



Distr.
GENERAL

S/2991
17 April 1953

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE DATED 16 APRIL 1953 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE SIXTY-FIRST
REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 7 JULY 1950 (S/1588)

The representative of the United States of America to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor to refer to paragraph 6 of the resolution of the Security Council of July 7, 1950, requesting the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the United Nations Command.

In compliance with this resolution, there is enclosed herewith, for circulation to the members of the Security Council, the sixty-first report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period January 1 through January 15, 1953, inclusive.

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA
FOR THE PERIOD 1-15 JANUARY 1953
(Report No. 61)

I herewith submit report number 61 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 January 1953, inclusive. United Nations Command communique numbers 1481-1495 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Armistice negotiations continued in recess, but communications were retained through liaison officers. At a meeting of liaison officers on 1 January 1953 the United Nations Command Liaison Officer rejected a Communist protest of an alleged overflight of the conference site which reportedly occurred on 24 December 1952. According to eye witness and radar surveillance reports the United Nations Command aircraft did not approach closer than one mile to the neutral conference area.

On 2 January 1953 the United Nations Command Senior Liaison Officer delivered another letter rejecting a Communist protest of an overflight which occurred on 26 December 1952. His letter included the following statement:

"Experience has demonstrated that in spite of costly and elaborate physical measures to insure pilot recognition of the conference site at Panmunjom, and careful instruction of United Nations Command pilots in order to prevent overflight of the Kaesong-Panmunjom area and road, overflights will occasionally occur. Where no hostile act is committed within these areas, such overflights do not violate the spirit of the existing understanding between liaison officers, but fall within the exceptions, 'weather and technical conditions beyond control', provided for by paragraph 5 of the understanding."

On 7 January 1953 the Senior Communist Liaison Officer delivered a letter protesting an overflight alleged to have occurred on 4 January 1953. On 11 January 1953 the Senior United Nations Command Liaison Officer rejected the Communist protest of 7 January. His letter contained the following statement:

"The United Nations Command has never agreed that overflight of the conference site by military aircraft by itself constitutes a hostile act. The United Nations Command did agree that: 'Except under weather and technical conditions beyond control the military aircraft of both sides shall not fly over the conference site area at Panmunjom.' Your statement that these harmless incidents of inadvertent overflight would make it 'utterly impossible to assure the maintenance of the conference site area' is patently untenable, since such incidents have unavoidably occurred at intervals during the entire period of the agreement's existence without prejudice to the continued maintenance of the conference site.

"The United Nations Command has every intention of abiding by the spirit of the Security Agreements reached at Panmunjom on 22 October 1951, but does not propose to accept the picayune complaints registered by your side on every slightest pretext. Your protest of 7 January is accordingly rejected."

On 15 January 1953 the Senior United Nations Command Liaison Officer delivered the following letter to the Communists in a meeting at Panmunjom:

"In accordance with instructions from the Senior Delegate of the United Nations Command Delegation, you are hereby notified that effective 25 January 1953 the United Nations Command will grant immunity from attack on two convoys per week between Kaesong and Pyongyang, consisting of not more than six trucks and three jeeps each, provided that:

- "a. One such convoy depart Kaesong and the other depart Pyongyang between 0600 and 0700 hours on Sunday of each week;
- "b. Such convoys follow the prescribed route that passes through Sohng and Namchonjom and complete travel by 2000 hours on Sunday;
- "c. All convoy vehicles are marked with red panels easily distinguishable from the air, and remain in convoy;
- "d. On the approach of aircraft, convoys will not seek cover but remain in movement along the road without increasing speed.

"Under present conditions with the armistice negotiations in recess, no valid reason for the continuance of the privilege granted on 25 November 1951 exists, and the United Nations Command will hereafter allow only that immunity described above. However, at any time that meetings of the main delegations are resumed, the United Nations Command will reconsider your requirements for immunity to attack of your delegation's convoys. As your authorities have been previously informed, the United Nations Command Delegation stands ready to resume meetings at any time upon receipt of a letter from your Senior Delegate stating that he is ready to accept one of the United Nations Command proposals for the attainment of an armistice, or offering a constructive proposal which could lead to an honorable armistice."

The Senior Communist Liaison Officer after scanning the letter made the following statement: "I hereby notify your side that in due course of time our side will talk with your side regarding this matter."

