

UNITED NATIONS  
SECURITY  
COUNCIL



GENERAL

S/2619  
30 April 1952

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE DATED 29 APRIL 1952 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES  
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE FORTIETH REPORT  
OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 7 JULY 1950 (S/1588)

The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to Paragraph 6 of the Resolution of the Security Council of July 7, 1950, requesting the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the United Nations Command.

In compliance with this Resolution, there is enclosed herewith, for circulation to the members of the Security Council, the Fortieth Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period February 16 through February 29, 1952, inclusive.

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA  
FOR THE PERIOD 16-29 FEBRUARY 1952  
(Report No. 40)

I herewith submit report number 40 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-29 February, inclusive. United Nations Command communiques numbers 1176-1189 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Discussions continued at the staff officer level on agenda item three although little progress was made. The Communists refused to accept the six port of entry complexes on each side, proposed by the United Nations Command, as areas in which the neutral nations inspection teams are to operate. Furthermore, the Communists were adamant in their insistence on having the Soviet Union participate in the neutral nation inspection teams. On 21 February the senior United Nations Command staff officer made the following statement: "Your side has said many times that we have no reason and cannot give any reason for objecting to the nomination of the Soviet Union as one of the neutral nations. We have carefully considered these statements made by you. The United Nations Command does have reasons for rejecting the Soviet Union as one of the nations to participate in the supervisory commission. The reasons are clear, cogent and irrefutable. I should like to point out, however, that neither side is obligated to state reasons for the acceptance or rejection of any particular nation. The principle simply and clearly states that both sides agree to invite neutral nations acceptable to both sides. The acceptability or non-acceptability of any given nation, therefore, is a unilateral matter beyond the purview of these discussions. In the furtherance of understanding, however, and so that our position may be unmistakably clear to you, we will give our reasons for stating, unequivocally, that the Soviet Union is not acceptable to our side. The United Nations Command holds that it is in the interest of all concerned that members of the supervisory commission should be drawn from those nations not in close proximity to Korea and without a record of past participation in the Korean question. This is not the introduction of a new principle. It is our rightful and unilateral application of logic to the problem of selecting nations acceptable to both sides. I repeat, the Soviet Union is not acceptable to our side."

/On 25 February

On 25 February in a further sincere effort to break the deadlock on this issue, the United Nations Command representatives proposed that the number of neutral nations from each side be reduced to four, namely, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Communists have rejected this proposal so far.

After receiving from the Communists a proposed new text for armistice agenda item four, dealing with prisoners of war, the United Nations Command delegation made a careful study of its provisions in an effort to insure that the areas of agreement could be expanded to the maximum. It was pointed out forcefully to the Communist representatives that the United Nations Command approach was made in the light of earnestness and sincerity and that our sole objective was the securing of a just and honourable arrangement by which our prisoners could be exchanged with despatch. The proposed draft submitted by the Communists showed mutual agreement on many clauses and only minor differences on others, but the stand which they took on the subject of voluntary repatriation was entirely unacceptable. On 20 February, after many differences in wording and phraseology had been resolved, the Communists presented a revised wording of their initial proposal, but retained the intent of forced repatriation to which we strongly objected.

On 22 February the United Nations Command submitted a complete draft of armistice wording on item four which reflected all changes to date. The Communists maintained their insistent opposition to voluntary repatriation and on the basis that the subjects were closely allied, rejected the proposals for parole and a sixty-day time limit in which to exchange prisoners, despite the fact that they had previously concurred in the principle.

The inconsistency of the Communist stand was clearly defined in a carefully prepared presentation in which the United Nations Command reminded the Communists that last December they explained away the fact that they had only a few thousand prisoners by saying that some captured personnel were released at the front shortly after capture, while others, if they so desired, were allowed to join the Communist Forces. By this act the Communists applied the principle of voluntary repatriation and took great credit for such action as an indication of how sincerely they adopted humanitarian policies. The proposal submitted by the United Nations Command that prisoners of war should be able to

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choose the side to which they wished to go and should not be subjected to the barbarous treatment of delivery by force was identical with the principle the Communists claim they have previously applied on their side. Further, in order to insure that the implementation of release policies proposed by United Nations Command was to be carried out in detail, the Communists would have their own Red Cross representative at our prisoner of war camps as well as at the point of exchange.

