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MEETING: 21 OCTOBER 1983

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NOTE

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The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2482nd MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 21 October 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Abdullah SALAH (Jordan).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2482)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Namibia:
 - (a) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
 - (b) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
 - (c) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

The meeting was called to order at 11.25 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:

- (a) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
- (b) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
- (c) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the representative of Senegal to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sarré (Senegal) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite Mr. Mueshichange to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mueshichange took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with decisions taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the representatives of Angola, Canada, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Oramas Oliva (Cuba), Mr. Wolde (Ethiopia), Mr. Krishnan (India), Mr. Treiki (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Fafowora (Nigeria), Mr. Koroma (Sierra Leone), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Rupia (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Kunda (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Botswana, the Federal Republic of Germany, Mozambique and Venezuela in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Legwaila (Botswana), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. dos Santos (Mozambique) and Mrs. Coronel de Rodríguez (Venezuela) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/16056, which contains the text of a note verbale dated 20 October from the Mission of Guinea to the President of the Council.

7. The first speaker is the representative of Angola, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

8. Mr. FIGUEIREDO (Angola): On behalf of my delegation, Sir, I ask you to accept our best wishes on your assumption of the presidency of the Council. I also take this opportunity to commend Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana on his work as President last month.

9. The general debate in the General Assembly has just ended. We have heard the enunciation of high principles, noble sentiments, profound beliefs, sacred creeds. We have heard rhetoric, shibboleths and dogma. We have also heard words of wisdom, solidarity and support. We have been presented with a number of documents and reports on various international problems and sources of tension and conflict.

10. However, crises continue to exist all over the world and show no sign of abatement. Many are, if anything, worse. One of the most serious problems threatening international peace and security is also one of the oldest before the United Nations—the illegal occupation of Namibia by the racist armed forces and Administration of South Africa. This occupation of the Territory of Namibia, this oppression of the people of Namibia, this exploitation of the human and natural resources of Namibia has, in recent years, undergone various processes and has been given different labels by the *apartheid* occupation régime of South Africa, all designed to make the occupation more palatable to the majority inhabitants of Namibia and more acceptable to critics. But the people of Namibia, led by their liberation movement, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), have rejected these attempts at deception, and progressive forces all over the world have denied the legitimacy sought by the *apartheid* régime for its illegitimate offspring—an extension racist régime in Windhoek.

11. Since 1978, the South African Administration has manipulated the situation in other, intricate ways: by giving false promises to the United Nations and false assurances to the international community, meanwhile remaining intransigent, buttressing its military presence in Namibia, increasing its economic power at home, acquiring a nuclear capability, and threatening the sovereign countries in southern Africa with acts of aggression and military adventurism and expansionism aimed at destabilizing their legitimate Governments.

12. An impartial look at the issues relating to Namibian independence also shows the almost limitless subterfuge and deception employed by the racist South African régime to buy time and acquire more sympathetic friends and administrations overseas.

13. Whenever all outstanding issues have been settled, Pretoria invents new ones to take their place. My delegation does not believe that the *apartheid* régime will end its illegal occupation of Namibia unless it is forced to do so. International consensus, pressure or censure will not force South Africa to move towards genuine independence for Namibia. If the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978) is not set in motion in the very near future, there will be only two options available to the international community—the peaceful one, through imposition of sanctions and the withdrawal of Western political, economic and military support for the Pretoria régime, or a long-drawn-out armed struggle by SWAPO and the people of Namibia, with support of every type by their friends.

14. The position of Angola on Namibian independence has been stated succinctly on numerous occasions. The people, the Party and Government of Angola offer their total solidarity with, and support for, the people of Namibia and SWAPO, in keeping with the principles of our revolution and the spirit of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and in keeping with our commitment to freedom from imperialism, colonialism and racism, all of which are embodied in the Pretoria régime, which seeks to terrorize not only its own majority inhabitants but also much of southern Africa.

15. We reject manufactured and irrelevant demands, artificial linkages between completely unrelated issues and attempts to give the Pretoria régime precious time under the rubric of "constructive engagement", which, in fact, has enabled South Africa to become more belligerent in carrying out acts of armed aggression in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and other southern African States. This "constructive engagement" has allowed the racist armed forces of South Africa to engage in a destructive engagement in Angola and to extend Pretoria's illegal occupation of Namibia to parts of southern Angola.

16. The position of my Government on the problems in southern Africa has been stated on a number of occasions, most recently in the general debate, at the 27th meeting of the General Assembly. However, for the record in the Council I should like to reiterate the four points made on that occasion by President José Eduardo dos Santos; they represent the position of the MPLA-Workers Party (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—Partido de Trabalho) and of the Government of Angola. The first requirement is the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of South African troops occupying our territory. Secondly, Council resolution 435 (1978) must be speedily implemented in order to steer Namibia to real independence. Thirdly, South Africa's attacks on Angola must cease. Fourthly, all logistic and military support given to the gangs of UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) puppets terrorizing our towns must cease.

17. If Namibia is to win independence peacefully, the next and only step is the immediate implementation of resolution 435 (1978), starting with a cease-fire, the emplacement of the United Nations Transition Assistance

Group (UNTAG), the withdrawal of South African troops and elections under United Nations supervision. As part of this process, the Pretoria régime should immediately announce its choice of electoral system and hold talks to fix a date for the cease-fire so that implementation of resolution 435 (1978) can commence.

18. The armed forces of South Africa must also immediately withdraw from all Angolan territory, part of which they have occupied since 1981, and pay compensation for the damage and destruction they have wrought—most recently in Cangamba, a town 400 kilometres inside Angolan territory.