The Communists continued their harassing probes and limited objective attacks along the Korean battle front during the first half of January with little variation from the previous period. The over-all volume of enemy artillery and mortar fire increased slightly; however, the usually very heavy volume of fire in direct support of limited objective attacks was markedly lighter during the period. No change in Communist dispositions along the line of contact was reported. Prisoners of War continued to state that the mission of their units was defensive.

Enemy initiated action along the western front consisted of routine reconnaissance and relatively light probes. After a fifteen-minute fire fight on 2 January, a United Nations Command division repulsed a company-sized probe against an outpost six miles southeast of Sangnyong. The other highlight of the actions on this front occurred 11 January on Old Baldy hill, four and one half miles south of Mabang. Here a Chinese Communist company-sized attack was broken up by heavy United Nations Command artillery fire and the attackers were forced to withdraw within twenty minutes, suffering heavy losses.

United Nations Command forces made hostile forward positions the objective of several surprise raids, inflicting numerous casualties on the enemy. One such raid, taking place during the middle of the period in the west, resulted in a fifty-five-minute clash and an estimated sixty enemy casualties before the raiders withdrew to friendly lines.

On the central front the Sniper Ridge area, north of Kumhwa, continued to be the center of the Communists' attention. United Nations Command positions in this area were probed or harassed at least once nightly by small enemy forces up to company strength, but immediate reaction by the defenders caused the Communists to withdraw in each instance.

The latter half of the period produced a two company attack supported by mortar fire against Capitol Hill, seven miles east of Kumsong. United Nations Command defenders held on to their positions and Communists withdrew after a fifty-minute fire fight.

Ground action was the most persistent on the eastern front during the period. A hostile attack of company strength was launched against United Nations Command outpost positions three and one half miles southwest of Mulguji on the night of 5-6 January. This attack lasted for six hours and twenty minutes before being repulsed by the staunch defenders in the early morning hours of 6 January. Again, on the night of 9 January, outpost positions in the vicinity of the previous action were attacked by a reinforced platoon. This enemy push built up to company strength before the thirty minutes battle subsided and the enemy withdrew.

By far the most significant action on the front during the period was a battalion strength attack against United Nations Command main battle positions five miles southeast of Yuusil on 12 January. The attack was mounted on a 2000 yard front and supported by 1600 rounds of mortar and artillery. Defenders repulsed the North Korean attackers after an hour long battle. The enemy renewed the attack one hour later only to be thrown back again, suffering for the whole action an estimated 215 casualties.

Generally the pattern of activity across the Korean battle front was comparable to that noted during the last half of December, except for a very slight increase in mortar and artillery expenditures. Of interest was the absence of the usually heavy mortar and artillery support accompanying Communist attacks.

United Nations Command naval aircraft from fast carriers in the Sea of Japan struck pre-selected targets and targets of opportunity from Kosong to the Korean border. Bad weather, high winds, and heavy seas curtailed operations during eleven days of this period. However, during the days that weather and sea conditions permitted, strikes continued against enemy transportation facilities, troop billeting and supply areas, gun positions and other targets of military significance.

A number of missions were flown in direct support of friendly ground forces, resulting in the destruction of many bunkers, gun and mortar positions and front line supply areas.

A major strike was made on a newly-constructed billeting area fifty miles west of Chongjin, within twenty miles of the Korean border. Fifty-three buildings were destroyed and thirty-five were damaged. A number of fires were observed in the area.

Attacks on interdiction targets resulted in large numbers of rail and road cuts, and destroyed or damaged railroad and highway bridges, locomotives, rail cars, and trucks.

United Nations Command carrier-based aircraft operating off the Korean West Coast continued their offensive strikes on enemy targets in central western Korea from the Haeju approaches to Kangso. Marginal to non-operational weather reduced effective sorties during this period; however, the attacks continued against troop concentrations, supply areas, gun positions, and transportation facilities throughout Hwanghae Province. Many rail cuts were inflicted on the main supply routes and a number of rail cars, bridges, and trucks were destroyed. Attacks on troops in villages resulted in the destruction of a number of barracks. Many troop casualties were inflicted.

Shore based aircraft provided front line units with close air support and flew combat reconnaissance and escort sorties deep into enemy territory. These sorties destroyed or damaged numerous gun and mortar positions, bunkers, buildings, personnel and supply shelters, warehouses, railroad cars, railroad and highway bridges, and made many rail cuts. Numerous personnel and troop casualties were also inflicted.

