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SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-SIXTH YEAR

SUPPLEMENT FOR JANUARY, FEBRUARY AND MARCH 1971

UNITED NATIONS



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New York, 1972

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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DOCUMENTS S/7930/ADD.1031-1131*

Supplemental information received by the Secretary-General
on the situation in the Middle East

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1031

[Original: English]
[2 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 31 December 1970 was received on 1 January 1971 from the Acting Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO):

"OP¹ reports.

"(a) OP Two. Between 0933² and 0955 three rounds of mortar and machine-gun fire and between 1444 and 1454 three rounds of mortar and sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Six. Between 1653 and 1655 machine-gun fire and flares and at 2052 machine-gun fire and flares, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Four. Between 2245 and 2248 mortar and machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1032

[Original: English]
[2 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 1 January 1971 was received on 2 January from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Three. Between 0103 and 0104 and between 0510 and 0513 machine-gun fire, and be-

tween 0543 and 0545 artillery fire, all by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Five. Between 0505 and 0521 machine-gun and mortar fire and between 1011 and 1016 mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two. Between 0923 and 0928 and between 1227 and 1235 machine-gun and mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP One. Between 1502 and 1510 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1033

[Original: English]
[4 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 2 January 1971 was received on 3 January from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Three. Between 0037 and 0043, between 0122 and 0125 and between 0143 and 0235 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two. Between 0825 and 0830 sporadic mortar fire and at 1304 one mortar round by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six. Between 0927 and 0940 and between 1031 and 1034 sporadic light-machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP One. At 1007 one mortar round by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Five. Between 1011 and 1015 machine-gun fire and between 2038 and 2041 machine-gun fire and one mortar round by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1034

[Original: English]
[4 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 3 January 1971 was received on 4 January from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Six. Between 0926 and 0930 light-machine-gun fire and between 1916 and 1919 four mortar flares by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Five. Between 1006 and 1009 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two. Between 1037 and 1047 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Three. Between 1704 and 1709 intense machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

* For documents S/7930 and Add.1-17, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967*; for document S/7930/Add.18-41, *ibid.*, Supplement for July, August and September 1967; for documents S/7930/Add.42-61, *ibid.*, Supplement for October, November and December 1967; for documents S/7930/Add.62-66, *ibid.*, Twenty-third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1968; for documents S/7930/Add.67-72, *ibid.*, Supplement for April, May and June 1968; for documents S/7930/Add.73-92, *ibid.*, Supplement for July, August and September 1968; for documents S/7930/Add.93-108, *ibid.*, Supplement for October, November and December 1968; for documents S/7930/Add.109-146, *ibid.*, Twenty-fourth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1969; for documents S/7930/Add.147-249, *ibid.*, Supplement for April, May and June 1969; for documents S/7930/Add.250-367, *ibid.*, Supplement for July, August and September 1969; for documents S/7930/Add.368-480, *ibid.*, Supplement for October, November and December 1969; for documents S/7930/Add.481-625, *ibid.*, Twenty-fifth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1970; for documents S/7930/Add.626-808, *ibid.*, Supplement for April, May and June 1970; for documents S/7930/Add.809-945, *ibid.*, Supplement for July, August and September 1970; for documents S/7930/Add.946-1030, *ibid.*, Supplement for October, November and December 1970.

¹ For locations of the observation posts established by UNTSO in the Israel-Syria sector see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fourth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1969*, document S/7930/Add.222, para. 2.

² All times GMT.

[Original: English]
[5 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 4 January 1971 was received on 5 January from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Two. Between 0556 and 0559 mortar fire and between 1124 and 1128 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP One. Between 0645 and 0655 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six. Between 1106 and 1117 and between 1328 and 1417 sporadic small-arms fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Five. Between 1130 and 1135, machine-gun fire and between 2005 and 2010 machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Three. Between 1310 and 1323 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1036

[Original: English]
[6 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 5 January 1971 was received on 6 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Two. Between 0618 and 0630 machine-gun and mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP One. At 1605 flares and machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately and between 1850 and 1852 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Seven. Between 1900 and 1910 flares and machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1037

[Original: English]
[7 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 6 January 1971 was received on 7 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Two. Between 0620 and 0636 sporadic machine-gun fire and four mortar rounds by Israel forces.

"(b) OP One. Between 0820 and 0821 machine-gun fire, at 1100 one mortar round and between 1601 and 1603 six mortar rounds, all by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Four. Between 1405 and 1424 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1038

[Original: English]
[7 January 1971]

1. The Secretary General has received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilas-

vuo, the following report on an incident which took place at the United Nations observation post OP Four (map reference 2327-2596) in the Israel-Syria sector:

"1. On 2 January 1971, at 2305 hours, the United Nations military observers on duty at OP Four were held up by a party of three heavily armed persons who entered their living caravan. These intruders were all similarly dressed in brown pants, brown sweaters and boots. They wore no headaddress and were carrying sub-machine guns of an unidentified type. One of them had a pistol and they all wore ammunition pouches and carried hand grenades of an unidentified type. When asked by the UNMOs 'what do you want?', one of the intruders replied in halting English, 'looking at the position'. They threatened the UNMOs with their weapons. Having taken a number of items from the living caravan, and ripped the handset off the Motorola radio set, two of them left the caravan and the other remained covering the UNMOs with his sub-machine gun. At 2325 hours the person guarding the UNMOs left the caravan and joined the others who then left the OP site. The direction of arrival and departure of the intruders could not be determined and the intruders could not be identified.

"2. On 2 January, at 2359 hours, the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission (Damascus) reported the incident to the acting senior Syrian Arab delegate, who promised to inform his authorities in order to conduct an inquiry.

"3. On 3 January, an inquiry conducted by the officer-in-charge, Tiberias control centre, into the incident failed to establish the identity of the intruders.

"4. On 4 January, the UNTSO findings on the incident were passed to the senior Syrian Arab delegate and to the senior Israel representative, who were requested to provide the results of any inquiry conducted by their respective authorities.

"5. On 5 January, the Israel Defence Forces liaison officer was contacted and asked for the results of the Israel authorities inquiry. The same day, the Israel liaison officer stated that on 3 January a search was conducted by Israel trackers at the OP Four site and its immediate environs; as a result of this search, tracks made by three persons wearing regular Syrian boots were followed from the OP Four site through a destroyed bunker located in the immediate vicinity of the OP and leading an east-southeast direction towards Syrian territory; when following the track, the trackers found a box of soap powder, a mirror and a vehicle registration card, items which were taken from the UN OP living caravan. No further inquiry was carried on this incident, he added.

"6. On 6 January, the senior Syrian Arab delegate called the Chairman of ISMAC and stated that he had investigated this matter and could assure the Chairman that, without doubt, the intruders were not members of the Syrian regular army.

"7. It appears, therefore, that despite inquiries conducted by UNTSO and by both the Israel and Syrian authorities, the identity of the armed intruders could not be established."

2. The Secretary-General is disturbed by this type of incident, which, if repeated, may have serious implications for the cease-fire observation operation in the Israel-Syria sector. It is important to note that

United Nations military observers do not carry arms and depend for their safety on their special status and on the protection provided by the parties to the ceasefire. While the inquiries into the incident have not established the identity of the intruders and the evidence available indicates that those intruders were not members of any regular army, the Secretary-General wishes to appeal to all concerned to take all possible measures to prevent a recurrence of such incidents.

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1039

[Original: English]
[8 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 7 January 1971 was received on 8 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Two. Between 0525 and 0550 sporadic machine-gun fire, between 0925 and 0955 three mortar rounds and sporadic machine-gun fire, and between 1105 and 1120 intense machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Six. Between 0755 and 0805 and between 1340 and 1348 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP One. At 0925 one mortar round, between 1133 and 1135 machine-gun fire and at 1703 one mortar round, all by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Five. Between 1056 and 1100 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1202 and 1203 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1040

[Original: English]
[9 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 8 January 1971 was received on 9 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity.

"(a) OP Four. Between 0540 and 0543 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two. Between 0825 and 0844 sporadic machine-gun and mortar fire and between 0915 and 0949 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces. At 1835 intense small arms fire by unidentified party (United Nations military observers could not identify firing party) and at the same time flares, machine-gun, mortar and later artillery fire (see para. 3) by Israel forces (United Nations military observers could not determine which party fired first). Fire ceased by unidentified party at 1840 and by Israel forces at 1948.

"(c) OP Six. Between 1210 and 1230 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Three. Between 1854 and 1903 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity: nil.

"3. Firing on or close to United Nations installations.

"OP Two. Between 1835 and 1948 during machine-gun fire by Israel forces, eight rounds im-

pacted within OP compound damaging several OP fittings (see para. 4).

"4. Casualties and damage.

"(a) United Nations. OP Two: three bullet holes through OP toilet. Two bullet holes through liaison officer's toilet. Two bullet holes through gasoline drum and one bullet hole through kerosene bucket.

"(b) Israel. No report received.

"(c) Syria. No report received."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1041

[Original: English]
[11 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 9 January 1971 was received on 10 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Five. At 0826 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces

"(b) OP Six. Between 0855 and 0905 two mortar rounds, between 0951 and 1010 four mortar rounds and at 1158 one mortar round, all by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Three. Between 1415 and 1423 two mortar rounds by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1042

[Original: English]
[11 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 10 January 1971 was received on 11 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Three (map reference 2308-2678).

"Between 2056 and 2059 flares and sporadic light-machine-gun and mortar fire and between 2125 and 2131 mortar fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1043

[Original: English]
[11 January 1971]

With reference to the list of observation posts established by UNTSO in the Suez Canal Sector^a the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo, has reported that OP Hotel on the west side of the Canal has been relocated to map reference 7391-8718 as from 1400 hours, 7 January 1971.

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1044

[Original: English]
[12 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 11 January 1971 was received on 12 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

^a See Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fourth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1969, document S/7930/Add.222, para. 2.

"Report from OP November (map reference 2316-2564).

"Between 1747 and 1748 machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1045

[Original: English]
[13 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 12 January 1971 was received on 13 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Two. Between 0619 and 0627 and between 0734 and 0750 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP One. Between 0721 and 0813 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six. Between 1121 and 1125 machine-gun fire and between 1215 and 1219 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Four. Between 1545 and 1547 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Five. At 2042 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1046

[Original: English]
[14 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 13 January 1971 was received on 14 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Six. Between 0934 and 0936 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two. At 1304 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, and between 1751 and 1801 sporadic machine-gun and mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Three. Between 1755 and 1805 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Victor. Between 1756 and 1807 sporadic mortar fire by Syrian forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1047

[Original: English]
[15 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 14 January 1971 was received on 15 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Six. Between 0632 and 0636 small-arms fire, between 1017 and 1021 two mortar rounds and between 1242 and 1303 four mortar rounds, all by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two. Between 0704 and 0709 and between 1408 and 1410 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Five. At 1043 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1048

[Original: English]
[16 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 15 January 1971 was received on 16 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Two. Between 0705 and 0733 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Five. Between 0942 and 0946 two mortar rounds by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Yoke. Between 0958 and 1009 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1049

[Original: English]
[18 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 16 January 1971 was received on 17 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Two. Between 0839 and 0840 five mortar rounds by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Three. Between 1742 and 1751 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Five. Between 1830 and 1845 sporadic mortar fire and flares by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1050

[Original: English]
[18 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 17 January 1971 was received on 18 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP One. Between 0710 and 0711 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Seven. At 0805 machine-gun fire by Israel forces, which ceased immediately.

"(c) OP Two. Between 0817 and 0818 three rounds of mortar fire, between 0927 and 0942, between 1014 and 1037 and between 1310 and 1315 machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Six. Between 0858 and 0902 two rounds of mortar fire and between 0951 and 1041 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1051

[Original: English]
[19 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 18 January 1971 was received on 19 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP One. At 0636 small-arms fire which ceased immediately, between 0901 and 0912 spo-

radic machine-gun fire and between 0935 and 1007 machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two. Between 0654 and 0656 machine-gun fire, between 0830 and 0833 three rounds of mortar fire and between 1320 and 1340 sporadic mortar fire, all by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six. Between 0915 and 0940 six rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Seven. Between 1630 and 1631 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1052

[Original: English]
[20 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 19 January 1971 was received on 20 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Two. Between 0800 and 0806 sporadic mortar and machine-gun fire and between 0845 and 0846 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Uniform. Between 1400 and 1404 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Seven. At 1955 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(d) OP One. Between 2230 and 2232 intense machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1053

[Original: English]
[21 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 20 January 1971 was received on 21 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Six. Between 0800 and 0804 four rounds of mortar fire and between 0945 and 0950 two rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Seven. Between 0915 and 0926 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1104 and 1107 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two. Between 0930 and 0950 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Four. Between 2210 and 2211 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1054

[Original: English]
[22 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 21 January 1971 was received on 22 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Six. Between 0857 and 0859 and between 0934 and 0949 two rounds of mortar fire each time by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Five. Between 1352 and 1357 two rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1055

[Original: English]
[23 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 22 January 1971 was received on 23 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Four. Between 0745 and 0747 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two. Between 0935 and 0941 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1106 and 1140 five rounds of mortar fire and machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six. Between 1005 and 1008 two rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Five. Between 1040 and 1057 three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Three. Between 1725 and 1729 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1056

[Original: English]
[25 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 23 January 1971 was received on 24 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Four. Between 0601 and 0603 small-arms fire by Syrian forces.

"(b) OP Six. Between 0947 and 0950 two rounds of mortar fire and at 1205 one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two. Between 1206 and 1212 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Five. At 1325 one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Three. At 1455 one round of mortar fire and between 2028 and 2030 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1057

[Original: English]
[25 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 24 January 1971 was received on 25 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Two. Between 1048 and 1051, three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Six. Between 2227 and 2229 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1058

[Original: English]
[26 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 25 January 1971 was received on 26 January

from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Five. Between 0018 and 0019 sub-machine-gun fire and between 1752 and 1808 artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two. Between 1230 and 1238 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1807 and 1830 mortar fire and flares by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Yoke. At 1230 machine-gun and mortar fire by Israel forces and at the same time machine-gun and sporadic mortar fire by unidentified party (United Nations military observers could not identify this firing party nor determine which side fired first). Fire ceased by unidentified party at 1245 and by Israel forces at 1254."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1059

[Original: English]
[27 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 26 January 1971 was received on 27 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Yoke. Between 1223 and 1227 cannon fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two. Between 1654 and 1723 sporadic mortar and artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Three. Between 1710 and 1722 artillery fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1060

[Original: English]
[28 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 27 January 1971 was received on 28 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP One. Between 0656 and 0659 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Six. At 0940 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two. Between 1027 and 1029 and between 1229 and 1233 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Yoke. At 1244 sporadic rocket and machine-gun fire by unidentified party (United Nations military observers could not identify firing party) and at 1245 sporadic tank, mortar and machine-gun fire by Israel forces. Fire ceased by unidentified party at 1248 and by Israel forces at 1314. Between 1330 and 1332 mortar fire by Israel forces.

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1061

[Original: English]
[29 January 1971]

The following report on firing on the Israel-Syria sector on 28 January 1971 was received on 29 January

from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity.

"(a) OP One. Between 0410 and 0428 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1744 and 1745 machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two. Between 1028 and 1038 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1206 and 1207 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Five. Between 1100 and 1113 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1913 and 1934 seven rounds of artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Six. At 1847 intense machine-gun and sporadic rocket fire by unidentified party (United Nations military observers could not identify firing party, see para. 2) and at 1848 sporadic mortar and machine-gun fire by Israel forces. Fire ceased by unidentified party at 1926 and by Israel forces at 1940.

"2. Firing on or close to United Nations installations.

"OP Six. Between 1847 and 1926, during intense machine-gun and sporadic rocket fire by unidentified party, machine-gun rounds and shrapnel impacted within OP compound damaging several OP fittings and two rocket projectiles passed between ten and fifteen metres over OP (see para. 3). The OP caravan was illuminated.

"3. Damage.

"OP Six. One bullet hole through living caravan; one bullet hole through observation trailer; one piece of shrapnel impacted in observation trailer."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1062

[Original: English]
[30 January 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 29 January 1971 was received on 30 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Six (map reference 2300-2847).

"Between 0710 and 0718 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1063

[Original: English]
[1 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 30 January 1971 was received on 31 January from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Six. Between 0725 and 0740 sporadic small-arms and machine-gun fire, between 1320 and 1328 sporadic mortar fire and at 1700 two rounds of mortar fire, all by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Five. Between 1205 and 1208 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1745 and 1755 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Yoke. At 1216 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Three. Between 1556 and 1612 sporadic machine-gun fire and at 1935 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Four. Between 1700 and 1735 mortar flares and sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1064

[Original: English]
[1 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 31 January 1971 was received on 1 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Yoke. Between 0903 and 0905 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Six. Between 1040 and 1045 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two. Between 1045 and 1058 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP One. Between 1430 and 1433 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1717 and 1719 flares and sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Uniform. Between 1800 and 1803 flares and sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1065

[Original: English]
[2 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 1 February 1971 was received on 2 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Two. Between 0820 and 0830 sporadic mortar fire, at 1051 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, between 1254 and 1315 sporadic machine-gun and mortar fire and between 1352 and 1355 mortar fire, all by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Five. Between 0910 and 0918 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1501 and 1506 mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six. At 1147 one round of mortar fire and between 1204 and 1206 mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP One. Between 1217 and 1242 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1066

[Original: English]
[2 February 1971]

With reference to the list of control centres and observation posts established by UNTSO in the Suez Canal Sector the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo, has reported that the Ismailia control centre, on the west side of the Canal, has been relocated to map reference 7381-8768 as from 0500 hours, 1 February 1971.

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1067

[Original: English]
[3 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 2 February 1971 was received on 3 February

from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Six. Between 0830 and 0835 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Seven. At 0900 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, and between 1345 and 1357 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Five. Between 1040 and 1045 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Yoke. Between 1059 and 1101 and at 1137 each time three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Two. At 1252 one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(f) OP Victor. At 1305 one artillery or heavy mortar round by Israel forces.

"(g) OP Three. At 1308 one round of mortar fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1068

[Original: English]
[4 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 3 February 1971 was received on 4 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Yoke. At 0751 sporadic mortar and intense machine-gun fire by Israel forces, and at 0755 sporadic mortar fire by Syrian forces. Fire ceased by Syrian forces at 0756 and by Israel forces at 0812.

"(b) OP Two. Between 1409 and 1414 and between 1605 and 1615 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP X-Ray. Between 1824 and 1836 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Five. Between 1829 and 1834 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP November. Between 2103 and 2104 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1069

[Original: English]
[5 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 4 February 1971 was received on 5 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports.

"(a) OP One. Between 0035 and 0042 flares and sporadic machine-gun fire and at 0515 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces. At 1230 one rocket (see para. 2) by unidentified party (United Nations military observers could not identify firing party). At 1544 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, and between 1815 and 1817 machine-gun fire, by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Three. At 1130 one round of mortar fire and between 1438 and 1453 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Five. At 1328 three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Uniform. Between 2125 and 2132 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"2. Firing on or close to United Nations installations."

"OP One. At 1230 one rocket fired by unidentified party, from east of OP passed approximately 10 to 15 metres above OP caravan. No Israel forces personnel were in the vicinity of OP."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1070

[Original: English]
[6 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 5 February 1971 was received on 6 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Yoke. Between 1117 and 1118 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Six. At 1126 one mortar round by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Three. Between 1735 and 1737 machine-gun fire and between 1902 and 1935 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1071

[Original: English]
[8 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 6 February 1971 was received on 7 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP One. Between 0529 and 0638 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP X-Ray. Between 0952 and 0955 machine-gun and mortar fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1072

[Original: English]
[8 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 7 February 1971 was received on 8 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"OP Three. Between 0023 and 0035 intense machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1073

[Original: English]
[9 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 8 February 1971 was received on 9 February

from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Five. At 1604 machine gun fire, which ceased immediately, and between 1758 and 1813 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two. Between 1730 and 1811 machine gun and mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Winter. Between 1758 and 1813 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP One. Between 2110 and 2115 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1074

[Original: English]
[10 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 9 February 1971 was received on 10 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Six. Between 1925 and 2005 sporadic mortar and machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Five. Between 1941 and 1948 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 2044 and 2055 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1075

[Original: English]
[11 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 10 February 1971 was received on 11 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP One (map reference 2249-2960).

"Between 1059 and 1100 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1076

[Original: English]
[12 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 11 February 1971 was received on 12 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP One. Between 0415 and 0427 and between 0442 and 0510 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Romeo. Between 0835 and 0844 sporadic rifle fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two. Between 1158 and 1205 sporadic machine-gun fire and one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Three. Between 1226 and 1227 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Five. Between 1228 and 1250 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

[Original: English]
[13 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 12 February 1971 was received on 13 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP One. Between 0740 and 0750 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP X-Ray. Between 1115 and 1117 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six. Between 1116 and 1121 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1078

[Original: English]
[15 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 13 February 1971 was received on 14 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Six. At 0934 one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Four. At 1445 one round of mortar fire and between 1633 and 1638 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP One. Between 1937 and 1939 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1079

[Original: English]
[15 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 14 February 1971 was received on 15 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Yoke. Between 1021 and 1030 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Three. Between 1053 and 1107 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six. Between 1215 and 1235 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1080

[Original: English]
[16 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 15 February 1971 was received on 16 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Five (map reference 2290-2787).

"At 0508 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, and between 0850 and 0856 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

[Original: English]
[17 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 16 February 1971 was received on 17 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Yoke. At 0959 sporadic rocket fire by Syrian forces and immediately after sporadic mortar and intense machine-gun fire by Israel forces. Fire ceased by Syrian forces at 1000 and by Israel forces at 1005.

"(b) OP One. At 1441 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1082

[Original: English]
[18 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 17 February 1971 was received on 18 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Victor. Between 0542 and 0544 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Three. Between 0642 and 0647 sporadic mortar and machine-gun fire, between 0745 and 0750, between 1018 and 1022 and between 1047 and 1052 sporadic machine-gun fire, at 1430 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, and between 2009 and 2026 sporadic machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six. At 1337 two anti-tank rockets and between 1410 and 1430 sporadic small-arms fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Five. Between 1615 and 1626 sporadic mortar fire and between 1850 and 1950 sporadic mortar and artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Two. At 1623 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, and between 1906 and 1959 mortar flares, sporadic artillery and mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(f) OP One. Between 1740 and 1744 intense machine-gun and small-arms fire and between 2335 and 2338 intense machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1083

[Original: English]
[19 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 18 February 1971 was received on 19 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Yoke. Between 0602 and 0605 sporadic mortar and machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Three. Between 1016 and 1029 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP X-Ray. Between 1103 and 1114 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Two. Between 1640 and 1651 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Six. Between 1746 and 1755 sporadic mortar and machine-gun fire and between 1906 and 1910 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(f) OP One. Between 1845 and 1847 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1084

[Original: English]
[20 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 19 February 1971 was received on 20 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Six (map reference 22995-28468).

"Between 1730 and 1735 sporadic heavy machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1085

[Original: English]
[22 February 1971]

With reference to the observation posts established by UNTSO in the Suez Canal Sector, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO has reported that OP Pink, which was temporarily closed on 6 February 1970 [see S/7930/Add.538], has been relocated from map reference 7661-8281 to MR 7661-8278 and has been reopened as from 1200 hours, 20 February 1971.

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1086

[Original: English]
[22 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 20 February 1971 was received on 21 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Six. Between 0950 and 0958 sporadic heavy machine-gun fire and between 1035 and 1038 two rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Seven. Between 2217 and 2227 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1087

[Original: English]
[22 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 21 February 1971 was received on 22 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports.

"(a) OP Five. Between 0130 and 0153 sporadic machine-gun and small-arms fire, mortar flares and four rounds of mortar fire and between 1120 and 1128 sporadic machine-gun fire, by Israel forces. At 1858 intense machine-gun and mortar fire (see para. 2) by Israel forces and, at the same time, machine-gun and rocket fire (see also para. 2) by unidentified party (United Nations military observers

could not identify the firing party). Firing ceased by unidentified party at 1917 and by Israel forces at 1929.

"(b) OP One. Between 0732 and 0739 eight rounds of mortar fire by unidentified party (UNMOs could not identify the firing party). Between 1050 and 1110 machine-gun fire and five rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces. Between 1152 and 1215 nine Israel forces soldiers were seen proceeding from map reference 2266-2938 to MR 2270-2938 (maximum penetration 1200 metres). Between 1152 and 1230 six artillery rounds, eleven mortar rounds and machine-gun and small-arms fire, and between 1248 and 1307 twelve mortar rounds and sporadic machine-gun and small-arms fire by Israel forces. Between 1255 and 1300 five Israel forces soldiers were seen proceeding in the same area mentioned above, the same depth of penetration. Between 1355 and 1359 ten Israel forces soldiers were observed between the same above-mentioned map references but moving from east to west.

"(c) OP Two. Between 1214 and 1216 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"2. Firing on or close to United Nations installations.

"OP Five. At 1858, during exchange of fire between Israel forces and unidentified party, machine-gun fire from both sides impacted five to ten metres north and south of OP and at OP site itself. Fire by unidentified party originated from four hundred metres east and six hundred metres south-east of OP caravan. The OP caravan was illuminated.

"3. Damage and casualties.

"One bullet passed east to west through shower unit, one bullet passed east to west through latrine wall and two bullets passed west to east, breaking two windows in driver's compartment of United Nations vehicle."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1088

[Original: English]
[23 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 22 February 1971 was received on 23 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Two. Between 0134 and 0135 machine-gun fire and between 0622 and 0627 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP One. Between 0507 and 0515 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1089

[Original: English]
[24 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 23 February 1971 was received on 24 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Four. Between 1637 and 1640 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two. At 1805 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1090

[Original: English]
[25 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 24 February 1971 was received on 25 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports.

"(a) OP Two. Between 0653 and 0656 two rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP One. Between 1017 and 1024 three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Three. Between 1555 and 1557 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Four. Between 1618 and 1625 machine-gun fire by Israel forces (see para. 2).

"(e) OP Uniform. Between 1737 and 1738 sporadic machine-gun fire and flares by Israel forces.

"2. Firing on or close to United Nations installations.

"OP Four. At 1619, during machine-gun fire by Israel forces, one round of heavy-machine-gun fire hit top of shelter. The OP was illuminated."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1091

[Original: English]
[26 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 25 February 1971 was received on 26 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Four. Between 0123 and 0125 sporadic machine-gun fire, between 1753 and 1755 one mortar flare and sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1902 and 1904 intense machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Three. Between 0612 and 0618 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six. Between 1125 and 1128 and between 1338 and 1343 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Yoke. Between 1217 and 1224 and between 1244 and 1316 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1092

[Original: English]
[27 February 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 26 February 1971 was received on 27 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Two. Between 0425 and 0436 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP One. Between 0419 and 0431 and between 0458 and 0502 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Three. Between 1322 and 1328, between 2009 and 2029, between 2200 and 2201 and between 2310 and 2315 sporadic machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1093

[Original: English]
[1 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 27 February 1971 was received on 28 February from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP One. Between 0005 and 0006 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 0903 and 0915 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP November. Between 0539 and 0550 sporadic machine-gun fire by unidentified party (United Nations military observers could not identify the firing party). Between 0556 and 0602 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Seven. At 1202 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Two. Between 1957 and 2018 mortar flares and sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1094

[Original: English]
[1 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 28 February 1971 was received on 1 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Two. Between 0604 and 0607 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP One. Between 0927 and 0928 and between 0952 and 0955 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Seven. Between 1047 and 1049 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Four. Between 1930 and 1935 one mortar flare and sporadic machine-gun fire and at 2315 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1095

[Original: English]
[2 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 1 March 1971 was received on 2 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports (all firing by Israel forces).

"(a) OP Four. Between 0005 and 0015 sporadic machine-gun fire.

"(b) OP Five. Between 0400 and 0406 sporadic machine-gun fire.

"(c) OP One. Between 0633 and 0652 sporadic mortar fire.

"(d) OP Seven. Between 0927 and 0939 sporadic machine-gun fire.

"(e) OP Six. Between 1103 and 1114 sporadic machine-gun and mortar fire.

"(f) OP Three. Between 1755 and 1805 and between 1822 and 1945 sporadic machine-gun fire."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1096

[Original: English]
[3 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 2 March 1971 was received on 3 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP One. Between 0439 and 0454 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Seven. Between 0807 and 0810 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Four. Between 0915 and 0931 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Two. At 1115 one round of mortar fire and between 1719 and 1736 eleven rounds of mortar fire, by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Three. Between 1650 and 1652 machine-gun fire by Israel forces. At 1729 two rounds of artillery fire by Syrian forces. At 1730 two rounds of artillery fire, at 1758 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, between 1939 and 1942 machine-gun fire and flares, between 2004 and 2020 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 2320 and 2359 machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces.

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1097

[Original: English]
[4 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 3 March 1971 was received 4 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Five. Between 0356 and 0402 sporadic machine-gun fire, between 0808 and 0810 machine-gun fire and at 1548 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, all by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Yoke. Between 1011 and 1019 sporadic machine-gun fire, between 1106 and 1107 two rounds of artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Three. Between 1806 and 1812 sporadic machine-gun fire, between 1930 and 1931 machine-gun fire, between 1949 and 1957, between 2026 and 2102 and between 2140 and 2142 sporadic machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1098

[Original: English]
[5 March 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 4 March 1971 was received on 5 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity.

"(a) OP Five. Between 0358 and 0405 sporadic machine-gun fire and at 1208 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two. Between 2015 and 2022 nine rounds of mortar fire and between 2055 and 2058 four rounds of mortar fire, by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"OP Sierra. Between 0754 and 0808 a total of four Israel forces Mirage aircraft observed flying north to south over OP. Aircraft recrossed the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines, from east to west, north of OP Winter. Overflight confirmed by OPs Romeo, November and Winter."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1099

[Original: English]
[6 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 5 March 1971 was received on 6 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Five. Between 0404 and 0408 and between 0434 and 0444 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces. At 2158 intense machine-gun fire, mortar fire and rockets by unidentified party (United Nations military observers could not identify firing party) and at 2208 mortar fire and later tank fire by Israel forces. Firing ceased by unidentified party at 2216 and by Israel forces at 2238.

"(b) OP Six. Between 0838 and 0839 sporadic machine-gun fire and at 0910 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Yoke. Between 0950 and 0954 and between 1048 and 1050 sporadic machine-gun fire, at 1134 one round of mortar fire and between 1937 and 1954 sporadic artillery fire, all by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Three. Between 1637 and 1640 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1100*

[Original: English]
[8 March 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 6 March 1971 was received on 7 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: nil.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"(a) OP Seven. At 1249 one Israel forces Phantom aircraft crossed the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines, from west to east south of OP, and recrossed from east to west north of OP.

"(b) OP Three. At 1249 one Israel forces Phantom aircraft crossed the limits of the Israel forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Israel side, from east to west south of OP. Report confirmed by OP Victor.

* Incorporating document S/7930/Add.1100/Corr.1.

"(c) OP Five. At 1250 one Israel forces Phantom aircraft observed flying south-east to north-west over the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines, two kilometres south-east of OP."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1101

[Original: English]
[8 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 7 March 1971 was received on 8 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Seven. Between 1115 and 1146, between 1211 and 1214, between 1439 and 1448 and between 1515 and 1520 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Six. Between 2011 and 2014 three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1102

[Original: English]
[9 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 8 March 1971 was received on 9 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Six. Between 0811 and 0821 five rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two. Between 1000 and 1015 three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Five. Between 1017 and 1021 sporadic light cannon (20 mm) fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Winter. Between 1743 and 1744 five rockets fired by unidentified party (United Nations military observers could not identify the firing party) from location approximately three kilometres north of OP. Between 1758 and 1807 seven rounds of artillery fire by Israel forces. This report confirmed by OP Five, OP X-Ray and Kuneitra Outstation."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1103

[Original: English]
[10 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 9 March 1971 was received on 10 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Romeo. Between 0700 and 0707 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two. Between 1202 and 1203 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Seven. Between 2003 and 2005 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1104

[Original: English]
[10 March 1971]

1. The situation in the Suez Canal sector has been quiet since 8 August 1970, although during this period there have been a number of overflights by one party or the other. In the present circumstances, the Secretary-General feels it advisable to resume the practice of reporting to the Security Council concerning the Suez Canal sector which prevailed before 8 August 1970. The Secretary-General hopes that his reports to the Security Council on the situation in the Suez Canal sector may be helpful during a period when the maintenance of quiet is crucial to efforts to find a peaceful settlement in the whole area.

2. The following report on the situation in the Suez Canal sector on 9 March 1971 has been received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports on ground activity: nil.

"OP reports on air activity.

"(a) OP Hotel (map reference 7391-8718). At 1344 one Israel forces Mirage and one unidentified aircraft (United Nations military observers could not determine type or nationality because of high altitude) crossed canal from east to west over the OP.

"(b) OP Orange (MR 7604-8415). Between 1345 and 1356 a total of four Israel forces aircraft (one Phantom and one Mirage each time) flying north to south crossed Great Bitter Lake north of OP and recrossed canal south of OP Kilo. Overflights confirmed by OPs Silver, Pink, Kilo, Lima and Red."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1105

[Original: English]
[11 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 10 March 1971 was received on 11 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Seven. Between 0707 and 0737 sporadic machine-gun fire, between 1712 and 1714 machine-gun fire and at 1924 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, all by Israel forces.

"(b) OP X-Ray. Between 0750 and 0801 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two. Between 0909 and 0910 machine-gun fire and at 1035 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Four. At 0919 one round of mortar fire by Israel forces and at 1920 one round of tank fire by Syrian forces.

"(e) OP Three. Between 1447 and 1500 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1106

[Original: English]
[12 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 11 March 1971 was received on 12 March

from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Two. Between 1044 and 1047 and between 1315 and 1317 heavy-machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP November. Between 1745 and 1754 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Three. Between 1826 and 1839 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1107

[Original: English]
[13 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 12 March 1971 was received on 13 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP Reports.

"(a) OP Three. At 0845 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, and between 1640 and 1648 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Seven. At 1953 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1108

[Original: English]
[15 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 13 March 1971 was received on 14 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Five (Map reference 2290-2787).

"Between 1702 and 1712 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1109

[Original: English]
[15 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 14 March 1971 was received on 15 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Seven (map reference 2203-2408).

"Between 1843 and 1846 intense machine-gun and mortar fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1110

[Original: English]
[16 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 15 March 1971 was received on 16 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Three (map reference 2308-2678): between 1202 and 1211 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP One (MR 2249-2960): between 2007 and 2008 two rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1111

[Original: English]
[16 March 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 15 March 1971 was received on 16 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: nil.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"(a) OP Yellow (map reference 7432-8861): between 1254 and 1258 one Israel forces Mirage aircraft flying north to south on west side of canal.

"(b) OP Orange (MR 7604-8415): at 1259 one Israel forces Mirage and one Phantom aircraft flying north to south crossed Great Bitter Lake. Report confirmed by OP Silver. At 1310 one Israel forces Phantom aircraft flying north-west to south-east crossed Little Bitter Lake."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1112

[Original: English]
[17 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 16 March 1971 was received on 17 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP One. Between 0750 and 0812 sporadic machine-gun fire and two rounds of mortar fire, between 0834 and 0835 machine-gun fire, between 1215 and 1239 four rounds of mortar fire and between 1744 and 1745 intense machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Five. Between 0933 and 0935 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Seven. Between 1046 and 1048 and between 1304 and 1305 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Two. Between 1147 and 1156 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1113

[Original: English]
[18 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 17 March 1971 was received on 18 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP One. Between 0512 and 0522 six rounds of mortar fire and at 1655 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Yoke. Between 0603 and 0608 mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Two. Between 0703 and 0704 four rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Five. Between 1210 and 1214 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Four. Between 1707 and 1708 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(f) OP Romeo. Between 2246 and 2314 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1114

[Original: English]
[19 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 18 March 1971 was received on 19 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Yoke. At 0626 one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Seven. Between 0750 and 0802 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1232 and 1237 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP One. Between 1210 and 1219 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1115

[Original: English]
[19 March 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 18 March 1971 was received on 19 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: nil.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"OP Kilo (map reference 7660-8225): At 0708 one UAR Sukhoi-7 aircraft crossed canal from west to east, north of OP. Recrossed thirty seconds later south of OP."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1116

[Original: English]
[20 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 19 March 1971 was received on 20 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP November. Between 0737 and 0738 small arms fire and at 0800 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Three. Between 1627 and 1630 sporadic machine-gun fire, between 1823 and 1829 three rounds of mortar fire and at 1857 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Four. Between 1914 and 1934 sixteen rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP One. At 2050 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, and at 2113 three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1117

[Original: English]
[20 March 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 19 March 1971 was received on 20 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Report from OP Green (map reference 7394-9401).

"At 0758 two unidentified aircraft (United Nations military observers could not determine type or nationality because of mist) were observed flying low south to north over the OP. The aircraft crossed the 10 kilometre marker north of the OP and then commenced climbing and turning east. Between 0759 and 0801 intense machine-gun and ack-ack fire by UAR forces from the vicinity of Port Fouad and Port Said."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1118

[Original: English]
[22 March 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 20 March 1971 was received on 21 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity.

"(a) OP Uniform. Between 1614 and 1615 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Sierra. Between 1955 and 2014 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Four. Between 1955 and 2020 and between 2109 and 2116 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"OP One. Between 0851 and 0852 one Israel forces Piper Cub aircraft crossed the limits of the Syrian forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Syrian side north of OP and recrossed the limits of the Israel forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Israel side, northwest of OP."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1119

[Original: English]
[22 March 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 21 March 1971 was received on 22 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity.

"(a) OP November. Between 0652 and 0654 rockets and machine-gun fire from unidentified party (United Nations military observers could not identify the firing party) towards Israel-manned military position forward of the limits of the Israel forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire line on the Israel side at map reference 23088-25579. Between 0701 and 0706 sporadic machine-gun and mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Four. Between 0653 and 0705 sporadic machine-gun and eight rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP One. Between 0658 and 0723 five rounds of mortar fire and between 0848 and 0905 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Two. At 1052 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, and between 1134 and 1142 three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Five. Between 2220 and 2240 seven rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"(a) OP Four. Between 0720 and 0732 one Israel forces Phantom and one unidentified aircraft (UNMOs could not identify type or nationality of aircraft because of altitude), crossed the area between the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines from west to east near OP and recrossed from south-east to north-west, north of OP.

"(b) OP Winter. At 0722 one Israel forces Mirage and one unidentified aircraft (UNMOs could not identify type or nationality because of altitude) flying north to south crossed above-mentioned area from east to west south of OP Victor. Flight path and time confirmed by OP Victor but aircraft could not be identified because of altitude.

"(c) OP November. Between 0725 and 0731 one Israel forces Mirage and one unidentified aircraft (UNMOs could not identify type or nationality because of altitude) flying north to south, east of OP, crossed above-mentioned area from east to west one kilometre south of OP and recrossed from west to east seven kilometres south of OP. Crossing from east to west confirmed by OP Sierra but aircraft was identified as one Phantom and one unidentified aircraft because of altitude.

"(d) OP Two. Between 0730 and 0735 one Israel forces Mirage and one unidentified aircraft (UNMOs could not identify type or nationality because of altitude) flying south to north, crossed above-mentioned area from east to west, south of OP and recrossed west to east near OP."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1120

[Original: English]
[22 March 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Suez Canal sector on 21 March 1971 was received on 22 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity: nil.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"OP Silver (map reference 7452-8583): Between 1305 and 1310 one Israel forces Phantom and one Mirage aircraft, flying north to south, crossed Great Bitter Lake and recrossed from west to east over OP Pink (MR 7661-8278). Overflights confirmed by OPs Hotel, Foxtrot, Orange, Pink, Kilo, Red and Blue."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1121

[Original: English]
[23 March 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 22 March 1971 was received on 23 March

from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity.

"(a) OP One. Between 0701 and 0706 four rounds of mortar fire and between 0900 and 0947 seven rounds of mortar fire and sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Six. At 1731 two mortar flares by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"OP November. At 0830 two Israel forces Mirage aircraft crossed the area between the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines from west to east south of OP."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1122

[Original: English]
[24 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 23 March 1971 was received on 24 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP One. At 0408 one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Two. Between 1952 and 1954 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Four. Between 2310 and 2327 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1123

[Original: English]
[25 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 24 March 1971 was received on 25 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP One. Between 0407 and 0413 three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Six. Between 0957 and 1002 two rounds of mortar fire and between 1434 and 1443 three rounds of artillery fire, by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Five. Between 1309 and 1311 two rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Two. Between 1340 and 1354 three rounds of artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Four. Between 1915 and 1920 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1124

[Original: English]
[26 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 25 March 1971 was received on 26 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Five. Between 0409 and 0411 sporadic machine-gun fire and between 1313 and 1321 three rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP One. Between 0412 and 0413 three rounds of mortar fire, between 1201 and 1208 sporadic machine-gun fire and at 1344 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, all by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six. Between 0810 and 0814 and between 0910 and 0915 GMT sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Two. Between 0900 and 0904 and between 1250 and 1305 sporadic mortar fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1125

[Original: English]
[27 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 26 March 1971 was received on 27 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP One. Between 0415 and 0418 three mortar rounds by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Five. Between 0902 and 0905 sporadic heavy machine-gun fire, between 1903 and 1918 and between 1942 and 1945 sporadic artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six. Between 1805 and 1930 machine-gun fire and later sporadic mortar fire, flares and five artillery rounds by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Four. At 1923 machine-gun fire by Israel forces, which ceased immediately."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1126

[Original: English]
[29 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 27 March 1971 was received on 28 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP Five (map reference 2290-2787): at 0841 machine-gun fire by Israel forces, which ceased immediately.

"(b) OP Two (MR 2306-2736): at 1708 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, and between 1808 and 1809 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1127

[Original: English]
[29 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 28 March 1971 was received on 29 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP X-Ray. Between 0636 and 0637 three rifle shots and between 1249 and 1252 rifle fire by Syrian forces.

"(d) OP Yoke. Between 0937 and 0944 four rounds of mortar and at 1252 one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP Six. At 1034 one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Uniform. Between 1140 and 1153 five bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(e) OP Two. Between 1206 and 1208, between 1639 and 1640 and between 1706 and 1720 each time sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(f) OP Winter. Between 1250 and 1300 machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(g) OP Five. Between 1252 and 1302 and between 1912 and 1915 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"(h) OP One. At 1750 machine-gun fire and three mortar flares by Israel forces and at 1753 machine-gun fire by unidentified party (United Nations military observers could not identify the firing party), which ceased immediately. Fire ceased by Israel forces at 1758.

"(i) OP Three. Between 2054 and 2056 machine-gun fire by Israel forces."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1128

[Original: English]
[30 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Suez Canal sector on 29 March 1971 was received on 30 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity.

"OP Green (map reference 7394-9401): between 1957 and 2006 machine-gun fire across canal 300 metres south of OP and one flare by UAR forces. Tracers were seen.

"2. OP reports on air activity: nil.

"3. Complaints by the parties.

"Senior United Arab Republic liaison officer was queried about firing incident reported by OP Green and lodged the following complaint: 'The enemy on east side tried to move some of his men near kilometre post 11 and it was discovered by UAR forces. The enemy on east side began to shoot at UAR forces and this is considered as an aggression against our forces.' Senior UAR liaison officer stated that this complaint came from senior UAR commander.

"Complaint has been passed to senior Israel representative and assistant Israel Defence Forces liaison officer."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1129

[Original: English]
[30 March 1971]

The following report on incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 29 March 1971 was received on 30 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"1. OP reports on ground activity.

"(a) OP Victor. Between 0742 and 0821 machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP Six. At 1140 one round of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(c) OP November. Between 1443 and 1448 mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(d) OP Two. Between 1946 and 1954 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces.

"2. OP reports on air activity.

"OP November. At 1208 one Israel forces Skyhawk aircraft crossed the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines from west to east over OP."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1130

[Original: English]
[30 March 1971]

With reference to the report on firing in the Suez Canal sector on 29 March 1971 [S/7930/Add.1128], the following additional information was received on 30 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"Following complaint was received today 30 March 1971 at 1530 from assistant Israel Defence Forces liaison officer: 'I have been instructed to protest against the following violations of the cease-fire by the UAR which took place on 29 March 1971 in

the Suez Canal sector in OP Green area: between 1955 and 2005 UAR forces opened machine-gun fire from the western side towards the eastern side of the canal.'"

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.1131

[Original: English]
[31 March 1971]

The following report on firing in the Israel-Syria sector on 30 March 1971 was received on 31 March from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General Ensio Siilasvuo:

"OP reports.

"(a) OP One (map reference 2249-2960). Between 0430 and 0432 two rounds of mortar fire by Israel forces.

"(b) OP November (MR 2316-2564). Between 0703 and 0709 three rounds of tank fire, one mortar and sporadic machine-gun fire, all by Israel forces. At 0734 sporadic machine-gun fire by Israel forces and at 0735 machine-gun fire, which ceased immediately, by unidentified party (United Nations military observers could not identify the firing party). Fire ceased by Israel forces at 0735."

DOCUMENTS S/10070 AND ADD.1 AND 2

Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Special Representative to the Middle East

DOCUMENT S/10070

[Original: English]
[4 January 1971]

INTRODUCTION

1. On 22 November 1967, the Security Council adopted resolution 242 (1967), which reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East.

"Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

"Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

"1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

"(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

"(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

"2. Affirms further the necessity

"(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

"(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

"(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

"4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible."

2. On 23 November 1967 I reported to the Council [S/8259] that I had invited Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring of Sweden to accept the designation as the Special Representative mentioned in paragraph 3 of the Council's above-mentioned resolution. Ambassador Jarring accepted this designation and arrived at United Nations Headquarters on 26 November, where he entered into consultation with the representatives of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic (Syria, the other State concerned, did not at that stage or later accept the Security Council resolution). After those consultations with the parties, Ambassador Jarring established the headquarters of the United Nations Middle East Mission in Cyprus.

3. In reports dated 22 December 1967, 17 January 1968, 29 March 1968, 29 July 1968 and 3 December 1968 [S/8309 and Add.1 to 4, respectively], I reported to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of Ambassador Jarring. On 7 August 1970, I was able to inform the Security Council [S/9902] that Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic had agreed to take part in discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices for the purpose of reaching agreement on a just and lasting peace between them. Unfortunately and for well known reasons those discussions were interrupted immediately after they began. The members of the Security Council will have been able to observe that in the last few days it has become possible to arrange for the resumption of the discussions. I hope that these resumed discussions will be fruitful. However, it seems appropriate at this time to provide the Security Council with a somewhat fuller account of the activities of the Special Representative than heretofore.

I. ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE DURING THE PERIOD 9 DECEMBER 1967 TO 26 NOVEMBER 1968

4. When the Special Representative first met with the parties in December 1967, he found that the Israeli Government was of the firm view that a settlement of the Middle East question could be reached only through direct negotiations between the parties culminating in a peace treaty and that there could be no question of withdrawal of their forces prior to such a settlement. On 27 December, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, Mr. Abba Eban, communicated to the Special Representative a proposal that Israel and the United Arab Republic representatives should, as a first step, discuss an agenda for peace. The Israeli proposals for such an agenda were:

"1. *Political and juridical problems*: The replacement of cease-fire arrangements by peace treaties ending the state of belligerency, ending all hostile acts and threats and embodying a permanent undertaking of mutual non-aggression.

"2. *Territorial and security problems*: The determination of agreed territorial boundaries and security arrangements. Agreement on this measure would determine the deployment of armed forces after the cease-fire.

"3. *Navigation problems*: Practical methods should be discussed for ensuring free navigation for all states including Israel in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba when the cease-fire is replaced by peace. In the light of tragic experience, it is evident that international declarations cannot by themselves solve this problem. Concrete measures and guarantees are required.

"4. *Economic problems*: Proposals for terminating boycott practices and instituting normal economic relations."

5. The United Arab Republic and Jordan, for their part, insisted that there could be no question of discussions between the parties until the Israeli forces had been withdrawn to the positions occupied by them prior to 5 June 1967. Reacting specifically to the Israeli proposals for discussing an agenda for peace, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, stated that the withdrawal of Israel's forces to the positions held

prior to June 1967 was a basic and preliminary step to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

6. An Israeli proposal for discussions on an agenda for peace with Jordan was submitted to the Special Representative on 7 January 1968. It followed the same general lines as the proposal for the United Arab Republic but contained more detailed suggestions for economic co-operation, as well as the following new topics:

"*Humanitarian problems*: In the proposed negotiation, high priority should be given to a solution of the refugee problem with international and regional co-operation.

"*Religious and historical sites*: Access to sites of special religious significance should be discussed. The Government of Israel clarified its views on this subject in several verbal and written communications to the United Nations."

It was also stated:

"In the meantime, it is urgent that breaches of the cease-fire and activities by El-Fatah and other such organizations should be suppressed and every effort made on both sides to avoid exchanges of fire."

7. The proposals, when communicated to the Jordanian authorities by the Special Representative, were objected to in the same way as the proposals to the United Arab Republic had been.

8. Faced with these conflicting positions, the Special Representative sought to obtain from the parties an assurance that they would implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967), in the hope that such a declaration would be regarded as a basis for subsequent discussions between the parties. The Special Representative received from Mr. Eban a number of formulations of Israel's position on the Security Council resolution, of which the last, dated 19 February 1968, read as follows:

"1. The Government of Israel, out of respect for the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 and responding affirmatively thereto, assures you of its full co-operation in your efforts with the States concerned to promote agreement and to achieve an accepted settlement for the establishment of a just and lasting peace, in accordance with your mandate under the resolution.

"2. Israel's position has throughout been that the best way to achieve the objective of the Security Council resolution is through direct negotiations. However, as a further indication of Israel's co-operation, we are willing that this be done in a meeting convened by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

"3. On 12 February 1968, I informed you of Israel's acceptance of the Security Council's call in its resolution of 22 November 1967 for the promotion of agreement on the establishment of peace. The United Arab Republic is also aware of Israel's willingness as explained on 1 February to negotiate on all matters included in the Security Council's resolution. We accept the sponsor's view that the principles recommended for inclusion in the peace settlement are integrally linked and interdependent.

"4. We have noted the United Arab Republic's willingness to 'implement' the Security Council's resolution and fulfil its obligations thereunder. It is a matter of concern that the United Arab Republic

statements, unlike those of Israel, do not specifically use the precise terms of the resolution in such crucial matters as 'agreement' and the 'establishment of a just and lasting peace', and that the United Arab Republic has not yet agreed to a process of negotiation without which, of course, a declaration of willingness to fulfil the resolution is of no substantive effect. The resolution is a framework for *agreement*. It cannot be fulfilled without a direct exchange of views and proposals leading to bilateral contractual commitments. The United Arab Republic position is, therefore, still deficient in important respects. We are, however, conscious of the importance of the fact that the United Arab Republic and Israel have both responded affirmatively to the call for co-operating with you in the mission laid upon you by the Security Council. At the same time, it would be unrealistic to ignore that there have been sharp differences of interpretation of what the resolution entails. To subscribe to similar declarations does not of itself solve practical issues at stake.

"5. It is accordingly urgent to move forward to a more substantive stage and to embark on a meaningful negotiation for achieving the just and lasting peace called for by the Security Council."

In discussions with the Special Representative, Mr. Eban stated that Israel would not object to an indirect approach to negotiations provided that it was designed to lead to a later stage of direct negotiations and agreement.

9. The United Arab Republic Foreign Minister gave repeated assurances that the United Arab Republic was ready to implement the Security Council resolution as a whole and to fulfil its obligations under it, but stated that it would not accept direct negotiations. The United Arab Republic accepted indirect negotiations; however, the first step must be an Israeli declaration "in clear language" that it would implement the Security Council resolution.

10. The Jordanian authorities expressed a similar point of view to the Special Representative.

11. The Special Representative then proceeded to United Nations Headquarters for consultations with the Secretary-General. Returning to the area at the beginning of March, he informally presented to the parties, to ascertain their reactions, a draft letter from himself to the Secretary-General, which would be worded as follows:

"The Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic [Jordan] have both indicated to me that they accept Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 for achieving a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle East question and intend to devise arrangements, under my auspices, for the implementation of the provisions of the resolution.

"The two Governments have expressed their willingness to co-operate with me in my capacity as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the discharge of my tasks of promoting agreement and achieving such a settlement.

"In view of the urgency of the situation and with a view to expediting efforts to reach settlement, I have invited the two Governments to meet with me, for conferences within the framework of the Security Council resolution, in Nicosia. I have pleasure in

informing you that the two Governments have responded favourably to this invitation."

12. When Ambassador Jarring presented this text to the United Arab Republic Foreign Minister on 7 March 1968, the latter stated that recent statements by Israeli leaders showed that they were following an expansionist line. It was no longer sufficient to have Israel give an assurance of intent to implement the resolution; the Arabs had to be satisfied that the Israelis were going to "implement it for action". If the Israelis withdrew completely from the occupied territories, peace could be arrived at by the implementation of the other provisions of the Security Council resolution under the Council's guidance.

13. In a meeting on 10 March, the Special Representative informed the Israeli Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic attitude. He then informally showed his draft letter to the Foreign Minister, who expressed the personal view that it would be fully acceptable to the Israeli authorities if it was also accepted by the other side and led to contacts between them. Subsequently the Special Representative was informed of Israel's official acceptance, without conditions, of the text.

14. In a meeting on 14 March, the Jordanian authorities stated that they were ready to accept the proposed meeting in principle provided that the text was modified to read that the parties had "declared their readiness to implement the resolution".

15. During the following weeks, Ambassador Jarring paid repeated visits to the countries concerned in an endeavour to obtain from the Israelis a more precise formulation of their acceptance of the resolution and from the two Arab States acceptance of the idea of meetings between the parties under his auspices.

16. At a meeting in Amman on 16 April 1968, the Jordanian authorities stated that they were prepared to accept the text of the Special Representative's draft letter provided that the third paragraph was amended to read as follows:

"In view of the urgency of the situation and with a view to expediting efforts to reach settlements, I will meet with representatives of Israel and Jordan for conferences within the framework of the Security Council resolution, in New York. I have pleasure in informing you that the two Governments have responded favourably hereto."

The acceptance was based on the assumption that the United Arab Republic would accept an identical text.

17. The Israeli authorities found difficulties in the Jordanian amended text. They had accepted meetings at Nicosia, on the understanding that the Special Representative's invitation would lead to joint meetings. The new text appeared to give the impression that only meetings between the parties and the Special Representative were intended. The change of venue, while not objectionable in principle, tended to create the impression that only discussions with the permanent missions in the scope of normal United Nations activities would take place; a change from Nicosia to a European city would be acceptable.

18. The United Arab Republic Foreign Minister at first continued to insist on a prior declaration by Israel of its intention to implement the Security Council resolution. Finally, however, on 9 May, on the eve of the Special Representative's departure from the area [*see following paragraph*], he replied to the

Special Representative's proposed invitation in the form amended by Jordan in the following written statement:

"With reference to your indication to me today of your desire to meet with a representative of the United Arab Republic in New York, I wish to reaffirm the readiness of our Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York to meet with you to continue the contacts which you have been conducting with the parties concerned in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 for the implementation of that resolution.

"I have referred in the course of our previous meetings to the importance of the setting of a time-table for the implementation of the resolution of the Security Council, and offered you several alternatives towards that end, one of which was that you present a time-table prepared by yourself for the implementation of the resolution. These suggestions emanate from the United Arab Republic's indication to you of its acceptance and readiness to implement the above-mentioned resolution.

"I wish to express anew our willingness to cooperate with you in your capacity as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the discharge of your tasks as defined in the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967."

The United Arab Republic Foreign Minister repeated that the United Arab Republic was ready to implement the resolution as a whole and as a "package deal". It insisted, however, that Israel should do likewise, including complete withdrawal.

19. Ambassador Jarring was faced with a position where there was now agreement, though clearly with considerable differences of interpretation, on the first two paragraphs of his proposed invitation, but where there was disagreement on the third paragraph containing the actual invitation. Further journeying backwards and forwards between the various countries was unlikely to be productive. In consultations with me, he considered issuing a formal invitation along the lines of his proposal, but with the venue at New York, but it was felt that a forced acceptance obtained by such an invitation would not be helpful. Instead it was decided that the talks in New York should begin without a formal invitation by the Special Representative or a letter from the Special Representative to the Secretary-General but on the basis of a short statement to the press in which it would be announced that the Special Representative was arriving in New York for consultations in continuation of his mission.

20. During his stay in the area, the Special Representative visited Beirut on three occasions. The Lebanese Government expressed its full support for a solution according to Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Lebanon, however, had no territory under occupation and therefore did not have the same detailed involvement in the settlement as the United Arab Republic and Jordan. The Special Representative did not visit Syria, whose Government, as noted above, had not accepted the Security Council resolution.

21. Ambassador Jarring left the area on 10 May 1968 and arrived at Headquarters on 15 May 1968.

22. In the five weeks following his arrival in New York, Ambassador Jarring pursued actively his contacts with the permanent representatives of the

parties at both a formal and informal level. Unfortunately these contacts did not serve in any way to break the dead-lock between the parties concerning the interpretation of the Security Council resolution and the manner in which it should be implemented. In that regard, the representative of Israel had stated in the Security Council on 1 May 1968.

"In declarations and statements made publicly and to Mr. Jarring, my Government has indicated its acceptance of the Security Council resolution [242 (1967)] for the promotion of agreement on the establishment of a just and durable peace. I am also authorized to reaffirm that we are willing to seek agreement with each Arab State on all the matters included in that resolution." [1418th meeting, para. 111.]

This statement was not regarded as acceptable by the Arab representatives.

23. Returning to New York on 22 July after a short stay in Europe during which he had met in various capitals the Foreign Ministers of the United Arab Republic, Israel and Jordan, Ambassador Jarring decided, with my approval, to return to the Middle East and resume his direct contacts with the parties. This second round of discussions, which began on 16 August 1968, took the form of an exchange of questions and of comments between the parties through the Special Representative. Some progress in the clarification of the respective positions of the parties had been made when the opening of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly caused the venue of the discussions to be transferred to New York, where they could be carried out with greater convenience. With the arrival of the Foreign Ministers of the parties for the session towards the end of September, Ambassador Jarring began a series of frequent meetings with them individually, which were at first mainly of an informal nature but which, following the delivery by the Foreign Ministers of their speeches in the general debate, assumed a more formal character and concluded with written communications from the Foreign Ministers of Israel and of the United Arab Republic restating the positions of their respective Governments. Those written statements were in amplification of the positions of the parties as publicly stated in the General Assembly and made clear the essential differences between them. On the one hand, Israel regarded the Security Council resolution as a statement of principles in the light of which the parties should negotiate peace and, on the other hand, the United Arab Republic considered that the resolution provided a plan for settlement of the Middle East dispute to be implemented by the parties according to modalities to be established by the Special Representative. It was also abundantly clear that there was a crucial difference of opinion over the meaning to be attached to the withdrawal provisions of the Security Council resolution, which according to the Arab States applied to all territories occupied since 5 June 1967 and according to Israel applied only to the extent required when agreement had been reached between the parties on secure and recognized borders between them.

