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NOTE DATED 3 APRIL 1953 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE SIXTIETH REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 7 JULY 1950. (S/1588)

The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor to refer to Paragraph 6 of the Resolution of the Security Council of July 7, 1950, requesting the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the United Nations Command.

In compliance with this Resolution, there is enclosed herewith, for circulation to the members of the Security Council, the Sixtieth Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period December 16 through December 31, 1952, inclusive.

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS
IN KOREA FOR THE PERIOD 16 - 31 DECEMBER 1952
(Report No. 60)

I herewith submit report number 60 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 December 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiques numbers 1465-1480 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

The armistice negotiations remained in recess, although the liaison officers of both sides met almost daily. On 30 December senior Colonel Chu Yon, North Korean Army, relieved Colonel Chang Chun San as Senior Communist Liaison Officer. On 31 December Colonel Willard B. Carlock, United States Army, relieved Colonel Charles W. McCarthy as Senior United Nations Command Liaison Officer. There were no other noteworthy incidents connected with armistice negotiations.

While no major incidents of violence occurred during this period in the pro-Communist camps, a continuation of harassing measures was noted. To all evidence, it appears that pro-Communist prisoners of war and civilian internees are intent in their efforts to contest the control of camp authorities. At every echelon of command involved in the operation and administration of these camps, continued attention is being given to devising methods of control which will be effective and yet will minimize overall casualties.

Enemy activities during the period followed approximately the same pattern as that experienced during the first half of December. Statistically the numbers of probes and engagements of less than company-size were similar during the first and second periods of December, as was the number of company and battalion-sized attacks reported. There was an increase in probes of platoon or squad-size in a United Nations Command division sector on the eastern front, highlighted by a company-sized attack on division positions during the latter part of December. One battalion and two company attacks against United Nations Command positions in the west-central front completed the more significant enemy activities.

Christmas week saw a considerable step-up in the enemy's employment of tactical propaganda. A similar increase was noted prior to Christmas a year ago. Use of loudspeakers and leaflets was general and on two occasions light aircraft dropped leaflets over central front positions. Signs were erected and wrapped parcels and cards were found in front of United Nations Command positions. One United Nations Command division on the western front reported finding a bottle of Chinese wine with a propaganda message attached.

Enemy artillery and mortar fire diminished during the period to a new low since July 1952. No single day was noticeably high, with 4,890 rounds being the daily average. Of interest was the enemy's use of tanks. On two separate occasions, just at dusk, a platoon of tanks placed fifty to 100 rounds of direct fire against United Nations Command division observation posts.

On the western front small probes and patrol clashes were comparable to the level of enemy activity during the first part of December. However, the area to the east of Sangnyong was the scene of three significant enemy actions. During the early morning hours of 21 December, two small United Nations Command outpost positions, five and one-half miles east of Sangnyong, were attacked by an enemy company. This action lasted just short of one hour before the enemy withdrew. During this attack, 1500 rounds of mortar and artillery fell on friendly positions. The second, and more significant Communist attack, took place shortly after midnight of 23 December, eight miles east of Sangnyong. There, an enemy battalion, heavily supported by mortar and artillery, attacked a strongly-held United Nations Command outpost position. The end of the battle, which raged four hours, saw the attackers thrown back with heavy losses. United Nations Command casualties were light. Again, on 29 December, the same United Nations Command positions five and one-half miles east of Sangnyong were subjected to a Chinese Communist reinforced company attack. Friendly main line of resistance positions remained intact and the Chinese withdrew after an unsuccessful hour-long attack.

During the last half of December, the focal point of attention on the central front continued to be centered around the Sniper Ridge -- Rocky Point area, north of Kumhwa, while the remainder of the sector was relatively quiet. The Sniper Ridge -- Rocky Point area was subjected to nightly probes or attacks by small enemy forces of platoon-size or smaller. Frequently these attacks numbered as many as five or six a night, and lasted as long as three hours in some instances. The most important actions were two company-sized attacks, one against Sniper Ridge, of four hours' duration, in the early morning hours of 15 December, and the second against Rocky Point on the night of 30 December, lasting five hours. Each time, United Nations Command units stood firm and the Communists' thrust was thrown back with heavy losses.

