General Assembly

**Open-ended Working Group to consider the objectives
and agenda, including the possible establishment of the
preparatory committee, for the fourth special session of
the General Assembly devoted to disarmament**
Third session, 27-31 August 2007, New York

Report of the Open-ended Working Group

I. Introduction

1.   In its resolution 61/60 of 6 December 2006, the General Assembly decided to establish an open-ended working group, working on the basis of consensus, to consider the objectives and agenda, including the possible establishment of the preparatory committee, for the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, taking note of the paper presented by the Chairman of Working Group II during the 1999 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission[1] and the working papers presented during the three substantive sessions of the Open-ended Working Group in 2003, as well as the reports of the Secretary-General regarding the views of Member States on the objectives, agenda and timing of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

II. Organizational matters

A. Opening and duration of the substantive sessions

2.   The Open-ended Working Group held an organizational session, on 22 March, and three substantive sessions, at United Nations Headquarters, from 25 to 29 June, 30 July to 3 August and 27 to 31 August 2007, respectively, under the chairmanship of Alfredo Labbé (Chile). In the course of those sessions, the Working Group held 15 meetings, including an organizational meeting. Consultations were also held by the Chair during the intersessional period, and the Working Group participated in a retreat during its second session, on 31 July 2007. The Working Group also devoted one meeting during its third session, on 28 August, to an interactive discussion with non-governmental organizations.

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[1] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42* (A/54/42).

3.   The Disarmament and Peace Affairs Branch of the Department for General Assembly and Conference Management and the Office for Disarmament Affairs served as secretariat to the Working Group.

4.   At its 1st meeting (organizational meeting), on 22 March, the Working Group adopted the timetable for its three substantive sessions as contained in document A/AC.268/2007/CRP.1.

B.   Composition of the Bureau

5.   At its 1st meeting, on 22 March, the Bureau of the Working Group was constituted as follows:

Chairman:
     Alfredo Labbé (Chile)

Vice-Chairmen:
     Katarzyna Biernat (Poland)
     Carl Magnus Nesser (Sweden)
     Febrian Ruddyard (Indonesia)

Rapporteur:
     Lotfi Bouchaara (Morocco)

6.   At its 7th meeting, on 30 July, the Working Group elected Sulay-Manah J. Kpukumu (Sierra Leone) as Rapporteur.

C.   Programme of work

7.   At its 2nd meeting, on 25 June, the Open-ended Working Group adopted its programme of work as contained in document A/AC.268/2007/CRP.2, which read as follows:

    1.   Consideration of the objectives and agenda of the fourth special session devoted to disarmament.

    2.   Consideration of the possible establishment of the preparatory committee for the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

    3.   Report of the Open-ended Working Group to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session.

D.   Documentation

8.   The Working Group had before it the following documents:

    (a)   Tentative schedule of substantive sessions (A/AC.268/2007/CRP.1);

    (b)   Programme of work (A/AC.268/2007/CRP.2);

    (c)   Some reflections and questions from the Chair: working paper by the Chairman of the Open-ended Working Group (A/AC.268/2007/CRP.3; upgraded to A/AC.268/2007/WP.1) (see annex I);

(d)   Proposal by the Non-Aligned Movement on the objectives of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (A/AC.268/2007/CRP.4; upgraded to A/AC.268/2007/WP.2) (see annex II);

(e)   Additional reflections and questions: working paper by the Chairman of the Open-ended Working Group (A/AC.268/2007/WP.3) (see annex III);

(f)   European Security Strategy: conference room paper submitted by the European Union (A/AC.268/2007/CRP.5) (see annex IV);

(g)   Final reflections and suggestions from the Chair: conference room paper submitted by the Chairman of the Open-ended Working Group (A/AC.268/2007/CRP.6) (see annex V);

(h)   Final reflection and recommendation by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at the conclusion of the Open-ended Working Group mandated by resolution 61/60: working paper by the Non-Aligned Movement (A/AC.268/2007/CRP.7; upgraded to A/AC.268/2007/WP.4) (see annex VI).