United Nations Command naval patrol planes supported the United Nations Command effort in Korea by making daily flights over waters adjoining Korea, conducting antisubmarine, reconnaissance, and weather data missions.

On the Korean West Coast United Nations Command surface units carried out routine patrols and blockaded the coastline around the perimeter of Hwanghae Province. These vessels successfully defended the friendly held islands off the Korean West Coast by maintaining constant watch and harassing enemy troop concentrations and gun positions on the mainland.

Enemy coastal guns and mortars were active during the period. The friendly held islands of Mudo, Wollae-do, and Yukto were fired on; however, no damage or casualties were reported. A United Nations Command minesweeper received enemy heavy mortar fire while sweeping the north channel at Mudo; however, she sustained no damage from the encounter. In all instances surface units were effective in silencing enemy gun positions, and in many instances these positions were destroyed or heavily damaged by counter battery fire.

Small United Nations Command vessels conducted close inshore patrols and swept mines in waters off enemy shores.

The naval blockade continued along the Korean East Coast from Kosong to Chongjin. Inclement weather, heavy seas and ground fog limited the effectiveness of shore bombardment. However, surface units on day and night coastal patrols fired on key targets along the coastal main supply routes to inflict and maintain rail and road cuts, and destroy bridges and rolling stock. Tunnels were blocked at several points.

A number of supply and industrial areas were damaged or destroyed at various coastal points from Wonsan to Chongjin.

United Nations Command cruisers, with destroyers assigned, rendered direct support for front line troops on the east coast. Enemy troop movements were illuminated nightly by these units and destructive call fire missions were carried out almost daily against enemy gun positions, bunkers, supply areas, roads and trenches.

United Nations Command surface units carried out gun strikes on interdiction and industrial targets between Chaho and Songjin. Cuts were made in the rail lines, and heavy slides were created at several points. A number of rail cars and bridges were destroyed. Seven warehouses were destroyed and others were damaged in several supply and industrial areas.

Enemy shore batteries in the Wonsan area were active during the period, and the friendly-held island of Hwangto-do received several rounds of fire from enemy coastal batteries. These gun positions were engaged by United Nations Command surface units and in all instances were silenced.

The enemy was denied the use of the coastal waters, and all enemy craft detected were taken under fire and either destroyed or driven ashore. United Nations Command minesweepers continued operations to keep the channels, coastal areas, and anchorages free of mines of all types.

United Nations Command naval auxiliary vessels, and transports provided personnel lifts and logistic support for the United Nations Command forces in Korea.

The combined and prolonged air attacks against the Sinanju area communications complex highlighted the United Nations Command air operations during this period. Medium bombers, light bombers and fighter bombers struck bridges, rail lines, highways, repair facilities, marshalling yards and gun positions in the Sinanju-Yongmi-dong vicinity to deny the enemy the use of this important transportation complex. Night attacks by light bombers and fighter bombers were scheduled to prevent repair of facilities knocked out by daylight raids. Utilization of delayed fuse bombs delayed work crews and slowed down transportation which had not been completely blocked by the concentrated attacks.

On 9 January, United Nations Command medium bombers blasted rail bridges at Yongmi-dong, antiaircraft gun positions near Sinanju, and a marshalling yard located at Yongmi-dong to start the combined operation. Crews reported searchlights in the area and sporadic fighter attacks; however, no United Nations Command aircraft were damaged by the enemy fighters.

Medium bombers pounded the Sonchon and Anju marshalling yards on the night of 10 January and reported receiving accurate antiaircraft fire over Anju.

Enemy fighters, though active, did not prevent the medium bombers from getting excellent bombing patterns in the target areas.

Weather hampered daylight operation on 11 January, but United Nations Command Superforts were able to blast the marshalling yards at Pugwon and Hapochan with maximum loads of 500 pound bombs.

United Nations Command medium bombers continued to hit marshalling yards on the night of 12 January when the Kwaksan and Chongju installations were attacked.

Communist supply areas at Huichon, Changjin-ni, Naewason-ni, Kunu-ri and Hamhung were also pounded as well as a military staff establishment at Yongpung-ni, a headquarters and supply area at Tosong and twin bridge spans at Huichon.

The Superforts flew seventeen close support missions along the front lines and accomplished eight leaflet sorties over various cities and towns in North Korea.

United Nations Command fighter bombers followed up the medium bomber attack of 9 January with a daylight raid of 128 aircraft. The fighter bombers struck bridges, rail lines and gun positions.