24. Discouraging though the prospects seemed, Ambassador Jarring decided to carry out another brief round of discussions in the Middle East. As he explained in a letter to me dated 26 November 1968, he had in mind inviting the parties to a new round of discussions in the middle of January 1969 in order

to give them time for reflection and for careful consideration of their respective positions.⁴

II. ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FROM 27 NOVEMBER 1968 TO JUNE 1970

25. Ambassador Jarring departed from Headquarters on 27 November 1968 and met representatives of Israel in Nicosia on 2 and 3 December, of the United Arab Republic in Cairo on 4 December and of Jordan in Amman on 7 December. Unfortunately, these meetings did not reveal a change of position in the attitude of the parties that would have made it expedient for Ambassador Jarring to convene a meeting of the parties in the middle of January 1969, as envisaged in his letter of 26 November 1968.

26. After resuming for a time his duties as Ambassador of Sweden to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Jarring returned to Headquarters on 29 January 1969. He there undertook a series of personal contacts with the representatives of the parties and the representatives of other Member States.

27. At that stage, Ambassador Jarring concluded, with my concurrence, that the best contribution which he could make to breaking the existing deadlock was to make a further tour of the Middle East in which he would formally submit to the parties a series of questions designed to elicit their attitude towards Security Council resolution 242 (1967). He accordingly left New York on 21 February 1969 for the Middle East. At meetings with the Foreign Ministers of the United Arab Republic on 5 March, of Jordan on 8 March, of Israel on 9 March and of Lebanon on 14 March, he submitted the questions which he had previously prepared. The replies of the parties were received by Ambassador Jarring as follows:

Israel: handed to Ambassador Jarring in Jerusalem by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 2 April 1969.

Jordan: received by Ambassador Jarring in Nicosia on 24 March 1969.

Lebanon: received by Ambassador Jarring in Moscow on 21 April 1969.

United Arab Republic: handed to Ambassador Jarring in Cairo by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic on 27 March 1969.

The questions and replies are reproduced in annex I.

28. It had been the hope of Ambassador Jarring, in submitting his questions, that the replies might show certain encouraging features which might make it possible to invite the parties for a series of meetings between them and him at some mutually convenient place. Unfortunately, the replies were in general a repetition of attitudes already expressed to Ambassador Jarring on numerous occasions from the beginning of his mission. They showed continued serious divergencies between the Arab States and Israel both as regards the interpretation to be given to the Security Council resolution and as to the procedures for putting its provisions into effect.

29. Ambassador Jarring was regretfully forced to conclude, with my agreement, that the conditions for convening a useful series of meetings at that time did not exist and that there was no further move

which he could usefully make at that stage. He therefore returned on 5 April 1969 to Moscow, where he resumed his duties as Ambassador of Sweden to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

30. Ambassador Jarring continued to keep in close touch with me and with representatives of the parties and of other interested States.

31. Ambassador Jarring returned to Headquarters from 12 September to 8 October 1969 and from 10 to 26 March 1970, but found no new elements which would permit him to organize active discussions with the parties. On each occasion he returned to his post in Moscow.

32. On 3 April 1969, the representatives of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America began a series of meetings on the Middle East question, which have continued at various intervals up to the present time. After each such meeting, the Chairman reported to me on the substance of the discussions and I kept Ambassador Jarring informed.

III. THE ATTEMPT TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS UNDER THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S AUSPICES (JUNE 1970 TO 4 JANUARY 1971)

33. In June 1970, the Government of the United States of America proposed to the Governments of Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic that they should each advise Ambassador Jarring as follows:

(a) that having accepted and indicated their willingness to carry out resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts, they would designate representatives to discussions to be held under his auspices, according to such procedure and at such places and times as he might recommend, taking into account as appropriate each side's preference as to method of procedure and previous experience between the parties;

(b) that the purpose of the aforementioned discussions was to reach agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between them based on (1) mutual acknowledgement by the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and (2) Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, both in accordance with resolution 242 (1967);

(c) that, to facilitate his task of promoting agreement as set forth in resolution 242 (1967), the parties would strictly observe, effective 1 July at least until 1 October, the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council.

34. Having been informed by the United States Government that the States concerned had accepted its peace initiative, I invited Ambassador Jarring to return immediately to Headquarters, where he arrived on 2 August. I informed the Security Council in a note dated 7 August 1970 [S/9902] that Ambassador Jarring had received confirmation from the representatives of those States of their acceptance and that he had addressed to me a letter as described above. I was informed by the United States representative that his Government had received the acceptance of the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Israel to a standstill cease-fire for a period of ninety days from 2200 GMT on the same day. Ambassador Jarring and I had previously been informed by

⁴ For the texts of the letter from Ambassador Jarring and the reply by the Secretary-General, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-third Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1968*, document S/8309/Add.4.

the Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers, that his Government would take responsibility for organizing the standstill cease-fire.

35. Ambassador Jarring at once entered into contact with the parties and, after considering their views on the time and place of the discussions, on 21 August 1970 addressed to them invitations to take part in discussions opening in New York on 25 August 1970. On the appointed day he met representatives of each of the parties. However, Ambassador Tekoah, who had been designated by Israel as its representative for the initial phase of the talks, then stated that he had been instructed by his Government to return to Israel for consultations. On his return on 8 September, he communicated to Ambassador Jarring the following decision of his Government.

"Israel's acceptance of the United States peace initiative according to its decision of 4 August 1970, and the appointment of a representative to the talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring are still in effect.

"The Government of Egypt has gravely violated the cease-fire-standstill agreement, and this violation is continuing without let-up.

"The strictest observance of the cease-fire-standstill agreement is one of the central elements of the American peace initiative and of the talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. Therefore, so long as the cease-fire-standstill agreement is not observed in its entirety, and the original situation restored, Israel will not be able to participate in these talks.

"Ambassador Tekoah, who is returning to his post as head of the permanent delegation of Israel at the United Nations, has been authorized to bring this decision of the Government of Israel to the attention of Ambassador Jarring."

The Special Representative thus found himself precluded for the time being from holding formal meetings with the Israeli representatives, and his talks with the representatives of the Arab States, though they continued, could not be productive because of the lack of contact with the Israeli representative. After a brief visit to Moscow from 6 to 14 October to attend to his affairs as Ambassador of Sweden there, the Special Representative returned to New York and had a wide range of contacts with representatives of the parties and of other Member States during the commemorative session of the General Assembly and the debate on the Middle East, which followed that session.

36. Immediately following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2628 (XXV), Ambassador Jarring entered into contact with the representatives of the parties in order to invite them to re-enter into talks under his auspices for the purpose of reaching agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace. The representatives of Jordan and the United Arab Republic informed him that their Governments continued to be willing to do so; the representative of Israel stated that the matter was under consideration in the Israeli Cabinet.

37. On 19 November and pending a decision by the Israeli Cabinet, Ambassador Jarring returned to Moscow. On the eve of his departure, he addressed a letter to the Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he formally invited the Israeli Government to resume its participation in the discussions, as well as letters to the representatives of Jordan and the

United Arab Republic, in which he took note of the position of their Governments. These letters, together with replies from the representative of the United Arab Republic and the Israeli Foreign Minister, are reproduced in annex II.

38. On 30 December, Ambassador Jarring received in Moscow a message from the Foreign Minister of Israel in which the latter informed him of the readiness of the Government of Israel to resume its participation in the talks. The message is also reproduced in annex II.

ANNEX I

Questions submitted in March 1969 by the Special Representative to the Governments concerned and their replies

Note: Ambassador Jarring submitted his questions to the States concerned in the form of separate lists specifically addressed to each Government. Those lists were, however, prepared from a general list applicable to all the parties and that list is, to save repetition, reproduced here. As some questions related to provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) which applied to only one or some of the parties, the numbers of questions in the specific lists were not always the same as those in the general list. Where the number of the answer differs from that of the question in the general list, the latter number is added in square brackets.

Specific lists of questions based on the following general list were, submitted by Ambassador Jarring to the Governments of the United Arab Republic on 5 March, of Jordan on 8 March, of Israel on 9 March and of Lebanon on 14 March 1969.

A. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

Security Council resolution 242 (1967) sets out provisions and principles in accordance with which a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle East question should be achieved. Some of these provisions would impose obligations on both sides, some on one side, and some on the other. It has generally been accepted that they should be regarded as a whole. The following questions designed to elicit the attitude of the parties towards the provisions of the Security Council resolution are based on this assumption and are to be understood in the context that each provision is regarded as part of a "package deal".

1. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) accept Security Council resolution 242 (1967) for implementation for achieving a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle East question in accordance with the provisions and principles contained in the resolution?

2. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) agree to pledge termination of all claims or states of belligerency with Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic (Israel)?

3. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) agree to pledge respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic (Israel)?

4. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) accept the right of Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic (Israel) to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force?

5. If so, what is the conception of secure and recognized boundaries held by Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic)?

6. Does Israel agree to withdraw its armed forces from territories occupied by it in the recent conflict?

7. Does the United Arab Republic agree to guarantee freedom of navigation for Israel through international waterways in the area, in particular:

- (a) through the Straits of Tiran, and
- (b) through the Suez Canal?

8. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) agree that, if a plan for the just settlement of the refugee problem is worked out and presented to the parties for their consideration, the acceptance in principle of such a plan by the parties and the declaration of their intention to implement it in good faith constitute sufficient implementation of this provision of the Security Council resolution to justify the implementation of the other provisions?

9. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) agree that the territorial inviolability and political independence of the States in the area should be guaranteed:

- (a) by the establishment of demilitarized zones;
- (b) through additional measures?

10. Does Israel agree that such demilitarized zones should include areas on its side of its boundaries?

11. Does Jordan agree that a demilitarized zone should be established in Jordanian territory from which Israel armed forces have been withdrawn?

12. Does the United Arab Republic agree that a demilitarized zone should be established:

- (a) at Sharm el-Sheikh;
- (b) in other parts of the Sinai peninsula?

13. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) agree that demilitarization of such zones should be supervised and maintained by the United Nations?

14. Would Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) accept as a final act of agreement on all provisions a mutually signed multilateral document which would incorporate the agreed conditions for a just and lasting peace?

B. REPLY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

(Handed to Ambassador Jarring in Jerusalem by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 2 April 1969)

[2 April 1969]

Israel's position on all the subjects raised in your eleven questions has been stated in detail in my address to the General Assembly of 8 October 1968, and in the memoranda presented to you on 15 October 1968 and 4 November 1968.

I now enclose specific replies in an affirmative spirit to the questions as formulated. It is my understanding that on the basis of the answers received from the three Governments you propose to pursue further mutual clarifications in an effort to promote agreement on all the matters at issue in accordance with your mandate. We are ready to join in this process at any appropriate place.

Israel's statements of attitude, including her replies to these questions, has taken into account recent developments in Arab policy including the speeches recently delivered by President Nasser and other Arab leaders. We have noted the specific and emphatic reiteration of their refusal to make peace with Israel, to recognize Israel, to negotiate with Israel, to cease terrorist attacks on Israel or to admit the possibility of sovereign co-existence in any field. It would appear at this time that the effective negation by the United Arab Republic of the principles of the Charter and of the Security Council's resolution is obvious and vehement. We hope that this policy, to which effect is given every day, will change; but these authoritative statements have caused deep concern and have intensified the tension which we would have wished to see relieved.

It is also our view that highly publicized encounters by four Member States have weakened the attention which should have been concentrated on the efforts of the parties themselves to move towards agreement. They are causing a duplication and dispersal of effort. They have also encouraged a wrong impression in some quarters that a solution can be sought outside the region and without its Governments. Israel recognizes your mission as the authoritative international framework within which peace between the States in the Middle East should be promoted.

I recall the idea which we discussed some weeks ago that the Foreign Ministers of the three Governments should meet with you soon at a suitable place to pursue the promotion of agreement. As you will remember, I reacted positively to this idea. I wish to reaffirm that Israel will continue to co-operate with you in the fulfilment of your mission.

(Signed) Abba EBAN
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Israel

Answer to question 1

Israel accepts the Security Council resolution 242 (1967) for the promotion of agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace, to be reached by negotiation and agreements between the governments concerned. Implementation of agreements should begin when agreement has been concluded on all their provisions.

Answer to question 2

It is the Arab States, not Israel, which claimed and originated states of belligerency. They declared themselves for two decades to be in a state of unilateral war with Israel. It is therefore primarily incumbent upon them to terminate the state of war with Israel.

On the establishment of peace with its Arab neighbours, Israel agrees to the termination, on a reciprocal basis, of all claims or states of belligerency with each State with which peace is established. A declaration specifying each State by name would be made by Israel in each case.

The corresponding statement by any Arab State must specifically renounce belligerency "with Israel" and not "with any State in the area". Legal obligations must be specific in regard to those by whom they are bound.

Renunciation of belligerency includes the cessation of all maritime interference, the cessation of boycott measures involving third parties; the annulment of reservations made by Arab States on the applicability to Israel of their obligations under international conventions to which they have adhered; non-adherence to political and military alliances and pacts directed against Israel or including States unwilling to renounce claims or states of belligerency with Israel and maintain peaceful relations with it; the non-stationing of armed forces of such other States on the territory of the contracting States and the prohibition and prevention in the territory of Arab States of all preparations, actions or expeditions by irregular or paramilitary groups or by individuals directed against the lives, security or property of Israel in any part of the world.

The last stipulation is without prejudice to the fact that the responsibility of Arab governments for preventing such activities is legally binding under the cease-fire established by the parties in June 1967.

Answer to question 3

Israel agrees to respect and acknowledge the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of neighbouring Arab States; this principle would be embodied in peace treaties establishing agreed boundaries.

Answer to question 4

Israel accepts the right of Jordan, Lebanon, the United Arab Republic and other neighbouring States to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force. Explicit and unequivocal reciprocity is Israel's only condition for this acceptance. "Acts of force" include all preparations, actions or expeditions by irregular or paramilitary groups or by individuals directed against the life, security or property of Israel in any part of the world.

Answer to question 5

Secure and recognized boundaries have never yet existed between Israel and the Arab States; accordingly, they should now be established as part of the peace-making process. The cease-fire should be replaced by peace treaties establishing permanent, secure and recognized boundaries as agreed upon through negotiation between the Governments concerned.

Answer to question 6

When permanent, secure and recognized boundaries are agreed upon and established between Israel and each of the neighbouring Arab States, the disposition of forces will be carried out in full accordance with the boundaries determined in the peace treaties.

Answer to question 7 [General question 8]

The refugee problem was caused by the wars launched against Israel by Arab States, and has been perpetuated through the refusal of Arab States to establish peaceful relations with Israel. In view of the human problems involved in this issue Israel has expressed its willingness to give priority to the attainment of an agreement for the solution of this problem through regional and international co-operation. We believe that agreement could be sought even in advance of peace negotiations. We suggest that a conference of Middle Eastern States should be convened, together with the Governments contributing to refugee relief and the specialized agencies of the United Nations, in order to chart a five-year plan for the solution of the refugee problem in the framework of a lasting peace and the integration of refugees into productive life. This conference can be called in advance of peace negotiations.

Joint refugee integration and rehabilitation commissions should be established by the Governments concerned in order to work out agreed projects for refugee integration on a regional basis with international assistance.

In view of the special humanitarian nature of this issue we do not make agreement on plans for a solution to the refugee problem contingent on agreement on any other aspect of the middle Eastern problem. For the same reason it should not be invoked by Arab States to obstruct agreement on other problems.

Answer to question 8 [General question 9]

The effective guarantee for the territorial inviolability and political independence of States lies in the strict observance by the Governments of their treaty obligations. In the context of peace providing for full respect for the sovereignty of States and the establishment of agreed boundaries, other security measures may be discussed by the contracting Governments.

Answer to questions 9 and 10 [General questions 10 and 13]

Without prejudice to what is stated in answer to question 8, it is pointed out that experience has shown that the measures mentioned in questions 9 and 10 have not prevented the preparation and carrying out of aggression against Israel.

Answer to question 11 [General question 14]

Peace must be juridically expressed, contractually defined and reciprocally binding in accordance with established norms of international law and practice. Accordingly, Israel's position is that the peace should be embodied in bilateral peace treaties between Israel and each Arab State incorporating all the agreed conditions for a just and lasting peace. The treaties, once signed and ratified, should be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

C. REPLY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN

*(Received by Ambassador Jarring in Nicosia on
24 March 1969)*

[23 March 1969]

Following are the answers of my Government to the questions which you presented to us in Amman, on Saturday, 8 March 1969. The answers as numbered, hereunder, correspond to your questions.

These answers explain my Government's position, which position has repeatedly been stated to you throughout our past meetings.

May I take this opportunity to express to you my continued sincere wishes for your success in the important mission with which you are entrusted.

*(Signed) Abdul Monem RIFA'I
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Jordan*

Answer to question 1

Jordan, as it has declared before, accepts Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and is ready to implement it in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles contained in the resolution.

Answer to question 2

Jordan agrees to pledge termination of all claims or states of belligerency. Such a pledge becomes effective upon withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories which Israel has occupied as a result of its aggression of 5 June 1967.

A pledge by Israel to terminate the state of belligerency would be meaningful only when Israel withdraws its forces from all Arab territories it occupied since 5 June 1967.

Answer to question 3

On 5 June 1967 Israel launched its aggression against three Arab States, violating their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Agreement to pledge respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area requires the termination by Israel of its occupation and the withdrawal of its forces from all the Arab territories it occupied as a result of its aggression of 5 June.

Answer to question 4

Jordan accepts the right of every State in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force, provided that Israel withdraws its forces from all Arab territories it occupied since 5 June 1967, and implements the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967.

Answer to question 5

When the question of Palestine was brought before the United Nations in 1947, the General Assembly adopted its resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 for the partition of Palestine and defined Israel's boundaries.

Answer to question 6 [General question 8]

It has always been our position that the just settlement of the refugee problem is embodied in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 which has been repeatedly reaffirmed by each and every General Assembly session ever since its adoption.

If a plan on the basis of that paragraph is presented for consideration to the parties concerned, its acceptance by the parties and the declaration of their intention to implement it in good faith, with adequate guarantees for its full implementation, would justify the implementation of the other provisions of the resolution.

Answer to questions 7 and 8 [General questions 9 and 11]

We do not believe that the establishment of demilitarized zones is a necessity. However, Jordan shall not oppose the establishment of such zones if they are astride the boundaries.

Answer to question 9 [General question 13]

If demilitarized zones are established Jordan accepts that such zones be supervised and maintained by the United Nations.

Answer to question 10 [General question 14]

In view of our past experience with Israel and her denunciation of four agreements signed by her with Arab States we consider that the instrument to be signed by Jordan engaging

her to carry out her obligations, would be addressed to the Security Council. Israel would likewise sign and address to the Security Council an instrument engaging her to carry out her obligations emanating from the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. The endorsement by the Security Council of these documents would constitute the final multi-lateral act of agreement.

D. REPLY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON

(Received by Ambassador Jarring in Moscow on 21 April 1969)

In reply to the questionnaire which you addressed to me on 14 March 1969, I have the honour, on behalf of the Lebanese Government, to inform you of the following:

Lebanon is essentially involved in the general context of the Israeli-Arab conflict—and, therefore, in the consequences of the war launched by Israel on 5 June 1967—because of its brotherly solidarity with the Arab States and of the threats which are constantly directed at it by Israel.

Lebanon is justified in considering, however, that the armistice agreement which it concluded with Israel on 23 March 1949 remains valid, as indicated in its message of 10 June 1967 to the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission and as confirmed by U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his report to the General Assembly of 19 September 1967. In that report, Mr. Thant, referring to the actual text of the agreement, said that it could be revised or suspended only by mutual consent. In view of Lebanon's circumstances, now and in the past, the armistice lines have, of course, never been changed. These lines, it should be noted, correspond to the frontiers of Lebanon which have always been internationally recognized in bilateral and multi-lateral diplomatic instruments as well as by the League of Nations and the United Nations. Lebanon participated actively in the drafting of the United Nations Charter and was admitted in its present form and structure to membership in the Organization. Its frontiers have not undergone any *de facto* or *de jure* alteration as a result of the cease-fire decisions taken by the Security Council after 5 June 1967.

It may be appropriate to state the above-mentioned facts, more particularly with a view to explaining the nature and character of the only reply which we are in a position to give to the questionnaire you sent to us on 14 March 1969.

In this reply, which reflects the position taken by Lebanon at inter-Arab conferences, we proclaim Lebanon's support of the position of the Arab States whose territory has been occupied by Israel and which have accepted the Security Council's decision of 22 November 1967.

The present note is consistent with the spirit of the talks which you have already held with various Lebanese officials.

(Signed) YOUSSEF SALEM
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Lebanon

E. REPLY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(Handed to Ambassador Jarring in Cairo by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic on 27 March 1969)

[27 March 1969]

The memorandum handed to you on 5 March 1969 during your recent visit to Cairo clearly expresses the realities of the present situation. In its items 1 to 7, the memorandum gives a clear restatement of the position of the United Arab Republic which is based on the acceptance of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, and its readiness to carry out the obligations emanating therefrom.

The memorandum also clearly expounds Israel's persistence in rejecting the Security Council resolution and its refusal to carry out its obligations emanating from it as well as Israel's plans for annexation of Arab lands through war; a policy which is not only prohibited by the Charter of the United

Nations but which also violates the Security Council resolution which specifically emphasizes the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. It has become obvious that Israel, in its endeavour to realize its expansionist aims, is no longer satisfied with the actual rejection of the Security Council resolution but actively works against it.

The same memorandum also states Israel's expansion plan as revealed by the quoted statements of Israeli leaders. This plan aims at:

1. Annexation of Jerusalem;
2. Keeping the Syrian Heights under its occupation;
3. Occupation of the west bank in Jordan and its complete domination, practically terminating Jordan's sovereignty in that part;
4. Economic and administrative integration of the Gaza strip into Israel and the systematic eviction of its inhabitants;
5. Occupation of Sharm El-Sheikh and the Gulf of Aqaba area as well as the continued military presence in eastern part of Sinai;
6. The establishment of Israeli settlements in occupied territories.

This Israeli position constitutes a flagrant violation and clear rejection of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 and of the peaceful settlement for which it provides.

In the light of these undeniable facts, I find it incumbent upon me to state categorically, at the outset of the replies to the specific questions you addressed to the United Arab Republic on 5 March 1969, that all the answers of the United Arab Republic, which reaffirm its acceptance of the Security Council resolution and its readiness to carry out the obligations emanating from it require, likewise, that Israel accept the resolution and carry out all its obligations emanating from it and in particular withdrawal from all Arab territories it occupied as a result of its aggression of 5 June 1967.

Answer to question 1

The United Arab Republic, as it has declared before, accepts Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and is ready to implement it in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles contained therein.

Answer to question 2

The United Arab Republic agrees to pledge termination of all claims or state of belligerency. Such a pledge becomes effective upon withdrawal of Israel's forces from all Arab territories occupied as a result of Israel's aggression of 5 June 1967.

A declaration by Israel terminating the state of belligerency would be meaningful only when Israel withdraws her forces from all Arab territories it has occupied since 5 June 1967.

Answer to question 3

On 5 June 1967, Israel launched its aggression against three Arab States violating their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Acceptance by the United Arab Republic to pledge respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area requires the termination by Israel of its occupation and the withdrawal of its forces from all the Arab territories it has occupied as a result of its aggression of 5 June, and the full implementation of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967.

Answer to question 4

The United Arab Republic accepts the right of every State in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force, provided that Israel withdraws its forces from all Arab territories occupied as a result of its aggression of 5 June 1967, and implements the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967.

When the question of Palestine was brought before the United Nations in 1947, the General Assembly adopted its resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, for the partition of Palestine and defined Israel's boundaries.

Answer to question 6 [General question 7]

We have declared our readiness to implement all the provisions of the Security Council resolution covering, *inter alia*, the freedom of navigation in international waterways in the area; provided that Israel, likewise, implements all provisions of the Security Council resolution.

Answer to question 7 [General question 8]

It has always been our position that the just settlement of the refugee problem is embodied in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of December 1948, which has been unfailingly reaffirmed by each and every General Assembly session ever since its adoption.

If a plan on the basis of that paragraph is presented for consideration to the parties concerned, its acceptance by the parties and the declaration of their intention to implement it in good faith, with adequate guarantees for its full implementation would justify the implementation of the other provisions of the Security Council resolution.

Answer to questions 8 and 9 [General questions 9 and 12]

We do not believe that the establishment of demilitarized zones is a necessity. However, the United Arab Republic will not oppose the establishment of such zones if they are astride the boundaries.

Answer to question 10 [General question 13]

If demilitarized zones are established the United Arab Republic accepts that such zones be supervised and maintained by the United Nations.

Answer to question 11 [General question 14]

In view of our past experience with Israel and her denunciation of four agreements signed by her with Arab States, we consider that the instrument to be signed by the United Arab Republic engaging her to carry out her obligations, should be addressed to the Security Council. Israel should likewise sign and address to the Security Council an instrument engaging it to carry out its obligations emanating from the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. The endorsement by the Security Council of these documents would constitute the final multilateral document.

ANNEX II

Correspondence relating to the resumption of the discussions

A. LETTER DATED 18 NOVEMBER 1970 TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL

I have the honour to refer to my letter of 7 August 1970 addressed to the Secretary-General, referred to in document S/9902, in which I informed him of the agreement of your Government and of the Governments of Jordan and the United Arab Republic to the holding of discussions under my auspices for the purpose of reaching agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between the parties.

As you will recall, I issued on 21 August 1970 an invitation to the parties to take part in discussions opening in New York on 25 August 1970. Ambassador Tekoah, who was Israeli representative for the initial stage of the discussions, met me twice on the opening date, but was recalled to Israel for consultations. On his return on 8 September he communicated to me the decision of your Government, for reasons which were explained to me and have been publicly announced by your Government, to suspend its participation in the talks.

I am definitely of the view that the time has come for me once again to invite your Government to participate in discussions for the purpose of reaching agreement on the establish-

ment of a just and lasting peace in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

When I met you last on 5 November 1970, to consider the question of Israel's return to the discussions, I noted your concern about the influence of the debate of the General Assembly on the Middle East question and of its resolution 2628 (XXV). I wish to assure you in this connexion that I am proceeding on the basis that there is no change in my mandate, which I continue to regard as having been defined in Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

You will understand, I know, my desire to make a positive report to the Secretary-General about the progress of our discussions. I am accordingly inviting your Government to reconsider its position on the question and to resume its participation in the discussions. In this connexion, I wish to state that I have already been informed by the Governments of Jordan and the United Arab Republic of their continued willingness to participate.

I take this opportunity to inform you that, pending a reply from your Government to this appeal, I am returning to my post in Moscow. I hope that your Government will find it possible in the near future to respond favourably to this invitation, in which case I shall be available to return to New York at twenty-four hours' notice.

(Signed) Gunnar JARRING
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
to the Middle East

B. LETTER DATED 18 NOVEMBER 1970 TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF JORDAN*

I have the honour to inform you that I have today addressed a letter to the Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs in which I once again appealed to his Government to resume participation in discussions for the purpose of reaching agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

In that connexion, I keep in mind the willingness of the Governments of Jordan and the United Arab Republic, as expressed to me by yourself and your colleague from the United Arab Republic, to continue to participate in such discussions.

I take this opportunity to inform you that, pending the receipt of a reply from Israel, it is my intention to return to my post in Moscow. I wish to emphasize, however, that I am ready to return here at twenty-four hours' notice on receipt of the Israeli reply.

(Signed) Gunnar JARRING
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
to the Middle East

C. LETTER DATED 18 NOVEMBER 1970 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

With reference to your letter of today in which you inform me of your imminent return to your post in Moscow, I note with appreciation your reference to the readiness of the United Arab Republic to co-operate fully with you.

I wish to emphasize that, conscious of its obligations under the Charter and in abiding by the Security Council resolution 242 (1967), the United Arab Republic has for the last three years consistently co-operated with you, in the sincere hope that you will successfully achieve the targets entrusted to you by the Secretary-General, in accordance with the aforementioned resolution.

Since my Government designated me last August to enter into discussions with you, I have during several meetings restated my Government's belief in a lasting peace based on the faithful implementation of the aforementioned Security Council resolution in all its parts and consequently the restoration of all Arab lands occupied by Israel since 5 June 1967, as well as ending the injustices inflicted so far on the Arab people of Palestine.

* An identical letter *mutatis mutandis* was sent to the representative of the United Arab Republic.

I am sure that your report to the Secretary-General on your mission which will be transmitted by him to the Security Council before 5 January 1971, will be of great benefit to the members of the Security Council and will assist them in taking whatever steps they may deem necessary in carrying out the responsibility entrusted to them by the Charter.

(Signed) Mohammed H. EL-ZAYYAT
Permanent Representative of the United Arab
Republic to the United Nations

**D. LETTER DATED 1 DECEMBER 1970 FROM THE MINISTER FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL**

I have received your letter of 18 November 1970 in which you invite the Government of Israel to participate in discussions under your auspices for the purpose of reaching agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967). I note your assurance in reply to my comments on General Assembly resolution 2628 (XXV) that you are proceeding on the basis that there is no change in your mandate, which you continue to regard as having been defined in Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

On 6 August 1970 Ambassador Tekoah conveyed to you Israel's position on the United States peace initiative. This communication remains valid as the expression of Israel's policy. Concerning the discussions which we have agreed to hold under your auspices, I also draw attention to the Israel Government's decision of 6 September 1970 which was conveyed to you by Ambassador Tekoah.

On 22 November 1970 the Government of Israel adopted and published the following decision:

"The Government will act in accordance with the policy expressed in the Prime Minister's statement to the Knesset on 16 November 1970, for the creation of conditions which will justify implementation of the Government's resolution of 4 August 1970—which was approved by the Knesset—concerning the holding of talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring including consolidation and extension of the cease-fire agreement with the aim of progressing from a cease-fire to a complete end to the war and to lasting peace."

We are now holding discussions on the creation of conditions which would justify a decision by the Government of Israel to hold talks with the United Arab Republic under your auspices, in accordance with our decision of 4 August 1970 conveyed to you by Ambassador Tekoah on 6 August. I shall keep you in touch with developments on this matter as they arise.

We have publicly announced that we are ready for discussions with Jordan whose Government has informed you on its continued willingness to participate in such talks.

We are also willing to hold discussions on the establishment of permanent peace with Lebanon which has announced its adherence to Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

(Signed) Abba EBAN
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel

**E. MESSAGE FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
ISRAEL, MR. ABBA EBAN**

Further to my letter of 1 December 1970 I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Israel decided on 28 December 1970 as follows:

"The present political and military conditions enable and justify the termination of the suspension of Israel participation in the talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. The Government decided to authorize the Minister for Foreign Affairs to inform those concerned of the readiness of the Government of Israel to resume its participation in the Jarring talks in accordance with the basic principles of the Government policy and on the basis of its decisions of 31 July and 4 August 1970 as approved by the Knesset concerning Israel's affirmative reply to the peace initiative."

In view of this decision I should like to meet you in Jerusalem at your earliest convenience and my intention is to survey the situation, to acquaint you with the basic views of my Government and to discuss steps necessary to ensure the fulfilment of your mission for the promotion of agreement on the establishment of peace.

DOCUMENT S/10070/ADD.1

[Original: English]
[1 February 1971]

1. On 4 January 1971, in submitting to the Security Council a report on the activities of Ambassador Jarring, my Special Representative to the Middle East, I was able to note that it had been possible to arrange for the resumption of the discussions under his auspices with Israel, Jordan and the United Arab Republic for the purpose of reaching agreement on a just and lasting peace between them.

2. Ambassador Jarring resumed his discussions with the parties at Headquarters on 5 January 1971 and has pursued them actively. He has held a series of meetings with the representatives of Israel (including meetings with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during a brief visit to Israel made from 8 to 10 January 1971 at the request of that Government), of Jordan, and of the United Arab Republic. In addition, he held meetings with the representative of Lebanon, which is also a State directly concerned with the Middle East settlement.

3. At an early stage in these meetings Israel presented to Ambassador Jarring, for transmission to the Governments concerned, papers containing its views on the "Essentials of Peace". Subsequently, the United Arab Republic and Jordan, having received the respective Israeli views, presented papers containing their own views concerning the implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Papers containing the further reactions of the Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic have now been received.

4. While recognizing that the resumed discussions are still at an early stage and that much further clarification is required, I find grounds for cautious optimism in the fact that the parties have resumed the talks through Ambassador Jarring in a serious manner and that there has been some progress in the definition of their positions. Furthermore, the parties, who have already indicated their willingness to carry out resolution 242 (1967), are now describing in greater detail their view of their obligations under that resolution. I take this opportunity to appeal to the parties to pursue their role in the discussions in a constructive manner, to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring with a view to the carrying out of resolution 242 (1967) and, in this very difficult and crucial stage of the discussions, to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint, and to maintain the quiet which has prevailed in the area since August 1970.

DOCUMENT S/10070/ADD.2

[Original: English]
[5 March 1971]

1. On 1 February 1971 I submitted to the Security Council a report [S/10070/Add.1] on the activities of Ambassador Jarring, my Special Representative to the Middle East, since the resumption on 5 January 1971

of the discussions under his auspices with the parties to the Middle East conflict for the purpose of reaching agreement on a just and lasting peace between them. In that report, I found grounds for cautious optimism in the fact that there had been some progress in the definition of the position of the parties and I appealed to them to pursue their role in the discussions in a constructive manner, to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring with a view to the carrying out of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and, in that very difficult and crucial stage of the discussions, to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet which had prevailed in the area since August 1970.

2. In response to that appeal, the Foreign Ministry of Israel, in a communiqué released in Jerusalem on 2 February, announced that Israel would preserve the cease-fire on a mutual basis; in a speech to the National Assembly on 4 February, the President of the United Arab Republic declared the decision of the United Arab Republic to refrain from opening fire for a period of thirty days ending on 7 March.

3. In pursuing his mandate to promote agreement between the parties, Ambassador Jarring, while sharing my cautious optimism that the parties were seriously defining their positions and wished to move forward to a permanent peace, noted with growing concern that each side was insisting that the other should make certain commitments before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the provisions of a final peace settlement.

4. On the Israeli side there was insistence that the United Arab Republic should give specific, direct and reciprocal commitments towards Israel that it would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make towards Israel the various undertakings referred to in paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). When agreement was reached on those points, it would be possible to discuss others, including the refugee problem; such items as secure and recognized boundaries, withdrawal and additional arrangements for ensuring security should be discussed in due course.

5. The United Arab Republic continued to regard the Security Council resolution as containing provisions to be implemented by the parties and to express its readiness to carry out its obligations under the resolution in full, provided that Israel did likewise. However it held that Israel persisted in its refusal to implement the Security Council resolution, since it would not commit itself to withdraw from all Arab territories occupied in June 1967. Furthermore in the view of the United Arab Republic Israel had not committed itself to the implementation of the United Nations resolutions relevant to a just settlement to the refugee problem.

6. The papers received by Ambassador Jarring from Israel and Jordan relating to peace between these two countries showed a similar divergence of views. Israel stressed the importance of Jordan's giving an undertaking to enter into a peace agreement with it which would specify the direct and reciprocal obligations undertaken by each of them. Jordan emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and expressed the view that the essential first step towards peace lay in an Israeli commitment to evacuate all Arab territories.

7. Ambassador Jarring felt that at this stage of the talks he should make clear his views on what he believed

to be the necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which the parties had agreed to carry out in all its parts. He reached the conclusion, which I shared, that the only possibility to break the imminent deadlock arising from the differing views of Israel and the United Arab Republic as to the priority to be given to commitments and undertakings—which seemed to him to be the real cause for the existing immobility in the talks—was for him to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commitments which seemed to be inevitable prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement between them. It should thereafter be possible to proceed at once to formulate the provisions and terms of a peace agreement not only for those topics covered by the commitments, but with equal priority for other topics, and in particular the refugee question.

8. In identical aide-mémoires handed to the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Israel on 8 February 1971 Ambassador Jarring requested those Governments to make to him certain prior commitments. Ambassador Jarring's initiative was on the basis that the commitments should be made simultaneously and reciprocally and subject to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement, including in particular a just settlement of the refugee problem. Israel would give a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine. The United Arab Republic would give a commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, various undertakings and acknowledgements arising directly or indirectly from paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

9. On 15 February, Ambassador Jarring received from the representative of the United Arab Republic an aide-mémoire in which it was indicated that the United Arab Republic would accept the specific commitments requested of it, as well as other commitments arising directly or indirectly from Security Council resolution 242 (1967). If Israel would give, likewise, commitments covering its own obligations under the Security Council resolution, including commitments for the withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip and for the achievement of a just settlement for the refugee problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions, the United Arab Republic would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. Finally the United Arab Republic expressed the view that a just and lasting peace could not be realized without the full and scrupulous implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the territories occupied since 5 June 1967.

10. On 17 February, Ambassador Jarring informed the Israeli representative of the contents of the United Arab Republic reply to his aide-mémoire.

11. On 26 February, Ambassador Jarring received a paper from the representative of Israel, in which, without specific reference to the commitment which he had sought from that Government, Israel stated that it viewed favourably "the expression by the United Arab Republic of its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel" and reiterated that it was

prepared for meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries. Israel gave details of the undertakings which in its opinion should be given by the two countries in such a peace agreement, which should be expressed in a binding treaty in accordance with normal international law and precedent. Israel considered that both parties having presented their basic positions should now pursue the negotiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions.

12. On the crucial question of withdrawal on which Ambassador Jarring had sought a commitment from Israel, the Israel position was that it would give an undertaking covering withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from "the Israeli-United Arab Republic cease-fire line" to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement; Israel would not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines.

13. On 28 February, Ambassador Jarring informed the United Arab Republic representative of the contents of the Israeli paper.

14. Ambassador Jarring has been very active over the past month and some further progress has been made

towards a peaceful solution of the Middle East question. The problems to be settled have been more clearly identified and on some there is general agreement. I wish moreover to note with satisfaction the positive reply given by the United Arab Republic to Ambassador Jarring's initiative. However, the Government of Israel has so far not responded to the request of Ambassador Jarring that it should give a commitment on withdrawal to the international boundary of the United Arab Republic.

15. While I still consider that the situation has considerable elements of promise, it is a matter for increasing concern that Ambassador Jarring's attempt to break the deadlock has not so far been successful. I appeal, therefore, to the Government of Israel to give further consideration to this question and to respond favourably to Ambassador Jarring's initiative.

16. To give time for further consideration and in the hope that the way forward may be reopened, I once more appeal to the parties to withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the quiet which has prevailed in the area since August 1970.

DOCUMENT S/10071

Letter dated 29 December 1970 from the representative of the Khmer Republic
to the President of the Security Council

*[Original: French]
[4 January 1971]*

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 21 December 1970, I have the honour to bring the following to your attention for the information of the members of the Security Council.

On 6 December 1970, from 9 a.m. to noon, Khmer forces engaged in clearing National Highway 4 clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese, two and a half kilometres south-west of Srê Khlong, in Kompong Speu.

On the same day, at about 9 a.m., there was another clash for about twenty minutes on National Highway 4, seventy-nine kilometres from Phnom-Penh, in Kompong Speu. Cambodian losses were one killed and four wounded, while a number of dead and wounded were carried off by the enemy.

On the same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired on a Khmer position two and a half kilometres east of Prey Totung, in Kompong Cham.

On the same day, Khmer forces engaged in clearing National Highway 6, clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at Phnom Batheay, sixteen kilometres south-west of Skonn, in Kompong Cham. The Cambodian forces lost two killed and eight wounded. The enemy losses are unknown.

On the same day, Khmer forces on a reconnaissance mission clashed for thirty minutes with sixty Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese south-west of the town of Kompong Chhnang. Four enemy troops were killed on the battlefield and five rifles and ammunition were captured.

During the night of 6 to 7 December 1970, at about 9 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched an attack against a position on the Prêk Thnot dam in Kompong Speu. Following a vigorous counter-attack by the Khmer forces, twenty of whom were wounded,

the enemy withdrew carrying off several dead and wounded.

On 7 December 1970, from noon to 6 p.m., Cambodian troops advancing towards Srê Khlong, had a sharp clash with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese, on National Highway 4, seventy-eight kilometres from Phnom-Penh, in Kompong Speu. The fighting resulted in twenty-eight wounded on the Cambodian side and several killed and wounded, who were carried off, and a weapon captured on the enemy side.

On the same day, at about 6.20 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North-Vietnamese fired on a position on the Prêk Thnot dam, in Kompong Speu, wounding one man.

On the same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese attacked a Khmer position at Rokar Khpos, twenty-two kilometres south-east of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal, killing two men.

On the same day, Khmer forces on patrol clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese for twenty minutes, thirty-three kilometres north of the town of Takéo, as a result of which several of the enemy were killed or wounded and carried off.

On the same day, Khmer forces on patrol clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese ten kilometres south of the town of Prey Veng, as a result of which four enemy troops were killed on the battlefield and several of their killed and wounded were carried off.

On the same day, a defensive position nine kilometres north of the town of Svay Rieng was fired on for a short period.

On the same day, at about 9.30 a.m., there was a clash between Khmer forces and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese forces on National Highway 6, five kilometres west of Puok, in Siemreap, during which Khmer casualties were one killed and ten wounded.

On the same day, at about 11.05 a.m., there was another clash near Phum Khnat, thirteen kilometres north-west of the town of Siemreap.

On the same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired on two Khmer defensive positions situated nine and eleven kilometres east of Skoun, in Kompong Cham.

During the night of 7 to 8 December 1970, at about 3 a.m., several hundred Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese simultaneously launched two attacks in force against two Khmer positions at O-Sanday, nine kilometres north-west of Svay Rieng, and at Kompong Chak, eight kilometres north of Svay Rieng. The Khmer soldiers returned vigorous counter-fire, compelling the enemy to withdraw after a number of unsuccessful assaults, leaving behind 145 dead, 56 sub-machine-guns, 5 light machine-guns, 2 60 mm mortars, 3 Chinese automatic pistols and 20 (PA/AC) rockets. One Viet-Cong-North-Vietnamese soldier was captured by the Cambodian forces, whose casualties were fourteen dead and twenty-five wounded.

On 8 December 1970, at about 8.15 a.m., two clashes took place at Phum Prey Totung, seven kilometres south-east of Kompong Trach, and at Phum Prey Nop, four kilometres north of Tani, in Kampot; the enemy carried with them two wounded, while the casualties of the Khmer forces were one dead and one wounded.

On the same day, at about 9.30 a.m., Khmer elements in a reconnaissance operation clashed with Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese soldiers south of Baray Tuk Thlar, eleven kilometres north-east of Siemreap. After about twenty minutes, the enemy withdrew, leaving behind one dead and one sub-machine-gun. The Cambodian casualties were four wounded.

On the same day, at about 7.30 a.m., a brief clash took place between Khmer and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese elements, four kilometres south-west of Srê Khlong, on National Highway 4, in Kompong Speu; the Cambodian casualties were four wounded.

On the same day, at about 12.15 p.m., another clash took place at Wat Taphem, about eighteen kilometres south-east of Kompong Speu; one man was killed on the spot, while the enemy carried with them a number of dead and some wounded.

On the same day, at about 1 p.m., a sharp clash took place between Khmer soldiers and about 300 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese, east of Srê Khlong, in Kompong Speu. After about three hours, the enemy withdrew carrying off many dead and wounded. The Cambodian casualties were five dead and eighteen wounded.

On the same day, Kompong Thom was fired upon with an 82 mm. mortar on two occasions.

On the same day, a clash took place between Khmer and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese elements, about ten kilometres west of Skoun, in Kompong Cham, as a result of which the enemy carried off a number of dead and wounded and two Cambodian soldiers were killed.

On the same day, at about 12.30 p.m., another clash took place with about 100 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese, twenty-seven kilometres north of Takéo; the enemy left three dead on the battlefield and carried off several dead and wounded while the casualties of the Khmer forces were one killed.

During the night of 8 to 9 December 1970, a defence position at Chamcar Kor, in Kompong Speu, was fired upon.

During the same night, at about 1 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired sixteen 82 mm mortar rounds on Siemreap, slightly wounding two Khmer soldiers.

On 9 December 1970, at about 4.30 p.m., Puok in Siemreap was recaptured from the enemy. Vigorous mopping-up operations were carried out on the outskirts of the locality.

On the same day, at about 6 p.m., following heavy combat operations, Srê Khlong in Kompong Speu was recaptured by Cambodian troops who then carried out thorough mopping-up operations in the entire area.

During the night of 9 to 10 December 1970, at about 8 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired with an 82 mm mortar on another position at Peam Kreng, nine kilometres west of Kompong Thom, killing one and wounding two persons.

During the same night, at about 8 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired on a defence position at Kompong Chhnang.

On 10 December 1970, the enemy fired on a naval vessel of the Republic of Viet-Nam, off Tuk Khleang, twenty-four kilometres below Phnom-Penh, in Kandal,

On the same day, at about 12.30 p.m., a clash took place between Khmer and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese elements at Prek Taten, twenty-one kilometres south-west of Phnom-Penh, on the east side of the Bassac, in Kandal.

On the same day, a clash took place six kilometres south-west of Tram Khnar, in Takéo. The enemy withdrew in confusion, carrying off a number of wounded.

On the same day, at about 8.30 a.m., a clash took place between Khmer and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese elements near Stung Chhay, twenty-six kilometres north of Veal Rinh, in Kompong Seila; the enemy carried off several dead and wounded, while the casualties of the Cambodian forces were one dead and five wounded.

On 10 and 11 December 1970, at about 8 p.m. and 6.20 p.m. respectively, the Viet-Cong-North-Viet-Nameese opened mortar fire on Kompong Thom.

During the night of 10 to 11 December 1970, at about 10.05 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched an attack against a position at Rocar Kong, in Kandal, thirty-two kilometres north of Phnom-Penh, on the west bank of the Mekong. At about 11 p.m., the air force intervened in support of the Khmer soldiers, who returned vigorous counter-fire, smashing all the assaults of the enemy.

During the same night, at about 8.30 p.m., the enemy fired on a position occupied by Khmer soldiers who were defending the Kaong bridge, thirty-eight kilometres north of Veal Rinh.

On 11 December 1970, at about 5.20 a.m., Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired with an 82 mm mortar on a position at Kompong Chak, eight kilometres north of the town of Svay Rieng.

On the same day, at about 6 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese briefly opened mortar fire on a position at Srê Khlong in Kompong Speu.

During the night of 11 to 12 December 1970, at about 10.30 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired four 82 mm shells on a position at Trapeang Kraloeng, seventeen kilometres south-west of the town of Kompong Speu.

During the same night, at about 10 p.m., a Khmer navy convoy clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese off Prek Po, thirty-eight kilometres north-east of Phnom-Penh. Cambodian losses were moderate and those of the enemy are unknown.

During the same night, at about midnight, the town of Kompong Cham was fired on.

During the same night, at about 1 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese violently attacked positions at Prey Totung and Khvet Thom, in Kompong Cham. After several hours of fierce fighting, the enemy withdrew, at about 7 a.m., while continuing to fire sporadically on the positions until midday. Cambodian losses amounted to four dead and about fifty wounded, those of the enemy to ten dead left behind, several dead and wounded carried off, seven sub-machine-guns and seven light machine-guns.

On 12 December 1970, at about 8 a.m., Khmer forces on a reconnaissance operation had a skirmish with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese some forty-seven kilometres north-east of the town of Kompong Thom; it lasted for about thirty minutes, after which the enemy withdrew leaving behind three dead, two Chinese sub-machine-guns and one B40 rocket launcher and taking several dead and wounded with them. One Cambodian was killed and six wounded.

During the night of 12 to 13 December 1970, at about 1 a.m., Rocar Kong, in Kandal, was again attacked. The heavy return fire of the Khmer soldiers repulsed several enemy assault attempts. At about 3.15 a.m., aircraft intervened to support the Cambodian ground forces.

During the same night, at about 1.15 a.m., large numbers of Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched an attack against a position at the Prey Totung school, in Kompong Cham. Khmer aircraft intervened to support the Cambodian ground forces.

On 13 December 1970, at about 10 a.m., fighting occurred between Cambodian troops and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese on the slopes of Phnom Batheay, in Kompong Cham. At about noon, the Khmer forces succeeded in dislodging the enemy from their pockets of resistance and in taking possession of the summit. The Khmer casualties are provisionally established at eight dead and twenty-four wounded, and those of the enemy at twenty-four dead left behind, about sixty wounded and dead carried off, 7 sub-machine-guns, 1 mortar, 1 rocket launcher, 8 mines, 2,000 cartridges, 30 grenades, 3 boxes of medical supplies, clothing and equipment.

On the same day, at about 7.30 p.m., Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese opened mortar fire on the defences of Kompong Cham airfield.

On the same day, at about 9 a.m., another clash took place two kilometres east of Stung Chhay, in Kompong Seila. After about ten minutes' fighting, the enemy withdrew, taking three wounded with them.

On the same day, at about 7 a.m., Khmer forces on patrol on National Highway 4 were fired on for about an hour by Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at the sixty-ninth kilometre mark, in Kompong Speu.

On the same day, a clash took place between Khmer forces and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese on the western outskirts of Rocar Kong, in Kandal. Enemy losses amounted to one dead left behind, six wounded carried away with them, one grenade and one mine. Five Cambodians were wounded.

During the night of 13 to 14 December 1970, at about 1.20 a.m., Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched an attack against a position at Kompong Seila. Vigorous counteraction by the Khmer soldiers, one of whom was killed and seventeen wounded, forced the enemy to withdraw taking some dead and wounded with them.

On 14 December 1970, at about 1.30 a.m., Khmer defence forces at Tonle Bet, in Kompong Cham, killed two Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese who had tried to throw grenades into their positions.

On the same day, at about 2.30 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese attacked a defence position at the Prey Totung school, in Kompong Cham.

On the same day, at about 9 a.m., another clash took place three kilometres north-east of Prek Kdam, in Kandal. Upon the arrival of reinforcements, at about 11.20 a.m., the enemy withdrew carrying dead and wounded with them. Four Khmer soldiers were wounded.

I wish to reaffirm the strong and energetic protest of the Government of the Khmer Republic against the illegal and permanent occupation of Cambodian territory, followed by savage attacks perpetrated by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese against a neutral and peaceful country to which they have no right and with which they have no ethnic affinity, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, of international law and of the 1954 Geneva Agreements.⁵ These criminal attacks reveal for all to see the annexationist aims of the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese communist imperialists and represent a dangerous threat to peace and security not only in Cambodia but throughout the region of South-East Asia.

The Government of the Khmer Republic holds the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam entirely responsible for all the extremely grave consequences resulting from this situation and reserves the right to take any necessary action to defend the independence, sovereignty, neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) KHIM TIT

Permanent Representative of the Khmer Republic to the United Nations

⁵ Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China.

Letter dated 8 January 1971 from the representative of Jordan
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[8 January 1971]

Upon instructions from my Government and further to my letters of 16 July 1970 [S/9868], 23 July 1970 [S/9885] and 27 August 1970 [S/9919] concerning Israel's arbitrary and continued expulsion of the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories, I bring to your attention a new list of persons deported in the year 1970.

The list includes 329 names of persons from all over the west bank of Jordan and the Gaza Strip including civic and community leaders of different villages and towns. The list also includes elderly men in their seventies and eighties.

Israel's measures of expulsion, which constitute a link in the chain of its policy to replace the indigenous population with alien elements who settle on confiscated or sequestered Arab land, prove once more the anti-Arab and racial policies of Israel and its philosophy of Zionism. For there is a clear pattern of measures and policies which Israel has been following: conquest, occupation, confiscation of Arab land and property coupled with systematic expulsion of the Arab population and their leaders and the building of Israeli and purely Jewish settlements and the injection of new immigrants to colonize the conquered land. This was the case twenty-two years ago and it has been the case since June 1967.

This is why Israel and its leaders are not interested in a political solution under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. They are more interested in creating new "realities".

May I request you to bring this matter to the Commission on Human Rights for its forthcoming session.

I should appreciate it if this letter, and the accompanying list of persons deported be circulated as official documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative
of Jordan to the United Nations

LIST OF PERSONS DEPORTED DURING THE YEAR 1970

1. Ismail Hussein
2. Said Hamdan Abdullah
3. Mohammad Issa Thelji
4. Abdel-Hafez Ahmad Duaiss
5. Taysir Mohammad Al-Afiouni
6. Rabah Hussein Moussa
7. Farook Muslih El-Shakhshir
8. Hussein El-Haj Abdel-Rahman
9. Mustafa Abdel-Halim Mustafa
10. Abdel-Ghaffar Yunis Zalloom
11. Tahsin Muhammad Suleiman
12. Kamal Muhammad Abdel-Latif
13. Kassim Jabr Muhammad
14. Mrawih Tahir Hasan
15. Muhammad Ahmad As'ad
16. Abdullah Al-Sheikh Yussuf
17. Tahir Hussein
18. Abdel-Karim Abdel-Razzak Al-Kadi
19. Khalid Muhammad Hasan Affana

20. Hasan Yusuf Kassim
21. Saleh Abdel-Rahman Hasan
22. Muhammad Muflih Abul-Hayja
23. Fayez Rashid Issa Hlal
24. Abdel Karim Saleh Khalil
25. Mufdi Sleiman Ahmad
26. Abdel-Ilah Khalid Munir
27. Riad Ismail Abu-Kahile
28. Hasan Amin Kamel
29. Abdel-Halim Mahmoud Osman
30. Jum'a Mahmoud Muhammad Abu-Fareh
31. Badih Osman Jabr Muhammad
32. Muhammad Salim Id Abu-Said
33. Muhammad Said Muhammad
34. Osman Rashid Al-Tabbakh
35. Abdel-Rahman Hussein
36. Subhi Ibrahim Badawi
37. Sadik Muhammad Abdel Rahim
38. Farid Muhammad Haniid
39. Awad Hussein Al-Najjar
40. Ahmad Salim Ahmad
41. Rashed Rashid Mahmoud
42. Badr Mahmoud Jabr
43. Hussein Abdullah Hussein
44. Yussuf Abdullah Yussuf
45. Tahir Mahmoud Jabr
46. Jabir Abdel-Hadi Abdullah
47. Badr Hasan Mahmoud
48. Ibrahim Hasan Abu Thoraya
49. Ahmad Ibrahim Hasan
50. Roohi Hamid Ahmad
51. Muhammad Said Ahmad
52. Abdel-Kader Tewfik Hamdan
53. Ahmad Abdel-Kader Mahmoud
54. Ghazi Muhammad Hamid Al-Bakri
55. Ahmad Mahmoud Abdel-Fattah Annab
56. Muhammad Abdel-Fattah Hasan Abu-Ras
57. Abdel-Karim Mahmoud Abdel-Nabbi
58. Muhammad Ahmad Abdel-Razzak Awad
59. Ali Hasan Abu-Ghosh
60. Muhammad Darwish Salih Al-Sha'r
61. Tewfik Khamis Nasr
62. Akram Ramiz Hasan Al-Labbadi
63. Fawzi Mahmud Muhammad Osman
64. Hamdi Mahmoud Kassab
65. Yussuf Ahmad Ghosheh
66. Muhammad Yussuf Muhammad Attarri
67. Ahmad Ibrahim Muhammad Al-Harini
68. Muhammad Yussuf Ghanim
69. Ahmad Khalil Hamdan
70. Suleiman Ali Akil
71. Raghib Muhammad Hasan Taha
72. Fayez Abdel-Rahim Zindah Tafish
73. Hussein Salih Al-Haj-Hussein
74. Abdel-Rahman Osman Abu Al-Rab
75. Salman Ibrahim Abu Abdo
76. Tayeh Jum'a Yussuf Assaf
77. Mohammad Said Muhammad Mdiye
78. Sadik Muhammad Abdel-Rahim Tobassi
79. Rashed Irsheid Mahmoud
80. Farid Muhammad Hamed Salah
81. Ahmad Salim Ahruad Hasan
82. Badr Mahmoud Jabr Shabaneh
83. Abdel-Rahman Hussein Hasan Al-Ashkar
84. Sabhi Ibrahim Khalil Badawi
85. Awad Hussein Al-Najjar
86. Hussein Abdullah Hussein Jarrah
87. Husni Ahmad Hussein Al-Seeghi
88. Ali Khidr Khamis Abu Diyeh
89. Hammoud Saleh Hammoud Al-Daghra

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8270.