19. I have been speaking thus far on the issue of Namibian independence, which is the issue before the Council. However, the representative of South Africa yesterday [2481st meeting] made an attempt to turn his statement into a discussion on what can be termed the South African occupation of parts of southern Angola.

20. The rules of procedure limit Council debates to the matter at hand but, since no one has raised a procedural objection, permit me to respond to some of the points raised in the statement of the representative of South Africa despite the fact that these clearly come under the mandate of another question of which the Council has been seized since 1978—that is, the question of South African aggression against Angola.

21. In 1975, even as our late President, Mr. Agostinho Neto, was announcing independence to a jubilant civilian crowd in Luanda, South African guns could be heard not too far from our capital. It was in response to the South African military invasion of Angola within hours of our birth as an independent Angola that we invited our friends, among them our Cuban friends, to assist us in fighting this fresh onslaught of imperialism. Thus, South Africa's racist attacks on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola have nothing to do with the presence of Cubans in Angola or the question of Namibian independence, as the racists would have us believe. There has never been a single Angolan soldier on non-Angolan soil. Are we being told that we have no right to self-defence within our own borders and to be assisted by friends of our own choice at our own invitation? What about the pre-implementation talks held at Geneva in 1981, which also broke down because of Pretoria's intransigence? There was no reference to a Cuban presence in Angola at that time. It was not until mid-1981, after collusion between Pretoria and its Western allies, that the linkage was manufactured.

22. As for the Cuban presence in Angola being a cause for the gravest concern not only to South Africa but to "all the countries of the region", as the South African representative mentioned yesterday in his statement, perhaps he has not really understood the cause of the gravest concern in the region. It is the militarist and terrorist policies and actions and the genocide of the *apartheid* South African régime itself that are constantly referred to by every State in southern Africa in every forum, including the Council. If it is otherwise, I should certainly like to hear those countries speak for themselves.

23. The racist South African armed forces have mounted brutal attacks on all front-line States. Was that indeed also because of a Cuban presence in those countries? Were there Cuban troops in Lesotho? The racist régime has as many pretexts, excuses and rationales as there are *apartheid* laws.

24. The real reason is contained in the phrase used by the South African representative himself in referring to the inexcusable South African terrorist attack on Maputo recently. The representative referred to "the pre-emptive operation". And that is the key to all the racist régime's acts of aggression and terrorism both inside South Africa, against its majority inhabitants, and across its borders in Namibia and in other front-line States—pre-emptive operations against the genuine independence of Namibia; pre-emptive operations against the spread of freedom and liberation, even as former colonies regain independence; pre-emptive operations against the granting of the inalienable rights of the South African majority inhabitants; pre-emptive strikes against anything at all that threatens the racist *apartheid* State and structure of South Africa. The racist régime attempts to deceive the international community; yesterday it actually attempted to insult the intelligence of the Council members by presenting specious arguments.

25. The issue is not the Cuban presence. Angola is indeed an independent State. Certainly, the issue here is the independence of Namibia. The issue is not SWAPO bases, it is the continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its exploitation as the fifth province of South Africa. The issue is not support for the freedom fighters of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC); it is the denial of human, civil, political and economic rights of South Africa's oppressed majority.

26. Those are the issues South Africa seeks to deny, reject or camouflage, as witness the statement yesterday by the representative of the racist régime.

27. To return to the issue before the Council, namely, the question of Namibia: as long as South Africa continues to get political and economic support from its friends, it will feel free to undertake with impunity acts of armed aggression in southern Africa and continue its occupation and exploitation of Namibia.

28. The Council must reject South Africa's intransigence in linking the independence of Namibia to irrelevant extraneous issues, and if South Africa fails to comply with relevant resolutions the Council should consider the adoption of appropriate measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

A luta continua; a vitória é certa.

29. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

30. Mr. RUPIA (United Republic of Tanzania): Mr. President, I wish first, on behalf of my delegation, to thank you and the other members of the Council for giving us an opportunity to participate in the Council's deliberations on the question of Namibia. We are confident that your rich personal experience in the diplomatic field and your well-recognized talents will be put to full use in guiding the deliberations of the Council to a successful conclusion. Coming from a region so rife with conflict arising from the denial of a people's freedom and its right to a homeland, you are personally well aware of the magnitude of the suffering which can be imposed on a struggling people.

31. I should like also to join those who have spoken before me in paying a well deserved tribute to Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana, who presided over the Council during the month of September, for a job well done.

32. Allow me also to express my Government's appreciation for the efforts of the Secretary-General in seeking a peaceful resolution of the Namibian problem. His visit to the region in fulfilment of the mandate entrusted to him by the Council in its resolution 532 (1983), gave him the opportunity to come in contact with the vivid realities and the human tragedy attendant on the continued occupation of Namibia. In particular, the visit vindicated our long-standing position that there can be no substitution for the central role of the United Nations in the search for a solution to the Namibian question nor can it be relegated to a secondary position.

33. The report of the Secretary-General [S/15943] equally confirmed what has always been our understanding of the current status of the negotiations in the context of Council resolution 435 (1978). The visit, therefore, thrashed out some of the positions which were hitherto muted.

34. This series of Council meetings has been convened in order to consider the report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to resolution 532 (1983). In May this year, the Council met under very uncertain circumstances. It was convened in an attempt to salvage a great opportunity to bring to an end the colonization of Namibia, an opportunity that was gradually slipping away. Hence we saw the need for the Council to revive its resolve speedily to implement its plan for the independence of that Territory. The international community was trying to find ways to break the impasse which had been, and continues to be, imposed on the liberation of Namibia. It therefore saw fit to mandate the Secretary-General to initiate consultations with a view to securing the implementation of the plan. Considering that resolution 435 (1978) has been accepted by the parties involved, one would have expected these meetings to be convened for the purpose of triggering the implementation of the resolution. But to date, it is painfully clear that our realization of that objective is not so imminent.

