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NOTE DATED 11 JULY 1952 FROM THE ACTING REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES
ADDRESSED TO THE ACTING SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE FORTY-FOURTH
REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 7 JULY 1950 (S/1588)

The Acting Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor to refer to paragraph 6 of the resolution of the Security Council of July 7, 1950, requesting the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the United Nations Command.

In compliance with this resolution, there is enclosed herewith, for circulation to the members of the Security Council, the forty-fourth report of the United Nations Command operations in Korea for the period April 16 through April 30, 1952, inclusive.

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REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA
FOR THE PERIOD 16-30 APRIL 1952

Report No. 44

I herewith submit report number 44 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-30 April, inclusive. United Nations Command communiques numbers 1236-1250, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

The sub-delegation meeting on agenda item 3 continued until 19 April with no progress being made on the remaining issues. On 19 April the Communists proposed that the Staff Officers' meetings on agenda item 3 be resumed on the following day. The United Nations Command sub-delegation agreed. Staff Officers' meetings on agenda item 3 continued through 27 April with discussion centering on:

- (a) The restrictions on reconstruction and rehabilitation of airfields and
- (b) The acceptance of the Soviet Union as a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

On 28 April plenary sessions were resumed. The United Nations Command proposed an overall solution of all remaining problems, including the basis of exchange of Prisoners of War. The United Nations Command proposed, and the Communist delegation agreed, to the conduct of executive sessions until such time as either side may elect otherwise.

Executive sessions at Staff Officer level on agenda item 4, which had been originally agreed to by both sides in order to allow maximum freedom of discussion were abrogated unilaterally by the Communists on 25 April. The United Nations Command was able, for the first time since executive sessions started on 25 March, to release the entire scope of the negotiations conducted during this period. This unilateral termination by the Communists of the executive sessions brought to a climax the long series of fruitless attempts on the part of the United Nations Command to achieve an equitable and honorable settlement of the issues involved.

During the executive sessions and in the open sessions which preceded them, agreement had been reached on a number of matters relating to Prisoners of War; but on the primary issues, the basis on which Prisoners of War were to be

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exchanged, the positions of the Communists and the United Nations Command were diametrically opposed. The Communists have been adamant in their demand for unconditional return of all Prisoners of War held by each side; a demand absolutely unacceptable to the United Nations Command because it would almost certainly mean death or torture for the thousands of United Nations Command held prisoners who signified their determination to resist return to Communist control.

On two related issues the views of the Communists and the United Nations Command were violently opposed. The Communists attempted to lay claim to 37,000 South Korean civilian internees held by the United Nations Command who early in the war had largely been impressed into the North Korean army. At the same time the Communists refused to account for more than 50,000 persons admittedly captured by them but whose names were not on the prisoner lists submitted at the time such data were exchanged last December. Their only accounting for this group was the allegation that they had been released at the front, had died, or had been permitted to join their armed forces.

Discussions in the open sessions dragged on, sometimes under extremely trying circumstances. In an effort to create the most favorable possible atmosphere in which the detailed position of each side could be examined and discussed without the necessity for publicity to which the Communists appeared particularly sensitive, the United Nations Command proposed that executive, or secret, sessions be held.

On 25 March the first secret session was convened. The United Nations Command position on forced repatriation was made unmistakably clear. The Communists indicated their willingness to negotiate but only on condition that the United Nations Command would provide an estimate of the total number of persons the Communists would expect to have returned to their side. The United Nations Command explained that since no poll of the individual preferences of prisoners had been taken, there was no basis for any reliable estimate of the number available for return. However, the United Nations Command guaranteed the return to the Communists of every North Korean and Chinese Communist prisoner who desired to return to Communist control. But in no case would the United Nations Command employ force to insure the return of any person who resisted repatriation. As a further indication of desire to effect the most
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equitable settlement of this issue, the United Nations Command agreed to permit any South Korean Prisoner of War or civilian internee to transfer to the Communist side if he so desired.

Continued insistence on the part of the Communists for a round number of persons to be returned to Communist control compelled the United Nations Command to initiate a screening program for all persons held in custody in the camps at Koje Do and Pusan.

The screening program was designed to determine the number of North Korean and Chinese Prisoners of War who could not be returned without the use of force to Communist control and to give the nationals of the Republic of Korea held in custody by the United Nations Command, either as Prisoner of War or civilian internees, freedom of choice to be returned to Communist control or to remain in the Republic of Korea.