90. Dawood Khalil Salman
91. Munir Muhammad Mahmoud
92. Suleiman Salem Muhammad Darwish
93. Nayef Muhammad Ahmad Al-Ghalban
94. Zuhair Muhammad Mahmoud
95. Ass'ad Ali Al-Fayad
96. Moussa Hussein Burham Al-Ghalban
97. Hussein Mahmoud Farris
98. Abdullah Muhammad Abdullah
99. Nawaf Attia Muslih
100. Mijahid Ahmad Nafih
101. Fahim Salih Said
102. Suleiman Salim Id
103. Atif Yunis Kallab
104. Said Said Id
105. Hasan Mahmoud Hasan
106. Sabir Mahmoud Abdul-Latif
107. Abdel-Karim Hamid Mansour
108. Abdel-Hamid Bakri Al-Harbawi
109. Khalil Ali Khalil Wash'shah
110. Muhamad Arafat Abdullah
111. Adnan Kamel Hamad
112. Mahmoud Ismail Abdel-Razzak
113. Fahmi Hamed Taher Sultan
114. Tarek Subhi Mahmoud
115. Khalil Hasan Hussein
116. Abdel-Aziz Abdel Rahim Ahmad
117. Mustafa Hamdan Al-Najjar
118. Mahmoud Suleiman Al-Dardissi
119. Moussa Farhan Ahmad
120. Suleiman Muhammad Mahmoud
121. Hussam Salih Hussein
122. Hasan Abdel-Hadi Abdel-Hamid
123. Jibrail Ahmad Hasan
124. Mustafa Abdullah Muhammad
125. Salih Mahmoud Muhammad
126. Ahmad Abdel-Majid El-Haj
127. Majid Moussa Mukbel Odeh
128. Ibrahim Abdel Rahim
129. Ahmad Mahmoud Hasan Kadoora
130. Yussuf Khalil Al-Ra'i
131. Talal Muhammad Ahmad Aw-Wad
132. Naim Tahsin Hussein Muhammad
133. Muhammad Hassan Muhammad Al-Kshif
134. Ata Ahmad Ibrahim
135. Ibrahim Muhammad Yacoub
136. Munir Al-Rayes
137. Dr. Walid Al-Kamhawi
138. Said Abdullah Ahmad
139. Amin Abd-Rabbo Hussein
140. Sadik Ahmad Salim
141. Jabr Amin Hasan
142. Said Al-Abd Muhammad
143. Hasan Khalil Abdullah
144. Talal Abdel-Hamid Odeh
145. Farhau Abdel-Latif Yussuf
146. Ahmad Muhammad Alyan
147. Ghandi Abdel-Aziz Abd-Rabbo
148. Abdel-Karim Salih Abdullah
149. Mahmoud Farris Abdel-Hadi
150. Ahmad Muhammad Ahmad
151. Abdel-Majid Mahmoud Salem
152. Hammad Awad Matawih
153. Muhammad Jamil Muhammad
154. Ibrahim Sakhril Suleiman
155. Zaki Yunus Abdel-Rahman
156. Ayed Muhammad Odeh
157. Ibrahim Khalil Askool
158. Khidr Muhammad Abdel-Wahab
159. Muhammad Mubarak Abdel-Hadi
160. Ismail Khalil Shamlakh
161. Ibrahim Khidr Abdel-Ghafour
162. Abdel-Rahman Mahmoud Hamed
163. Jihad Salim Khreiwish
164. Hussein Muhammad Khalil
165. Odeh Nuseir Suleiman
166. Suleiman Salih
167. Hisham Muhammad Moussa

168. Yussuf Fawzi Yussuf
169. Muhammad Al-Haj Hasan
170. Khalid Ahmad Suleiman
171. Muhammad Ibrahim Muhammad
172. Sulhi Abdullah Ibrahim
173. Muhammad Zuhdi Nasser
174. Barakat Salim Barakat
175. Moussa Fayez Moussa
176. Adnan Ali Osman
177. Jum'a Salih Moussa
178. Muhammad Ali Salih
179. Fali Abdel-Salam
180. Rajih Kassab
181. Muhammad Hasan Adwan
182. Azmi Naji Al-Jumeidi
183. Hasan Ibrahim Al-Simadi
184. Nasser Ibrahim Sharid
185. Mustafa Ahmad Ibrahim
186. Ibrahim Muhammad Shihadeh
187. Mustafa Muhammad Rashid
188. Muffih Jum'a Abu-Hjeir
189. Abdel-Fattah Ahmad Ghanem
190. Abdel-Salam Hasan Al-Tamimi
191. Moussa Osman Rizk
192. Muhammad Hashim Shejla
193. Khalil Muhammad Abu-Nada
194. Khalil Muhammad Mahmoud
195. Khalil Al-Kifrawi
196. Suleiman Al-Sawarcheh
197. Husni Ismail Tamimi
198. Shukri Husni Salameh
199. Abdullah Abdel-Al Abu-Taha
200. Shueib Fayad Al-Barri
201. Shaker Muhammad Abu Ayadeh
202. Hasan Muhammad Al-Nawajeha
203. Mahmoud Muhammad Al-Zibadeh
204. Said Muhammad Mesammah
205. Emil Aw-Wad Ibrahim
206. Abdel-Wahab Dari Al-Bakri
207. Adel Yussuf Abdel-Kader
208. Salih Sabri Hasan
209. Hani Abdel-Aziz Annab
210. Moussa Muhammad Hasan Hussein
211. Farid Ali Marahil
212. Aziz Abdel-Rahim Jabir
213. Ahmad Hamdan Ibrahim
214. Issa Harb Muhammad
215. Bassam Muhammad Mustafa
216. Mahmoud Abdel-Salam Yacoub
217. Tahir Kassim
218. Suleiman Hasan Muhammad
219. Ismail Ali Mustafa
220. Ismail Yussuf Mahmoud
221. Harb Muhammad Ridwan
222. Ahmad Muhammad Al-Ghalban
223. Ismail Muhammad Al-Abd
224. Said Id Salih
225. Sadik Muhammad Allan
226. Majid Muhammad Abdel-Rahim
227. Muhammad Hasan Al-Shorbaji
228. Jamil Bannoura
229. Al-Abd Salameh Salem
230. Ahmad Al-Bassyuni
231. Jum'a Al-Ghabn
232. Abdel-Ra'oof Al-Najjar
233. Khalid Al-Baddi
234. Jawad Salah
235. Omar Muhammad Said
236. Kassim Shtiyeh
237. Dawood Jabran
238. Sadik Shrayim
239. Ahmad Maroof
240. Ahmad Abu-Shalloof
241. Naim Abdel-Wahed
242. Aw-Wad Khattab
243. Ibrahim Muhammad Darwish
244. Ahmad Mahmood Khalil
245. Mahmood Al-Shawaf

246. Ahmad Muhammad Rihan
 247. Ahmad Ibrahim Moussa
 248. Hamad Yussuf Abdel-Rahim
 249. Omar Abdel-Rahim Ahmad
 250. Ibrahim Muhammad Moslem
 251. Ahmad Suleiman Muhammad
 252. Badr Kamel Mustafa
 253. Bassam Amin Kamel
 254. Ahmad Tewfik Mahmood
 255. Ibrahim Muhammad Al-Hoot
 256. Ibrahim Muhammad Darwish
 257. Rafik Favez Ashi
 258. Ibrahim Muhammad Al-Nabahin
 259. Yussuf Muhammad Khouri
 260. Muhammad Suleiman Abu Freih
 261. Freih Abu Oreiban
 262. Samih Rashad Muhsin
 263. Ghannam Arafat Al-Khatib
 264. Obeid Abu Oreiban
 265. Abdel-Hamid Mahmood
 266. Muhammad Abdel-Rahman Ghannam
 267. Mazin Al-Salibi
 268. Abdel-Latif Jabir
 269. Jamal Muhammad Hassan
 270. Salim Odeh Jum'a
 271. Abdel-Hamid Ahmad Awad
 272. Hasan Ahmad Suleiman
 273. Hammad Kamel
 274. Mansour Muhsin
 275. Kassim Al-Wadiyeh
 276. Salim Al-Astal
 277. Muhammad Ali Mahmoud
 278. Abdel Rahim Abdel-Rahman
 279. Muhammad Farid Rashed
 280. Jihad Abd Yussuf
 281. Salih Mahmoud Salih
 282. Hasan Hamdi
 283. Yahya Abdel-Hafez
 284. Hussein Muhammad Ahmad
 285. Shehadeh Muhammad Shehadeh
 286. Hisham Nazmi Ahmad
 287. Said Abdel-Hafiz

288. Shawkat Yacoub Ali
 289. Munir Awad Abdullah
 290. Ahmad Al-Abki
 291. Muslim Muslim
 292. Rayik Hasan
 293. Ishak Al-Mara'i
 294. Mahmoud Hussein Yussuf
 295. Abd Muhammad Ahmad
 296. Muhammad Suleiman Abu Hadid
 297. Muhammad Hamid Muhammad
 298. Nasr Khalid Al-Katawi
 299. Muhammad Yussuf Jaber
 300. Jum'a Al-Shawaf
 301. Ali Jaber Hamdan
 302. Yussuf Abu Atwan
 303. Salah Farhan
 304. Imad Kamil Al-Khatib
 305. Jaber Hamdan
 306. Subhi Moussa Bashir
 307. Moussa Nayef Abu-Sitteh
 308. Khamis Al-Baltaji
 309. Muhammad Is'hak Abdel-Latif
 310. Subhi Al-Malhi
 311. Abdullah Muhammad Jiddeh
 312. Ziyad Said Antar
 313. Muhammad Ahmad Al-Karam
 314. Said Zhib Abdel-Hafiz
 315. Nasr Khalid Al-Tihawi
 316. Mahmoud Hasan Yusuf Hussein
 317. Muslim Nabih Muslim Shlak
 318. Khalil Talib Hassan Al-Najjar
 319. Muhammad Hafiz Irsheid
 320. Shawkat Yacoub Ali Nofal
 321. Muhammad Hamed Muhammad
 322. Rayek Tewfik Hasan
 323. Ahmad Abdel-Ghani Al-Imayss
 324. Munawar Awad Abdullah Kasra
 325. Abd Muhammad Ahmad Rahim
 326. Is'hak Ali Al-Mra'i
 327. Muhammad Salman Rabih
 328. Salim Suleiman Hamid
 329. Nasr Khalid Al-Kattawi

DOCUMENT S/10074*

**Letter dated 8 January 1971 from the representative of Jordan
 to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]
 [8 January 1971]*

Further to my letter of today, 8 January 1971 [S/10073], concerning Israel's systematic expulsion of Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories and upon instructions from my Government, I regret to inform you that these arbitrary Israeli measures continue unabated.

Only yesterday, 7 January 1971, the Israeli occupying authorities deported eighteen Jordanians from the west bank of Jordan. My Government immediately contacted the representative of the Committee of the International Red Cross in Amman and informed him that such deportations are unacceptable and asked that these persons be allowed to return.

In view of Israel's determined policy of systematic expulsion of Arab inhabitants from the occupied territories, it has become necessary that steps and measures be taken to stop such violations of basic human rights and defiance of Security Council decisions which call upon Israel to facilitate the return of those who fled the areas of hostilities in 1967 and not to force those who stayed in their homes, villages, towns and cities to leave, or worse, to expel them.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

*(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
 Permanent Representative
 of Jordan to the United Nations*

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8271.

Letter dated 8 January 1971 from the representatives of Jordan
and the United Arab Republic to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[9 January 1971]

Upon instructions from our Governments, we regret to bring to your attention further Israeli violations and illegal measures to change the character and demographic composition of the Arab territories under Israeli military occupation since 5 June 1967.

The hasty construction for what is called "the master plan" of Jerusalem, which calls for an additional 200,000 Jewish people to be settled within five years in the occupied lands in and around Jerusalem, has brought new international cries against Israel's unilateral and illegal actions, as well as severe criticism for such plans. Such cries and criticism appeared in two articles: one in *The Economist* of 2 January 1971 and another in *The Times* of London on 21 December 1970. The editorial of *The Times* of 24 December 1970 under the heading "Jerusalem the Golden" is particularly relevant and important. We attach a copy of each.

The process of establishing Israeli settlements is not only limited to occupied Jerusalem and the area around it. In the rest of the occupied bank of Jordan, the Gaza Strip, the occupied Syrian Heights and the Sinai, new settlements are being hastily constructed by the Israeli authorities with the intention of becoming "permanent Jewish villages".

This follows the undeclared official policy of the Israeli Government, as outlined in what is called the "Allon Plan", to absorb the occupied territories by creating new "realities". The Israeli Defence Minister, Mr. Dayan, underlined this policy when he said, as quoted in *Le Monde* of 30 December 1970, "The best way to achieve this will be to populate the west bank, the Golan Heights and the Sinai with Jewish people as rapidly as possible".

This explains some of the reasons behind Israel's boycotting and stalling Ambassador Jarring's mission to implement his mandate under Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Israel and its leaders are clearly buying time to complete these plans of absorption. The same issue of *Le Monde* reports that "all Israeli maps printed since 1967 show Israel's boundaries as including the Sinai Desert, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank of Jordan and the Golan Heights".

The Israeli paper *Ha'aretz* of 4 March 1970 reported that: "Authoritative sources in the Israeli Government stated that 77,600,000 Israeli pounds were allocated this year for the maintenance of new settlements to be established this year in the occupied territories". The paper reported that since the six-day war until 1970, twenty-eight settlements were established and 87,800,000 Israeli pounds were spent for that purpose. The total amount would therefore be 165,400,000 Israeli pounds.

The Israeli paper *Yadi-Out* of 5 March 1969 reported: "It was learned that an additional 20,500,000 Israeli pounds will be spent by the Ministry of Agriculture in establishing new settlements in the occupied territories: two in the Golan Heights, two in the Jordan Valley and one in the area of Kfar Itzion".

A third Israeli paper, *Ma'ariv* of 10 March 1970, reported that 156 Jewish families are waiting to reside in the settlement to be established in Hebron.

The Israeli Government's far-reaching policy concerning Israeli settlements and enterprise in the Arab territories under its military occupation is clearly reflected in an article published in *Time* magazine of 4 January 1971, of which we attach a copy.

The magazine reports one example as follows:

"Egged, Israel's biggest bus line, is now planning a 300-bed motel in Sinai at a cost of \$500,000. 'Why not?' asks an Egged spokesman. 'The Government has agreed to a forty-nine-year lease, and who's going anywhere anyway?'"

In view of these and other Israeli actions committed in continuing defiance of the United Nations Charter and resolutions, it has become imperative that the international community should take the necessary steps to put an end to these continued violations, if indeed a just solution to the Middle East crisis is to be found by peaceful means.

We shall be grateful if this letter and the attached articles and editorial are circulated as official documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed H. EL-ZAYYAT
Permanent Representative of
the United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

ARTICLE ENTITLED "JERUSALEM THE GOLDEN" PUBLISHED IN *The Times* OF LONDON DATED 24 DECEMBER 1970

Pilgrims who go to Bethlehem this Christmas will see a Church of the Nativity that has altered little over the centuries. Nor has the general outline of the town yet changed drastically, while it must be supposed that the shepherds' fields were as bleak and stony two thousand years ago as they are today. This physical consistency of the Holy Places is important. Much of the virtue of a pilgrimage lies in the pilgrims' consciousness that their acts are being repeated in the same manner and in the same setting that unbroken tradition has hallowed.

It would be rash to assume that these conditions are likely to survive much longer. The future of the Holy Places is of course bound up with the future of the land to which they belong, and although nobody would suggest that there is any threat to the fabric of the buildings themselves the setting in which the buildings lie is in flux. For most people the site and their setting are inextricably bound up with each other.

Many Israelis themselves are worried about what is happening in and around Jerusalem, and still more worried about what may happen in the future. It was in consequence of these anxieties that a conference of international architects and town-planners has just been

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8272.

held in Jerusalem, and already the criticisms heard there have borne fruit. The "master plan" which had been drawn up to provide for a population of nearly a million in the space of the next forty years is to be revised, though it will still extend the boundaries of Jerusalem to include the two Arab towns of Bethlehem, five miles to the south, and Ramallah, ten miles to the north, which is outside the area which the Israeli Government declared annexed after the June war.

Criticism at the conference was mainly on the grounds of aesthetics and good order. Non-specialists inevitably have other grounds for concern—namely that all Israeli plans, whether big or modest, make assumptions about Jerusalem which the rest of the world rejects. Their position was put clearly by the American representative at the Security Council, Mr. Charles Yost, when he said on 1 July 1969:

"The expropriation or confiscation of land, the construction of housing on such land, the demolition or confiscation of buildings, including those having historic or religious significance, and the application of Israeli law to occupied portions of the city are detrimental to our common interests in the city. The United States considers that the part of Jerusalem that came under the control of Israel in the June 1967 war, like other areas occupied by Israel, is occupied territory and hence subject to the provisions of international law governing the rights and obligations of an occupying Power."

On this occasion the Security Council went on to condemn unanimously and "in the strongest terms" all measures taken to change the status of the Arab areas of Jerusalem. This condemnation had no effect on Israeli policy or, rather, it had the effect of speeding up efforts to transform the area. This indeed is what is at the heart of the argument. On the one hand is the Israeli Government, which is mainly concerned to get as many Israelis as quickly as possible into the area, and on the other are those, like the Mayor of Jerusalem, Mr. Kollek, who are no less determined that the city shall remain for all time united and Israeli, but who would also like the future city to be worthy of its past and its reputation.

The effect of government haste on the appearance of the city is only too clear. The surrounding hills are having blocks of flats built on them, and Arab land is confiscated for the purpose. A pursuance of present policy would create a spreading modern town with a native quarter in the centre preserved for the benefit of tourists. But, equally, even the most high-minded proposals for the development of a much larger area must be based on the assumption that all is to pass finally and legally into Israeli hands, and that is something that the rest of the world has not accepted.

The Christian and Moslem worlds can acknowledge the special and passionate concern of Jewry and Israel over Jerusalem without sacrificing their own deep and abiding concern. At this moment the facts of war have left Israel in total possession, just as Britain was left in possession in 1917 and thus occupying what in mandatory language was called "a sacred trust of civilization". The final status of Jerusalem must be part of a general settlement, and may well prove to be the hardest part to negotiate. Such a settlement would not only have to give Israel the absolute territorial security to which she is entitled, but also the feeling of absolute identity with Zion which is so much of the inspiration of Zionism. But this would be a settlement for Jerusalem more likely to endure if it was in an inter-

national framework rather than a framework of sole ownership.

Meanwhile, the city and its surroundings remain, as always, not simply a home for many people of many faiths, but also, particularly on festivals such as Christmas, a focus for the prayers and affections of many millions who think of it as a place uniquely beautiful as well as uniquely blessed.

REPORT BY ERIC MARSDEN FROM TEL AVIV ENTITLED "WORLD ARCHITECTS ARE INVOLVED IN JERUSALEM PLANNING DISPUTES" PUBLISHED IN *The Times* OF LONDON DATED 21 DECEMBER 1970

Thirty-one leading architects, town planners and art experts, who opened a three-day conference here last night on the building of the new Jerusalem, found themselves plunged into controversies over the city.

These began two weeks ago when a forum called by the Council for the Beautification of Israel was told that international politics were bedevilling city planning.

Israel architects accused the Government of rushing Jewish settlements in former Jordan-held areas. Further criticism and warnings were given against skyscrapers and sprawling housing estates at a conference in Tel Aviv last week of the Congress of Architects and Engineers.

The present meeting in Jerusalem is of the town planning sub-committee of the World Advisory Council on the Jerusalem master plan set up last year by Mr. Teddy Kollek, the mayor, to advise on the city's restoration and beautification.

In an opening address last night, Mr. Kollek referred to criticisms made by the engineers and architects and asked for the town planners' advice.

Some was given by Professor Buckminster Fuller, of the United States, the inventor of the geodetic dome. He expressed concern at investments for profit by "remote speculators" which, he said, could undercut the idealism which made Jerusalem unique. Jerusalem was the centre of the world and all humanity was concerned in its development.

Experts taking part include three Britons, Sir Nikolaus Pevsner, Sir Philip Hendy, advisor to the Israel Museum, and Mr. Denys Lasdun.

The meeting will discuss details of the master plan, which was drawn up in 1964 but revised after Israel occupied the old city in 1967. It charts Jerusalem's growth in carefully planned stages to 1985 and to 2010 without detriment to its historic and religious interests.

Since the American peace initiative in the summer the Israel Ministry of Housing has brought out new plans of its own which clash with those of the city's master planners.

They call for the speedy settlement of 50,000 people on empty, rocky ridges in the Nebi Samwel (tomb of Samuel) area. The planners fear this can only be done by putting tall blocks of flats on the hills from which the Crusaders first saw Jerusalem.

The city master plan provided for only between 4,000 and 8,000 settlers there, in two-storey houses and villas harmonizing with the hills' contours.

Jewish residents were the chief critics of the Ministry at the public forum. An architect claimed four-storey buildings would ruin Nebi Samwel's landscape and asked: "Will it be more Israeli if there are 50,000 living there instead of 5,000?"

The chairman of the Jerusalem branch of the council accused the Government of taking a hasty decision to expropriate the area and build massively to create Jewish presence. He gave a warning that it was bad politics to ignore the aesthetics of Jerusalem, which the British had gone to great lengths to preserve.

He said there were plans for eight-storey buildings which would look like cigarette packets and waffles.

The Ministry also intends to build in two other districts, commanding magnificent views of the city. One is on the old Government House hill, where the United Nations local headquarters now stand. Long-range developments will add 100,000 people to the three areas.

When the peace talks were proposed the Government disclosed that 3,000 acres of empty land had been expropriated, most of it in east Jerusalem, but the building plans were kept secret until recently. The mayor is worried by the Ministry move and has urged the Government to consider the implications of a major change in the master plan.

He pointed out that the crowded city would have worse traffic problems and streets might have to be widened to cope with 15,000 extra cars. Mr. Kollek said the Ministry has agreed to investigate the cost involved and to consider the objections.

ARTICLE ENTITLED "JERUSALEM: CONCRETE JUNGLE"
PUBLISHED IN *The Economist* DATED 2 JANUARY 1971

At a three-day meeting just before Christmas, a world committee of architects, town planners and art experts roundly condemned Israel's master plan for "greater Jerusalem". The meeting had been convened by the mayor of Jerusalem, Mr. Teddy Kollek, who had his own doubts about the plan—particularly about the new road scheme—but clearly did not expect such sweeping criticism. If the plan were carried out, the foreign experts seemed to be saying, Jerusalem would become just as ugly and just as inconvenient to live in as most of the world's large cities have already become. The Italian expert poured particular scorn on Israel's efforts to reproduce the "picturesque".

The criticisms were all made on aesthetic, not political, grounds. The experts apparently swallowed the fact that the master plan takes in great chunks of the west bank including both Bethlehem and Ramallah, and ends up with an area about eight times as big as the present municipality. Mr. Kollek has promised that the plan will be revised—but the revision will presumably cover the same area.

The plan is in any case being overtaken by the determination of the Israeli Government to stake its permanent claim to Arab Jerusalem. The Israelis have said that their withdrawal from Jerusalem is "not negotiable" their Ministry of Housing has set about turning this statement into concrete. Tall apartment buildings for Israeli Jews are already springing up on the hills beyond the Old City. Arab residents of Jerusalem see their part of the city being encircled by what could eventually turn out to be new Israeli suburbs.

The Israelis, to judge by the architectural mess they have made of their own country, are fine roadbuilders but rotten architects. They work fast and, given a free hand, could quickly and irrevocably spoil the singular beauty of Jerusalem's landscape. The aesthetic opposition may induce them to create better buildings. It will not stop them building. Since early Zionist days,

the policy has been to create physical facts and Israeli Jerusalem is now in the process of creation.

ARTICLE ENTITLED "ISRAEL: SETTLING IN ALONG THE BORDER" PUBLISHED IN *Time* DATED 4 JANUARY 1971

A telling anomaly of the 1967 Middle East war is that Israel, in spite of capturing vast stretches of Arab territory, actually ended up with a border 68 miles shorter than before the fighting. Reason: the present *de facto* lines are straighter. They are also much easier for Israel to defend. In any peace negotiation, therefore, a crucial question will be how much of this occupied territory Israel will be willing to relinquish and how much it will insist on retaining to preserve border security. *Time* Jerusalem Bureau Chief Marsh Clark made a three-day, 465-mile tour along Israel's eastern boundaries. He discovered "a frenzy of construction and settlement activity", which suggests that Israel is not about to surrender its occupied territory. His report:

My companion on the trip, an Israeli reserve officer, started by placing a 9 mm pistol on the ledge under the dash of our Ford Cortina. His gesture seemed symbolic of the atmosphere along much of the border. We began at Mount Hermon, the snow-covered peak that cornerstones the border between Israel, Lebanon and Syria. There we spotted the first of the yellow bulldozers that are everywhere in the occupied territories, scraping and pushing, widening and straightening, lifting boulders or rearranging sand. It is said that Israel has more bulldozers *per capita* than any other nation; I can believe it.

Beneath Mount Hermon, dozers are shaping a road along which Israel patrols can roll. The patrols keep an eye on "Fatahland", the corner of Lebanon from which the Arab guerrillas have launched destructive attacks on Israel.

From Mount Hermon, the border road winds down the Golan Heights. Until 1967, Syrian troops used the heights as an artillery platform against kibbutzim in the northern Galilee valley below. Now the heights are largely deserted. Kuneitra, which once had a population of 20,000, has only 300 today, most of them members of an Israeli kibbutz that operates a coffee shop selling apple strudel, beverages, and busts of Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan and David Ben-Gurion. Smaller Syrian villages are being bulldozed. "They had become a health hazard", explains an Israeli officer. "They provided refuge for stray dogs, cats and *fedayeen*." Some Golan fields still carry red-triangle signs denoting Syrian minefields. Others are lush with wheat and cotton grown by Israeli kibbutzniks who ride in tractors with armor plating on the side.

Dead Sea life. The rolling Jordanian border south of the heights is still Israel's most vulnerable. For that reason, the Government has established there a necklace of *nahals*, fortified camps manned by young Israelis who are equally able to farm or to fight. But where the Dead Sea provides natural protection, Israel is developing tourist attractions. In the vicinity of Masada, the legendary fortress of ancient Hebrew history, there are now three hotels with 228 rooms as well as two guest houses and three youth hostels. Another hotel, the Pan American Dead Sea (no kin to the airline), will be finished in thirty months at a cost of \$5 million. The Pan American will have

181 rooms and an indoor pool fed by therapeutic waters from the lowest spot on the face of the earth.

Nearly finished is the road that rolls along the sea from Jericho to Eilat, which before Israel renamed it in 1949 was an Arab police post known, deliciously, as Umm Rashrash. Eilat is already a thriving resort. New motels line its shore, and hippies occupy its beaches. But Eilat is strategically important too. The glass-bottom boats that take tourists out to marvel at the Gulf of Aqaba's coral formations rock in the swells of supertankers bringing Persian Gulf oil into Eilat to be pipelined to the Mediterranean.

See the battlefields. The biggest adventure of a border tour occurs along the 170-mile road from Eilat to Sharm el-Sheikh at the confluence of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea. All but about fifty miles of the highway have been completed; the

immense effort being expended cannot be for any other purpose than to keep a permanent Israeli presence on the western side of the Gulf of Aqaba. When the road is finished, Israeli tourists will speed in three hours through the pink and purple Sinai mountains that it took commandos in 1956 three days to cross.

At Sharm el-Sheikh the beginnings of another tourist mecca are already in place. For \$14 a night one can get an air-conditioned room in an eighty-bed motel, watch movies and go scuba diving. Already along another road to Sharm el-Sheikh through the Mitla Pass, holiday-makers from Tel Aviv can take a five-day "See the Sinai Battlefields" tour for \$98.60. Egged, Israel's biggest bus line, is now planning a 300-bed motel in Sinai at a cost of \$500,000. "Why not?" asks an Egged spokesman. The Government has agreed to a forty-nine-year lease, and who's going anywhere anyway?"

DOCUMENT S/10077

Letter dated 7 January 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]
[12 January 1971]

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 29 December 1970 [S/10071], I have the honour to bring the following to your attention for the information of the members of the Security Council.

On 14 December 1970, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired on a defensive position at Prakham and on another ten kilometres east of Skoun, in Kampong Cham, killing one man and wounding another.

On the same day, at about 12 noon, there was a violent clash between Khmer and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese forces at Taing Srey and Trapeang Tea, about 3.7 kilometres north of Batheay, in Kompong Cham. After five hours of hard fighting, the enemy withdrew, leaving behind fifty-five dead and carrying with them many other dead and wounded. Cambodian casualties were two killed and nineteen wounded.

On the same day, at about 7 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched an attack against a position at Veal Rinh, thirty-six kilometres north-east of Kompong Som, in Kompot. The vigorous counteraction by the Khmer forces, seven of whom were wounded, compelled the enemy to withdraw at about 9.45 p.m., carrying with them several dead and wounded.

On 15 December 1970, at about 5 a.m., Veal Rinh was again attacked. Cambodian casualties were five wounded; enemy losses are unknown.

On the same day, at about 7.05 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Vietnamese made a brief mortar attack on a position at Srê Khloug, in Kompong Speu.

On the same day, at about 8.40 a.m., Khmer forces on a search operation at Bak Touk, eight kilometres west of the town of Kompong Thom, clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese, during the engagement, one Cambodian soldier was wounded.

On the same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched an attack against a position at Prey Totung, in Kompong Cham.

On the same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired on a defensive position at Khvet, four kilometres west of Prey Totung, in Kompong Cham. The vigorous counteraction by the Khmer forces, three of whom were wounded, compelled the enemy to withdraw, carrying with them five dead and several wounded.

On the same day, at about 12 noon, Khmer forces on operations at Prêk Koy, two and a half kilometres north of Rocar Kong, in Kandal, clashed with some 400 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese in an engagement lasting an hour and a half. The enemy left behind seven dead and carried away with them about twenty dead and wounded; Cambodian casualties were one killed and twelve wounded.

On 16 December 1970, Cambodian troops mopped up the centre of Prey Totung and the surrounding area, in Kompong Cham. The ground was strewn with hundreds of Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese corpses, and hundreds more were hurriedly buried by the enemy before withdrawing. Preliminary estimates indicate that over 2,000 of the enemy were killed during the fighting at Prey Totung.

On the same day, at about 5 p.m., Veal Rinh, in Kampot, was again violently attacked by some 400 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese.

On the same day, at about 3 p.m., there was a clash between a Khmer patrol and some sixty Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese near Wat Damnak Trayoeung, about seven and a half kilometres north of Tuk Meas, in Kampot.

On the same day, there was a clash lasting about twenty minutes between Khmer and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese forces four and a half kilometres south of the town of Siemreap; the enemy left behind one dead and carried away with them several wounded, while Cambodian casualties were one killed and five wounded.

On the same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese attacked a train two kilometres north of Tuol Leap

station, about eighteen kilometres west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal, causing casualties of two dead and twenty wounded, including ten civilians.

During the night of 16 to 17 December 1970, for a short time, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired on a position at Wat Nokor, a few kilometres north-west of the town of Kompong Cham.

On the same night, at about 7.30 p.m., a position at Kompong Seila was attacked by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese.

On 17 December 1970, at about 10 a.m., Khmer forces clashed with some fifty Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese approximately four and a half kilometres south-east of Trapeang Kraloeng, in Kompong Speu; Cambodian casualties were two wounded.

On the same day, there was a clash, lasting fifteen minutes, between Khmer and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese forces at Phum Trapeang Tuol, about twenty-two kilometres west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal, in which the enemy suffered casualties of five dead, whom they carried away with them.

On the same day, at about 12 noon, Khmer forces on operations clashed with some 200 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese twenty-three kilometres south-west of the town of Kompong Speu.

On the same day, at about 1 p.m., there was another clash on National Highway 4, seventy-three kilometres from Phnom-Penh; Khmer casualties were five killed and four wounded, while the enemy carried away with them several dead and wounded.

On the same day, Khmer forces on patrol clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at Phum Mrech four kilometres north of Tuk Meas, in Kampot. The enemy carried away with them two wounded.

On the night of 17 to 18 December 1970, at about 9.15 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese were ambushed by Khmer forces forty-two kilometres north of Veal Rinh, in Kompong Seila. After an engagement lasting about ten minutes, the enemy were routed, leaving behind two wounded and carrying with them several others. One Cambodian was slightly wounded.

On 18 December 1970, at about 11.35 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched an 82 mm mortar attack on the defensive positions at Kompong Seila.

On the same day, there was a clash, lasting about thirty minutes, between Khmer and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese forces at the Prakhâm-Trapeang Kâk cross-roads, about ten kilometres south of Taing Kauk, in Kompong Cham. The enemy left behind two dead and carried away with them several wounded; one Cambodian was wounded.

On the same day, at about 2.30 p.m., there was another clash, lasting for an hour, twenty-one kilometres south-west of Kompong Speu. The enemy withdrew shortly after Khmer air forces were called in. Three Cambodian soldiers were wounded during this engagement.

On the same day, at about 2 p.m., Khmer forces on operations clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese on National Highway 4, seventy kilometres from Phnom-Penh, in Kompong Speu. The engagement lasted for more than an hour, and five Cambodians were wounded.

On the afternoon of 18 December 1970, the Khmer troops coming from Kompong Cham and Skoun re-

spectively to clear National Highway 7 linked up at Prey Totung. Sweep operations continued actively in the area.

On the night of 18 to 19 December 1970, at about 7 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired on the defensive positions at Moha Seing, Talat, Srê Khlong and Trêng Trayoeung, on National Highway 4 in Kompong Speu.

On 19 December 1970, a defensive position about thirty-seven kilometres south-west of the town of Kompong Speu was also fired on.

On the same day, at about 5.15 p.m., a position at the Srê Ambel cross-roads, thirty-eight kilometres north of Veal Rinh, in Kompong Seila, was attacked for about four hours by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese. At about 9 p.m., Khmer air forces were called in.

On the same day, there was another clash eight kilometres north-east of Kep, in Kampot.

On the same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese sabotaged a road bridge on National Highway 5, about eight kilometres south of the town of Kompong Chhnang. When withdrawing, they took away with them four Khmer villagers.

On the night of 19 to 20 December 1970, at about 11.25 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched violent attacks against Srê Khlong and Talat, in Kompong Speu. The Khmer forces took vigorous counter-action and broke up all the enemy's attempted assaults.

On 20 December 1970, at about 12.20 p.m., Cambodian forces recaptured the Talat bridge, seventy-eight kilometres from Phnom-Penh on National Highway 4, in Kompong Speu. Pursuit operations were carried out in the area.

On the same day, at about 8.30 a.m., there was a clash between Khmer and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese forces at O Taping, about thirty kilometres north-west of the town of Kompong Chhnang.

During the night of 20 to 21 December 1970, the town of Kompong Cham was fired on for a short time.

On the same night, at about 8 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired on a position at Peam Oknha Ong, about thirteen kilometres east of Phnom-Penh, on the east bank of the Mekong, in Kandal.

On 21 December 1970, at about 12.30 p.m., a position thirteen kilometres west of Trapeang Kraloeng, in Kompong Speu, was fired on for about twenty minutes.

On the same day, at about 8 a.m. Khmer forces engaged in clearing National Highway 6 had a serious clash with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese, lasting one hour, seven kilometres south-west of Skoun, in Kompong Cham. Khmer casualties were two killed and 2 wounded, and several of the enemy were also killed or wounded.

I wish to reaffirm the strong and energetic protest of the Government of the Khmer Republic against the illegal and permanent occupation of Cambodian territory, followed by savage attacks perpetrated by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese against a neutral and peaceful country to which they have no right and with which they have no ethnic affinity, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, of international law and of the 1954 Geneva Agreements.⁶ The criminal attacks reveal for all to see the annexationist aims of the

⁶ *Idem.*

Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese communist imperialists and represent a dangerous threat to peace and security not only in the Khmer Republic but throughout the region of South-East Asia.

The Government of the Khmer Republic holds the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam entirely responsible for all the extremely grave consequences resulting from this

situation and reserves the right to take any necessary action to defend the independence, neutrality sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the country.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) KHIM TIT
Permanent Representative of the Khmer Republic
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10078

Letter dated 15 January 1971 from the representative of Lebanon
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[15 January 1971]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following.

Before midnight of Thursday, 14 January 1971 and early Friday, 15 January 1971, five Israeli helicopters landed armed units in the Lebanese coastal village of Sarafand situated forty-three kilometres north of the Lebanese-Israeli border and fifteen kilometres south of the town of Saida. As a result of the Israeli aggressive action undertaken in the village, two Lebanese civilians were wounded, one house was destroyed, and two other houses were damaged.

The Israeli forces were engaged by Lebanese army tanks and planes, and were forced to withdraw at three o'clock in the morning. The Israeli authorities resorted today to a trumped-up pretext to justify this unprovoked act of aggression against the territorial integrity of Lebanon. They alleged that boats originating from Sarafand on 2 January landed six *fedayeen* south of Ras-al-Nakoura, five of whom were captured. The sixth escaped. An investigation undertaken by the Lebanese authorities has established that Israel had engineered and carried out an insidious plan by which a certain Hisham Abdel-Karim al-Sa'di was landed on the Lebanese coast from Israel. He claimed to be an

Arab who had escaped from Israel. He persuaded five Palestinian residents in Lebanon to accompany him by sea to a point situated south of Ras-al-Nakoura. An Israeli patrol was awaiting their arrival and captured the five Palestinians; and Israel alleged that the above-mentioned Hisham had escaped.

Once again, Israel initiates an incident it then uses as a pretext for its military actions. It thus follows its general aggressive policy, which has caused many deaths and injuries amongst the Lebanese, the destruction of their property and the disruption of their normally peaceful existence.

Lebanon strongly protests anew against this latest act of aggression and calls to the attention of the Council that such repetitious, Israeli acts are of a nature to endanger constantly the peace and security of Lebanon and the Middle East.

I request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Edouard GHORRA
Permanent Representative of Lebanon
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10080

Letter dated 18 January 1971 from the representative of Syria
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[18 January 1971]

Acting on instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the following.

Radio Israel made a broadcast that at midnight of 2 to 3 January 1971 three regular Syrian soldiers entered United Nations observation post Four in the Syrian occupied territory and stole some pieces from the room.

As this news is devoid of any truth, the Syrian authorities deny it most categorically.

I shall be grateful if this letter can be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH
Permanent Representative of Syria
to the United Nations

**Letter dated 19 January 1971 from the representative of Israel
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English]
[19 January 1971]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter of 15 January 1971 addressed by the representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council [S/10078]. On 30 December 1970, the Permanent Mission of Israel drew the attention of the President of the Security Council to continuing terror attacks carried out from Lebanon against Israel and to the support given them by the Lebanese authorities [S/10067].

The aggression from Lebanon described in the Mission's letter has since been followed by a further intensification of sabotage raids and of shelling attacks on Israeli villages. The bases from which these acts of aggression are perpetrated are situated inside Lebanon, along the entire cease-fire line, from the area opposite Kiryat Shemonah to the Mediterranean coast.

On 31 December 1970, saboteurs from Lebanon blew up part of a building in the town of Kiryat Shemonah.

On the night of 1 January 1971, raiders from Lebanon ambushed an Israeli patrol in the Avivim area, in Upper Galilee, and killed one soldier.

On the same night and on 2, 4, 8, 10 and 11 January 1971, a number of Israeli villages were attacked by mortar or rocket fire.

On 15 January, raiders from Lebanon attacked and killed an Israeli civilian working with his tractor in the area of Har Dov in eastern Galilee.

During the last six months 260 acts of aggression have taken place from Lebanese territory, causing the death of eleven Israelis and the wounding of seventy-seven.

On 4 January 1971, as reported by the Middle East News Agency, the Prime Minister of Lebanon reiterated his Government's co-operation with the terror organizations.

Encouraged by this attitude of the Lebanese Government, the terror organizations have tried to extend the field of their operations and to carry them out through the sea.

On 2 January 1971, a group of raiders, sent from a base in Lebanon by rubber boat, tried to land in northern Israel. Five of the raiders were captured by Israeli forces. It appears that a sixth managed to get away. The attackers wore frogman suits and carried arms and equipment. They revealed that their mission was to kidnap an Israeli citizen.

It was learned that the Lebanese harbour at Ras-Al-Shak (Sarafand), approximately thirteen kilometres south of Sidon, serves as a base from which terrorists, arms and sabotage material are dispatched into Israel and the Gaza Strip. Repeated recent terrorist activities in Gaza, which have taken a heavy toll of lives, particularly among local Arab residents, depend on such shipments of men and material from Lebanon.

The London *Times* on 16 January 1971, published a dispatch from its correspondent at Sarafand, Lebanon, in which he described the location as "an important Palestinian guerrilla staging base".

During the night of 14 to 15 January 1971, an Israeli unit acted to disable this terrorist base. It encountered a large force of saboteurs ten of whom were killed and several wounded in the ensuing clash. Six Israeli soldiers were slightly injured. The saboteurs' camp, caves and underground structures used as living quarters and for storage were blown up. A raft with a rocket mounted on it was also destroyed. A quantity of arms was seized.

Contrary to the claim contained in the above-mentioned letter from the representative of Lebanon that the target of the Israeli action was a civilian village, the El-Fatah terror organization has confirmed that the action was directed against one of its bases. An El-Fatah spokesman, quoted by press agencies in reports from Beirut on 15 January 1971, declared that the target was "a supplies and combat guerrilla base". He went on to refer to heavy fighting between its "commandos" and the Israeli force.

As shown already in the letter of this Mission previously mentioned, the Government of Lebanon bears a heavy responsibility for harbouring these terrorist forces and for encouraging their activities in violation of the United Nations Charter and in defiance of the cease-fire. Rather than cover up for terror warfare against Israel and indulge in political incitement and distortion of facts, as in the Lebanese letter, the Government of Lebanon must take effective steps, in accordance with its international obligations, to stop aggression from its territory.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10082

**Letter dated 18 January 1971 from the Secretary-General to Governments of all States Members of
the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies, containing a further appeal for voluntary
contributions for the financing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus**

[Original: English/French/Spanish]
[20 January 1971]

I have the honour to address once again an appeal to your Government for a voluntary contribution to meet the costs of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

On 10 December 1970, by paragraph 3 of its resolution 291 (1970), the Security Council extended the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force for a further period ending 15 June 1971.

The basis for the financing of UNFICYP as decided by the Security Council is, as you know, by voluntary contributions. Even so, having in mind that the Force has been indispensable in restoring and maintaining quiet in Cyprus and continues to be in Cyprus at the request of the parties and the unanimous decision of the Security Council, it would seem clear to me that there is a certain moral obligation for all peace-loving States to provide the United Nations with the financial means necessary to maintain that Force.

I make this renewed appeal for contributions because of the serious financial plight of UNFICYP, which is due largely to insufficient response to previous appeals for voluntary contributions.

The cost of maintaining the Force for the period from 16 December 1970 to 15 June 1971, inclusive of repatriation and liquidation costs, is estimated at \$6,359,000. The present deficit of UNFICYP, including the above-mentioned figure and on the assumption that all pledges of voluntary contributions received so far will be paid in full, is approximately \$10,760,000. This foreseeable deficit could, however, increase to approximately \$19,450,000 in view of the fact that payment of certain pledges of one Government appears to be dependent on the receipt of additional contributions from other Governments. A list of voluntary contributions paid or pledged to the UNFICYP Special Account since the inception of the operation in March

1964 is attached. In addition, Governments providing contingents are continuing to bear at their expense considerable extra costs incurred as a result of this operation; based on their reports, it is estimated that these absorbed costs would total approximately \$2,700,000 for the current six-month period.

The continuing and growing deficit jeopardizes the proper support of the Force and even its existence. As my responsibilities in regard to UNFICYP can be discharged only if Governments are prepared to provide the necessary financial support for this important United Nations peace-keeping effort, I earnestly hope that Governments which have not yet done so will now see their way to making a contribution to it. I might add that, at this stage, it is all the more important to maintain the Force in Cyprus because of the talks between the two communities which are now in progress and which have been made possible to a large degree by the quiet achieved and maintained with the assistance of UNFICYP.

I therefore appeal again to the Governments of all States Members of the United Nations or members of specialized agencies to respond promptly and generously with voluntary contributions to provide the necessary financial support for the United Nations peace-keeping operation in Cyprus.

(Signed) U THANT
Secretary-General

PLEDGES AND PAYMENTS TO THE UNFICYP SPECIAL ACCOUNT FOR THE PERIOD
27 MARCH 1964 TO 15 JUNE 1971, AS AT 11 JANUARY 1971

Government	(In United States dollar equivalents)	
	Total pledges	Payments received
Australia	1,419,875	1,419,875
Austria	1,000,000	1,000,000
Belgium	1,583,676	1,533,676
Botswana	500	500
Congo, Democratic Republic of	20,000	10,000
Cyprus	582,600	582,600
Denmark	1,725,000	1,725,000 ^a
Federal Republic of Germany	9,500,000	9,500,000
Finland	525,000	525,000 ^a
Ghana	11,667	11,667
Greece	9,250,000	9,250,000
Guyana	2,473	2,473
Iceland	8,000	8,000
Iran	26,000	26,000
Ireland	50,000	50,000
Israel	26,500	26,500
Italy	2,919,778	2,019,778
Ivory Coast	60,000	60,000
Jamaica	14,800	14,800
Japan	640,000	640,000
Khmer Republic	600	600
Laos	1,500	1,500
Lebanon	1,297	1,297
Liberia	8,270	6,770
Libyan Arab Republic	30,000	30,000
Luxembourg	45,000	45,000
Malawi	5,590	5,590
Malaysia	7,500	7,500
Malta	1,820	1,820
Mauritania	2,041	2,041

<i>Government</i>	<i>(In United States dollar equivalents)</i>	
	<i>Total pledges</i>	<i>Payments received</i>
Morocco	20,000	20,000
Nepal	400	—
Netherlands	921,000	921,000
New Zealand	42,000	42,000
Niger	2,041	2,041
Nigeria	10,800	10,800
Norway	1,615,471	1,615,471
Pakistan	14,800	14,800
Philippines	3,000	3,000
Republic of Korea	16,000	16,000
Republic of Viet-Nam	4,000	4,000
Sierra Leone	11,900	11,900
Singapore	3,500	3,500
Sweden	2,620,000	2,620,000 ^a
Switzerland	1,495,000	1,495,000
Thailand	2,500	2,500
Trinidad and Tobago	2,400	2,400
Turkey	1,839,253	1,839,253
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	26,970,476	23,981,865 ^a
United Republic of Tanzania	7,000	7,000
United States of America	52,100,000 ^b	40,100,000
Venezuela	3,000	3,000
Zambia	38,000	28,000
TOTAL	117,212,028	101,251,517

^a Payment has been made or will be made by means of an offset against the Government's claims for reimbursement of its costs.

^b Maximum amount pledged. The ultimate contribution will be dependent on contributions of other Governments.

DOCUMENT S/10083

Letter dated 20 January 1971 from the representative of the United Arab Republic to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[20 January 1971]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the aide-mémoire which I handed to Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East, on 15 January 1971.

I am sure that the members of the Security Council and the whole membership of the United Nations are by now aware of the position of the United Arab Republic in accepting Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and in expressing its willingness to carry out this resolution in all its parts.

In carrying out his mandate as established by this same Security Council resolution, Ambassador Jarring was and is assured of our fullest co-operation.

In order, however, fully to inform you and all the members of the Security Council, of our official position, I am instructed by my Government to request that this letter and the attached aide-mémoire be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed H. EL-ZAYYAT
Permanent Representative of
the United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

[15 January 1971]

It was quite clear that, when you started your mission, in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967), its essential aim was to establish the necessary contacts with the parties concerned with a view to implementing this resolution in all its parts in order to reach a just settlement in the Middle East.

The United Arab Republic has accepted this resolution from the outset, and informed you in explicit terms at the time that it accepted the resolution and declared its willingness to implement it. At the same time Israel refused to implement the resolution.

In the course of discharging your mission, it became clear to you that it would be preferable, in order to achieve the implementation of the resolution, that you direct specific questions to the parties based on the provisions of the resolution. This emanated from your belief that the response of the parties would eventually lead to the full implementation of the Security Council resolution.

The United Arab Republic has answered in full your questions of 5 March 1969 as appears in the report submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council dated 4 January 1971 [S/10070].

Confirming its readiness to implement all the provisions which the Security Council's resolution requires that it carry out, the United Arab Republic adopted a positive attitude in responding to all the questions. As for Israel's attitude, it was noted that it deliberately refrained from submitting answers to certain questions, especially to those regarding its withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories. Israel further declined to declare its willingness to implement the United Nations resolutions on the Palestine refugees.

It is evidently clear that the memorandum which Israel handed to you on 10 January 1971 added no new element to Israel's previous answers to your questions. In point of fact it continued to ignore the most essential elements required for the attainment of a lasting and just peace namely:

Withdrawal from the Arab territories it occupied by its armed forces since 5 June 1967;

Achieving a just settlement for the Palestine refugees in accordance with the resolutions repeatedly adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly since 12 December 1948.

It is the belief of the United Arab Republic that any settlement, aimed at the realization of peace in the area, should contain the necessary elements to make it lasting. This cannot be achieved unless it is founded on the purposes and the principles of the United Nations Charter and the scrupulous implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and all other relevant United Nations resolutions.

In order to reach such a settlement in accordance with the provisions of the Security Council resolution, it is necessary that:

(1) The Israeli aggression should be terminated and the Israeli armed forces should be withdrawn beyond the 5 June 1967 lines, as provided for in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) which reaffirms the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security;

(2) Israel should declare its repudiation of the policy of territorial expansion which it has pursued at the expense of the neighbouring Arab States. This policy is repeatedly expressed in the statements made by Israeli leaders;

(3) A just settlement for the Palestine refugees should be reached. This can only be realized through Israel's respect for the rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with United Nations resolutions;

(4) All claims or states of belligerency, should be terminated and freedom of navigation in waterways should be guaranteed;

(5) The sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force should be respected and acknowledged;

(6) Peace and the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area should be guaranteed.

The Security Council may decide upon the necessary arrangements which would provide security to all States in the area. These arrangements may, *inter alia*, include:

(a) The establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would participate;

(b) The establishment of demilitarized zones across the borders.

The United Arab Republic has previously stated its readiness to implement its obligations in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967). This was clearly manifested in the United Arab Republic answers submitted to you on 5 March 1969. You may recall that during our contacts over the last three years the United Arab Republic has frequently assured you of this intention. Moreover, the United Arab Republic has declared in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, that to achieve a peaceful settlement it is indispensable that all the obligations provided for in the Security Council resolution should be fully carried out and that this is the essential prerequisite for the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the area.

The United Arab Republic reiterates anew its full readiness to carry out all its obligations as contained in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). It is essential that Israel, on its part, should fully carry out all its obligations under this same resolution.

After the lapse of more than three years since the beginning of your mission, it should be evident that Israel refuses to implement the Security Council resolution. It continues to procrastinate in an attempt to escape the carrying out of its obligations contained in the resolution. Israel seeks to dictate its conditions by relying on force and on the status quo. It submits notes containing nothing but mere repetition of its previous positions.

This attitude on the part of Israel does not only impede the achievement of the peaceful settlement. It continues to escalate the explosive situation in the Middle East. This constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security. The situation in the area, therefore, cannot be permitted to deteriorate any further. Consequently, it is deemed necessary that the Security Council should exercise its responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Motivated by its ardent desire to ensure the continuation of your mission, essential to the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 22 November 1967, the United Arab Republic is of the opinion that the Security Council should adopt all adequate measures in order to assist you to carry out the mission entrusted to you by the Secretary-General in accordance with that resolution.

DOCUMENT S/10084

Letter dated 21 January 1971 from the representative of Pakistan to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[21 January 1971]

I am instructed by the Government of Pakistan to bring to the notice of the Security Council the serious

situation which has arisen in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, a territory whose status remains to be

determined in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council as well as the international agreement embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, jointly accepted by both the parties to the dispute.

This serious situation has been directly caused by the actions of the Government of India, taken on 8, 9 and 12 January 1971, in prohibiting entry into the State of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and other well-known leaders of Kashmir, Mirza Afzal Beg and Mr. G. M. Shah, in banning the Plebiscite Front and in subsequently arresting a large number of political workers in the Indian-occupied area of the State. These actions have been taken with the objective of suppressing all political activity in the State and of preventing participation in Indian parliamentary elections of the representative organizations and personalities of the Indian-occupied area.

In this context, it needs to be borne in mind that it is a well-known and established principle of the jurisprudence of the United Nations that, in a territory whose people have not exercised their right of self-determination elections held under the control of the occupying or administering authority cannot be a substitute for a plebiscite or referendum held under impartial auspices. In regard to the specific question of Jammu and Kashmir, resolutions 91 (1951) and 122 (1957) of the Security Council have clearly laid down that "any action" which a constituent assembly convened by India "might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part thereof . . . would not constitute a disposition of the State" consistent with the principle that "the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations".

In total disregard of this principle, however, it has been one of the main contentions of the Government of India that, by holding four elections in the Indian-occupied part of Jammu and Kashmir, India has fulfilled its obligation of ascertaining the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir with regard to the accession of the State to India. This contention, of course, runs totally contrary to the fact that these elections were not allowed to be fought over the issue of that accession.

Apart from this inherent characteristic of the elections in Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, the fact has been brought out by abundant impartial evidence that the elections held in 1952, 1957 and 1962 were rigged and consisted of nothing but fraudulent manipulations by the Government of India and its puppet régime in Kashmir. This evidence is on the records of the Security Council. As regards the elections which were held in 1967, I would invite reference to my letter of 27 April 1967 contained in document S/7862. Now, the Government of India has clearly shown by its latest actions that it is not prepared for the elections to be held this year to become a fair poll of popular opinion in the State. A leading Indian newspaper, the *Hindustan Times* of New Delhi, stated in its editorial of 11 January 1971 that, by imposing restrictions on the Plebiscite Front, the Government of India "will now be spared the familiar embarrassment of rigging the elections".

Another main contention advanced by India with regard to the Kashmir dispute has been that the people

of the Indian-occupied area have accepted the State's accession to India. Always removed from reality, this contention has now been further disproved by India's alleging in the official notification issued on 12 January that the members of the Plebiscite Front and its sympathizers had disclaimed or questioned India's sovereignty and territorial integrity by saying that Kashmir was not a part of India and that the question of its accession to India remained to be decided. In this and an accompanying notification, India has acknowledged that "violent activities were gathering momentum rapidly and would have become uncontrollable and have an adverse effect on the security of the State unless the activities of the Plebiscite Front are checked immediately and its influence among the youth and students is brought to an end". This admission of widespread agitation and discontent in the Indian-occupied territory is signal proof of the fact that India has been keeping the bulk of the State under forcible subjugation and that the people of the State are by no means reconciled to Indian occupation.

It may be pertinent here to quote reports of these actions of the Government of India published in the international press. *The Times* of London of 8 January 1971 in a dispatch from New Delhi dated 7 January stated:

"Shaikh Abdullah and his Plebiscite Front Movement which is seeking self-determination for the Muslim majority in the northern state of Kashmir, have decided to contest the forthcoming mid-term parliamentary election.

"The decision has alarmed the central Government, which has refused to hold a plebiscite in the disputed territory for the past 20 years. . . .

"There can be no doubt that the Government would be in an embarrassing position, both at home and internationally, if the Shaikh's movement won the election with a large majority."

The New York Times of 10 January, carrying a New Delhi dispatch of 9 January, reported:

"Apparently, New Delhi fears that if the front is allowed to contest the state elections it might gain control of the Kashmir Government."

An editorial of *The New York Times* of 13 January 1971 stated:

"Mrs. Gandhi's admirable faith in the democratic process unfortunately seems to stop at the Kashmir border. The Kashmiri Government in Srinagar, backed by New Delhi, has barred Sheikh Abdullah, leader of Kashmir's Moslem majority, from the state and has arrested more than 500 workers of the Sheikh's political organization, the Plebiscite Front. The Front, which seeks self-determination for Kashmir, will be barred from contesting the election."

The Government of India has sought to justify these actions by insinuating that it is Pakistan which encourages agitation in Indian-occupied Kashmir. While the baselessness of an allegation of this type hardly needs to be exposed, it may be pertinent here to quote the editorial of the *Hindustan Times* of 11 January which said that "the notion that Pakistan is preparing to strike betrays a whole series of diplomatic, political and military assumptions that seem . . . removed from objective reality".

India's actions against the Plebiscite Front and its leaders, whose popular and representative character is unquestioned, are but the latest demonstration of her

policy of not only ruthlessly suppressing all opposition to her occupation but also of penalizing any individual or group in the State that invokes the decisions of the United Nations and asks India to abide by them. The notification issued by the Government of India on 12 January 1971 declaring the Plebiscite Front to be an "unlawful association" gave the following as one of the grounds of such declaration:

"[The Front,] has for its object a so-called settlement of the question of the accession of the State to India through a plebiscite and the said object, which amounts to an assertion of a claim to determine whether the State is, or will remain, a part of the territory of India, is an unlawful activity."

It is unquestionable that the object of the Front, as described in the notification, is identical with the object solemnly proclaimed by the Security Council in its resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir, by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and by both the parties to the dispute when they declared their adherence to the latter's resolutions. In banning the pursuit of such an object, India declares the upholding of international law as unlawful and assumes a position totally incompatible with the obligations of its membership of the United Nations. On India's own showing, the Plebiscite Front seeks nothing more than that the pledge given to the people of Jammu

and Kashmir by the United Nations should be fulfilled and an impartial plebiscite should be held to determine the disposition of the State. Evidently, neither party to the dispute can prejudge the result of such a plebiscite. It is, therefore, clear that when India asserts that the demand for the plebiscite amounts to an attempt to bring about the "secession" of Jammu and Kashmir from India, it brings a charge not against those who articulate that demand but against itself for attempting to perpetuate an occupation which, it knows, is intolerable to the people of the State and will not withstand any fair ascertainment of their popular will.

The Government and the people of Pakistan view with serious concern the situation created by these actions and would wish the members of the Security Council to take cognizance of the fact that these actions aggravate tensions in the subcontinent of India and Pakistan and that the responsibility for the consequent deterioration of the relations between India and Pakistan will lie squarely on the Government of India.

I shall be grateful if this letter is circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) A. SHAHI
Permanent Representative of Pakistan
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10088

Letter dated 25 January 1971 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[25 January 1971]

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 18 January 1971 by the representative of Syria [S/10080].

An investigation carried out by the Israel Defence Forces on the morning of 3 January 1971, immediately after the raid on United Nations observation post Four revealed that tracks made by three persons wearing regular Syrian boots were followed from the observation post Four site through a destroyed bunker located in the immediate vicinity of the observation post and leading in an east-south-east direction towards Syrian territory. When following the track, the trackers found items which had been taken from the United Nations observation post living caravan. These findings were transmitted to the United Nations observers and published in Security Council document S/7930/Add.1038.

The persons who plundered observation post Four under cover of darkness made their escape to the Syrian lines. These lines are guarded by a dense network of military positions along the line and in depth. No armed elements, irrespective of whether they belong to the regular Syrian army or to units of Syrian-based terrorists, can operate from within this Syrian military zone without the knowledge and permission of the Syrian authorities.

The Syrian Government is responsible for all violations of United Nations observation posts committed by elements operating from within or behind the Syrian lines, of which the raid on United Nations observation post Four was one instance.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

Letter dated 25 January 1971 from the representative of Jordan
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[26 January 1971]

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of Jordan's statement presented to Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East upon the resumption of his mission.

For reasons, which have become obvious, and upon instructions from my Government, I should be grateful if this letter and the above document on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) could be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
242 (1967) OF 22 NOVEMBER 1967 FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN
THE MIDDLE EAST

The Government of Jordan welcomes the resumption of the mission entrusted to Ambassador Gunnar Jarring to assist efforts to achieve a just and durable peace in the area in accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

Jordan's acceptance of that resolution is based on its desire to achieve a just and speedy peaceful solution. It is further based on the provisions and principles of the Charter under which the Security Council has moved in its resolution 242 (1967) towards the establishment of a just peace.