III.   Organization of work

9.   At its 2nd meeting, on 25 June 2007, the Working Group decided to organize its work in accordance with the specific mandate contained in General Assembly resolution 61/60 to discuss the objectives and agenda, including the possible establishment of a preparatory committee, for the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Group agreed first to consider the objectives and agenda for the fourth special session devoted to disarmament.

10.   During the time allocated for general comments at its 2nd meeting, the Working Group heard general statements made by the representatives of the following countries: Dominican Republic (on behalf of the Rio Group), Indonesia (on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement), Germany (on behalf of the European Union), the Republic of Korea, Mexico (on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition), the Islamic Republic of Iran and Brazil.

IV.   Conclusion

11.   In accordance with its mandate as contained in General Assembly resolution 61/60, the Working Group devoted 14 meetings to the consideration of the objectives and agenda for the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It also took part in an all-day retreat. The Chairman prepared several working papers and the Working Group also had before it proposals submitted by delegations. At the third session, the Chairman presented a conference room paper (A/AC.268/2007/CRP.6). No consensus on the objectives and agenda for a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was reached by the Working Group. However, the Working Group recognized that further discussion and exchanges of ideas were needed. The Working Group underlined the need to refer the issue back to the General Assembly for its consideration.

12.   The Working Group also decided to annex to its report the documents listed in paragraph 8 above. The Chairman's working papers are presented without prejudice

to the positions of any delegation or group of delegations; they are his sole responsibility and do not represent a negotiated position, nor do they represent a command consensus.

V. Adoption of the report of the Open-ended Working Group

13.   At the 14th meeting, on 30 August, the Rapporteur, Sulay-Manah J. Kpukumu (Sierra Leone), introduced the draft report of the Working Group to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session (A/AC.268/2007/CRP.8).

14.   At its 15th meeting, on 31 August, the Working Group adopted the draft report by consensus.

Annex I

Some reflections and questions from the Chair

Working paper by the Chairman of the Open-ended Working Group

Disclaimer: This **is not a paper** devised to start a drafting exercise. It is a modest attempt to provide food for thought and initiate a diplomatic discussion on a matter beset by acute divergences among Member States (starting with the need and political feasibility of a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament). Of course, its assertions are open to debate.

- The 1978 tenth special session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, produced an impressive Final Document.[a] It reaffirms universal principles (some of them can be traced back to the statute of the League of Nations) and sets forth a number of objectives which remain valid today. On the other hand, important objectives envisaged in the text have been accomplished.[b]

- Resolution S-10/2, adopted by consensus, is a politically binding instrument. If we want it to remain pertinent — as a programme for political action — at the beginning of the 21st century, we must renew our political support for it.

- The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly reflects a sense of foreboding and urgency prompted by the Cold War at its height. While certain parameters and phenomena remain constant in international security, we find ourselves at a different political juncture in 2007. The risk of a global nuclear confrontation is less likely today than in 1978.

- The present juncture is marked by its own threats and challenges; a fourth special session ought to take political and practical stock of these. In fact, we don't need a special session just to reaffirm our allegiance to resolution S-10/2: a General Assembly Plenary resolution would suffice for such a limited — albeit important — purpose.

- To command a comparable political authority, the final document of a fourth special session should be a **coalescing vehicle for all** United Nations Member States. As such, it must enjoy significant consensus (including all key players) and add value over and above what was accomplished by the first special session.

- The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the cornerstone of international security, but its legal regime has been subjected to increased political strain. The Chair is convinced that confronting nuclear disarmament with nuclear non-proliferation portrays a false dichotomy: nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are in reality the obverse and the reverse of the same coin.

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[a] Resolution S-10/2.

[b] The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

- The 2010 Review Conference will be a litmus test of the States Parties' political support for the NPT. Another failure would require political remedies best adopted in a multilateral setting. The General Assembly is the principal body of the United Nations, empowered both with political legitimacy and legal authority to act on behalf of all the United Nations membership.