Continued protracted discussion indicated only that the Communist delegation refused to adopt any realistic approach to this basic, fundamental principle as supported by the United Nations Command. Having accomplished all that could be done at the staff officer level, and having successfully removed many areas of disagreement, the United Nations Command agreed to move discussions from staff officer level and on 29 February the sub-delegation for item four was reconvened, with the one remaining issue of voluntary repatriation to be resolved.

A riot believed to have been Communist planned and led, among Korean civilian internees in a compound on the island of Koje-Do on 18 February was put down by United Nations Command security troops who, in the course of their duties, had been suddenly attacked by over 1,500 inmates of the compound. The remaining 3,500 inmates did not join in the disturbances. Order was restored only after severe fighting. One American soldier and sixty-nine inmates were killed. One American soldier was injured, twenty-two suffered minor hurts and 142 inmates were wounded. No prisoners of war were involved.

The clash followed entrance of the troops into the compound at 0530. Their mission was to maintain order while United Nations personnel interviewed the internees to determine which individuals desired transfer to other compounds. Interviews were to be accomplished privately to encourage free expression of desires. Any internees requesting transfer would be moved to non-Communist compounds. It was evident that Red compound leaders were determined and prepared to block this procedure. Weapons known to have been used against the troops in the demonstration, which obviously had been planned and organized, include steel pickets, spiked wooden clubs, barbed wire flails, blackjacks, metal tentpole spines, iron pipes, rocks and knives.

The United Nations Command ordered an official investigation immediately. The situation was brought under control and peace restored. Unrest had not spread to other compounds. The senior delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross, stationed in Japan, was notified promptly. He dispatched two of his assistants immediately to Koje-Do for an independent investigation.

As was expected, the Communists attempted to use this incident to bolster their stand on forced repatriation, claiming that the United Nations Command had been responsible for the uprising and that the participants were only demonstrating their desire to return to Communist control. The United Nations Command delegation replied calmly and factually, pointing out the absurdity of the Communists' comments and emphasizing that this incident was an internal affair of no interest to the Communists. The civilian internees in United Nations Command custody are not military personnel belonging to the Communist side. They are Nationals of the Republic of Korea. The United Nations Command position is fully sanctioned by the Laws of Nations. The Communists have no authority, sanction or precedent in international law to support their stand that this matter did concern them.

On the question of joint Red Cross Teams to assist in the prisoners of war exchange, agreement with the Communists on the composition of such teams was obtained on 19 February. This agreement provides for three teams composed of equal membership from the National Red Cross Societies of both sides. One team would operate in North Korea with a total membership of sixty - thirty from each side. A second team would operate in South Korea with the same number. The third team consisting of twenty members would perform its duties in the demilitarized zone.

To insure that the United Nations Command is prepared to implement the agreement on the Red Cross Teams, immediate steps were taken to contact, through the American Red Cross, the National Red Cross Societies to be invited to send representatives. Denmark was included in this group because of the urgent need for medical doctors on each team. These Red Cross doctors are readily available on the Danish Hospital ship "Jutlandia".

In addition, relief supplies for United Nations Command prisoners of war furnished by the American and British Red Cross Societies and now stored in

Japan, are being carefully checked and readied for immediate use. If needed, supplemental food packages and medical kits will be supplied by the United States Army. All these supplies can be airshipped to Korea on short notice in case of an armistice agreement.

The International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, indicated agreement with the plan for the Red Cross Societies of both sides to assist in the exchange of prisoners of war in Korea.

In plenary session of 16 February 1952, the Communist delegation made the following statement in presenting their new proposal for agenda item five:

"In order to reach speedily a fair and reasonable settlement on agenda item five, recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides, our side, the delegation of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers, now submits a revised draft of the principle.

