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NOTE DATED 5 FEBRUARY 1952 FROM THE DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE THIRTY-FIFTH REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 7 JULY 1950 (S/1588)

Paris, February 5, 1952

The Deputy Representative of the United States to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary General of the United Nations and has the honor to refer to Paragraph 6 of the Resolution of the Security Council of July 7, 1950, requesting the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the United Nations Command.

In compliance with this Resolution there is enclosed herewith, for circulation to the members of the Security Council, the Thirty-fifth Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period December 1 through December 15, 1951.

ANNEX A

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA  
FOR THE PERIOD 1 - 15 DECEMBER 1951  
(Report No. 35)

I herewith submit report number 35 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1 - 15 December, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiques numbers 1099-1113 inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

During this period armistice negotiations on agenda Item three continued in Sub-Committee meetings. On 3 December the Communist side introduced two proposals: "(6) In order to ensure the stability of the military armistice so as to facilitate the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, both sides shall undertake not to introduce into Korea any military forces, weapons and ammunition under any pretext. "(7) In order to supervise the strict implementation of the stipulation of Paragraph (6), both sides agree to invite representatives of nations neutral in the Korean War to form a supervisory organ to be responsible for conducting necessary inspection, beyond the Demilitarized Zone, of such ports of entry in the rear as mutually agreed upon by both sides, and to report to the Joint Armistice Commission the result of inspection."

Communist proposal (6) above would result in the evacuation of United Nations Command Forces from Korea by attrition. The United Nations Command holds that it has the right to maintain its forces in Korea during the period of the military armistice and pending a settlement at higher level.

Communist proposal (7) shows the clear intent to confine the activities of the Military Armistice Commission to the Demilitarized Zone only. Comparable United Nations Command proposals were as follows:

"4. A. Both sides shall designate an equal number of members to form a Military Armistice Commission which shall be responsible for supervising the execution of and adherence to the whole armistice agreement. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with, and assisted by, observer teams which shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Military Armistice Commission only. The observer teams shall be composed of representatives of nations neutral in the Korean War, such nations to be mutually agreed to by both sides.

/"B. Observation

"B. Observation outside the Demilitarized Zone will be performed only by neutral observer teams. Observation within the Demilitarized Zone may be performed by neutral teams, by joint teams selected by the Military Armistice Commission, or by the Military Armistice Commission itself.

"C. Neutral observe teams shall be located at such land, sea, and air ports of entry and communication centres as are mutually agreed to by both sides. These observer teams shall be permitted freedom of movement over principal lines of communication throughout all of Korea and each side shall afford these teams full assistance in the execution of the duties assigned them by the Armistice Commission. In addition, such periodic aerial reconnaissance and observation and photographic flights as are mutually agreed to by both sides will be performed by neutral teams.

"5. Neither side shall increase the level of military units, military personnel, or equipment, or war material existing in Korea at the time the armistice becomes effective. The rehabilitation, expansion, and improvement of existing airfields and aviation facilities and construction of new airfields and new aviation facilities shall not be permitted."

Toward the close of the period there were four basic points of disagreement concerning Agenda Item three:

A. No increase in present strength levels and equipment stocks versus no introduction of personnel and equipment under any pretext.

B. Rehabilitation of facilities, particularly airfields.

C. Status of offshore islands.

D. Relationship of neutral observer teams to Military Armistice Commission.

Item four consists of "arrangements pertaining to prisoners of war". From the 4th to the 10th of December the United Nations Command Delegation daily urged that a separate sub-Delegation be designated to discuss Item four. This proposal was made by the United Nations Command Delegation for the sole purpose of expediting the negotiations and in view of the humanitarian features of prisoner of war matters. Finally, on 11 December, after a week's time had been wasted, the Communists agreed to initiate discussions. At the outset of these discussions the United Nations Command made, and has made daily since then, two fundamental and logical proposals: namely, that information on prisoners of war be exchanged and that representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross be permitted to visit prisoner of /war camps.

war camps. Both of these reasonable and humanitarian proposals, designed to alleviate the suffering of prisoners and their families, were callously and summarily rejected by the Communists. The United Nations Command long ago agreed to observe the Geneva Convention relative to prisoners of war and has done so. Names of prisoners have been sent to the International Committee of the Red Cross. International Committee of the Red Cross representatives regularly visit United Nations Command prisoner of war camps. The enemy, in complete disregard of the custom and usage of civilized society, has refused up to period covered by this report to exchange information on prisoners.