The Government of Jordan has always co-operated closely with Ambassador Jarring in the fulfilment of his mission and will continue to do so. As evident from the Secretary-General's report dated 4 January 1971 [S/10070], the Government of Jordan has acted in a constructive and positive manner and has made its position very clear. In doing so it was prompted by a sincere desire to implement resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts as well as all other relevant United Nations resolutions aimed at the solution of the Middle East crisis in all its aspects.

The Government of Jordan hereby reiterates its position concerning the implementation of the Security Council resolution:

(a) Withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all occupied territories without exception in conformity with resolution 242 (1967), which emphasized "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war". Israel must accept and put into effect this concept which governs relations amongst nations.

(b) Peace is indivisible. Every State in the area is entitled to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Israel should unequivocally repudiate its policy of territorial expansion.

(c) The Government of Jordan recognizes the religious and cultural importance of the Arab city of Jerusalem to all faiths. It will therefore guarantee free access to all religious and historical places to all concerned as well as freedom of worship. Jordan stands ready to make all necessary arrangements to this effect.

(d) A just settlement of the Palestine refugees must be reached. This can only be realized through Israel's respect for the rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the United Nations resolutions.

(e) The termination of all claims or states of belligerency and guaranteeing freedom of navigation in international waterways.

(f) Guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area. The four permanent members may, through the Security Council, obtain adequate arrangements to provide security to all States in the area. Such arrangements may include a United Nations observation force in which the permanent members may participate. Arrangements for ensuring security of the States in the area might also include the establishment of demilitarized zones on a reciprocal basis.

(g) With the implementation of the above steps the elements of conflict and dissension will disappear and a just and durable peace will ensue. There will be respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force as envisaged in resolution 242 (1967).

DOCUMENT S/10090

Letter dated 26 January 1971 from the representative of Syria
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[26 January 1971]

Acting upon instructions from my Government and with reference to the letter addressed to you on 25 January 1971 by the Israeli representative [S/10088] in reply to my letter of 18 January 1971 [S/10080], I have the honour to state the following:

(1) The "investigation" carried out by the Israeli occupying authorities and the ensuing false allegation

that "the Syrian Government is responsible for all violations of the United Nations observation posts" is one-sided and cannot be regarded except as an additional Israeli attempt to distort facts and obfuscate the real issues.

(2) The supplemental information report contained in document S/7930/Add.1038, dated 7 January 1971,

to which the Israeli representative himself referred, categorically denies the Israeli allegations. Paragraph 6 of the report states:

"On 6 January, the senior Syrian Arab delegate called the Chairman of ISMAC and stated that he had investigated this matter and could assure the Chairman that, without doubt, the intruders were not members of the Syrian regular army."

Furthermore, paragraph 7 of the same report, in concluding the inquiry undertaken by UNTSO itself states:

"It appears, therefore, that despite inquiries conducted by UNTSO and by both the Israel and Syrian

authorities, the identity of the armed intruders could not be established."

Israel's long record of occupying and destroying United Nations premises is too well known to be emphasized.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH
Permanent Representative of Syria
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10092

Report of the Secretary-General in pursuance of Security Council resolution 282 (1970) concerning the question of apartheid

[Original: English/Russian/Spanish]
[3 February 1971]

1. At its 1549th meeting held on 23 July 1970, the Security Council adopted resolution 282 (1970) concerning the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. The operative paragraphs of this resolution read as follows:

"1. *Reiterates* its total opposition to the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa;

"2. *Reaffirms* its resolutions 181 (1963), 182 (1963) and 191 (1964);

"3. *Condemns* the violations of the arms embargo called for in resolutions 181 (1963), 182 (1963) and 191 (1964);

"4. *Calls upon* all States to strengthen the arms embargo

"(a) By implementing fully the arms embargo against South Africa unconditionally and without reservations whatsoever;

"(b) By withholding the supply of all vehicles and equipment for use of the armed forces and paramilitary organizations of South Africa;

"(c) By ceasing the supply of spare parts for all vehicles and military equipment used by the armed forces and paramilitary organizations of South Africa;

"(d) By revoking all licences and military patents granted to the South African Government or to South African companies for the manufacture of arms and ammunition, aircraft and naval craft or other military vehicles and by refraining from further granting such licences and patents;

"(e) By prohibiting investment in, or technical assistance for, the manufacture of arms and ammunition, aircraft, naval craft, or other military vehicles;

"(f) By ceasing provision of military training for members of the South African armed forces and all other forms of military co-operation with South Africa;

"(g) By undertaking the appropriate action to give effect to the above measures;

"5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the present resolution and report to the Security Council from time to time;

"6. *Calls upon* all States to observe strictly the arms embargo against South Africa and to assist effectively in the implementation of the present resolution."

2. By notes dated 31 July 1970, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution to all States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies, drawing their particular attention to paragraphs 4 and 6.

3. In response to his notes of 31 July the Secretary-General received, as of 15 October 1970, replies from six Member States. Two of these were simple acknowledgements (Panama and United Kingdom) and one from Brazil was circulated upon request as a document of the Security Council [S/9914]. In addition, the President of the Security Council received a telegram dated 10 August 1970 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic which was also circulated on the President's instructions as a document of the Security Council [S/9909].

4. In the course of its twenty-fifth session, the General Assembly, at the 1864th plenary meeting held on 13 October 1970, adopted resolution 2624 (XXV) on the policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa. In that resolution the General Assembly recalled Security Council resolution 282 (1970) calling upon all States to strengthen the arms embargo against South Africa. The operative paragraphs of the resolution of the General Assembly read as follows:

"1. *Calls upon* all States to take immediate steps to implement fully the provisions of Security Council resolution 282 (1970);

"2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the present resolution, as he has been doing with regard to Security Council resolution 282 (1970), and to report to the General Assembly not later than 10 December 1970."

5. Accordingly, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of resolution 2624 (XXV) to all States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies under cover of notes dated 22 October 1970, in which he requested them to provide him with relevant information so that he could report to the General Assembly as requested.

6. On the basis of the replies received, the Secretary-General submitted his report to the General Assembly on 7 December and published an addendum on 15 December 1970.⁷ Thirty-four replies received by 15 December referred to the Secretary-General's note of 22 October 1970. Two were simple acknowledgements (Nicaragua and United Kingdom), and the remainder were included in substance in the Secretary-General's report submitted in compliance with resolution 2624 (XXV).

⁷ Documents A/8208 and Add.1.

7. As of 29 January 1971, the Secretary-General has received a total of forty-four replies to his notes of 31 July and 22 October 1970 concerning action taken by States in implementation of Security Council resolution 282 (1970). Annex I below contains a comprehensive list of replies to both notes, together with an indication as to where the substantive parts of these replies are to be found. The substantive parts of the replies not reproduced elsewhere which either referred solely to the Secretary-General's note of 31 July or were received after 15 December 1970 are reproduced in annex II below.

ANNEX I

Comprehensive list of substantive replies to the Secretary-General's notes verbale of 31 July and 22 October 1970, transmitting Security Council Resolution 282 (1970) and General Assembly Resolution 2624 (XXV)

Country	Date of reply	Document in which the reply is reproduced
Brazil	19 August 1970	S/9914
	3 November 1970	A/8208
Bulgaria	1 December 1970	A/8208
Canada	20 November 1970	A/8208
Central African Republic	9 December 1970	A/8208/Add.1
China	7 December 1970	A/8208/Add.1
Cuba	4 December 1970	A/8208/Add.1
Cyprus	3 November 1970	A/8208
Czechoslovakia	7 December 1970	A/8208/Add.1
Denmark	1 December 1970	A/8208
Ecuador	13 August 1970	See annex II below
	17 November 1970	A/8208
Federal Republic of Germany	4 December 1970	A/8208
Guatemala	6 January 1971	See annex II below
Hungary	14 December 1970	A/8208/Add.1
Iraq	28 December 1970	See annex II below
Ireland	3 December 1970	A/8208/Add.1
Israel	6 January 1971	See annex II below
Italy	25 November 1970	A/8208
Japan	5 December 1970	A/8208/Add.1
Kenya	27 December 1970	See annex II below
Mauritania	2 December 1970	A/8208/Add.1
Mexico	24 November 1970	A/8208
Netherlands	29 September 1970	See annex II below
	23 November 1970	A/8208
New Zealand	4 December 1970	A/8208/Add.1
Norway	14 December 1970	A/8208/Add.1
Panama	29 October 1970	A/8208
Romania	4 December 1970	A/8208
Sierra Leone	5 October 1970	A/8208
	5 December 1970	See annex II below
Sudan	27 November 1970	A/8208
Sweden	7 December 1970	A/8208/Add.1
Switzerland	19 November 1970	A/8208
Thailand	3 December 1970	A/8208/Add.1
Uganda	9 December 1970	A/8208/Add.1
United States of America	2 December 1970	A/8208
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	18 December 1970	See annex II below
Upper Volta	2 December 1970	A/8208/Add.1
Venezuela	3 December 1970	A/8208

ANNEX II

Substantive parts of replies received not reproduced elsewhere

ECUADOR

[Original: Spanish]
[13 August 1970]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is pleased to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations that the Government of Ecuador faithfully complies with provisions adopted by

the Security Council against the policy of *apartheid* of the South African Government.

GUATEMALA

[Original: Spanish]
[6 January 1971]

In connexion with resolution 2624 (XXV), adopted by the General Assembly on 13 October 1970, concerning "the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa", I wish to inform you that the Government of Guatemala has no arms trade with South Africa.

[Original: English]
[28 December 1970]

The Secretary-General will recall that the Government of Iraq has expressed on various occasions its condemnation of the policies of *apartheid* by the Government of South Africa.

The delegations of Iraq to the sessions of the General Assembly and at other forums of the United Nations and its organs have always supported the various United Nations resolutions regarding the discrimination policies of South Africa. As on previous occasions, Iraq was a co-sponsor of resolution 2624 (XXV) and the policy of the Government of Iraq has always been the full implementation of United Nations resolutions on *apartheid* and racial discrimination.

The Government of Iraq, needless to say, will take all the necessary measures towards full and effective implementation of Security Council resolution 282 (1970) in all its provisions, and it will always call upon the colonial powers to honour their commitments under the Charter with regard to the racial policies of the Government of South Africa.

ISRAEL

[Original: English]
[6 January 1971]

With reference to resolution 2624 (XXV), Israel voted in support of the said resolution and the Government of Israel is conducting its policy in conformity with it.

KENYA

[Original: English]
[27 December 1970]

The Government of Kenya fully complies with resolution 282 (1970) of the Security Council, and has, since the attainment of independence, consistently maintained a total boycott of South Africa.

Kenya has time and again condemned any sale of arms to the oppressive régime of South Africa, and has, at the meetings of the Organization of African Unity, the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries and the General Assembly of the United Nations, called on all those States which sell or intend to sell arms to the racist régime of South Africa to desist doing so forthwith.

[Original: English]
[29 September 1970]

The Netherlands Government has studied the text of the above-mentioned resolution of the Security Council with the utmost attention. The Netherlands Government, furthermore, wishes to inform the Secretary-General that it will take due account of its contents in carrying out its policy on this matter.

SIERRA LEONE

[Original: English]
[5 October 1970]

The Government of Sierra Leone has no relations whatever with the Government of the Republic of South Africa.

The Government of Sierra Leone has fully and unreservedly implemented the arms embargo on South Africa and is determined to use every lawful means to influence nations friendly to Sierra Leone to implement the Council resolution.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Original: Russian]
[18 December 1970]

The position of the Soviet Union with regard to the inhuman policy of *apartheid* practised by the Government of the Republic of South Africa is widely known. It has been expressed time and again in statements by the Soviet delegation in the Security Council and the General Assembly, and in notes to the Secretary-General including the note from the USSR Permanent Mission dated 29 April 1969.^a

The Soviet Union has always, in the past and the present, emphatically condemned the policy of *apartheid* and racism, which the United Nations has declared a crime against humanity.

The Soviet Union is scrupulously implementing the resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly on the question of *apartheid*, including decisions on the cessation of sales and deliveries of weapons and military equipment of any kind to the racist South African régime.

On the basis of its position of principle and in accordance with the decision of the United Nations, the Soviet Union does not maintain diplomatic, consular, trade or other relations with the Republic of South Africa and, needless to say, does not supply that country with weapons or with any kind of military equipment.

^a See document A/7538/Add.1.

DOCUMENT S/10093

Letter dated 26 January 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]
[27 January 1971]

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 7 January 1971 [S/10077], I have the honour to bring the following to your attention for the information of the members of the Security Council.

On 22 January 1971, at about 1.40 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese subjected to harassment by mortar and rocket fire the following Khmer military installations on the outskirts of the capital, causing considerable material damage and loss of life:

(1) At the Khmer National Air Force Base at Pochentong, a number of planes and helicopters were destroyed;

(2) At the Khmer Naval Base at Chruai Changwar, one man was wounded;

(3) At the Military Transport Camp at Pochentong, twenty-six were killed and 150 wounded, including wives and children of soldiers' families. Several buildings were also destroyed.

I wish to reaffirm the firm and vigorous protest of the Government of the Khmer Republic against the illegal and permanent occupation of Cambodian territory, followed by savage attacks perpetrated by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese against a neutral and peace-loving country to which they have no right and with which they have no ethnic affinity, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, of international law and of the 1954 Geneva Agreements.^a These criminal attacks

^a Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China.

reveal for all to see the annexationist aims of the Viet Cong-North Viet-Nameese communist imperialists and represent a dangerous threat to peace and security not only in the Khmer Republic but throughout the region of South-East Asia.

The Government of the Khmer Republic holds the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam entirely responsible for all the extremely grave consequences resulting from this situa-

tion and reserves the right to take any necessary action to defend the independence, neutrality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) KHIM TIT
Permanent Representative of the Khmer Republic
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10094

Letter dated 28 January 1971 from the representative of India
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[29 January 1971]

Under instructions from the Government of India, I have the honour to draw your attention to the letter dated 21 January 1971 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations [S/10084].

The State of Jammu and Kashmir became an integral part of India by virtue of its accession to India in 1947. All the arguments and issues raised by the representative of Pakistan in his letter concern matters which are entirely within the domestic jurisdiction of India and the Government of India has made it clear, both to Pakistan and to the Security Council, that it will not discuss such questions with any other country or in the United Nations.

The letter from the representative of Pakistan falls into the pattern of Pakistan Government's efforts to cloud the fact of its aggression in Jammu and Kashmir and to annex this Indian territory by force. Pakistan has twice committed aggression against India in pursuance of this policy and has also resorted to infiltration, subversion and other disruptionist activities against India at different times in spite of its commitment under the Tashkent Declaration⁹ not to do so. Recent events have once more brought to light that Pakistan was in-

involved in directing sabotage, espionage and other activities in Jammu and Kashmir with a view to realizing its aggressive designs on Kashmir. The Government of India has taken and will continue to take measures against organizations and persons who seek to subvert the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India and I have particularly been instructed by my Government to make it clear that India cannot accept that Pakistan has any right whatsoever to question such action by my Government.

The outstanding issue in Kashmir between India and Pakistan is concerning the question of Pakistan's illegal and forcible occupation of a part of this Indian state. The Government of India has expressed its readiness to discuss this question between the two countries peacefully and bilaterally and the Government of India hopes that Pakistan will adopt a co-operative and peaceful approach in regard to the outstanding Kashmir issue rather than interfere in India's internal affairs and thereby spoil Indo-Pakistan relations.

I should be grateful if you would kindly have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) S. SEN
Permanent Representative of India
to the United Nations

⁹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1966*, document S/7221.

DOCUMENT S/10095

Letter dated 27 January 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]
[29 January 1971]

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 26 January 1971 [S/10093], I have the honour to bring the following to your attention for the information of the members of the Security Council.

On 21 December 1970, at about 9 a.m., Khmer forces on patrol clashed with about 100 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at a spot six kilometres west of Kaong, in Kompong Seila, for some twenty minutes. The enemy left behind three dead and carried away with them a number of dead and wounded. Cambodian casualties were two killed and ten wounded.

On the same day, at about 8.45 a.m., Khmer forces on patrol clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese, eight kilometres north-east of Kep, in Kampot,

for some thirty minutes. The enemy left behind twelve dead and carried away with them about twenty dead and wounded. Khmer casualties were four killed and ten wounded.

On the same day, at about 7.30 a.m., Khmer forces on a disengagement operation on National Highway 4 came under Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fire for several minutes about seventy kilometres south-west of Phnom Penh, in Kompong Speu.

On the same day, at about 12.30 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese again fired on the same forces, wounding one of them.

On 22 December 1970, at about 8.30 a.m., an engagement lasting some forty minutes took place between

the Khmer forces and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Namease at Phum Phlâu Trei four kilometres north-west of Dey Eth, in Kandal. The enemy then withdrew, leaving behind eleven dead and carrying with them several other dead and wounded.

On the same day, at about 4.30 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Namease launched an attack against a position at the Prêk Thnot dam, sixteen kilometres west of Kompong Speu. The enemy withdrew at about 9 a.m., leaving behind twenty-one dead, thirty grenades, 1,000 rounds of ammunition, three Chinese sub-machine-guns, two rocket launchers, ten shells and twenty pairs of sandals, and carrying with them several dead and wounded. Khmer casualties were nine wounded.

On the same day, at about 4.30 a.m., an engagement took place between the Khmer forces and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Namease four and a half kilometres south-west of Trapeang Kraloeng, in Kompong Speu.

During the night of 22 to 23 December 1970, at about 7 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Namease launched an attack against a position at the Srê Ambel crossroad, thirty-seven kilometres north of Veal Ring, in Kompong Seila.

During the same night, at about 7 p.m., another engagement took place in the outskirts of the town of Kampot.

During the same night, at about 8 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Namease harassed the town of Kompong Thom with mortar and automatic-weapon fire, wounding two persons.

During the same night the town of Prey Veng was fired upon briefly by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Namease.

On 23 December 1970, at about 7.30 a.m., Khmer forces on a reconnaissance operation clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Namease one and a half kilometres south of Prey Totung, in Kompong Cham. The enemy left behind fifteen dead and carried away with them several dead and wounded. Khmer casualties were three killed and eight wounded.

On the same day, at about 3.30 p.m., Khmer forces on patrol clashed with some fifty Viet-Cong-North Viet-Namease at Dambêk Khpos, seven kilometres south-west of Tani, in Kampot. After about thirty minutes of fighting, the enemy withdrew, leaving behind two dead, one Chinese sub-machine-gun, about 100 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition, one grenade and equipment, and carrying with them four wounded. One member of the Khmer forces was wounded.

On the same day, at about 6.50 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Namease fired on a position at the Talat bridge, three and a half kilometres north-east of Srê Khlong, in Kompong Speu. The enemy withdrew at about 7.30 p.m., carrying with them several dead and wounded. Khmer casualties were one killed and one wounded.

During the night of 23 to 24 December 1970, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Namease fired on the defence positions of the town of Kompong Cham: the Chiro position, seven and a half kilometres north-east of Tonlé Bet, where they wounded four members of the Khmer forces, and the Phaav position, where two of the enemy were killed and left behind.

On 24 December 1970, at about 11.10 a.m., an engagement lasting about ten minutes took place between forces of the Khmer Navy patrolling on the

Mekong and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Namease at a spot five kilometres south-east of Tuk Khleang, in Kandal. Khmer casualties were two wounded, while the enemy carried away with them several dead and wounded.

On the same day, at about 2 p.m., another engagement took place at Sdock Veng, three kilometres south of Bat Doeung, in Kandal.

On the same day, at about 11 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Namease attacked a position at Lovea Sar Locu, some thirty kilometres south-east of Phnom Penh, on the east bank of the Mekong, in Kandal. The Khmer forces, who suffered two wounded, fought back vigorously, forcing the enemy to withdraw after half an hour, carrying away with them several dead and wounded.

On the same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Namease fired on a position at Phum Lom Hach, twenty-five kilometres west of Phnom Penh, in Kandal. The vigorous response of the Khmer forces killed or wounded about ten of the enemy, who were carried away.

During the night of 24 to 25 December 1970, at about 11.30 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Namease launched an attack against Khmer forces at the Kaong bridge, in Kompong Seila.

During the same night, at about 12.20 a.m., they attacked a Khmer position at the Kompong Som-Srê Ambel crossroads and another situated nine kilometres north-east of the Kaong bridge, in Kompong Seila. Losses were estimated to be one dead and four wounded on the Khmer side; on the enemy side, several dead and wounded were carried away and some 75 mm recoilless guns were destroyed.

On 25 December 1970, Khmer forces on patrol clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Namease at a spot four kilometres north of Tonlé Bet, in Kompong Cham. Khmer casualties were two killed and six wounded, while the enemy carried away with them a number of dead and wounded.

On the same day, at about 8.30 a.m., an engagement took place between the Khmer forces and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Namease at Kdei Daung, some three kilometres west of the town of Kompong Thom. After about thirty minutes of fighting, the enemy withdrew, carrying with them several dead and wounded and leaving behind three dead, one carbine of United States make, five backpacks, two hundred litres of petrol, ten 60 mm mortar shells and two grenades. Khmer casualties were two wounded.

On the same day, three engagements took place between the Khmer forces and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Namease at Wat Prek Thmey, five and a half kilometres north of Setbo, at Phum Trapeang Totung, nineteen kilometres north-west of Phnom Penh, and at a spot thirty-six kilometres west of the capital, in Kandal.

On the same day, at about 2 p.m., Khmer forces on patrol clashed for some minutes with some forty Viet-Cong-North Viet-Namease at a spot twelve and half kilometres south-west of Srê Khlong, in Kompong Speu.

On the same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Namease launched an attack against a Khmer position at Phum Hanouman, fourteen kilometres south of Kompong Kantuot, in Takeo. After half an hour of fighting, the enemy withdrew, carrying with them one dead and two wounded.

During the night of 25 to 26 December 1970, at about 9 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Namease fired

on a position of the Khmer forces at the O Tapaông bridge, thirty-two kilometres north-east of the town of Pursat.

During the same night, an engagement took place between the Khmer forces and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at a spot thirteen kilometres north of the town of Prey Veng.

During the same night, a Khmer position at Kompong Châk, nine kilometres north of the town of Svay Rieng, was harassed three times by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese. The response of the Khmer forces who suffered three wounded, forced the enemy to withdraw, carrying with them a number of dead and wounded.

During the same night, at about 6.30 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired on a Khmer position at Angkor College, 700 metres north-east of the town of Siemreap.

During the same night, at about 9 p.m., an engagement took place near Baray, in Siemreap. The enemy withdrew after some ten minutes of fighting, leaving behind one dead.

During the night of 25 to 26 December 1970, at about 8.30 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired on the administrative building at Tuk Khleang, about twenty-six kilometres south-west of Phnom Penh, on the east bank of the Mekong.

On 26 December 1970, another engagement, lasting half an hour, took place three kilometres west of Skoun. Khmer casualties were one killed and one wounded.

On the same day, at about 9.45 a.m., Khmer forces on a search operation clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese eleven kilometres west of Stung Chral, in Kompong Seila.

On the same day, at about 10.20 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese briefly fired upon a Khmer position at Kompong Seila.

During the night of 26 to 27 December 1970, another engagement, lasting about one hour, took place nine kilometres north-west of the town of Kompong Cham. Khmer casualties were one killed and two wounded, while the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese left behind two dead and carried away with them several dead and wounded.

During the same night, at about 11 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired on a Khmer position six kilometres east of Tram Khnar, in Takeo.

During the same night, at about 7 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese directed sporadic fire at a Khmer position north-east of the town of Prey Veng.

On 27 December 1970, between 9 a.m., and 4.50 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese opened fire three times on a Khmer position fifteen kilometres north-east of Kaong, in Kompong Seila, wounding two persons.

On the same day, at about 3.20 p.m., an engagement lasting half an hour took place between the Khmer forces and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at a spot twelve kilometres east of Kaong, in Kompong Seila. Khmer casualties were one killed and seven wounded, while the enemy carried away with them several dead and wounded.

On the same day, another engagement took place at Phum Lovèk, twenty-four kilometres north-east of the town of Siemreap, causing Khmer casualties of one killed and four wounded. Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese losses were described as heavy.

On 27 December 1970, at about 11 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched a fierce attack against a Khmer position at Rocar Kong, thirty-two kilometres north-east of Phnom Penh, in Kandal. With air support, the Khmer forces fought back vigorously and repulsed several enemy attacks. Estimated losses were four dead and twelve wounded on the Cambodian side, and several dead and wounded, who were carried away, on the enemy side.

During the night of 27 to 28 December 1970, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired upon a Khmer position at Phaav, twelve kilometres south-east of Skoun, in Kompong Cham. The response of the Khmer forces, who suffered seven wounded, forced the enemy to withdraw, carrying with them a number of dead and wounded.

During the same night, following a fierce engagement at Chambâk, in Takeo, the Khmer forces suffered three killed and four wounded, while the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese dispersed, leaving behind 50 dead, 50 grenades, 3 anti-tank mines, 13 shells, 250 rounds of machine-gun ammunition, 1 torch and 5 belts, and carrying with them about 100 wounded.

On 28 December 1970, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired upon the Khmer positions at Ampil Thom and Khvet Thom, situated respectively six and four and a half kilometres west of Prey Totung, in Kompong Cham, killing one person and wounding four.

During the night of 28 to 29 December 1970, at about 12.50 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese directed mortar fire at Khmer forces at the Talat bridge, three and a half kilometres north of Srê Khlong, in Kompong Speu. The response of the Khmer forces, who suffered one dead and four wounded, forced the enemy to withdraw, carrying with them a number of dead and wounded.

During the same night, at the same hour, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fiercely attacked a Khmer position at Srê Khlong. By about 5.30 a.m., the Khmer air force had intervened, while the fighting continued. Estimated losses were three dead and fourteen wounded on the Khmer side, and on the enemy side some fifty dead and about 100 wounded were carried away.

On 29 December 1970, at about 6.15 p.m., 82 mm mortar fire was again directed at Srê Khlong, in Kompong Speu.

On the same day, at about 7.30 a.m., an engagement took place between the Khmer forces and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at a spot twenty-six kilometres north-west of the town of Pursat. After half an hour of fighting, the enemy withdrew, leaving behind one dead, two M-17 rifles, one barrel of kerosene, one revolver and one hammock, and carrying with them several dead and wounded.

On the same day, at about 8 a.m., a Khmer position at Phum O Tapaông, in Pursat, was fired upon by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese.

On the same day, at about 11 a.m., Khmer forces conducting operations clashed for some twenty minutes with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at Wat Tuol Sophi, seven and a half kilometres south-west of Oudong, in Kompong Chhnang. During the engagement, one member of the Khmer forces was killed and four others were wounded.

On the same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired on a Khmer position at Kompong Seila.

During the night of 29 to 30 December 1970, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired upon a Khmer position at the Doeum Treang bridge and another at Phum Po, situated respectively three kilometres south-west and 700 metres south-east of Kompong Kantuot, in Kandal.

On 30 December 1970, at about 10.40 a.m., a hard-fought engagement lasting half an hour took place four kilometres north of Kompong Châk, in Svay Rieng. The enemy left behind seven dead, six Chinese sub-machine-guns, one AR-15 and one rocket launcher and carried away with them several dead and wounded. Khmer casualties were one killed and two wounded.

I wish to reaffirm the strong and vigorous protest of the Government of the Khmer Republic against the illegal and permanent occupation of Cambodian territory, followed by savage attacks perpetrated by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese forces against a neutral and peaceful country to which they have no right and with which they have no ethnic affinity, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter of international law

and of the 1954 Geneva Agreements.¹⁰ These criminal attacks reveal for all to see the annexationist designs of the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese communist imperialists and represent a dangerous threat to peace and security not only in the Khmer Republic but throughout the region of South-East Asia.

The Government of the Khmer Republic holds the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam fully responsible for all the extremely grave consequences resulting from this situation and reserves the right to take any necessary action to defend the country's independence, neutrality, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) KHIM TIT

*Permanent Representative of the Khmer Republic
to the United Nations*

¹⁰ Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China.

DOCUMENT S/10098

Letter dated 2 February 1971 from the representative of the United Arab Republic to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[2 February 1971]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the aide-mémoire which I communicated yesterday, 1 February 1971, to Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East.

I request that this letter and the attached aide-mémoire and its annex be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed H. EL-ZAYYAT
*Permanent Representative of
the United Arab Republic
to the United Nations*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On 22 November 1967, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 242 (1967) and accordingly the Secretary-General designated you as his Special Representative to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution.

During your contacts with us, which started on 18 December 1967, we have confirmed to you our readiness to implement the resolution as a "package deal" and our willingness to carry out our obligations as stipulated therein. We have explained this in our reply to your questions handed to you on 27 March 1969. This reply was included in the report submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on 4 January 1970 [S/10070].

Our readiness to implement resolution 242 (1967) emanated from respect for the will of the international community and our compliance with the United Nations Charter. We have also welcomed all the international

efforts exerted to achieve a peaceful settlement, declared our support of the French initiative of 16 January 1969, and accepted the American initiative submitted on June 1970.

All our international contacts were aimed at achieving a permanent peace in the Middle East established on the firm basis of justice and not dictated by the threat or use of force or as a result of territorial expansion. Hence our position remained that the settlement necessitates that Israel should respect the Charter of the United Nations and its decisions and implement the Security Council resolution in full. Each party to the conflict should pledge to abide by its obligations and the settlement should not reflect the weight of conquest or the consequences of the use of force against United Nations Member States.

Reaffirming our desire for peace and for the continuation and success of your mission, we have stated our position in the communication submitted to you on 15 January 1971, which was based on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in order to achieve a peaceful and durable settlement [see S/10083].

From our experience, during the long time which lapsed since the beginning of your mission, it has become evident that Israel refuses to implement the Security Council resolution and continues to seek to impose its terms from a position of strength thus blocking the progress of your mission.

Firmly believing in the importance of achieving a just and lasting peace in the area, and because of Israel's persistence in its refusal to implement the Security Council resolution, and being concerned about the continuation of your mission, we have submitted the issue to the United Nations General Assembly, at its twenty-fifth session. The General Assembly adopted resolution 2628 (XXV) on 4 November 1970 which

expressed serious concern that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) had not been implemented, and reaffirmed that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible and that consequently territories thus occupied must be restored. The resolution reaffirmed that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East necessitates the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the conflict, the termination of all claims or states of belligerency, and recognized that the respect for the rights of the Palestinians is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The resolution also called upon the parties directly concerned to resume contacts with you with a view to carrying out at the earliest possible date your mandate for the implementation of the Security Council resolution in all its parts. In adopting this resolution the United Nations has once more stressed the importance of achieving a peaceful settlement in accordance with the Security Council resolution, thus rejecting Israel's policy which is based on the use of force to impose an Israeli settlement in the area, disregarding the Security Council resolution and the United Nations Charter.

Upon the adoption of that resolution on 4 November, the United Arab Republic Government declared its readiness to resume contacts with you and instructed its representatives accordingly. On the other hand, Israel has always refused to comply with the Security Council resolution, rejected all international efforts deployed towards achieving a peaceful settlement in the area, and continues to occupy Arab territories.

In these occupied Arab territories, Israel persists in carrying a policy of repression, expulsion, and collective punishment against the inhabitants, adopting various administrative and legislative measures including the use of armed force to impound the property of these inhabitants. Moreover, it continues to establish settlements in the occupied territories whose indigenous Arab inhabitants are replaced by new immigrants. The General Assembly and the Security Council adopted several resolutions calling on Israel to abide by the provisions of the United Nations Charter, norms of international law and relevant international agreements which obligate Israel to respect the rights of the Arab inhabitants of occupied territories. Nevertheless, the repressive measures being currently perpetrated by Israel in these territories clearly reveal its persistence in a policy designed to change their Arab character, establish Israeli settlements and create a fait accompli with a view to consolidating its occupation. This brings further evidence of its expansionist policy. This explicitly indicates that the peace claims of the Israelis are merely intended to delude world public opinion.

We consider that the two Israeli notes of 10 and 27 January 1971 which were submitted to you reveal that Israel continues in its refusal to implement the Security Council resolution, since Israel does not commit itself to withdrawal from all Arab territories it occupied in June 1967. We also consider that peace referred to by Israel in its notes remains meaningless as long as Israel evades total withdrawal from the Arab territories. Israel's refusal to commit itself to withdraw from all Arab territories is a confirmation of the expansionist designs for the realization of which it had launched its 1967 aggression.

Israel's deliberate omission in its notes of peace guarantees, the open opposition by its leaders to the stationing of United Nations peace-keeping forces in

which the four permanent members of the Security Council would participate to guarantee peace, and its opposition to the establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders, clearly underline Israel's rejection of a just and lasting peace.

In its notes, furthermore, Israel does not commit itself to the implementation of the United Nations resolutions relevant to a just settlement of the refugee problem, resolutions which were adopted by the General Assembly during the past twenty-two years, the last of which was resolution 2672 (XXV) of 8 December 1970.

In adopting a position based on the use of armed force aimed at dictating its terms to the Arab States in order to realize its expansionist design, Israel is obstructing the achievement of the peaceful settlement stipulated in the Security Council resolution.

The continuation of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories is an act of aggression that constitutes a breach of peace in the area and seriously endangers world peace. Israel's adamant refusal to implement the Security Council resolution makes it incumbent on the Council, in exercising its responsibility under the Charter, to take the necessary measures required to assist you in the discharge of your mandate and the implementation of its resolution 242 (1967), thus securing the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all the Arab occupied territories and establishing the requisite guarantees to ensure that international peace and security will not be endangered.

ANNEX

Excerpts from the aide-mémoire handed to Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East, on 20 January 1971 (document S/10083)

In order to reach such a settlement (just settlement in the Middle East) in accordance with the provisions of the Security Council resolution, it is necessary that:

(1) The Israeli aggression should be terminated and the Israeli armed forces should be withdrawn beyond the 5 June 1967 lines, as provided for in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) which reaffirms the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security;

(2) Israel should declare its repudiation of the policy of territorial expansion which it has pursued at the expense of the neighboring Arab States. This policy is repeatedly expressed in the statements made by Israeli leaders;

(3) A just settlement for the Palestine refugees should be reached. This can only be realized through Israel's respect for the rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with United Nations resolutions;

(4) All claims or states of belligerency should be terminated and freedom of navigation in waterways should be guaranteed;

(5) The sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force should be respected and acknowledged;

(6) Peace and the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area should be guaranteed.

The Security Council may decide upon the necessary arrangements which would provide security to all States in the area. These arrangements may, *inter alia*, include:

(a) The establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would participate;

(b) The establishment of demilitarized zones across the borders.

Letter dated 28 January 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]
[2 February 1971]

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 27 January 1971 [S/10093] I have the honour to transmit the following for the information of the members of the Security Council.

On 30 December 1970, at about 6.20 p.m., the Communist Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese aggressors harassed a Khmer defence position at Kompong Seila, using mortars and automatic weapons. Vigorous counteraction by the Khmer defenders succeeded in silencing the enemy at about 7 p.m.

During the night of 30 to 31 December 1970, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed a Khmer defence position at Prèk Tameak, in Kandal, without causing any damage.

On the same night, a Khmer defence position north of the town of Prey Veng was briefly subjected to harassment by Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese.

On 31 December 1970, at about 5 a.m., Khmer operational forces engaged the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at Kraing Chèk, approximately thirteen kilometres north of the town of Kompong Speu. The enemy, having been surprised and subjected to heavy fire by the Khmer forces, tried to avoid a clash and managed to withdraw at about 11 a.m., leaving behind thirty dead and sixteen Chinese sub-machine-guns (PM/AC) and carrying away a number of other dead and wounded. The Khmer casualties were seven wounded.

On the same day, at about 8.45 a.m., there was a clash lasting about five hours several kilometres north of Kompong Seila between Khmer forces and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese, during which seven Khmer were wounded.

On the same day, at about 4.15 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese briefly harassed a Khmer position at Thnal Totang, about seventeen kilometres north of the town of Takeo.

On the same day, at about 8 a.m., there was a clash between Khmer forces and a Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese force estimated at about 200 men, sixteen kilometres north-east of the town of Kampot. After nearly an hour's fighting the enemy withdrew, leaving behind 5 dead, 700 cartridges for Chinese sub-machine-guns, 25 hand shovels, 15 grenades and 10 boxes of loaders, and carrying away several dead and wounded. Two Khmer were wounded.

On 1 January 1971, at about 12 noon, there was another clash about twenty kilometres north of Veal Rinh, on National Highway 4, in Kompong Seila.

On the same day, Khmer troops recaptured and reoccupied the region and the hill of Phnom-Krom, seven kilometres south of Siemreap, and the district of Svay Thom, seven kilometres east of the same town. Contacts were re-established between the civilian and military authorities and the clergy and population of the district.

On the same day, at about 6 a.m., a clash lasting half an hour took place between Khmer forces and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese about six kilometres east of the town of Siemreap, on National Highway 6. Two Khmer soldiers were slightly wounded.

On the night of 1 to 2 January 1971, at about 8 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired on a Khmer defence position at Sràng, in Kompong Speu, using 82 mm mortars and automatic weapons. Under return fire from the Khmer forces, the enemy withdrew after about ten minutes, carrying away with them several dead and wounded.

On 2 January 1971, at about 2.30 a.m., Khmer forces on patrol in the vicinity of the defence position at Kompong Seila briefly engaged a force of about twenty-five Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese.

On the same day, at about 9.45 a.m., there was another clash north-east of that same position between Khmer forces carrying out a mopping-up operation and about 300 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese in entrenched positions. After three hours of heavy fighting the Khmer forces, four of whom were wounded, succeeded in dislodging the Communist aggressors from their positions. The enemy withdrew at about 12.40 p.m., carrying away their dead and wounded.

On the night of 2 to 3 January 1971, at about 8 p.m., Khmer forces patrolling in the southern sector of the defence position at Kompong Seila, clashed for half an hour with an estimated 200 Viet-Cong-North-Viet-Nameese, wounding several, whom the enemy carried away with them.

On the same night, at about midnight, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed a Khmer defence position situated two and a half kilometres west of the town of Kompong Cham, wounding one Cambodian soldier.

On the same night, at about midnight, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed a Khmer defence position at Kraing Tasame, ten kilometres east of the town of Pursat.

On 3 January 1971, there was a clash between Khmer forces and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese twelve kilometres north of Pursat. The enemy withdrew after half an hour, carrying away about ten wounded.

On the same day, at about 7 a.m., during a mopping-up operation, Khmer forces clashed violently for three and a half hours with a force of some 200 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese about twenty-three kilometres north of the town of Takeo; six Khmer were killed and twelve wounded, while enemy casualties were several dead and wounded, whom they carried away with them.

On the same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched an attack on the Khmer defence position at Svay Thom. Under the return fire from the Khmer forces, two of whom were killed and four wounded, the enemy was forced to withdraw, leaving behind two dead and carrying away a number of dead and wounded.

On the same day, at about 4.15 a.m., after about ten minutes of harassing the Khmer defence position at Kompong Seila with 82 mm and 120 mm mortar fire, and 75 mm recoilless guns, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese attacked the position. The heavy fire re-

turned by the Khmer forces frustrated all thrusts by the enemy, forcing them to withdraw at about 6.20 a.m.

On 4 January 1971, between 3 and 4 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese again sporadically harassed the same position with 82 mm mortar fire. The Khmer defenders, who suffered eight wounded, returned the fire and forced the enemy to withdraw, carrying away with them a number of dead and wounded.

On the same day, at about 11.40 a.m., there was a clash between Khmer forces and Viet-Cong-North Vietnamese at Phum Phlau Trey, about twenty-two kilometres south-east of Phnom-Penh, on the east bank of the Mekong, in the province of Kandal. After about twenty minutes the enemy withdrew, carrying away several dead and wounded. Khmer casualties were two wounded.

I wish to reiterate the firm and vigorous protest of the Government of the Khmer Republic against the illegal and permanent occupation of Cambodian territory, followed by savage attacks perpetrated by Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese against a neutral and peace-loving country to which they have no right and with which they have no ethnic affinity, in flagrant violation

of the United Nations Charter, international law and the 1954 Geneva Agreements.¹¹ These criminal attacks reveal clearly the annexationist aims of the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese communist imperialists and represent a dangerous threat to peace and security not only in the Khmer Republic but throughout the region of South-East Asia.

The Government of the Khmer Republic holds the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam entirely responsible for all the extremely grave consequences resulting from this situation and reserves the right to take any necessary action to defend the independence, neutrality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council communication.

(Signed) KHIM TIT
Permanent Representative
of the Khmer Republic
to the United Nations

¹¹ *Idem.*

DOCUMENT S/10100

Letter dated 2 February 1971 from the representative of India
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[3 February 1971]

I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a note dated 8 January 1971, which the High Commission of India in Islamabad (Pakistan) has delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, in reply to the Pakistan note circulated as a Security Council document [S/10059]. I request that the attached note be circulated also as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) S. SEN
Permanent Representative of India
to the United Nations

NOTE NO. ISL(POL)103/2/71, DATED 8 JANUARY 1971, FROM THE HIGH COMMISSION OF INDIA IN ISLAMABAD TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF PAKISTAN

The High Commission for India and Pakistan presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, and has the honour to refer to their note No.IN(4)-6/5/69 dated 16 December 1970.

The attention of the Government of Pakistan is drawn to the note given in India on 16 September 1969, regarding the Central Labour Laws (Extension to Jammu and Kashmir) Bill 1969. The note rejected the note of 3 September 1969 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, on the same subject as it constituted an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of India in furtherance of Pakistan's ambitions on Indian territory. The Government of India rejects the note under reference for the same reasons. It is a matter of regret that the hope expressed earlier about the Government of Pakistan desisting from such interference in future has been belied.

DOCUMENT S/10101

Letter dated 5 February 1971 from the representative of Lebanon
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[5 February 1971]

Pursuant to my letter to you dated 15 January 1971 [S/10078], and upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following.

After midnight, Monday, 1 February 1971, an Israeli patrol crossed the Lebanese border to the village of Al-Khyam and opened fire on the village. At the same time, another Israeli patrol crossed the border to the village of Kafr-Kala. It blew up two houses and abducted to the Israeli territory two civilians, who were released the following day.

Units of the Lebanese army engaged the Israeli forces and forced them to withdraw.

This new Israeli act of aggression constitutes another premeditated encroachment upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon in violation of the Lebanon-Israel Armistice Agreement¹² and in defiance of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council resolutions, and international law.

By her provocative actions, Israel is bent on a policy aimed at constantly disturbing the peace and security of Lebanon and at maintaining a state of turbulence and terror in the Middle East.

I respectfully request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Edouard GHORRA
Permanent Representative
of Lebanon to the United Nations

¹² Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 4

DOCUMENT S/10102

Letter dated 5 February 1971 from the representative of Pakistan
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[5 February 1971]

Under instructions from the Government of Pakistan, I have the honour to draw your attention to the letter dated 28 January 1971 [S/10094] from the representative of India in answer to my letter of 21 January [S/10084].

The representative of India has sought to deny outright the jurisdiction of the United Nations in the international dispute concerning the status and disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Regarding the questions involved in this dispute and the situations arising from it, the Representative of India states that "the Government of India has made it clear, both to Pakistan and to the Security Council, that it will not discuss such questions with any other countries or in the United Nations."

This attempted denial of the jurisdiction of the United Nations, particularly of the Security Council, is based on the proposition that "the State of Jammu and Kashmir became an integral part of India by virtue of its accession to India in 1947". The irrationality of the argument, as stark as it is incredible, is apparent from the fact that it was *after* this alleged accession (effected by a feudal Maharajah) that the Government of India:

(a) Declared before the Security Council that it (the accession) was by no means to be considered as unalterable, that it was tentative and that the status of Jammu and Kashmir would finally be determined by a plebiscite to be conducted under international auspices;

(b) Acknowledged that Pakistan was one of the two parties interested in the Jammu and Kashmir question;

(c) Submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Security Council in relation to the settlement of the problem of the disposition of Jammu and Kashmir;

(d) Signified its acceptance of the principles of settlement embodied in the resolutions adopted by the

United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949; and

(e) Participated in more than a hundred meetings of the Security Council convened solely for the purpose of discussing the problem concerning the State of Jammu and Kashmir—the India-Pakistan question—and how it could be resolved.

If the instrument of accession executed by a Maharajah who had forfeited his authority over the territory at the time of the execution had made Jammu and Kashmir an integral part of India, it is obvious that India would have taken the earliest opportunity to challenge the competence of the Security Council in making any pronouncement or taking any decision with regard to the disposition of the territory and, indeed, going beyond the principal subject matter of India's original complaint. If such challenge had been lawful, the question would not have been placed on the agenda of the Security Council. Certainly, India itself would not have made the numerous statements that its representatives solemnly made before the Security Council to the effect that it is agreeable to the determination of the status of the territory through an impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. It is also clear that in that event the Security Council would not have adopted as many as twenty-two resolutions and two statements of consensus on the subject.

The most recent substantive resolution of the Security Council on the question is resolution 211 (1965) adopted on 20 September 1965. Paragraph 4 of this resolution reads as follows:

"Decides to consider, as soon as paragraph 1 of Council resolution 210 (1965) [of 6 September 1965] has been implemented, what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict, and in the

meantime calls on the two Governments to utilize all peaceful means, including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, to this end."

When the resolution was adopted, it was emphatically stated by the members of the Security Council that the Council had thus committed itself to help bring about a settlement of the problem underlying the conflict between India and Pakistan, i.e. the problem concerning the status of Jammu and Kashmir.

It will be recalled that, after the adoption of the resolution mentioned above, India refused to participate in meetings of the Security Council on the India-Pakistan question. The Council, bearing in mind its similar experience with South Africa, which had set a strikingly parallel example, unanimously took the view that it could proceed to discuss and adopt suitable decisions on the question of Jammu and Kashmir despite India's non-participation. The very basis of the functioning of the United Nations would have been undermined if the Council had agreed to confer on a party to an international dispute a right to veto its proceedings with regard to that dispute. The Council's response to India's withdrawal from the proceedings was clear from the fact that these proceedings continued and, indeed, led to the adoption of a resolution. The following are some statements made in this connexion:

(a) At the 1249th meeting on 28 October 1965, the representative of one of the permanent members (Ambassador Seydoux of France) urged the Security Council to keep before it the idea that:

"its mission is, in the last analysis, to study possible measures to promote a settlement of the political problem, namely, the problem of Kashmir, which is at the root of this conflict" [1249th meeting, para. 8].

(b) At the 1248th meeting on 27 October 1965, an African representative (Ambassador Usher of the Ivory Coast) said:

"As the African representative in the Security Council and in view of the fact that we shall be discussing this question at future meetings, I should like to state for the record that we greatly deplore the fact that the two parties . . . are not taking part in the debate. It is, however, not the first time that this has happened in the Security Council. We shall undoubtedly find that, when we discuss the problem of *apartheid*, South Africa will, as usual, not be with us, although I could wish that it would be; but its absence has not prevented the Council in the past from taking a number of appropriate decisions. That is why I believe that in the present case the Council can usefully continue its deliberations and take decisions which can be carried out." [1248th meeting, para. 5.]

(c) The same view was clearly expressed by an Asian representative (Ambassador El-Farra of Jordan) who said at the same meeting of the Security Council:

"The absence of one of the parties cannot stop the work of the Security Council. It cannot stop the Council from deliberating on the question, taking decisions and finding constructive solutions. Otherwise it would amount to a veto, if the absence of one of the parties could stop the work of the Council." [Ibid., para. 7.]

(d) At the 1251st meeting on 5 November 1965, a Latin American representative (Ambassador Paysse Reyes of Uruguay) stated:

"Thirdly, Uruguay voted for resolutions 209 (1965), 210 (1965), 211 (1965) and 214 (1965) of 4, 6, 20 and 27 September. In doing so, my delegation stated that it understood that the Security Council was considering the problem of Kashmir as a whole: that is, both the present crisis and the need to make some effective contribution to removing the cause of the crisis. This means, in our view, that resolution 211 (1965) implies that the protagonists should make a triple commitment: a cease-fire, withdrawal of troops and armed personnel, a decision or a desire to consider what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the basic problem which has been under the jurisdiction of the Security Council since 1948." [1251st meeting, para. 14.]

The Government of Pakistan has made a positive response to the call contained in Security Council resolution 211 (1965) to utilize all peaceful means including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter to settle the political problem—i.e. the dispute concerning the State of Jammu and Kashmir—underlying the conflict between India and Pakistan. Its efforts, however, have been nullified by the attitude adopted by the Government of India. The extreme nature of this attitude has now been clearly revealed in the contents of the letter of the representative of India under reference.

In claiming that the situation in Jammu and Kashmir is a matter of its internal jurisdiction, India takes a position identical to that which has been taken by colonial Powers in regard to territories under their subjugation and which has been categorically rejected by the United Nations. In refusing to discuss an international issue in the Security Council, India faithfully follows the example set by South Africa. But India stands all by itself in denying the jurisdiction of the United Nations over an issue regarding which it participated in negotiations conducted by the United Nations and declared itself engaged by the international agreement to which those negotiations led. Now, by refusing to recognize even the international character of the dispute concerning Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India makes it impossible for any international peace-making machinery, in or outside the United Nations, to be brought into play for its honourable settlement. Its posture is one of defiance, not only towards the United Nations, but also towards all individual members of the community of nations, who, by virtue of that membership, have a legitimate interest in the resolution of an international dispute which has twice led to war and which affects the welfare and happiness of the inhabitants of the subcontinent of India and Pakistan constituting a large segment of the human race.

In contrast to the attitude of the Government of India, Pakistan wishes to make it plain that it is receptive to any suggestion, and will co-operate with any effort, emanating from any Government or from the United Nations, which would seek to resolve the problem of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State impartially ascertained.

Pakistan's anxiety regarding the situation in Jammu and Kashmir has been aggravated in recent weeks by the rapid deterioration resulting from the extremely

repressive measures adopted by the Government of India. These measures compel the people of the State to resort to desperate acts which cannot but have an immediate effect on the climate of relations between India and Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan considers it both its duty and its responsibility to draw the attention of the Security Council to such grave and ominous developments.

My submissions above also provide a reply to the letter addressed to you by the representative of India dated 2 February 1971 [S/10100].

I shall be grateful if this letter is circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) A. SHAHI

Permanent Representative of Pakistan
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10104

Note by the President of the Security Council transmitting a note verbale
from the observer of the Republic of Viet-Nam

[Original: English]
[8 February 1971]

The attached note verbale dated 8 February 1971 from the observer of the Republic of Viet-Nam was addressed to the President of the Security Council with the request that it should be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

NOTE VERBALE DATED 8 FEBRUARY 1971 FROM THE
PERMANENT OBSERVER OF VIET-NAM TO THE
UNITED NATIONS, ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Permanent Observer of the Republic of Viet-Nam to the United Nations presents his compliments to the President of the United Nations Security Council and has the honour to enclose herewith the translation of a message delivered on 8 February 1971, by His Excellency Nguyen Van Thieu, President of the Republic of Viet-Nam, to the soldiers and cadres taking part in an operation along the Viet-Nam-Laos borders.

It would be greatly appreciated if the President of the Security Council would kindly circulate this text to Member States of the United Nations as a document of the Council.

*Message of President Nguyen Van Thieu to the people,
soldiers and cadres on the operations carried out on
8 February 1971 by the Armed Forces of the Re-
public of Viet-Nam on Laotian territory*

Today, 8 February 1971, I have ordered the armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam to attack the Communist North Viet-Nameese bases on the Laotian territory along the Viet-Nam-Laos border in Military Region I.

This operation is called Operation Lamson 719. This is an operation limited in time as well as in space, with the clear and unique objective of disrupting the supply and infiltration network of the Communist North Viet-Nameese troops lying in the Laotian territory, and which for many years was occupied by the Communist North Viet-Nameese and used to launch attacks against our country.

Today, I solemnly confirm that the Republic of Viet-Nam always respects the independence, neutrality, and sovereignty of the Royal Kingdom of Laos.

I also solemnly confirm that the Republic of Viet-Nam does not have any territorial ambition whatsoever, and never interferes in the internal politics of the Royal Kingdom of Laos. I also pledge that when the above-mentioned limited operation ends, the armed

forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam will withdraw completely from the Laotian territory.

Throughout the world, we all know that for many years the Communist North Viet-Nameese themselves have openly violated the neutrality and the territory of the Royal Kingdom of Laos, and blatantly violated the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos just as they had blatantly violated the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Indochina in order to wage the aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Throughout the world, we all also know that the Communist North Viet-Nameese openly occupied one important part of the Laotian territory, built the Ho Chi Minh Trail there in order to move countless soldiers into the south, weapons, ammunitions and military materiel, and established in that part of the Laotian territory great military and logistics bases in order to wage the aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

If this situation prevails, the Communist North Viet-Nameese will stubbornly continue their war of aggression throughout Viet-Nam, Laos and the Khmer Republic.

In the particular case of the Republic of Viet-Nam, while we show maximum goodwill at the Paris talks in order to solve this war through a negotiated settlement and through serious negotiations, while the allied nations have withdrawn a great part of their troops and continue to withdraw from the Republic of Viet-Nam, on the contrary, the Communist North Viet-Nameese still continue to infiltrate troops, weapons, ammunitions, and military equipment, and are getting ready to launch new attacks in the forthcoming months.

For these reasons, the attacks of our armed forces against the Communist North Viet-Nameese troops along the borders on the Laotian territory do not constitute an act of belligerence by the Republic of Viet-Nam, but are solely a necessary act of legitimate self-defence of the Republic of Viet-Nam against the Communist North Viet-Nameese aggressors.

This is not an act of aggression of the Republic of Viet-Nam against the friendly nation of Laos; on the contrary, this constitutes an act designed to stop the Communist North Viet-Nameese from expanding and maintaining their aggression potential.

Nor is this an expansion of the war undertaken by the Republic of Viet-Nam; on the contrary, this is an act to help end the war soon and restore peace in this part of the world.

**Letter dated 8 February 1971 from the representative of the United Arab Republic
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English]
[8 February 1971]

By its resolution 237 (1967) the Security Council "calls upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities".

I am instructed by my Government to bring to your attention reports of intensified repressive and indiscriminate attacks against the civilian inhabitants of Sinai and Gaza Strip being committed by the Israeli forces of occupation.

It would be a matter of concern for the members of the Security Council to note what *The New York Times* correspondent wrote from Israel on 2 February 1971. He reported that "the (Israeli) army garrison in Gaza was more than doubled—with cease-fire in effect along the Suez Canal, the Israeli Army could spare the troops. A unit of tough border police called the Green Berets of Israel was dispatched to Gaza town, armed with truncheons."

Some detailed information from Israeli sources about what is happening today in Gaza Strip are attached. They are as follows:

Annex I: Excerpts from an article by Shalom Cohen, member of the Knesset, published in *Haolam Hazeh* on 27 January 1971;

Annex II: Excerpts from "Foreign Reporters' Testimony" as published in the aforementioned weekly newspaper;

Annex III: Excerpts from the Israeli Parliament Protocol, session of 18 January 1971.

These events are sadly reminiscent of the tragic massacres which occurred in the vicinity of the village of Kafr Kassem on the eve of Israeli aggression against Egypt on 29 October 1956 and the subsequent mass murder which occurred in Gaza, Rafah and Khan Younis in the days and weeks immediately following the 1956 aggression and which was reported fully at the time by the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in November 1956.

The United Nations cannot be indifferent to the fate of the civilian population which is being victimized not only by the fact of the prolonged occupation itself but also by such acts of oppression.

I request that this letter and its annexes be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed H. EL-ZAYYAT
Permanent Representative
of the United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

ANNEX I

Extracts from an article entitled "Gaza as death" by Shalom Cohen, member of the Knesset, published in *Haolam Hazeh* of 27 January 1971

The deeds are done. Even if they try to cloud and hide them, it will be of no use. These deeds were done last week, they are being done now, while I am writing these lines. The question is what can we do to stop them.

Which order, which power, which authority—and immediately—can resolve to stop the use of whips and sticks against innocent people in the streets of Gaza? And to stop killing whoever runs in the streets—either because of fear or nervousness, or as a hunted animal? Who can prevent the honour of innocent women from being violated in the streets or in their homes? And that searches will not be used to justify the destroying of furniture, insulting people, and torturing them?

Who can stop the unjustified arrest of passers-by, and 'all of what happened in Gaza this week, and is happening now?

...I restrain myself from giving the details of each of these deeds. But if the authorities want us to believe them—today, tomorrow and after tomorrow, here and abroad—that what was done was done without an official order, let an order be given now to stop what is happening in Gaza immediately.

Otherwise, we will know that the horrible things are being done with knowledge and according to a plan. And let them not say tomorrow that phrase which is hanging over all of Europe: "I didn't know".

ANNEX II

Excerpts from "Foreign Reporters' Testimony" as published in *Haolam Hazeh*

A member of the Israeli parliament Mr. Uri Avneri, declared in a speech before the Knesset on 25 January 1971 that foreign reporters who visited him were shocked (at what they saw in Gaza). They infiltrated into Gaza and wandered about without official escort, and they saw what was done there in the daylight and in the main streets. The testimony of those reporters, as told to Mr. Avneri, was published in his weekly, Haolam Hazeh. It reads as follows:

Regiments of the border guards were asking people for their identification. The guards carried Uzi sub-machine-guns and long sticks. Others carried another kind of equipment—skin-whips. One of the guards would start looking at a citizen's papers while others would complete the job: hitting his face and whipping his legs. A citizen who entered the civil administration office was whipped on his legs while another guard was inspecting his papers.

A newspaper boy told the reporters: "I was riding my bicycle distributing the *Jerusalem Post* to subscribers. The soldier stopped me and scattered the papers in the street. When my watch fell, one of the soldiers smashed it with his feet."

In the Shifa hospital, we saw a nine-year-old girl who was mistakenly wounded by the border police. However, the Israeli broadcast said that "a young woman was wounded". We also saw a twelve-year-old boy in the hospital suffering from internal bleeding—as a result of the treatment from border police. During this same visit in the hospital, seven people were being treated after having been beaten by the border police.

Many of the local employees of the civil administration refused this week to go to work, because of the treatment from the border police, who ignore the movement permission given to those and beat them indiscriminately. Israeli employees of the military government in Gaza did not try to conceal their resentment and shock at what they saw with their own eyes.