Fighter bomber operations in the Sinanju area on 12 January were limited due to marginal weather, but returning pilots reported destruction of railroad bridges and many buildings, and damage to gun positions.

On the following day United Nations Command Thunderjets and Shooting Stars flew 449 sorties against pre-briefed targets, concentrating the major portion of the effort in the Yongmi-dong-Sinanju area. After blasting numerous enemy antiaircraft gun positions, the fighter bombers destroyed or damaged several bridges and railroad cars and made many rail cuts.

Jet and propeller driven fighter bombers, in addition to the 298 sorties flown in close support of United Nations Command ground units, made rail cuts at Haeju, Chinnampo, Kangdong, Sinchon, between Pyongyang and Sariwon and near Schung. Tunnels were sealed by fighter bomber strikes at Haeju and Yangdok.

Early morning reconnaissance flights were made over main supply routes and United Nations Command Shooting Stars were called in to bomb Communist vehicles. This operation was conducted as a follow-up tactic after light bombers had made road blocks during the waning hours of darkness.

United Nations Command light bombers were scheduled nightly to make attacks on targets near the points where fighter bombers had struck during the day, and to drop delay fused bombs in the areas where work crews were attempting to repair bridges and rail lines.

Light bombers, in their after dark patrols of enemy supply lines, hammered at enemy trucks moving toward the front, definitely destroying more than 1162 of the Communists' vehicles. They made road blocks at Suan, Yangdok, Wonsan and above Pyongyang, cut highways at key points and bombed road bridges at Sohung and Singye.

Other targets for night flying light bombers included a supply area near Suan, troop billets at Chaeryong, a communications center at Koksan and troop and supply assembly areas at Wonsan and Yangdok. The light bombers, with other night flying United Nations Command aircraft, also attacked enemy front line positions.

During the first part of the month, prior to the attacks on the Sinanju area, United Nations Command aircraft attacked various key military targets including rail centers, tunnels, supply concentrations, assembly points and troop billeting areas.

Throughout all daylight operations, United Nations Command Sabrejets flew constant patrols in the target areas maintaining air superiority over northwest Korea. The enemy MIG aircraft were never able to get through the United Nations Command fighter screen to attack the heavily loaded fighter bombers. On nine days of the period the MIGs were engaged by United Nations Command fighter interceptors with resulting claims of fourteen MIG jets destroyed and fifteen others damaged. The most outstanding serial battle occurred on 14 January, when United Nations Command Sabrejets knocked down eight MIG fighters, probably destroyed two and damaged eight more with minor damage to only one Sabrejet.

During the period ending 15 January, combat cargo planes made normal airlift of equipment and personnel in logistical support of United Nations Command operations.

Communications directed to enemy civilians and troops, informing them of the sincerity of United Nations Command peace efforts and the humanitarianism embodied in the principle of non-forced repatriation, were continued, employing

leaflets and radio broadcasts. This campaign to penetrate the informational blackout imposed by the Communist leaders in Korea has assumed major proportions during recent months in an effort to counter the effects of the calculated hate program of the Communists.

The United States Government has agreed to a request from the Government of the Republic of Korea to re-examine the procedures now being followed in making dollar payments to the Republic of Korea for the United States share of won expended for military purposes in the Korean effort. New arrangements were being developed in early January 1953 whereby United States payments to the Republic of Korea for won received will be made monthly on a pay-as-you-go basis.

The Government of the Republic of Korea is preparing a comprehensive budget for FY 1953-54, which begins 1 April 1953. Reliance upon the comprehensive budget technique, not used by the Republic of Korea before, is designed to disclose in a single document the total integrated requirement for expenditure and receipt of public funds by the Government of the Republic of Korea. The deficit disclosed by the comprehensive budget may be viewed as suggestive of the magnitude of additional indigenous receipts required as well as the area of further foreign aid contributions. Initial hearings were held in December 1952 by a sub-committee of the Combined Economic Board. Data thus made available to the United Nations Command will be useful in determining military assistance as well as economic aid required to assist the people of the Republic of Korea in their struggle with Chinese and North Korean Communists.

A representative of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency met with United Nations Command officials in Tokyo on 14 January 1953. The program which the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency will undertake in supplementing the Command in Chief's United Nations Command operations in civil relief and economic aid to the Republic of Korea was discussed. During the discussion it was indicated that action has been taken to expedite the implementation of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency's expanded operations.