"The revised draft of the principle proposed by the delegation of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers on agenda item five, recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides, is as follows:

"In order to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three months, after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etcetera.

"On 17 February 1952 the United Nations Command delegation accepted the Communist proposal on agenda item five with the following statement:

"We have carefully considered your revision of the principle proposed by you as the solution of item five of the agenda. In order to give you concrete evidence of the sincerity of the United Nations Command delegation and to eliminate entirely any pretexts for further delay on your part in reaching agreement on unresolved issues in items three and four, the United Nations Command delegation accepts your proposal of 16 February as the

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solution of this item of the agenda, subject to the following remarks:

"So that there may be no question regarding the understanding of the United Nations Command delegation as to the meaning of your proposal, we deem it advisable to make certain explanations at this time. First, we desire to point out that this recommendation will be made by the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, to the United Nations as well as to the Republic of Korea. Second, in accepting the term Foreign Forces, we are doing so on the basis of your statement that this term means non-Korean Forces. And third, we wish it clearly understood that we do not construe the word etcetera to relate to matters outside of Korea."

In reply, on 19 February 1952, the senior Communist delegate said the following:

"The draft of the principles submitted by our side on the item five of the agenda is very clear in itself. There can be no misunderstanding whatsoever. By the governments of the countries concerned on both sides in our draft of principles is naturally meant the governments of the countries concerned on the side of the Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteers and the governments of the countries concerned on the side of the United Nations Command. By Foreign Forces in our draft of principles is naturally meant non-Korean Forces. And the meaning of questions, etcetera in our draft of principles is also very clear. It neither binds the forthcoming political conference to the discussion of certain specific questions nor excludes the possibility of the discussion of other questions by this political conference."

The Communists then proposed to turn over the work of drafting the details of the articles in the fifth item of the agenda to Staff Officers. The senior United Nations Command delegate then stated: "We have already told you that we don't consider that your draft proposal requires rewriting. We have accepted it as you drafted it for inclusion in the armistice agreement. We agree to recess with the understanding that item five is to be turned over to the Staff Officers to complete any necessary mechanical details. Our Staff Officers will not be authorized to change the agreed wording." To date the Communists have not asked for a Staff Officer's meeting on this agenda item.

/Despite

Despite frequent periods of unfavourable winter weather, a United Nations Command carrier force operating in the Sea of Japan continued to direct its major effort against the enemy's supply routes. Attention was again centred on the vulnerable East coast rail network north and south of Wonsan where bridges, by-passes, locomotives and rail cars, as well as the rail lines themselves, were brought under attack.

In the Yellow Sea, United Nations Command carriers continued air operations on the West coast of Korea, supporting the blockade and providing air-spot and cover for surface units on anti-invasion stations in support of the friendly held islands.

Shore-based aircraft participated in all phases of the United Nations Command Air operations except air to air combat, with the major effort being placed on interdiction and close support missions in that order of priority.

Patrol aircraft operated day and night in all sea areas adjacent to Korea and Japan, providing reconnaissance and shipping surveillance as well as regular weather flights.

The appearance of an increased number of enemy sampans and small craft, attempting to run the tight coastal blockade, furnished lucrative targets for bombardment by United Nations Command ships and planes. During the week of 18-24 February, 175 of these craft were sunk or damaged. Contributing heavily to this total was an enemy attempt to invade a friendly-held island. This assault was shattered by a combination of Naval gunfire and alert beach fighting, and the invasion force, estimated at approximately 300 men, was routed with heavy personnel losses.

Surface vessels continued to support the United Nations Command operations by bombarding suitable targets along the East coast. 16 February marked the first anniversary of the siege of Wonsan which has seriously disrupted the flow of Communist traffic through this vital hub. Fire support vessels conducted fire missions for United Nations Command ground forces, utilizing air spot and directions from the forces supported, to destroy the enemy's forward installations and to inflict heavy personnel casualties. Further north, the targets included harbor facilities, industrial areas and lines of communications. Daylight travel along the coastal routes was effectively impeded and night travel was subjected to indirect interdiction fire.



