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NOTE DATED 30 MARCH 1953 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE FIFTY-NINTH REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 7 JULY 1950 (S/1588).

The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor to refer to Paragraph 6 of the Resolution of the Security Council of July 7, 1950, requesting the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the United Nations Command.

In compliance with this Resolution, there is enclosed herewith, for circulation to the members of the Security Council, the Fifty-ninth Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period December 1 through December 15, 1952, inclusive.

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA FOR  
THE PERIOD 1 - 15 DECEMBER 1952  
(Report No. 59)

I herewith submit report number 59 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 December 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiques numbers 1450-1464 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

There were no meetings of the Armistice Delegations as the negotiations continued in recess. Developments in the United Nations General Assembly were followed closely as possibly leading to the resumption of the negotiations. The rejection of the Indian resolution by the Chinese Communist and North Korean authorities made it appear that the Communists will continue to insist on an Armistice on their own terms, and that they will continue to demand the repatriation of all prisoners of war.

The number of incidents in the pro-communist prisoner of war camps which occurred during the preceding several weeks continued to increase. On 6 December 1952, the prisoner of war command reported indications that plans were being formulated for a mass outbreak within the United Nations Command prisoner of war and internee camps. Coded documents had been intercepted in several of the compounds. The code was broken by the authorities and the documents disclosed plans for mass break. The code appeared to be common throughout the main camp and the branch camp areas, indicating that the plan was centrally directed. The date and the time that these plans were to be operative was not known.

An investigation was initiated at once. All camp commanders were acquainted with the situation and were directed to take every precaution to negate any attempt by the internees to put such plans into effect. Eight days after the first reports became available, the plot matured into violence. At noon on December 14, reports came to the commander of the camp that internees in two of the camp compounds were massing. It was evident that immediate action was necessary to prevent the rioters from breaking out of their compounds and inciting their fellows in the six other compounds to attempt similar action. The compound commander, with a small detachment of United States and Republic of Korea guards, had to act at once to prevent many hundreds of internees from breaking out of their compounds and inviting pitched battles.

The necessity for using force to repress inspired and centrally-directed outbursts of fanatical violence by prisoners is, at times, unavoidable. That such unavoidable use of force should result in casualties is no evidence that force was not required. The communist authorities have no regard for human life. This is evidenced by their frequent exploitation of their own prisoners of war by inspiring them to a state of fanatical disregard of their own lives. The prisoner of war disturbances caused by the Communists are directed towards embarrassing the United Nations Command and aimed at reaping propaganda benefits, particularly if the United Nations Command can be forced into a situation where force must be used to control the prisoners of war. On the military side, the prisoner of war disturbances are designed to divert United Nations Command Forces from front-line duty.

In all of the camps housing anti-Communist prisoners of war there were no incidents during this period, and interior administration and gradual improvement of facilities continued at a satisfactory rate.

Activity across the battle front during the first ten days of the period was comparable to the relatively light action of late November. On 11 December, however, attention was directed to the Sangnyong area of the western front where the Communists, in a local objective attack, initially seized three United Nations Command outposts. This action initiated a sustained battle for the possession of the outposts. The enemy continued to harass the Kumhwa area of the central front with almost daily small-scale attacks against the Sniper Ridge complex. The remainder of the front received a number of minor enemy probes bent on testing United Nations Command defenses and determining friendly dispositions.

Enemy artillery and mortar fire falling across the front continued to decrease, although a leveling off was noted toward the end of the period. This was caused by action which erupted in the Sangnyong area late in the period. The daily average amounted to an estimated 7,600 rounds.

There were no major changes in enemy dispositions along the front during the period.

The enemy expanded his propaganda efforts by augmenting his front-line propaganda broadcasts with the employment of aircraft to drop propaganda leaflets on United Nations Command positions at least twice during the period.

The Sangnyong area of the western front was spotlighted during the latter part of the period when the Communists struck four outposts and a main battle position early on 11 December. The enemy attack, mounted in reinforced battalion strength, succeeded in wresting three outposts from defending Republic of Korea troops in the initial assault. The contested positions are located on twin hills dubbed Big and Little Nori in the area five and one half miles southeast of Sangnyong. Republic of Korea troops reacted violently by mounting a series of counterattacks which, after a see-saw struggle over a period of three days, succeeded in regaining all ground previously lost to the enemy. Subsequent hostile attempts to retake the positions were promptly repulsed and all were held by United Nations Command elements at the close of the period.

Battle action on the central front consisted for the most part of small hostile harassing attacks in the Kumhwa area. The majority of the Communist endeavors were directed at Sniper Ridge and Rocky Point, two hills northeast of Kumhwa, which were taken from the enemy in November. At the beginning of the period, the enemy pursued his daily attacks of up to company strength against these battered hill positions with vigor. On 2-3 December the Communists succeeded in temporarily wresting Sniper Ridge positions from Republic of Korea defenders only to be ejected in turn by United Nations Command elements. Regardless of cold weather, the enemy continued to mount small-scale attacks against Sniper Ridge and Rocky Point, a promontory 1,000 meters to the east. After 3 December none of these almost-daily hostile sorties met with any success and stalwart Republic of Korea troops remained in possession of both hills at the close of the period.

