

Distr. GENERAL الجمعية العامة

A/HRC/6/G/2 24 July 2007

ARABIC

Original: ENGLISH

مجلس حقوق الإنسان الدورة السادسة البند ٤ من حدول الأعمال المؤقت

حالات حقوق الإنسان التي تتطلب اهتمام المجلس بها

مذكرة شفوية مؤرخة ٢٦ حزيران/يونيه ٢٠٠٧ موجهة من البعثة الدائمة لجمهورية السودان لدى مكتب الأمم المتحدة في جنيف إلى أمانة مجلس حقوق الإنسان

تُهدي البعثة الدائمة لجمهورية السودان لدى مكتب الأمم المتحدة وسائر المنظمات الدولية في حنيف تحيياتها إلى أمانة مجلس حقوق الإنسان، وتتشرف بأن تحيل رفق هذا نص البيان الذي ألقاه الدكتور لام أكول أحساوين، وزير خارجية جمهورية السودان، أمام المجلس الوطني السوداني بشأن دعم الأمم المتحدة لبعثة الاتحاد الأفريقي في السودان بغية تسوية أزمة دارفور.

* استُنسخ كما ورد، باللغة التي قُدِّم بما فقط.

⁽A) GE.07-13532 090807 100807

Annex

STATEMENT BY H. E. Dr. LAM AKOL AJAWIN, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON THE UN SUPPORT TO AMIS IN DARFUR JUNE 20, 2007.

Mr. Speaker, Sir,
The Honourable Members of the Assembly,

I have the honour to address you today on the latest developments on the issue which has engrossed the Sudanese public opinion for so long, and which was the center of concern of the august Assembly due to your sense of national responsibility and your keenness to maintain the national integrity and sovereignty of our country. That is the joint role by the UN and the AU to solve the Darfur problem in its various aspects. My address to you comes at a time we have reached complete understanding with the UN and the AU on what has come to be termed the hybrid operation for peace-keeping in Darfur. It is an understanding which puts an end to strained relationship—with—the—UN—and—the—international—community-during which the various state organs stood firm against those bent to undermine our independence and sovereignty.

Mr. Speaker, Sir, Members of the Assembly,

This issue attracted deep official and popular concern as it has far reaching effects on Darfur and the Sudan as a whole. As what has been achieved is an unqualified victory to all, I would like to have some of your time to outline to you briefly the developments of the issue from the very beginning.

In August 2006, the USA and Britain led a feverish activity in the Security Council with the aim of transforming the African

Union mission in Darfur to a UN operation. Due to the definite rejection of the Sudan to this attitude, it was agreed to conduct consultations in New York involving Sudan, the UN, the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the AU. However, before the proposed consultative meeting was convened the two countries, the USA and Britain, expedited the issuance of the Security Council Resolution No. 1706 which devided on the transition of the mission to the UN and extended the mandate of the UNMIS to cover Darfar by adding new duties which included restructuring of the police and the Sudanese judiciary and monitoring the borders with neighbouring countries. Sudan rejected the resolution for a number of reasons which we have earlier explained before the august Assembly the most notable of which are that the resolution impinges on the sovereignty of Sudan and completely ignores the DPA.

As a result of Sudan's rejection of the resolution, AU PSC held a meeting at the Summit level in New York on the 20th of September 2006. The African leaders in that meeting agreed on the principle of the UN support for the African Union mission in Sudan. Upon that position the UN SG by then, Mr. Kofi Anan, called for a meeting of all the stakeholders in order to work out the size and nature of the proposed UN support for AMIS. The meeting was eventually held in Addis Ababa on November 16, 2006 headed jointly by the UN SC and the Chairperson of the AU and was attended by representatives of all the permanent members of the UN SC beside the Secretary General of the Arab League, the representatives of EU and some members of AUPSC and Sudan.

As you may recall that high-level meeting adapted a new approach for the resolution of the Darfur conflict based on three tracks, namely: re-energizing the peace process, consolidating the cease-fire and peace-keeping.

In relation to the peace process, the meeting agreed on revitalizing the search for peace making it all-inclusive and based upon the DPA which should not be reopened for negotiation. It was also agreed that the UN and the AU should lead the mediation effort between the GOS and the non-

signatory movements. As you may recall the UN and the AU named Mr. Jan Eliason and Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim as their respective special envoys for that purpose. To that end, they have been making contacts with different parties including the officials of our government and the leaders of the non-signatory movements. Their offort was commended and supported by the Tripoli Consensus which was concluded on 29 April 2007 with the wide participation of all the regional and international stakeholders. The Tripoli Consensus called for unifying all the current initiatives on the political side under the leadership of the AU and the UN joint mediation led by Mr. Jan Eliason and Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim.