On the eastern front there was a noticeable increase in probing and small attacks northeast of the Punch Bowl during the last half of December. This was punctuated by a company-sized Communist attack against friendly positions on 25 December. United Nations Command positions were slightly penetrated during the struggle but a friendly counterattack restored the line within two hours.

The continued general decline of enemy artillery and mortar fire since November probably represents a general lowering of forward stockpiles resulting from very heavy expenditures during October. Generally higher vehicular activity in the forward areas tends to indicate an intensive Communist effort to restock during the present relative lull. Most indications point to a continuation of an active defence by the enemy with additional limited objective attacks in the future.

United Nations Command naval aircraft operating from fast carriers in the Sea of Japan struck pre-selected targets and targets of opportunity from the vicinity of Kosong to near the Manchurian border.

On 16 December a major strike on industrial areas and transportation facilities in extreme North Korea was hampered by weather and only one primary target was hit, that of Yuson-dong, where much damage was inflicted in industrial areas by bombs, secondary explosions and fire. Other planes on that date hit secondary targets at Hyesanjin and Songjin.

Enemy supply areas along the battlefield were hit almost daily. Strikes on other strategically located supply areas throughout central and northeastern Korea have weakened the enemy's supply potential.

Numerous buildings in industrial and troop billeting areas were destroyed during the period. Fifty-three buildings were destroyed in a new construction area west of Songjin in the vicinity of Pyongbugun. Cuts were made in the rails at strategic points from Hyesanjin, Musan, and Hoeryong, where the East Korean net touches the Manchurian border, to Kosong. Numerous locomotives, rail cars, and bridges were destroyed and many tunnels were closed.

Off the west coast of Korea, United Nations Command carrier based aircraft continued their strikes on enemy targets of military significance in central western Korea west of a line between Kaesong and Hanchon. Throughout this area attacks continued on the enemy's transportation system. Many rail cuts were inflicted on the line running from Changyon to Sariwon and on the Ongjin, Haeju, Sariwon net. Locomotives and rolling stock were destroyed or damaged and a number of tunnels were closed.

Attacks on troops in villages throughout the Hwanghae Province destroyed a number of buildings. Many troop casualties were inflicted.

Numerous vehicles were destroyed on the highways of the Hwanghae Province and many bridges were destroyed or damaged.

United Nations Command aircraft on 27 December were attacked by four MIGs. The attack continued for fifteen minutes; however, no damage was done to either side.

Shore based United Nations Command aircraft provided front line units with close air support and flew combat reconnaissance and escort sorties deep into enemy territory. These sorties destroyed or damaged numerous gun and mortar positions, bunkers, buildings, personnel and supply shelters, warehouses, railroad cars, railroad and highway bridges, and made many rail cuts. Numerous personnel casualties were also inflicted.

United Nations Command patrol planes supported the United Nations effort in Korea by flying daily anti-submarine, reconnaissance, and weather data missions over the waters surrounding Korea.

On the Korean West Coast, United Nations Command surface units carried out routine patrols and blockaded the Korean coastline around the perimeter of the Kwanghae Province from the Haeju River approaches to the Taedong. These vessels successfully defended the friendly held islands north of the 38th Parallel by maintaining constant watch and harassing enemy troop concentrations and gun positions on the mainland. The approaches to friendly held islands were illuminated almost nightly to detect any enemy aggression.

Small United Nations Command vessels conducted close inshore patrols and swept mines in waters off enemy shores.

The naval blockade continued along the Korean east coast from the vicinity of Kosong to Chongjin. Surface units on day and night coastal patrols fired on key targets along the coastal main supply routes to inflict and maintain rail and road cuts, destroy locomotives, railroads, trucks, and bridges, and block tunnels at several points. Many supply and industrial areas of military significance were damaged or destroyed at various coastal points from Wonsan to Chongjin.