There was no appreciable increase in enemy activity along the eastern front during the period, although the previously contested Achor Hill area three and one half miles south of Kosong was the target of two hostile groups of estimated company size. These attacks, which were launched at midnight 1-2 December, were both repelled in thirty-minute engagements. The pattern of extensive patrolling by both sides continued, although as a result of adverse weather, enemy contacts were somewhat reduced as compared to previous periods.

Despite the general decrease in enemy-initiated action during the period, his limited-objective attacks on the western front suggest that the Communists have not entirely given up their policy of conducting an aggressive defense. Other indications also point to a continuation of hostile limited-objective attacks. However, the lesson of heavy losses in men and material sustained by the enemy during previous actions and increasingly adverse weather conditions may limit such operations to instances wherein the tactical situation and weather are favorable to such Communist actions. Several reports received during the period indicate the possibility of a major Communist winter offensive. These reports, however, are presently unsubstantiated. Although the Communists retain the capability of launching a powerful offensive, the bulk of present indications point to a continuation of the enemy's present over-all defensive attitude.

United Nations Command Naval aircraft from fast carriers in the Sea of Japan struck various targets from the vicinity of Kosong North. Approximately 430 close and deep support missions resulted in destruction of many bunkers, gun and mortar positions, and front-line supply areas. Numerous troop casualties were also inflicted. A major strike was made against the four important rail and supply centers of Hyesanjin, Musan, Hunyung and Najin on 9 December. Observers reported excellent results, stating that railroad repair shops, turntables, round-houses, locomotives, rail cars, and a number of industrial buildings were destroyed. Inclement weather halted operations for two days during the period, but on thirteen days, strikes continued against enemy transportation facilities, troop billeting and supply areas, industrial centers and other targets of military significance.

A strike on the Kyosen Number 1 hydroelectric plant resulted in heavy damage to the powerhouse and transformer yard. All six penstocks were cut near the powerhouse. A turbine building was 75 per cent destroyed in the Fusen hydroelectric complex and two penstocks were cut.

The main supply routes in central eastern and northeastern Korea were attacked almost daily and trucks, locomotives, rail cars, and rail and road bridges were destroyed. Rails were cut and roads cratered in a number of strategic places at frequent intervals.

United Nations Command carrier-based aircraft operating in the Yellow Sea continued their offensive strikes on enemy installations in central west and northwest Korea. This period was highlighted by strikes on troop concentrations in villages, with the attacks concentrated mainly on Tungsan-got and in the coastal areas opposite the friendly islands of Chodo and Sokto, and in the Haeju approaches. Many troop shelters were destroyed and numerous casualties inflicted as a result of these strikes. Throughout the Hwanghae Province, attacks continued on enemy transportation facilities, supply and storage areas, gun positions, and industrial areas. Strafing and bombing of rolling stock on the rail lines and roads resulted in destruction of rail cars and trucks and numerous rail and road cuts.

Shore-based Marine aircraft provided front-line units with close air support and flew combat and reconnaissance sorties deep into enemy territory. These sorties destroyed or damaged gun and mortar positions, bunkers, personnel and supply shelters, warehouses, railroad cars, railroad and highway bridges, and inflicted numerous enemy troop casualties.

Naval patrol planes supported the United Nations' effort by making daily flights over waters adjoining Korea, conducting anti-submarine, reconnaissance and weather data missions.

On both coasts of Korea United Nations Command surface units carried out routine patrols and blockaded the coastline. They successfully defended the friendly held islands north of the 38th parallel by maintaining constant watch and harassing enemy troop concentrations and gun positions on the mainland. Ground fire support was rendered to friendly guerrilla landing parties, and enemy gun positions were engaged and silenced whenever located. Coastal communications, transportation facilities, supply build-ups, troop concentrations and billeting areas within range were brought under frequent attack by Naval gunfire. Meanwhile, the smaller United Nations Command vessels conducted close inshore patrols and swept mines to keep channels and anchorages navigable.

The enemy was effectively denied the use of sea communications, and all craft detected were either destroyed or driven ashore.

Enemy shore batteries along the east coast of Korea continued active during the period. A Canadian destroyer operating off Songjin was taken under fire by two 76 MM guns. Other United Nations Command ships were targets for enemy guns in the Wonsan area and at Suwon-dan. In all cases these guns were

effectively silenced by counterbattery fire. No casualties or material damage were suffered by friendly units.

United Nations Command Naval auxiliary vessels, Military Sea Transportation Services and merchant vessels under contract provided personnel lifts and logistic support for United Nations Command naval, air and ground forces in Korea.

The United Nations Command Air Forces continued to disrupt Communist troop concentrations, main lines of communications, rail and highway bridges, supplies, gun positions and certain industrial targets. Air operations were restricted by poor weather on seven days.