As for peace-keeping, the high level meeting adopted a three-phased UN support package for AU forces in Darfur. This entails the light support package, heavy support package culminating in a hybrid operation. In accordance with the Addis Ababa high-level consultative meeting the peace keeping mission in Darfur should be capable of restoring peace and security in Darfur through supporting the implementation of the security arrangements of the DPA. At the same time it should facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid for the affected populations in Darfur. The meeting also stressed that the nature of the mission should be predominantly African.

The role of the UN would be to provide logistical and technical support through the first and second support packages and also by benefiting from the UN systems of command and control. According to this arrangement, the UN Secretary General would present a draft resolution to the UN organs to authorize financial support to the hybrid operation.

During the meeting the Sudan agreed to the first and second support packages proposed by the UN. A tripartite mechanism was agreed upon to oversee the implementation of the international support. The Sudan, however, made reservations on some details of third package which is known as the hybrid operation, specifically, the appointment of the special envoy who would head the mission and the size of forces.

The Addis Ababa understanding, no doubt, provided a solid-basis on which the AU PSC carried out its deliberations to adopt relevant resolutions as regards the future of the African Union forces in Darfur. In its Abuja session of 30 November 2006 which convened on the summit level, the AU PSC adopted Addis Ababa resolutions which incorporated, at the same time, Sudan's reservations mentioned above. The AU PSC decided the following:

- a. The special envoy shall be appointed jointly by the UN Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission after the usual consultations. This was the procedure followed in appointing Mr. Rudolph Adada the Foreign Minister of the Congo Republic as the Joint Special Representative to head the mission following Sudan Government's approval.
- b. The forces on the ground shall be commanded by an African appointed by the Chairman of the African Union Commission after consultation with the UN Secretary General. General Martin Luther, Nigerian was appointed for this mission.
- c. The size of the forces would be determined by the UN and the AU taking into consideration the situation on the ground and the requirements which enable the forces carry out their duties efficiently.

As the Abuja meeting addressed our concerns, the august Council of Ministers endorsed in its meeting of 3/12/2006 the resolutions of the High Level Consultative meeting read together with the resolutions of the AU PSC summit meeting. This was followed by the Presidential Statement of the Security Council on 19 December 2006 which adopted the Abuja and Addis Ababa resolutions and welcomed the commitment of the GONU to the Addis Ababa understanding and the Abuja resolutions. It is obvious, therefore, that since that time the three parties were in full agreement on the general framework of the peace keeping operation in Darfur.

The meetings that took place afterwards were to discuss the details of each phase. The implementation of the first phase started immediately after the Consultative meeting in Addis

Ababa. Also the details of the second phase (Heavy Package) were agreed on 10 April 2007.

Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members,

As regards the details of the third phase known as the hybrid operation, the Sudan received on 25 May 2007 a letter from the UN Secretary General containing details of the UN proposals on the hybrid operation. Our first observation on the matter was that the proposals were not shared first with the AU as the procedure should be. Despite that, we started studying the proposals by all our competent bodies as I have already explained before this august Assembly on 5 June 2007. Later on the Government received another amended version of these proposals after consultations between the UN and the AU. The Government continued studying the proposals and made its observations to be discussed in the Tripartite Technical High Level Consultative meeting. The technical tripartite meeting took place on 11 - 12 June 2007. Our delegation was led by Dr. Mutrif Siddig, the Under Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and comprised representatives of the relevant government bodies. Our position in the meeting centred on laying emphasis on the necessity to adhere to the agreed terms of reference by the parties to the meeting beside highlighting the African character of forces and safeguarding the African control and command of the mission. And since the UN is to fully finance the operation. Sudan agreed that the financial and administrative aspects of the operation benefit from the structures and systems used by the UN in similar cases. The meeting also adopted our delegation's standpoint which called for assuring respect for Sudan's sovereignty, territorial integrity and protection of its borders. Furthermore, the meeting adopted our position on what is called the exit strategy for the forces which will be based on continuous assessment of the performance of the mission and the needs for its continuation.