- The objectives and agenda of a fourth special session are to be decided by the General Assembly. This Working Group — which **is not** a mini-special session — is intended to facilitate such a decision. In its 2003 version, the Working Group failed to reach consensus; the Chair is persuaded that repeating the 2003 exercise is riskier than essaying a new approach.

- A fourth special session will require a critical mass of political support from key players and the United Nations membership at large. The Chair is convinced that such a critical mass can be reached, **incrementally**. Any increment, however modest, is a success.

- If we engage seriously in the business of increasing political support for a fourth special session, we would be well advised to avoid certain unnecessary contentious elements. True, divergences will continue to exist, but not all of them are equal. It is perfectly possible to concentrate, first, on the identification of points of convergence while recognizing the persistence of differences. (After all, divergence is the **raison d'être** of diplomacy).

Some questions for the first week

- Any multilateral review process entails political assessments of reality (events, phenomena, institutions, policies) and Member States may differ or disagree substantially in their interpretation.

Should a fourth special session include, necessarily, a review component?

Is a review component indispensable in relation to a non-legally binding instrument?

Would it serve the purpose of promoting consensus, which is essential for a successful special session?

- If we want a forward-looking fourth special session, it should address new threats and challenges. Disarmament does not occur in a vacuum: it responds to perceptions of security and regional and global scenarios.

What new threats and challenges fall within the scope of a special session?

In which way could a fourth special session contribute to current international efforts to cope with (some) of these threats and challenges?

- Old but persisting challenges should be revisited. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are the most salient of these challenges. The Chair believes that a fourth special session, while setting the multilateral way forward, should recognize — as a matter of simple fact — both past and current achievements in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.[c]

How could a fourth special session dispel the false dichotomy between disarmament and non-proliferation?

How could a fourth special session help to further past and current progress towards nuclear disarmament?

How could a fourth special session support current collective efforts to address (and, in certain cases, redress) nuclear non-proliferation?

- The first special session systematized the **disarmament machinery** and created bodies and mechanisms that still exist today. While there are grounds to believe that most of these bodies have served us well, the stagnation affecting some — perhaps the result of too liberal an application of the rule of consensus — has given rise to proposals for the review of their methods of work.

Should a fourth special session dedicate special attention to the disarmament machinery, making its modernization and democratization one of its main objectives?

What bodies and mechanisms require particular attention?

Should a fourth special session set limits to the rule of consensus, reserving its application only to matters of substance?

- The involvement of civil society and the engagement of public opinion was encouraged at the first special session.

Should a fourth special session put in place mechanisms and rules of procedure to ensure a systematic participation of civil society in the activities of United Nations disarmament bodies (as in other United Nations bodies)?

What bodies would be better suited for civil society participation?

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[c] These achievements may be summarized as: reduction of total numbers of nuclear warheads; elimination of certain categories of nuclear weapons; decommissioning of nuclear weapon systems; non-replacement of weapon systems (strategic bombers); abandonment of nuclear programmes (South Africa, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya).

Annex II

Proposal by the Non-Aligned Movement on the objectives of the fourth special session devoted to disarmament

The objectives of the fourth special session should include, inter alia:

• To work towards achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

• To assess the current international situation in the field of disarmament and its relation to preserving international peace and security;

• To provide for a comprehensive, thorough discussion and review as well as an assessment of all issues in the field of disarmament and international security, including those of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, non-proliferation in all its aspects and disarmament machinery;

• To identify challenges and obstacles, and ways and means to address them, for future actions on issues related to disarmament and non-proliferation, with a view to adopting a final document of the fourth special session devoted to disarmament, including the possibility of concluding a programme of action;

• To reaffirm guidelines, principles and priorities set out in the first special session devoted to disarmament and to assess its implementation, and to take into consideration the possibility of setting additional guidelines and practical measures related to disarmament;

• To emphasize, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament, and to further strengthen the disarmament machinery established by the General Assembly at its tenth special session;

• To promote international stability based on the principle of undiminished security for all States;

• To promote multilateralism in the field of disarmament and to enhance cooperation at all levels.

