delegations of our countries sought to intensify the work in the Conference in this field and make it more concrete. This was the aim of the working papers from Mongolia and Poland and three working papers from the German Democratic Republic submitted to the Ad hoc Committee this year. Although substantial progress is unfortunately some distance away, we believe that this year certain encouraging trends towards a more businesslike approach in the consideration of the problems on our agenda were visible in the Ad hoc Committee. These trends should be developed by making good use of the potential for points of contact so that next year we can identify a number of subjects for thorough elaboration. In our view it is time for the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space to move beyond the phase of general abstract debate, and to stop going round in circles discussing the same old subjects without any prospect of finding a solution. This body of the Conference on Disarmament should not be an arena for unproductive confrontational polemics or rival tactical gambits in a diplomatic game, but should become a forum for meaningful consideration of the military, strategic, scientific, technological and legal aspects of problems relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This will obviously require, on the basis of existing realities, agreement on a generally acceptable basis, the achievement of true consensus and the taking into account of the positions of all sides. In the assessment of the delegations of the socialist countries, the devising of measures to increase confidence and openness in States' outer space activities could provide a foundation for this purpose. They would thus constitute the first tangible steps towards realization of the more ambitious long-term objective of keeping outer space free from weapons.

The socialist countries, noting with satisfaction the growing support in the Ad hoc Committee for the need for in-depth study of the concepts of measures to build confidence and openness, believe that a promising direction for work would be consideration of the prospects of using space facilities to promote the evaluation of compliance with multilateral agreements in the area of confidence-building, arms limitation and disarmament and to monitor developments in areas of tension. Approaches to such a task have been proposed specifically in the working paper submitted to the current session by the USSR on the establishment of an international space monitoring agency, and in the French paper on space and verification, relating to a proposal for the establishment of an agency for the processing and interpretation of satellite imagery. Despite the considerable differences between these proposals, we believe that they contain converging or parallel ideas which can be developed

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further. The Group of Socialist Countries is convinced that, despite the considerable importance of the Soviet-American dialogue on the problems of preventing an arms race in outer space, and without prejudice to the way the dialogue may develop, the Conference on Disarmament is the very forum where meaningful multilateral efforts can be made in order to prevent outer space from being turned into a new arena for military confrontation.

Allow me to express the gratitude of the Group of Socialist Countries to the distinguished Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on outer space, Ambassador Bayart, whose diplomatic skill, wisdom and tact eventually made it possible to find compromise solutions and thus successfully complete the work of the Ad hoc Committee. We also remember Ambassador Bayart's effective guidance of the work of the Conference in July. Many delegations will, I think, agree that under the able guidance of Ambassador Bayart the Ad hoc Committee took a further step forward during the 1989 session.

The Group of Socialist Countries attaches special significance to the nuclear issues - cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, prevention of nuclear war, and above all the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The group regrets that it was not possible to establish subsidiary bodies under any of these agenda items.

The Group of Socialist Countries fully supported the consultations conducted by Ambassador Yamada of Japan on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the nuclear test ban. These consultations seemed to be close to completion, but they too have so far failed to produce any tangible results. We hope that the efforts to reach agreement on a mandate for the ad hoc committee will not be broken off with the departure of Ambassador Yamada, and we request you, Sir, to pursue them during the inter-sessional period. We are convinced that in this area a real possibility exists for a reasonable compromise, which might be based on the proposal made by Czechoslovakia. This would allow the member States of the Conference to initiate specific discussion of the problem of banning nuclear tests in an ad hoc committee set up for the purpose at the very next session.

On the credit side of the 1989 session we should count the work of the Ad hoc Group of Seismic Experts, which finalized its agreement on the initial concepts for a global system for the international exchange of seismic data and decided to start the next stage of the large-scale experiment on the exchange of level II seismic data in January 1990.

