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NOTE DATED 30 MARCH 1953 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE FIFTY-EIGHTH REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 7 JULY 1950 (S/1588)

The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor to refer to Paragraph 6 of the Resolution of the Security Council of July 7, 1950, requesting the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the United Nations Command.

In compliance with this Resolution, there is enclosed herewith, for circulation to the members of the Security Council, the Fifty-eighth Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period November 16 through November 30, 1952, inclusive.

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN  
KOREA FOR THE PERIOD 16 - 30 NOVEMBER 1952  
(Report No. 58)

I herewith submit report number 58 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-30 November 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiques numbers 1438-1449 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Armistice negotiations continued in recess. On the 20th of November 1952 the Senior United Nations Command delegate again requested the Communists to permit captured personnel in their custody to receive individual parcels through the mail exchange which is now in operation. The letter which the Communists have ignored is quoted:

"On 6 October 1952 I addressed a letter to you requesting that your side permit our captured personnel in your custody to receive individual parcels through the mail exchange which is now in operation. The United Nations Command further offered the same facilities for the captured personnel of your side whom we hold in custody.

In an effort to simplify the administrative handling by your side and to expedite delivery of these parcels, I further offered for your consideration an easy and workable plan which would not impose any exceptional burden on your logistic capabilities. Although our proposal was fully bilateral and based solely on the humanitarian motive of bringing some measure of comfort to the captured personnel of both sides, you have to date failed even to acknowledge receipt of my communication.

As I have previously pointed out, the approach of winter and the hardships imposed by cold weather make it particularly desirable to take all possible steps at this time to enable the captured personnel of both sides to receive relief parcels. Further, the nearness of the holiday and New Year seasons, which many of the captured personnel of both sides customarily observe as a period of special spiritual and familial significance, makes it especially appropriate that these deliveries should be undertaken with minimum delay. Since it is clearly the right of prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention to receive individual parcels, it is inconceivable that you should continue to deny the prisoners of both sides the simple and harmless benefits of the exchange of parcels which I again propose.

I reiterate that the United Nations Command is prepared to implement our part of this proposal without delay. Again I express my sincere hope for your early and favorable reply."

There were no other developments in the armistice negotiations during the period.

In the few scattered incidents which occurred in pro-Communist Prisoner of War camps no particular trend could be discerned other than that of pure harassment. At Koje-do, on 25 November, three prisoners of war of one inclosure assaulted without provocation an unarmed United States aid man at the inclosure aid station and then fled to their compound. Orders which were issued immediately by camp authorities for the three prisoners responsible to report to the inclosure command post were refused and two platoons of trained Republic of Korea Army Infantry entered the compound and removed the three offenders. During the forcible segregation of these individuals, twenty-nine prisoners were slightly injured. About fifteen minutes after this first incident a similar one occurred in another inclosure when three prisoners of a group of thirty-five who were on a work detail assaulted, again without provocation, a United States work supervisor. After the work detail returned to their inclosure a United States Infantry platoon entered the inclosure service yard and dispersed the work detail which was then displaying an obviously defiant attitude. The three prisoners of war who had committed the assault were removed.

The camp authorities at Koje-do reported that incidents of this type would probably continue for a period of several days as part of carefully planned violence. Information, as yet incomplete, had been uncovered which indicated that prisoner groups had been ordered by subversive elements to create incidents while International Committee of the Red Cross delegates were at Koje-do on a routine inspection and visit.

Enemy activity along the stalemated Korean front declined considerably with minor clashes typifying the ground action. Although none of these engagements involved major forces, the enemy displayed no less determination in mounting his local objective attacks, most of which were against hard-won United Nations Command positions in the Kumhwa area of the central front. A number of small-scale actions resulted from raids and patrols conducted by

United Nations Command elements against Communist forward positions. A decrease in hostile artillery and mortar fire was again evident with the approximate daily average falling to 9,000 rounds, which represented a drop of 2,000 rounds from the previous month. Enemy troop dispositions along the line of contact remained unchanged, except for the reinforcement of units in the Kumbwa area and the routine relief of a front-line army on the western front.

Action was relatively light along the western front, with local engagements seldom approaching company size. Three hostile attacks against friendly elements on 18-19 November in the Punji sector were repulsed. One attack by two enemy companies forced a slight initial penetration which United Nations Command counterattacks nullified within two hours. On 20-21 November United Nations Command units in the Kigong area bore the brunt of an enemy thrust against three outpost positions. Two of the outposts withdrew under fire from one enemy company each, but the positions were later reoccupied without opposition. On 25 November a brisk skirmish occurred in a sector near Kigong where United Nations Command raiding elements forced two separate withdrawals of forward enemy units. The raiders faced two enemy counterattacks and returned to friendly territory after a six-hour engagement. In the Sangnyong area on 28 November another United Nations Command raiding unit forced a hostile group to withdraw from its position. A short time later, the enemy counterattacked the United Nations Command elements who then returned to their main battle positions.