35. When my delegation spoke before the Council in May [2448th meeting], we devoted our attention to showing why we thought it was regrettable that, after the extensive and exhaustive negotiations that had taken place, one

of the parties to those negotiations would have chosen to turn its back on the agreement and hence on the independence of Namibia.

36. If the United Nations plan embodied in resolution 435 (1978) is still unimplemented it is because of a policy that has come to be known as "linkage" or "parallelism". Inherent in that policy are considerations which are inimical not only to the independence of Namibia but to the Charter of the United Nations. Indeed, they are inimical to the independence of Namibia because the policy seeks to link that independence to issues totally irrelevant to that purpose and outside the context of resolution 435 (1978), approving the United Nations plan. Apart from the rights of the Namibians, the insistence on linking the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola is an interference in the internal affairs of Angola.

37. The decision of Angola regarding those troops is a sovereign prerogative of that State. It is consistent with the Charter and international law. No country has any right to violate the norms of international law. It is extortionist to make the implementation of Council resolutions contingent upon the satisfaction of geo-political preoccupations of any Member of the Organization, especially a permanent member of the Council. Council resolution 435 (1978) was negotiated and adopted as a framework for the achievement of the independence of Namibia. That and that alone, was its sole purpose. It did not and was not meant to encompass issues irrelevant to that objective and certainly not to be a vehicle of any Power or group of countries to obtain, by extortion, national foreign policy objectives otherwise unobtainable.

38. There can be no doubt that those who seek to pervert logic, falsify the truth and trample on the rights of peoples for ideological expediency, do not want peace in southern Africa. Those who go to great lengths to manufacture for South Africa excuses with which to justify aggression, even more than the *apartheid* authorities themselves, cannot claim to be agents of stability in the region. Rather, their actions seek to perpetuate instability and violence.

39. South Africa is occupying Namibia illegally. It occupies parts of Angola. Yet an attempt is being made to obscure the fact of the occupation of Namibia and Angola and instead to propel into predominance considerations that do not relate to the independence of Namibia or even to the security of the region, but seek to advance global cold-war ambitions. Why do we not hear condemnation of South Africa for its occupation of Angola? Why is it so difficult for the same friends of South Africa even to condemn *apartheid*, the real cause for the tension in that region?

40. We have repeatedly sought to impress upon the authors of the policy of linkage the fallacy of their position. In doing so, we have pointed out irrefutable facts in order to expose the fallacy of their position. Perhaps for emphasis it is worth while recalling certain incontrovertible facts.

41. When, in 1975, the *apartheid* régime invaded Angola to prevent the assumption of leadership of Angola by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), there were no Cuban forces in Angola. Then, as it is the case now, we did not hear any concerns about the security of Angola. Angola's appeal for help went largely unanswered. The Cuban Government was prepared to help. It is, therefore, a fact that the stationing of Cuban troops in Angola was precipitated by South African aggression. Their presence is made more necessary today by that continuing aggression.

42. Between 1975 and 1982 eight years elapsed. During that period a series of diplomatic initiatives to secure the peaceful independence of Namibia were launched. These initiatives culminated in the adoption of Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978) and the convening of the ill-fated pre-implementation meeting at Geneva in 1981, as well as the proximity talks in 1982. South Africa participated fully in all these negotiations, and all this time the Cuban troops remained in Angola. Yet, as my delegation has had occasion to observe before in the Council, at no point did South Africa raise the question of those troops, let alone link them in any manner to the negotiations on the independence of Namibia. The régime itself was aware that its armed aggression against and occupation of Angola necessitated that presence. Instead, linkage—a product of the policy of constructive engagement—was introduced and quickly attributed to South Africa.

43. Even if we were to accept that it is South Africa that now insists on linkage, there can be no doubt whatsoever that this policy, while conveniently embraced by that régime, was engineered by the United States. In this regard, even those other members of the contact group that have failed to disassociate themselves from this policy of linkage are accomplices in this scheme to deny freedom to the people of Namibia. For it is this insistence on linkage, and this alone, which has deadlocked progress on the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). It is thus unfair, and the ultimate in insincerity, for any party to the negotiations on the independence of Namibia to attempt, even remotely, to ascribe responsibility to Angola. Above all, it is futile to try to exonerate the *apartheid* régime of its culpability, or to create justification for it.

44. It is important that the Council not be derailed into consideration of fictitious issues. That is a diversionary ploy aimed at deflecting the international focus from the real issues. The issues at hand are those of *apartheid* in South Africa, the illegal occupation of Namibia, and the acts of destabilization against the independent African States neighbouring the *apartheid* régime, including the occupation of Angola's territory. No one can seriously claim the existence of any other relevant issue. While this series of Council meetings is called to consider the issue of the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa, we hope that those who champion security in southern Africa will participate fully in convening other meetings of the Council to consider those other problems which are threatening international peace and security.

45. South Africa has escalated its violence. Apart from its occupation of Angolan territory, it has mounted a campaign of destabilization of other neighbouring independent African States. Lesotho is today a victim of economic sabotage and blockade for giving humanitarian assistance to the refugees of *apartheid*; Zimbabwe, Zambia, Swaziland, Botswana and even far-removed countries like Seychelles have fallen victim to South African aggression. South Africa recruits, trains and finances bandits and mercenaries to carry out its military incursions into these countries. As recently as Monday, 17 October, the capital of Mozambique, Maputo, was attacked in what has become a pattern of destabilization contemptuously aimed at coinciding with any action by the international community to censure the *apartheid* régime. Every series of Council meetings to consider the question of Namibia has been accompanied by an act of aggression by South Africa. The adoption of resolution 435 (1978) was preceded by the Cassinga massacre on 4 May 1978; the Cuamato attack was timed to coincide with the disruption of the pre-implementation meeting in January 1981; the Maseru raid was timed to deflect the attention of the international community from South Africa's non-implementation of the United Nations plan on Namibia.