Support in the Conference is growing all the time for the idea that an ad hoc group of scientific experts should be set up to prepare practical proposals for a system to monitor the non-conduct of nuclear tests, as well as the creation of an international system for the global monitoring of radiation safety using space communications. The detailed and concrete specific proposals made to this effect by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic were met with interest. The Group of Socialist States shares the widely held view in the Conference that it would be appropriate for this multilateral forum to consider issues related to nuclear disarmament and the



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prevention of nuclear war. It supported the draft mandates proposed by the Group of 21 for ad hoc committees under agenda items 2 and 3, and regrets that the Group of Western Countries blocked a positive decision on this score.

The Group of Socialist Countries expresses its regret that the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament was unable to make tangible progress in elaborating the draft programme. We are confident that the Ad hoc Committee will resume its work to settle outstanding issues in the very near future, when prospects for progress in this regard are brighter. Of course, we proceed from the assumption that this item will remain on the agenda of the Conference. The Group of Socialist Countries expresses its gratitude to Ambassador Alfonso García Robles of Mexico, who has been the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme since 1981, for his able guidance of the work of the Ad hoc Committee, his great tact and the considerable diplomatic skill he has demonstrated. We wish him good health and well-being.

The setting up of an ad hoc committee on a given topic is no guarantee that the problem will be rapidly solved. For instance, the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons is re-established year in, year out, yet no substantive progress has been achieved towards international agreement thereon. The time has come at last to take steps to overcome the stagnation of negotiations in this field. We believe that the only basis for that is an objective look at existing realities, with due regard for those elements where the positions of the parties concerned coincide. This would make it possible to work towards a single approach to the solution of key issues concerning the prohibition of radiological weapons and the need to prevent attacks on nuclear facilities. Our group reaffirms its readiness to co-operate fully with all delegations in order to reach agreement on effective international instruments to provide non-nuclear-weapon States with guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. I would like to take this opportunity to express the appreciation of the Group of Socialist Countries to the Chairmen of the Ad hoc Committees on Radiological Weapons and Negative Security Assurances, Ambassador Oswaldo de Rivero of Peru and Ambassador Ali Shams Ardekani of Iran.

The Group of Socialist Countries is convinced of the necessity and desirability of improving the effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament and rationalizing its work. The proposals which were made back in October 1987 at the meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty are well known. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the socialist States who have attended the Conference on Disarmament have referred to these proposals. Quite recently the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, J. Johanes, reminded us of some of them in his statement in the plenary of the Conference on 17 August. In proposing a whole package of measures which our Group feels would enable the Conference to carry out its role as the sole multilateral disarmament forum, the socialist States, of course, never considered that these ideas should be viewed on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. On the contrary, they were put forward in order that what was acceptable for all could be selected after careful discussion and analysis. We proceed from the assumption that improving the effectiveness

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of our work is a common concern, and we hope that due attention will be paid to this aspect at the 1990 session. This is exactly why our group has drawn up and circulated an informal document listing possible subjects for discussion. We are encouraged by the positive response received from a number of delegations. This reaction gives us grounds to hope that they might serve as a basis for the resumption of substantive discussion next year in an appropriate format.

In the view of the members of our group, multilateral diplomatic machinery on disarmament, one representative of which is the Conference, has a great creative potential which we are only beginning to use. The States members of our group for their part are ready to do everything they possibly can in order to allow the Conference to fully attain its goals.

In conclusion, I would like on behalf of the group and on my own behalf to express to you, Sir, our sincere gratitude for your able guidance of the Conference at this important and difficult final stage. Your outstanding qualities were manifested especially clearly today, on the final day of our work, when, thanks to your contribution, we managed to get out of what was a far from simple situation. We would also like to thank the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, his deputy, Ambassador Berasategui, all their colleagues in the secretariat, the interpreters and the translators for the excellent way in which the Conference was organized and serviced this year.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada.

Mr. YAMADA (Japan): Mr. President, I could not let this occasion pass without expressing, on behalf of the Group of Western Countries, our deepest gratitude to you for your marvellous leadership in making it possible to close this year's session successfully with the adoption of the annual report of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations. I am very grateful to you for bearing with me during the prolonged consultations on the draft of the report. I would also like to express our deep appreciation to your deputy, Mr. Hilale, for his excellent work in conducting successful consultations on substantive parts of our annual report.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Japan for his statement, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Iran.