ANNEX III

Excerpts from the Israeli Parliament Protocol, session of 18 January 1971:

Uri Avneri, MP: I received reports about what is happening these days in Gaza also. As an Israeli citizen, a member of the Knesset, I am shocked at what is being done these days... let it be registered in the Knesset record that at least

one member of the Knesset raised his voice today to express his most extreme protest against the deeds that are taking place now in Gaza... (interruption)... The Minister of Defence said in Haifa that the soldiers of the Israeli Army are not ready to do these things [shooting into crowds]. Hence, I decided to send the border police which is not under the jurisdiction of the Israel Defence Army... In Gaza today, brutal treatment against innocent population is taking place. Beating is not only a daily matter, but an hourly one. Passers-by in the streets are beaten by the border police and lashed with whips—this is what is happening now in Gaza.

Gideon Hausner, MO: I am taking the stand in order to refute in the sharpest and clearest language some of Uri Avneri's words which were heard here, and which are a grave insult to the whole State and to the army it sent in order to ensure the safety of the citizens who are being killed daily.

Avneri: Read your own speech in a certain trial [Hausner was the prosecutor in the Eichmann trial] about the duty to

stand up to say certain things [Avneri refers here to the obligation to refuse to obey orders which are essentially immoral, a point which Hausner made in the Eichmann trial].

Hausner: You shouldn't clarify to me my duty in this regard. What was said here about the job that troops of the State are implementing at the risk of their lives in order to protect first of all the people of the murderers, is an insult to the Knesset.

Avneri: Does this end justify all the means? Are you ready to say that this justifies all the means? [A reference to the same point in the Eichmann trial and to the attitude of the nazis that the end justified the means.]

Mr. Avneri asked for permission to give a personal statement in answer to attacks by other members of the Knesset. However, the Chairman did not allow him to quote the testimony given to him by foreign correspondents who had infiltrated Gaza, although this testimony was published the same morning in Avneri's weekly. *Haolam Hazeh*.

DOCUMENT S/10106

Letter dated 8 February 1971 from the representative of the United States of America to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[8 February 1971]

I have the honour to refer to the letter of today's date from the observer of the Republic of Viet-Nam to the President of the Security Council [see S/10104] enclosing a statement by the President of the Republic of Viet-Nam concerning necessary measures of self-defence being taken against North Viet-Nam forces and their supply network in Laotian territory adjacent to the border of the Republic of Viet-Nam. The United States of America, which is assisting the Republic of Viet-Nam in these measures, fully supports the position of the Republic of Viet-Nam as set forth in that statement. Enclosed, for the information of the members of the Security Council, is a statement on the decision of the United States to assist in these measures of self-defence issued by the official press spokesman of the Department of State.

I request that this letter and its enclosure be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Charles W. Yost
Permanent Representative of
the United States of America
to the United Nations

STATEMENT ISSUED 8 FEBRUARY 1971, BY THE OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Last evening the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam announced in Saigon that elements of its armed forces had crossed into enemy occupied territory of Laos to attack North Viet-Nam forces and military supplies which have been assembled in sanctuaries close to the border of South Viet-Nam. These sanctuaries lie between the 16th and 17th parallels and comprise concentrations which are an important part of the Ho Chi Minh trail system. Our military command in Viet-Nam has announced the limits of the United States military participation.

The decision of the United States to assist is based on the following policy considerations:

(1) No American ground combat forces or advisors will cross into Laos.

(2) The operation will be a limited one both as to time and area. The Viet-Nam Government has made it clear that its objective will be to disrupt those forces which have been concentrated in this region for use against South Viet-Nam and United States forces located in the northern military regions of South Viet-Nam, and to intercept or choke off the flow of supplies and men during the dry season which are designed for use further south on the Ho Chi Minh trail in South Viet-Nam and Cambodia.

(3) The operation will promote the security and safety of American and allied forces in South Viet-Nam and is consistent with statutory requirements. It will make the enemy less able to mount offensives and strengthen South Viet-Nam's ability to defend itself as United States forces are withdrawn from South Viet-Nam. It will protect American lives.

(4) This ground operation by the South Viet-Nam against the sanctuaries thus will aid in the Viet-Namization programme. The withdrawal of American forces from Viet-Nam will continue. During the month of April President Nixon will announce further withdrawals.

(5) The measures of self-defence being taken by the Republic of Viet-Nam are fully consistent with international law. A report to this effect is being made by the Republic of Viet-Nam to the President of the Security Council of the United Nations, to the Geneva Co-Chairmen, and to the Governments which comprise the International Control Commission.

(6) This limited operation is not an enlargement of the war. The territory involved has been the scene of combat since 1965. The principal new factor is that South Viet-Nam forces will move against the enemy on the ground to deny him the sanctuaries and disrupt the main artery of supplies which he has been able to use so effectively against American and South Viet-Nam forces in the past.

(7) The United States has consistently sought to end the conflict in Indo-China through negotiations.

President Nixon specifically proposed last October that there should be (a) a cease-fire throughout Indo-China, (b) a negotiated time-table for the withdrawal of all forces, (c) immediate release of all prisoners of war, (d) an international peace conference for all of Indo-China, and (e) a political settlement. This continues to be the policy of the United States.

(8) The Royal Lao Government has issued a statement which, while critical of the current military action, points out that "primary responsibility for this development rests on the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam which has violated international law and the 1962

Geneva Agreements.¹³ The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has violated and is continuing to violate the neutrality and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos". The United States Government continues to favour the neutrality of Laos and the restoration of the situation contemplated by the 1962 Geneva Accords in which all foreign forces would be withdrawn from Lao territory. A new Indo-China conference as proposed by President Nixon could accomplish this objective.

¹³ Declaration on the neutrality of Laos and Protocol, signed at Geneva on 23 July 1962 (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 456 (1963), No. 6564).

DOCUMENT S/10107

Letter dated 9 February 1971 from the representative of Israel
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[9 February 1971]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 8 February 1971 [S/10105] from the representative of the United Arab Republic concerning the situation in the Gaza area.

The propaganda aims of the letter are self-evident and require no comment. The allegations contained in it are unfounded and unsubstantiated. Unlike the situation prevailing during the Egyptian occupation, the Gaza area is today open to the world and the normal conditions of life of the majority of its population are on public record.

During the Egyptian occupation, the United Arab Republic military rule was severe. For all practical purposes the area was sealed off from the outside world. Free movement of its inhabitants was limited, and rigorous and long curfews were imposed.

The policy of the Government of Israel is to ensure normal life and development for all the inhabitants under its control, including those of the Gaza area and Sinai. It is this policy, and its successes, which anger the Arab Governments and the terror organizations. For more than twenty years certain Arab Governments have been exploiting and victimizing the refugees, using them as a tool for their international adventurism and obstructing the solution of the refugee problems lest this might prejudice those Arab Governments' aggressive designs on Israel. Today these same Governments are again exploiting refugees, this time as a camouflage for their support of war by sabotage and terror.

In the Gaza area, these terrorist organizations, after having unleashed campaign of terror, have perpetrated hundreds of acts of murder and sabotage against the inhabitants of the area. The general objective is simply to make their life intolerable.

Between 12 June 1967 and 7 February 1971, 137 Arabs have been murdered by Arab terrorists—33 of them women and 21 children; 1,063 Arabs were wounded, including 221 children and 107 women.

Over one thousand hand grenades have been thrown, during this period, by Arab terrorists at the local Arab inhabitants, in marketplaces and streets. The victims have been Arab labourers on their way to work, school-children while attending school. That the general objective was to make the continuation of normal life impossible is substantiated, *inter alia*, by operation reports

of the terror units which have been made available to the Israel authorities in Gaza. Thus, a report dated 9 February 1969 states: "We threw a hand grenade at the Jaffa secondary school since its students refused to take part in a demonstration. After the grenade was thrown all the students left." Another report dated 22 April 1969 describes the throwing of a hand grenade at the al-Gala Theatre in order to prevent local inhabitants from entering it.

It is by now common knowledge in Gaza that the sum of five Israeli pounds is paid to any terrorist who throws a hand grenade at any gathering of Arab civilians.

Several instances of this may be recalled:

On 13 December 1967, forty-two local Arabs were injured as a result of a hand grenade explosion in a marketplace of Gaza; on 15 March 1969, fifteen Arab children were injured as a result of a hand grenade explosion in a Gaza street; on 19 April 1970, twenty-two Arab labourers were wounded when a hand grenade hit their bus; on 17 June 1970, three local Arabs were killed and twenty-one wounded as a result of a hand grenade explosion in the Khan Yunes market; on 26 November 1970, four Arab women were murdered at Beit Lahia in the Gaza Strip; on 1 February 1971, three Gaza Arabs were killed and sixty-one wounded as a result of an explosion of dynamite laid in the Post Office Bank of Gaza.

In the light of these circumstances, the Israel authorities are left with no choice but to take all the steps necessary to protect the lives and property of the local population against acts of terrorism, wherever threatened or committed. The selective measures taken by the Israel authorities aim only to defeat the terrorist plans to unearth their agents. The Arab Governments who encourage the acts of terrorism by training and sending agents to the area, by supplying them with weapons and explosives, by instructing and inciting them through their official radio stations, are taking upon themselves full responsibility for the bloodshed in the Gaza area. It is therefore a matter of surprise that a complaint is now made of the fact that Israel is taking normal measures to maintain public order in the Gaza area. The actions taken by the Israel authorities are in pursuance of their duty to ensure the safety,

welfare and security of the population of the area concerned.

It is regrettable that, at this stage, the United Arab Republic continues on its course of false and hostile propaganda.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10108

Letter dated 8 February 1971 from the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[9 February 1971]

I have the honour to refer to paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution 283 (1970) concerning the issuance of travel documents for Namibians. In this connexion, I should like to inform you that I have received a letter from the Acting Commissioner for Namibia, dated 11 January 1971, announcing that the travel documents scheme as authorized by the General Assembly has entered into operation. A copy of his letter is attached herewith.

(Signed) Samar SEN
President,
United Nations Council for Namibia

QUESTION OF TRAVEL DOCUMENTS

Letter dated 11 January 1971 from the Acting Commissioner for Namibia addressed to the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia

I have the honour to inform you that pursuant to the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolutions 2145 (XXI), 2248 (S-V), 2325 (XXII), 2372 (XXII) and 2678 (XXV), United Nations travel and identity documents have now been issued to two Namibians at present residents of Zambia. The scheme envisaged by the General Assembly and by the Council has therefore entered in operation.

These first two travel and identity documents were issued at the Office of the Commissioner for Namibia in Lusaka on 30 December 1970 and will enable the holders to proceed to certain European countries where they have obtained scholarships to advance their studies.

In this connexion I should like to mention the full measure of co-operation received from the Government of Zambia, who have inscribed a right of return in these documents, valid for two years.

(Signed) Agha A. HAMID
Acting Commissioner for Namibia

DOCUMENT S/10109

Report of the Security Council Committee on the Admission of New Members concerning the application of Bhutan for membership in the United Nations

[Original: English]
[9 February 1971]

At the 1565th meeting of the Security Council, held on 9 February 1971, the President of the Security Council referred the application of Bhutan for membership in the United Nations [S/10050] to the Committee for examination and report in accordance with rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At its 35th meeting, held on 9 February 1971, the Committee examined the application of Bhutan and unanimously decided to recommend to the Security Council that Bhutan be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

Accordingly, the Committee decided to recommend to the Security Council the adoption of the following draft resolution.

"The Security Council,

"Having examined the application of Bhutan for admission to the United Nations [S/10050],

"Recommends to the General Assembly that Bhutan be admitted to membership in the United Nations."

DOCUMENT S/10111

Letter dated 10 February 1971 from the representatives of Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Morocco, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yemen to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[10 February 1971]

In pursuance to the United Arab Republic letter of 8 February 1971 [S/10105] and upon instructions from our Governments, we have the honour to bring to your attention and to emphasize the intensified Israeli oppression against Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip.

Since the occupation began in June 1967, and especially during the last three weeks, the Israeli occupying authorities have been using large-scale terror and harsh measures against the Palestinians living in that area.

They have imposed long and intolerable curfews on several areas, and a large refugee camp called Beach Camp has been under total curfew since the end of December 1970. No one is permitted in or out of the camp. Even the personnel of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) have been prevented from carrying out their duties. According to reports coming from the Gaza area, only under the cover of night can children carry essential provisions such as food and water to their homes, since their parents are prevented from doing so.

Several thousand inhabitants have been arrested and taken to detention areas in the Sinai Desert. There they are being subjected to cruel interrogation and inhuman punishment.

The Israeli authorities have dispatched the border police to Gaza. They are professional mercenary soldiers who patrol the streets, sticks in hand, machine-guns pointed, shooting innocent people regardless of age and sex, screening the refugee camp, searching houses for arms, destroying furniture and abusing women.

On 3 January, the Israeli Military Governor dismissed the Mayor of the city of Gaza, the Honorable Ragheb El-Alami, because he refused to collaborate with the Israeli authorities.

The horrible methods used by the border police, who are usually called by the Israeli occupation authorities for the ruthless tasks, have aroused the indignation of a number of foreign reporters who visited the area, and even some members of the Israeli Knesset.

L'Observateur described Gaza as "the capital of terror" in its article published in the issue No. 324 of 25-31 January 1971. Moreover, a senior official of the UNRWA said, according to the *Washington Post* Foreign Service of 20 January 1971, "that the security measures introduced in Gaza involved a pretty rough physical treatment that brought the population to near-panic".

It is cynical that at the same time as Israel proclaims her desire for an extension of the cease-fire, the Israeli authorities are employing elements of their armed forces for repression of civilians in the occupied territories. It should be added that a similar atmosphere of oppression has prevailed in the Golan Heights, Sinai, and the West Bank, including Jerusalem, since the occupation began.

It is imperative that the Security Council, which in its resolution 237 (1967) called upon Israel "to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities", should take adequate steps to stop this inhuman oppression, which defies elementary human conduct and constitutes a grave violation of Israeli obligations under the Charter, the Geneva Conventions and the various resolutions relevant to these matters.

We request you to bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council and to circulate it as an official document of the Security Council.

*Signed by the representatives of the following
States Members of the United Nations:*

Algeria	Morocco	Syria
Iraq	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	Tunisia
Jordan	Saudi Arabia	United Arab Republic
Kuwait	Sudan	Yemen
Lebanon		
Libyan Arab Republic		

DOCUMENT S/10113

Letter dated 11 February 1971 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[11 February 1971]

I am instructed by my Government to refer to the letter dated 10 February 1971 [S/10111] sent to you over the signatures of representatives of fourteen States, members of the Arab League.

The letter repeats the allegations regarding the situation in the Gaza area contained in the United Arab Republic letter of 8 February 1971 [S/10105].

In my letter to you of 9 February 1971 [S/10107] I already had the honour to indicate the unfounded character of those charges and to inform you of the true facts.

Florid and embellished repetition of the allegations, such as the fourteen representatives have indulged themselves in, does not bring those allegations nearer reality.

I have the honour to request circulation of this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Singed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10114

Letter dated 9 February 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]
[11 February 1971]

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 28 January 1971 [S/10099], I have the honour to transmit the following for the information of the members of the Security Council.

On 4 January 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed a Khmer defence position at Prey Totung in Kompong Cham, wounding four persons.

During the night of 4 to 5 January 1971, at about 11.45 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed a Khmer defence position at Kompong Seila, without causing any damage.

On the same night, at about 11.30 p.m., the enemy launched a violent attack against a position held by Khmer forces guarding the bridge at Kompong Seila. With air support, the Khmer forces, which suffered two killed and two wounded, vigorously counter-attacked and the enemy were forced to withdraw, carrying away several dead and wounded.

On the same night, at about 1.45 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese attacked the Khmer forces guarding the bridge at Svay Daun Kéo, situated approximately thirty-three kilometres north-west of the town of Pursat.

On 5 January 1971, at about 6.30 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese, using mortars, harassed a Khmer defence position at Veal Rinh about thirty-six kilometres north-east of Kompong Som. Vigorous counteraction by the Khmer forces silenced enemy fire.

The same day, a Khmer patrol engaged the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese about five kilometres south-west of Bat Doeung, in Kandal. After an engagement lasting about ten minutes, the enemy withdrew. The Khmer forces suffered one killed and two wounded in the engagement.

On the night of 5 to 6 January 1971, at about 11.50 p.m., elements of the Khmer Navy engaged the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at Prek Dach, approximately thirty-eight kilometres south-east of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal, killing one and wounding three on the Khmer side. The killed and the wounded on the enemy side were carried away.

On 6 January 1971, at about 6 a.m., another engagement took place between Khmer forces and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at Prék Prasap, some twenty-eight kilometres north-east of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal. After about three and a half hours of fighting the enemy scattered, leaving one dead.

On the same day, at about 10.20 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese again harassed a Khmer defence position at Kompong Seila. The vigorous

counteraction by the Khmer forces obliged the enemy to withdraw after about twenty minutes, carrying away some dead and wounded. The Khmer side suffered one wounded.

On the same day, at about 8.30 a.m., Khmer forces carrying out a search operation clashed with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese some three and a half kilometres north-west of Srâng in Kompong Speu for about fifteen minutes.

The same day, at about 10.30 a.m., an engagement took place at Sdok Vèng, approximately five kilometres south of Bat Doeung, in Kompong Speu, causing dead and wounded who were carried away by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese.

On the same day, at about 10.30 a.m., the enemy harassed Khmer forces on a reconnaissance operation on National Highway 4, approximately ninety kilometres from Phnom-Penh, in Kompong Speu. No losses were reported.

On 7 January 1971, Khmer forces operating in the Pich Nil area, about forty-five kilometres south-west of Kompong Speu, were harassed for about ten minutes by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese.

On the same day, at about 7.45 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese briefly harassed the Khmer defence position at Kompong Seila.

The same day, a sharp clash took place between the Khmer and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese forces at Phum Koh Roca, seven kilometres south-west of the town of Kompong Cham, lasting approximately half an hour. There were seventeen wounded on the Khmer side and some dead and wounded on the enemy side who were carried away.

On the same day, at about 8.30 a.m., Khmer operational forces engaged a force of about 100 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at Phum Trapeang Pring, six kilometres north of Chakrei Ting, in Kampot. After half an hour of fighting, the enemy withdrew, leaving 1 killed, 1 M-1 Garand rifle, 500 cartridges for a Chinese sub-machine gun (PM/AC), clothing and documents, and carrying away several dead and wounded.

On the same day, an engagement took place between Khmer forces and a force of about 100 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at Phum Rung, about thirty kilometres north-west of the town of Takeo, continuing for approximately twenty minutes and causing one wounded on the Khmer side.

During the night of 7 to 8 January 1971 the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese twice harassed Khmer

forces, guarding the Doeum Treang bridge, approximately twenty-two kilometres south-west of Phnom-Penh on National Highway 3, in Kandal.

On the same day sharp clashes took place between Khmer operational forces and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at Dâs Kanchor, in the area of Srê Khlong, and at Trêng Traying, about forty kilometres south-west of the town of Kompong Speu, on National Highway 4.

On the same day, from 7.30 to 8.30 a.m., an engagement took place four kilometres east of the town of Siemreap, causing one wounded on the Khmer side and some dead and wounded on the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese side, who were carried away.

On the same day, at about 6 p.m., a Khmer defence position at Kompong Seila was harassed by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese using mortars and 75 mm recoilless guns.

During the night of 8 to 9 January 1971, at about 9.15 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese briefly harassed a Khmer defence position at Dâs Kanchor, about two kilometres north-east of Srê Khlong, in Kompong Speu.

During the same night, at about midnight, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese simultaneously harassed both the Khmer troops operating in Trêng Traying, forty kilometres south-west of Kompong Speu, and the camp at Srê Khlong. The vigorous counteraction by the Khmer forces obliged the enemy to cease fire at about 5.35 a.m.

On 9 January 1971, a sharp clash took place between Khmer forces and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese about four kilometres east of Kompong Trach, in Kampot. The enemy withdrew at the end of half an hour, leaving 3 dead, 1 60 mm mortar and 13 shells, 7 grenades, 1 sub-machine-gun (PM/AC) with 2 clips, and 6 shovels, and carrying away several dead and wounded. The Khmer side suffered three dead and three wounded.

On the same day, at 6.30 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese attacked a Khmer outpost situated five kilometres north-west of Veal Rinh, in Kampot. The vigorous counteraction by the Khmer forces obliged the enemy to withdraw at about 7.10 a.m., after several unsuccessful attempts to assault the position, carrying away some killed and wounded. The Khmer side suffered no casualties.

On the same day, at about 6.10 p.m., an engagement took place between Khmer forces and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese two and a half kilometres north-west of Veal Rinh, in Kampot.

During the night of 9 to 10 January 1971, at about 9.35 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese, using mortars and 75 mm recoilless guns, briefly harassed a Khmer position at Svay Kravann on the outskirts of the town of Kompong Speu, killing one and wounding seven.

On the same night, the Khmer position at Dâs Kanchor was again harassed by the enemy.

On the same night, at about 10.15 p.m., a further engagement took place at Samrong about five kilometres north of Tuk Meas in Kampot which lasted some forty minutes and left several dead and wounded on the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese side who were carried away and one killed and three wounded on the Khmer side.

On 10 January 1971, a Khmer patrol engaged a force of some fifty Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese

about twelve kilometres north-east of Kep, in Kampot, for approximately ten minutes. During the engagement the Khmer forces suffered three wounded.

On the same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese briefly harassed a Khmer defence position in the northern sector of the town of Prey Veng, without causing any damage.

On the same day, there was a brief clash between Khmer elements and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese twenty-two kilometres south-east of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal.

On the same day, at about 10 a.m., Khmer elements on a search operation clashed with an estimated 600 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese, four kilometres south of Kiriwong and thirty-five kilometres south of the town of Takeo, wounding ten of the Khmer soldiers.

During the night of 10 to 11 January 1971, at about midnight, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese sporadically harassed a Khmer defence position at Thmat Porng, about twenty-two kilometres north-east of the town of Kompong Speu. The heavy fire returned by the Khmer defenders obliged the enemy to withdraw at about 2.50 a.m., carrying away dead and wounded.

On 11 January 1971 another clash lasting about ten minutes occurred at Svay Tani, some twenty-eight kilometres south-east of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal. One Khmer soldier was wounded.

On the same day, at about 9.30 a.m., Khmer operational forces clashed with some fifty Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at Prey Totung, about eight kilometres south of the town of Pursat. After about twenty minutes' fighting, the enemy withdrew, leaving behind one dead and pieces of equipment and carrying away other dead and wounded.

During the night of 11 to 12 January 1971, at about 10 p.m., a brief clash occurred at O Sandan, some seventeen kilometres south of the town of Kompong Chhnang.

During the same night, at approximately 12.50 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired about thirty 82 mm mortar shells on a Khmer defence position at Srê Khlong, in Kompong Speu, without causing any damage.

During the same night, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese briefly harassed a Khmer defence position at Phum Au Loek, about nineteen kilometres west of the capital, in Kandal.

On 12 January 1971, a clash lasting about twenty-five minutes occurred between Khmer elements and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese, five kilometres east of the town of Siemreap, on National Highway 6. One Khmer soldier was killed and three were wounded and the enemy left behind one dead and carried away several dead and wounded.

On the same day, a clash occurred between Khmer forces and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at Angkor Chey about six and a half kilometres south-east of Dey Eth in Kandal.

On the same day at about 6 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired two 107 mm artillery shells on a Khmer position at Kompong Seila, without causing any damage.

On the same day, at about 7.30 p.m., Khmer operational forces clashed with Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese eight kilometres north of Veal Rinh, in Kampot. One Khmer was wounded and the enemy carried some wounded away.

On 13 January 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese briefly harassed a Khmer position at Tonlé Bet, in Kompong Cham.

On the same day, a clash lasting about twenty minutes occurred between Khmer forces and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at Phum Phlau Trey, about three kilometres north-west of Tuk Khleang, on the east bank of the Mekong, in Kandal. The enemy carried some wounded away.

On the same day, at about 3 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed Khmer operational forces on National Highway 4, ninety kilometres south-west of Phnom-Penh, in Kompong Speu, wounding three soldiers, and a Khmer defence position twenty-two kilometres south-west of Kompong Speu.

On the same day, at about 1 p.m., a sharp clash occurred between Khmer forces on a search operation and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese four kilometres north-west of Kompong Châk, in Svay Rieng. After three hours' fighting, the enemy withdrew, leaving behind two dead and carrying away about thirty dead and wounded. The Khmer casualties were two dead and nine wounded.

During the night of 13 to 14 January 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed a Khmer defence position at Kompong Châk, in Svay Rieng, wounding one person.

During the same night, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed an outpost north of the town of Prey Veng. The fire returned by the Khmer soldiers, one of whom was killed and one wounded, forced the enemy to withdraw after about ten minutes, carrying some dead and wounded away.

During the same night, at about 8 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese, using mortars and automatic weapons harassed Khmer elements based at Phum Kraing Kroch, about six and a half kilometres south of the town of Kompong Speu. The Khmer counteraction silenced the enemy after five minutes.

On 14 January 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed Khmer position at the Prék Thnot dam, wounding one person.

On the same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched an attack on a Khmer position at Chambâk, in Takeo, about thirty-eight kilometres south of Phnom-Penh. The enemy withdrew after making unsuccessful attempts to storm the position.

On the same day, at about 3 p.m., a clash occurred on National Highway 4, about twenty kilometres south of Kompong Seila.

On 15 January 1971, at approximately 2.20 p.m. Khmer forces on a search operation in the area of Lovear Sâr, about twenty-eight kilometres south-east of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal, had a sharp clash with Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese in entrenched positions. The Khmer Air Force intervened at about 3.30 p.m. The provisional toll is two dead and six wounded on the Khmer side and several dead and wounded among the enemy.

During the night of 15 to 16 January 1971, the enemy harassed a Khmer defence position at Tuk Khleang, about twenty-six kilometres south-west of Phnom-Penh, on the east bank of the Mekong, in Kandal.

During the same night, a clash occurred between Khmer forces and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at Phum Boeund Kroum Krom, about thirty kilometres south-east of Phnom-Penh, on the same bank, in Kandal.

On 16 January 1971, at about 9.45 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired five 82 mm mortar shells on Khmer forces at the Siemreap airfield, wounding six of them.

On the same day, a sharp clash occurred between Khmer operational forces and some 400 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese in entrenched positions at Phum Thmey, about eight kilometres south-west of the town of Kompong Cham. The Khmer casualties were four wounded and six dead, left behind while the enemy carried away several dead and wounded.

On 17 January 1971 at about 6 p.m., an estimated 200 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fell into an ambush laid by Khmer forces thirteen kilometres north of the town of Takeo. Under heavy fire, the enemy withdrew in disorder, leaving behind four dead, three rifles and documents.

On the same day, at about 7.40 p.m., a Khmer defence position at Rocar Kong, about thirty-two kilometres north-east of Phnom-Penh, on the west bank of the Mekong, in Kandal, was harassed by Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese.

During the night of 17 to 18 January 1971, at about 8 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed for about ten minutes a Khmer defence position at Lovear Sâr Krom, thirty-three kilometres south-east of Phnom-Penh on the east bank of the Mekong. When the Khmer soldiers returned their fire, the enemy withdrew, carrying some wounded away.

During the same night, at about 7.10 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese, using mortars and automatic weapons, harassed the defence system of the town of Kompong Speu, wounding two persons.

On 18 January 1971, at about 4 p.m., after hand-to-hand fighting during which four Khmer soldiers were wounded, the Khmer troops recaptured the Pich Nil pass. Four lorries were seized 500 metres from the pass.

On 19 January 1971, a clash occurred between Khmer forces and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese about twelve kilometres west of the town of Kompong Thom. The enemy withdrew after about fifteen minutes fighting, carrying some wounded away.

I wish to reiterate the firm and vigorous protest of the Government of the Khmer Republic against the illegal and permanent occupation of Khmer territory, followed by savage attacks perpetrated by Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese against a neutral and peace-loving country to which they have no right and with which they have no ethnic affinity, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, international law and the 1954 Geneva Agreements.¹⁴ These criminal attacks reveal clearly the annexationist aims of the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese communist imperialists and represent a dangerous threat to peace and security not only in the Khmer Republic but throughout the region of South-East Asia.

The Government of the Khmer Republic holds the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam

¹⁴ Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China.

and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam entirely responsible for all the extremely grave consequences resulting from this situation and reserves the right to take the necessary action to defend the independence, neutrality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) KHIM TIT

*Permanent Representative of the Khmer Republic
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/10115

Letter dated 11 February 1971 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]
[12 February 1971]

I should be grateful if you would have the attached statement by TASS of 4 February 1971 concerning the situation in Indo-China issued and circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Y. MALIK

*Permanent Representative of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
to the United Nations*

STATEMENT BY TASS

In recent days the situation in Indo-China has become decidedly more complicated. It is reported that large numbers of Saigon ground forces with United States air support have invaded Laos. United States aircraft are daily carrying out mass air raids over Laotian territory in which B-52 heavy bombers are participating.

In extending the military conflagration to the territory of Laos the United States and its lackeys are committing an act of aggression, a further direct violation of the United Nations Charter and a blatant outrage against the principles of international law. Such acts are likewise a further violation of the Geneva Agreements,¹⁵ to which the United States is a party. They demonstrate once again how high-handedly the United States administration tramples on the sovereignty and independence of other States and how lightly it violates the obligations of the United States under international treaties and agreements.

Having been resolutely rebuffed by the Viet-Nameese people and the patriots of Cambodia and Laos, certain circles in the United States are counting on the widening of the aggression in Laos to change the situation in their favour, to halt and set back the powerful libera-

¹⁵ *Idem.*

tion movement in Indo-China and to subject the countries of that area to the neo-colonial order.

The new aggressive actions of the United States will seriously further complicate the situation in Indo-China. They are jeopardizing the contacts between the political forces in Laos which have been instituted with a view to the peaceful settlement of the situation in that country.

In the Soviet Union the armed invasion of Laos by the United States and its Saigon puppet forces is vigorously condemned. It is perfectly obvious that the continuation and expansion by the United States invaders and their Saigon puppets of their aggressive acts in that part of the world will inevitably meet with ever greater resistance on the part of the people of Indo-China, who are fighting for freedom, independence and the right to decide their destiny independently.

There can be no doubt that the efforts of the imperialists to suppress the liberation struggle of the peoples of Indo-China is doomed to failure. If the problem of Indo-China is to be solved it will be necessary to reach a political settlement which will be in accordance with the national interests of the people of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia, and will take into account their indisputable right to be the sovereign masters of their own territory.

The full weight of responsibility for further complicating the situation in Laos, as in the whole of Indo-China, rests on the ruling circles in the United States of America. The Soviet people, like the other freedom-loving peoples, are outraged by the bloody crimes of the aggressors and demand that they should be brought to an end. The just struggle of the peoples of Indo-China has the unswerving support of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, as of all the peace-loving forces of the world.

DOCUMENT S/10116

Letter dated 13 February 1971 from the representative of Pakistan to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[13 February 1971]

I am instructed by the Government of Pakistan to bring to the urgent notice of the members of the Security Council the serious situation which has currently developed between Pakistan and India.

This situation has directly resulted from:

(a) the unwarranted decision by the Government of India to prohibit the flying of the civil aircraft of

Pakistan over Indian territory and thus to disrupt a most vital communications link between the eastern and western wings of Pakistan; and

(b) statements made by the Prime Minister and the Government of India threatening Pakistan with further dire consequences if Pakistan does not comply with certain arbitrary demands made by India which

exceed any requirements of international law or consensus or are incompatible with the obligations and responsibilities of the two Governments.

India's decision to "suspend" the overflights of the civil aircraft of Pakistan between the two wings of the country, which are separated by Indian territory, has imposed an enormous hardship on the people of Pakistan and constitutes an act clearly in violation of the Convention on International Civil Aviation¹⁶ signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944 and the India-Pakistan Agreement relating to Air Services¹⁷ signed at Karachi on 23 June 1948. Members of the Security Council are aware that, under article 9 (b) of the Chicago Convention, the right temporarily to restrict or prohibit flying over its territory is reserved to a State only "on condition that such restriction or prohibition shall be applicable without distinction of nationality to aircraft of all other States" and also "in exceptional circumstances or during a period of emergency or in the interest of public safety". The suspension by India of overflights of the civil aircraft of only one country and at a time when no hostilities are taking place between that country and India is, therefore, an act not only in violation of international law, but also of belligerence. Coming at this juncture, when Pakistan's Government and newly elected representatives face the delicate and sensitive task of evolving a fully democratic constitution, the disruption of normal air traffic between the eastern and western wings of Pakistan, so vital to the political and economic life of both, subjects Pakistan to a condition of disability which no other country has had to face.

Despite this action by India, the Government of Pakistan has refrained from any retaliation by way of imposing a similar ban on Indian civil aircraft overflying Pakistan territory.

The Government of India has sought to justify its hostile act on the ground that it is in retaliation against the seizure while in flight over Kashmir and forced landing in Lahore of an Indian plane by two Kashmiri youths on 30 January 1971. The facts about this hijacking incident are:

(a) The Government of Pakistan deplored the hijacking and made it plain that it wholly disapproves of such acts. It did so despite the fact that so far this appears to have been a desperate act arising out of the conditions of extreme repression prevailing in the Indian-occupied area of Jammu and Kashmir and a sequel to the expulsion of Sheikh Abdullah and other Kashmiri leaders. It is well known that such conditions in the Indian occupied area arouse the strongest feelings among the people of Pakistan.

(b) Immediately after the aircraft landed in Lahore and upon discovery that the two armed hijackers were determined to maintain control of the plane, the foremost object of the concerned authorities in Pakistan was to save the lives of passengers and crew. This could only have been done by recourse to tactful measures and persuasion. Any forcible means would have resulted in loss of lives of those aboard. After the passengers and crew were extricated, they were taken to the city, given comfortable lodgings and provided transportation with proper escort to return to India without any avoidable delay. The care taken by the authorities of Pakistan to ensure the safety and comfort

of the passengers and crew of the aircraft, has been publicly acknowledged by them in press interviews.

(c) The authorities made every effort to secure the release of the plane as well. However, the armed hijackers demanded that the Government of India should first release thirty-six political prisoners belonging to their political organization in Indian-occupied Kashmir. This condition was promptly communicated to the Government of India through appropriate channels. India summarily rejected it and persisted in its own demand that the hijackers should be handed over to Indian authorities. Thereupon, the hijackers blew up the plane. The Government of Pakistan deplored this act. It had every intention of returning the aircraft to India and indeed had communicated this fact to the Indian authorities concerned. But the brusque and peremptory demand for the hijackers to be handed over to India, coupled with threatening statements emanating from India, so inflamed the situation that it led to the destruction of the plane and thus frustrated the intention of the Pakistan Government.

Instead of showing appreciation of Pakistan's co-operative attitude, the Government of India seized on this incident to make demands on the Government of Pakistan which, it knew, no Government with even a modicum of self-respect could accept. These demands are totally arbitrary and are not justified by any of the provisions of the Tokyo Convention of 14 December 1963 on offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,¹⁸ the declaration¹⁹ of the International Civil Aviation Organization made in June 1970, General Assembly resolution 2645 (XXV) and the Hague Convention of 16 December 1970.²⁰

The first demand made by the Government of India is that the two Kashmiri youths should "be surrendered to the Indian authorities so that they can stand their trial". Now, it is explicitly stated in these international instruments that nothing in them "shall be deemed to create an obligation to grant extradition". The Indian demand would not have been justified even if the offenders had been persons of Indian nationality. As citizens of Jammu and Kashmir, they are by no means Indian nationals.

The second Indian demand is that Pakistan should pay compensation to India for the loss of the aircraft. Again, there is nothing in the relevant international instruments which would make it an obligation for Pakistan to compensate India for a loss which was caused in the circumstances mentioned above. Even if this evaluation is challenged, Pakistan's liability to payment of compensation or otherwise is a matter which, under the relevant international instruments, is to be resolved through negotiation or, if negotiation fails, through arbitration or judicial settlement. Instead of recourse to such processes, India has deliberately resorted to the hostile act of disrupting a vital air link between the two wings of Pakistan. The consequences to Pakistan are out of all proportion to the loss sustained by India of one Fokker Friendship plane.

Even after having committed this act, the Government of India has persisted in threatening Pakistan with further retaliatory action if Pakistan does not accept Indian demands for payment of compensation and

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. 704 (1969), No. 10106.

¹⁹ International Civil Aviation Organization, *Resolution adopted by the Assembly, Seventeenth Session (Extraordinary)* (Montreal, 1970), resolution A17-1.

²⁰ Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.

¹⁶ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 15 (1948), No. 102.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. 28 (1949), No. 423.

return of hijackers. Statements to this effect were made by no less an authority than the Prime Minister of India on 3 and 10 February. In a note handed over to the Pakistan High Commissioner in New Delhi on 9 February, the Government of India stated:

"If the Government of Pakistan is not willing to settle the matter of compensation and to return the two hijackers to face their trial in India, the situation may deteriorate and the Government of Pakistan will be wholly responsible for any consequences that may follow."

An even more ominous demand made by India is that Pakistan should forsake its deepest principles, abdicate its responsibility and surrender its position regarding Jammu and Kashmir, a territory whose status will remain in dispute as long as it is not determined by the processes agreed upon by both India and Pakistan. The tone in which this demand is made is clear from the following words in the above-mentioned Indian official note of 9 February 1971:

"The Government of India takes serious objection to the reference made to internal affairs of India in the note under reference and wishes to remind the Government of Pakistan of its obligation to cease its aggression on Indian territory in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. If the Government of Pakistan persists in its attitude of openly or clandestinely interfering in India's internal affairs, it will

be wholly responsible for the consequences of this policy."

It will be recalled that whenever Pakistan reminds India of its international commitment regarding Jammu and Kashmir, or voices anxiety about the situation there, India considers it an act of interference in its internal affairs.

The Government of Pakistan assures the members of the Security Council that, as much as any other Member State, it recognizes that international civil aviation is a vital link in the promotion and preservation of friendly relations among States and that any wrongful interference with civil air travel jeopardizes the lives and safety of human beings and is a matter of grave concern. We reject as totally baseless the allegation that Pakistan authorities in any way connived at, encouraged or assisted the act of hijacking which took place. There is no reason why a hijacking incident should be allowed to lead to a situation of confrontation. However, for reasons best known to itself, India appears to be deliberately embarked on a course which threatens to bring about such a situation.

I should be grateful if this letter is circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) A SHAHI
Permanent Representative of Pakistan
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10117

Letter dated 13 February 1971 from the representative of Poland to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[15 February 1971]

Upon instructions from my Government I have the honour to submit herewith the text of an unofficial translation of the aide-mémoire dated 12 February 1971 from the Government of the Polish People's Republic to the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question at Geneva.

I shall be most grateful if you will arrange to have this communication circulated as an official document on the Security Council.

(Signed) Eugeniusz KULAGA
Permanent Representative of Poland
to the United Nations

AIDE-MÉMOIRE DATED 12 FEBRUARY 1971 FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE INTERNATIONAL CON- FERENCE ON THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LAOTIAN QUESTION

1. Recent reports from Laos give rise to justified and grave concern. They reveal unparalleled intensification of the bombing of the territory of the Kingdom of Laos by the United States Air Force and violation of the Laotian frontier by the Saigon régime troops, covered by the air forces and supported by artillery and auxiliary services of the United States. Thus, the situation poses a threat of a further escalation, on a still far larger scale, of new aggressive actions from the territory of South Viet-Nam, where, close to the 17th

parallel, the United States and Saigon troops have been concentrated.

The violation of the territory of the Kingdom of Laos and preparation on a very large scale of military operations has brought about a growth of tension in the whole of Indo-China and immensely complicated the internal situation of the Kingdom of Laos.

2. As is known, over recent months in Laos there appeared a practical possibility of finding a political solution to the domestic problems of that country. The special envoy of the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Lao Patriotic Front, Prince Souphanouvong, visited Vientiane for several months and held talks with a view to initiating negotiations to prevent further bloodshed and spare Laos the tragic fate of Cambodia. Unfortunately, the aggressive action recently taken by the United States-Saigon troops against the Kingdom of Laos only too flagrantly resembles developments which had earlier brought the disaster of war upon Cambodia.

As the result of these deplorable actions we are witnessing an aggravation of the internal situation and increasing mutual mistrust in Laos. Indeed, they paralyse efforts towards better mutual understanding and the endeavours, by the Laotian parties involved, aimed at a peaceful solution of their domestic problems. Consequently, new dangers have emerged of a further extension of military operations and engulfing Laos in new bloodshed.

3. Poland, as a signatory of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos²¹ and member of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos, established by terms of these agreements, has never relented in her efforts to seek for peaceful solutions to help spare Laos the tragedy of war.

The present violation of the territory and the air space of the Kingdom of Laos is a glaring contradiction of the basic provisions of the Geneva Agreements of 1962, accepted, as they were, also by the United States of America and the Saigon side.

Contrary to these obligations, the United States of America, for a long time now, has been intervening in the internal affairs of Laos. This intervention resulted in 1964 in a rightist coup d'état which overthrew the National Unity Government and upset the machinery of the tripartite agreements between the Laotian political groupings, the machinery which had laid the basis for the Geneva Agreements. It also paralysed the activity of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in that country. At that very time the United States of America started violating the air space of that country and launched air raids against the areas controlled by the Laotian patriotic forces.

For our part we have repeatedly pointed out the tragic consequences of a political and military intervention of this kind.

²¹ Declaration on the neutrality of Laos and Protocol, signed at Geneva on 23 July 1962 (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol 456 (1963), No. 6564).

The United States intervention has pushed Laos into the tragedy of a civil war. The Kingdom of Laos has been turned into a scene of fratricidal warfare and is now facing a threat to share the fate of Viet-Nam and Cambodia. The responsibility for the present state of affairs rests with the United States of America.

4. We cannot but deplore the United States policy towards Laos. It leads to a serious extension of the Indo-China war, to further bloodshed, untold sufferings of the population of the countries of the region and the poisoning of global international relations. It is the considered view of the Polish Government that the United States should refrain from all armed attacks against the Kingdom of Laos, stop its intervention in the internal affairs of that country and respect the undeniable right of the Laotian people to decide their own future.

5. The Polish Government hereby appeals to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Laos to use their utmost influence to prevent the United States of America from escalating military operations in Indo-China and to induce it to refrain from any further aggression against the Kingdom of Laos.

For its part, as a member of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos, the Polish Government is bound to reiterate its determination to spare no efforts to help seek for political solutions in the interest of the Laotian people, regarding the International Commission in Laos as an important instrument of exercising a constructive role, once favourable conditions to this effect arise.

DOCUMENT S/10118

Letter dated 16 February 1971 from the representative of Portugal
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[16 February 1971]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that on 13 February 1971, around 10.30 a.m., two MIG-17 planes, coming from the Republic of Guinea, overflew the Portuguese province of Guinea, penetrating its air space far into the interior before returning to the country of their origin. The Portuguese Government cannot refrain from inviting the attention of the Security Council to the grave nature of this violation which would not have taken place if the Republic of Guinea had scrupulously adhered to its international obligations to respect the peace and territorial integrity of the countries that are its neighbours.

I should appreciate it if you would direct that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council, on the usual terms.

(Signed) António PATRÍCIO
Chargé d'affaires, a.i.
of Portugal to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10119*

Letter dated 12 February 1971 from the representatives of Jordan and Lebanon
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English/French]
[16 February 1971]

In pursuance of the letter of 10 February 1971 addressed to you by the representatives of the fourteen

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8280.

Arab States Members of the United Nations [S/10111], and in reference to the letter dated 11 February 1971 sent to the President of the Security Council by the Permanent Representative of Israel to the

United Nations regarding the intensified Israeli oppression against Palestinians in the Israeli occupied Gaza Strip [S/10113], we have the honour to bring to your attention on behalf of the Group of Arab States excerpts from the contents of an Agence France-Presse dispatch published in the French newspaper *Le monde*, dated 11 February 1971. Under the title "Ten Israeli soldiers brought before a disciplinary tribunal for 'the unjustified use of violence'" this dispatch states:

"An Israeli army spokesman announced at Tel-Aviv on Tuesday evening that a total of ten soldiers had been brought before a disciplinary tribunal which was to try them for '*the unjustified use of violence and causing damage to dwellings*' during the recent security operations in the Gaza Strip. He further announced that three Israeli soldiers had been tried for thefts committed in houses which they were searching.

"The spokesman also stated that, following those operations, seven injured Arabs from Gaza had been admitted to hospital and that some twenty others, less severely injured, had received treatment on the spot.

The Israeli military spokesman had announced early in the evening that three Israeli officers, two of them of senior rank, had been given administrative reprimands for having failed to quell certain

excesses committed by soldiers belonging to their unit."

The contents of that dispatch soundly belie the summary and light manner in which the Israeli representative attempted to refute the facts which the Arab representatives had detailed in their letter. Due to the fact that the dispatch published by *Le Monde* refers to an official military source partly corroborating those facts, we would deem it appropriate for the United Nations organs to investigate the situation further and to bring the conclusions of their findings to the attention of the international community. Among other measures the Commission on Human Rights, due to convene shortly in Geneva, could perform a primary duty by alerting world public opinion to the oppressive acts committed by Israeli military forces against the helpless and defenceless Arab civilian population of the Gaza Strip.

We request that this document be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
*Permanent Representative
of Jordan to the United Nations*

(Signed) Edouard GHORRA
*Permanent Representative
of Lebanon to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/10120

Letter dated 12 February 1971 from the representative of Bulgaria
to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[16 February 1971]

I have the honour to transmit to you the statement of the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency concerning the United States-South Viet-Nameese invasion of Laos and the worsening of the situation in the Indo-China peninsula. I should be grateful if you would have the text of this statement circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Guéro GROZEV
*Permanent Representative of Bulgaria
to the United Nations*

STATEMENT BY THE BULGARIAN TELEGRAPH AGENCY

The Bulgarian Telegraph Agency is authorized to make the following statement.

Despite the efforts of the peace-loving forces of the world, the situation in Indo-China has become further complicated and has grown worse. In violation of the Geneva Agreements,²² the United States and its Saigon puppets have invaded the territory of Laos. This new act of aggression is a flagrant violation of the basic norms of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations. The President of the United States has made a calculated and irresponsible attack on the sovereignty and independence of yet another people of Indo-China. The United States is endeavouring by its acts of aggression to disrupt the contacts established between political forces in Laos, to prevent the political solution of the problem of Laos and further to complicate the situation in Indo-China. The ruling circles in the United

States are thus becoming ever more deeply entrapped in their aggressive plans to impose neo-colonialism on the region and thereby to threaten world peace.

The Bulgarian people has learned with anger and indignation of the new armed invasion of Laos by the United States and its Saigon lackeys and vigorously condemns the continuation and expansion of the aggression, which will unquestionably be countered by the firm and resolute resistance of the peoples of Indo-China fighting for their liberty and independence and for the right to decide their destiny and future for themselves.

The peoples of Indo-China are not alone in the fight against the usurper. They are actively supported by the peoples of the socialist States and by all peace-loving forces throughout the world.

There can be no doubt that the endeavours of the United States imperialists and local reaction to stifle the just struggle for the liberation of the peoples of Indo-China will suffer defeat.

Such is not the way to the resolution of the Indo-China problem; that can only come about through a political solution in conformity with the legitimate rights and national interests of the peoples of Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos.

The Bulgarian people condemns the new, bloody crimes of the aggressors in Indo-China and resolutely demand that they should cease immediately.

The entire responsibility for the latest complication of the situation in Laos and in Indo-China lies with the ruling circles of the United States.

²² Agreements in the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China.

Letter dated 16 February 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]
[17 February 1971]

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 9 February 1971 [S/10014], I have the honour to bring the following to your attention for the information of the members of the Security Council.

On 18 January 1971, a clash took place between Khmer and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese elements at Bovear Sâr Krom, thirty-three kilometres south-east of Phnom Penh on the east bank of the Mekong in Kandal, resulting in a number of enemy dead and wounded who were carried away by their side.

The same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed a Khmer position at Prek Yuon opposite Lovear Sâr Krom, wounding five persons.

During the night of 18 to 19 January 1971, about midnight, Khmer troops engaged in clearing National Highway 1 between Prey Vêng and Neak Luong were harassed by Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese ten kilometres south-east of Prey Vêng near the villages of Prey Ang Kounh and Chan. After return fire from Khmer forces with air support, the enemy was dispersed shortly thereafter.

On 19 January 1971, at approximately 9 a.m., a violent clash took place between Khmer elements, engaged in mopping-up operations and some 1,200 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese about ten kilometres north-east of Kep in Kampot. Fighting was still continuing at approximately 5 p.m.

The same day, at about 4 a.m., Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed a Khmer position at Srâ Khlong in Kampong Speu for some thirty minutes, using automatic weapons, mortars and 75 mm recoilless weapons.

The same day, at approximately 7 p.m., Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired five 82 mm mortar shells at a Khmer position at Kompong Seila in Kompong Seila.

The same day, a violent clash took place some twelve kilometres south-west of the Pich Nil pass on National Highway 4. Our forces lost four killed and ten wounded while the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese lost thirty-three dead on the battlefield and several dead and wounded carried away, with two men, two B40 rocket launchers, six AK and a considerable quantity of ammunition captured.

The same day, a violent clash took place at Phum Chhoeu Teal Chrum, seven kilometres south-east of Tram Khnar, in Takeo, resulting in three wounded on the Khmer side and two dead on the battlefield and five wounded carried away on the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese side.

During the night of 19 to 20 January 1971, Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed a Khmer position at Lovear Sâr Loeu, thirty-two kilometres south-east of Phnom Penh, in Kandal.

On 20 January 1971, at approximately 7.45 a.m., a clash took place between Khmer elements and some 200 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at Phum Key Rong, five kilometres south of Tram Khnar in Takeo.

It lasted two hours and Khmer casualties were two dead and nine wounded, while the enemy suffered nine dead on the battlefield and several killed and wounded which they carried away.

The same day, a clash took place fourteen kilometres north-west of the town of Svay Rieng.

The same day, another clash took place near Vat Chék, approximately five kilometres north-west of the town of Svay Rieng, resulting in one dead and one wounded on the Khmer side and five killed on the battlefield and several dead and wounded carried away on the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese side.

The same day, at approximately 6 a.m., a clash took place at Ta Miev, some ten kilometres north-west of Maung in Battambang, resulting in two killed and three wounded on the Khmer side while the enemy losses consisted of six killed on the battlefield and one Chinese sub-machine-gun, three automatic pistols, one B40 rocket launcher and four grenades captured.

The same day, at approximately 7.25 a.m., another clash took place four kilometres north-east of the Pich Nil pass in Kompong Seila. It lasted some twenty minutes, after which the enemy withdrew in disorder.

The same day, at approximately 7 a.m., Khmer forces engaged in clearing National Highway 4 clashed violently with Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese occupying fortified bunkers on either side of the road at the entry to the Pich Nil pass. Hand-to-hand fighting broke out at approximately 6 p.m. Casualties were tentatively estimated at seven killed and fifty-six wounded on the Khmer side and fifty-one killed on the battlefield, four taken prisoner and some weapons captured on the enemy side.

The same day, at approximately 7.30 a.m., a clash lasting some two hours took place seven kilometres south-west of Tram Khnar in Kompong Speu, resulting in two dead on the Khmer side and nine killed on the battlefield and several killed and wounded carried away on the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese side.

The same day, at approximately 7.35 p.m., Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese again harassed Srê Khlong in Kompong Speu.

On 21 January 1971 at approximately 2.30 p.m., Khmer troops successfully occupied the chalet at Pich Nil after a vigorous mopping-up operation to eliminate all pockets of enemy resistance. The result of the operation was two killed on the Khmer side whereas the enemy lost ten killed on the battlefield and two Chinese automatic pistols and a large quantity of ammunition were captured.

During the night of 21 to 22 January 1971, Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese attacked a Khmer defence position at Rocarkong and another at Kambaul, situated thirty-two kilometres north-east and fifteen kilometres south-west of Phnom Penh respectively.

The same night, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese, using heavy weapons, harassed the town of Kompong Cham and the locality of Tonlé Bet in Kompong Cham.

The same night, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese attacked a Khmer position at Kompong Châk, ten kilometres north of the town of Svay Rieng.

On 22 January 1971, at approximately 5.45 a.m., Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese were ambushed by friendly forces some twenty-one kilometres east of Kompong Seila. The enemy withdrew, leaving thirty-one dead on the battlefield.

The same day, at approximately 12 noon, Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed a Khmer position two kilometres south-west of Stang Chral. Following counter-action by the Khmer forces, four of whom were wounded, the enemy withdrew leaving on the battlefield one MAS 36, one MAT 49 automatic pistol and two Chinese automatic pistols with four full magazines.

The same day, Khmer elements engaged in mopping-up operations clashed with Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at Samrong, some ten kilometres west of Phnom Penh in Kandal. The Khmer side suffered three killed and twenty wounded while the enemy suffered ten killed and some twenty wounded.

During the night of 22 to 23 January 1971, Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese attacked a Khmer position at Tuk Khleang and another at Phlaur Trei, situated some twenty-two kilometres south-east of Phnom Penh on the east bank of the Mekong in Kandal.

The same night, at approximately 11 p.m., Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese attacked the patrol depot at Prék Phneou, some twelve kilometres north-west of Phnom Penh in Kandal. Heavy return fire by the Khmer defenders forced the enemy to withdraw at approximately 11.50 p.m. leaving on the battlefield three dead, one B40 rocket launcher and eight shells, thirty plastic charges and a full Chinese sub-machine-gun magazine and carrying away some thirty killed and wounded.

The same night, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed the Khmer defence complex at the town of Prey Veng.

On 23 January 1971, a clash occurred between Khmer and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at Svay Thom, seven kilometres east of the town of Siemreap, lasting approximately thirty minutes.

The same day, the enemy briefly harassed a Khmer position ten kilometres north-west of the town of Kompong Cham.

The same day, at approximately 5.45 a.m., Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese attacked a Khmer position at Saang in Kandal, wounding two of the Khmer forces.

The same day, the enemy harassed a Khmer position at Neak Ta Samrong, twenty-five kilometres south-east of Phnom Penh in Kandal.

During the night of 23 to 24 January 1971, Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese intermittently harassed a Khmer position at Trapeang Thnot, some twenty-three kilometres north-west of Phnom Penh in Kandal from 6.45 p.m. until dawn, without causing any damage.

During the same night, at approximately 7.15 p.m., a Khmer position at Wat Thla, on the northern outskirts of the capital, in Kandal, was also harassed.

Heavy return fire by the Khmer forces forced the enemy to withdraw, leaving one dead on the battlefield.

During the same night, at approximately 11 p.m., Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed a Khmer position at Kompong Tuol, two kilometres west of Kompong Kantuot, in Kandal.

During the same night, Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed a Khmer position at O Sandey, nine kilometres north-west of the town of Svay Rieng, with mortar and automatic-weapons fire. Counteraction by the Khmer forces, two of whom were wounded, forced the enemy to withdraw, leaving one dead on the battlefield.

During the night of 24 to 25 January 1971, at approximately 8.10 p.m., Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed a Khmer position at Prék Phneou, wounding one man.

During the same night, they also harassed a Khmer position at Bat Docung and other at Kambaul, situated respectively twenty-five kilometres north-west and fifteen kilometres south-west of Phnom Penh, in Kandal.

During the same night, about midnight and about 4 a.m. on 25 January 1971, Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese again harassed the Pochentong air base with mortar and automatic-weapons fire.

On 25 January 1971, from 1.30 a.m. to 4 a.m., the enemy harassed a Khmer position at Phum Ta Kauk, eleven kilometres west of Kompong Travèk, in Prey Veng. The Khmer forces, three of whom were wounded, took vigorous counteraction, forcing the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese to withdraw leaving four dead and four rifles on the battlefield.

I wish to reaffirm the firm and vigorous protest of the Government of the Khmer Republic against the illegal and permanent occupation of Khmer territory, followed by savage attacks perpetrated by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese forces against a neutral and peace-loving country to which they have no right and with which they have no ethnic affinity, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, of international law and of the 1954 Geneva Agreements.²³ These criminal attacks reveal for all to see the annexationist aims of the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese communist imperialists, and represent a dangerous threat to peace and security not only in the Khmer Republic, but throughout the region of South-East Asia.

The Government of the Khmer Republic holds the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam entirely responsible for all the extremely grave consequences resulting from this situation and reserves the right to take any necessary action to defend the independence, neutrality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) KHIM TIT
Permanent Representative of the Khmer Republic
to the United Nations

²³ *Idem.*

DOCUMENT S/10123*

Letter dated 17 February 1971 from the representative of Jordan
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[17 February 1971]

My Government has received information that the Israeli authorities have bulldozed parts of the premises of Government House, the headquarters of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, situated in no-man's land in Jerusalem.

Upon instructions from my Government and in accordance with Security Council resolution 252 (1968) and 267 (1969), I should be grateful if a report on this new Israeli violation could be issued, as urgently as possible, as an official document of the Security Council.

May I request that this letter also be circulated as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8281.

DOCUMENT S/10124*

Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolutions 252 (1968), 267 (1969) and 271 (1969) and General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V)

[Original: English]
[18 February 1971]

1. In the light of recent reported statements from various sources concerning Jerusalem and in view of the reporting responsibilities conferred upon him by the Security Council and the General Assembly,²⁴ the Secretary-General considers it necessary to submit the present report.

2. On 10 December 1970, the Secretary-General handed to the permanent representative of Israel to the United Nations a note of the same date, which reads as follows:

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations and has the honour to request the Permanent Representative to bring the following to his Government's urgent attention:

"1. A press report, which appeared in the 19 August 1970 issue of the *Jerusalem Post*, contained information that 'the Jerusalem District Town Planning Committee yesterday [18 August 1970] approved a master plan for a 10,000-dunam area within and outside the Old City walls'. The press report indicated, among other things, that the plan was to take effect in four months [i.e. on 18 December 1970] and that 'the Government House area has been classified as a residential area, with land to be set aside for hotels'.

"2. On instructions from the Secretary-General, representatives of UNTSO informally approached the Israel Foreign Ministry on this matter. on 12 No-

vember 1970, they were informed by the Deputy Director of the Division of Political Affairs that the plan referred to by the *Jerusalem Post* had not yet been made public. They then asked the Deputy Director whether the plan affected the Government House premises, both in its present limits and those before June 1967, but received no reply.