United Nations Command heavy cruisers with destroyers assigned gave direct support for front line troops near Kosong. Enemy troop movements were illuminated by these units nightly and destructive fire missions were carried out daily against enemy gun positions, bunkers and supply areas.

A United Nations Command battleship with destroyers carried out gun strikes on industrial areas in Wonsan, Hungnam-Hamhung, Chongjin and other coastal points in interdicted rail and road targets at several points along the Northeast Korean Coast.

Other United Nations Command surface units continued to pound the coastal main supply routes from Songjin to Hungnam. Industrial areas and other targets of military significance in Wonsan, Hungnam, Sinpo, Chaho, Tanchon, Songjin, Chongjin and other strategic points were hit by guns of these surface units.

Enemy shore batteries in the vicinity of Tanchon, Songjin and Wonsan continued to harass United Nations Command ships. However, no serious damage was caused to friendly units.

The enemy was denied the use of the coastal waters for shipping. All craft detected were taken under fire and either destroyed or driven ashore. Enemy coastal movements were kept under constant surveillance. United Nations Command minesweepers continued operations to keep the channels, coastal areas, and anchorages free of mines of all types.

United Nations Command Naval Auxiliary vessels, Military Sea Transportation Service and Merchant vessels under contract provided personnel lifts and logistic support for the United Nations Command Naval, Air and Ground forces in Korea.

Continuing their hammering at Communist targets, United Nations Command aircraft included enemy troop and supply concentrations, supply-laden trucks, roads and rails, and front line positions among their objectives. United Nations Command Sabrejets continued to best the Russian-built MIG-15s. Medium bombers flew regular night missions deep into North Korea to bomb supplies and industrial targets. The light bombers on nightly armed reconnaissance of main routes struck principally at moving traffic and small supply targets. Jet and propeller driven fighter-bombers struck heavily at road and rail supply lines and scheduled large formations of aircraft against supply concentrations and one industrial area.

Thirteen enemy MIG fighters were destroyed by United Nations Command Sabrejet interceptors and nineteen more damaged. One Sabrejet was lost. On one occasion a MIG pilot crashed his aircraft in an attempt to escape a pursuing Sabrejet, and the Sabrejet pilot was credited with a victory without even firing a shot.

On Christmas Day, MIG aircraft which were apparently on their way toward United Nations Command territory were intercepted and driven back by United Nations Command Sabrejets vectored to the invading MIGs through use of ground radar equipment. In the battle one MIG-15 was destroyed and one was damaged. In another battle on the same day one other MIG was claimed probably destroyed. No United Nations Command Sabrejets were lost in these encounters.

Three days later a total of 155 MIG jets were sighted by United Nations Command aircraft and of these thirty-three were engaged by the Sabrejets. All sightings occurred between the Yalu and Chongchon Rivers. The Sabrejets destroyed two enemy MIG-15s, probably destroyed one more, and damaged three. In these battles and in others near the end of the reporting period, the United Nations Command pilots noticed that the MIG pilots appeared to be capable of skillfully accomplishing formation maneuvers and displaying good technique when operating in small elements. It was believed that the enemy pilots were attempting to establish a standard intercept pattern against Sabrejets. The enemy pilots still did not appear eager to engage the United Nations Command interceptors.

United Nations Command medium bombers operated at night to strike supply areas, troop concentrations, an ore processing plant, and an airfield at Pyongyang. During the first week of the period the Superforts dropped maximum loads of 500 pound bombs on supply areas near Sariwon, Kwan-ni, Kanchow, Unhung-ni, Tansang-ni and Pyongyang, as well as making attacks on a troop concentration at Yongyong-dong. Ten medium bombers bombed the Yongsan-dong Military School on the night of 17 December using 389 general purpose 500 pound bombs. Excellent results were reported by attacking crews.