Mr. MASHHADI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Due to the lateness of the hour and the fact that this is the last day of work for the CD in 1989 - one of the main reasons why my delegation joined the consensus to adopt the annual report which has just been adopted - my intervention will be very brief and will focus on our reservation regarding the report and will seek to shed light on some points and clarify certain matters.

(Mr. Mashhadi, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Regarding CD/WP.370, under section D, paragraph 10, which was the subject of intensive consultations for the best part of the past two and a half weeks, there are certain points which should be taken into consideration. The first point is that this part of the report deals with the technical section of the annual report, and this is the reason why it should be factual and reflect the facts. But here we are facing certain ambiguities, and to my delegation these are not the complete facts, and the report in this section could be more factual than it is. In paragraph 10, equal footing has somehow been given to those delegations and States whose applications were approved by consensus of the Conference and the State whose application was rejected. In the formal plenary of the Group of 21 the application and the question was raised, and according to the papers the application was rejected, or, in the jargon of the Conference, no consensus emerged regarding that application. Therefore, it is not factual to have all those applications and treat them on an equal footing while we have approval and rejection.

The other point is that if the plenary is going to be open to the public, there are many delegations and States and representatives of non-governmental organizations and individuals who can attend - and I mean that they have attended in the sense of presence. Either we have to refer to the names of all those who were present during the course of the plenary sessions of the Conference on Disarmament in 1989, or not - to be selective. Or we have a kind of decision-making process and decision-making mechanism - if the shoe fits one foot it should fit the other. If we are going to refer to all, we have to refer to all, or if we have a certain decision-making process or mechanism we have to obey that and we have to respect that. We joined the consensus for the reasons I mentioned before, and also because of the reading of my delegation that, in paragraph 10, attendance simply means presence - nothing more. And of course, this does not give any right to others who say that because their names were there in the past they should also be there in the future - the Conference will and should follow the rules of procedure as it has done in the past, and of course, my delegation reserves the right for 1990 to explain some of its positions. The other point is that my delegation has sought not to politicize this matter. The Conference on Disarmament is dealing with vital matters pertaining to the very existence of humanity and, therefore, our report in this part should be factual and should not be politicized.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement, and I invite the secretariat to take note of his reservations. I now call on the representative of Peru.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Allow me to take the floor very briefly to say something of substance on behalf of the Group of 21. You, Sir, have the very sincere appreciation of the members of the Group for your perseverance and the optimism you have always shown, your great patience and dedication which have been an example to us all throughout this month of your presidency. This effort which has earned our thanks also extends to your delegation, which has always been ready to co-operate with us in the quest for more satisfactory solutions for all. It is to be welcomed that the efforts made by the delegations represented in the Conference and the

(Mr. Calderon, Peru)

regional groups have led to a successful conclusion of our work. Of course the results are illusory, but at least we in the Group of 21 hold out hope of better days, and at all events we are persuaded that multilateralism has won a victory this evening. I would also like to mention the interpreters, translators and other services and very particularly - I repeat, very particularly - Ambassador Komatina, the Secretary-General of the Conference, the Deputy Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, and other members of the secretariat for their valuable assistance, which has been timely, and has also been of major help to our work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Peru for his statement, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair and to the delegation of the Kingdom of Morocco. Are there any other delegations wishing to take the floor? I see none. Permit me now to make my closing statement as President of the Conference.

We have come to the end of the 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament after six months of sustained work, sometimes difficult negotiations, laborious consultations in search of a compromise for the implementation of the mandate of the Conference. I do not intend to draw up an exhaustive or detailed summary of our collective efforts. On the one hand, the Chairmen of the ad hoc committees have ably covered matters relating to their particular fields, and on the other many delegations have dwelt thereon, expressing their views on subjects where progress was recorded and also on matters where consensus could not be reached. The aim of this final statement is not so much to make a judgement on a session of intense activity, as to draw a number of conclusions.