46. There cannot possibly be in this regard any legitimate concern of the *apartheid* régime or of any other country to which the international community must address itself. There can be no consideration of any so-called regional issues outside the context of the independence of Namibia, the ending of acts of destabilization by South Africa and the abolition of the diabolical system of *apartheid*, for it is these issues which inherently pose threats of peace and security to the region and the world as a whole.

47. If we speak in those terms, it is to underscore the indignation of the international community. It is to underscore the pain of seeing a people colonized, part of a country occupied, and the victims being told that freedom cannot come, sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be restored, unless the perpetrator of the very vile crimes is rewarded; of their being told that, though all issues relating to Council resolution 435 (1978) have been resolved, implementation of that resolution cannot commence.

48. The Council, therefore, must be categorical in condemning and rejecting linkage. It cannot afford to equivocate on such a diversionary idea, which seeks to undermine the authority and integrity of this body. Above all, the Council cannot afford to equivocate on the independence of Namibia.

49. It is clear that it is South Africa that poses a threat to international peace and security, and continued insistence on linkage will have the effect of perpetuating the threat. To buy time for South Africa to entrench its illegal occupation of Namibia, to create excuses for that régime to continue its occupation of parts of Angola, will only poison the possibility of bringing about peace and security in the region. It is a matter of public record that the international community has rejected and condemned the policies of parallelism or linkage. The General Assembly, the Non-Aligned Movement and the OAU have all rejected outright

the premise and content of the policy of linkage. The least the Council can do is also to reject linkage.

50. Likewise, the Council must reaffirm both the central role of the United Nations in the search for a settlement of the question of Namibia and the continuing validity of resolution 435 (1978) as the only framework for such a settlement. These two factors remain central to any action that may be taken on Namibia.

51. Similarly, it is clear that no issue relevant to resolution 435 (1978) remains outstanding. The report of the Secretary-General is very clear on this. The Council must, therefore, require South Africa to communicate, within a prescribed time-frame, its choice of the electoral system to be used in the election of the Constituent Assembly so that the Council can proceed with the adoption of the enabling resolution triggering the implementation of its resolution 435 (1978).

52. The Council must also be categorical in its resolve to ensure that its resolutions are implemented. It should send clear signals to the *apartheid* régime that it must either co-operate and facilitate the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) or face the institution of appropriate measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.

53. I cannot conclude without paying a well-deserved tribute to SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people. Its sense of statesmanship, enduring even the prevarication of the *apartheid* régime, attests to its commitment to peaceful settlement. Africa's resolve to see Namibia free is irrevocable. No threat, of whatever magnitude, can deter Africa from that objective. We pledge our unflinching support to the combatants of SWAPO in the prosecution of the struggle. •

54. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Yugoslavia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

55. Mr. GOLOB (Yugoslavia): I wish first of all to extend to you, Sir, my sincere congratulations on your assumption of the high office of President of the Council for the month of October. We are happy to have you, the representative of a friendly and non-aligned country and a man of diplomatic experience and skill, at the helm of the Council during its consideration of the question of Namibia. Under your wise guidance the Council will, we believe, be able to address itself to this important question in a constructive and decisive manner.

56. I should also like to congratulate your predecessor as President of the Council for the month of September, Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana, on the exemplary manner in which he conducted the work of the Council.

57. These meetings of the Council are in our view, a logical, necessary and timely sequel to the meetings held in May and June of this year. Those meetings were attended by a number of ministers for foreign affairs of non-aligned countries who expressed in the Council the position taken

jointly at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March 1983. At the 2446th meeting of the Council, the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, Mr. Lazar Mojsov, emphasized that the question of Namibia is not only an African problem but a global problem as well, one involving the basic principles on which international relations are founded. He further stated that foreign domination in Namibia, as anywhere else, poses a direct threat to international peace and security, and he concluded by saying that resistance of foreign domination in Namibia and elsewhere is a pre-condition for safeguarding peace and security.

58. In resolution 532 (1983) adopted on 31 May 1983, the Council mandated the Secretary-General to resolve, in direct consultations with the parties in conflict, the outstanding questions relevant to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and to report to the Council within the prescribed time-frame.

59. The Secretary-General, acting in a dedicated manner, fulfilled his mandate promptly and reported that all the outstanding issues relevant to resolution 435 (1978) had been resolved. The sole undetermined issue has been the choice of the electoral system, and since it has been left to South Africa to choose either one of the two systems proposed, it is not the issue where agreement is pending. It must therefore be considered resolved.

60. The report of the Secretary-General has shown, however, that South Africa continues to insist on linkage between the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and an irrelevant and extraneous issue—the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. South Africa is thereby obstructing the independence of Namibia and imposing a condition upon it that was never contemplated by the Council when it adopted resolution 435 (1978).

61. What is then necessary is that the Council resolutely and categorically reject linkage or any other condition alien to resolution 435 (1978). We believe it is the Council's duty to do so in order to remain faithful to its own decision and to deny South Africa the opportunity of insisting on something that is in no way whatsoever connected with the United Nations plan. The Council should, we believe, confirm that the plan is the only basis for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian problem, thus removing any grounds for any present or future attempts of the racist régime to find excuses for its obstruction of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

62. That done, and bearing in mind that all outstanding issues germane to that resolution have been resolved, the Council should finally set in motion the United Nations plan. It is our opinion that the request to make known its choice of electoral system promptly should be addressed to South Africa, after which the envisaged procedure of implementation of resolution 435 (1978) could begin.