The Kumbwa sector of the central front experienced repeated hostile attacks against Sniper Ridge and vicinity. The Communists began immediate attempts to recapture the Sniper Ridge complex after United Nations Command forces took the position on 15 November. Although inclement weather hampered ground activity toward the end of the period, hostile forces mounted numerous attacks of up to battalion strength against unyielding United Nations Command defenders. None of these enemy attacks succeeded in gaining their objectives despite ample artillery and mortar support. Toward the end of the period the Communist attacks against this position decreased in both size and number of units employed despite the reinforcement in this area by major elements of a reserve Chinese Communist Army. A short distance to the east of Sniper Ridge is a terrain feature known as Rocky Point on which is located another disputed outpost position. United Nations Command defenders lost this outpost to an enemy company on 16 November but

subsequently reoccupied it and defended it successfully against repeated small-scale Communist attacks. Other hostile probes focused on an outpost known as Jackson Heights, northeast of Chorwon. This position changed hands several times but was held by United Nations Command elements when the period ended.

Along the eastern front minor probes and patrol contacts constituted the bulk of the ground action. The only contest of significance involved Republic of Korea forces who repulsed a thirty-minute thrust of a hostile company in the Oemyon area on 22 November. With the slackening of ground action a large number of propaganda broadcasts were directed at United Nations Command elements along the east central front. On many occasions these ineffective and often unintelligible broadcasts ceased when friendly artillery was directed in the area from which the broadcast emanated.

Several reasons can be advanced to explain the diminution in intensity and number of Communist limited objective attacks during the period. The most logical reason for this decline may be that the enemy does not wish to continue the heavy manpower and materiel losses resulting from these attacks. The forced employment of Communist reserves in areas where action has been the severest attests to the heavy enemy personnel losses, while the decline in the enemy's expenditure of artillery and mortar ammunition serves to indicate a lowering of his forward ammunition stocks. Further evidence pointing to a temporary lowering of Communist supplies in the forward areas as a result of the heavy fighting in September, October and early November may be deduced from Communist vehicle activity which has shown a decided increase in the forward areas during the month of November. This increased traffic while serving to replenish the enemy's forward supply stocks also may constitute final preparations for winter weather which will impede transportation. Despite the present relative lull in enemy-initiated operations occasioned by his earlier losses, there are numerous indications that the Communists have not abandoned their policy of a more active defense. While these indications point to additional limited objective attacks, there is no firm evidence pointing to an imminent major Communist ground offensive in Korea.

United Nations Command Naval aircraft operating from fast carriers in the Sea of Japan struck various targets from the vicinity of Kosong to the Manchurian border. On one occasion Task Force 77 planes struck targets along the northeast Korean Coast within twenty nautical miles of the Korean border.

Although inclement weather curtailed air operations during five days of this period, strikes continued against enemy transportation facilities, troop billeting and supply areas, gun positions, and other targets of military significance.

Numerous close support missions were flown which resulted in the destruction of many bunkers, gun positions, and front line supply areas. Many troop casualties were also inflicted.

A surface and air bombardment of targets at Chongjin and Kyongsong was carried out on 17 November resulting in the destruction or damage of many military buildings, a factory, power station, a transformer and several railroad cars. Nineteen additional planes hit a troop billeting and supply area at Kilchu destroying numerous buildings.

On 18 November, while operating in the Chongjin area, three carrier-based Panther jets encountered seven MIGs. Four MIGs attacked, and in the engagement which followed, two MIGs were shot down and a third damaged. One Panther jet was damaged but returned safely aboard the carrier.

Attacks on interdiction targets resulted in numerous railcuts and destroyed or damaged locomotives, rail cars, rail and highway bridges, trucks and boats.

Off the West Coast of Korea, carrier-based aircraft continued their strikes on enemy military targets in central western Korea west of a line between Kaesong and Hanchon. Throughout the Hwanghae Province attacks were pressed against troop concentrations, gun positions and supply areas to inflict sizeable losses on the enemy. Other attacks on the enemy's transportation system resulted in the destruction of a large number of rail and highway bridges, and vehicles.

Six Marine aircraft were attacked by four MIGs over Chaeryong. After making three passes each, the MIGs retired to the north. Neither friendly nor enemy planes were damaged in the encounter.

Shore based aircraft provided front-line units with close air support and flew combat and reconnaissance sorties deep into enemy territory. These sorties destroyed or damaged numerous gun and mortar positions, bunkers, personnel and supply shelters, warehouses, railroad cars, railway and highway bridges and made

rail and road cuts. Numerous personnel casualties were also inflicted.