There were few significant military developments and no major changes in troop dispositions along the line of contact during the period. Both sides continued routine reconnaissance patrolling. The enemy remained alert, and appeared determined to intercept all United Nations Command patrols. He also made numerous small scale probing attacks, all of which were promptly repulsed.

On the western front, extending northeastward about fifty miles from Hungwang to the vicinity of Chungdong, small, scattered patrol clashes occurred on the sector between Pungi and Kigong, to the west of Sangnyong, and to the south of Sagimak. Usually, upon establishing the presence of the enemy, the United Nations Command patrols returned to their bases after a short skirmish. During the period, the 39th Chinese Communist Forces Army relieved the 47th Chinese Communist Forces Army in the Sangnyong area, apparently in conformity to the enemy's long established policy for the periodic relief of units on the line of contact.

Contacts were much more frequent and somewhat more intensive on the central and eastern fronts, and hostile small scale probing efforts were virtually continuous. The bulk of these skirmishes were concentrated in the vicinity of Kumsong on the central front, and in the vicinity of Mulguji, Sohui, and Cemyon on the eastern front. The enemy supported his forces with moderate volumes of artillery and mortar fire in all sectors.

There was evidence of continued improvement in the organization and development of hostile defences, but the enemy displayed little interest in offensive warfare. The volume of traffic sighted in the enemy rear areas, however, indicates a continued effort to maintain full combat capacity as regards logistic support; and the steady flow of hostile replacements to depleted units demonstrates the enemy intention to maintain a strong military potential in Korea.

/Strong United

Strong United Nations Command security elements scored significant successes against guerrillas during the current period. The bulk of the 7500 to 10,000 bandits and Communist dominated partisans operating in the Republic of Korea have long been concentrated in the more inaccessible mountain regions in the extreme southwest of the Korean peninsula. Although not a serious impediment to logistic or frontline military operations, these forces have constituted a serious problem to internal administration, and are extremely prejudicial to the maintenance of civil order. Because of a recent flare up in the activity of these bands, it was decided to launch a determined military effort to eliminate the guerrilla menace. Accordingly, strong Republic of Korea forces were deployed into southwestern Korea to seek out and destroy all dissident elements. To date, this effort has been very successful. From 1 to 12 December, 2500 were killed or captured. Increasing numbers of guerrillas are surrendering and the remainder have retreated farther into the mountains to avoid destruction.

Minor guerrilla groups were contacted occasionally in rear areas, in the vicinity of the front lines, near the east coast. The chief concern of these small bands has been to avoid United Nations Command security elements which were seeking them out. They have not constituted a menace to United Nations Command military operations.

The clear, cold weather of early December favored United Nations Command Naval forces in exerting increased pressure on the enemy. Up and down the length of the North Korean coasts the ships and planes of the fleet methodically and accurately chopped up enemy rail and highway routes with record quantities of high explosive missiles. Close support by Naval gunfire and air attack was also stepped up in highly effective blows at enemy personnel and weapons. The Communists resisted strongly with heavy return fire from their coast artillery and anti-aircraft batteries; and in a surprise night amphibious invasion they succeeded in driving off the Korean garrison to seize the island of Taewha-Do in the Bay of Korea. Several of their troop laden junks were sunk by the defending British destroyer Cockade which was itself slightly damaged by enemy gunfire. United Nations Command Marine Commandos retaliated with a series of harassing raids deep behind enemy lines near Songjin on the northeast Korean coast.

Naval aircraft reported several brushes with Communist jet fighters and thirteen MIG-15's were sighted over Wonsan. Blockading ships and aircraft sank or damaged numerous junks and sampans to deprive the enemy of seaborne supplies.

/Heavy

Heavy bombardments of North Korean coastal supply hubs were made at frequent intervals as United Nations Command Naval and Marine forces intensified their attacks throughout the period.

The tentative agreements on a cease fire line have had no effect on the United Nations Command air operation. Aircraft of Far East Air Forces and attached United Nations Command units continued to search out and destroy targets throughout North Korea. An average of 885 sorties per day were flown in the execution of this mission.

In close support, location and destruction of troublesome front line enemy artillery has been emphasized during daylight operations. More than 230 of these positions have been wiped out or heavily damaged in the past two weeks. At night B-29 medium bombers supported United Nations Command ground forces by attacking enemy positions and troop concentrations beyond the range of artillery.