63. We believe that it is the responsibility of the Council to act promptly and decisively for several compelling reasons. First, it has to avert the mounting threat to security

in southern Africa brought about by the racist régime's constant policy of aggression against the destabilization of neighbouring African States from the Territory of Namibia before the point of explosion is reached and international peace and security at large are endangered. There could not be any better example, to our mind, of the often-suggested preventive functioning of the Council than a prompt implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia.

64. Secondly, the international community, and therefore the Council, has a responsibility to bring to an end the long suffering and the sacrifices of the Namibian people and its sole and authentic representative, the liberation movement, SWAPO. The demand that freedom finally be given to Namibia is universal, and the Council has the duty to act in accordance with it.

65. Thirdly, the victims of the constant aggressive actions of the Pretoria racist régime—in particular Angola, as well as Lesotho, Mozambique and other front-line States—should finally be enabled to live in peace and security so that they can turn to the pressing problems of their economic and social development. It is impermissible that the independence and sovereignty of those countries should be permanently violated. It is indeed impermissible that South Africa should be left to continue to occupy parts of Angolan territory, to kill Angolan people at will and to destroy the infrastructure of that country with total impunity and then even attempt to shift to Angola the heavy responsibility for preventing the implementation of the United Nations plan that South Africa itself bears. The international community must not allow that situation to continue and must urgently create the conditions in which the unbearable aggression against Angola would cease.

66. For all those reasons, there is the greatest urgency in the request heard at this table for the Council to proceed with the implementation of the United Nations plan. South Africa should be called upon to communicate to the Secretary-General its choice of electoral system without any further delay; and the Secretary-General would then report to the Council as soon as possible, after which the Council would proceed with the adoption of the enabling resolution for the implementation of the United Nations plan.

67. The importance of a prompt decision along these lines also resides in the message that the Council would thus be sending to South Africa—that is, that the Council would no longer tolerate South Africa's obstruction of the implementation of the resolution. By so doing, the Council would be acting in accordance with the pressing need to safeguard the prestige and effectiveness of the world Organization and its central role on the question of Namibia.

68. In the event that South Africa should continue to flout the will of the international community, and if the report of the Secretary-General confirms that fact, my delegation will, as it has done in the past, support any measure aimed at exerting pressure on South Africa,

including the appropriate measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. It is our opinion that an economic boycott of South Africa on the basis of the relevant General Assembly resolutions should be applied by all countries. May I remind the Council that such a measure was helpful in the struggle for independence of Zimbabwe, and there is no reason to believe that the same would not hold true for Namibia?

69. In all regions of the world independence is the overriding request. In a growing number of countries there is an ever-stronger resistance to foreign domination and occupation, so much so that it is becoming an ever more essential element of the present state of affairs of the world. No authentic liberation struggle has ever been defeated, and the Namibian people will win their struggle and achieve their independence.

70. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Mozambique. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

71. Mr. DOS SANTOS (Mozambique): Allow me, Sir, to begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council this month. I am sure that under your leadership our discussions will be very successful and bring nearer the day when the people of Namibia will be able to enjoy, like the peoples of many independent countries, including your own, its birthright: freedom, independence, justice and democracy.

72. I should like to take this opportunity also to congratulate your predecessor for the able and serene manner in which he conducted the affairs of the Council during the turbulent month of September.

73. Similarly, the Secretary-General deserves my appreciation for his untiring dedication to the Organization.

74. The adoption of Council resolution 435 (1978) meant for the people of Namibia, and indeed the world at large, that Namibia's independence was just around the corner, that it was just a matter of a few months. The cheese of hope has been and continues to be deliberately dangled near the nose of freedom-loving people in such a way as to make them think that sooner rather than later they will be able to eat it. But it was never meant to be eaten. This is how we should interpret the situation we are facing now. Lengthy and protracted discussions ensued after the adoption of resolution 435 (1978). At one point during the nursing period, and later, as time went by, it became abundantly clear that the child's father—or mother, if you wish—not only was unprepared to feed him or her but was also ready to abandon the child to his or her fate. The five-year-old negotiation was marked by a process whereby road-block after road-block was erected by the father on the child's way to the dining room. But when the child, under the care of his or her stepmother, grew strong—to the chagrin of his or her father—the latter attempted to inject a lethal fluid into the child's body, although the father continued publicly to claim that he loved his child.

This fluid goes by the name of "linkage" or "parallelism". Let me say it as bluntly as I can: In legal terms, this is called attempted murder. The accused is generally known as the contact group. Africa—and, indeed, the whole world—is being invited to be an accomplice to this dastardly act.

75. Appeasing and embracing South Africa has only increased its stubbornness and brought untold suffering not only to the people of Namibia and South Africa itself but also to all independent neighbouring countries. Within the framework of this policy, we have seen increased diplomatic, political, economic, military and even nuclear co-operation between some Western countries and *apartheid* South Africa. Far from inhibiting racist South Africa and increasing its isolation, this policy has allowed it to attack its neighbours, with little reaction from the international community of nations.

76. Having assured itself of diplomatic cover in international forums, the licences and patents necessary to manufacture weapons, and supplies of war *matériel*, the racist South African régime has been able, through a belligerent and expansionist policy, to arrogate to itself the right to carry out repeated acts of aggression against its neighbours, to attack militarily any country in Africa, to continue its illegal occupation of Namibia, to obstruct Namibia's independence, to strengthen its repugnant and obnoxious *apartheid* system, to destabilize front-line States and to invade and occupy part of Angolan territory.