Naval patrol planes supported the United Nations' effort in Korea by flying daily reconnaissance, anti-submarine and weather data missions over the waters surrounding Korea.

On the Korean west coast United Nations Command surface units carried out routine patrols and blockaded the coast line around the perimeter of Hwanghae Province from the Haeju river approaches to the Taedong. These vessels successfully defended the friendly held islands north of the 38th parallel by maintaining constant watch and harassing enemy troop concentrations and gun positions on the mainland. Friendly guerilla units were also given naval gunfire support toward accomplishment of their missions. The approaches to Sokto, Mudo, Sosuapto, Sunwido, and Yongmaedo were illuminated almost nightly to prevent possible enemy aggression.

Small United Nations Command vessels conducted close inshore patrols and swept mines in waters off enemy shores.

The naval blockade continued along the Korean east coast from the vicinity of Kosong to Chongjin. Surface units on day and night coastal patrols fired on key targets along the coastal main supply routes to maintain rail and road cuts, destroy locomotives, railcars, trucks and bridges, and block tunnels at several points. Many supply areas, warehouses, factories, and other targets of military significance were damaged or destroyed at various coastal points.

United Nations Command cruisers with destroyers assigned gave direct support to the troops on the coastal flank of the front line. Enemy troop movements were illuminated by these units nightly, and during the day destructive fire missions were carried out against enemy bunkers, gun positions and supply areas.

Surface units operating the Wonsan-Hungnam areas continued to interdict rolling stock and to harass other targets of military significance.

Rail targets between Chaho and Songjin were pounded daily by the guns of surface units. Trains were sighted frequently and a number of them were destroyed.

Enemy shore batteries along the east coast of Korea continued to harass United Nations Command ships, and one vessel was hit by an enemy 105mm shell. One personnel casualty was suffered, and the ship required yard repair.

The enemy was denied the use of the coastal waters for shipping. All craft detected were taken under fire and either destroyed or driven ashore. Enemy coastal movements were kept under constant surveillance.

United Nations Command minesweepers continued operations to keep the channels, coastal areas, and anchorages free of mines of all types.

United Nations Command Naval auxiliary vessels, Military Sea Transportation Services and merchant vessels under contract provided personnel lifts and logistic support for the United Nations Command naval, air, and ground forces in Korea.

Sabrejets of the United Nations Command Air Forces destroyed the 500th Russian-built enemy MIG-15 during the first week of the reporting period. On 16 November the MIGs failed to appear, but during the next six days the Sabrejets engaged the enemy jet fighters daily, destroying sixteen and damaging four MIGs. Such losses apparently discouraged the enemy pilots and their momentary and sporadic aggressiveness declined noticeably. Two more enemy MIG-15s were destroyed in the last half of the period to bring the total for month of November to twenty-seven destroyed, nineteen damaged, and four other probably destroyed.

Pilots reported that on two occasions MIGs spun in without being attacked by United Nations Command fighters. The attacks initiated by the enemy pilots continued to be of the hit-and-run variety with no attempt to follow through on the attack.

The month brought to a close two years of jet aerial warfare with the Chinese Communists and North Koreans failing to produce an aircraft-pilot team capable of seriously threatening United Nations Command air superiority. The Red pilots have rarely demonstrated the ability to exploit fully their aircraft's capabilities. Despite their evident willingness to alter operational concept when the need arises, the Communists have not yet devised an effective counter effort against the United Nations Command Sabrejet team. MIG losses, as opposed to those of the Sabrejets, during these two years, stood at approximately eight to one.

The United Nations Command medium bombers accomplished a large scale raid on four targets on the Yalu River on the night of 28/29 November. Forty Superforts struck an airfield and military repair facility at Sinuiju, and an airfield and communications center at Uiju. Crews reported good patterns on the targets and large fires and secondary explosions as a result of the bombing. Enemy night fighters were observed in the area, but were not effective. Flak ranged from meager to intense and was described as accurate by many of the crews. However, no major damage was received by the medium bombers. Searchlights were used by the enemy defensive forces, but on only two occasions were they "Locked-on" the attacking aircraft. The Superforts provided their own flak suppression to increase the effectiveness of the raid.



Carrying out their regular attacks on supplies, the Superforts hit a number of other targets during the period, including storage areas at Pyongyang, Haeju, Hoechang, Tosong, Songi-ri and Chongchon-ni. Communications centers were bombed at Unpari and Yongmidong, and a military headquarters at Yongpung-ni was the primary target for the night of 21 November. Support for United Nations Command ground units continued as the medium bombers used electronic devices to bomb enemy positions in the frontline area.