In the second portion of the period the United Nations Command medium bombers hit billeting areas at Hahwan-ni and Pungpo-ri and blasted supply targets at Pugwon. On 26 December fifteen Superforts bombed the communication center at Chongju with excellent results reported. Two nights later twelve aircraft hit the Pyongyang airfield and the following night eleven medium bombers struck the Taegam-ni Headquarters area northwest of Pyongyang.

The largest medium bomber raid of the period was conducted on 30 December when five aircraft blasted the ore processing plant near Choaktong deep in enemy territory and eleven medium bombers attacked a supply target near Sinanju. The clear skies and bright moonlight night made it possible for enemy fighters to make visual attacks on the United Nations Command bombers. One aircraft was lost to enemy fighters or flak. This was the first medium bomber combat loss since 19 November 1952.

United Nations Command light bombers carried out regular armed reconnaissance missions from dusk till dawn. All principal routes in North Korea were covered with particular attention given to the highway and rail line from Pyongyang to Wonsan and the routes to the south of this line. During the period numerous locomotives were sighted and seven destroyed.

Small daylight formation raids were accomplished by the light bombers attacking supply targets and troop concentrations. On these missions, fighter cover was provided by United Nations Command jet fighters.

Other missions by United Nations Command light bombers included 160 close support sorties. The bombers operated under control of ground radar stations.

United Nations Command fighter bombers flew deep into North Korea to strike at supply targets, ammunition dumps, troop billeting areas and known headquarters positions. Road blocks were made at Ichon, Chaeryong and rails were cut near Sinchon, Wonsan and Hwongju.

Jet and propeller driven aircraft damaged a tunnel at Kowon and sealed another rail tunnel near Wonsan. They attacked an airfield under repair at Pyongyang and in the same area made rail cuts and destroyed rail cars. The Thunderjets and Shooting Star fighter bombers destroyed one bridge and damaged another in the Haeju area.

In night operations Thunderjets and Shooting Stars joined the light bombers in armed reconnaissance missions on the main rail and highway line from Sinmek through Sariwon, Pyongyang, and Sinanju. Flights ranged as far to the northwest as Chongju to bomb rail and vehicle traffic.

Guided to their targets by Mosquito aircraft, the fighter bombers flew 605 close support sorties in advance of United Nations Command ground positions. They silenced enemy gun positions, blasted bunkers, supplies, and inflicted heavy troop casualties.

Air rescue units continued their regular missions of patrol and rescue.

On 22 December 1952 a United Nations Command pilot was rescued by an air rescue aircraft. The United Nations Command aircraft had ditched near the south coast of the Haeju Peninsula after having been hit by enemy ground fire after a dive bombing mission in the Haeju area. The pilot was wearing a new type exposure suit and was in the water approximately one hour with no ill effects.

Combat cargo aircraft flew normal logistical airlift for personnel and supplies in support of United Nations Command operations.

Available Psychological Warfare media were concentrated in communicating to enemy troops and to North Korean civilians the sincerity of the United Nations and United Nations Command endeavour for peace. Emphasis in this campaign was on the Indian Resolution as one more in a series of concrete efforts which, if met in the spirit with which they were advanced, would have resulted in an early peace.

Civilian relief supplies delivered by the United Nations for use in Korea as of 30 November 1952 totaled \$243,978,485. The United States Government furnished goods valued at \$218,910,952. United Nations Members and other free nations contributed an additional \$11,667,350; United States voluntary agencies contributed \$10,952,657; and United Nations voluntary agencies \$2,447,526.

The United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency has accepted an United Nations Civil Assistance Command in Korea procurement request for the purchase of 100 "Land Crete" machines to manufacture brick-shaped earth blocks and tile from indigenous material on sites where a building program is being conducted. These symmetrical building units are expected to greatly popularize use of rammed-earth construction. Delivery of the machines to Korea will enable a much more comprehensive building program.

The Republic of Korea - United Nations Civil Assistance Command in Korea - United States Navy project for training Republic of Korea merchant seamen was initiated on 17 November.