77. Only a few days ago Mozambique was once again a victim of this aggressive nature of *apartheid* South Africa, when explosive devices placed by racist South African agents in an apartment building in Maputo went off, wounding five people. This was a barbaric, unprovoked attack against innocent people who were resting after a hard week's work, and constitutes a blatant, gross violation both of Mozambique's sovereignty and of international law and practice.

78. The attack came at a time when racist South Africa was under increasing pressure both at home and abroad on account of its criminal and abominable policy of *apartheid* and racial discrimination. At home the struggle against *apartheid* is being successfully intensified, but there is also growing dissension within the ruling party. The so-called constitutional reforms will shortly be brought to a vote, so the faction espousing them would like to take a firm stand and thus bolster its position. If South Africa can blame outsiders for its problems, so much the better.

79. In the rest of the world, South Africa's position is not a rosy one. During the general debate in the General Assembly, for instance, speaker after speaker condemned South Africa's policy. This will later be repeated in meetings of the Assembly and its main Committees, and is taking place now in the Council, as was only to be expected.

80. It should be remembered that whenever South Africa is under great pressure its response is always the same.

South Africa has shown in the past that it is not in favour of peaceful relations with its neighbours, and I am convinced that the international community will take the necessary steps to stop South African aggression.

81. Yesterday [2481st meeting] a racist South African spokesman made allegations too wild to deserve any serious consideration. Since I harbour the greatest respect for the Council, I shall not waste its valuable time in trying to comment on all those allegations. I should like just to touch in passing upon some facts.

82. *Apartheid* South Africa is fond of alleging the existence of ANC military bases in Maputo, and of launching attacks against them. On a number of occasions when those attacks have occurred, members of the diplomatic corps accredited in Mozambique and journalists from all over the world have immediately been shown the attacked places, and the so-called bases have turned out to be a nursery school, a fruit-juice and jam factory, and some houses. Despite these facts, the Pretoria régime has continued, as in the past, to label these places as military bases, and it will continue to do so tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. Allegations or insinuations about ANC military bases existing in Mozambique represent nothing but a sad concoction of a sick mind.

83. My Government has the right and, indeed, the duty to take all—I repeat, all—necessary measures to preserve Mozambique's national independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty and to defend its people from these murderous acts. The Council may wish to take good note of that.

84. An obvious attempt is clearly being made to turn accepted, normal moral values upside down. Those who deliberately try to reward the aggressor and punish the victims, to glorify the illegal and vilify the legal, will have to accept responsibility for whatever may happen, and will have no one to blame but themselves.

85. Namibia's independence and the presence of any foreign forces in Angola at the invitation of a legal and recognized Government are two separate and unrelated issues. Any insistence on relating the two issues constitutes a flagrant, gross and grotesque interference in the internal affairs of a free, independent and sovereign State, Angola. Any fraternal forces now present in Angola—and I say it time and again—are there at the invitation of the Angolan Government, to help it defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, as envisaged in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. They are not there for any offensive purpose whatsoever.

86. On the other hand, Namibia's independence is an issue: it is a colonial question. Namibia must be decolonized, and its people must regain their freedom and independence without any impediment or hindrance. We who claim to be democracies must not, under whatever pretext, deny the Namibian people their right to exercise democracy lest we jeopardize and place a big question mark over our own democracies.

87. Linkage is a clumsy fabrication, deliberately presented in order to create a vicious circle: "Namibia", they say, "cannot be allowed to attain its independence until some forces are removed from Angola. On the other hand, we are doing everything possible to maintain those forces by attacking and occupying parts of Angolan territory, so that we can justify the denial of independence to Namibia." The vicious circle is drawn. Namibia remains unfree.

88. South Africa aims to create and maintain a *cordon sanitaire* around its borders. It will continue trying to demonstrate to its own people that all the woes resulting from *apartheid* policies actually stem from nothing but outside interference. What South Africa fears most is the example an independent Namibia could constitute for the people of South Africa, by way of encouraging them in their struggle for the total eradication of the *apartheid* system.

89. In the light of the foregoing, I remain convinced that the Council will: denounce and reject linkage, as it is deeply repugnant and offensive, and completely extraneous to resolution 435 (1978); demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of racist South African troops from Namibia; immediately take the necessary steps leading to Namibia's independence; and secure the conditions that will make *apartheid* South Africa relinquish its stranglehold on Namibia, through such steps as rigorous application and extension of the arms embargo, comprehensive, mandatory sanctions, denial of nuclear assistance, and disinvestment.

90. It is not enough to condemn *apartheid* as morally wrong. The international community should be prepared to take concrete steps to show its aversion and opposition to the racist doctrine of the South African régime. It is high time we backed up our opposition to *apartheid* with deeds as well as words and distanced ourselves from this abominable policy.

91. Whether we like it or not, the people of Namibia will be free. The Council can, and indeed must, do a great deal in that process. The train of freedom and independence is moving on to freedom and independence. The overwhelming majority of mankind is on board. I hope that no one will wish to jump out. Should there be a few who would like to do that, they are free to do so as long as they make no effort to derail the train. Let Namibia be free today, not tomorrow.

92. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the Deputy Minister for External Relations of Cuba. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

93. Mr. ORAMAS OLIVA (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): First of all, Sir, I should like to extend to you the congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of the presidency of the Council, which once again falls to a country that is a friend of ours and is non-aligned. At this time I also wish to express our appreciation to your predecessor, Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana, for the wise manner in which he conducted the proceedings of the Council.