Proposal by the Non-Aligned Movement on the agenda of the fourth special session devoted to disarmament

The agenda of the fourth special session should include, inter alia:

• Implementation of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament

• The international situation since the first special session, the post-cold-war era and trends at global, regional and subregional levels

• Nuclear weapons

  – Nuclear disarmament

  – Nuclear non-proliferation

- Nuclear-weapon-free zones

- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

- Security assurances

- Non-strategic nuclear weapons

- Nuclear danger

- Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty/CTBT

- Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty/FMCT

• Other weapons of mass destruction

- Chemical weapons

- Biological weapons

- Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

• Missiles

• Prevention of an arms race in outer space

• Conventional weapons

- The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons

- Other conventional weapons including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects

- Anti-personnel mines

- Sophisticated conventional weapons

• Regional disarmament and security

- Regional disarmament

- Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region

- Maintenance of international security/good-neighbourliness, stability and development of South-Eastern Europe

• Confidence-building measures, including transparency in armaments

• Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

• Disarmament machinery

- First Committee of the General Assembly

- Conference on Disarmament

- United Nations Disarmament Commission

- Regional centres

- Department for Disarmament Affairs

- Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters

- Groups of governmental experts

- UNIDIR
- United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme
- Relationship between disarmament and development
- Peaceful uses of nuclear energy
- Other measures for the promotion of disarmament
  - Disarmament and non-proliferation education
  - United Nations Disarmament Information Programme
  - Cooperation with civil society and NGOs
- Related matters of disarmament and international security
  - Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security
  - Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control
  - Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament
  - Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction
  - Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures
- Disarmament concepts and terminology
- An agreed programme of action

Annex III

Additional reflections and questions

Working paper by the Chairman of the Open-ended Working Group

- During the first week of our Working Group we have discussed ideas pertaining to the scope of the objectives of a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Of course, we have not exhausted the matter, but we have moved in the right direction.

- Above all, we have been able to create and sustain a collegial atmosphere which, in itself, is a much needed confidence-building measure within the disarmament machinery.

- The interactive debate has enabled us to recognize some points of convergence. These accrue to the critical mass of political support we need to convene a fourth special session.

- During our second week we'll try to identify additional points of convergence related to the agenda of a fourth special session.

Some questions for the second week

- There is a degree of overlap and a number of similarities between disarmament international law and humanitarian international law. Such similarities and overlapping occur particularly in connection with human security priorities. Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan described small arms as "weapons of mass destruction" in terms of the carnage they cause.

Should proliferation and illicit manufacture and transfer of small arms and light weapons be a priority item on the agenda of the fourth special session?

Should mines, explosive remnants of war and sub-munitions be incorporated as separate agenda items for the fourth special session?

- Globalization and the informatics revolution have generated myriad opportunities for progress and development and, at the same time, new vulnerabilities, amplified by an increased, global interdependence. Cyber threats have the ability to disrupt not only economies or financial systems but human security in every region of the world.

Should the fourth special session deal with cyber-security?

What kind of multilateral instrument would better cope with threats to cyber-security?

- Missiles are probably the weapon-system experiencing the fastest development and the widest dissemination. There is currently no legally-binding instrument on missiles. MANPADS (in the wrong hands) are perceived as a severe threat to civil aviation.

Should missile proliferation be included as a priority agenda item for the fourth special session?

What normative approach could work best to tackle missile proliferation?

Would it be advisable to start addressing first certain types of missiles (i.e. MANPADS)?

 • Terrorism has been recognized by the international community as a major and pressing global challenge. Multilateral preventive action is indispensable to forestall the use of weapons of mass destruction, delivery vehicles and, in general, any major weapon system by terrorists.

Should the fourth special session address the prevention of the use of weapons of mass destruction, delivery vehicles and major weapon systems as a priority agenda item?

Should the fourth special session discuss the objectives and a basic framework of a convention for the prohibition of radiological weapons?

 • Weaponization of outer space seems a more distinct possibility in 2007 than in 1978.

Should PAROS be a priority agenda item for the fourth special session?