Enemy shore batteries on both coasts intensified their fire against United Nations Command blockading ships. Counter battery fire silenced many of the enemy's guns, destroyed or damaged several ammunition and supply dumps, and caused many personnel casualties. The enemy's fire resulted in damage to two United Nations Command ships and injuries to eleven crew members. Temporary repairs, where necessary, permitted the ships to return to action.

Although severe icing conditions were experienced along portions of the West coast, surface units maintained their anti-invasion patrols, and illuminated and fired on enemy positions on the mainland. When enemy activity indicated a potential danger of attack on friendly islands, surface units fired on the enemy and dispersed his boat and troop concentrations.

Minesweepers swept the important sea lanes on both coasts for all types of mines and made check sweeps of previously cleared areas despite heavy seas, low visibility, and rain and snow. Blockading surface units provided prompt counter-battery and suppression fire on several occasions when enemy shore batteries took the minesweepers under fire, thus preventing damage or casualties to United Nations Command forces.

Naval auxiliary, Military Sea Transport Service and merchant vessels under contract provided logistic support for all components of the United Nations Command forces in Japan and Korea.

United Nations Command Air Forces continued their full scale air operations throughout the Central and Northwest sectors of North Korea. Day counter-air sweeps, day and night interdiction of the main Communist supply routes, and airlift of high priority supplies accounted for the greater part of the sorties flown in support of the Korean operations. The continued inactivity of the enemy forces on the ground and in the air over the line of contact again resulted in reduced requirement for air defence and close air support sorties.

The weather was affected by the normal seasonal north to south fluctuation of the polar front, accompanied by the normal west to east flow of low pressure cells across Korea. This resulted in intermittent bad weather throughout the area which caused a decline in the sortie rates and greatly increased the problem of location and destruction of targets on the ground.

Jet fighters of the Communist Air Defence system were consistently more active than during any previous period. No fundamental changes in their tactics

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were observed however. MIG-15s, usually flying in large formations, were seen over North Korea on all but three days. It is estimated that an aggregate of 1,900 MIG-15 sorties were observed, and that of this number, 200 engaged in combat with United Nations Command aircraft. These air to air encounters resulted in the loss to the enemy of twelve aircraft destroyed and twelve damaged, while the United Nations Command suffered no losses and only one aircraft damaged. Typical of the increased enemy air activity was the sighting of 389 MIGs by United Nations Command pilots on 19 February. This represented a new high in the daily sightings of enemy aircraft.

The principal targets for United Nations Command fighter bombers and night flying light bombers were enemy supply installations, rail lines, rolling stock and motor vehicle traffic. These operations were successful in hampering the movement of supplies and personnel by the enemy, especially along the western and central rail lines from Sonchon and Kanggye south to the battle area. In view of the increased enemy air activity, it was necessary to provide a combat air patrol of F-86 for the fighter bombers. These operations were so well co-ordinated that no United Nations Command fighter bombers were lost to enemy air activity.

United Nations Command medium bombers continued in support of the Korean operations. The main targets for these missions continued to be the destruction of key railroad bridges, which the enemy labour forces repair with great rapidity. In addition, the B-29's performed close air support and leaflet missions each night as well as a number of reconnaissance missions.

The United Nations Command Forces operating in support of the Korean operations continued to require the movement of high priority supplies and materiel by air. Combat cargo aircraft maintained their operations on a daily basis despite the adverse weather conditions encountered at their bases and enroute. The movement of personnel again constituted a large portion of these operations, especially on East-bound flights which permitted the evacuation of combat casualties to hospitals in Japan.

The Communist air power based north of the Yalu River still constitutes a strong threat to the United Nations Command Air, Ground and Naval operations in Korea, but no major commitment of this force has yet been made. United Nations Command Forces and installations in friendly territory suffered no casualties or damage, although five unidentified aircraft were reported over friendly territory.