"3. On 3 December 1970, the *Jerusalem Post* carried a further report on this subject according to which the District Planning Commission approved in principle on 1 December developments in the Government House area and near Beit Safafa and detailed plans for the property were expected to be submitted shortly to the Housing Ministry since the Ministry was known 'to want construction to start next month'. The report also stated that 'the Government House development, designed by David Best, will consist of 600 to 700 housing units on 150 dunams'.

"4. In order to enable the Secretary-General to meet his responsibilities to the Security Council and to the General Assembly in relation to the status of the City of Jerusalem, he would appreciate the receipt at an early date of detailed information from the Israel authorities relating to the reported 'master plan' together with a copy thereof.

"5. In connexion with the matter under reference, the Secretary-General also attaches great importance to the status of the United Nations premises at Government House. He would therefore appreciate clarification from the Israel authorities as to whether the reported 'master plan' envisages any development affecting the United Nations premises at Government House, either as to the area returned to the United Nations by the Israel authorities in August 1967 or the remainder of the area of the

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8282.

²⁴ Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 and 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969, and General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967.

Government House premises as constituted on 5 June 1967, in respect of which the Secretary-General has expressed the views of the United Nations in his report to the Security Council of 11 August 1967 [S/7930/Add.27], and his letter of 22 August 1967 to the representative of Israel [S/7930/Add.29]."

3. On 8 January 1971, the Acting Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed the following note to the Secretary-General:

"The Acting Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour, on instructions of his Government, to refer to the Secretary-General's communication of 10 December 1970 and to state that he is authorized to assure the Secretary-General that the position of the Government of Israel as regards Government House continues to be as indicated in the letters dated 29 June 1967 and 22 August 1967 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General [S/7930/Add.20 and 29], and that no changes are contemplated with regard to the arrangements made in August 1967."

4. On 26 January 1971, the Secretary-General handed two notes to the representative of Israel. The first note reads:

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the Acting Permanent Representative's note of 8 January 1971 in reply to his note of 10 December 1970 to the Permanent Representative."

"In his note of 10 December 1970, the Secretary-General indicated that he would appreciate the receipt of a copy of the reported Jerusalem 'master plan' and detailed information thereon from the Israel authorities, as well as clarification as to whether such a 'master plan' envisages any development affecting part or the whole of the United Nations premises at Government House."

"The reply given in the Acting Permanent Representative's note of 8 January 1971 omits any reference to the reported 'master plan' and does not contain either a response to the Secretary-General's request for a copy of the plan or information thereon."

"In this connexion the Secretary-General would call the attention of the representative to the Secretary-General's reporting responsibilities in regard to the status of Jerusalem under the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. These are Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 and 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969, and General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967. Consequently the Secretary-General must again request from the Israel authorities the transmission of a copy of the reported 'master plan' as well as detailed information on the plan."

"The Secretary-General is sending to the representative of Israel a separate note dealing with the United Nations Government House premises."

The second note is as follows:

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations and has

the honour to refer to the Acting Permanent Representative's note of 8 January 1971 and to the related question of the inviolability and return to the United Nations of its premises at Government House in Jerusalem, as constituted on 5 June 1967."

"In a note of 10 December 1970, the Secretary-General asked the representative to transmit to his Government a request for information about the reported Jerusalem 'master plan' and for clarification as to whether it 'envisages any development affecting the United Nations premises at Government House, either as to the area returned to the United Nations by the Israel authorities in August 1967 or the remainder of the area of the Government House premises as constituted on 5 June 1967'."

"The Acting Permanent Representative, in the reply contained in his note of 8 January 1971, does not answer the question raised by the Secretary-General about the effects of the reported 'master plan' on the whole or part of the Government House premises. Instead, the Acting Permanent Representative assures the Secretary-General that 'the position of the Government of Israel as regards Government House continues to be as indicated in the letters dated 29 June 1967 and 22 August 1967 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General [S/7930/Add.20 and 29], and that no changes are contemplated with regard to the arrangements made in August 1967'."

"In so far as the assurances proffered by the Government of Israel do not safeguard the rights of the United Nations to possession of the whole of its Government House premises as constituted on 5 June 1967, they do not cover the obligations of the Secretary-General in this matter."

"In his report of 11 August 1967 to the Security Council [S/7930/Add.27], the Secretary-General made it clear that 'the United Nations is entitled to the return of the premises of Government House exactly as they were constituted on 5 June 1967 and that it has the right to exclusive and undisturbed occupancy and possession of the full Government House compound'. This position was expressly reserved by the Secretary-General in the exchange of letters of 22 August 1967 with the representative of Israel [S/7930/Add.29] prior to the return of UNTSO to a part of the Government House premises, Solely because of the urgent need for the facilities at Government House, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO was authorized by the Secretary-General to return to the lesser area, without prejudice to all rights and claims of the United Nations to the occupancy and possession of the whole of the premises."

"This reservation made by the Secretary-General is part of the understanding for the return of UNTSO to Government House and entails that Israel should refrain from any unilateral action which would frustrate or render ineffective the United Nations right to inviolability of the whole of its Government House premises and to the immunity of those premises, 'by whomsoever held', from 'search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action', in accordance with the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations to which Israel acceded on 21 September 1949."

"Since the dispatch of his note of 10 December 1970, the Secretary-General has been informed by UNTSO that on 3 January 1971 a bulldozer commenced working within the perimeter of the United Nations premises at Government House as constituted on 5 June 1967, on the south-eastern side of these premises. This activity, which coincides with reports appearing in the press about the immediate implementation of a project to erect housing units and other buildings in that area, indicates a further and serious violation of the inviolability of United Nations premises under the Charter of the United Nations and the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

"Aside from legal and other considerations, the works currently being carried out by Israel within United Nations premises may bring about irreparable physical change to these premises. Consequently, the Secretary-General, while reserving the right of the Organization to claim compensation for any en-

suing loss or damage, requests that these works be suspended.

"The Secretary-General continues to maintain that there is no basis for any curtailment of United Nations rights to Government House as constituted on 5 June 1967 and, especially in view of the recent developments mentioned above, is compelled to seek again by all appropriate means the full recognition and implementation of the right of the Organization to the occupancy and possession of its whole premises in that area. Accordingly the Secretary-General, in the exercise of his responsibilities in a matter involving the rights and interests of the Organization and in view of the implications of this matter on the principle of inviolability of United Nations premises wherever located and by whomsoever held, now also requests the unreserved return to the United Nations of the remainder of its Government House premises."

5. So far no reply to these two notes has been received from the representative of Israel.

DOCUMENT S/10125

Letter dated 17 February 1971 from the representative of Guinea to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]
[18 February 1971]

On instructions from my Government and in reply to the letter dated 16 February 1971 from the chargé d'affaires, a.i. of Portugal [S/10018], I have the honour to deny most categorically the gratuitous accusation contained in the letter in question.

At no time on 13 February 1971 did Guinean aircraft overfly the Portuguese-occupied African territory of Guinea (Bissau).

On the sole occasion when, as a result of a navigational error, a Guinean civil aircraft was over Guinea (Bissau) (an enclave under Portuguese colonial domination) it was seized outright and its crew imprisoned, in violation of all international rules of air traffic.

The sequestration of this civil aircraft from the Republic of Guinea and of its crew has continued to date, despite the resolutions of the Security Council.

Violations of the air space of the Republic of Guinea, as well as of its territorial waters and soil, by Portuguese colonial occupation forces stationed in Guinea (Bissau) are daily occurrences.

The armed aggression and invasion of Guinean national territory on 22, 23, 27 and 28 November 1970, perpetrated against the Republic of Guinea by Portugal, are proof, if such were still required, of the aggressive character of Portuguese colonialism, which is a real, serious and permanent threat to the peace and security of the African States and to world peace.

We draw the attention of world public opinion and of the Security Council to the fact that the fanciful accusations made against the Republic of Guinea and reproduced in the letter of the chargé d'affaires, a.i. of Portugal are a screen behind which the Portuguese Government, assured as it is of the support of its NATO allies, is preparing to launch a further attack against the Republic of Guinea.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this letter to be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdoulaye TOURE
Permanent Representative of the Republic
of Guinea to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10126*

**Letter dated 18 February 1971 from the representative of Israel
to the President of the Security Council**

*[Original: English]
[18 February 1971]*

On instructions of my Government I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 17 February 1971 by the representative of Jordan [S/10123] and to inform you as follows.

The United Nations headquarters in Jerusalem have in no way been affected by development activities now being undertaken in the city to meet urgent housing needs of the population.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

*(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations*

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8283.

DOCUMENT S/10127*

**Letter dated 19 February 1971 from the representative of Israel
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]
[19 February 1971]*

I have the honour, on instructions of my Government, further to my letter to you of 18 February 1971 [S/10126] concerning the letter addressed to you on 17 February 1971 by the representative of Jordan [S/10123], to state the following.

It is a matter of public record that on 5 June 1967, when the Jordanian Government initiated its full-scale attack on Israel in Jerusalem in spite of Israel's call to Jordan transmitted through United Nations channels, to refrain from doing so, it violated and occupied the compound of the United Nations headquarters in Jerusalem.

The Secretary-General reported on this at the time, notably at the 1347th meeting of the Security Council on 5 June 1967.

It will not be overlooked that it is precisely the Government of Jordan which is now advancing spurious charges in relation to an area which was the object of its own deliberate and unprovoked aggression.

I have the honour to request circulation of this letter as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

*(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations*

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8284.

DOCUMENT S/10128*

**Letter dated 19 February 1971 from the representative of Israel
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]
[19 February 1971]*

On instructions of my Government I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 12 February 1971 by the representatives of Jordan and Lebanon [S/10119] concerning the situation in the Gaza area, and to state as follows.

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8285.

In my letter of 9 February 1971 addressed to the President of the Security Council [101107], I stressed that the Arab Governments bear direct and full responsibility for the acts of terror and murder carried out in the Gaza area, and consequently for disturbing the conditions of peace and order in that area.

The responsibility of Jordan and Lebanon is particularly heavy since the bases from which terror operations are conducted and from which arms and equipment are dispatched to the Gaza area, are located on Jordanian or Lebanese territory. Many terror squads captured by the Israeli authorities while attempting to penetrate into the area by land or by sea have expressly admitted that they had been sent from Jordan or Lebanon. In the face of such a situation, the Israeli Government had no choice but to take measures to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the population of the Gaza area and to maintain public order there.

In pursuance of its consistent policy of presenting the facts as they are, the Government has published information concerning irregularities which may have occurred in the course of these actions, and announced the conclusions drawn therefrom.

It would be a matter of interest to know if any of the Arab Governments are capable of making inquiries

and publishing findings in connexion with questions arising from security measures, let alone of taking measures in the light of such findings.

It is characteristic that not a single Arab Government has thus far raised its voice to condemn acts of murder and terror perpetrated by Arab terrorists against the local population of Gaza and resulting in hundreds of victims, including women and children. A recent example of these acts of bloodshed is the mining of a civilian truck in the area of Khan Yunis on 6 February 1971. One Arab girl was killed in this murderous act and the wounded included five Arab children and one adult.

I have the honour to request circulation of this letter as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10130* **

Letter dated 22 February 1971 from the representatives of Jordan and the United Arab Republic to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[23 February 1971]

Further to our letter addressed to you of 8 January 1971 [S/10075], and upon instructions from our Governments, we have the honour to bring to your attention the following Israeli violations concerning Jerusalem.

General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V), as well as Security Council resolutions 252 (1968), 267 (1969) and 271 (1969), deplored Israel's unilateral steps to change the character of Jerusalem and confirmed that actions by Israel which purport to alter the status of the city were invalid and could not change that status.

Security Council resolution 267 (1969) *inter alia*:

"2. *Deplores* the failure of Israel to show any regard for the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council mentioned above;

"3. *Censures* in the strongest terms all measures taken to change the status of the City of Jerusalem;

"4. *Confirms* that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel which purport to alter the status of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, are invalid and cannot change that status;

"5. *Urgently calls* once more upon Israel to rescind forthwith all measures taken by it which may tend to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, and in future to refrain from all actions likely to have such an effect".

All these resolutions and others have not deterred Israel from disregarding United Nations authority and decisions. It has continued to confiscate or expropriate Arab land and property which is partly depicted and explained by the attached two maps.²⁵

* Also issued as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8286.

** Incorporating document S/10130/Corr.1.

²⁵ The maps and photographs attached to the mimeographed version of this document are not reproduced here; they have been deposited in the archives of the United Nations Secretariat, where they are available for consultation.

New Israeli settlements and industrial projects are being constructed on Arab confiscated lands. The Ministry of Housing, according to the Israeli daily newspaper *Ha'aretz* of 24 November 1970, was to build 3,000 housing units in the eastern part of Jerusalem. Israeli companies were to build an additional 500 units in different places in the city. It was expected that 698 units would be completed by the end of 1970 in Ramat Eshkol. (This is the housing project initiated in 1969 on confiscated Arab land between Shaykh Jarrah and the village of Shn'fat.) One hundred and fifty units are being built on Mount Scopus and twelve buildings in Karm el-Waz. Three photographs of such housing units are attached.²⁵

Moreover, the Israeli occupying authorities started building thirteen hotels with 4,200 rooms to be finished within five years according to *Ha'aretz* daily newspaper of 6 July 1970. The same paper reported that six of these hotels with 1,325-room capacity were to be built on confiscated Arab land in Jerusalem.

Regarding the Old City of Jerusalem, *Ha'aretz* of 5 January 1971 reported that: "A special unit works within the Old City; its task is to evacuate Arab inhabitants. Up till now there are 2,500 families left and all efforts are being made to evacuate them. Lately fifty Arab shops and groceries were closed down and 3,000 Arabs were evacuated."

In place of those evicted Arabs, Jewish families will move into the renovated houses as well as the newly built housing units. Israel's Deputy Prime Minister, Yigal Allon, has already moved into one of the houses. *Ha'aretz* of 25 November 1970 reports that 172 houses will be finished within six months, to be occupied by Jewish families.

The latest stage of confiscation was announced on 30 August 1970. The Israeli Minister of Finance issued an order to confiscate 11,680 dunums (a dunum equals 1,000 square metres) of Arab land north and south of the City of Jerusalem and around the wall of the Old City. The following suburbs and villages were affected:

(a) 470 dunums of the village of Bayt Hanina near An Nabi Ya'Qub

(b) 4,840 dunums of the villages of Bayt Hanina and An Nabi Samwil north-west of the city;

(c) 2,240 dunums of the village of Sur Bahir south-west of Jerusalem near Telpiot and Jabal El-Mukabber, where the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) headquarters is located;

(d) 2,700 dunums of the villages of Bayt Safafa and Sharafat south-west of the city;

(e) 1,200 dunums of the villages of Kallandya near Jerusalem Airport;

(f) 130 dunums in the Birket es-Sultan area adjacent to Jaffa Gate;

(g) 100 dunums around the walls of the Old City.

The above confiscation order was issued in the Israeli *Official Gazette* No. 1656, dated 30 August 1970 [see annex II].

The above measures of confiscation of Arab lands were a prelude to the Israeli so-called "master plan" for Jerusalem, a subject of our letter addressed to you of 8 January 1971. This plan continues to draw sharp criticism from the international community, for it purports to change not only the demographic situation and the character of Jerusalem but also the villages and hills around the city extending to the towns of Ramallah in the north of Bethlehem in the south.

The so-called "master plan" of Jerusalem envisages the construction of four suburbs on confiscated private and public Arab land and property: 1,700 housing units to be constructed in An Nabi Ya'Qub and Bayt Hanina villages north of the city; 18,000 units in Nabi Samwi village to the north-west of the city; 3,000 housing units in the area near the village of Sur Bahir and El-Mukabber mountain near Telpiot, partly in the no man's land; and 12,000 units between the villages of Bayt Safafa and Sharafat, north-west of the city.

Besides serving a military strategic purpose these projected housing units are intended to house new waves of Jewish immigrants. "Jewish immigration to Jerusalem is the fundamental question", said Mr. Sharef, Israel's Minister of Housing, as reported in *The New York Times* on 16 February 1971. The construction of these units—up to 35,000—is to accommodate 122,000 new Jewish immigrants—almost half of Jerusalem's present population.

The aim was spelled out by Mr. Sharef, as reported in *The New York Times* of 16 February 1971: "To settle new immigrants as quickly as possible in order to keep Jerusalem 'a Jewish city'".

The cynicism in this statement is very obvious, for Jerusalem, before its occupation by Israel in 1948, never had a Jewish majority.

A *Survey of Palestine*, prepared by the Palestine Chief Secretary for the information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, shows that of the total population of Jerusalem determined by the census of 1922 and 1931, 56,346 were Arabs and 34,431 were Jews, and 78,071 were Arabs and 54,538 were Jews, respectively (page 149, table 7 c). The same survey gives an estimate of total settled population in Jerusalem for the end of 1944 as 140,530 Arabs and 100,200 Jews (page 152, table 8 c).

The Anglo-Palestine Yearbook 1947-1948 estimates the total settled population in Jerusalem at the end of 1946 as 150,590 Arabs and 102,520 Jews (page 34).

Finally, the report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine states that Jews comprise more than 40 per cent of the total population of Jerusalem,²⁶ but less than half. Figures pertaining to the number of Arabs include both Christian and Moslem.

The above facts give a background to the developments since 1948 and demonstrate the effect of Israel's policy of creating *faits accomplis*. Israel's actions since June 1967 follow such a scheme and the pattern of colonization has become very clear: military conquest; forced mass exodus of the Arab population: bulldozing and dynamiting of Arab houses, villages and quarters within the cities; duress, through either imprisonment or expulsion; confiscation of land and construction of new purely Jewish settlements and the "ingathering" of new waves of immigrants.

The New York Times of 16 February 1971 exposed in the words of Israeli leaders the intention of Israel and its determination to annex Jerusalem and its environs in utter disregard of the will of the people and in complete defiance of the United Nations resolutions.

We attach extracts from *The New York Times* of 16, 17 18 and 19 February 1971 and an editorial from the same paper of 17 February 1971, as annex III.

In your report of 18 February 1971 concerning Jerusalem [S/10124], you asked for a copy of the Jerusalem "master plan" and detailed information thereon from the Israeli occupying authorities. You also reported that UNTSO had informed you that on 3 January 1971, a bulldozer commenced working within the United Nations premises at Government House. No response came from the Israeli authorities except to hastily adopt and proceed with the so-called "master plan".

Mr. Kollek, the illegally appointed Mayor of Jerusalem, said, according to *The New York Times* of 21 February 1971, that the construction of up to 35,000 housing units "must go ahead" and that they (the Israelis) could not "accept foreign advice on where and when to build".

In paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of its resolution 267 (1969) the Security Council:

"6. Requests Israel to inform the Security Council without any further delay of its intentions with regard to the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution;

"7. Determines that, in the event of a negative response or no response from Israel, the Security Council shall reconvene without delay to consider what further action should be taken in this matter;

"8. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution."

We request that this letter and the attached annexes be circulated as official documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed H. EL-ZAYYAT
Permanent Representative
of the United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

²⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Supplement No. 11*, volume I, Chapter II A, para. 22.

ANNEX I

A sample of new housing units constructed on confiscated Arab land

[The photographs attached to the mimeographed version of this document are not reproduced here; they have been deposited in the archives of the United Nations Secretariat, where they are available for consultation.]

ANNEX II

Notices published in the Israeli Official Gazette No. 1656, dated 30 August 1970

LAND (ACQUISITION FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES) ORDINANCE, 1943

Notice published pursuant to sections 5 and 7

The public is hereby notified that the lands described in the annex hereto are unreservedly required by the Minister of Finance for public purposes and that the Minister of Finance is prepared to negotiate the acquisition thereof.

Any person who claims any right in or usufruct of the said lands and who wishes to obtain compensation therefor is invited to forward to the Director of the Land Registration Division, within two months of the date of publication of this notice in the *Official Gazette*, a statement of his right in or usufruct of the said lands, together with evidence in support of his claim, including details of the entry, if any, in the land register and an itemized statement of the compensation applied for and the amount claimed in respect of each item.

The public is also hereby notified that the Minister of Finance intends to take immediate possession of the lands in question, inasmuch as they are urgently required for the public purposes for which it is proposed to acquire them, and the Minister of Finance hereby orders any person who is in possession of the said lands to relinquish possession thereof forthwith.

ANNEX

1. A plot of land having an area of approximately 470 dunums, situated at Jerusalem, in and around the place known as Neve Yaakov.

The said plot of land is marked in red on Plan No. HS/A/112/322, drawn on the scale of 1:2500 and signed by the Minister of Finance.

2. A plot of land having a total area of approximately 4,840 dunums, situated to the north-west of Jerusalem.

The said plot is marked in red on Plan No. HS/121/322, drawn on the scale of 1:5000 and signed by the Minister of Finance.

3. A plot of land having a total area of approximately 2,240 dunums, situated to the south-east of Jerusalem, marked in red, with the exception of the lands marked in blue, on Plan No. HR/122/322, drawn on the scale of 1:5000 and signed by the Minister of Finance.

4. A plot of land having a total area of approximately 2,700 dunums, situated to the south-west of Jerusalem, marked in red, with the exception of the lands marked in blue, on Plan No. HR/123/322, drawn on the scale of 1:5000 and signed by the Minister of Finance.

5. A plot of land having a total area of approximately 1,200 dunums, situated at Jerusalem, in and around the place known as Kallandya.

The said plot is marked in red, with the exception of the lands marked in blue, on Plan No. HR/124/322, drawn on the scale of 1:5000 and signed by the Minister of Finance.

6. A plot of land having a total area of approximately 130 dunums at Jerusalem, consisting of a combination of parcels and parts of parcels, the boundaries being those numbered 30020, 30031 and 30032 and the boundary specified under No. 30029. The said lands are marked in red, with the exception of the lands marked in blue, on Area Plan No. HF/120/322, drawn on the scale of 1:1250 and signed by the Minister of Finance.

7. A plot of land having a total area of approximately 100 dunums at Jerusalem, consisting of a combination of parcels and parts of parcels, the boundaries of which are numbered 30033 and 30034. The said lands are marked in red on Area Plan No. HF/126/322, drawn on the scale of 1:1250 and signed by the Minister of Finance. Copies of the plans in question are deposited at the Jerusalem District Land Registration Office and at the Jerusalem District Headquarters and any interested persons are entitled to inspect them during office hours.

LAND (ACQUISITION FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES) ORDINANCE, 1943

Notice published pursuant to sections 5 and 7

The public is hereby notified that the land described in the annex hereto is required by the Minister of Finance for public purposes for a period of Ninety-nine years and that the Minister of Finance is prepared to negotiate the disposal and use of the said land.

Any person who claims any right in or usufruct of the said land and who wishes to obtain compensation therefor is invited to forward to the Director of the Land Registration Division, within two months of the date of publication of this notice in the *Official Gazette*, a statement of his right in or usufruct of the said land, together with evidence in support of his claim, including details of the entry, if any, in the land register and an itemized statement of the compensation applied for and the amount claimed in respect of each item.

The public is also hereby notified that the Minister of Finance intends to take immediate possession of the land in question, inasmuch as it is urgently required for the public purposes for which it is proposed to acquire possession thereof, and the Minister of Finance hereby orders any person who is in possession of the said land to relinquish the possession and use thereof forthwith.

ANNEX

The land having an area of approximately 600 dunums, situated at the place known as Ramat Rachel, comprising the parcels and parts of parcels covered by land registry sections Nos. 30175, 30177, 30178, 30289, 30290 and 30291.

The said land is marked in red on Plan No. HP/127/322, which is drawn on the scale of 1:5000 and signed by the Minister of Finance.

Copies of the said plan are deposited at the offices of the Land Registration Division in Jerusalem and the offices of the District Superintendent in Jerusalem, and any interested person may inspect them during office hours.

ANNEX III

Articles published in *The New York Times*

ARTICLE BY HENRY RAYMOND ENTITLED "ISRAELIS DISREGARD CRITICS, PRESS JERUSALEM HOUSING", PUBLISHED ON 16 FEBRUARY 1971

Jerusalem, 15 February—Disregarding local and international critics, the Israeli Ministry of Housing announced today that it would move ahead with plans for four sprawling housing projects in the Biblical hillsides that surround Jerusalem.

The plans envision the construction of up to 35,000 units capable of accommodating 122,000 new Israeli residents—almost half of Jerusalem's present population—in the territories that were seized from Jordan in the six-day war of 1967.

In announcing details of the plan, Zev Sharef, the Minister of Housing, spoke with unusual bluntness of its political goals: to settle new immigrants as quickly as possible in order to keep Jerusalem "a Jewish city". He said that the Government would finance new housing for Arabs in the surroundings of the towns of Ramallah and Bethlehem, north and south of Jerusalem respectively.

Up to now Israeli officials had been careful about attributing political motives to the expansion of housing projects outside Jerusalem, wanting to avoid as much as possible any suggestion that the projects were motivated by anything other than urban and human considerations.

Mr. Sharef's announcement was the first public statement on the matter by an Israeli official since Mayor Teddy Kollek of Jerusalem said on 28 January that the new housing projects would be delayed for "urbanistic and aesthetic" reasons. The Mayor was responding to criticism from a group of international architects and city-planners that has been helping him design a master plan for Jerusalem, several local architects and the Council for a Beautiful Israel, a recently formed conservation group opposed to haphazard urban construction and industrial sprawl.

"Jewish immigration to Jerusalem is the fundamental question", Mr. Sharef said repeatedly during a three-hour news conference marked by sharp exchanges over the impact of the proposed housing developments on the historic pastoral landscape surrounding this city, holy to three religions.

"For more than 100 years Jerusalem had a Jewish majority, and we want to keep this up without touching the legitimate interests of the minorities and preventing the division of Jerusalem again", he added. Jerusalem now has a population of about 275,000, of whom about 60,000 are Arabs.

Questioned on whether he was speaking for himself or for the entire Cabinet, Mr. Sharef said that he had discussed the plan with the Ministers of Justice and Interior and that there was "complete agreement within the Government".

Five architects dismissed

Five young architects of the Ministry of Housing who recently joined the ranks of the critics were summarily dismissed yesterday by Mr. Sharef, who accused them of "talking with forked tongues". The architects, who initially worked on the projects, wrote a letter to Mayor Kollek on 3 February stating that they had suffered a "crisis of conscience" and urging him to oppose the plan.

While Mr. Kollek had sought strenuously to confine the debate to aesthetic and urban considerations at today's news conference, Mr. Sharef practically reversed the Mayor's approach.

"We are moved by national and not urban considerations", Mr. Sharef, a short, stocky man of 63, declared.

He cited as national considerations the need to provide new housing for immigrants and to relieve the urban congestion already afflicting some of Israel's cities, a desire to maintain the present population balance of Jerusalem and the Government's resistance to suggestions that the capital be internationalized as part of a peace settlement.

Mr. Sharef expressed disagreement with some of the recommendations for a master plan for Jerusalem made in December by the international panel of experts formed by Mayor Kollek. The panel included such well-known architects as Philip C. Johnson and Louis I. Kahn of the United States and Bruno Zevi of Italy, as well as city planners such as Professor Charles M. Haar, chairman of the Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University.

The panel criticized what it termed lack of inspiration and vision in the planning effort for Jerusalem and attempts at prosaic solutions in a centre of faith and poetry. It also noted the absence of any Arab or Moslem representatives on the planning group.

One of its recommendations was to try to hold Jerusalem suburbs to a low population density, creating garden villages that would not disturb the serene beauty of the city's surroundings. This is also the conception advocated by the Council for a Beautiful Israel.

"We see no reason why Jerusalem must claim a preferential status", Mr. Sharef said. "Some planners have been speaking of a 2.8 per cent annual growth, but we believe Jerusalem must annually absorb 10 to 15 per cent of our immigrants—that is a national consideration."

Repeatedly the Minister criticized those who oppose the housing projects, charging that they were favouring "the selfish tastes of the fat rich" at the expense of people in need of housing.

According to the Ministry's plan, Jerusalem is to be the hub of a wheel from which suburbs will spring in four directions: Neve Yaakov to the north with 1,700 units; Ramot near the Hill of Samuel to the west with up to 18,000 units; Talpiot East on the slopes and crest of the Government House Hill, formerly in the no man's land between Israel and Jordan, with 3,000 units and Sharafat in the south with 12,000 units.

The unveiling of the models, which had been kept secret by the Ministry since the beginning of their design six months ago, showed that the plans attempt to blend construction with the topography. David Best, a Manchester-born architect and a graduate of MIT, who designed Talpiot East pointed out that he had confined the project to clusters of four-story buildings in soft Jerusalem stone flanked by low-flying flat structures that would serve as community centers.

23,020 units sought

The first phase of construction calls for a total of 23,020 units, with the rest being added in stages over a five-year period. The precise density of the proposed suburbs must be decided by the Jerusalem Municipal Council, which will meet Sunday to consider the project.

After the meeting with Mr. Sharef this afternoon, Mayor Kollek pointedly refrained from entering into an open disagreement with the Minister. In an interview, the Mayor commended the planners for concentrating on developing the hillsides and sparing much of the skyline of the areas surrounding the city. He did, however, express some reservations about the impact of the proposed suburbs on the center of Jerusalem.

"If they say that these are national considerations, then the city should not carry the brunt of the problems faced by sprawling suburbs such as the increase in transportation need and the drain they are likely to cause on the business center", the Mayor said. "Clearly we shall have to make changes in our master plan to adjust to the new situation."

Mr. Sharef's exposition was attacked by Amos Elon, the urban specialist of *Ha'aretz*, Israel's most influential newspaper. In an editorial prepared for tomorrow's issue Mr. Elon characterized the plans as "monotonous, mediocre and unsatisfactory", and called on the Municipal Council to oppose it.

ARTICLE BY HEDRICK SMITH ENTITLED "US OPPOSES PLAN BY ISRAEL TO BUILD NEAR JERUSALEM: IT FEARS PROPOSED HOUSING PROJECTS COULD AFFECT CITY'S FINAL STATUS", PUBLISHED ON 17 FEBRUARY 1971

Washington, 16 February—The State Department took sharp issue today with Israel's plans to construct large housing projects in the hills around Jerusalem captured from Jordan during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

Robert J. McCloskey, the department spokesman, said that the Israeli plans were unacceptable because they could affect the final status of Jerusalem, whose future is a major point of contention between Jordan and Israel.

"Pending a settlement of the issue of Jerusalem, which is really a part of the negotiation", Mr. McCloskey declared, "we feel that unilateral actions that tend to be regarded as changing the status of the city—we would find that unacceptable."

Private complaints voiced

At the same time, well-placed American officials complained privately that Israel seemed to be "dragging its feet" by challenging the authority of Dr. Gunnar V. Jarring, the United Nations intermediary who is conducting the indirect Arab-Israeli peace talks in New York.

Washington takes the position that, contrary to the reported views of some Israeli officials, including Deputy Premier Yigal Allon, Dr. Jarring has the authority to put detailed questions to Israel and her Arab neighbors on specific

elements of a Middle East peace settlement. At the moment, however, this has not become an active point of dispute between the United States and Israel.

No protest expected now

American officials said that no official protest had been made to Israel over the housing project, and that it was unlikely that any would be made at this time.

Mr. McCloskey was commenting in response to questions about announcements in Jerusalem yesterday by Zev Sharef, the Israeli Minister of Housing, that Israel planned to build up to 35,000 housing units—capable of accommodating 122,000 new Israeli residents—in the hills around Jerusalem. Mr. Sharef asserted that Israel's goal was to settle new immigrants as quickly as possible in order to keep Jerusalem "a Jewish city".

Mr. McCloskey said that the Administration had, in the past, previously expressed its opposition to Israeli steps to annex the Arab sector of Jerusalem.

Specifically, he cited a statement by Secretary of State William P. Rogers last 9 December 1969, which said:

"We have made clear repeatedly in the past two and one-half years that we cannot accept unilateral actions by any party to decide the final status of the city. We believe its status can be determined only through agreement of the parties concerned, which in practical terms means primarily the governments of Israel and Jordan."

Although the Nixon Administration has been at pains to maintain a neutral position on the latest Egyptian and Israeli moves, officials have indicated privately that they regard Cairo as the more forthcoming at the moment, with its proposal for a partial Israeli pullback in the Sinai Peninsula and reopening the Suez Canal. Washington also regards the Egyptian response to Dr. Jarring's efforts as more positive.

DISPATCH ENTITLED "KOLLEK BARS US SUGGESTION", PUBLISHED ON 17 FEBRUARY 1971

Jerusalem, 16 February—Mayor Teddy Kollek said tonight that Israel's right to build housing developments in the former Arab territories around Jerusalem "is a right that cannot be shaken".

Though he has been critical of planning aspects of four new controversial housing projects made public yesterday, the Mayor rejected a State Department suggestion that the projects should be halted in the interest of peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

"We are trying to build a good city for all the citizens of Jerusalem regardless of any future boundaries and as befits good city planning", Mr. Kollek said in a television broadcast. This is a right that cannot be shaken. Whoever introduces politics brings an alien element into this question."

Mr. Kollek was commenting on the State Department's contention that the proposed housing projects would affect the final status of the disputed areas around Jerusalem.

A highly placed source in the Government said tonight that Mr. Sharef could count on Premier Golda Meir's endorsement of his zeal to provide more housing for Jewish immigrants. The source indicated, however, that the Housing Minister's presentation of his case had been less than admirable in tact and diplomacy.

Foreign Minister Abba Eban was understood to feel that Mr. Sharef's news conference yesterday had unnecessarily thrust the issue into the international arena.

EDITORIAL ARTICLE ENTITLED "THE HILLSIDES OF JERUSALEM", PUBLISHED ON 17 FEBRUARY 1971

The Israeli Housing Ministry's announced plan to push ahead with the construction of new housing for Israelis on former Arab lands in East Jerusalem constitutes a serious threat to the future of the Holy City and to the cause of peace.

The proposed developments on the biblical hillsides surrounding the city have been severely criticized by international architects and city planners who fear they will destroy the unique character of Jerusalem, sacred to the followers of three great religions. An Israeli urban specialist has characterized the plan as "monotonous, mediocre and unsatisfactory". On aesthetic grounds alone, development should be further delayed pending the careful restudy promised recently by Jerusalem's Mayor Kollek.

But the Housing Ministry's proposed action has even more serious political implications. Minister Zev Sharef has openly proclaimed that the purpose of the new construction is to consolidate Israel's control over Arab sections of Jerusalem, which were annexed after the June 1967 war, in disregard of United Nations resolutions—an action the State Department yesterday said would be "unacceptable".

Mr. Sharef's announcement—coupled with the negative reaction of Israeli officials to UN Ambassador Gunar Jarring's effort to elicit some specific Israeli commitment to withdraw from occupied areas—is bound to raise grave questions about Israel's readiness to move toward peace in accordance with the principles laid down in the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. As Professor Jacob Talman of Hebrew University has observed, Israeli settlement in East Jerusalem "only confirms Arab fears that there is no intention of withdrawing from occupied areas".

Almost no one, including the Arabs of East Jerusalem, wants the Holy City divided and strife-torn again as it was before the Six-Day War. But it is difficult to imagine a permanently peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict which would leave Israelis in exclusive, unilateral control of the entire city.

The case for a rethinking of Israeli policy toward Jerusalem was put eloquently by Lewis Mumford, the American city planner, in a recent memorandum to Mayor Kollek. "The integrity of Jerusalem as a whole, in which Israelis and Arabs, Jews, Moslems and Christians will be enabled to form a permanent working partnership, must be the basic premise", Mr. Mumford wrote. "Yet this assumption presupposes a state of political harmony, economic co-operation and human good feelings that does not as yet exist, and that certainly cannot be produced by any proposal that would make Israeli national interest the sole determining factor."

This ministerial decision is contrary to Israel's own larger interests in Jerusalem and in peace.

ARTICLE BY HENRY RAYMONT ENTITLED "JERUSALEM COMPROMISE SOUGHT", PUBLISHED ON 18 FEBRUARY 1971

Jerusalem, 17 February—Mayor Teddy Kollek tried today to work out a compromise to scale down the national Government's proposals for major housing development in the barren but scenic valleys and hillsides around Jerusalem as conservation groups demanded that the plans be halted altogether.

Approval of the project appeared assured, however, as a result of the political momentum it has gained this week. On Monday, the Minister of Housing Zev Sharef, linked the housing plans to the Government's determination to increase the Jewish majority in the areas surrounding the city that were seized from Jordan in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967.

Assurances are sought

This afternoon, a Municipal Council sub-committee voted unanimously to endorse the plans, which were submitted Monday by Mr. Sharef as a package proposal. The council acted in a closed session even as Mayor Kollek was negotiating with Mr. Sharef for a drastic reduction in the size of Ramot, near the Hill of Samuel, the largest and most controversial of the four projects.

"We are trying to reach agreement with the Ministry of Housing that the whole area should be settled sparsely and only after extensive social and economic research", Mr. Kollek said in an interview tonight. "If I can get assurances that the Ministry will stop at 650 housing units in the first phase and not exceed 3,000 in the final one, we shall have an agreement."

Under the Ministry's proposal, construction would begin immediately in the area around the Hill of Samuel—some five miles north-west of Jerusalem—where, according to tradition, the Prophet Samuel is buried. The project envisions 10,000 four-story houses, with a possibility of expansion up to 18,000 units.

The blueprint for large-scale housing projects just outside this ancient city clashes with suggestions by some 30 prominent international architects and planners who met here in December to discuss the Mayor's Jerusalem Master Plan. They envisioned the area as a low-density suburb of stone villas carefully designed to blend with the landscape—a concept that the Mayor is trying to preserve.

Mr. Kollek said Friday night on television that he had initially endorsed the Ministry's high-density project for the Hill of Samuel, disregarding the advice of his own planners. He said he now believed that this was a mistake.

Mayor seems cheerful

Sitting in his office last night, Mr. Kollek appeared cheerful despite a day of demonstrations outside his office, editorial protests and hectic negotiations between municipal officials and the Ministry of Housing. He said he was confident that a compromise could be reached "in a day or two", before an important meeting on the housing plan Sunday, when the full Municipal Council is expected to vote on the sub-committee's recommendation.

The controversy over the Ministry's projects, simmering for three months, exploded into the open Monday when Mr. Sharef disclosed for the first time that the plans envision up to 35,000 housing units for 122,000 new settlers in the approaches to the city. The initial stage of the construction calls for 12,000 units.

Mr. Sharef's disclosure drew sharp criticism yesterday from the United States State Department, which said that it opposed any change in the status of the area surrounding Jerusalem—including new construction—until a peace settlement had been reached.

ARTICLE ENTITLED "UN REQUEST SAID TO BE IGNORED", PUBLISHED ON 19 FEBRUARY 1971

United Nations, New York, 18 February—The Israeli authorities have ignored a request for information from Secretary General Thant about their plans for the urban development of Jerusalem, informed sources said today.

The sources said that this would be one of the points raised tomorrow in a public report by Mr. Thant criticizing Israel for her policies in Jerusalem.

A United Nations spokesman said that Israeli bulldozers had been operating "without authorization" from the United Nations on the grounds of Government House, the headquarters of the United Nations truce observation team. The property around Government House is owned by the United Nations. It is in a grove of trees in the former no man's land between the Arab and Israeli parts of Jerusalem.

ARTICLE BY HENRY RAYMONT ENTITLED "ISRAEL ADAMANT ON HOUSING PLANS: AIDE STRESSES INTENTION TO KEEP JERUSALEM UNIFIED", PUBLISHED ON 19 FEBRUARY 1971

Jerusalem, 18 February—The Minister of Housing, Zev Sharef, said tonight that Israel was determined to continue to develop Jerusalem as a unified city regardless of the political boundaries that emerged from the peace talks.

Mr. Sharef appeared on television to explain the housing project that he announced Monday for sectors around Jerusalem that had either belonged to Jordan or had been in a no man's land before the six-day war of 1967.

Indicating that Israel would insist on rule over Jerusalem as part of any negotiated settlement, Mr. Sharef said that she would reject all attempts by the United States or the United Nations to have her abandon her position.

"The Government sees Jerusalem as one", the Minister said. "We must continue to develop the city and create housing for new immigrants without concern for the politics that are a matter for diplomats and other officials to deal with."

Critical of US position

He was asked to comment on the criticism of the United States State Department spokesman, Robert J. McCloskey, of the proposed construction and on the report that Secretary General Thant would raise the question tomorrow before the United Nations Security Council.

"The basic decision to build in new areas was made in August, 1967, and we don't think we will change our ideas because of Mr. McCloskey", the Minister said.

The American criticism was seen by Israeli officials as having helped to solidify support here behind the Housing Ministry plan. Even those who had opposed the project on aesthetic grounds are now reluctant to appear to be making common cause with foreign critics. Jerusalem's Mayor, Teddy Kollek, who had reservations about the plan, said:

"I am convinced that the unanimous vote the Municipal Council's building sub-committee gave the plan yesterday was directly the result of the State Department's comment."

While the Mayor and Mr. Sharef did not agree on the size and character of some of the housing to go into the project, Mr. Kollek said, "We are in full agreement that there must be building and that Jerusalem must never again be a divided city".

He added that by raising the matter in the Security Council, Mr. Thant "will just solidify support for the plans when they come before the full Municipal Council on Sunday."

Mr. Kollek said in an interview tonight that there had been "considerable progress" in his effort to reach a compromise in the Ministry's plan to build at least 10,000 housing units near the Hill of Samuel, north-west of the city, the largest and most controversial of the new projects. The Mayor favors a more modest program.

DOCUMENT S/10131

Letter dated 23 February 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]
[24 February 1971]

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 16 February 1971 [S/10122], I have the honour to bring the following to your attention for the information of the members of the Security Council.

During the night of 25 to 26 January 1971, at about 6 p.m., an estimated 500 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched an attack in force against a Khmer defence position at Phnom-Prey Khiev, approx-

imately twenty-seven kilometres west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal. Vigorous counteraction by the Khmer forces, who had air support, forced the enemy to withdraw at about midnight.

During the same night, at about 7 p.m., the enemy attacked another Khmer position at Lovear Sâr Kandal, situated some thirty kilometres south-east of the capital on the east bank of the Mekong in Kandal.

On 26 January 1971, at about 6 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched a violent harassing attack on a Khmer position at Saang, in Kandal. The Khmer forces, supported from the air, struck back vigorously, forcing the enemy to stop firing.

The same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched an attack on a Khmer position at Chrey Loas, approximately twenty-two kilometres north-west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal. Vigorous counteraction by the Khmer defenders forced the enemy to withdraw after making several unsuccessful attempts to storm the position.

During the night of 26 to 27 January 1971, at about 7.10 p.m., the Viet Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched an attack on a Khmer position at Bat Docung, twenty-five kilometres north-west of Phnom-Penh, in Kompong Speu.

During the same night, at about 8 p.m., the enemy directed harassing fire with mortars and automatic weapons at a Khmer position at Prek Phneou, in Kandal, setting fire to two houses.

During the same night, at about 8.30 and 9 p.m. respectively, the Viet-Cong North Viet-Nameese launched harassing attacks on Khmer positions at Kambaul and Stung Meanchey, in Kandal.

On 27 January 1971, at about 9.20 a.m., Khmer elements conducting a clearing operation two kilometres north of Saang, in Kandal, clashed with a force of approximately 100 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese.

The same day, at about 7.25 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched a harassing attack on a Khmer position at the crossroads at Kirirom, in Kompong Speu.

The same day, at about 8.45 p.m., a Khmer position at Leach, situated approximately thirty kilometres south-west of the town of Pursat, was subjected to harassing mortar fire by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese.

During the night of 27 to 28 January 1971, at about 8 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched harassing attacks on three Khmer defence positions at Phnom Baset, Saang and Lovear Sar Krom, situated respectively twenty kilometres north-west, forty kilometres south-east and twenty-five kilometres south-east of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal, without causing any damage.

On 28 January 1971, at about 8.30 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched a harassing attack on a Khmer position at Leach approximately thirty kilometres south-west of the town of Pursat.

On 29 January 1971, Khmer and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese elements fought an engagement lasting some thirty minutes at a point seven kilometres south-west of the town of Kompong Cham; a number of dead and wounded were carried away by the enemy, and there were seven wounded on the Khmer side.

The same day, at about 1.10 p.m., Khmer and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese elements fought an engagement near Saang; a number of dead and wounded were carried away by the enemy, and there were four wounded on the Khmer side.

The same day, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched a harassing attack lasting several minutes on an outpost at Kompong Trach, in Kampot.

During the night of 29 to 30 January 1971, at about 11.05 p.m., Viet Cong-North Viet-Nameese elements harassed a Khmer position situated approximately six kilometres south-west of the town of Kompong Cham for twenty minutes, wounding seven persons.

On 30 January 1971, at about 3.30 p.m., a fuel convoy was attacked by Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese elements, at a point twenty-one kilometres north of Veal Rinh on National Highway 4 in Kompong Seila. Three persons were wounded and three fuel trucks set afire.

The same day, during a clearing operation, Khmer elements clashed with a force of Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at a point five kilometres south of Tani, in Kampot, for half an hour. The enemy suffered three killed and a dozen wounded, whom they carried off.

During the night of 30 to 31 January 1971, at about 10 p.m., Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese elements launched a harassing attack on a Khmer position at Kambaul, situated fifteen kilometres south-west of Phnom Penh, in Kandal.

The same night, at about 10.55 p.m., they attacked a Khmer position at Phum Veal Thom, fourteen kilometres east of Phnom-Penh, on the east bank of the Mekong, in Kandal. The Khmer troops, which suffered three killed and seven wounded, returned the fire, forcing the enemy to withdraw, carrying with them a number of dead and wounded.

On 31 January 1971, Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese elements launched a harassing attack on a Khmer position at Saang, in Kandal, killing one person.

The same day, there was another thirty-minute clash near Phum Thmei, eight kilometres south-west of the town of Kompong Cham, resulting in three dead and two wounded on the Khmer side and a number of dead and wounded carried away by the enemy.

The same day, Khmer troops on patrol clashed with Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese elements at a point forty-two kilometres north-west of the town of Kompong Speu in a thirty-minute engagement which resulted in one dead and one wounded on the Khmer side and a number of dead and wounded carried away on the enemy side.

The same day, there was another engagement at kilometre 92, on National Highway 4, in Kompong Speu, resulting in three wounded on the Khmer side.

During the night of 31 January to 1 February 1971, Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese elements attacked a Khmer position at Trapeang Thnot, approximately twenty-five kilometres north-west of Phnom-Penh.

During the same night, at about 8.30 p.m., Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese elements launched a harassing attack on an outpost at Kompong Seila.

I wish to reaffirm the firm and vigorous protest of the Government of the Khmer Republic against the illegal and permanent occupation of Khmer territory, followed by savage attacks perpetrated by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese forces against a neutral and peace-loving country to which they have no right and with which they have no ethnic affinity, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, of international law and of the 1954 Geneva Agreements.²⁷ These criminal attacks reveal for all to see the annexationist aims of the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese communist imperialists, and represent a dangerous threat to peace

²⁷ Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China.

and security not only in the Khmer Republic, but throughout the region of South-East Asia.

The Government of the Khmer Republic holds the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam entirely responsible for all the extremely grave consequences resulting from this situation and reserves the right to take any necessary

action to defend the independence, neutrality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) KHIM TIT
Permanent Representative of the Khmer Republic
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10132

Letter dated 24 February 1971 from the Executive Secretary of the Organization of African Unity to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[26 February 1971]

In conformity with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, I have the honour to transmit to you for the information of the Security Council text of the memorandum on the Simonstown Agreement²⁸ prepared by the Organization of African Unity.

(Signed) Mamadou Mactar THIAM
Executive Secretary of the Organization of
African Unity to the United Nations

MEMORANDUM ON THE SIMONSTOWN AGREEMENT

The United Kingdom Government has claimed that it has an obligation under the so-called Simonstown Agreement to supply more warships and other naval equipment to the racist South African régime. It has persisted in this claim despite the appeals by the Organization of African Unity and the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries and resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as massive opposition in Great Britain and the Commonwealth to the sale of arms to the Pretoria régime.

A study of the so-called Simonstown Agreement shows clearly that the United Kingdom has no obligation to sell any more military equipment to South Africa. Moreover, the Agreement itself, concluded fifteen years ago, before the achievement of independence by most African States and the establishment of the Organization of African Unity, is anachronistic and can have little validity at the present time. Any revitalization of that Agreement, accompanied by the breach of the arms embargo against South Africa and attempts to link South Africa by the back door with NATO, cannot but be regarded by the independent African States as an unfriendly and hostile act.

The term "Simonstown Agreement" a misnomer

The so-called Simonstown Agreement consists of exchanges of four letters between the British Minister of Defence, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, and the South African Minister of Defence, Mr. F. C. Erasmus, in London on 30 June 1955. They were published under the title: "Exchanges of Letters on Defence Matters between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa, June 1955" (Cmd. 9520). They were:

²⁸ Agreement relating to the transfer of the Simonstown Naval Base: see *Exchanges of Letters on Defence Matters between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa, June 1955* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955, Cmd. 9520).

(a) Memorandum on the need for international discussions with regard to regional defence;

(b) Agreement on defence of the sea routes round southern Africa;

(c) Agreement relating to the transfer of the Simonstown Naval Base and arrangements for its future use; and

(d) Details of the ancillary administrative and financial arrangements for the purpose of implementing the agreement on the transfer of the Simonstown Naval Base.

Only (c) and (d) concern the Simonstown Naval Base and only (c) can properly be called the Simonstown Agreement.

The first three exchanges of letters were registered more than a year later, in August 1956, with the United Nations and were published in the United Nations *Treaty Series*, vol. 248 (1956), No. 3495.

Moreover, in registering the letters with the United Nations, the United Kingdom Government indicated that (a) "does not contain any substantive obligations but is registered in order to facilitate understanding of the other two agreements".

Agreement contains no obligation to continue supply of arms

The only provision concerning supply of arms by the United Kingdom to South Africa is not in the exchange of letters on the transfer of the Simonstown Naval Base, but in the Agreement on the defence of the sea routes round southern Africa. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of that Agreement read:

"2. The Union Government has approved a programme for the expansion of the South African Navy. The programme will be spread over a period of eight years from 1955 to 1963, and will involve the purchase of the following vessels, which will be added to the existing fleet:

- 6 anti-submarine frigates
- 10 coastal minesweepers
- 4 seaward defence boats.

"3. The Union Government will place firm orders in the United Kingdom for the purchase of these vessels, costing some £18 million. The British Admiralty agrees to act as agents for the Union Government in this matter."

Thus, the only obligation of the United Kingdom was to facilitate purchase of some equipment before 1963. As these purchases were completed (except for two vessels for which South Africa cancelled the

orders, no further legal obligation remains. If there had been such an obligation, South Africa could have denounced the Agreement when the Labour Government announced an arms embargo in 1964.

The conclusion is not disputed even by South Africans. Mr. C. J. R. Dugard, Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Witwatersrand, wrote in the *South African Law Journal* of May 1968:

"There is no other provision dealing with the supply of coastal defence vessels (and none at all dealing with the supply of aircraft). It therefore seems clear that Britain's legal obligations in this respect came to an end before the British Government's decision to discontinue the supply of arms to South Africa in November, 1964."

Mr. G. G. Lawrie, Senior Lecturer, in Political Studies at the University of Witwatersrand, wrote in the same journal that "the text of the correspondence gives no support to the charge that the failure of Britain to supply arms to South Africa is a breach of her treaty obligations".

Leaders of the British Conservative party and the South African régime have had to resort to arguments on the "spirit" of the Agreement or a "moral" obligation under the Agreement to defend the supply to South Africa of arms and ammunition. On this point, the comment of Mr. C. J. R. Dugard is very pertinent. He wrote:

"As Britain's sole obligation to supply defence equipment to South Africa in terms of the Simonstown Agreement was restricted to a specified number of naval vessels to be furnished between 1955 and 1963, it cannot seriously be contended that her decision to impose an embargo on the sale of arms and ammunition to South Africa constitutes a breach of the Agreement. Furthermore, if Britain did have a 'moral' obligation to continue the supply of defence equipment to South Africa after 1963, this must clearly have given way to her legal obligation to carry out the recommendations of the Security Council that such supplies of arms be discontinued. This does not mean that the resolutions were mandatory but simply that they imposed an obligation upon Britain to consider them in good faith, with a view to putting them into effect. However weak and uncertain such an obligation may be, it is at least a legal obligation which takes precedence over a purely 'moral' obligation".

If the United Kingdom resumes the supply of military equipment to South Africa, in violation of resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, it will not be because of any legal obligations under the 1955 Agreement, but because of other motives.

The importance of the Simonstown Naval Base

The Labour Government in Britain recognized that the Simonstown Naval Base had ceased to be of vital importance because of the developments in Asia and in naval strategy.

At the end of 1966, it decided, for economic reasons, to withdraw its one warship stationed at Simonstown. It also decided to withdraw the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, from Simonstown. In negotiations between Britain and South Africa in January 1967, it was agreed that Britain would withdraw all its military personnel from Simonstown and retain only a naval officer and a small staff to maintain liaison.

Despite the British arms embargo and the virtual withdrawal of British military presence in South Africa, the South African régime did not repudiate the Simonstown Agreement. One of the reasons for this attitude was explained by the *Johannesburg Star* on 6 January 1968 as follows:—"While the Simonstown Agreement lasts Britain is by implication committed to help us defend, for example, South West Africa against any comers."

It will be seen from paragraph 7 of the Agreement on Defence of the Sea Routes round Southern Africa that the Agreement covers the coast of Namibia, a territory for which the United Nations has assumed direct responsibility and which is under illegal occupation by the Pretoria régime.

An even more important consideration for the Pretoria régime is the possibility of linking itself with NATO or other military alliances through the military agreement with Britain. The background of the 1955 Agreements is worth recalling in this connexion.

The background of the 1955 Agreements

The date of the Agreements—30 June 1955—is very significant. This was soon after the Asian-African Conference at Bandung. The South African régime and the Central African Federation were deliberately not invited to that historic Conference, while African leaders from colonial territories were welcomed. The Conference adopted important decisions on the elimination of colonialism and *apartheid* in Africa.

This was also soon after the British decision to grant independence to the Gold Coast, later Ghana, the first of the British colonial territories to achieve independence. The South African régime had opposed the granting of independence to African territories, but its views had been ignored.

Already in January 1953, the South African Prime Minister, Dr. Malan, had proposed that an "African Charter" should be drawn up by Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and South Africa to ensure that Africa would develop as part of "Western Christian Civilization". He had declared, as quoted in *The New York Times* of 18 January 1953 "Personally, I would rather be a member of NATO. I would rather be a member of NATO than a member of the United Nations. It is a better safeguard for world peace."

In August 1954, he proposed a NATO guarantee for South Africa and the western Indian Ocean area. Mr. Strijdom, the Minister of Lands, who was to succeed Dr. Malan as Prime Minister, declared that his Government aimed at winning over the four colonial powers in Africa to a policy of maintaining white supremacy. He said, according to *The New York Times* of 18 August 1954:

"It is our task to win their support for our standpoint that white rule must be maintained and that otherwise they, as well as we, are doomed to disappear. The white man who does not view with fear conditions throughout Asia and Africa is an irresponsible fool."

The South African Defence Minister went to London after proposing a five-power Western control of the Simonstown Naval Base and the creation of a western Indian Ocean Treaty, allegedly to deter Soviet and Indian ambitions in Africa.²⁰ The British Government

²⁰ See J. E. Spence, *The strategic significance of southern Africa*, (London, Royal United Service Institution, 1970), p. 12.

paid little attention to these proposals and drove a hard bargain.

All that South Africa obtained was the transfer of the administration and control of the Naval Base at Simonstown. (Under the Smuts-Churchill Agreement of 1921, Britain had "the right of perpetual user" in this base.)

While the transfer might have given some emotional satisfaction to Afrikaner nationalists, the South African régime had to agree:

- (a) To pay the sum of £2,250,000 to Britain;
- (b) To maintain the facilities in a state of efficiency;
- (c) To make the facilities available to the Royal Navy in time of peace, and to make them available to the Royal Navy and navies of allies of the United Kingdom when United Kingdom is involved in war, even if South Africa is not involved;
- (d) To place the command and control of the wireless telegraphy installations in the hands of the Royal Navy Commander-in-Chief when the United Kingdom is involved in war; and
- (e) To purchase naval vessels from the United Kingdom at a cost of £18 million.

It might be presumed that the main reason that the South African régime accepted this Agreement was the promise of a role in wider defence arrangements by the colonial powers in Africa.

The abortive plans for "regional defence"

As indicated earlier, the first exchange of letters was on a Memorandum on the Need for International Discussions with regard to Regional Defence, which, Britain later claimed, did not contain any substantive obligations but was included only to facilitate understanding of the other Agreements. This Memorandum makes strange reading today. For instance, paragraph 3 reads:

"The defence of southern Africa against external aggression lies not only in Africa but also in the gateways to Africa, namely in the Middle East. It is therefore the declared policy:

(a) Of the United Kingdom to contribute forces for the defence of Africa, including southern Africa, and the Middle East;

"(b) Of the Union Government to contribute forces in order to keep the potential enemy as far as possible from the borders of South Africa, in other words, for the defence of southern Africa, Africa and the Middle East gateways to Africa. While the Union's contribution will depend upon satisfactory arrangements being arrived at between the countries mainly concerned as to the nature and extent of the contribution which each will make, the Union Government is in the meantime building up a task

force for use outside South Africa against external aggression."

It was agreed in the Memorandum that the United Kingdom and South Africa would jointly sponsor a conference to develop the planning begun at a Conference in Nairobi on the logistic facilities and communications within Southern Africa, and particularly along the lines of communications to the Middle East. It was also agreed that they would jointly endeavour at that Conference to secure the setting up of "suitable machinery to pursue the aims of the Conference on a continuing basis".

The African Defence Facilities Conference was held in Nairobi in August 1951 with the participation of the United Kingdom, South Africa, Belgium, Italy, France, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia. (The United States attended as an observer.) It made a number of recommendations "to ensure the rapid movement of troops and military supplies through the eastern and central parts of Africa".³⁰ However, discussions to establish a regional defence treaty for South and Central Africa broke down: Britain argued that African troops were essential for guarding airfields and supply bases, but South Africa opposed allowing African units to bear arms.³¹ Soon after, on 12 November 1951, the South African Government announced that "in accordance with its declared policy of assisting in the defence of the Middle East and of the African continent against communist aggression, the Government has undertaken in time of war to send ground and air forces to the Middle East. . . . In pursuance of this undertaking, the Union has accepted membership of the Middle East Command."³²

What was envisaged in the Memorandum was, therefore, another conference of colonial powers in Africa to negotiate a "cold war" military pact, despite the opposition of Egypt and other non-aligned States.

But, already by 1955, the Middle East Command had proved abortive, the Egyptian revolution had taken place and Britain had been obliged to agree to evacuate the Suez Canal Zone. The forthcoming independence of the Gold Coast, as Ghana, had presaged the beginning of the end of the era of colonial domination in Africa.

It is needless to say that independent African States would never enter into a military agreement with the racist régime in South Africa. The only real conclusion which Britain should draw today from the situation in Africa is a pure and simple denunciation of the Simonstown Agreement which has become not only outdated and anachronistic in letter and spirit, but in fact, ridiculous in its imperialist implications. Africa is against it and will spare no effort to show its opposition.

³⁰ Commonwealth Survey, 1951, 14.9.51, 1 (b), p. 7.

³¹ See J. E. Spence, *The strategic significance of southern Africa*, (London, Royal United Service Institution, 1970) p. 11.

³² Commonwealth Survey, 1951, 23.11.51, 1 (b), p. 9.

DOCUMENT S/10133*

Letter dated 26 February 1971 from the representative of Jordan
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[26 February 1971]

Upon instructions from my Government I have the honour to bring to your attention a very urgent and

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8287.

serious matter of a new Israeli violation in territories occupied by Israel since 5 June 1967.

Recently the Israeli Military Governor informed the community leaders of the village of Silwad, north of

Ramallah, of the intention of the Israeli occupying authorities to confiscate 600 dunums of the lands of the village. The aim, he said, was to resettle a number of the Palestine refugees from the Gaza area.

The Military Governor also met community leaders of the villages of Deir Dibwan, Ein-Yabroud and Betien, all north of Ramallah, and told them that some land of these villages will be confiscated to resettle Palestine refugees from the Gaza area.

These arbitrary measures of confiscation of lands and mass transfer of population within territories occupied by Israel since 5 June 1967 are against the will of the people and in total disregard of United Nations resolutions and in violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Article 49 of the Geneva Convention of 1949³³ stipulates:

"Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive." (Our italics.)

In its resolution 10 (XXVI) of 23 March 1970, the Commission on Human Rights:

³³ Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol 75 (1950), No. 973).

"4. Deplores all policies and actions aiming at the deportation of the Palestinian refugees from the occupied Gaza Strip;

"...
"8. Also calls upon Israel to desist forthwith from deporting the Palestinian civilians from the Gaza Strip."

Israel continues to confiscate Arab land and property and forcibly remove and transfer masses of population within the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967.

An investigating group of the Commission on Human Rights, similar to the *Ad Hoc* Working Group of Experts investigating violations of human rights in occupied territories, found that "elements of genocide" were present in the "forced removal of Africans" from their lands in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia, according to United Nations press release WS/491 of 26 February 1971. Israel's measures are not different.

May I ask you to bring this matter to the attention of the Commission on Human Rights and of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.

I shall be grateful if this letter is circulated as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10134

Letter dated 26 February 1971 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]
[1 March 1971]

I should be grateful if you would take the necessary measures to have the attached statement by the Soviet Government on the United States intervention in Laos circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Y. MALIK
Permanent Representative of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
to the United Nations

STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, DATED 25 FEBRUARY 1971, ON THE INTERVENTION IN LAOS BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

By invading Laos, the United States of America continues to expand its aggressive actions against this sovereign State.

The Soviet Government resolutely condemns the armed intervention against Laos as a new criminal act of the United States, committed in gross violation of the accepted standards and principles of international law, and contrary to the obligations assumed by the United States under the Charter of the United Nations. The United States has defined the Geneva Agreements of 1954³⁴ on the settlement in Indo-China, and those

adopted in 1962 on Laos,³⁵ which provided a good basis for settlement of the situation in that country.

The war which has been going on for many years in Viet-Nam, the expansion of military operations in Cambodia and the invasion of Laos by the Saigon-United States armed forces, as well as the stepping up of aggression and of the threat to engage in further provocations against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, are all links in the chain of United States aggression against the peoples of Indo-China, which has aroused the indignation of the whole world.

By its cynical policy of "Viet-Namization", the United States has promoted the armed forces of the puppet régime of Saigon to the role of an indirect instrument of its plans, with the intention of "using Asians to fight Asians". It is asserted at Washington that United States armed forces are playing only a "limited part" in the invasion, providing only fire support and rear support for the South Viet-Nameese forces.

Such statements, designed to confuse world society, deceive no one. Daily and hourly, the air forces and artillery of the United States are conducting massive air attacks and bombardments, showering thousands of bombs and shells on the soil of Laos and on its peaceful

³⁵ Declaration on the neutrality of Laos and Protocol, signed at Geneva on 23 July 1962 (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 456 (1963), No. 6564).

³⁴ Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China.

inhabitants, and sowing death and destruction. Moreover, as has been officially stated at Washington, no limits are set to the use of the United States military air forces in Laos.

An attack using air power and artillery is just as much a crime as one using land troops. To those Lao-tians now dying, it makes no difference whether they are killed by a bullet or by a bomb from an aircraft. The United States cannot count on being given any credit on these grounds.

The attempts of the United States to justify the invasion of the territory of Laos by references to the concepts of "self-defence" and the "security needs" of the American troops which earlier invaded another neighbouring country appear equally flimsy and provocative. The same thing has already been heard in the past from colonialists when they have chosen the next victim for their rapacious attacks. If this logic was followed in international affairs, the world would be subject to completely arbitrary rule, and no nation could feel itself secure.

At a press conference held on 17 February, President Nixon of the United States stated unambiguously that he did not exclude the possibility of again using United States air forces against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. To all appearances, the Government of the United States is attempting to convince public opinion that the United States can act in Indo-China with impunity, and that the United States aggressors can "get away with anything".

There are dangerous delusions, fraught with the most serious consequences, above all for the United States itself. The United States has already conducted an extensive air war against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. The end result of this reckless adventure is well known; the attempt to break the will of the people of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam culminated in complete failure.

Now, too, any plans which the United States may have to achieve its goals by stepping up military provocations against North Viet-Nam are doomed to failure. The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam is a member of the socialist family, and the Soviet Union and the other socialist States will assist their brother Viet-Nameese in repulsing United States aggression.

The United States invasion of Laos and the threats to intensify provocation against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam can only further complicate the whole situation in Indo-China, and make it more difficult to find ways of reaching a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam while guaranteeing the neutral status of Laos and Cambodia. To judge by the latest statements of its Government, the United States is not ready to undertake serious and constructive discussion at the talks on Viet-Nam currently proceeding in Paris. All these factors belie the frequent assertions by United States officials of their desire for a peaceful settlement in Indo-China.

The actions of the United States in throwing off so lightly the international obligations it had assumed will undermine all the foundations on which relations among States are built. The United States will bear a heavy responsibility for the new complications in the international situation. Such actions cannot, moreover, fail to affect Soviet-United States relations.

The Soviet Government again stresses that the main prerequisite for a settlement of the Indo-China problem is the cessation of United States aggression and *de facto* recognition of the essentially inalienable national right of the peoples of the area to settle their own fate without foreign interference.

A genuine and constructive programme for the restoration of peace in Indo-China is provided by the proposals of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam, made on 17 September 1970 and supported by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, as well as the proposals of the National United Front of Cambodia and the Patriotic Front of Laos.

The just struggle of the people of Indo-China for their freedom and independence will meet with the unswerving support of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, as well as all peace-loving forces in the world. The Soviet Union cannot overlook the new escalation of United States aggression. The Soviet people will continue in the future to be ready to provide all the necessary assistance to its brothers in the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and to the patriots of Indo-China who, in defence of their legal rights, are fighting to achieve their fundamental interests and aspirations.

There is no doubt that the just cause of the peoples of Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos will triumph.

DOCUMENT S/10136*

Letter dated 28 February 1971 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]
[1 March 1971]

Would you please arrange for the attached statement of the Soviet Government on the Middle East to be circulated as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) Y. MALIK
Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8288.

STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, DATED 28 FEBRUARY 1971, ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The liquidation of the aftermaths of the Israeli aggression against Arab countries and the attainment of a political settlement of the Middle East conflict continues to be one of the important and urgent international problems, on which the general state of the international situation depends. New efforts were undertaken lately in the interests of reaching a political settle-

ment in the Middle East. But now the situation is again aggravating and the entire political settlement may find itself pushed back. The ruling circles of Israel are obviously aiming at this.

On 21 February this year the Government of Israel published an official statement that it refuses to withdraw Israeli troops from the occupied territories of Arab States, in particular from the territory of the United Arab Republic, and that Israel "will not withdraw to the 4 June 1967 cease-fire line".

The Israeli extremists have never concealed their plans of conquest and intention to retain the Arab territories occupied as a result of the 1967 aggression. But the circumstances in which the Israeli Government made this statement lend special meaning and significance to it.

A more favourable situation than ever before has been taking shape in the past several weeks for reaching agreement on a political settlement on the basis of fulfilment in full volume of the known 22 November 1967 resolution of the Security Council by all the interested sides. The decisive role in the creation of this situation was played by the United Arab Republic's consistent line at a solution of the Middle East problem by political means.

As a result of efforts by the United Arab Republic and a number of other Arab States, supported by the huge majority of States in the world, contacts by the special envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, with the sides in the conflict were resumed a month and a half ago. From the very outset these contacts, the first ever, acquired the nature of a discussion of concrete undertakings which are a part of the set of measures for political settlement. Wishing to create a favourable atmosphere in the interests of successful talks, the Arab countries expressed consent to continue the observance of the cease-fire despite the fact that a part of their territory is being occupied by Israel for the fourth year now. The United Arab Republic Government proposed a resumption of international shipping through the Suez Canal in the event of a commencement of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Sinai Peninsula.

All this facilitated the development of contacts. On 8 February, noting the shaping possibilities for progress in the cause of the political settlement, the special envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General approached both sides with a proposal to inform him of their readiness to assume concrete commitments on two key questions of the settlement—the withdrawal of troops from occupied territories and the terms of the peace which is to be established in the Middle East.

The stand of the United Arab Republic on these questions is clear and positive. As it follows from statements by United Arab Republic representatives and, in particular, in connexion with the message by the special envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General, the United Arab Republic is ready to conclude an agreement on peace with Israel, if Israel undertakes a commitment to withdraw its troops from all occupied territories and fulfils United Nations decisions on the Palestine refugees. The United Arab Republic is prepared for the agreement on peace to envisage commitments by the sides on ending the state of war, on respect of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, on recognition and respect of the right of each side to live in peace within secure and recognized borders, on non-interference in each other's inter-

nal affairs. Within the framework of the political settlement the United Arab Republic agrees to ensure the freedom of shipping through the Suez Canal in accordance with the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and freedom of shipping in the Strait of Tiran in accordance with principles of international law. The United Arab Republic also expressed agreement with the idea of creating demilitarized zones along both sides of the border and the stationing in some areas of a United Nations peace-keeping force.

The constructive position of the United Arab Republic Government was met with much satisfaction by all who sincerely strive for peace in the Middle East. Even those circles which far from sympathize with the national liberation struggle of the Arabs, the United Arab Republic and other Arab States that have embarked on the road of progressive development, could not but admit that the position of the United Arab Republic both as a whole and in details accords with the programme of political settlement drawn up by the Security Council. The United Arab Republic's bold and realistic position contributed to a strengthening of the international prestige of the United Arab Republic. It fully exposed the slanderous allegations by enemies of the Arab national liberation movement that the United Arab Republic is not prepared to accept terms of a peace in the Middle East that would be fair for all, including Israel.

It became obvious that the talks had approached the decisive stage. It was enough for the Israeli Government to announce its readiness to assume a part of the commitments concerning the political settlement, including the commitment to withdraw troops from all occupied territories, and a genuine turn to peace would have finally taken place in the Middle East.

But this did not happen. In its 21 February statement, replying to the special envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General, Israel actually gave a negative reply to the main question without which there can be no peace in the Middle East—the question of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories. Israel thereby openly came out as an aggressor and again showed the whole world that it does not want to give up its plunderous habits and is not stopping short of challenging the United Nations Organization and the peoples of the whole world.

It is an open secret on what the Israeli Government counts when promoting a line at frustrating the political settlement and at further aggravating the situation in the Middle East. It counts on support by the United States of America, which invariably encourages Israel's aggressive policy against the Arab countries, gives the Israeli occupationists extensive patronage and supplies them with the latest types of weapons.

American representatives have announced more than once the interest of the United States Government in achieving a political settlement in the Middle East. But there is a big gap between words and deeds in American policy. The United States pays lip service to peace in the Middle East and to a settlement of the Middle East conflict by political means. But in deeds Israel has been and continues to be the shock tool of American imperialism in frustrating the political settlement, in creating new dangerous complications in the Middle East. In words, the United States Government recognizes the lawful interests of Arab States. In deeds, it supports Israel's aggressive course.

In view of all this, the United States shares with Israel the entire responsibility for the situation that is now shaping in the Middle East. It also shapes responsibility for Israel's latest obstructionist step—its announced refusal to withdraw troops from Arab territories—and for all possible consequences of this.

The question arises—in what direction will events further develop in the Middle East. Every government, every responsible politician must realize that the alternative in the Middle East is such: political settlement or a military clash. That is why the Soviet Government believes that vigorous actions by all States interested in peace are now especially necessary in a direction to prevent Israel and its patrons from frustrating the cause of political settlement. If the peace-loving States unite their efforts in the struggle for such a settlement in the Middle East, it will be possible to achieve this task.

If, however, the ruling circles of Israel think that by promoting a policy of sabotage they will be able to achieve their main aim for which the aggression against Arab countries in 1967 was unleashed—to break the Arab national liberation movement, to overthrow the progressive régimes that have asserted themselves in the United Arab Republic and other Arab countries, they should better remember that such plans are doomed to failure. The Soviet Union is a friend of the Arab peoples and gives them the necessary assistance, political and material, in the struggle for the liberation of lands captured by the Israeli aggressors. This aid will be given further.

The Soviet Government firmly comes out for a settlement of the Middle East conflict by political means! It will further do everything for the policy of peace to score victory in the struggle between forces of peace and forces of aggression in the Middle East.

DOCUMENT S/10137

Letter dated 1 March 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]
[1 March 1971]

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 23 February 1971 [S/10131], I have the honour to bring the following to your attention for the information of the members of the Security Council.

On 1 February 1971, at about 8 a.m., Khmer and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese elements fought an engagement lasting about ten minutes at Phum Prey Beng, thirteen kilometres north of the town of Kompong Speu; one Khmer soldier was wounded.

During the night of 1 to 2 February 1971, at about 8.30 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed a Khmer position at Kompong Seila.

On 2 February 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched a brief harassing attack on a Khmer position at Phum Khabal Thnal, situated approximately eleven kilometres north-west of the Bac Prek Kdam ferry, in Kandal.

The same day, at about 9.45 a.m., a clash occurred at kilometre 92.5 on National Highway 4 between Khmer and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese elements. After an hour of fierce fighting, the enemy dispersed, carrying with them a number of dead and wounded.

The same day, at about 10.15 a.m., Khmer forces engaged in an operation clashed with about a hundred Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese at Phum Pos Nhin, eight kilometres south of the Chakrei Ting cement works in Kampot. After an engagement lasting some twenty minutes, the enemy dispersed, leaving behind one ton of rice, a number of cooking utensils and clothing and carrying with them several dead and wounded.

During the night of 2 to 3 February 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed Khmer elements guarding the Spean Dek bridge, which is situated on National Highway 6 approximately ten kilometres south of Batheay, in Kompong Cham.

During the same night, they harassed another position at Kompong Svay, approximately eighteen kilometres south-east of Phnom-Penh on the east bank of the Bassac, in Kandal.

On 3 February 1971, at about 1 p.m., an engagement lasting some twenty minutes was fought at Phum

Chrey Leas, twenty-two kilometres north-west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal; three Khmer soldiers were wounded.

The same day, at about 1.40 p.m., Khmer troops patrolling the Vihear Suor area, approximately sixteen kilometres north-east of Phnom-Penh, fought an engagement lasting half an hour with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese, which resulted in two dead and seven wounded on the Khmer side; a number of dead and wounded were carried away by the enemy.

The same day, at about 11 a.m., two further clashes lasting about half an hour each occurred at Trapeang Rokar and Krol Khieu, approximately twenty-eight kilometres north-west of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal; the Khmer side suffered one dead and one wounded and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese side left behind four dead and lost two CKC rifles and 250 cartridges.

The same day, between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese carried out a harassing attack on a Khmer position at Tuk Khleang, situated twenty-six kilometres south-east of Phnom-Penh, on the east bank of the Mekong, in Kandal, wounding two.

During the night of 3 to 4 February 1971, between 8 p.m. and midnight, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed Khmer troops based at Lovear Sar Krom, approximately thirty kilometres south-east of Phnom-Penh, on the east bank of the Mekong, in Kandal.

On 4 February 1971, at about 2 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched an attack on a Khmer position at Kompong Chak, approximately eight kilometres north of the town of Svay Rieng. The vigorous counter-action by the Khmer troops, who suffered one wounded, forced the enemy to withdraw at about 3 a.m., carrying with them a number of dead and wounded.

The same day, at about 6.20 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed a Khmer position at Chantrea in Svay Rieng, killing one and wounding eight.

I wish to reaffirm the firm and vigorous protest of the Government of the Khmer Republic against the illegal and permanent occupation of Khmer territory, followed by savage attacks perpetrated by the Viet-

Cong-North Viet-Nameese forces against a neutral and peace-loving country to which they have no right and with which they have no ethnic affinity, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, of international law and of the 1954 Geneva Agreements.³⁶ These criminal attacks reveal for all to see the annexationist aims of the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese communist imperialists, and represent a dangerous threat to peace and security not only in the Khmer Republic, but throughout the region of South-East Asia.

The Government of the Khmer Republic holds the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam

³⁶ Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China.

and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam entirely responsible for all the extremely grave consequences resulting from this situation and reserves the right to take any necessary action to defend the independence, neutrality sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) OR KOSALAK
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires, a.i. of the
Khmer Republic to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10138*

Letter dated 1 March 1971 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[1 March 1971]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 22 February 1971 by the representatives of Jordan and the United Arab Republic concerning Jerusalem [S/10130].

That letter contains many distortions and falsifications. For example, the statistics given do not refer to the city of Jerusalem but to the entire district. They are taken from *A Survey of Palestine*, where they are entitled "The total population of the sub-district of Jerusalem including the rural population of the sub-district". This same source confirms that Jews constituted the majority of the urban population of Jerusalem in each of the years 1922, 1931 and 1944—the first two figures being census returns, and the third an official projection prepared by the Statistical Services of the Mandatory Government (in 1922, 33,971 Jews out of a total population of 62,578; in 1931, 51,222 Jews out of a total population of 90,503; and in 1944, 97,000 Jews out of a total population of 157,080).

In this connexion it may be noted that the Jewish majority in the city of Jerusalem existed many decades before the British Mandate. Thus we find in Baedeker's *Palestine and Syria*³⁷ that according to statistics for the year 1887, there lived in Jerusalem 28,000 Jews out of a total population of 43,000 citizens. The accurate statistics for the year 1905 are 40,000 Jews out of a total population of 60,000, according to the thirteenth edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.³⁸ It is a gross distortion to state that a confiscation of lands took place in Jerusalem and it is in contradiction to details contained in annex II of the Arab letter. The truth is that Jewish and Arab lands were expropriated without any punitive element or discrimination, for purposes of public development and housing. Some of the owners of the lands in question, Jews and Arabs alike, have already received full compensation, and negotiations with the remainder over the compensation to be paid are continuing. Acquisition of land for such purposes is a common feature of public administration all over the world. In Jerusalem, this was frequently resorted to by the Jordanian authorities when they usurped control of part of the city.

Similarly, the preparation of a master plan for any city is the customary procedure of modern urban development throughout the world. In Jerusalem, the municipal authorities are doing their best in this direction through consultations with world-renowned experts.

The passages in the letter of the two Arab representatives referring to the evacuation of the Old City are another instance of factual distortion. They in fact refer to the reconstruction of the Old Jewish Quarter, which had been destroyed with premeditation by the Jordanian authorities during their 1948 aggression and misrule. That destruction had encompassed thirty-nine synagogues and places of learning, apart from residences and other Jewish public buildings. The Jews have inhabited the Old City of Jerusalem from its earliest recorded history. However, between 1948 and 1967 the Jordanian Government uprooted and expelled all the Jewish citizens, and transformed this quarter and with it the whole of the Old City into an area utterly clear of Jews (*Judenrein*). Moreover, the Jordanian Government prevented free access to the Jewish Holy Places, in flagrant violation of its international obligations.

It is a matter of record that the two States whose representatives signed the letter of 22 February 1971 are the only States in modern history which exerted maximum efforts to destroy the city of Jerusalem by armed force. In 1948 the two Governments attempted to conquer Jerusalem and in the process resorted to heavy bombardment and shelling of the besieged city. I have already described Jordan's policy in the occupied part of the city in my letter to the Secretary-General of 5 March 1968.³⁹ Later, in June 1967, the Government of Jordan resumed its aggression against Jerusalem and turned it into a battlefield after rejecting an Israeli appeal through General Odd Bull, head of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, expressing Israel's desire to remain at peace with Jordan.

I have the honour to request circulation of this letter as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8289.

³⁷ Second edition (Leipzig, 1894, pp. 53-54).

³⁸ Vol. 15, p. 335.

³⁹ Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1968, document S/8439.

DOCUMENT S/10139*

Letter dated 2 March 1971 from the representative of Jordan
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[2 March 1971]

Upon instructions from my Government and further to the letter addressed to you by the representative of the United Arab Republic and myself [S/10130], I have the honour to bring to your attention a new measure of confiscation of Arab property in Jerusalem by the Israeli occupying authorities.

According to the Israeli daily newspaper *Ha'aretz* of 11 January 1971, the Israeli occupying authorities issued an order of transferring the shares of the Electricity Company of the District of Jerusalem belonging to the Jordanian municipality to the Israeli municipality. The shares, which number 6,186, are worth 61,860 Jordanian dinars (\$173,208).

This new measure of confiscation of Arab property by the Israeli authorities belies the superficial attempt by the Israeli representative in his letter of 1 March 1971 [S/10138] to distort the facts by resorting to euphemism. One look at the maps and their explanations annexed to letter sent by the United Arab Republic and Jordan [S/10130] shows the distribution of land and Israel's confiscation, which indicates a racial and discriminatory policy as well as violations of United Nations resolutions and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

I shall be grateful if this letter is circulated as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8290.

DOCUMENT S/10140*

Letter dated 2 March 1971 from the representative of Syria
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[2 March 1971]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to state the following concerning Israel's unabated measures fully to achieve its dominance of Jerusalem.

On 18 February 1971, you submitted a report to the Security Council and the General Assembly concerning the status of Jerusalem [S/10124]. Paragraph 4 of this report contains the text of two notes handed by you on 26 January 1971 to the representative of Israel. The first of the two notes contains the following paragraph:

"In this connexion the Secretary-General would call the attention of the representative to the Secretary-General's reporting responsibilities in regard to the status of Jerusalem under the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. These are Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 and 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969, and General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967. Consequently the Secretary-General must again request from the Israel authorities the transmission of a copy of the reported 'master plan' as well as detailed information on the plan."

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8291.

The second note stated

"Aside from legal and other considerations, the works currently being carried out by Israel within United Nations premises may bring about irreparable physical change to these premises. Consequently, the Secretary-General, while reserving the right of the Organization to claim compensation for any ensuing loss or damage, requests that these works be suspended."

United Nations Members desirous of maintaining the rule of law were awaiting the replies of the Israeli authorities to your two notes. Instead, from 18 February up till today, numerous reports have been published in the press confirming Israel's implementation of its "master plan" in Jerusalem, including work being carried out within United Nations premises.

To quote only one of such reports, *Time* magazine in its issue of 1 March, in an article entitled "Full speed ahead", stated:

"Israeli Housing Minister Ze'ev Sharef announced that the Government would construct 19,500 apartments for about 100,000 people in three outlying districts. . . . The Government, Sharef said bluntly, is determined that Jerusalem remain 'an emphatically Jewish city. This is a plan with a Jewish goal. *This is a Zionist exhibition*.'" (Our italics.)

The same article goes on to say:

"[Mayor Kollek of Jerusalem] insists that Jerusalem cannot wait until its status is finally settled before it constructs more housing. In an analogy for Americans, he argues: 'You don't stop urban development in Washington until you solve the black-white problem.'"

We are also informed in the same article that more than 4,000 acres of land—mostly Arab—had been expropriated for housing but Arab owners have refused to accept payment because this would sanction Israel's right of eminent domain.

The Government of Israel, faithful to its policy of facing the world with a fait accompli, has chosen to disregard completely all three decisions of the Security Council and resolutions of the General Assembly concerning Jerusalem. It is sad that this Israeli cynicism

should come after the last session of the General Assembly, which emphasized most solemnly the rule of law, one basic tenet of which is the non-acquisition of territories by force. Israel, driven by the arrogance of power and tyranny, has chosen defiantly to follow the law of the jungle.

The Government and people of Syria cannot keep silent on the fate of the Holy City of Jerusalem, which is being turned now by the Israeli Fascists into a "Zionist exhibition".

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH
Permanent Representative of Syria
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10141*

Letter dated 2 March 1971 from the representative of the United Arab Republic
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[3 March 1971]

I have the honour to refer to your further report on the activities of your Special Representative to the Middle East, contained in document S/10070/Add.1 dated 1 February 1971, in which you appealed to the parties concerned to withhold fire and exercise military restraint, and to our conversation about this report.

In this connexion, and upon instructions from my Government, I am enclosing the portions of the statement of Mr. Anwar El Sadat, President of the United Arab Republic, before the National Assembly of the United Arab Republic on 4 February 1971 in which he responded to your appeal.

I have the honour to request that this letter and the annex thereof be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed H. EL-ZAYYAT
Permanent Representative of the
United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

EXCERPTS FROM THE STATEMENT BY MR. ANWAR EL SADAT, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC ON 4 FEBRUARY 1971

Our co-operation was unlimited and unconditional with the United Nations Secretary-General and with his special envoy entrusted with the task of following up the implementation of the Security Council resolution. Then, this week, we reached a cross-road:

First, the enemy continues its occupation of our land and tries to stabilize this occupation by changing the nature of the land, especially in Jerusalem and the west bank, and by establishing colonies in the Syrian Heights and the Egyptian Sinai Desert;

Secondly, we cannot stand silent before what is taking place, and our sacred duty, that cannot be denied us by anybody, is to liberate the land and renew the fighting with the enemy;

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8292.

Thirdly, the contacts in the United Nations have not until now realized a satisfactory result because the enemy continues its intransigence and defiance not only to us, but also the whole world community and the principles of international law from the first to the last letter; and,

Fourthly, there are different parties who are trying by all means to convince us to extend the cease-fire period even for a few weeks.

Brothers, we come now to our conception of our forthcoming steps as imposed upon us by the values which we maintain, the principles which we uphold and our commitments towards world peace and the international community.

I have examined all aspects of the situation with the political and military leaderships and with all the institutions of contemplation and decision-making of our régime. Extensive discussions took place in the Cabinet, the National Defence Council and the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union. The considerations which were laid before us were—briefly—as follows:

First, we cannot, nor is it right for us to do so, let the cease-fire be renewed automatically as long as no progress is made in Ambassador Gunnar Jarring's efforts. For, if we did so, it would mean that the cease-fire lines might become a fait accompli, or might even become political lines, as happened in connexion with the Armistice Lines of 1949, and that we cannot allow to happen under any conditions.

Secondly, we are aware of the extensive, and unfortunately clever, endeavours which are being made to delude world public opinion by projecting the problem to it incorrectly, presenting it in such a light as to make it seem as if it has shrunk to a question of firing or ceasing fire, with the consequent illusion resulting from this faulty simplification that the party which began firing would be considered as being intransigent.

Aggression is the basis of the whole problem. Aggression is represented by imposing the occupation by the force of fire, whereas firing for the purpose

of removing the occupation is the natural, legitimate and legal right—indeed, it is the sacred duty—of all those who respect and believe in freedom on any land and for every people.

Thirdly, we must be frank with ourselves and admit that so far we have failed to find in any of Israel's statements or in its behaviour, whether at the United Nations in New York or on the territory of the crisis area in the Middle East, one single indication of its readiness to implement the Security Council resolution. Indeed, all indications point to its relentless endeavours to impede and annul its effectiveness as well as to obstruct all the international efforts that are being exerted to solve the crisis.

The simplest proof of this fact is that talking about peace is incompatible with the continued occupation of the land, nor is it compatible with the continuation of the arrogance and foolishness based on force.

In spite of this, the United Nations Secretary-General has a different viewpoint, which he has put forward in the report submitted to the Security Council, which contained his appeal to the parties to the dispute. He said in this report that though he admitted that there was need for further clarification, he nevertheless found room for cautious optimism. He based his "cautious optimism"—as he said—upon the fact that the parties have resumed their contacts with Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, that some progress has been achieved in defining the positions of the parties and that the parties, who have expressed their desire to implement the Security Council's resolution, were now defining in more detail their viewpoints about their commitments resulting from this resolution. The United Nations Secretary-General concluded his report by appealing to the parties to continue playing their role in the discussions in a constructive manner and to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring with a view to implementing the Security Council resolution.

At the end of the report, there was the appeal made by the United Nations Secretary-General to exercise self-control in this difficult situation and to renew the cease-fire on 5 February, when the current cease-fire period comes to an end.

Fourthly, in this atmosphere, there were quite a number of the Security Council member States, in which we had confidence regarding their understanding of our stance and their sympathy with our struggle, which approached us in another urgent attempt to resort to self-restraint.

When the United Nations Secretary-General launched his appeal, they told us that they had thought about it. Commenting on it, they stated that the United Nations Secretary-General's decision to proclaim his appeal at this serious juncture through which the Middle East was passing, implied that the United Nations Secretary-General, by virtue of his position and responsibility, was of the opinion that he had reasons to believe that there were possibilities of achieving real progress towards implementing the Security Council resolution. They were of the view that it might be advisable, on our part, to provide for the United Nations Secretary-General the atmosphere that would help him to implement the Security Council resolution, which is the very task entrusted to him by the Council in the text of the resolution dated 22 November 1967.

Our profound, sincere and responsible discussions have led us to define our position as follows:

First, the United Arab Republic considers itself as being committed to the one and only responsibility of liberating the territories occupied during the 1967 aggression.

This is a major commitment, and all our political, military, economic and diplomatic actions should be geared towards this end, and all sacrifices should be made, however dearly they may cost.

The first commitment of any nation is that which it has towards its freedom within the framework of the principles of international law. No one can ever ask it for, or impose upon it, a commitment contrary to the foregoing one, on the basis of which it has to reserve to itself the right to freedom of action concerning the prospects facing it.

Secondly, while adhering to this first and most important commitment, we accept the United Nations Secretary-General's appeal and have decided to maintain the cease-fire for a period that we cannot extend beyond thirty days, ending 7 March. The Secretary-General and the entire international community must, during this period, be sure that there is real progress as regards the core of the problem and not only in its external aspects.

We deem it necessary for the Security Council to be informed before the end of this period of a report by the Secretary-General on the progress made, though we know now, and have always known, that Israel, with the *carte blanche* support and assistance of the United States, will not progress beyond its present attitude. However, we pray to God that practical experience will prove that our doubts were unfounded.

DOCUMENT S/10142*

Letter dated 3 March 1971 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[3 March 1971]

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you by the representative of Jordan on 26 February 1971 [S/10133].

The charges in the Jordanian letter constitute a distortion of the facts and are misleading.

There has been no confiscation nor any expropriation of lands in the villages mentioned in the discussed letter; neither is there any intention on the part of the Government of Israel to take such steps in the future.

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8293.

I have the honour to request circulation of this letter as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10143

Letter dated 1 March 1971 from the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[3 March 1971]

I have the honour to transmit herewith for the information of the members of the Security Council the text of a statement issued on 1 March 1971 by the United Nations Council for Namibia, concerning the decision by the Government of the United Kingdom to supply certain categories of arms and spare parts for previously supplied military equipment to South Africa.

(Signed) Samar SEN
President
United Nations Council for Namibia

STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE UNITED NATIONS COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA ON 1 MARCH 1971 CONCERNING THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO SUPPLY ARMS TO SOUTH AFRICA

The United Nations Council for Namibia, at its 100th meeting on 25 February 1971, considered the recent decision by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to sell certain categories of arms and spare parts for previously supplied military equipment to South Africa.

The Council wishes to record its regret regarding this decision, which, in its view, is contrary to the provisions of Security Council resolutions 181 (1963) of 7 August 1963, 182 (1963) of 4 December 1963, 191 (1964) of 18 June 1964 and 282 (1970) of 23 July 1970 calling upon all States to refrain from the sale of arms and ammunition to South Africa. These resolutions reflect the concern of the great majority of the Members of the United Nations that any arms and ammunition supplied to the South African Government will be used for perpetuating its policy of *apartheid* and minority rule in southern Africa. The United Nations Council for Namibia, which is a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly with special responsibilities for the administration of Namibia, shares the concern of the majority of the Members of the Organization since South Africa, in defiance of the United Nations, not only continues its illegal occupation of the Territory but also carries out the same policies of *apartheid* and minority rule in Namibia.

The Council is convinced that any measures which strengthen the South African police and armed forces will inevitably aid South Africa in its suppression of the Namibian people's struggle for freedom and independence.

DOCUMENT S/10144* **

Letter dated 4 March 1971 from the representative of Bulgaria to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[4 March 1971]

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the statement of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, concerning the latest initiatives of the United Arab Republic and the statement of the Soviet Government of 28 February [S/10136], to be circulated as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) Guéro GROZEV
Permanent Representative of Bulgaria
to the United Nations

STATEMENT BY THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA

In connexion with the latest initiatives of the United Arab Republic for the peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis, the position of Israel and the statement of the Soviet Government of 28 February 1971, a representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria stated to the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency:

After the initiative of the cease-fire and the proposal to reopen the Suez Canal to navigation, the United Arab Republic stated, in reply to questions by the

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8294.

** Incorporating document S/10144/Corr.1.

special representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Jarring, that it was ready to conclude a peace treaty with Israel. The proposal of the United Arab Republic requires the ending of the state of war and respect for each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence by all the countries in the region, on condition that Israel withdraws its troops from the Sinai peninsula and from all the occupied territories, and implements the resolutions which have been adopted concerning the Palestine refugees. These constructive proposals by the United Arab Republic in fact represent the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, and thus provide a basis for a political settlement of the Middle East crisis. They were welcomed by the peoples of the whole world, including the people of the United States, who sincerely wish for peace in the Middle East. They received the full support of the socialist countries. What was the response of Israel to this initiative? Persisting in its policy of aggression, Israel in its statement of 21 February 1971 in fact rejected the proposals of the United Arab Republic aimed at a peaceful solution to the crisis. It gave a negative reply to the question without a solution to which there can be no peace in the Middle East, namely the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories. Thus, Israel made Mr. Jarring's mission more difficult, demonstrated its scorn for all United Nations resolutions, and yet again afforded proof of its aggressive intentions.

Israel's reply may prevent the extension of the ceasefire along the Suez Canal and on other fronts, which expires on 7 March 1971.

At this crucial juncture, on 28 February 1971, the Soviet Government published a statement which unmasks the manoeuvres of the aggressors and their protectors, and shows the only path to follow and the only means to use if the Middle East crisis is to be settled. At the moment when the question of political

settlement or military confrontation is being raised, the statement of the Soviet Government expresses the position of the whole of progressive mankind, that the only way to solve the conflict is by peaceful means. It is for this reason that the statement is a document of capital political importance, which will without doubt unite and mobilize the progressive forces of the world against the aggressive intentions of Israel. Now more than ever the parties concerned must support the peaceful initiative of the Soviet Government, and not allow Israel and its leaders to make a political settlement of the conflict unattainable.

The Bulgarian Government fully supports the timely statement of the Soviet Government, and is firmly convinced that it will contribute to the peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis.

The Bulgarian Government condemns the policy of Israel, which is leading to an aggravation of the situation in that part of the world. It believes that Israel could not persist in its policy of aggression without the unreserved support of the United States of America, which to all appearances wishes to crush the national liberation movement in the Arab countries and suppress the progressive régimes which have been set up there. The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the whole of the Bulgarian people declare their full support for the constructive proposals of the United Arab Republic for a settlement of the Middle East conflict. The People's Republic of Bulgaria has been, and will continue to be, a faithful friend to the Arab peoples in their just struggle. As in the past, Bulgaria will provide full moral and material support to the Arab peoples in their struggle to liquidate the aftermaths of aggression.

The Middle East crisis can and must be solved by peaceful means on the basis of full implementation of the Security Council resolutions, and on condition of withdrawal by the aggressor from the occupied Arab territories.

DOCUMENT S/10145

Letter dated 4 March 1971 from the representative of Guinea to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]
[5 March 1971]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your knowledge and to that of international public opinion the continual armed attacks by the Portuguese colonialist forces based in Guinea (Bissau) against the frontiers of the Republic of Guinea.

These continual armed attacks are marked by the machine-gunning of secondary schools, flights over the national territory of Guinea and the shelling of Guinean villages by piratical aircraft coming from the territory of Guinea (Bissau) under Portuguese colonial domination.

The Government of the Republic of Guinea alerts international public opinion to the fact that since 22 November 1970, after the defeat inflicted on the Portuguese invasion troops, the Fascist authorities in Lisbon have been continuing to perpetrate grave acts of provocation against the peaceful people of the Republic of Guinea.

The Government and people of the Republic of Guinea express their irrevocable determination to defend their sovereignty and to stop any attempt to invade the national territory of Guinea.

I would request you to have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdoulaye TOURE
Permanent Representative of Guinea
to the United Nations

**Letter dated 5 March 1971 from the representative of Israel
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]
[5 March 1971]

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 2 March 1971 by the representative of Jordan [S/10139], and to state the following.

This letter is another step in the time-worn campaign of distortions and political incitement conducted by the representative of Jordan. In previous letters I have pinpointed some of his serious misrepresentations of fact.

The facts concerning the Electricity Company are as follows:

In view of the situation in Jerusalem it was found necessary, in order to ensure the continuity and operation of electrical services to the people of Jerusalem, to introduce requisite changes in the status of certain elements of the public ownership of these services.

It must however be stressed that no change whatsoever has taken place in the ownership status of private persons, Arab or other, or of other public bodies, which in fact comprise the overwhelming majority of shareholders in the Jerusalem Electric Corporation.

It should also be noted that the Corporation continues to function with the help, including the financial help, of the Government of Israel in the whole area included in its concession and that its operations have continued intact and unimpaired.

I have the honour to request circulation of this letter as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8295.

DOCUMENT S/10147

Letter dated 5 March 1971 from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English/Spanish]
[5 March 1971]

In accordance with the decision taken by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples at its 782nd meeting, on 4 March 1971, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, for the information of the Security Council, the text of the consensus adopted by the Special Committee at that meeting.

Pursuant to the same decision, the Special Committee has requested me to draw the attention of the Security Council to the statements made by some members of the Committee at that meeting.⁴⁰

(Signed) Germán NAVA CARRILLO
Chairman of the Special Committee
on the Situation with regard to the Implementation
of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples

CONSENSUS ADOPTED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES AT ITS 782ND MEETING, ON 4 MARCH 1971, CONCERNING THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO PROCEED WITH THE SALE OF SEVERAL HELICOPTERS AND SPARE PARTS FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples deplores the decision of the United Kingdom Government to proceed with the sale to South Africa of a number of helicopters and spare parts for military equipment despite the provisions of Security Council resolutions 181 (1963) of 7 August 1963, 182 (1963)

⁴⁰ See document A/AC.109/PV.782.

of 4 December 1963, 191 (1964) of 18 June 1964 and 282 (1970) of 23 July 1970.

These resolutions, which call upon all States to observe an unconditional embargo on the supply of arms, military equipment and related material to South Africa, were adopted because of the growing concern of Member States that South Africa would employ such military equipment against the peoples of southern Africa in order to strengthen its régime of *apartheid* and perpetuate minority rule in the region.

Developments in southern Africa, especially South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia in defiance of the authority of the United Nations, the presence of South African police in Southern Rhodesia despite United Nations resolutions calling for their removal, and the growing co-operation between military authorities in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Territories under Portuguese administration, have unfortunately served to increase this concern.

The Special Committee, mindful of the responsibilities entrusted to it by the General Assembly to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of the Declaration and to examine the

compliance of Member States with the Declaration and other resolutions on the question of decolonization, and mindful also of the provisions of paragraph 3 of the programme of action contained in General Assembly resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970, views with grave concern this decision of the United Kingdom Government, which will have serious repercussions throughout the whole of southern Africa.

Because of the close co-operation which exists between the Governments of South Africa and Portugal and the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, aimed at denying the colonial countries and peoples in southern Africa their right to self-determination and independence, the decision of the United Kingdom Government will inevitably increase the capacity and the efforts of those authorities to suppress the struggle of the peoples of southern Africa for freedom and independence.

The Special Committee, deploring the sale or supply of arms, ammunition, military equipment and related material to South Africa by any State whatsoever, urges all States, without exception, to desist forthwith from such sale or supply, in accordance with the aforementioned resolutions.

DOCUMENT S/10149*

Letter dated 8 March 1971 from the representative of Jordan
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[8 March 1971]

Upon instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 2 March 1971 [S/10139] I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 5 March 1971 [S/10146] by the representative of Israel concerning changes in the status of Jerusalem.

It has become customary for the representative of Israel to brush aside facts brought up by my delegation or another concerning Israel's measures in Jerusalem which violate United Nations resolutions by describing those facts as distortions.

The Israeli letter of 5 March 1971 admits the changes referred to in my letter of 2 March 1971 affecting the Jordanian Electricity Company as follows:

"In view of the situation in Jerusalem it was found necessary, in order to ensure the continuity and operation of electrical services to the people of Jerusalem, *to introduce requisite changes in the status of certain elements of the public ownership of these services.*" (Our italics.)

It is these changes in the status of Jerusalem, affecting in this particular case a Jordanian company, which we are protesting against and which the United Nations resolutions condemn and forbid.

The question arises as to who is distorting the facts and who is defying the United Nations resolutions.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8296.

Letter dated 5 March 1971 from the representative of Czechoslovakia
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[8 March 1971]

I have the honour to enclose the statement of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic dated 25 February 1971, concerning the situation in Indo-China and I should appreciate very much if the statement were circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zdeněk ČERNÍK
Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia
to the United Nations

STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC DATED 25 FEBRUARY 1971 CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN INDO-CHINA

In recent days there has been further dangerous aggravation of the situation in the area of Indo-China which is causing grave concern on the part of the Government and the people of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The United States of America, which is constantly violating the territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, which is continuing its armed intervention against the people of South Viet-Nam and which had together with the Saigon units invaded the neutral Cambodia, has conspired to launch armed intervention into the third country of Indo-China—the neutral Laos. On 8 February 1971 the region of southern Laos was invaded by tens of thousands of Saigon mercenaries under the auspices of the United States armed forces and with their direct air and artillery support. Numerous Thai armed units are also gradually being involved in the campaign.

The escalation of aggressive actions of the United States of America against the people of Laos is an attempt at thwarting a peaceful settlement in Laos by way of negotiations between the two Laotian parties on the basis of the proposal of the Patriotic Front of Laos of March 1970. It is part and parcel of the American endeavour to weaken and to suppress the national liberation struggle of the anti-imperialist forces in the region of Indo-China. To the world public American

imperialism is again revealing its true identity as the sworn enemy of freedom and independence of nations.

It is being confirmed anew that the United States of America is only feigning to solve the Viet-Namese conflict by peaceful effort and that in reality it is further escalating armed intervention against the people of the whole of Indo-China. In contradiction to the commitment to respect the neutrality, independence and sovereignty of Laos which the American Government took upon itself by signing the Geneva Agreements of 1962⁴¹ and in contradiction to the basic norms of international law, the United States is grossly violating the neutrality and independence of Laos. The intensified intervention of the United States of America in Laos and the new threats of the American Government to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam testify to a dangerous military course of the United States of America which gravely threatens the security and peace of nations not only in South-East Asia, but throughout the world.

The Government and people of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic have always felt solidarity with the peoples of Indo-China in their struggle against American aggression. They have always supported and they will continue to support their just struggle for national independence and freedom and therefore they energetically condemn the new imperialist aggression against neutral Laos. They fully support the statement of the Central Committee of the Patriotic Front of Laos of 8 February 1971 denouncing this act of aggression of the United States against the people of Laos. They are firmly convinced that the only way to end the conflict in Indo-China is to stop all United States of America war operations in South Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos and to withdraw United States troops and those of its allies from those countries.

The just struggle of the people of Indo-China for their inalienable rights, freedom and independence will end in victory.

⁴¹ Declaration on the neutrality of Laos and Protocol, signed at Geneva on 23 July 1962 (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 456 (1963), No. 6564).

DOCUMENT S/10152*

Letter dated 9 March 1971 from the representatives of Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[9 March 1971]

We the undersigned have the honour to present to you the enclosed letter signed by the Secretary-General of the International Moslem Organizations which met recently in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, regarding the question of Jerusalem.

These organizations are the only international Moslem organizations representing a cross-section of the world Moslem opinion and their unity in outlook on the Islamic issues.

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8297.

May we ask you to be so kind as to circulate the enclosed documents as official documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Signed by the representatives of the following
States Members of the United Nations:

Indonesia	Saudi Arabia	United Arab
Jordan	Somalia	Republic
Pakistan	Tunisia	

LETTER DATED 22 FEBRUARY 1971 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL MOSLEM ORGANIZATIONS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Subject: Judaization of Jerusalem

On behalf of the Joint Meeting of the representatives of the five international Moslem organizations convened in Mecca from 11 February to 15 February 1971, I have the pleasure of addressing this memorandum to you:

The following organizations were represented at the above meeting:

World Moslem Congress, Karachi, Pakistan; the International Islamic Organization, Djakarta, Indonesia; the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, Cairo; the General Islamic Conference of Jerusalem (now in Amman); and Moslem World League, Mecca.

These are the only international Moslem organizations, representing a cross-section of the world Moslem opinion and their unity in outlook on the Islamic issues.

Here please find enclosed a translation of the resolution on the Palestine issue with special reference to Baitul-Maqdis (Jerusalem), the Zionist expansionist projects, the blatant continuance of Judaizing the Holy City thus destroying its *status quo* and its historical features and expelling the old Arab inhabitants from their hearths and homes, thus adding to the already cumbersome refugee problem.

The joint meeting of the International Moslem organizations earnestly appeals to you, in the name of the Charter of the United Nations and in the name of the various resolutions of the United Nations particularly with regard to the city of Jerusalem, to call an immediate halt to this continuous aggression by the Israelis in defiance of the United Nations and of world public opinion. We declare that the process of brazen-

faceted Judaization is not only a threat to the sanctity of the Holy City but also an insult to religion as such. The above process of aggression is worsening the already explosive situation in the Middle East.

(Signed) Mohammed Soroor AL-SABBAN
*Secretary-General
of the International Moslem Organizations*

Resolution on the Palestine issue

This joint meeting of the International Moslem organizations,

Noting with appreciation the continuous efforts of the various Moslem Governments and Moslem peoples organizations for the liberation of Palestine, specially for retrieving Jerusalem,

Urges that the above efforts must be continued, nay multiplied, till the objectives are achieved, namely the complete liquidation of all traces of Israeli aggressions,

Upholds the fullest support to the commandos and to all freedom-fighters for the restoration of the basic human rights in all the affected areas,

Demands the continuous urging of the Islamic spirit of struggle and sacrifice so as to strengthen and fortify them to achieve victory as even did their forefathers,

*Decides to send a memorandum to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the Islamic secretariat, the Secretary-General of the Arab League and the Heads of Moslem States, with the view to calling a halt to the continuance of the inhuman Zionist aggression, specially to save the Holy City of Jerusalem from Judaization and to save the Arab citizens of the Holy City from becoming refugees, in short to maintain the 1967 *status quo* and the historical features of the city.*

DOCUMENT S/10153

Letter dated 9 March 1971 from the representative of the Khmer Republic
to the President of the Security Council

[Original: French]
[10 March 1971]

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 1 March 1971 [S/10137], I have the honour to bring the following to your attention for the information of the members of the Security Council.

During the night of 4 to 5 February 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched a 60 mm mortar attack on a Khmer position at Phnom Chilea Châcha, some thirty-seven kilometres north of Phnom-Penh, in Kompong Cham, causing injuries to two persons.

During the same night, at approximately 9.30 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese fired four 60 mm mortar shells at a Khmer position at Kompong Dangkor, situated some twenty kilometres south of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal.

During the same night, between 9.30 p.m. and 11 p.m., another Khmer position, at Phum Phnom Del, three and a half kilometres south of Chilea, in Kompong Cham, was also harassed.

During the same night, at approximately 10.10 p.m., the enemy fired four 122 mm rockets, which fell near the Transport Brigade Camp at Pochentong, causing injuries to two persons.

On 5 February 1971, at about 4.10 a.m., an encounter took place two and a half kilometres south of Tram Khnar, in Takeo. The air force intervened, forcing the enemy to withdraw at about 2 p.m., leaving at the scene of the encounter seven dead, one PM/AC, one carbine, two AC rifles and six cases of ammunition, and taking away some fifty dead and wounded. There were three dead and five wounded on the Khmer side.

During the night of 5 to 6 February 1971, at about 8 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese attacked a Khmer position at Chambâk, situated twenty-eight kilometres north of Takeo.

On 6 February 1971, at about 9 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese launched an attack on a Khmer position situated two kilometres south of Tram Khnar, in Takeo. At approximately 12.30 p.m., the air force intervened, forcing the enemy to withdraw at about 2 p.m.

On the same day, at about 9.15 a.m., there was an encounter six kilometres south of Kralanh, in Siem-reap, which lasted some twenty minutes, after which

the enemy withdrew, leaving behind one dead and an AC rifle and ammunition.

On the same day, at about 1 p.m., there was an encounter between Khmer and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese elements at Phum Ang Tapok, twenty-five kilometres north-east of the town of Kompong Speu. As a result of the encounter one person was wounded on the Khmer side, two dead were left at the scene, one PM/AC, one PA/AC and several bags of medical supplies were captured, and there were several dead and injured on the enemy side.

During the same day, at about 1.45 p.m., an engagement took place at Phum Sambuor, approximately ten kilometres south of Kralanh, in Siemreap. The list of casualties so far amounts to one dead and three wounded on the Khmer side and several dead and wounded on the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese side.

During the night of 6 to 7 February 1971, at about 11 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed a Khmer position at Sala Lèk Pram, and the Romeas camp, situated respectively thirty-two kilometres south and approximately thirty kilometres south-west of the town of Kompong Chhnang.

During the same night, at about 8.45 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese briefly harassed a Khmer defence position at Kompong Trach, thirty-three kilometres east of Kampot.

On 7 February 1971, between 1 a.m. and 7 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese twice attacked a Khmer position at Pich Nil. Two members of the Khmer forces were killed on that occasion.

During the same day, at about 7.35 a.m., patrolling Khmer forces had an encounter with the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese one kilometre east of Svay Thom, some eight kilometres east of the town. As a result, three persons were injured on the Khmer side.

On the same day, at about 11.20 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese attacked a military convoy travelling from Kompong Som, three and a half kilometres south of the Srê Ambel intersection, in Kompong Seila, killing three persons and damaging four trucks.

On the same day, at about 10 a.m., an encounter took place some seventeen kilometres north of the town of Kompong Speu.

On the same day, between 8.45 a.m. and 11.40 a.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese attacked a Khmer position at Tuk Chhou, eight kilometres north-west of the town of Kampot.

On the same day, between 8 a.m., and 3 p.m., there was a violent clash between Khmer and Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese forces in the region of Vihear Suor. The artillery and air force intervened, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, which left behind some fifty dead and ten PM/AC.

During the night of 7 to 8 February 1971, at approximately 8 p.m., the enemy harassed the Khmer defence position of Sala Lèk Pram, in Kompong Chhnang.

During the same night, at about 10 p.m., the enemy again attacked the Khmer position at Tuk Chhou, in Kampot. Strong resistance from the Khmer forces obliged the enemy to withdraw.

During the same night, at about 9 p.m., the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese harassed a Khmer position at Kraing Chèk, situated fifteen kilometres north of the town of Kompong Speu.

On 8 February 1971, at approximately 8.30 a.m., there was an encounter between Khmer troops who were carrying out a sweep, and some 500 Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese in the vicinity of Phum Kantuot Prey, in Kampot.

On the same day, another encounter took place at Phum Kam Nâp, some seven kilometres north of the town of Kampot, resulting in the death of one and injuries to five members of the Khmer forces.

On the same day, at about 10.30 a.m., another clash occurred at Phum Ta Am, some twelve kilometres south of Kralanh, in Siemreap, resulting in a toll of eleven dead on the battlefield and a number of dead and wounded taken away on the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese side.

During the night of 8 to 9 February 1971, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese twice harassed a Khmer position at Prey Chas, some twenty kilometres north-east of Phnom-Penh, in Kandal.

During the same night, at approximately midnight, the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese briefly attacked a Khmer defence position at the town of Kompong Speu, without causing any damage.

During the morning of 9 February 1971, the Khmer forces, after recapturing all the villages in the region of Vihear Suor, carried out an extensive sweep.

On the same day, at about 10.30 a.m., a clash occurred between Khmer elements carrying out a sweep and the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese forces, who were retrenched at a point two and a half kilometres north-east of Dey Eth, in Kandal, causing four dead and eight wounded among the Khmer forces.

I wish to reiterate the firm and vigorous protest of the Government of the Khmer Republic at the illegal and continuing occupation of Khmer territory, followed by savage attacks perpetrated by the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese forces against a neutral and peace-loving country to which they have no right and with which they have no ethnic affinity, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, of international law and of the 1954 Geneva Agreements.⁴² These criminal attacks reveal for all to see the annexationist aims of the Viet-Cong-North Viet-Nameese communist imperialists, and represent a dangerous threat to peace and security not only in the Khmer Republic, but throughout the region of South-East Asia.

The Government of the Khmer Republic holds the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam entirely responsible for all the extremely grave consequences resulting from this situation and reserves the right to take any necessary action to defend the independence, neutrality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) OR KOSALAK
Deputy Permanent Representative of the
Khmer Republic to the United Nations

⁴² Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China.

**Note verbale dated 11 March 1971 from the representative of Iran
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]
[11 March 1971]

The Permanent Representative of Iran to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to request that the enclosed statement by the Government of Iran should be issued as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN

On 7 June 1967 His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah Aryameh declared that "the days of occupation and retention of one country's territory by another are over". In accordance with this principle, the Imperial Government of Iran has always considered that the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories is essential for the establishment of peace in the Middle East. The Government of Iran was among the Governments which endorsed the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. On every occasion since the adoption of that resolution by the Security Council, the Government of Iran has emphasized the need for implementation of its provisions; hence it supported and voted in favour of the General Assembly resolution of 4 November 1970 endorsing the provisions of the Security Council resolution. At the same time, the Government of Iran, in pursuance of its stated policy, was among the sponsors of the resolutions of the 1967 emergency special session of the General Assembly with regard to the inviolability of the legal status of Jerusalem.

The Government of Iran welcomed the announcement of the Rogers plan for the restoration of peace in the Middle East and on 1 October 1970 declared its support of the plan at the 1857th plenary meeting

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8298.

of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Rogers plan sought to establish a cease-fire among the parties concerned, thereby laying a foundation for peace discussions in order to implement the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. The Government of Iran believes that the recent proposals by Ambassador Jarring, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, contain provisions based on the Security Council resolution and that they provide the basis on which a just and honourable peace could be established. Happily, the Government of the United Arab Republic has responded favourably to the Jarring proposals and has thereby opened the door for the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East. For the first time, it has declared its willingness to reach a peace agreement provided that Israeli forces are withdrawn from occupied territories.

Now that as a result of the positive attitude of the Government of the United Arab Republic, favourable conditions for restoration of peace in the Middle East have been realized, the Government of Iran hopes that Israel will reciprocate by taking positive steps in the direction of peace and regional tranquillity so that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General may succeed in his efforts to enable the parties concerned to reach a just and honourable agreement.

In view of what has been said and considering that the Government of Iran regards the response of the President of the United Arab Republic as a favourable basis for a just and honourable peace, should the Government of Israel persist in its refusal to implement the provisions of the Security Council resolution and maintain its negative attitude towards the Rogers Plan and the Jarring proposals, the Government of Iran will see no alternative but to condemn the uncivilized attitude of Israel.

DOCUMENT S/10155*

**Letter dated 12 March 1971 from the representative of Jordan
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]
[12 March 1971]

Upon instructions from my Government and further to my letters of 2 March 1971 [S/10139] and 8 March 1971 [S/10149] concerning Israeli measures of confiscation of Jordanian land and property in the territories occupied since June 1967, I regret to bring to your attention new Israeli measures of confiscation.

Twenty days ago the Israeli authorities confiscated 100 dunums of forested land, the property of a Jordanian, Mr. Jaabari, east of Sahl Zeef. After its confiscation the trees were cut and bulldozed.

More recently the Israeli authorities confiscated 1,500 dunums of the lands of the villages of Sanur and Jabaa. The Military Governor and a "committee of confiscation" had already met with the community leaders of the two villages and informed them of the above measures.

Such measures are illegal and in open defiance of the relevant United Nations resolutions. They cannot be separated from Israel's firmly declared designs of expansion.

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8299.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10156

**Letter dated 12 March 1971 from the representative of Portugal
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English]
[12 March 1971]

With reference to the letter dated 4 March 1971 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representative of the Republic of Guinea and circulated as document S/10145 of 5 March 1971, I have the honour to communicate to you the following, upon instructions from my Government.

(1) The representative of the Republic of Guinea addressed himself once more to the highest organ of the United Nations merely in order to repeat accusations that are vague and gratuitous, since they are neither specific nor susceptible of being proved or verified through any facts.

(2) It is an incontestable fact that the situation on the frontiers between the Portuguese province of Guinea and the Republic of Guinea continues to be characterized by a free and openly acknowledged activity of terrorist groups which utilize the territory of that State in order to attack Portuguese populations. For these attacks, the Government of the Republic of Guinea cannot escape responsibility; for, not only do they originate from its territory, but they are launched with the express support and at the instigation of that Government.

(3) Notwithstanding this unjustifiable attitude of the Government of Guinea, the Portuguese Government has persevered in maintaining the most rigorous respect for the sovereignty of that State, as also for the sovereignty of all other States bordering its territory, and repudiates as entirely unfounded the accusations concerning any attacks by land, sea or air being directed against

that State. These new and ridiculous accusations of the Government of Guinea are no more than a very inept way of masking the episodes of internal revolt on the part of the population of that country, which provided occasion for the violent repression recently carried out by that Government, amid circumstances that provoked the anguish and indignation of international public opinion. The Portuguese Government does not have to pronounce itself on these events, although the methods employed deserved the severest condemnation; but it cannot permit that, over and above all this, the Government of Conakry should use the state of rebellion prevailing in its territory as a pretext for future violations and aggressions against Portuguese territory.

(4) The Portuguese Government regrets that the Government of the Republic of Guinea, which violates the most elementary rules of harmonious coexistence of the international community, should address itself to the Security Council, without respect for the elevated functions of that organ, and with no other objective than that of disturbing the tranquillity of international relations and seeking to add unduly to the preoccupations of the United Nations.

(5) I would appreciate it if you would direct that this letter should be circulated as an official document of the Security Council on the usual terms.

(Signed) António PATRÍCIO
Chargé d'affaires, a.i. of Portugal
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10158*

**Letter dated 16 March 1971 from the representative of Israel
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]
[16 March 1971]

On instructions of my Government I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 9 March 1971 by the representatives of Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic [S/10152] and to state the following.

The allegations contained in that letter are incorrect, gratuitous and misleading. The letter reflects, to a great extent, the belligerent policies being pursued by the Arab States against Israel.

Notwithstanding the abnormal state of affairs in the region and the security problems caused by that policy, the Moslem institutions in Jerusalem and its Moslem residents and visitors enjoy the fullest possible liberty

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8300.

and facilities to pursue their normal activities and promote their religious interests.

The maintenance and improvement of the Moslem holy places, as well as the whole range of Moslem communal life, are traditionally regulated and administered by the Moslem religious authorities.

Furthermore, with the removal of political barriers imposed by the Jordanian Government for nineteen years, hundreds of thousands of Moslem citizens of Israel now enjoy free access to their holy places and religious institutions in Jerusalem.

Despite the absence of peace Israel permits the citizens of Arab countries, whose Governments consider themselves to be at war with Israel, to visit their holy places in Jerusalem and many tens of thousands have

taken advantage of this liberal policy during the past year.

Jerusalem, and particularly the Old City and its immediate neighbourhood, contains places and religious shrines which are sacred to three religions. The sacredness of Jerusalem has its origin in Judaism. That holy quality was subsequently adopted by Christianity and later by Islam. Reverence and attachment to Jerusalem are deeply rooted in the consciousness of the Jews no less than in that of the adherents of any other faith. Jerusalem has always been and will remain the single and only world centre of the Jewish people.

In the period of Jordanian usurpation in Jerusalem, the entire Jewish population of the Old City was uprooted and a destructive campaign was waged completely to eradicate what was left of the Jewish houses of worship and institutions of learning which flourished there for centuries. It could have been expected that the Governments signatories of the letter of 9 March would advocate mutual respect between the different religions. Therefore it is a matter of regret that when the armed forces of Jordan and Egypt wantonly attacked the city of Jerusalem in 1948, those Governments did not take any measures to prevent the sacrilege and later the crimes against the sacred sites of that religion which had been the first to recognize the holiness of Jerusalem. It is even more astonishing that they are now challenging the efforts being made by Israel to remedy those criminal acts by rebuilding the Jewish Quarter in the Old City. It is particularly

grotesque to find in the letter under discussion an accusation that Israel is "Judaizing" that very City in which the Jewish ethos is so deeply marked and where Jews have constituted the majority of the population for generations.

Jerusalem is a city with hundreds of thousands of people who are entitled to enjoy ordinary conditions of life, including the standards of public services and amenities customary in every well-developed city.

The Israeli authorities, dedicated to the welfare and dignity of the city, are treating with proper reverence all that is related to the holy places of all faiths, and the maintenance of their surroundings and decorum. They devote great efforts and many resources to the improvement of these places and their safety. At the same time the authorities promote the construction of housing and roads, and the development of economic resources, these taking place mainly in areas at a distance from the Old City.

The aim of the Government of Israel is to respect the interests of all religions in Jerusalem and it aspires to meet them through consultation and understanding with their representatives.

I have the honour to request circulation of this letter as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/10159*

Letter dated 15 March 1971 from the representative of Spain
to the Secretary-General

[Original: Spanish]
[16 March 1971]

On several occasions, my Government has had an opportunity to indicate its grave concern over certain events currently taking place in the City of Jerusalem as a result of the military occupation to which it is being subjected by a State Member of our Organization. My Government thought, and still thinks, that the fact of this occupation, as has been affirmed in many resolutions, cannot in any way justify certain measures of assimilation designed to change the true nature and alter the status of that city. An illegal act can never give rise to a right.

I have been instructed by my Government to convey to you the concern and the chagrin which the Head of the Spanish State feels over recent developments in this situation. In the view of the Spanish Government, measures of this nature alter the character of a city which is of such profound significance to a large part of mankind, since they are aimed at laying the foundations which could serve to support and justify an annexation which, if it should occur, would confront the international community with a *fait accompli*.

This concern bears witness to the traditional interest with which Spain has always viewed the situation and the problems of the Holy Places.

In the view of the Spanish Government, the provisions of the relevant United Nations resolutions should be strictly complied with, in particular the provisions of Security Council resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969) which condemn measures of any kind designed to achieve the aforementioned ends. Specifically, resolution 267 (1969) "urgently calls once more upon Israel to rescind forthwith all measures taken by it which may tend to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, and in future to refrain from all actions likely to have such an effect".

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have this note circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Jaime DE PINIÉS
Permanent Representative of Spain
to the United Nations

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8301.

DOCUMENT S/10160*

Letter dated 19 March 1971 from the representative of Israel
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[19 March 1971]

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 15 March 1971 by the representative of Spain [S/10159] and to state the following.

This letter is one more expression of the biased pro-Arab policy persistently followed by Spain for over twenty years on every political aspect relating to the Middle East, and it has to be read accordingly.

Spain did not raise its voice when Arab States twice in recent times initiated and launched military attacks, including heavy shellings, on Jerusalem, endangering all its holy places and religious sites. Spain also made no move when, during the Jordanian occupation of part of Jerusalem, the Jewish holy places and religious institutions and the whole of the Jewish quarter of the Old City were wantonly and systematically destroyed and Jews were denied access to their holy places.

As stated in my letter to you of 16 March 1971 [S/10158], Jerusalem is a living and growing city in which Jews have constituted the majority of the population for generations. The allegations in the letter under discussion that there have been "measures of assimilation" are unfounded. Urban improvements and developments in the city are designed to serve all its residents and ensure its proper growth. There has never been such equality in rights and opportunities for all religious bodies interested in Jerusalem and for all communities in the city as there is now.

I have the honour to request circulation of this letter as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8302.

DOCUMENT S/10162

Letter dated 23 March 1971 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[23 March 1971]

I have the honour to transmit herewith for the information of the members of the Security Council the text [see annex] of the Opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown for England and Wales on the extent of the existing legal obligations of Her Majesty's Government, arising under the Simonstown Agreements of 1955. These Agreements, which were registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations⁴³ in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter, are still valid and remain in force. It will be noted that, contrary to the allegation in the memorandum transmitted with the letter dated 24 February 1971 from the Executive Secretary of the Organization of African Unity to the United Nations [S/10132], the United Kingdom Government has certain legal obligations under the Agreements which are fully set out in the attached Opinion.

(Signed) C. T. CROWE
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Legal obligations of Her Majesty's Government arising out
of the Simonstown Agreements^a

Presented by the Attorney General by Command of
Her Majesty February 1971

OPINION OF THE LAW OFFICERS OF THE CROWN FOR ENGLAND
AND WALES ON THE EXTENT OF THE EXISTING LEGAL OBLIGA-
TIONS OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT, ARISING UNDER
THE SIMONSTOWN AGREEMENTS, TO PERMIT THE EXPORT OF
ARMS TO SOUTH AFRICA

We have been requested to submit to Parliament our written Opinion as to whether and to what extent Her Majesty's Government has any existing legal obligation, arising from the Simonstown Agreements, to permit the export of arms to South Africa. This Opinion expresses the substance of the advice which we have tendered to Her Majesty's Government over the last six months. Facts and documents relevant to this question have been placed before us by the Government departments concerned. Our Opinion refers to certain communications which took place between Her Majesty's Government and the South African Government. These communications

⁴³ See United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 248 (1956), No. 3495.

^a London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1971, Cmnd. 4589.

are set out in the numbered documents in the Annex^b to which the footnote numbering in the Opinion refers.

OPINION

THE BACKGROUND

The Simonstown Agreements

1. The documents commonly referred to as "The Simonstown Agreement" are the Agreement on defence of the sea routes round Southern Africa and the Agreement relating to the transfer of the Simonstown naval base. These Agreements are contained in exchanges of letters dated 30th June, 1955. They were published in Command Paper 9520 which was presented to Parliament in July, 1955. This Command Paper also included an exchange of letters setting out the terms of an understanding on the need for international discussions with regard to regional defence.* Any legal obligation upon Her Majesty's Government to permit the South African Government to purchase naval vessels or equipment in the United Kingdom derives from the Agreement on defence of the sea routes round Southern Africa (which is referred to hereafter as "The Sea Routes Agreement").

2. The purposes of the Sea Routes Agreement are stated in paragraph 1 as follows:

"1. Recognising the importance of sea communications to the well-being of their respective countries in peace and to their common security in the event of aggression, the Governments of the Union of South Africa and of the United Kingdom enter into the following Agreement to ensure the safety, by the joint operations of the respective maritime forces, of the sea routes round Southern Africa."

3. The machinery established by the Sea Routes Agreement for carrying out its purposes included the designation of the Royal Naval Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, as Commander-in-Chief for purposes of planning and operational command in war (paragraph 5 of Sea Routes Agreement), the earmarking in peacetime of naval forces to be assigned to him in time of war or emergency likely to lead to war, and a joint maritime war planning committee containing representatives of the two Navies. The peacetime responsibilities of the Commander-in-Chief included "the organisation for and conduct of combined training" of the national units earmarked to his command in war "so as to ensure that they can operate as an effective and integrated force" and the authority of the Commander-in-Chief extended to the co-ordination of the combined training of these forces and the calling for reports "concerned with the state of readiness and efficiency" of these forces (paragraph 3 of Annex to Sea Routes Agreement). Exchanges of officers and ratings between the two Navies was envisaged (paragraph 14 of Sea Routes Agreement).

4. There are specific obligations relating to the purchase of vessels for the South African maritime forces in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Sea Routes Agreement. These paragraphs are in the following terms:

"2. The Union Government have approved a programme for the expansion of the South African Navy. The programme will be spread over a period of eight years from 1955 to 1963, and will involve the purchase of the following vessels, which will be added to the existing fleet:

- 6 anti-submarine frigates
- 10 coastal minesweepers
- 4 seaward defence boats

"3. The Union Government will place firm orders in the United Kingdom for the purchase of these vessels, costing some £18M. The British Admiralty agree to act as agents for the Union Government in this matter."

^bThe text of the Annex to the Command Paper is not reproduced here.

* When communicating this exchange to the United Nations under Article 102 of the United Nations Charter, Her Majesty's Government informed the United Nations that 'this document does not contain any substantive obligations but is registered in order to facilitate understanding of the other two agreements'.

Legal effect of the Sea Routes Agreement

5. The Sea Routes Agreement is a treaty. It was intended to, and does, impose legal obligations upon each of the Governments who expressed their mutual agreement in the form of an exchange of letters.* The Agreement is still subsisting. It has not been terminated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 17, which provides that it "will remain in force until such time as the two Governments decide otherwise by mutual agreement". The subsequent statements of the two Governments (in, for example, documents 27 and 28) make it plain that each of them regards it as having continuing validity.

6. The Sea Routes Agreement gives rise to a number of obligations on the part of each of the signatory Governments. We are now concerned, however, with only one of these, that is to say the obligation of Her Majesty's Government in respect of the export of arms to South Africa. Although it was agreed† that the British Admiralty would "act as agents for the Union Government in this matter", Her Majesty's Government undertook no obligation itself to supply any arms or equipment. But the Union Government expressly agreed to "place firm orders in the United Kingdom for the purchase of these vessels".‡ This necessarily implies an obligation on the part of Her Majesty's Government to permit the export of any material purchased under the Agreement. Without this implication paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Agreement are empty of any meaning.

7. It is, therefore, plain that:

- (a) the Sea Routes Agreement laid certain obligations upon Her Majesty's Government;
- (b) one of those obligations was to permit the export to the South African Government of certain arms and equipment to be purchased in the United Kingdom.

The question with which we are concerned in this Opinion is how far, and in respect of what arms and equipment, that obligation extends.

South African naval purchases

8. The South African naval expansion programme referred to in paragraph 2 of the Sea Routes Agreement was stated to be 'spread over a period of eight years from 1955 to 1963'. In 1957 the Admiralty and the South African authorities agreed upon a scheme for procurement of the vessels to be purchased in the United Kingdom, in implementation of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Agreement, which was phased over the years 1955 to 1965.

9. In pursuance of their obligations under paragraph 3 of the Sea Routes Agreement the South African Government purchased:

- 4 anti-submarine frigates
- 10 coastal minesweepers
- 4 seaward defence boats.

10. Two anti-submarine frigates were, by agreement between the two Governments, omitted from the supply programme drawn up by the Admiralty for implementing paragraph 3 of the Agreement and there is now no obligation on the South African Government to order, or Her Majesty's Government to permit the supply of, these vessels. One anti-submarine frigate purchased was an existing vessel from the Royal Navy. This vessel and the ten coastal minesweepers and four seaward defence boats, were delivered with their initial outfit of equipment, stores and base reserves. Her Majesty's Government's obligation in respect of the supply of these vessels and their initial equipment has therefore been discharged.

11. In addition to the anti-submarine frigate formerly in service with the Royal Navy the South African Government

* A treaty, as defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Cmd. 4140), is 'an international' agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation. (Article 2(1)(a)).

† See paragraph 3 of the Sea Routes Agreement.

ordered three new anti-submarine frigates to be built in British yards. The design of these new anti-submarine frigates was basically the same as a class of vessel known as the Type 12 frigate, which was also constructed for the Royal Navy and is known as the Rothesay class. These vessels were ordered from the shipyards in 1956-1957. Their names and the dates when they were laid down, launched and completed are as follows:

	<i>Laid down</i>	<i>Launched</i>	<i>Completed</i>
President Kruger	6. 4.59.	20.10.60.	1.10.62.
President Steyn	20. 5.60.	23.11.61.	25. 4.63.
President Pretorius	21.11.60.	28. 9.62.	4. 3.64.

These three ships were delivered to the South African Government after completion

THE QUESTIONS

12. The following three questions thus arise:

- (a) whether Her Majesty's Government remains under any obligation to permit the supply of the initial equipment for the three anti-submarine frigates that were built in the United Kingdom and supplied in accordance with the Sea Routes Agreement;
- (b) whether Her Majesty's Government is under any obligation to permit the supply of replacement or additional equipment for all the vessels supplied in accordance with the Sea Routes Agreement;
- (c) whether the Sea Routes Agreement imposed a wider, general and continuing obligation upon Her Majesty's Government to permit the supply of any further arms that might in the future be requested by the South African Government for the purposes of the Sea Routes Agreement.

Interpretation of Treaties

13. The answers to these questions depend upon the proper interpretation of the treaty obligations of Her Majesty's Government under the Sea Routes Agreement. The rules of international law for the interpretation of treaties have recently been declared in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.[†] The two most important rules for the present purpose can be conveniently quoted from paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 31 of that Convention, as follows:

"1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

"...

"3. There shall be taken into account together with the context:

- "(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
- "(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
- "(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties."

Role of the Admiralty

14. Before considering the questions referred to in paragraph 12 above, it is necessary to clarify the position of the Admiralty in connection with the transactions which took place between the two Governments over the construction and equipment of the three anti-submarine frigates.

15. Under paragraph 3 of the Sea Routes Agreement it was agreed that the British Admiralty would act as agents for the South African Government in the placing of orders in the United Kingdom. The Admiralty (later Ministry of Defence) was, however, also the department of Government which dealt generally with the South African Government with respect to the implementation of the obligations of both parties

connected with the supply of the vessels. Although the Admiralty was "the agent" of the South African Government in the placing of orders, it is, in our opinion, impossible to distinguish the Admiralty from Her Majesty's Government for the purpose of the series of transactions with the South African Government which are discussed below.

16. At the time when the three frigates were ordered the concept of helicopters as an integral part of the equipment of frigates on anti-submarine activities was already envisaged. The capability of an anti-submarine frigate to carry a helicopter widely extends the effective capacity of the vessel in her anti-submarine role. But systems to put this into effect were still being developed. In 1958 the Admiralty adopted a system known as "MATCH"^{**} for equipping frigates with helicopters. This could be done either as part of the initial construction or by conversion. Conversion systems had to be worked out for each class of ship and the system for the Type 12 frigates was still being developed in the period 1960-1965. The "MATCH" system was adapted to Westland Wasp helicopters and a vessel equipped with it could not readily carry helicopters of another design.

WESTLAND WASP HELICOPTERS

The conversion of the frigates

17. The South African authorities were informed by the Admiralty of the system which was under consideration for converting Royal Naval ships of the Type 12 class to carry helicopters. By a letter dated 5th September, 1961⁽¹⁾ (over a year before the completion of the first of the three frigates), the South African authorities wrote to the Admiralty:

"It has now been approved in principle for these ships to be converted on similar lines to R.N. ships of the same class and for them to be fitted with a helicopter platform and hangar. It is further intended that this conversion should be carried out at the S.A.N. Dockyard, Simonstown".

This was followed by a letter of 28th December, 1961,⁽²⁾ asking the Admiralty to make available to the South African Navy, in order to carry out conversion of South African frigates to carry helicopters, drawings reflecting the possible Wasp helicopter conversion of a Rothesay class frigate. The Admiralty thereupon provided drawings showing preliminary arrangements for making fittings for the South African anti-submarine frigates then still under construction.⁽⁴⁾

18. In July, 1962, the South African authorities sought further information⁽⁶⁾ from the Admiralty in connection with the equipment of the three anti-submarine frigates for the operation of Wasp helicopters, and made enquiries about the possibility of converting one of the anti-submarine frigates during construction in the United Kingdom. They decided not to proceed with this when they were informed by the Admiralty that full information about the conversion system for Type 12 frigates would not be available for about twelve months, and that completion of the helicopter arrangements on the frigate concerned would seriously delay the vessel.⁽⁷⁾

19. During 1962 and 1963 there were further exchanges between the South African authorities and the Admiralty about the details of the design arrangements for converting Type 12 frigates to carry helicopters. The South African Government paid the Admiralty for the cost of some of the design work involved.⁽⁸⁻¹⁷⁾ In July, 1964, the official "MATCH" handbook was made available to the South African authorities by the Admiralty.⁽¹⁸⁾

20. Notwithstanding the announcement of the arms embargo on 17th November, 1964 (see paragraph 22 below), the particulars to assist with conversion of the frigates which is being carried out by the South African Government in South Africa have continued to be made available to the South African authorities by Her Majesty's Government. Indeed details of all modifications carried into this class of frigate have been and continue to be provided to the South African Navy.

^{**} Medium-Range Anti-Submarine Torpedo Carrying Helicopters.

[†] Cmd. 4140.

21. After completion (between 1962 and 1964), the three anti-submarine frigates constructed in the United Kingdom were delivered to the South African Government. Commencing in January, 1968, conversion of the frigates proceeded. The conversion of one has been completed; the conversion of another commenced in 1969 and has probably been finished; and the conversion of the third frigate commenced subsequently.

The arms embargo

22. In November, 1964, Her Majesty's Government announced their decision to impose an embargo on the export of arms to South Africa. This announcement was made by the Prime Minister, Mr. Wilson, in a statement in Parliament on 17th November, 1964.* In the statement announcing the embargo Mr. Wilson said that "outstanding commitments by the Ministry of Defence will be fulfilled", and, in answer to a question about the Simonstown Agreement, added "Nothing I have said in any way involves a breach of the Agreement. Moreover . . . the Agreement is not capable of unilateral denunciation".

South African reaction

23. The South African authorities sought clarification of the full implications of the statements announcing the embargo. They presented an aide memoire dated 21st December, 1964⁽²⁰⁾ to Her Majesty's Government. In this document the South African Government asked Her Majesty's Government to clarify its attitude towards the supply of various descriptions of equipment, and they sought confirmation that:

"the above mentioned categories of equipment are in fact regarded by the Government of the United Kingdom as being covered by 'commitments by the Ministry of Defence'".

The equipment listed in the note included the following:

"Westland Wasp Helicopters.

"Replacement of Westland Wasp Helicopters which may be written off strength as a result of accidents or wear and tear, or augmentation in numbers to meet S.A. naval requirements."

It will be noted that this enquiry did not refer to or specify any particular number of helicopters but referred generally to replacement or augmentation.

24. Her Majesty's Government replied to this note by three separate communications:

(1) An aide memoire dated 15th February, 1965,⁽²¹⁾ informed the South African Government that Her Majesty's Government were "prepared in principle to supply" the spare parts for certain aircraft and for Westland Wasp helicopters; and that Her Majesty's Government were not yet in a position to give an answer about the replacement or augmentation in numbers of Westland Wasp helicopters.

(2) A letter dated 9th March, 1965, from Sir Geoffrey Harrison (a senior official of the Foreign Office, in the absence and on behalf of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Chalfont) to the South African Ambassador⁽²²⁾ contained the following passage:

"I am writing to let you know that Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to supply additional Wasp helicopters to meet South African naval requirements. In reaching this decision, Her Majesty's Government have taken account of the fact that these specialised aircraft are integral parts of a complete anti-submarine weapons system supplied to South Africa under the Simonstown Agreement."

(3) A letter from Her Majesty's Government dated 31st May, 1965⁽²³⁾ informed the South African Government that Her Majesty's Government would be willing to consider the replacement of certain aircraft and "Westland Wasp helicopters which are lost in accidents or through mechanical defect in the light of the circumstances in each case". It also said that "Her

Majesty's Government would not, however, be able to allow the supply of replacements for these types of aircraft written off as a result of normal wear and tear". We comment on this letter (and in particular on the distinction between helicopters lost in accidents or through mechanical defects and helicopters written off as a result of normal wear and tear) in paragraph 54.

The 1967 request

25. In January, 1967, Her Majesty's Government received a list of defence equipment in respect of which the South African Government sought to place orders in the United Kingdom. This document included the following enquiry relating to helicopters:

"Wasp helicopters. Originally six Wasp helicopters (of which two have been written off) and recently a further four, net total 8, have been acquired. 12 AS helicopters are required. Will the additional four be supplied during the period 1971/1973?"

26. The South African fleet existing when the Simonstown Agreements were made in 1955 included two former Royal Navy destroyers, which had been purchased in 1950 and 1952. Between 1962 and 1966 the South African Government converted these destroyers to carry Wasp helicopters with the assistance of plans and instructions supplied by Her Majesty's Government. Six Wasp helicopters were supplied for these vessels before 1964. Four further Wasp helicopters were supplied in 1966. These are the helicopters referred to in the South African Government's enquiry quoted in the previous paragraph.

27. With regard to the enquiry of January, 1967, by the South African Government referred to in paragraph 25, the Prime Minister, Mr. Wilson, informed Parliament on 14th December, 1967, as follows:

"The South African Government have indicated an interest in buying certain items of mainly naval equipment. No reply has as yet been sent. Our policy on these matters remains as I stated it to the House on 17th November, 1964".*

It was on 17th November, 1964, that Mr. Wilson had stated that outstanding commitments by the Ministry of Defence would be fulfilled.

The exchanges of 1969/1970

28. The conversion of the first of the three anti-submarine frigates so as to enable her to carry Wasp helicopters had begun in January, 1968. But on 12th December, 1969, the South African Ambassador was informed that if the manufacturers of Westland Wasp helicopters applied for an export licence to sell this equipment to South Africa, a licence would be refused by Her Majesty's Government.

29. Following this, the South African Government delivered an aide memoire dated 3rd February, 1970.⁽²⁴⁾ In this aide memoire the South African Government referred to the letter of 9th March, 1965,⁽²²⁾ and sought clarification of the statement made to their Ambassador which, the aide memoire alleged, was contrary to the assurance contained in the letter of 1965; the aide memoire went on to enquire whether the letter and spirit of the Simonstown Agreement had any meaning for the United Kingdom.

30. Her Majesty's Government replied to this communication by an aide memoire on the 5th March, 1970.⁽²⁷⁾ In this document Her Majesty's Government confirmed that they attached importance to the Simonstown Agreement and regarded it as still in force, but informed the South African Government that Her Majesty's Government were unable to agree to license the supply of further Wasp helicopters to South Africa and that any assurances contained in the letter of 9th March, 1965, had been met by the supply thereafter of four additional Wasp helicopters.

31. The South African Government replied to Her Majesty's Government's note in an aide memoire dated 20th May, 1970.⁽²⁸⁾ They referred to the unwillingness of Her Majesty's Government to honour their obligations under the Simonstown Agreement and rejected the arguments advanced by Her Majesty's Government as unacceptable.

* Hansard Vol. 702 Cols 199 to 208.

Legal considerations

32. It is in the context of the matters narrated in the previous paragraphs that we have to consider the first of the questions posed in paragraph 12 above, namely whether Her Majesty's Government remain under any obligation to permit the supply of initial equipment for the three anti-submarine frigates built in the United Kingdom and supplied in accordance with the Sea Routes Agreement. It will be apparent that in practical terms this is confined to the question of whether Her Majesty's Government is under any obligation to permit the supply of any further Wasp helicopters.

33. There are, in our opinion, four factors that are relevant to a conclusion on this question:

- (1) The principle that the Sea Routes Agreement must be interpreted "in the light of its object and purpose";
- (2) The nature of the right conferred upon the South African Government in respect of the supply of vessels under the Sea Routes Agreement;
- (3) The subsequent practice of the parties in their application of the Sea Routes Agreement;
- (4) The principle that the parties must perform in good faith their obligations under the Sea Routes Agreement.

34. The object of the Sea Routes Agreement (paragraph 1) is "to ensure the safety by the joint operations of their respective maritime forces, of the sea routes round Southern Africa". To this end, paragraph 2 of the Sea Routes Agreement provides for the expansion of the South African Navy so that there should be available efficient forces in a state of readiness for the fulfilment of that purpose. This plainly indicates the intention of the parties that the vessels to be provided under the Agreement (including the anti-submarine frigates) should be as apt as possible for that purpose.

35. The nature of the right conferred (by paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Sea Routes Agreement) upon the South African Government to order vessels must also be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the words. So interpreted, these paragraphs, in our opinion, entitled the South African Government to purchase anti-submarine frigates of any type or design which they thought best. The South African Government's right of choice extended moreover to the equipment of the ships. The only restriction upon the South African Government's right to choose in this way was that vessels should fall within the broad descriptions set out in the Agreement. Apart from this the South African Government retained the freedom of a sovereign Government to decide upon the armament of its fleet.

36. The subsequent practice of the parties in applying the Sea Routes Agreement is apparent from what we have set out in paragraph 17 to 31 above. It is clear from the dealings between the Admiralty and the South African authorities, that both parties were interpreting their obligations in such a way as would enable the South African Government to obtain anti-submarine frigates from the United Kingdom (including, if they so desired, equipment of the latest design) which would be most effective for carrying out the purposes of the Sea Routes Agreement. This is why the South African Government was made aware by the Admiralty, not later than 1961, of the systems which were then under consideration for converting Royal Naval ships of the Type 12 class to carry helicopters. This is why, in light of this information, the South African Government in the same year made plain their intention that the Type 12 Frigates on order for them should be fitted with the "MATCH" system, either by conversion or as part of the original construction. The adoption by the South African Government of the "MATCH" system would necessarily have involved the equipment of their three anti-submarine frigates with Wasp helicopters. Her Majesty's Government not only acquiesced at the time in the foregoing proposals of the South African Government, but have continued, without interruption, to assist them by supplying technical information relating to the "MATCH" conversion system.

37. These transactions must be considered alongside the other factors referred to in paragraph 33 above. In particular they must be considered in the light of the obligation of Her Majesty's Government to act in good faith and in light of the object and purpose of the Agreement. In our opinion, the effect of these transactions was that the South African Government elected to purchase anti-submarine frigates whose armaments would include Wasp helicopters. Her Majesty's Government accepted that the obligation on their part to permit the supply of the vessels and equipment extended to helicopters as integral parts of the anti-submarine equipment of the frigates, when the "MATCH" system had been installed.

38. It is to be noted that the statement in the letter of 9th March, 1965,⁽²²⁾ that Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to supply Wasp helicopters to meet South African naval requirements is in unequivocal terms. This contrasts with the terms of the two other communications relating to the supply of equipment, which indicated merely willingness to "consider requests" made by the South African Government for the supply of equipment. Moreover, the express acknowledgment in the letter of 9th March, 1965,⁽²²⁾ that the Wasp helicopters are "integral parts of a complete anti-submarine weapons system supplied to South Africa under the Simonstown Agreement" plainly suggests that Her Majesty's Government in 1965 acknowledged that the Wasp helicopters were required to complete the essential equipment of the three anti-submarine frigates. It is difficult to explain the reference to "the Simonstown Agreement" except upon the basis of an acceptance by Her Majesty's Government of an obligation deriving from the Sea Routes Agreement.

39. We cannot accept the argument put forward in Her Majesty's Government's aide memoire of 5th March 1970⁽²⁷⁾ that any assurances contained in the letter of 9th March, 1965⁽²²⁾ were met by the supply thereafter of four additional Wasp helicopters. When these four helicopters were supplied to the South African Navy in 1968, none of the three anti-submarine frigates supplied in pursuance of the Sea Routes Agreement had been converted to carry helicopters. In fact there were, at the time of supply of the four helicopters, two South African Navy ships from which the helicopters could operate. These were of course, the two ex-Royal Navy destroyers that had been supplied prior to the making of the Sea Routes Agreement. These four helicopters could not have been regarded at that time as "an integral part" of equipment of the three new anti-submarine frigates, since it was not until about three years later that any of those ships were capable of carrying helicopters. Four helicopters would, in any case, have been insufficient to provide the initial equipment of the three anti-submarine frigates. In order to maintain this part of a frigate's armament as effective, reserves are essential. If the establishment standards of the Royal Navy were applied a total of eleven helicopters would be required to provide the initial equipment (together with reserve) for these three frigates.

Conclusions

40. Our conclusions on the question whether Her Majesty's Government remains under any obligation to permit the supply of the initial equipment of the three anti-submarine frigates may be summarized as follows:

1. Her Majesty's Government has at all material times been under an obligation to permit the South African Government to obtain three anti-submarine frigates from this country.
2. This obligation included an obligation to permit the South African Government to obtain frigates that were designed and equipped in the way which the South African Government considered most effective for carrying out the purposes of the Sea Routes Agreement.
3. Her Majesty's Government have acknowledged and confirmed (by the letter of 9th March, 1965⁽²²⁾) that their obligation to permit the supply of the anti-submarine frigates and their equipment extended to the supply of the Wasp helicopters, as integral parts of the complete anti-submarine weapons system.
4. The supply of the four additional Wasp helicopters in 1966 did not discharge these obligations.

* Hansard Vol. 756 col. 628.

5. Her Majesty's Government thus remains under a continuing obligation to permit the export from the United Kingdom of a sufficient number of helicopters to equip the three anti-submarine frigates supplied under the Sea Routes Agreement with their initial complement of Wasp helicopters (together with reserves) if these are requested by the South African Government.

REPLACEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT

The issues

41. We turn now to the second question posed in paragraph 12 of this Opinion, namely whether Her Majesty's Government is under any obligation to permit the supply of replacement or additional equipment for all the vessels supplied in accordance with the Sea Routes Agreement.

42. The Sea Routes Agreement is, as we have observed, an agreement of indefinite duration, remaining in force until such time as the Governments decide otherwise by mutual agreement. The Agreement provides for situations of peace and of war. In our opinion it was within the contemplation of the parties when the Agreement was concluded in 1955 that the arrangements for mutual defence of the sea routes were to be of long duration.

43. If the ships supplied are to carry out the purposes and intentions in the Agreement in joint operations, the efficiency of ships for war must be maintained. The armament, stores and base reserves for the ships or a part thereof would necessarily become worn out, lost or expended during the period during which the parties expected the Agreement to continue. If the ships were to be kept efficient this equipment would need to be replaced. The equipment of the vessels is of United Kingdom design and manufacture. Unless the ships are to be re-fitted with equipment from another country, their efficiency could only be maintained by the provision from United Kingdom suppliers of the necessary replacements. To deny the export of such supplies from this country would lead over a period of time to a serious reduction in the efficiency of the ships, and would detract from the ability of the ships to combine with the ships of the Royal Navy in training or operations.

44. As is apparent from the facts narrated in paragraphs 23 to 31 above the attitude of Her Majesty's Government to the supply of replacement parts necessary to maintain the South African Navy's ability to carry out its role under the Sea Routes Agreement was questioned by the South African Government in following the imposition of the arms embargo by Her Majesty's Government in 1964. On 10th December, 1964, the South African Government enquired about "the application of the embargo to routine demands for replacement parts for the South African Navy". The Ministry of Defence replied on 17th December, 1964.⁽¹⁹⁾ This letter included the following: "It is not the Government's intention to withhold replacement parts that are necessary to maintain the South African Navy's ability to carry out its role in the defence of the sea routes round Southern Africa in accordance with the Simonstown Agreement."

45. By the aide memoire of 21st December, 1964,⁽²⁰⁾ the South African Government sought to know the attitude of Her Majesty's Government towards the supply of "spares and equipment for ships now in service or subsequently acquired". Her Majesty's Government replied on 15th February, 1965,⁽²²⁾ that it had already replied to the South African Government on this matter. There is no reference to the precise document in which this reply had been given but we assume that it refers to the letter of 17th December, 1964.⁽¹⁹⁾

46. On 18th June, 1965, the South African Government delivered another aide memoire to the Foreign Office,⁽²⁴⁾ seeking to know whether Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to supply the equipment and stores listed. The list included naval equipment and stores, some of which was stated to be "for modernisation of S.A. Navy Ships" and were items of new equipment. Other items related to equipment already supplied.

47. In reply, by letter dated 31st August, 1965,⁽²⁵⁾ Her Majesty's Government stated:

1. As regards the naval items, that it "would be willing to supply, in the quantities necessary for peacetime consumption and practice", certain of those items (which were listed).
2. That certain equipment, which included some of the new equipment described in the South African communication as being "for modernisation of S.A. Navy ships", can be "supplied in unrestricted quantities".
3. That Her Majesty's Government could not agree to supply the Seacat missile system.

The decisions conveyed by the letter were stated to accord with the general principles outlined in the letter of 17th December, 1964.⁽¹⁹⁾

Legal considerations

48. It is in the context of these facts that we have to consider the extent of Her Majesty's Government's obligation to permit the supply of replacement or additional equipment for all the vessels supplied in accordance with the Sea Routes Agreement.

49. The Agreement contains no express terms relating to the supply of such equipment. But Her Majesty's Government's obligations have to be decided in light of the object and purpose of the Agreement, which has to be interpreted in good faith. One must also have regard to the subsequent practice of the parties in the application of the Agreement.

50. All these factors point, in our opinion, to one conclusion, which is also the one that accords with commonsense. In the context of the Sea Routes Agreement and of the circumstances which we have outlined, a Government which is obliged to permit the supply of complex equipment must thereafter be regarded as not merely willing but obliged, to the best of its ability, to permit the supply of any further components that proves necessary to keep the original equipment in operation. The letter of 31st August, 1965,⁽²⁵⁾ confirms that this was the view of Her Majesty's Government at that time.

Conclusions

51. We conclude, therefore, that the Sea Routes Agreement should be interpreted as implying an obligation on the part of Her Majesty's Government, if so requested by the South African Government, to permit the supply of replacements of the initial equipment and stores and base reserves for the vessels supplied from the United Kingdom, and of any other equipment, which is necessary to keep these vessels efficient for the purpose of carrying out the objects of the Agreement. This would include replacement of such a number of helicopters as are necessary to arm and provide a reasonable establishment of reserves for the frigates.

52. In the letter of 31st May, 1965,⁽²³⁾ Her Majesty's Government stated that they would "be willing to consider" the replacement of Wasp helicopters "which are lost in accidents or through mechanical defect", but would not be able to allow replacements for helicopters "written off as a result of normal wear and tear". The logic of this distinction is not apparent; but in any event this statement cannot be reconciled with the implied obligation referred to in paragraph 51. Assuming that the South African Government makes a request in good faith for the supply of a Wasp helicopter to make good a deficiency in the complement of an anti-submarine frigate, there is an obligation on Her Majesty's Government to permit the export of the helicopter if this is necessary to keep the vessel efficient for the purpose of carrying out the objects of the Agreement.

GENERAL OBLIGATIONS

53. There is finally the question whether the Sea Routes Agreement imposed a general and continuing legal obligation upon Her Majesty's Government to permit the supply of any further arms that might in the future be requested by the South African Government for the purpose of the Sea Routes Agreement.

54. The only express obligation in relation to the supply of arms or equipment that is imposed upon Her Majesty's Government by the Sea Routes Agreement is spelt out in

paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Agreement. That is, of course, confined to the naval vessels there set out. Any further legal obligation on the part of Her Majesty's Government to permit the supply of additional vessels or equipment can only arise if such an obligation could be implied as a term of the Sea Routes Agreement.

55. There remains therefore only the question of an implied term. The principle to be applied in considering this question is that a term should only be implied in a treaty when it is necessary to do so in order to give effect to the intention of the parties. Applying this principle it is necessary to reach the conclusion, in the light of the treaty itself and other surrounding circumstances that the parties must have intended to contract on the basis of the inclusion in the treaty of a provision whose effect can be stated with reasonable precision.

56. In support of the suggestion that a meaningful term can be implied, it can be argued that the treaty does provide for joint operations, joint command structure and for an integrated naval force provided by both States. Moreover, at the time of the Agreement the United Kingdom was a major supplier of arms to South Africa.

57. On the other hand the Agreement does not require the South African Government to maintain its maritime forces at any specified level nor with any specified type of armaments, nor does it impose any obligation on the South African Government to place future orders for naval equipment in the United Kingdom. So far as the provisions made in the Agreement were concerned, both parties retained their freedom to act as they thought best in determining the size, armament and sources of supply of their fleet. The undertakings in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Agreement contained only limited obligations to purchase and supply arms.

58. In face of these conflicting arguments one must face the final question. If any term of the kind now under consideration is to be implied, how is such a term to be defined? It is here that the suggestion of any general and continuing obligation appears to run into difficulty. To what kind of quantity of equipment would any implied term extend? Over what period?

And in what circumstances? We do not think it possible to formulate with any certainty the substance of a term relating to the supply of further arms which the two Governments must have intended at the time when the Sea Routes Agreement was concluded.

The whole concept of such a general and continuing obligation is, moreover, inconsistent with the precision with which the original obligations in respect of the supply of vessels is spelt out in the Sea Routes Agreement.

Conclusions

59. In our opinion it would not be reasonable, in these circumstances, to impute to the parties an intention to include a term in the Sea Routes Agreement which would place any general and continuing legal obligation on Her Majesty's Government to permit the supply of arms to the South African Government.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

60. We therefore advise that the extent of Her Majesty's Government's existing legal obligations to permit the export of arms to South Africa, arising from the Simonstown Agreements, is to permit, if requested by the South African Government, the supply of the following arms for the South African maritime forces:

- (1) such number of Westland Wasp helicopters as is necessary to equip the three anti-submarine frigates supplied under the Sea Routes Agreement with their initial complement (together with reserves) of Westland Wasp helicopters;
- (2) such replacements of the initial equipment and stores and base reserves for all the vessels supplied under the Sea Routes Agreement, and such other equipment for these vessels, as is necessary to keep the vessels efficient for the purpose of carrying out the objects of the Agreement.

Peter RAWLINSON
Geoffrey HOWE

DOCUMENT S/10163*

Letter dated 23 March 1971 from the representative of Spain to the Secretary-General

[Original: Spanish]
[23 March 1971]

With reference to the letter addressed to you on 19 March 1971 by the representative of Israel [S/10160], I should like to make the following observations.

(1) My delegation finds it surprising that the representative of Israel seems to regard as tendentious any policy which is not in consonance with the views of the Government of Israel.

(2) The Spanish delegation has stated repeatedly, in both the Security Council and the General Assembly, that compliance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its provisions is obligatory. The perpetuation of the military occupation of the territories usurped by the Government of Israel is a continuing source of conflict and a violation of the principles of the Charter. Taking advantage of this occupation to alter the status and character of Jerusalem through so-called urban improvements is precisely what is contrary to the resolutions mentioned in my letter of 15 March [S/10159].

(3) The Permanent Mission of Spain is not aware that the United Nations has adopted any decision condemning Jordan.

I hope that these clarifications will bring this discussion to a close.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Jaime DE PINIÉS
Permanent Representative of Spain
to the United Nations

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8303.

Letter dated 26 March 1971 from the representative of Mongolia
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English/Russian]
[1 April 1971]

I have the honour to transmit to you the statements of the Great National Khural (Parliament) of the Mongolian People's Republic and of the MONTSAME agency in support of the struggle of the peoples of Indo-China.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the statements as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) T. NARKHUU
Charge d'affaires, a.i. of Mongolia
to the United Nations

STATEMENT DATED 12 FEBRUARY 1971 BY THE FOURTH
SESSION OF THE GREAT NATIONAL KHURAL OF THE
MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC ON SUPPORT OF
THE STRUGGLE OF THE PEOPLES OF INDO-CHINA

In these days the people of the world follow developments in Indo-China with a deep sense of anxiety. The aggressive war which the United States has been conducting for some years against the peoples of Indo-China has grown wider and more sinister.

In the recent period the United States imperialists have sharply intensified the barbarous raids on South Viet-Name, Cambodian and Laotian territory, and also on southern regions of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. Not long ago, the United States and its Saigon satellites extended the escalated armed intervention to Laotian territory, thus producing an even more serious situation in Indo-China.

The United States military has been employing on an increasing scale against the peaceful population, in this predatory war, such means of mass destruction as napalm and poison chemicals.

The Mongolian people are deeply dismayed by the fresh criminal actions of the United States and its flunkys against the peoples of Indo-China, and along with the socialist nations and all progressive forces in the world indignantly condemn their acts of aggression.

The aggressive adventures of the United States military stand in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, the principles of international law and the Geneva Agreements of 1954⁴⁴ and 1962⁴⁵, and are highly detrimental to a political settlement of the Indo-China problem. Full responsibility for the exacerbation of the situation in Indo-China lies with the ruling United States circles.

The Great National Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic, expressing the will of the entire Mongolian people, emphatically demands that the United States withdraw all its troops from Indo-China, put an immediate end to its aggression in Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia, and agree to a just political settlement based on the constructive proposals of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam, affording the peoples of Indo-China an opportunity of deciding their own future

without any outside interference, in accordance with their national interests and aspirations.

The Mongolian People's Republic, in fulfilment of its international duty, has consistently supported the just struggle of the fraternal Viet-Name people and all patriotic forces in Laos and Cambodia to achieve the freedom and independence of their homeland and resist the United States aggressors and their hirelings.

The Great National Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic greets the message of 10 December 1970 from the Central Committee of the Viet-Nam Workers Party and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to the country's civilians and fighting men as an important document in the defence of the Viet-Name people's building of socialism, directed towards unity in the struggle against the United States imperialists.

The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic fully supports the statement of participants in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held at Berlin on 2 December 1970 to discuss the aggravation of the situation in Indo-China.

The Mongolian people are firmly convinced that the just struggle of the Viet-Name and other peoples of Indo-China against the aggressive warfare of the United States imperialists will triumph.

The Great National Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic expresses the determination of the Government and people of the country to go on actively supporting the successful struggle of the peoples of Viet-Nam and other Indo-Chinese countries in their heroic fight against the United States aggressors, in defence of their freedom and independence and for the preservation of the peace and security of nations.

STATEMENT OF MONTSAME

Following the recent journey of United States Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to Saigon, the United States Government began frantically escalating the aggressive war throughout the entire theatre of military operations in Indo-China.

According to reports received, during the past few days thousands of land troops of the Saigon puppet régime mounted a barbarous incursion, with direct support from the United States Air Force, into southern Laos.

Thus the ruling United States circles, having learnt nothing from their humiliating defeat in the Viet-Name war, have decided upon a fresh adventure which can only cause a further serious aggravation of the situation in Indo-China.

The acts of aggression of the United States military against the Indo-Chinese peoples are in blatant violation of the United Nations Charter, the principles of international law and the spirit of the Geneva Agreements on Indo-China and Laos.

These foolhardy actions again make it clear to all that the ruling United States circles have no regard

⁴⁴ Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indo-China.

⁴⁵ Declaration on the neutrality of Laos and Protocol, signed at Geneva on 23 July 1962 (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 456 (1963), No. 6564).

whatsoever for the international treaty commitments entered into by the United States Government. Responsibility for the further aggravation of the situation in Indo-China and in particular in Laos rests fully with the aggressors—the ruling United States circles.

The United States imperialists have been waging their bloody colonial war against the peoples of Indo-China for a long time. But the insidious designs of the aggressors are doomed to complete failure. The peoples of Indo-China, including the Laotian people, with the support of all progressive mankind, will unfailingly and decisively repulse the United States military and its flunkys.

The Mongolian people, together with all progressive mankind, emphatically condemn the fresh act of aggression by the United States imperialists and their hirelings against Laos and consider it to be a criminal action endangering the cause of peace in Indo-China, Asia and the entire world.

The Mongolian people, resolutely supporting the just struggle of the peoples of Indo-China, demand the immediate cessation of acts of aggression by the United States and its satellites in Laos, the full and unconditional withdrawal of its troops from Indo-China and the extension to the peoples of Indo-China of an opportunity to settle their own internal affairs with no outside interference.

DOCUMENT S/10165*

Letter dated 26 March 1971 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[29 March 1971]

Further to my delegation's letters of 8 January 1971 [S/10073 and S/10074] pertaining to the forcible deportation by Israel of 347 Arab inhabitants from the territories under its occupation and upon instructions from my Government, I regret to bring further deportations to your attention.

Between 8 December 1970 and 24 February 1971, 111 Arab inhabitants from the west bank of Jordan and the Gaza Strip were forcibly expelled and deported to the east bank of Jordan under inhuman conditions.

I attach eight lists giving the names of those expelled, the date of their expulsion, the names of their towns or villages and their ages.

Israel's continued measures of systematic expulsion of Arab inhabitants from territories occupied since June 1967, together with confiscation of Arab property and the establishment of Jewish settlements, prove beyond any shadow of doubt Israel's policies of expansionism and colonization based on its philosophy of racial discrimination: Zionism. It is an irony that this happens in the year 1971, which is being observed as the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, and at a time when the civilized world is observing the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

In view of such Israeli systematic discriminatory measures it has become urgent that more effective steps should be taken to end once and for all such shameful Israeli disregard for basic human rights. Those measures are in direct violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and repeated United Nations resolutions, particularly Security Council resolution 237 (1967).

I request you to bring this letter to the attention of the Commission on Human Rights and of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.

I should be grateful if this letter, together with the lists of those expelled could be circulated as a document.

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8304.

ment of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Anton A. NABER
Chargé d'affaires, a.i. of Jordan
to the United Nations

LIST OF ARABS DEPORTED TO THE EAST BANK OF THE JORDAN BETWEEN 8 DECEMBER 1970 AND 24 FEBRUARY 1971

Expelled on 8 December 1970

Muhammad Sulaiman Muslih, of Gaza
Muhammad Sayyah Muhammad, of Gaza
Muhammad Abd Rabbih Abd al-Karim, of Gaza
Muhammad Khidr Abd al-Hadi, of Gaza
Khalil Ibrahim Ahmad, of Gaza
Kamil Shakir Anis, of Gaza
Ahmad Mahmud Ahmad, of Hebron
Hamid Muhammad Mahmud, of Hebron
Jamal Muhammad Khalil, of Hebron
Muhammad Jabir Muhammad, of Hebron
Hammud Salim Muhammad, of Hebron
Yusuf Dib Yusuf, of Ramle
Musa Muhammad Ahmad, of Hebron
Ahmad Mahmud Muhammad, of Hebron
Muhammad Umar Abd ar-Razzaq, of Hebron
Zuhair Nu'aim Abd al-Mun'im, of Hebron

Expelled on 16 December 1970

Ali Ahmad Mahmud Musa ash-Shaikh, of Bait Najjar, aged 41 years
Yusuf Salih Muslih al-Jamal, of Rummana (Jenin), aged 60 years
Auni Hamad Abdullah ar-Rimawi, of Bait Rima (Ramallah), aged 26 years
Muhammad As'ad Musa, of Jenin, aged 22 years
Abd Hasan Muhammad al-Kashif, of Bir Zait, aged 23 years
Ibrahim Ya'qub Ahmad Sadiq, of Maithalun (Jenin), aged 44 years
Mahmud Muhammad Ibrahim Adwan, of Surif (Hebron), aged 20 years
Mahmud Muhammad Ahmad Sulaiman Husain, of Yata (Hebron), aged 21 years
Hnsam Hikmat Abd ar-Razzaq Ghazzal, of Nablus, aged 19 years

Muslih Mahmud Husain Abu Salih, of Jabaliya Camp (Gaza), aged 29 years
 Salih Khalil Abd al-Qadir Radi, of Khan Yunis (Gaza), aged 20 years
 Muhammad Fathi Dhiyab, of Jenin, aged 27 years
 Shahada Amin Shahada, of Bir Zait, aged 54 years
 Musa Rashad Muhammad Husain Abu Salih, of Ramallah, aged 19 years
 Musa Amin Abd al-Fakhir, of Jalqus (Jenin), aged 45 years

Expelled on 22 December 1970

Ibrahim Hasan Isma'il Hamad, of Al-Buraij Camp (Beersheba)
 Khalil Nimr Abu 'l-Mu'izza, of Jabaliya Camp (Beersheba)
 Muhammad Ibrahim Atiyya al-Baz, of Al-Buraij Camp (Beersheba)
 Khabir Jabr Abd al-Hadi, of Al-Buraij Camp (Beersheba)
 Abd al-Hadi Jabr Abu Id, of Al-Buraij Camp (Beersheba)
 Yusuf Ahmad Abd al-Hayy Abu Nada, of Jabaliya Camp (Beersheba)
 Sulaiman Jabr Hasan al-Abrag, of Sina al-Arish (Beersheba)
 Zaid Ibrahim Hammuda az-Zain, of Jabaliya (Beersheba)
 Ali Khair Hasan Darduna, of Jabaliya (Beersheba)
 Ibrahim Husain Yusuf, of Jabaliya Camp (Beersheba)
 Ayish Ahmad Darwish, of Jabaliya Camp (Beersheba)
 Abd al-Aziz Salmi Nasir Abu Rashid, of Dair al-Balah
 Walid Mahmud Muslih al-Aswad, of Gaza (Beersheba)

Expelled on 26 December 1970

Asim Amin Ufur, of Ramallah
 Yahya As'ad Abd ar-Rahman, of Gaza
 Hasan Adam Ibrahim, of Ramallah
 Majid Mahmud Ali, of the West Bank
 Fayiz Arafat Arif, of Gaza
 Hassan Muhammad Isma'il, of Gaza
 Abd al-Latif Muhammad Abd ar-Razzaq, of Jenin
 Mahmud Uthman Raghieb, of Nablus
 Muhammad Salman Ahmad, of Gaza
 Khidr Abd al-Qadir Muhammad, of Gaza
 Muhammad Khamis Salman, of Rafah

Expelled on 27 January 1971

Muhammad Nu'man Muhammad ar-Rimawi, of Bait Rima (Ramallah)
 Rushdi Muhammad Abd al-Latif at Tamimi, of An-Nabi Salih (Ramallah)
 Muhammad Mahmud Al-Abd Da'sh al-Walja, of Ad-Dahisha Camp
 Isma'il Uthman Abd al-Hadi Abu Afifa, of Na'lain (Ad-Dahisha Camp)
 Muhammad Khalil Abd al-Aziz Fanina, of Hebron
 Ziwani Zayid Khalil ad-Damiri, of Hebron
 Muhammad Subhi Muhammad Misk, of Hebron
 Yusuf Abd ar-Rahman Muhammad al-Hajj Ali Abu Shaut, of Aqaba Jabr Camp
 Qasim Muhammad Ali Hamdan al-Walja, of Jericho
 Mahmud Khalil Muhammad al-Arabi, of Bait Jibrin (Aqaba Jabr Camp)
 Khalid Muhammad Abdullah Abu Rayya, of Iraq al-Manshiya (Aqaba Jabr Camp)
 Musa Muhammad Mahmud Arabash, of Ain Karim (Jericho)
 Wajih Ali Abdullah Abl, of Gaza
 Muhammad Nur ad-Din Abdullah Mu'awwad, of Jaffa (Khan Yunis)

Sulaiman Salim Salmi Abu Qaliq, of Arab Yabna (Jabaliya Camp)

Jaudat Salama Muhammad al-Mashukhi, of Sarafand (Rafah)

Expelled on 16 February 1971

Salama Muhammad Sulaiman as-Sani', of Bait Lahm, aged 65 years
 Hasan Hamdan Hasan Abu Shalhub, of Gaza, aged 28 years
 Muhammad Khalil Mazazi, of Rafah, aged 21 years
 Abdulah Umar Abd al-Hamid al-Jaulani, of Hebron, aged 35 years
 Salih Naufal Mahmud Naufal, of Al-Buraij, aged 46 years
 Abd al-Wahhab Ahmad Abu Dhan, of Khan Yunis, aged 19 years
 Muhammad Isa Ahmad Ubaid, of Jabaliya, aged 32 years
 Samir Mithqal Jabir, of Hebron, aged 19 years
 Zakariyya Umar Ahmad Shahin, of Khan Yunis, aged 27 years
 Sami Ata Allah Abdullah Awwad, of Bait Lahm, aged 20 years
 Ali Muhammad Sa'id Lallu, of Bait Jala, aged 18 years
 Faraj Abd ar-Rahman Hasan ar-Rimawi, of Bait Rima, aged 31 years
 Ayish Salim Husain Jarada, of Gaza, aged 23 years
 Da'ud Abd al-Qadir Muhammad al-Maghribi, of Ad-Dahisha, aged 18 years
 Isa Muhammad Jibril Bashir, of Ad-Dahisha, aged 23 years
 Jamal Husain Mahmud Mansur, of Bait Jala, aged 19 years

Expelled on 19 February 1971

Khalil Muhammad Ali, of Bait Lahm
 Ibrahim Muhammad Abdulah, of Bait Lahm
 Afif Abd al-Jalil Hasan, of Bait Lahm
 Rashid Salim Hasan, of Bait Lahm
 Khalil Abd al-Qadir Hasan, of Bait Lahm
 Mustafa Mahmud Musa, of Bait Lahm
 Muhammad Ali Amin, of Bait Lahm
 Khidr Ubaid Allah Husain, of Bait Lahm
 Azmi Ibrahim Munrad, of Jerusalem
 Hasan Muhammad Salim, of Gaza
 Abd as-Satir Talab al-Wahidi, of Gaza

Expelled on 24 February 1971

Ahmad Mahmud Muhammad Aql, of Hulhul (Hebron), aged 33 years
 Faiq Mahmud Abd al-Jawad Hasan Zakariyya, of Ad-Dahisha, aged 22 years
 Umar Mustafa Mulham al-Labham, of Bait Attab (Ad-Dahisha), aged 21 years
 Zubdi Salih Mahmud Abu Shamma Kuli, of Bait Rima, aged 27 years
 Wanas Abd al-Aziz Muhammad Ahmad Qaryut, of Nablus, aged 20 years
 Mahir Ibrahim Mahmud Abu 'l-Huda, of Nablus, aged 19 years
 Husni Suhail Sa'd ad-Daraghima, of Tubas, aged 19 years
 Ali Abd al-Latif Abd ar-Rahman as-Sarur, of Gaza (Jabaliya Camp), aged 20 years
 Sulaiman Muhammad Abdullah Muhanna, of Khan Yunis, aged 17 years
 Salim Auda Ma'yuf ar-Rumailat, of Rafah (Gaza), aged 28 years
 Salam Sulaiman Hasan ar-Rumailat, of Rafah (Gaza), aged 25 years
 Sulaiman Awwad Salman Abu Khattab, of Gaza (Nasirat Camp), aged 55 years
 Sulaiman Husain Ubaid Abu Naqira, of Rafah (Gaza), aged 19 years

DOCUMENT S/10167*

**Letter dated 29 March 1971 from the representative of Israel
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]
[29 March 1971]

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 23 March 1971 by the representative of Spain [S/10163], in reply to my letter of 19 March 1971 [S/10160].

There is nothing in the letter from the representative of Spain that explains why Spain has shut its eyes to the aggressions committed against Jerusalem by Jordan and the United Arab Republic and the destruction by Jordan of the Jewish Quarter of the Old City, the uprooting of its Jewish population, the razing to the ground of its houses of worship and institutes of learning in flagrant violation of international law, the United Nations Charter and United Nations resolutions. Spain continues to ignore those facts and pursues a biased pro-Arab and anti-Israeli policy in matters of the Middle East.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8305.

DOCUMENT S/10168*

**Letter dated 30 March 1971 from the representative of Spain
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: Spanish]
[30 March 1971]

With regard to the letter of 29 March 1971 from the representative of Israel [S/10167], my delegation cannot but express surprise at the fact that the Ambassador of Israel does not quote from or refer to the resolutions which have, in his opinion, been violated by Jordan or the United Arab Republic in so far as relates to the character and status of Jerusalem, to which I alluded in my letter of 15 March [S/10159].

My Government is not pursuing a policy "pro" or "anti" anyone; it is guided in this matter by the resolutions which have been unanimously adopted by the Security Council and which I mentioned in my previous letters.

Proof of the objectivity of my Government's position is the fact that its expression of alarm at the measures of assimilation designed to change the true nature and alter the status of Jerusalem was in agreement with a similar comment made on 22 March by no less authoritative an organ than the *Osservatore Romano*.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Jaime DE PINIÉS
Permanent Representative of Spain
to the United Nations

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/8306.

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