During a twenty-four hour period prior to the screening, North Korean and Chinese Communist Forces Prisoners of War of each compound on Koje Do were carefully informed of the fact that they would be interviewed for the purpose of determining whether or not they would forcibly oppose repatriation. The prisoners were briefed not only on the importance of this decision, which was to be final, but on the fact that for their own safety they should not discuss the matters with others or make known their decision before the individual interviews were held.

The interviews were conducted by unarmed United Nations Command personnel near the entrance to each compound. Each prisoner, carrying his personal possessions, was called forward individually and interviewed in private. Highly qualified personnel conducted the interrogations.

The series of questions used in the interview was designed to encourage a maximum number of prisoners to return to the Communists' side, not to oppose such return. The first question was designed to identify those who clearly desired to return. In the case of Chinese prisoners, the first question was: "Would you like to return to China?" In the case of North Koreans, the first question was: "Would you like to return to North Korea?" If the answer was in the affirmative, the prisoner was listed for repatriation without further questioning. Those who replied in the negative were subjected to additional questions designed to determine whether their opposition was nominal or whether

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they would violently oppose repatriation. The second question was: "Would you forcibly resist repatriation?" If the answer was "No" the Prisoner of War was listed for repatriation. If the answer was "Yes" the Prisoner of War was asked four additional questions to fully determine his attitude. These were: "Have you carefully considered the important effect of your decision upon your family?" "Do you realize that you may stay in Koje Do for a long time - even after those who choose repatriation have already returned home?" "Do you understand that the United Nations Command has never promised to send you to any certain place?" "Do you still insist on forcibly resisting repatriation?" And then, perhaps the most important question, "Despite your decision, if the United Nations Command should repatriate you, what would you do?" The prisoner was listed for repatriation unless during the questioning he mentioned suicide, fight to death, braving death to escape, or similar intentions. As a result of these procedures all Prisoners of War were included among those to be repatriated except those whose opposition to return was so strong that they would attempt to destroy themselves rather than return to Communist control. A more humane, impartial and conscientious procedure could not be devised.

Prisoners of War and civilian internees in custody at the hospital compound in Pusan were screened under similar procedure.

As a result of the screening, in which Prisoners of War and civilian internees were interviewed to ascertain their decisions, approximately 70,000 Prisoners of War and civilian internees will remain on Koje Do to await repatriation to the Communist authorities following an armistice.

This was the number reported to the Communists and must be the basis on which any future negotiations are conducted.

The Communists attempted to secure agreement to conduct open Staff Officers' sessions. However, it was evident that they intended to make no reasonable attempts to move toward settlement of the Prisoner-of-War issue and that their offer meant only an opportunity for them to continue an unscrupulous propaganda campaign to distract the attention of the world from the basic problems involved in the negotiations. The United Nations Command recessed immediately in preparation for movement to plenary sessions as the most logical step to solve the unresolved issues. The Communists agreed to convene plenary sessions on 28 April, at the opening of which the United Nations Command informed the Communists that we were prepared to present an overall solution of the

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problems remaining to be settled. In response to the United Nations Command suggestion that the executive session form of meeting was the most suitable for this purpose, the Communists agreed that negotiations in plenary session would be withheld from the public. Both sides agreed further that the executive sessions could be discontinued at the request of either side. At the conclusion of the first conference, the Communists recessed to reconvene at the time of their choosing.

The status of agenda item 5 remains unchanged from that reported in United Nations Command Report number forty-three.

Enemy ground action was highlighted by small scale attacks on the central and east central sectors of the United Nations Command front, where he employed units of up to two-company strength. Effective enemy reactions to United Nations Command patrolling and probing efforts continued. He is still reluctant to allow access to the ground he controls and is determined to abruptly halt or drive back such United Nations Command actions. Enemy aggressive action usually starts during the hours of darkness and is supported by artillery and mortar fire. The heaviest of these fires was concentrated on the eastern front. Enemy positions and capabilities remained unchanged, although an inter-Army relief took place in the central sector.

The most aggressive action on the western front against United Nations Command units took place in the Pungwang-Punji sector from 15 through 17 April when hostile forces launched two attacks. The larger of these attacks involved a company which was repulsed by United Nations Command elements in the Punji sector on the night of 15-16 April. The following night two enemy platoons attacked the same sector. Other than these two unsuccessful hostile actions the enemy was content to intercept United Nations Command patrols and probing attempts and to continue to improve his defensive battle line positions. A minor order of battle change took place on the western front when a Chinese Communist Forces Army replaced one of its Divisions with two Divisions which had been in reserve. This is a normal change and conforms to the enemy policy of relieving front line units for rest and reorganizing purposes.