The medium bombers, operating at night, attacked numerous lucrative targets as well as furnishing close support for the United Nations Command ground forces each night. The Superforts, using electronic aiming devices, were not affected by the weather which restricted other operations. Attacks were made against supply areas near Yangdok, Samdong-ni, Taeyundong, Songna-ri and Kangdong, as well as troop billeting and headquarters areas at Salli, Sunchon, Sungang-ni and Kwang-hyon.

The medium bombers attacked the communications centers at Cholsan, in northwest Korea, Tocho-myon and Pingjang on the 4th, 6th and 11th of December, respectively. Industrial targets which were attacked included Moksong and the ore processing plant at Tokchon.

The Superforts observed Communist night fighters and other unidentified aircraft on several occasions in the vicinity of the target area. The Communist aircraft appeared unwilling or unable to attack the bombers as no firing passes were made. Flak and searchlights which the enemy used in their defense of the various target areas failed to seriously interfere with the successful conduct of the attacks.

The light bombers maintained continuous armed reconnaissance patrols over the main enemy supply routes during the hours of darkness, as well as flying close support missions along the bomblines under control of ground radar. The invaders successfully attacked vehicles, trains and troop concentrations along the principal supply routes and knocked out rail and road bridges.

Shooting Star and Thunderjet fighter bombers joined the light bombers on night intruder missions along the rail line and highway from Sinanju to Sariwon. The fighter bombers, during daylight hours, destroyed enemy supplies, artillery positions, troops and vehicles and certain key bridges and supply points. Most of the targets were located south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. The fighter bombers also provided close support missions for the United Nations Command ground forces.

United Nations Command Sabrejets continued to maintain air superiority over Korea with little difficulty. The enemy fighters were seldom seen far from the Manchurian border and, when sighted, appeared less aggressive than usual. Engagements between United Nations Command and Communist aircraft occurred on seven days with the United Nations Command pilots claiming a total of fifteen MIGs destroyed, two probably destroyed, and three damaged. The largest claim for destruction was made on 7 December when the Sabrejets reported destroying seven of the thirty-one enemy aircraft sighted, probably destroying one and damaging one MIG. The largest number of enemy aircraft were sighted on the 15th of December when 142 MIGs were observed near the Yalu River. The Sabrejets engaged thirty-five of the MIGs, claiming damage to two and probable damage to eight of the enemy aircraft.

On 11 December, a Marine Skynight, a night interceptor fighter, claimed destruction of one enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Pyongyang. The enemy aircraft is believed to have been a PO-2 Russian built biplane which the Communists have been using periodically for night heckling raids. After locating the enemy aircraft with the aid of radar equipment, the Marine pilot made one visual firing pass and observed the plane falling into the sea.

Combat cargo aircraft flew regular logistical missions in support of the Korean operations as they airlifted supplies, equipment and personnel and provided for the aerial evacuation of wounded United Nations Command personnel.

Developments in the United Nations General Assembly relating to the Indian proposal for resolving the prisoner repatriation issue were reported extensively in informational media directed to enemy troops and to North Korean civilians. In connection with the Indian proposal, United Nations Command efforts to achieve peace in Korea and United Nations Command determination to adhere to the humanitarian principle of non-forcible repatriation were reiterated.



A payment of \$8,552,225.92 to the Republic of Korea Government under the terms of an exchange of notes dated 24 May 1952, was made by the United States Government in Washington on 12 December. This payment, the fourth to date, makes a total of \$74,190,444.99 reimbursed to the Republic of Korea Government under the terms of the agreement which states that the United States will make payments on account for won drawings. Won advances are used to meet expenditures arising out of the operations and activities of the United States' forces in Korea, and this latest payment is for won advances used for military purposes during October and November 1952. It also includes repayment of dollars for won sold to U.S. military personnel for their personal use during the month of September 1952.

A new wage and classification plan for all United Nations Command direct hire indigenous labor to reflect prevailing wages and attempt to parallel increased cost of living are now in effect. Since the adjustment procedure is not sufficiently flexible to keep pace with the inflationary spiral, the regular partial payment of wages in kind has been incorporated to minimize the lag behind increase in living costs. A project has been established under procurement procedures to obtain goods for such issue.

A partial evacuation of Chunchon City in Kangwon-do has been completed involving approximately 12,000 persons. The reason for the movement was to reduce congestion on military routes. Most of the individuals evacuated are refugees from that part of Kangwon-do north of the 38th Parallel, who had moved to Chunchon to be as near as possible to their former homes. They were dispersed to the countries south of Chunchon. Grain and tents were made available to feed and house these people and necessary public health and sanitation measures were provided.

In the Cholla Provinces increasing numbers of refugees are moving from the remote, unsafe, bandit infested areas either to refugee camps or to towns where they hope to find employment.

After extensive surveys, supplies from civilian relief stocks were furnished for winterization of refugee camps, which activity is well under way throughout the Republic of Korea.