94. In 1983, the Council on many occasions, as required in the defence of the loftiest principles of mankind, had to deal with the question of Namibia in view of the lack of results achieved in that regard. Once again this United Nations body is dealing with this question and discussing the illegality of South Africa's continued possession of the Territory of Namibia and the negative consequences of its occupation.

95. Perhaps never before has world public opinion confronted with so much persistence, moral grandeur and political realism the task of achieving such an obviously just and necessary goal as the independence of Namibia, which is called for by resolution 435 (1978). Perhaps never before has the international community been so consistently flouted and the resolutions of the Council and the General Assembly spurned in such open violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations as by the racist régime of *apartheid*.

96. As is clearly stated under item 36 in the annotated preliminary list of items to be included in the provisional agenda of the thirty-eighth regular session of the General Assembly:

"Since the adoption by the General Assembly at its first session, in 1946, of resolution 65 (I), the question of Namibia (formerly South West Africa) has been on the agenda of every regular session, of the fifth and ninth special sessions and of the eighth emergency special session of the Assembly. During the period, several subsidiary bodies of the Assembly have examined the situation relating to the Territory, including the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa, the Good Offices Committee on South West Africa, the Special Committee for South West Africa and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The question has also been the subject of a number of resolutions of the Security Council . . . In addition, the International Court of Justice has examined and delivered opinions on related aspects of the question . . ."

97. As far back as 1966, the Assembly, in its resolution 2145 (XXI), terminated South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa, which is now called Namibia, the name adopted by the Assembly, in its resolution 2372 (XXII), in accordance with the desires of the Namibian people.

98. It is now 17 years since that decision was taken by the General Assembly but, in spite of the many resolutions that have been adopted in the interim, the question of Namibia seems to be in a state of stagnation.

99. In spite of the existence of Council resolution 435 (1978), which offered prospects for the long-awaited independence of Namibia, and in spite of the reaffirmation by the General Assembly in 1981, at its eighth emergency special session [*resolution ES-8/2*], that that resolution was "the only basis for a peaceful settlement" and that it was necessary to begin immediately the unconditional implementation of that resolution "without any prevarication,

qualification or modification", the present situation with regard to Namibia is rather sombre.

100. The racist régime of Pretoria stubbornly refuses to implement the decisions of the international community and grant independence to Namibia. Can it be that for the people of Namibia, who have suffered so much, there are no human rights? Or is it that complicity in this crime requires an ambivalent attitude and requires that the clamouring of a people yearning for freedom be silenced? How much longer can South Africa continue to impose its racist order on Namibia?

101. The stubborn persistence of the racist régime of South Africa and its defiance of the Organization and of the States belonging to it are supported by the encouragement it receives from the Government of the United States as it endeavours to delay independence for the people of Namibia.

102. To what is this stubborn resistance due? What reasons, interests and strategies comprise the intransigent position of the racist régime? What forces make it possible for it to defy the Organization and ignore with impunity international agreements?

103. Namibia is a vast Territory with bountiful natural resources and a strategic geographical location, which explains the long history of colonial occupation and oppression of the Namibian people and its territory, considered one of the richest of the African continent.

104. Another of the factors that have made Namibia very valuable in the imperialist strategy is that it has rich uranium resources, whose extraction and consumption are managed by transnational corporations, which, together with South Africa, have been using it to develop their nuclear industry for military purposes. According to the 1980 report of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Namibia's uranium production is 5,000 tons a year.

105. It is interesting that the main limitation on the development of mining in Namibia is the lack of water. In this land of scanty and irregular rainfall, water is costly and its supply is uneven. When Angola was still a Portuguese colony, South Africa signed an agreement with the Government in Lisbon in 1969 to build hydro-electric complexes in Calueque and Ruacaná.

106. The two Governments wanted to bring in thousands of Portuguese and white Namibian or South African settlers, with a twofold objective—economic and political. The presence of the white settlers in those vast, thinly-populated lands would make difficult the actions of the revolutionary movements in Angola against Portuguese colonial domination and the actions of SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people.

107. What are the Nazi racists in Pretoria and their allies in Washington trying to do? To try to overthrow the revolutionary processes in Angola and Mozambique and to bind the countries of the area to their economic interests is

not new, as we know: it is an old plan. For this purpose they train and give logistic support to the bandits of UNITA and of the mis-named Mozambique Movement of National Resistance. They wish to destabilize the progressive countries of southern Africa, and they will use any means to this end.

108. South Africa's advanced state of nuclear development, achieved with the help of Western capitalist countries and the United States, is a serious potential threat to the countries of Africa, principally those of southern Africa. It is no mere coincidence that when the General Assembly considered the question of Israeli nuclear armament at its thirty-seventh session it called on the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the OAU and the League of Arab States, in resolution 37/82, to follow closely the nuclear and military collaboration between Israel and South Africa.

109. There remain on the conscience of mankind the terrible massacres perpetrated by the South African criminal hordes in Cassinga in 1980; in Cangamba in 1983; in Angola, in Niazonia in 1976 and in Chimolho in 1977; the brutal aggressions in Matola, in Maputo itself, the capital of the sister republic of Mozambique, in 1982 and 1983; and the massacre in Lesotho in 1983, in the capital of that small, fraternal kingdom, carried out on the pretext of a punitive action against ANC militants. In the past few days these cowardly actions have been repeated in Maputo. They are clear expressions of the way in which international responsibility is regarded by the repudiated *apartheid* régime, whose ferocious, primitive claws were shown yesterday in the outrageous statement of its representative to the Council.