The first conclusion is that, despite a few hitches here and there, we had an excellent spirit this session. Our work was carried out in a very calm way underpinned by everybody's resolve to achieve the aims of the Conference. This is an encouraging observation based on two factors: on the one hand the easing of tension which has for some time now been a feature of international relations, and on the other the new spirit which informs the East-West dialogue. Both these factors were unanimously highlighted throughout the session.

My second point relates to the progress recorded in the chemical weapons negotiations. The extraordinary Paris consensus undoubtedly gave political impetus to our work; yet it should be recognized that this impetus did not lead to all the effects we had hoped for. Nevertheless, a movement has begun and it must be sustained by continuously renewed back-up. We are convinced that the negotiations which will continue during the inter-sessional period will bring us still closer to the long-awaited aim, the burgeoning of the convention on chemical weapons.

The third comment relates to a subject whose high priority is unanimously acknowledged - the nuclear test ban. High hopes were raised from the very beginning of our session by the statements made on the terms of the mandate for an ad hoc committee on the subject. The consultations conducted by succeeding presidents and, in particular Ambassador Yamada of Japan, kept us

(The President)

in suspense until the last few days of the session. It is true that the results produced by these consultations did not entirely come up to our expectations. But despite the legitimate disappointment we feel, we must note that the effort put into the search for a consensus on the mandate for the ad hoc committee was not wasted. The efforts made, and in particular those of Ambassador Yamada, made it possible to reduce the areas of disagreement. Thus we need to build on this achievement in order to pursue this search for consensus as soon as the next session begins.

My final comment will be to express great satisfaction. A satisfaction engendered by a twofold observation, which itself is the fruit of an analysis of the dozens of statements made throughout the session. First, the constantly renewed commitment on the part of all delegations to the principles which underlie our mission in this forum; and secondly the reiteration of the confidence placed in our Conference, and the highlighting of its prime and vital role in working towards complete and general disarmament under effective international control.

The report we have just adopted is an achievement to which all the members of the Conference made a valuable contribution in a responsible and fair spirit. I hasten to express my gratitude to them. The report also reflects the progress we have made during our work. And since it also reveals our disappointments, it takes on a human dimension and becomes an expression of hope, the hope to which my sovereign, His Majesty King Hassan II, gave voice in condensed form when he stated that disarmament should not be simply a virtue, but should become a necessity.

Allow me to express my thanks for the efforts, the skill and the great dedication of the chairmen of the ad hoc committees, Ambassadors Pierre Morel for chemical weapons, Ardekani for negative security arrangements, de Rivero for radiological weapons and Bayart for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and finally Ambassador García Robles for the comprehensive programme of disarmament. I am pleased to speak on behalf of you all in congratulating them on the effectiveness with which they carried out the tasks given to them by the Conference. I would also like to express my gratitude to Ambassador Komatina, the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to Ambassador Berasategui, the Deputy Secretary-General, and to the whole of the secretariat for their valuable assistance to me. Their efficient contribution greatly facilitated my task. Of course, I could not forget to thank our friends the interpreters and those back-up staff who work in the shadows, the translators and the technical services. A special word of thanks to the interpreters who are going to be working until midnight this evening. Finally I would like to say that for my country and myself it has been a great honour to preside over the Conference on Disarmament during this last month of its annual session. As you know, the tasks of the President for August will extend until we resume our work next February. That is why I would like to tell you that I will be fully available throughout the inter-sessional period, both here in Geneva and in New York in the second half of October. I will be available to all members of the Conference for any consultations they wish to conduct in anticipation of the next annual session of the Conference on Disarmament.

(The President)

These, then, were the few closing comments I wished to share with you. I have no other matters to discuss before the closure of this annual session of the Conference on Disarmament. Before I close the session, I would like to remind you that the next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 6 February 1990, at 10 a.m. As agreed by the Conference when adopting the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons contained in document CD/952, in accordance with paragraph 14 (c), the Ad hoc Committee will hold a session of limited duration between 16 January and 1 February 1990. I would also like to remind you that open-ended consultations of the Ad hoc Committee will be conducted between 28 November and 14 December this year.

The meeting rose at 7.25 p.m.