 • Export controls are intended to support the regimes established by disarmament instruments and, in particular, prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction, delivery vehicles and related materials and technologies by non-State actors. Multinational and multilateral efforts (for instance in APEC) are in place or under development.

Should export controls be included as a separate agenda item for the fourth special session?

 • Confidence-building measures are the basic tool of disarmament diplomacy. They have proved their enormous political value in global and regional frameworks. In the era of information society and globalization they could be used to address political and even cultural phenomena undermining international peace and security.

Should confidence-building measures be recognized as a priority agenda item for the fourth special session?

Could "classical" confidence-building measures be complemented with new, "cultural" confidence-building measures?

Annex IV

European security strategy

Conference room paper submitted by the European Union

A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD

EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

Brussels, 12 December 2003

Introduction

Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.

The creation of the European Union has been central to this development. It has transformed the relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens. European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions. Over this period, the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. Successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent.

No single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own

The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own.

Europe still faces security threats and challenges. The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that war has not disappeared from our continent. Over the last decade, no region of the world has been untouched by armed conflict. Most of these conflicts have been within rather than between states, and most of the victims have been civilians.

As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player. In the last decade European forces have been deployed abroad to

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places as distant as Afghanistan, East Timor and the DRC. The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.

I. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND KEY THREATS

Global Challenges

The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. Flows of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people. Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice. These developments have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in international affairs. And they have increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields.

Since 1990, almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90% of them civilians. Over 18 million people world-wide have left their homes as a result of conflict.

45 million people die every year of hunger and malnutrition... Aids contributes to the breakdown of societies... Security is a precondition of development

In much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns. Almost 3 billion people, half the world's population, live on less than 2 Euros a day. 45 million die every year of hunger and malnutrition. AIDS is now one of the most devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of societies. New diseases can spread rapidly and become global threats. Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict.

Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty.

Competition for natural resources - notably water - which will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions.

Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world's largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa.

Key Threats

Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.

Terrorism: Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties.

The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society.

Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security. The international treaty regimes and export control arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems. We are now, however, entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East. Advances in the biological sciences may increase the potency of biological weapons in the coming

The last use of WMD was by the Aum terrorist sect in the Tokyo underground in 1995, using sarin gas. 12 people were killed and several thousand injured. Two years earlier, Aum had sprayed anthrax spores on a Tokyo street.

years; attacks with chemical and radiological materials are also a serious possibility. The spread of missile technology adds a further element of instability and could put Europe at increasing risk.

The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction. In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for States and armies.

Regional Conflicts: Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East. Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for WMD. The most practical way to tackle the often elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict.

State Failure: Bad governance — corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability - and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has brought about the collapse of State institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best known recent examples. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon, that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability.

Organised Crime: Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This internal threat to our security has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism.

Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states. Revenues from drugs have fuelled the weakening of state structures in several drug-producing countries. Revenues from trade in gemstones, timber and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the world. All these activities undermine both the rule of law and social order itself. In extreme cases, organised crime can come

to dominate the state. 90% of the heroin in Europe comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan – where the drugs trade pays for private armies. Most of it is distributed through Balkan criminal networks which are also responsible for some 200,000 of the 700,000 women victims of the sex trade world wide. A new dimension to organised crime which will merit further attention is the growth in maritime piracy.

Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.

II. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

We live in a world that holds brighter prospects but also greater threats than we have known. The future will depend partly on our actions. We need both to think globally and to act locally. To defend its security and to promote its values, the EU has three strategic objectives:

Addressing the Threats

The European Union has been active in tackling the key threats.

- It has responded after 11 September with measures that included the adoption of a European Arrest Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the U.S.A. The EU continues to develop cooperation in this area and to improve its defences.

- It has pursued policies against proliferation over many years. The Union has just agreed a further programme of action which foresees steps to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency, measures to tighten export controls and to deal with illegal shipments and illicit procurement. The EU is committed to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty regimes, as well as to strengthening the treaties and their verification provisions.

- The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the DRC. Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU.