Minor clashes continued to typify the action along the Korean battle front as both sides maintained their defensive positions. Most of these small-scale engagements resulted from raids and patrols conducted by United Nations Command elements. Although these actions did not involve any major forces, they often culminated in sharp fire fights, usually involving numerically superior hostile defenders. With one exception, enemy-initiated action consisted of widely scattered and sporadic probing efforts utilizing units of squad and platoon strength. The most aggressive enemy action occurred on the central front where a six-day contest terminated with the enemy in possession of a disputed forward position. Enemy capabilities, troop dispositions and front lines were unaltered during the period.

Except for stubborn resistance to United Nations Command raids and patrols, enemy activity on the western front was limited to small ineffective probes, usually during the hours of darkness. United Nations Command-conducted raids constituted the most noteworthy action. A United Nations Command raid of a position in the Punji area on 16 February encountered a successful hostile defence. A later raid in the same area on 20 February, however, caused the enemy to evacuate a forward position. Enemy elements in the Chudong area on 16 February and in the Mabang area on 20 February tenaciously retained their positions against the action of United Nations Command raiding elements. United Nations Command elements conducted raids against two hostile positions in the Saginak area on 16 February. One of these terminated with a withdrawal of the small defending unit while the other resulted in the return of the United Nations Command elements.

Although local in nature, the severest conflict along the battle line took place in the Talchon area of the central front. The contest began on 14 February, when United Nations Command elements were forced to withdraw from an outpost position four and one-half miles southeast of Talchon as a result of two enemy attacks. The position was restored by immediate counteraction on 15 February. An enemy daylight attack against this same position on the following day was unsuccessful. Employing an increased strength of two companies supported by artillery and mortar fire, the enemy retook the position on 17 February. The following day United Nations Command Forces, in a day-long attack successfully drove the enemy back despite heavy resistance. On 19 February, however,

/the enemy

the enemy again forced United Nations Command elements to relinquish the position. With the exception of this action, enemy aggressiveness on the central front consisted of a small number of ineffective probes. However, the enemy displayed his usual determination in defensive operations against United Nations Command patrols and raids. Of the raids conducted by United Nations Command elements in Tuchon, Kumsong and Talchon areas, only one in the Tuchon area, resulted in an enemy withdrawal.

There was no deviation from the pattern of numerous patrol contacts and small-scale enemy probes on the eastern front. The majority of such activity occurred in the Mulguji and Tupo area. In the former area United Nations Command elements were forced to relinquish two outposts to small enemy units on 19 February. However, these positions were quickly retaken following strong artillery preparation. On 21 February versatile United Nations Command helicopters were employed to extricate and return a United Nations Command patrol which had been ambushed by hostile elements. As elsewhere, there were no significant changes in enemy troop dispositions on the eastern front.

The capabilities of hostile forces in Korea were not materially diminished during the period. Available information does not reveal any deficiencies which would adversely affect enemy military operations. Both the enemy forces and the United Nations Command forces are at a peak of combat effectiveness. Although occasional vague references to a future Communist offensive have been received, the majority of the indications fail to lend any credence to an early departure from the enemy's presently defensive attitude.

A major concern of United Nations Command leaflets and radio broadcasts was the reaffirmation of Korean unification as a cardinal objective of the United Nations. These media reviewed the long history of United Nations efforts to assist the Korean people in achieving this goal by peaceful means. Emphasis was placed on the unprincipled Communist obstruction of those efforts from 1945 on, and the similarity between these obstructions and the prolonged stalling of Communist delegates in the Armistice negotiations. The cost of these tactics, in terms of Korean lives and property, was continually stressed in leaflet and radio broadcasts to enemy soldiers and to Civilian residents of areas now under enemy occupation.

/A General

A General Staff Section for civil affairs (G-5) has been activated in Headquarters, United Nations Command. The function of this section is the supervision and co-ordination of civil affairs activities in the United Nations Command. The primary mission concerns the United Nations Command programme for civil assistance and economic aid to Korea.

The conferences between representatives of the United Nations Command and the Republic of Korea on economic affairs were recessed from 18 February until early in March. Although some progress has been made in these discussions, the most difficult problems, involving financial matters and inflation, remain unsolved.

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