The heavy impact of the rail interdiction programme is now more apparent. Along some sections of the open lines the cumulative damage caused by United Nations Command fighter bombers exceeds the recovery and repair capability of the enemy labour pool. In this respect the main line from Pyongyang south to Sariwon has been abandoned and the main West coast line from Sinanju to Sukchon is only occasionally serviceable. Some shuttle traffic is flowing south of Sinanju but numerous short hauls with multiple loading and unloading under cover of darkness are required in this operation. The important rail bridges at Sinanju, Songchon, and Sunchon were again knocked out by our night flying medium bombers.

Night intruder aircraft, aided by moonlight, have destroyed or damaged fifty locomotives in the past fifteen nights. Target of opportunity strikes by armed reconnaissance, interdiction, and night intruder aircraft are estimated to have accounted for 550 enemy troops killed, 1000 store houses destroyed and damaged, 560 rail cars destroyed and damaged, and 2550 vehicles destroyed as well as many other miscellaneous targets.

Enemy opposition to deep penetration by United Nations Command aircraft is increasing in intensity. In the area north and west of Pyongyang large numbers of MIG-15 fighters were seen by the United Nations Command pilots whenever the weather was favourable for flying. During the period, 2350 enemy jet aircraft were observed; United Nations Command fighters shot down twenty-nine and damaged at least twenty-eight more. The day of heaviest activity was 5 December when Far East Air Forces aircraft sighted 310 MIG-15's. Night flying aircraft were frequently intercepted and fired at by Communist night fighters, some of which  
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were reported as jet types. Observed tactics indicated that ground controlled radar and searchlights were used in these interceptions. United Nations Command aircraft suffered no losses and very little damage from these attacks.

Airdromes within North Korea have been slow to recover from the heavy bombing attacks delivered throughout November. These targets remained high on the priority list but required less effort to keep them in an unserviceable status. Throughout the period the only runway in North Korea which became temporarily serviceable for jet fighter operation was Uiju.

Aircraft of the Far East Air Forces Combat Cargo Command flew 3060 sorties to transport 10,130 tons in support of the Korean operation. Included in this total were 42,700 passengers and 3,000 medical evacuees.

Enemy aircraft were detected over South Korea on four occasions. There were also two ineffective air attacks on friendly islands north of the bomb line.

United Nations Command leaflets, loudspeaker, and radio broadcasts devoted particular attention to rapid dissemination of news reports concerning discussion of Armistice Agenda Items three and four, and urged support for United Nations efforts to bring hostilities to an early conclusion. The significance of Communist delaying tactics, which consumed day after day in fruitless quibbling over irrelevant issues, was made clear to soldiers and civilians alike. Through United Nations Command media, the soldiers of the Communist Armies were forcefully reminded of the relentless increase in their casualty lists while the Communist Delegates prolong the war with persistent evasion of inquiries and refusal to clarify vague and ambiguous proposals.

Continued action is being taken by the United Nations Command to import supplies and equipment for relief purposes as well as for stimulation of Korean industry. Power facilities and coal mines are being rehabilitated and placed in operation. Further, we are encouraging the Republic of Korea to take all steps possible toward self rehabilitation and the establishment of a sound, viable economy.

General health conditions throughout South Korea are reported relatively good. No wide spread outbreaks of respiratory diseases have been reported to date. The prospects of preventing impaired health due to lack of shelter appears good. The South Koreans have intensified construction of shelters from rough timber and mud. In many cases, tents have been provided and winterized. Warm floors are being

/constructed

constructed in tents and buildings from any material available and a great deal of ingenuity has been shown in improvising winter comforts. It is expected that these improvements together with houses being built with lumber supplied through the civil assistance programme will provide adequately for the majority of the needy population.

With the exception of a relatively large number of cases of dysentery reported from Kangwon-Do Province, the reported incidence of communicable diseases is quite low. Vaccines are being distributed according to schedule and the immunization programme is in full swing in all provinces under United Nations Command control with the exception of Cholla-Pukto.

For the period 25 June 1950 to 24 November 1951 the total estimated dollar value of supplies and equipment programmed under the United Nations Command programme for civilian relief and economic aid to Korea, exclusive of supplies delivered for common military and civilian use -- bridges, rolling stock, road building equipment, and similar items -- is \$187,673,578 of which supplies and equipment worth \$85,819,824 have been delivered. In this total is included \$168,140,631 programmed out of United States appropriated funds, of which \$69,428,425 worth of supplies and equipment has been delivered. Also included in the total are contributions from other United Nations members and voluntary relief agencies with an estimated dollar value of \$19,532,947, of which supplies worth an estimated \$16,319,399 have been delivered.