After the completion of the agreement on the hybrid operation the UN SC and AU PSC have to adopt the agreement and further the UNSC should issue a request for the UN General Assembly to provide finance for the operation. The UN sources expect that the hybrid operation will not start before the end of this year, since the operation itself depends upon completing the implementation of the heavy support package, at a time when the light support package has not been fully implemented, eight months ofter its commencement.

As you have noticed the agreement on the hybrid operation is not a new development, rather it is an elaboration of what has already been agreed upon between the three parties. We would like to emphasize here that the Government of the Sudan, the AU and the UN are working together in full cooperation to implement the support deal. In order to give assurances to the international community about our keenness and desire to meet our obligations in this regard, we extended an invitation to the UN Security Council to visit Khartoum in order to promote dialogue between the Council and us. Eventually, the delegation of the Security Council arrived in Khartoum on June 17, 2007. at an auspicious moment following the agreement on the hybrid operation. They held talks with the Sudanese side, including meeting H. E. the President. In those talks, we reiterated our cooperative position and keenness to deliver on our part in implementing the agreement. Upon that the delegation expressed its appreciation for our position and gave assurances that the Council will issue a statement welcoming the hybrid operation agreement and will request the General Assembly to issue a resolution for the finance of the operation.

In our opinion, those positive developments which culminated in agreeing on the hybrid operation paved the way for eliminating any kind of conflicts between the Sudan and some elements within the international community on the support deal. It also ruled out any threats of sunctions by the Security Council on the Sudan. It is worth mentioning that our firm stand and the pursuit of dialogue with the UN and the AU bore good fruits.

Mr. Speaker, Sir, Distinguished Members,

By making comparisons between the hybrid operation and the UNSC resolution 1706, we can clearly see that our stand enabled us to make a breakthrough since the hybrid operation

restored the respect for our sovereignty and territorial integrity and the rights of the state to carry out its sovereign duties.

Moreover, the hybrid operation came as a result of continuous and extensive consultations between the parties leading to mutual understandings, whereas resolution 1706 opted for imposing measures on us without any prior consultations with Sudan. Furthermore, resolution 1706 tried to take over the duties of AMIS completely; to the contrary, the hybrid operation kept those duties firmly in the hands of the AU, who will carry out the support of the parties to implement the DPA. This fact goes in line with our declared position of allowing the AU resume its duties in Darfur.

You may also recall that resolution 1706 gave UNMIS a very wide mandate covering restructuring our judicial and police forces and monitoring the borders, but we succeeded in maintaining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country and the rights of the state to protect its borders. We allowed the UN to provide technical assistance for our police and judiciary.

Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members,

Our agreement with the AU and the UN regarding the hybrid operation was widely welcomed as a turning point in resolving Darfur problem and removed the distortion which certain international circles tried to create in our relations with the international organizations by distorting and misrepresenting our viewpoints. The agreement was also met with satisfaction and support by the regional and international concerned parties. This was evidently shown by the Security Council member states with whom we held a meeting in Khartoum last Sunday.

Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members.

I would like to assure you that, in order to maintain what has been achieved, we shall concentrate our efforts in the time ahead on the following:

- Standing by the agreement reached and our keenness to implement it in full cooperation and coordination with the AU and the UN.
- Work to ensure financing the hybrid operation by the UN.
- Urging the African States to contribute troops to the hybrid operation especially after the UN assurances of financing the operation.
- Endeavour to isolate extremist circles which try to distort the agreement out of its context and casting doubt on our credibility of implementing the agreement.
- Enhancing the efforts of the two envoys, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim and Jan Eliason, to complement the political process by expediting the joining of the non-signatory factions, and working hard with the AU to convene the Darfur—Darfur Dialogue Conference.
- Work to convene the pledging conference for reconstruction and development in Darfur in the shortest possible time.
- Effective implementation of the agreement on facilitating the humanitarian work in Darfur which was signed by the Government and the UN on 28 March 2007.
- Close coordination between the Government and all signatories to the DPA to ensure full implementation of the DPA and overcoming any obstacles that face it.

Mr. Speaker, Sir, Honourable Members,

I am confident that the august assembly, as usual, would support our efforts in the coming period to consolidate what has been achieved and carry on with the rest of steps leading to peace in Darfur. We would certainly rety on the support of all our national forces and the contribution of the international parties concerned with the unity, peace and stability in Sudan.

Thank you