In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe.

Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate world-wide: their activities in central or south-east Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens. Meanwhile, global

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Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.

communication increases awareness in Europe of regional conflicts or humanitarian tragedies anywhere in the world.

Our traditional concept of self- defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.

In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.

Building Security in our Neighbourhood

Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.

Enlargement should not create new dividing lines in Europe. Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe

The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.

The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans. Through our concerted efforts with the US, Russia, NATO and other international partners, the stability of the region is no longer threatened by the outbreak of major conflict. The credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements there. The European perspective offers both a strategic objective and an incentive for reform.

It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region.

Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved. The two state solution - which Europe has long supported- is now widely accepted. Implementing it will require a united and cooperative effort by the European Union, the United States, the United Nations and Russia, and the countries of the region, but above all by the Israelis and the Palestinians themselves.

The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered.

AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER BASED ON EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM

In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.

We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.

> *Our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. We are committed to upholding and developing International Law.*
> *The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter.*

We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken.

Key institutions in the international system, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Financial Institutions, have extended their membership. China has joined the WTO and Russia is negotiating its entry. It should be an objective for us to widen the membership of such bodies while maintaining their high standards.

One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship.

Regional organisations also strengthen global governance. For the European Union, the strength and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has a particular significance. Other regional organisations such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union make an important contribution to a more orderly world.

It is a condition of a rule-based international order that law evolves in response to developments such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming. We have an interest in further developing existing institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and in supporting new ones such as the International Criminal Court. Our own experience in Europe demonstrates that security can be increased through confidence building and arms control regimes. Such instruments can also make an important contribution to security and stability in our neighbourhood and beyond.

The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.

Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform. As the world's largest provider of official assistance and its largest trading entity, the European Union and its Member States are well placed to pursue these goals.

Contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures remains an important feature in our policy that we should further reinforce. A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens.

A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society. Some have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms. It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide assistance. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union.

III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE

The European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management. We have instruments in place that can be used effectively, as we have demonstrated in the Balkans and beyond. But if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable. And we need to work with others.

We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention.

More active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.

As a Union of 25 members, spending more than 160 billion Euros on defence, we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously. We could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities.

The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations.

We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future. A European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight.

More Capable. A more capable Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to realise our full potential. Actions underway – notably the establishment of a defence agency – take us in the right direction.

To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary.

Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the medium-term, increase capabilities.

In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos. We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations.

Stronger diplomatic capability: we need a system that combines the resources of Member States with those of EU institutions. Dealing with problems that are more distant and more foreign requires better understanding and communication.

Common threat assessments are the best basis for common actions. This requires improved sharing of intelligence among Member States and with partners.

As we increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions. This might include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The last of these would be part of broader institution building.

The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century.

More Coherent. The point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy is that we are stronger when we act together. Over recent years we have created a number of different instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale.

The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development.

Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command.

Better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies is crucial in the fight both against terrorism and organised crime.

Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states.

Coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in different ways experience in both the Balkans and West Africa shows.

Working with partners There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described above are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors.

Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world.

The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence.

We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership.

Our history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the world: our neighbours in the Middle East, our partners in Africa, in Latin America, and in Asia. These relationships are an important asset to build on. In particular we should look to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China, Canada and India as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support.

Conclusion

This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.

Annex V

Final reflections and suggestions from the Chair

Conference room paper submitted by the Chairman of the Open-ended Working Group

Disclaimer: This paper has been formulated by the Chair -under his own responsibility. It does not necessarily reflect the national or group positions as expressed during the debate and it is not binding in any way.

1.   The Working Group sustained thorough discussions on the objectives and agenda of an SSOD-IV. The Working Group took into consideration the proposals by the NAM, conceptual documents and/or statements by the European Union, the Rio Group and the New Agenda Coalition as well as two *food-for-thought* papers submitted by the Chair.