The normally quiet central sector was the scene of the most aggressive hostile action along the entire United Nations Command front. Enemy units launched small scale aggressive attacks of up to two-company size supported by
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artillery and mortar barrages. These attacks ranged along the central sector from northeast of Kumhwa eastward to the Pukhan River. The most noteworthy action took place in the Kumsong area on the night of 16-17 April when two enemy companies attacked during the hours of darkness, under cover of rain and fog. This action, fought for eight hours, was ended by a successful United Nations Command counterattack. A two-company attack in the Yulsa area on the seventeenth and a company attack in the same area on the eighteenth were repulsed without loss of ground and with a minimum of casualties. Friendly elements in the Talchen area were temporarily forced to relinquish an outpost on the night of 16 April when two companies attacked, but the position was regained after a brief counterattack. United Nations Command tank elements fired on positions in the Sutae area on 16 April during daylight, inflicted over 200 enemy casualties and caused extensive damage to hostile bunkers and trench networks.

Hostile action along the eastern portion of the United Nations Command front consisted of patrol clashes and interceptions with very little initiative being shown by enemy forces. During this period enemy artillery and mortar units in the Tupo-Yunsil area of the eastern front expended almost half of the total reported delivered against United Nations Command units on the entire front.

From 16 to 18 April, inclusive, the Sixth and Seventh Companies of the Seventh Republic of Korea Regiment, Sixth Republic of Korea Division, performed in an outstanding manner by holding a critical terrain feature in the face of enemy attacks in superior numbers. Results were 163 known enemy dead, fifty estimated dead and two prisoners. Friendly losses were thirty-five killed and 117 wounded. This action reflects great credit upon these units and their supporting elements and illustrates the integrity and determination of the Republic of Korea Army.

United Nations Command jet- and propeller-driven aircraft, operating from the fast carriers in the Sea of Japan, flew against Communist transportation facilities and supply routes in North Korea. The attacks were concentrated on vulnerable rail lines along the east coast of Korea.

Rail lines were cut and bridges, by-passes and rail cars were destroyed. Additional destruction and damage included trucks, barracks, warehouses, locomotives, gun positions and many small vessels.

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United Nations Command carriers continued to operate in the Yellow Sea. Their planes furnished cover and air support for surface units on blockade patrols and anti-invasion stations. They also flew reconnaissance missions and offensive strikes over the Chinnampo area and Hwanghae Province and in close support of the front line troops. Rail cars, warehouses and motor vehicles were destroyed and many enemy casualties were inflicted.

Patrol planes conducted daylight reconnaissance missions over the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea and also flew day and night patrol and weather reconnaissance missions for surface units in these same areas.

The Naval blockade continued along the east coast from the bomblines to Chongjin. Surface units made day and night coastal patrols to fire on rail targets along the coastal line. Vessels continued a siege of major east coast ports with Wonsan, Hungnam and Songjin kept under almost continuous harassment. The Communists were denied the use of coastal waters for shipping and fishing as all attempts to go to sea were taken up and broken up. Fire support vessels at the bomblines provided gunfire support for the front line troops as far as twenty miles inland.

Enemy shore batteries were active against United Nations warships. In the Songjin area a minesweeper received one hit by a 2.5 inch projectile which caused light material damage and no personnel casualties. In the Chongjin area a destroyer received one hit from a 75mm battery. Two crew members were killed and four were injured, none seriously. The material damage was negligible. A destroyer minesweeper received one hit which caused only minor material damage and no personnel casualties. At Wonsan another United Nations Command vessel received one hit of 122mm fired from Hodo Pando. Material damage was not serious but two crew members were injured, one seriously. Shore batteries were active on numerous other occasions at Wonsan, Hungnam, Tanchon, Songjin and Chongjin.

On the Korean west coast, the United Nations Command surface units manned anti-invasion stations along the coast from Chinnampo to the Han River Estuary to protect friendly islands north of the battle line. Daylight firing into enemy positions started many fires and inflicted numerous casualties. An enemy attack on Yongmae Do was repulsed by United Nations Command vessels.

PT boats of the Republic of Korea Navy made their first offensive sorties, striking Hodo Pando on the east coast and the north shore of Tadong Man on the

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west coast. Fires were started by rockets and 40mm fire. On the east coast the boats received machine gun and small arms fire but were not hit. Other vessels conducted inshore patrol and blockade missions and assisted United Nations Command Forces in minesweeping duties.

Other Navy ships and merchant vessels, under contract, provided logistic support for United Nations Command Forces in Japan and Korea. Ships of the amphibious forces provided personnel lift to move Prisoners of War and internees from the island of Koje Do to other relocation centers in South Korea.