Supply laden Communist trucks, slowed by rough and broken highways, offered lucrative targets to light bombers operating at night. Numerous trucks and other vehicles were claimed destroyed by the night intruder aircraft during the period. Total vehicles destroyed during the first week almost reached the record of the week of 19 September 1952.

The night intruders also attacked supply areas at Singosan, Kangdong, Sariwon, Hungnam, Chaeryong and Koksan. They bombed rail and road bridges at Samdon-ni, Ichom, Sohung, Hwangju, Yangdok and Yongmidong. Certain of these bridges were deliberately attacked during periods of overcast weather in order to preclude attack by enemy night fighters. On these occasions the light bombers used electronic bombing devices. The light bombers continued the practice of creating road blocks on the principal highways and attacking the Red vehicles which were stalled by the attacks.

In daylight raids the light bombers hit supply areas, bombed road bridges and made rail cuts and teamed with night flying shore-based Marine aircraft to attack enemy frontline positions.

United Nations Command fighter bombers struck at Communist troop concentrations near Pyongyang, Sinchon, Haeju, Yonan, Singye, Namchonjom, and Sohung using high explosive bombs and napalm and strafing with thousands of rounds of 50 caliber ammunition. At Chongju, Thunderjets poured 25,000 gallons of napalm on a troop area.

The jet and propeller driven fighter bombers cut rail lines between Chunghwa and Kyomipo, sealed both ends of a tunnel at Yangdok and destroyed vehicles whenever they could be located.

Aided by target spotting Mosquito aircraft, the fighter bombers continued to provide a large amount of close support for United Nations Command troops along the frontline. Enemy troops, bunkers, supplies and gun positions were repeatedly blasted by the low-flying Mustangs, Thunderjets, Shooting Stars and Marine fighter bomber aircraft.

Combat Cargo aircraft provided regular logistical airlift for personnel and supplies in support of United Nations Command operations.

Repeated radio and leaflet warnings were employed to inform North Korea civilians of impending United Nations Command air attacks on military targets and to urge them to evacuate their families to safety. The effects of the campaign are considerable in spite of Communist efforts to prevent these humanitarian warnings from reaching the people.

United Nations devotion to peace in a world threatened by Communist aggression was reiterated. Maximum dissemination was given to information concerning United Nations functions and development, stressing the identification of the United Nations with peace and human rights. Reports indicate that the people of North Korea receive only a distorted picture of the United Nations through the enemy's controlled propaganda channels.

The estimated dollar value of civil assistance to Korea for the period 1 July 1950 to 31 October 1952, totals \$577,926,319. Approximately 96 per cent of this amount has been contributed by the United States, including \$328,136,088 for supplies and equipment and an estimated \$225,000,000 in services. United Nations members and other free nations contributed \$11,628,831, United States voluntary agencies \$10,797,874 and United Nations voluntary agencies \$2,363,526. A total of thirty-four countries, four United Nations voluntary agencies and twenty-six United States voluntary agencies are now participating in the Korean Aid Program. As contributing countries, Thailand led with an estimated dollar value of \$4,368,000 in rice. The Philippines were second with \$1,875,468 in rice, and Nationalist China third with \$617,130 in relief supplies. The American Relief for Korea, Inc., gave the largest non-governmental contribution, totaling \$3,871,145.

The War Relief Service of the National Catholic Welfare Conference was second with \$3,623,492.

At the 19 November meeting of the Combined Economic Board, a joint proposal was made for the free allocation of veterinary drugs and supplies to establish and maintain 200 veterinary clinics in Korea for six months. These clinics will be established at the National Veterinary Institute, two Veterinary Colleges, one High School, several livestock Breeding Stations, and in each major city area throughout the Republic of Korea, to treat animal disease and conserve livestock. It is estimated that in six months' time the clinics will be able to begin paying an increasing percentage of the cost of supplies.

A Seminar-workshop program currently is being held in Pusan for 180 educators from all Republic of Korea provinces. Conducted by members of the American Education Mission, the seminars cover five major areas of education, including teaching and learning; fundamental philosophy of education; administration, and child development and guidance. The six members of the American Education Mission, who were recruited for the Unitarian Services Committee, will spend nine months in Korea on a technical assistance program.

An appropriation of \$1,845,000 has been made by United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency for the orphan's program. Projects to be financed by this appropriation have been prepared by the Joint United Nations Civil Assistance Command Korea-United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency-Republic of Korea Child Welfare Committee, which was established on 6 October for the purpose of studying, analyzing and coordinating child welfare plans and activities. Three projects have been proposed, which include the establishment of a child welfare center and a rational model and training institution in each province; extension and improvement of the best existing educational institutions, and the establishment of three vocational training institutions.