110. Namibia's independence process is again at an impasse, caused by the obstinacy of the United States Administration and the South African régime. The recent journey to South Africa of the Secretary-General, within the framework of his mandate to consult the parties, conferred on him by resolution 532 (1983), made clear the South African Government's insistence on making the beginning of the process of Namibian independence dependent on the question of the presence of Cuban troops in Angola—that is, on the so-called linkage. But this is not the sole link; it has two more in hand: that MPLA should negotiate with UNITA and that the front-line countries should cease supporting ANC. These are sophistries, pretexts, which betray greed and an urge to impose its own order—the new order of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*.

111. In 1974, 1973, 1972, 1971 and even before that, there were no Cuban internationalists in Angola. The country was controlled by the Portuguese colonial army, which was certainly a close friend of the Pretoria racists. What was there then to prevent South Africa's withdrawal from the Territory of Namibia, occupied then, as today, illegally? This question should be put to the Pretoria racists in any future consultations.

112. Cuba vigorously rejects the attempt to link the presence of its troops on Angolan territory with the independ-

ence of Namibia and, like the overwhelming majority of States represented at the United Nations, considers that the presence of Cuban troops in Angola results from a sovereign agreement between two independent States and is therefore not a matter to be negotiated with third parties.

113. United States imperialism has tried in vain to present this just position of principle, based on international law, as an obstacle to Namibia's independence, attempting to conceal the fact that what is an obstacle to Namibia's independence and a threat to international peace is the occupation of part of Angolan territory by South African troops, in open, flagrant violation of the principles of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and the independence of a State legally constituted and recognized by the international community under international law and the Charter.

114. The declaration signed on 4 February 1982 by the Ministers for Foreign Relations of Cuba and Angola sets forth, in its first paragraph, defence of the principle of sovereignty, as reflected in agreements between Cuba and Angola, based on Article 51 of the Charter. In its article 9 it clearly states that:

"If the self-sacrificing struggle of SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, and the demands of the international community succeeded in bringing about a genuine solution of the problem of Namibia, based on strict compliance with United Nations Security Council resolution 435 (1978), and led to a truly independent Government and the complete withdrawal of the South African occupying troops to the other side of the Orange River, thus considerably diminishing the danger of aggression against Angola, the Angolan and Cuban Governments would consider the resumption of the implementation of the programme for the gradual withdrawal of the Cuban forces within a time-frame to be agreed upon by both Governments."

115. No one is unaware that United Nations resolutions would have been implemented and the suffering of the Namibian people would have ended long ago if South Africa did not enjoy the political, economic, military and diplomatic support of the main capitalist Powers, first and foremost, the United States, whose transnational corporations play a major role in the exploitation of Namibia. Without that support South Africa could not maintain its undeclared war against the front-line countries, especially against Angola. For that reason, the South African Government has been carrying out a policy of genocide and destruction, of economic sabotage and indiscriminate bombing of the peace-loving peoples of southern Angola. In a most brazen manner, the South African racist troops continue to occupy parts of Angolan territory, in open defiance of the agreements and appeals of the United Nations and world public opinion.

116. In just 10 months of 1983, the brutality of the *apartheid* régime has led to 323 violations of Angolan air space, seven air attacks on units of FAPLA (Forças Armadas

Populares de Libertação de Angola), three air attacks on the defenceless civilian population and two criminal attacks on SWAPO refugee camps. During the same period there were helicopter drops in Angolan territory and two land attacks. Many of these criminal actions were shamelessly carried out by the South African army from the illegally occupied territory of Angola.

117. Not satisfied with those direct attacks against Angola, with the open and brazen support of the Reagan Administration, South Africa continues to support the criminal activities of counter-revolutionary bands of UNITA. The strategic objective of this policy of force is to delay the process of Namibian independence as long as possible in order to strengthen the puppet parties of Namibia and thus undermine the position of SWAPO in any future Government.

118. All these manoeuvres were supported by a strong diversionary campaign against our military presence in Angola, and the repeated statements by the spokesmen of the State Department and the Prime Minister of South Africa, all reaffirming the policy followed by the Reagan Administration of portraying the solution of the conflict within the general framework of East-West confrontation.

119. America's stubbornly held position, which has received strong support from South Africa, has repeatedly been rejected by the Heads of State and Government of the front-line States and by SWAPO, as was reflected in the final communiqué of the Lusaka meeting on 4 September 1982, which revealed distinct differences of opinion on the subject among the members of the Western contact group.

120. The firm rejection by the front-line States was expressed emphatically in the meeting of the Liberation Committee in Harare on 20 February 1983, during the visit of the Secretary-General, and by other African countries too, which have reiterated that the solution of the problem of Namibia falls within the sole jurisdiction of the United Nations.

121. In turn, by a broad consensus, the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983, clearly reaffirmed that position of the African countries.

122. Other important events occurred in the first half of 1983. Various governmental bodies, progressive organizations and committees throughout the world, as well as the International Conference in Solidarity with the Front-line States, held at Lisbon from 25 to 27 March, and the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence held in Paris from 25 to 29 April, all confirmed that the position of the African countries enjoys broad representative support.

123. In expressing our profound concern over the situation that has been created in Namibia and in the front-line countries by racist South Africa, Cuba believes that it is the duty of the United Nations to assume its full responsibility so as to prevent the outbreak of a catastrophe in

southern Africa. South Africa must be forced to abide by international law, and there is no alternative but to apply broad, binding sanctions, as provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter.

124. We take our responsibility very seriously, and by our determined action we wish to prevent the continuation of a process that has already caused death, suffering and misery. "To view a crime calmly is to commit that crime", declared the forger of our independence, José Martí. The

Council must not by its inaction continue to be an accessory to the crime that has been committed against Namibia.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

NOTE

¹ See A/38/100.

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