The United Nations Command minesweepers continued operations to keep the channels, gunfire support areas, and anchorages free of mines. Sweepers also enlarged previously swept areas to meet the needs of operating forces.

Although eight days of poor weather hampered air operations, aircraft of the United Nations Command Air Force continued to maintain air superiority, attack rail lines, vehicles and supplies and provide close support for ground units. Medium bombers disrupted the two main rail routes from Manchuria into northwest Korea by repeatedly attacking four key railroad river crossings. Fighter bomber attacks were conducted against these and other important rail routes in North Korea. Light bombers conducted night attacks against enemy vehicles and against the rail lines in order to prevent the rapid repair of the cuts inflicted during daylight hours. Fighter interceptors patrolled the northwest sector of Korea and engaged the enemy MIG aircraft on six occasions.

The two main lines from Manchuria to North Korea, the Sinuiju-Sinanju route and the Kanggye-Kumuri line, were both interdicted by medium bombers. On the first route the interdiction was accomplished by four attacks on the Sinanju bridges, which rendered both bridges unserviceable, and a single attack on the Chongju Railroad bridges which completely blocked the line by knocking out the main and by-pass crossings. Without neglecting the Sinuiju-Sinanju line the effort was periodically shifted to the second main route. The Sinhungdong bridge on this route was bombed out three different times. In another attack on this route the rail crossings at Huichon were hit resulting in four spans destroyed on the by-pass and two spans destroyed on the main bridge.

In addition to other sorties, the medium bombers flew leaflet and close support missions. No medium bombers were lost although one aircraft sustained damage from antiaircraft fire.

In further interdiction operations United Nations Command fighter bombers concentrated large scale attacks on short stretches of track making multiple cuts and destroying sections of the road bed. The area of operation was influenced by weather; but, by maintaining a flexible target schedule, the fighter bombers were able to make cuts on all main lines with the result that the main routes were in commission only for very short periods of time. The majority of the cuts were on the lines between Sinanju and Namsidong, Kunari and Huichon, Pyongyang and Sinanju, and Sunchon and Samdongni, with the remainder of the cuts on lines farther south.

The primary missions of the light bombers remained night armed reconnaissance and interdiction. The light bombers were scheduled nightly on these missions. Delayed fuse bombs were dropped on the rail lines where fighter bombers had hit during the day to further harass the crews attempting to repair the lines. The night intruder aircraft were credited with destroying numerous vehicles, locomotives and railroad cars. No aircraft were lost during these operations.

United Nations Command fighter interceptors sighted enemy aircraft on only eight days. On two days the enemy jets failed to appear even though the weather was operational. The fighter interceptors claimed fifteen MIGs destroyed, eighteen damaged and two probably destroyed. The largest engagements occurred on 21 April when seven MIG aircraft were destroyed and three were damaged. One United Nations Command aircraft was lost during the engagement. No significant change in the pattern of MIG activity was observed. The aggressiveness of the enemy fighter pilots was not constant. It was again noted that pilots of the type fifteen aircraft were generally more aggressive than those of the MIG-15.

Tactical reconnaissance units continued to provide photograph coverage of important airfields, rail bridges, rail choke points and enemy installations. Current intelligence information was secured through visual reconnaissance missions. In addition to other missions flown, reconnaissance aircraft performed fire adjustment missions for United Nations Command vessels operating on the east coast of Korea.

United Nations Command leaflets and broadcasts disseminated factual reports of the Communist action in breaking off the executive sessions on

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prisoner exchange. In publicizing the continued Communist frustration of efforts to reach a realistic armistice agreement, the United Nations Command media made it clear to the soldiers and civilians in enemy territory that their Communist leaders were deliberately prolonging the war at a tragic cost in human lives. Intensified measures for air dropping miniature news sheets to cities and towns throughout North Korea are making it more difficult for the Communist to suppress the truth. Although it is not feasible to distribute enough leaflets to reach every person in North Korea, refugees fleeing from Communist tyranny report that the information contained in the United Nations Command news sheets is eagerly received and passed orally from person to person.

The health of the civilian population throughout South Korea is generally good. The incidence of relapsing fever and smallpox is on the decrease. A large scale immunization program for smallpox and typhus has been completed during which 7,576,202 persons received smallpox vaccinations, and 7,565,607 persons were immunized against typhus since October 1951.

Mild Spring temperatures have facilitated the progress in the construction of all types of houses under the National Housing Program. Of the 19,644 family units planned, 6,475 have been completed and 4,335 are under construction. Of the planned 17,912 refugee shelters, 13,649 have been completed and 1,188 are under construction.