2.   The Working Group —which enjoyed the participation of all players in multilateral disarmament- built and maintained a friendly, collegial and constructive atmosphere enabling a lively and in-depth exchange of ideas. The Chair believes that, in itself, such an atmosphere is a much needed *"confidence-building measure"* within the disarmament machinery.

3.   The Chair is convinced that this positive exchange of ideas contributed to the political support required by an SSOD-IV.

4.   On the other hand, the Working Group took note of a line of argument doubting the political benefit of an SSOD-IV, which, it was suggested, could widen the divergences besetting the disarmament fora. As a consequence, and in spite of the elements of convergence emerging from the debate of the Working Group, the Chair needs to register that the critical mass of political support necessary to convene an SSOD-IV **has not yet been reached.**

5.   Nevertheless, the Chair remains confident that such critical mass can be attained, incrementally, building upon the achievements of the Working Group. The Chair also remains convinced that a successful SSOD-IV ought to be a coalescing vehicle for all UN Member States. As such, its convening requires: a) significant political support from Member States, **including all the players**; and, b) patient and careful preparation.

6.   **Concerning the objectives** of an SSOD-IV the Chair registered support for:

a) a thorough multilateral exercise covering all issues and aspects of disarmament;

b) a reaffirmation of the political principles and programme of action set forth in SSOD-I;[1]

c) the need to deal effectively with new threats and challenges, especially those posed by non-state actors;

d) the notion that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are complementary and mutually reinforcing objectives;

e) a forward looking, non-confrontational review component, and;

f) a review of the structure, operation and methods of work of the disarmament machinery, including further involvement of civil society and the engagement of public opinion.

The Chair considers that further work is necessary to define with more precision the objectives of an SSOD-IV.

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[1] A/S-10/2

7. <u>Concerning the agenda</u> of an SSOD-IV, the Chair:

a) recognised the existence of two *"schools of thought"*: one advocating a detailed agenda (as exemplified by the NAM's proposal); another, pointing to the agendas of previous SSOD's, which contained (few) items of a general nature. The Chair is convinced that either approach–in its own way- permits governments to deal with all issues and aspects of disarmament;

b) registered strong support (particularly from African Delegations) for the inclusion of an item dealing with small arms and light weapons in all their aspects;

c) registered support for the inclusion of other items pertaining to the area where Disarmament, International Law and International Humanitarian Law overlap (notably in relation to the security of civilians such as those relating to mines and sub-munitions);

d) noted support for the inclusion of separate items on: i) missiles, ii) PAROS, iii) prevention of the use of WMD, their means of delivery and sophisticated conventional weapons by terrorists, iv) export controls and other new threats and challenges (such as cyber-security);

e) advanced the notion that, in the era of globalisation and the information society, confidence-building measures could be used to address political and even cultural phenomena undermining international peace and security.

8. **Concerning the future,** the Chair suggests that:

a) more diplomatic work is needed to attain the critical mass of political support for an SSOD-IV;

b) future work should be governed by the friendly, collegial and unconfrontational atmosphere characterising our Working Group (a major achievement in itself);

c) the format for such diplomatic work should be discussed with all key players; and

d) perhaps a Group of Experts, starting in 2009, could provide a suitable setting for further in-depth discussions.

Annex VI

Final reflection and recommendation by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at the conclusion of the Open-ended Working Group mandated by resolution 61/60

Working paper by the Non-Aligned Movement

At the end of the Open-Ended Working Group mandated by General Assembly resolution 61/60, the NAM would like to reaffirm its strong support to the convening of the SSOD IV and reiterate its positions and concrete proposals on the objectives and agenda for the SSOD IV as reflected in document A/AC.268/2007/WP.2.

The NAM stresses its continued support for the guidelines, principles and priorities as agreed by consensus in SSOD I.

The NAM considers it important to convene as soon as possible a preparatory committee for the SSOD IV.

The NAM stresses the importance of the General Assembly continuing its active consideration at its 62nd Session of the objectives, agenda and the establishment of a preparatory committee for the SSOD IV, including by reconvening the Open-Ended Working Group to consider the objectives and agenda, including the possible establishment of the preparatory committee, for the 4th Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament.