



SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-FOURTH YEAR

SUPPLEMENT FOR JANUARY, FEBRUARY AND MARCH 1969

UNITED NATIONS

New York, 1970

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

CHECK LIST OF SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENTS ISSUED DURING THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY-31 MARCH 1969

The titles of the documents printed in the present *Supplement* appear in bold type.

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DOCUMENTS S/7930/ADD.109-146¹

Supplemental information received by the Secretary-General on the situation in the Middle East

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.109

[Original text: English]
[2 January 1969]

The following report relating to the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector was received from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO on 2 January 1969:

"1. Incident in Canal zone: Ismailia control centre reported that United Nations military observers at observation post (OP) Foxtrot (map reference (MR) 7430-8674) today 2 January at 1025 hours GMT observed firing of several bursts of light machine-gun fire by United Arab Republic (UAR) forces from approximately 50 metres north of OP towards Israel forces patrol on eastern side of Canal opposite OP Foxtrot. Firing ceased at 1052 hours GMT.

"2. At 1152 hours GMT the deputy Israel Defence Force (IDF) liaison officer passed a message stating that at 1225 hours local time (1025 GMT) fire was opened by UAR forces on an Israel patrol opposite OP Foxtrot."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.110

[Original text: English]
[4 January 1969]

1. The following report relating to the situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector was received from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO on 3 January 1969:

"1. Chairman of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) received following message from Lebanon delegation at 0625 hours GMT 3 January: 'During the night from 2 to 3 January 1969 and on two occasions mortar and artillery shells were fired from Israel territory on the villages of Arab Loueizeh (approx. MR 2077-2977), Maissate (approx. MR 2082-2963), Sarada Ouel Amra (approx. MR 2060-2806) and Jisr Abou Zeble (approx. MR 2089-3001), causing damage that has not as yet been checked. Beginning and end of first firing: from 2105 hours local time (1905 GMT) to 2125 (1925 GMT). Beginning and end of second firing: from 2200 hours local time (2000 GMT) to 2330 (2130 GMT). Request immediate inquiry. Rendezvous: Marjayoun barracks at 1000 hours local time (0800 GMT)'.

¹ For documents S/7930 and Add.1-17, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967*; for documents S/7930/Add.18-41, *ibid.*, *Supplement for July, August and September 1967*; for documents S/7930/Add.42-61, *ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1967*; for documents S/7930/Add.62-66, *ibid.*, *Twenty-third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1968*; for documents S/7930/Add.67-72, *ibid.*, *Supplement for April, May and June 1968*; for documents S/7930/Add.73-92, *ibid.*, *Supplement for July, August and September 1968*; for documents S/7930/Add.93-108, *ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1968*.

"2. Two United Nations military observers departed ILMAC and Naqoura respectively at 0655 hours GMT to meet at Marjayoun to conduct inquiry".

2. The summary of the inquiry mentioned above, which was received from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO on 4 January, reads as follows:

"1. Action by United Nations military observers during inquiry:

"(a) The inquiry was conducted by two observers from ILMAC.

"(b) The inquiry commenced at 0955 hours GMT 3 January and concluded at 1300 GMT same day.

(c) The observers determined approx. map references of incidents as:

"(1) MR 2075-2978 (vicinity Arab Loueizeh).

"(2) MR 2070-2964 (west of Maissate).

"(3) vicinity of MR 2062-2975.

"(4) MR 2095-2998 (east of Jisr Abou Zeble).

"(5) MR 2115-2986 (south-west of Majidieh).

"2. Statements of witnesses (three witnesses were interviewed):

"(a) The first witness, assistant local commander, stated that from 1930 hours GMT 2 January and continuing for 45 minutes explosions were heard and seen from direction of Arab Loueizeh. Origin of fire estimated as vicinity of Abbasiye (crossroads at approx. MR 2099-2977). Estimated 80 explosions at this location. He further stated that from 2015 hours GMT 2 January and continuing for 30 minutes, 17 mortar bombs fell east of Jisr Abou Zeble, cutting one military and one civilian telephone line. Origin of fire estimated as vicinity of Abbasiye. A few minutes after last round fired, two explosions were heard and seen direction of El Mijidieh (approx. MR 2117-2987). He stated he observed no unusual activity prior to the first explosion at Arab Loueizeh and no return fire from troops under his command.

"(b) The second witness, detachment commander Amra, stated that at 1350 hours GMT 2 January one explosion was heard but not seen originating from a position in Israel estimated at 4 km. south-west of Amra. From similar location many explosions were heard day and night due to blasting in quarry. He stated that from 1930 hours GMT 2 January and continuing for 45 minutes estimated 70-80 explosions were heard and seen in vicinity of Arab Loueizeh and during same time he heard and saw 7-8 explosions at approx. MR 2070-2964. At 2030 hours GMT 2 January, one flare landed near Amra. At 2032 hours GMT 2 January, two explosions were heard and seen in vicinity of Amra and one explosion was heard and seen 150 metres north-east of Amra. He stated origins of fire as Abbasiye and Hill 291 (approx. MR 2048-2945).

"(c) The third witness, area commander southern area, stated that Lebanese troops Lebanese/Israel Armistice Demarcation Line reported no firing prior to first reported Israel fire. He gave order to return maximum 12 rounds mortar fire against one of the Israel positions and approximately ten rounds mortar were fired towards Hill 291 at 2030 hours GMT 2 January. He stated no casualties resulted from Israel fire.

"3. Physical evidence seen by United Nations military observers: More than 50 81 mm. mortar impacts observed at approx. MR 2075-2978. Five impacts observed at approx. MR 2067-2063. One impact observed at approx. MR 2060-2976. Seventeen 81 mm. mortar impacts and two broken telephone wires observed at approx. MR 2095-2998. Two 81 mm. mortar impacts observed at approx. MR 2115-2986. No evidence found of artillery shelling or casualties.

"4. Photographs were taken and a sketch was made".

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.111

*[Original text: English]
[26 January 1969]*

The following report concerning an incident which took place in the Suez Canal sector on 25 January 1969 has been received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull:

"At 0935 hours GMT, OP Mike (MR 7657-8037) reported that two motor boats moved into the area between light buoys Nos. 1 and 3, approximately 8 kilometres south of the OP. At 1000 hours GMT, one boat sailed west of light buoy No. 3. Both boats then sailed rapidly eastwards and at 1010 hours GMT had stopped at a bearing of 155 degrees, approximately 6 kilometres from OP Mike. United Nations military observers, one of whom is a navy officer, identified the boats as small motor gun boats.

"At 1013 hours GMT, the senior UAR liaison officer informed the Ismailia control centre that two Israel boats were moving westwards, but could not give their position accurately.

"At 1020 hours GMT, OP Mike reported no change in the position of the boats from their previous report. At 1023 hours GMT, OP Mike observed a small observation aircraft (Israel) flying south to north on the east bank, at medium altitude.

"At 1027 hours GMT, shooting broke out with approximately five bursts of anti-aircraft fire by UAR forces, from Green Island, directed at the two boats. Fire was not returned. Firing ceased at 1029 GMT. The Senior UAR Liaison Officer was informed at 1029 GMT and stated he would take action to stop the firing. At 1030 GMT, the two boats began to sail quickly to the south-east.

"At 1032 hours GMT, artillery fire by UAR forces from the western shore was observed at a bearing of approximately 265 degrees. The targets were the same boats as noted before. Fire was at the rate of one salvo per minute. Fire was not returned. The senior UAR liaison officer was informed at 1037 GMT that UAR artillery was firing.

"At 1039 hours GMT, OP Mike reported one burst of machine-gun fire observed by UAR forces from pier approximately 300 metres from OP Mike, but could not confirm firing across the Canal. At

1045 GMT, OP Mike reported that all firing had ceased. The Kantara control centre was informed at 1052 GMT and the senior UAR liaison officer at 1055 GMT. OP Mike reported that the location of the two boats when shooting started was approximately MR 7680-7990.

"OP Blue (MR 7677-8055) confirmed intermittent explosions in a south-westerly direction between 1027 and 1045 hours GMT. At 1036 GMT, OP Blue heard one burst of machine-gun fire, approximately 800 metres south-west of the OP, but could not confirm firing across the canal. The United Nations military observers at OP Blue could not observe the boat movement. When contacted by the Kantara control centre, the senior Israel representative had no information concerning firing in this area."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.112

*[Original text: English]
[5 February 1969]*

1. The following report concerning the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, at 1816 hours GMT, on 5 February 1969:

"1. United Nations military observers at OP Blue (MR 7677-8055) heard two rifle shots at 1222 and 1223 hours GMT, 5 February. Origin and target unknown. Immediately afterwards they saw a team of Israel soldiers carrying a person away from their work site. Distance to the site from the OP is less than one kilometre in a south-westerly direction.

"2. The local Israel force commander informed the United Nations military observers at OP Blue that one Israel soldier had been seriously wounded. This statement was confirmed by the senior Israel representative. The senior UAR liaison officer was informed and he stated that he had no information concerning any firing in this area.

"3. At 1336 hours GMT, United Nations military observers at OP Blue observed two single rifle shots fired by UAR forces from west side to east side of the Canal approximately 800 metres in a north-westerly direction from the OP. The senior UAR liaison officer was informed and stated he had no information or comment about the incident."

2. A subsequent message was received from Lt. General Bull at 2042 hours GMT on the same day. It reads:

"1. At 1443 hours GMT, United Nations military observers at OP Pink (MR 7661-8281) heard one single rifle shot approximately 300 metres north of the OP. Origin and target not confirmed. The local Israel force commander informed the observers at OP Pink that the shot was fired by UAR forces from the west bank of the canal. The senior UAR liaison officer and the senior Israel representative had no information concerning this firing.

"2. At 1456 hours GMT, the senior UAR liaison officer conveyed the following information concerning the two rifle shots across the Canal at 1336 GMT (see above):

"At 1530 hours local time (1330 GMT), fifteen Israel soldiers and two girls were standing on the sandbank and observing UAR side. They moved down from sandbank to edge of the canal and then moved back to sandbank. Then one single shot was

fired by one of them from this position towards UAR OP and at one UAR soldier. Soldier was not hit. Position of Israel party when shot was fired was south of Gabasat Hostel opposite ship repair dock one kilometre north-east of OP Mike (MR 7657-8037). Two Israel tanks later moved up to this area. The single shot crossed the canal.'

"The senior UAR liaison officer did not submit this information as a complaint. OPs Mike and Lima (MR 7662-8173) on western bank of canal reported NTR (nothing to report) from 1222 to 1600 hours GMT.

"3. Information given by the senior UAR liaison officer as stated in paragraph 2 above would place origin of fire south of OP Blue and therefore, in our view, not related to report from OP Blue at 1336 hours GMT where fire was observed north of OP Blue."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.113

*[Original text: English]
[8 February 1969]*

1. The following report concerning the cease-fire in the Israel-Syrian sector was received at 1900 hours on 7 February 1969 from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull:

"1. OP November (MR 23159-25635) reported that at 0840 hours GMT on 7 February an Israel light aircraft flying from the south-west crossed the Israel FDL (Forward Defended Localities) at map reference (MR) 2305-2554. At 0852 hours GMT OP Victor (MR 23280-26680) reported that an Israel light aircraft crossed Israel FDL and this was confirmed by OP Three (MR 23080-26775). At 0901 hours GMT United Nations military observers at OP One (MR 22485-29600) reported that four anti-aircraft rounds were observed exploding in air at MR 2252-2959 and four long bursts of heavy machine-gun fire were heard. Origin and target of fire not determined. At time of firing an Israel light aircraft was observed flying at approximately 3000 metres south of OP."

2. The following report was received from General Bull at 0902 hours on 8 February 1969:

"1. At 1530 hours GMT on 7 February Assistant IDF liaison officer stated that an Israel vehicle struck a land mine south of the village of Rafid in the Israel-Syrian sector and that one Israel forces soldier was killed and another wounded.

"2. United Nations military observers at OP Four (MR 23265-25955) reported that at 0812 hours GMT an Israel halftrack plus other vehicles were observed proceeding south on the patrol road east of OP Four. At 0900 hours GMT a loud explosion was heard and seen at MR 2316-2571 and the Israel halftrack was seriously damaged. Observers at OP November (MR 23159-25635) have confirmed this report. Thereafter there was considerable activity by Israel forces both north and south of the point of explosion. By 0925 hours GMT approximately twenty Israel soldiers and a halftrack were deployed in this area east of the patrol track. The observers at OP Four were advised by the local commander that an Israel soldier had been killed in this explosion. At 1350 hours GMT OP Four reported that the situation in this area had returned to normal."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.114

*[Original text: English]
[10 February 1969]*

The following report concerning the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, on 10 February 1969:

"Assistant IDF liaison officer on 9 February informed: 'At approximately 1700 hours local time (1500 GMT) UAR forces fired across the canal in Kantara area'. Observation Post Violet (MR 7409-9052), situated in south part of Kantara at 1550 hours GMT observed one burst of light machine-gun fire consisting of three rounds by UAR forces across the canal. The sound of bullets and the impacts heard 100 metres south of OP on east side of the canal. Senior UAR liaison officer had no information."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.115

*[Original text: English]
[11 February 1969]*

The following report concerning the cease-fire in the the Suez Canal sector was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, in the afternoon of 10 February 1969:

"1. At 1453 hours and 1455 hours GMT on 10 February Observation Post Red (MR 7675-8125) observed single rifle shots fired by UAR forces from west side of canal directed across canal approximately 300 metres north of OP.

"2. Assistant IDF liaison officer passed message at 1610 hours GMT stating that at 1645 hours local time (1445 GMT) today 10 February three shots were fired by UAR forces across Canal in Red/Gold area.

"3. Ismailia control centre queried senior UAR liaison officer, who gave the following information: 'Local commander OP Red area informed senior UAR liaison officer that Israel forces soldiers fired five single shots in area OP Red from east to west across Canal at 1545 hours local time (1345 GMT). This is only for information and not a complaint'."

2. A further report concerning the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector was received from General Bull on the morning of 11 February. It reads as follows:

"OP Red observed on 11 February firing across canal by UAR forces as follows:

"(a) 400 metres north of OP at 0858 hours GMT two rifle shots, at 0902 GMT one rifle shot, at 0930 GMT one rifle shot, at 1028 GMT one burst light machine-gun fire at 1033 GMT, 1034 GMT, 1036 GMT and 1038 GMT single shots, at 1049 GMT and 1051 GMT single shots, at 1052 GMT two shots, at 1053 GMT one shot, at 1055 GMT five shots, at 1056 GMT one burst light machine-gun fire, between 1100 GMT and 1102 GMT four shots and one long burst of light machine-gun fire. At 1200 hours GMT OP Red reports NTR (nothing to report). Israel soldiers working in that area.

"(b) 500 metres south of OP at 1012 hours GMT six rifle shots, at 1037 GMT two rifle shots, at 1117 GMT two rifle shots. Israel soldiers working in that area."

"(c) 200 metres south of OP at 1109 hours GMT one single shot.

"2. OP Gold (MR 7672-8145) heard rifle shots from west side of canal at 0859 hours GMT, 0903 GMT and 0930 GMT. Later OP Gold heard intermittent shots on west side of canal but cannot confirm firing across the canal. OP Lima (MR 7662-8173) confirmed intermittent firing south of OP between 1028 and 1055 hours GMT but cannot confirm origin of fire.

"3. Assistant IDF liaison officer at 0925, 0950, 1025, 1030, 1033 and 1110 hours GMT informed that UAR forces today had fired across the canal as follows: at approximately 0720 hours GMT three shots in OP Red/OP Gold area, at approximately 0915 GMT three shots in OP Red area, at approximately 0940 GMT one single shot in OP Red area, at approximately 1015 GMT six shots 500 metres south of OP Red, at approximately 1025 GMT two short bursts 200 metres north of OP Red, at approximately 1030 GMT three shots 400 metres north of OP Red, at approximately 1033 GMT four shots 400 metres north of OP Red, at approximately 1010 GMT one single shot in OP Pink (MR 7661-8281) area, at approximately 1050 GMT four shots between OP Red and OP Gold, at approximately 1100 GMT a few shots and one burst north of OP Red. At 1145 hours GMT the Assistant IDF liaison officer reported that from 1120 hours GMT the UAR forces in OP Red/OP Gold area were continuously sniping at any movement on east side of Canal and that the situation was very serious.

"4. The first three reports from OP Red were passed to senior UAR liaison officer, who had no comments regarding these. At 0937 hours GMT, senior UAR liaison officer stated: 'Local commander in OP Red area informed me that at 0745 hours GMT one burst light machine-gun fire (approximately 15 shots) had been fired from east to west across the canal between kilometre marks 151 and 152. No injury reported. This is for your information and not a complaint'. When asked for comments concerning subsequent incident reported senior UAR liaison officer replied: 'At 1020 hours GMT Israel forces fired four single shots at kilometre mark 151. No shots were fired from western side. This is for your information and not a complaint'.

"5. Officer-in-charge at Ismailia control centre, has requested senior UAR liaison officer to advise local commander in area opposite OPs Red, Gold (MR 7672-8145) and Blue (MR 7677-8055) to exercise restraint in view of repeated incidents recently. When requested to caution local commanders to exercise restraint, senior UAR liaison officer stated that if there was any tensions in this area it resulted from actions by Israel forces on eastern side."

3. A third report was received from General Bull in the afternoon of 11 February and reads as follows:

"1. OP Gold observed at 1342 hours GMT three rifle shots by UAR forces opposite OP across the canal. United Nations military observers observed one Israel soldier in position north of OP possibly wounded and being taken care of. Senior Israel representative had no information.

"2. At 1343 hours GMT, United Nations military observers at OP Red heard one single shot approximately 500 metres north of OP but could not con-

firm origin nor firing across the canal. Israel local commander informed that one Israel soldier had been slightly wounded.

"3. At 1425 hours GMT, the assistant IDF liaison officer reported that, at approximately 1350 GMT, UAR forces had fired one single shot across the canal 400 metres north of OP Red. One Israel soldier was wounded.

"4. At 1500 hours GMT, OP Red observed one rifle shot by UAR forces across the canal 300 metres south of OP.

"5. At 1304 hours GMT senior UAR liaison officer reported that local commander opposite OP Gold and OP Red area had informed that no shot fired from west to east between 1020 and 1300 hours GMT.

"6. At 1415 hours GMT, senior UAR liaison officer reported: 'Local commander in OP Gold area stated that Israel forces soldiers fired heavy machine-gun (half inch calibre) near area sunken ship in canal near the place "El Shot" from 1300 to 1430 hours GMT continuously from east to west across the canal. No UAR soldier wounded. This for information and not a complaint'. The place El Shot is situated between OPs Red and Gold, according to senior UAR liaison officer.

"7. United Nations military observers at OPs Red and Gold could not confirm any firing from east to west up to 1500 hours GMT on 11 February."

4. A fourth report was received from General Bull later in the afternoon of 11 February and reads as follows:

"1. At 1620 hours GMT, 11 February, assistant IDF liaison officer passed message stating that at 1700 hours local time (1500 GMT) today again one shot was fired by UAR forces across the canal in OPs Red and Gold area.

"2. At 1500 hours GMT, OP Red observed one rifle shot from UAR forces on west side fired across the canal 300 metres south of OP. At same time, Israel working team was 400 metres south of OP."

5. General Bull has also reported that United Nations military observers at OP Violet (MR 7409-9052) on 7 February and at OP Red on 10 February heard shots fired by UAR forces, which, however, were not confirmed as being directed across the canal.

6. In reporting recent firing incidents in the Suez Canal sector, General Bull has expressed his concern at this development and believes the situation to be "serious".

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.116

*[Original text: English]
[12 February 1969]*

With reference to the firing in the Suez Canal sector reported in document S/7930/Add.115 dated 11 February 1969, a further report was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, on the morning of 12 February 1969. This report reads as follows:

"1. Following reports received from Observation Posts Red (MR 7675-8125), Gold (MR 7672-8145) and Lima (MR 7662-8173) between 1735 and 2400 hours GMT on 11 February. Fire of unknown origin between 1735 and 1736 GMT OPs Red and Gold heard single shots. At 1745 GMT OP Gold heard

one burst machine-gun fire south of OP. At 1837 GMT OP Gold heard one single shot. At 1901 GMT OP Red heard one single shot north of OP. Between 1940 and 1947 GMT OP Red and Gold heard six shots. At 2014 GMT OP Lima heard one shot south of OP. At 2022 GMT OP Lima heard one burst light machine-gun fire.

"2. OP Silver (MR 7452-8583) heard one burst of light machine-gun fire approximately one kilometre south-west of OP at 1735 hours GMT. Origin unknown.

"3. Assistant IDF liaison officer passed following information concerning alleged UAR firing across the canal in OP Red-OP Gold area: at approximately 1735 hours GMT one shot, at approximately 1740 GMT one shot, at approximately 1830 GMT two shots, at approximately 1850 GMT one shot, at approximately 1905 GMT one shot, at approximately 1920 GMT one shot, at approximately 1945 GMT seven shots, at approximately 1950 GMT one burst light machine-gun fire, at approximately 2000 GMT four shots. Assistant IDF liaison officer also reported five shots allegedly fired across the canal in OP Silver area at approximately 1745 GMT.

"4. Following information, not complaint, received from senior UAR liaison officer at 1830 hours GMT: 'at 1730 GMT local commander opposite OPs Red/Gold area reports one burst machine-gun fire (three shots) and another burst machine-gun fire (five shots) from area between OPs Red and Gold (sunken ship El Shot area) from east to west across canal. No injury'.

"5. OPs Lima, Red and Gold reported NTR (nothing to report) at 1730 hours GMT."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.117

*[Original text: English]
[12 February 1969]*

The following report concerning the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, in the afternoon of 12 February 1969:

"1. Following firings by UAR forces from west side of canal reported 12 February: at 0641 hours GMT from OP Gold (MR 7672-8145) one single shot 300 metres north-west of OP. At 0914 GMT from OP Gold two single shots approximately 500 metres south-west of OP. At 0929 GMT from OP Gold two single shots approximately 700 metres south-west of OP. At 0946 GMT from OP Gold one single shot approximately 300 metres north-west of OP. At 1001 GMT from OP Red (MR 7675-8125) one long burst of light machine-gun fire 400 metres north of OP. Confirmed by OP Gold. At 1002 GMT from OP Gold one single shot approximately 700 metres south-west of OP. At 1007 GMT from OP Gold two single shots approximately 700 metres south-west of OP. At 1015 GMT from OP Red one single shot approximately 400 metres north-west of OP. At 1036 GMT from OP Red one single rifle shot approximately 700 metres south-west of OP. At 1217 GMT from OP Red one single rifle shot 300 metres south west of OP.

"2. Following reports received. Fired of unknown origin. At 0351 hours GMT OP Gold heard three single shots approximately 300 metres north-west of OP. At same time four shots heard by OP Lima

(MR 7662-8175) one kilometre south of OP. At 0835 GMT OP Gold heard one single shot approximately 300 metres north-west of OP. At 0928 GMT OP Red heard one single shot approximately 500 metres south-west of OP.

"3. Between 0905 and 0907 hours GMT OP Silver (MR 7452-8583) heard what appeared to be firing approximately three kilometres west of OP. At 1105 GMT OP Silver heard several explosions approximately five kilometres west of OP. Explosions discontinued at 1114 GMT. At 1106 GMT OP Foxtrot (MR 7430-8674) heard several heavy explosions at far distance in south-west direction from OP.

"4. Assistant IDF liaison officer at 0615 hours, 0830 hours, 0855 hours, 1035 hours, 1330 hours and 1500 hours GMT informed that UAR forces today had fired across the canal in OP Red - OP Gold area as follows: at approximately 0355 GMT one shot, at approximately 0400 GMT one shot, at approximately 0645 GMT three shots, at approximately 0650 GMT one shot, at approximately 0700 GMT one shot, at approximately 0830 GMT eight single shots, at approximately 0925 GMT two shots, at approximately 0950 GMT two shots, at approximately 1005 GMT one burst light machine-gun fire, at approximately 1020 GMT four shots, at approximately 1029 GMT two shots, at approximately 1220 GMT one shot, at approximately 1440 GMT two shots.

"5. Following message received from senior UAR liaison officer at 0936 hours GMT: 'at 0830 GMT local commander reports three rifle shots fired from east to west across canal south of OP Gold, kilometre mark 151. No injury. There was no activity in this area up to this time. This for information and not a complaint'."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.118

*[Original text: English]
[14 February 1969]*

1. The following report concerning the cease-fire in the Israel-Syrian sector was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, in the afternoon of 12 February 1969:

"1. At 0857 hours, GMT United Nations military observers at OP Yoke (MR 22710-29140) reported that Syrian positions in vicinity of OP fired several bursts of machine-gun and anti-aircraft fire at an Israel reconnaissance aircraft flying at approximately 1500 metres altitude over the area between the FDLs (Forward Defended Localities). OP X-Ray (MR 23043-28910) confirmed firing as reported by OP Yoke.

"2. At 0859 hours GMT United Nations military observers at OP One (MR 22485-29600) reported that one Israel Piper Cub aircraft was seen crossing the Israel FDL at MR 2247-2959 and turned to the north-west and recrossed the Israel FDL at MR 2238-2998 at 0901 hours GMT. As soon as Israel aircraft crossed the Israel FDL firing commenced almost simultaneously from Israel and Syrian positions in the area of the OP. Israel positions approximately two kilometres south-south-east of OP and position near vicinity of OP fired several bursts of machine-gun fire at undetermined targets. Syrian positions approximately 2500 metres east-south-east of OP approximately 1500 metres north of OP and approximately 2200 metres north of OP fired approximately

ten rounds of anti-aircraft fire and many bursts of machine-gun fire at the Israel reconnaissance aircraft. Syrian fire ceased at 0903 hours GMT and Israel fire ceased at 0904 hours GMT.

"3. At 0934 hours GMT UNMOs at OP Six (MR 22995-28468) saw two unidentified jet aircraft flying north to south parallel to and east of Syrian FDL. At same time military observers at OP Five (MR 22851-27760) reported that two Mirage aircraft were flying west of OP towards the east then turned to the south and crossed the Israel FDL at MR 230-276. At this time there was a large explosion from 1500 metres west of the OP and unidentified objects trailing smoke were seen falling to the ground. At 0956 hours GMT military observers at OP Winter (MR 23205-27924) reported two unidentified jet aircraft flying north to south approximately 1000 metres east of OP. These were followed by two additional unidentified jet aircraft which crossed the Israel and Syrian FDL heading to the south-south-east. At this time a large explosion was heard south-south-west of OP. At 0936 hours GMT military observers at OP Two (MR 23055-27355) reported one unidentified aircraft east of OP flying north to south. This aircraft was followed by an additional two unidentified aircraft which approached from the area east of OP Five (MR 22851-27760) crossing the Syrian FDL and flying in a south-south-east direction. At 0936 hours GMT military observers at OP Four (MR 23265-25955) reported that four Israel Mirage aircraft crossed the Syrian FDL heading in a south-east direction. These aircraft circled an area approximately 10 kilometres east-south-east of the OP and approximately eight rounds of anti-aircraft fire were heard in this direction. At 0959 hours GMT four jet aircraft flew in a southerly direction approximately five kilometres east of the Syrian FDL. Shortly after these aircraft disappeared from view, air-to-air rocket fire was seen and heard over Syrian territory by military observers at OP Uniform (MR 23660-26210). At 1000 hours GMT a large air explosion was heard at approximately MR 242-252 and shortly thereafter two unidentified aircraft were observed flying in a south-west direction six kilometres south of OP Uniform and crossing the Syrian and Israel FDLs. One MIG 21 aircraft was observed circling the area of the explosion and it disappeared at 1005 hours GMT in an easterly direction. At 1001 hours GMT OP Sierra (MR 23171-25360) reported that two Mirage aircraft flew from east to west of the OP. Aircraft were also observed in the vicinity of Teles Samene (approximately MR 243-252), and two explosions were seen and heard at that location. Height of aircraft varied between 500 to 1500 metres.

"4. Assistant IDF liaison officer stated: 'this morning, 12 February, two Syrian jet aircraft crossed the Israel FDL in a westerly direction in the vicinity of Massaade (approximate MR 2220-2930) and were intercepted by Israel aircraft. An air engagement followed and one of the Syrian aircraft was hit and the pilot seen bailing out east of the Syrian FDL'.

"5. Senior Syrian Arab representative stated: 'On 12 February 1969 at approximately 1200 hours local time two Syrian aircraft MIG 21 were on a routine patrol between OPs X-Ray and Winter east of the Syrian FDL when they were attacked by a number of Israel aircraft type Mirage. The Israel aircraft crossed the Israel and Syrian FDLs in the area of

approximate MR 2310-2760. The Israel aircraft opened machine-gun fire and air-to-air rocket fire on the Syrian aircraft over Syrian territory. As a result of this surprise aggression one Syrian aircraft was shot down at approximately MR 2430-2520 in Syrian territory. Request that Chairman of Israel-Syrian and Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC) conduct an inquiry into this incident'.

"6. Chairman of ISMAC will initiate inquiry morning 13 February."

2. The summary of the inquiry mentioned above was received from General Bull on the morning of 14 February and reads as follows:

"1. At 1630 hours GMT, 12 February, the senior Syrian Arab representative requested that an inquiry be conducted to establish the location of where a Syrian aircraft was allegedly shot down earlier that day.

"2. Inquiry was conducted by two United Nations military observers:

"(a) Inquiry commenced at scene of incident at 1250 hours GMT, 13 February, and concluded at scene of incident at 1410 GMT on the same day.

"(b) Scene of incident MR 2484-2535.

"(c) Summary of statements: Three witnesses, all Syrian soldiers, were interviewed and they stated that a Syrian aircraft had been shot down in flight approximately 4 kilometres south-west of the village of Naoua and that that would be in map square 247-255.

"(d) Physical evidence seen by United Nations military observers: One aircraft identified as a MIG-21 was seen at scene of incident. There was a large hole in left side of aircraft just forward of tail fin and cockpit and nose section had broken away. No evidence to indicate cause of damage.

"3. Photographs were taken and a sketch was made of the area."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.119

*[Original text: English]
[14 February 1969]*

1. On 13 February 1969, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, reported that the Israel authorities had informed the Officer-in-charge of the Kantara control centre in the Suez Canal sector that mines had been found in certain areas on the east side of the canal and had requested that United Nations military observers be sent to these areas to verify the presence of mines. General Bull indicated that three inquiries were being conducted by the Kantara control centre. The summaries of these inquiries, which were received from General Bull on the morning of 14 February, are set forth below.

2. The first summary of inquiry reads as follows:

"1. At 0745 hours GMT assistant IDF liaison officer stated that this morning two mines had been found on the road between Kantara and Observation Post Green (MR 7394-9401) and requested that United Nations military observers be sent to the area to verify the presence of mines.

"2. Inquiry was conducted by two operations officers from Kantara control centre:

"(a) Inquiry commenced at scene of incident at 1220 hours GMT, 13 February, and was concluded at 1230 hours GMT the same day.

"(b) Scene of incident: approximately MR 7405-9210, on the road parallel to an approximate 30 metres east of the canal, opposite kilometre marker 30.

"(c) Statement of representative of senior Israel representative: he stated that the mines were found by Israel soldiers at 0630 hours GMT on the morning of 13 February.

"(d) Physical evidence seen by United Nations military observers:

"(i) Four plastic anti-tank mines on dirt road;

"(ii) Numerous sets of footprints in both directions between scene of incident and the canal.

"3. Photographs were taken and a sketch of the area made."

3. The second summary of inquiry reads as follows:

"1. At 1012 hours GMT, 13 February, the representative of the senior Israel representative informed Officer-in-charge, Kantara control centre, that mines had been found on the main road, approximately 8 kilometres east of Kantara and requested that United Nations military observers be sent to the area to verify presence of mines.

"2. Inquiry was conducted by two operations officers from Kantara control centre:

"(a) Inquiry commenced at scene of incident at 1059 hours GMT, 13 February, and was concluded at 1145 hours GMT the same day.

"(b) Scene of incident: approximately MR 7455-9102, approximately 8 kilometres east of Kantara on main road to Gaza.

"(c) Statement by Israel representative: he stated that the presence of mines became known after a civilian truck had exploded a mine on the south shoulder of the roadway at 2000 hours GMT on 12 February.

"(d) Physical evidence seen by United Nations military observers:

"(i) A double metal band with interspersed transverse strips to keep the bands separated. Observers identified this as an electric contact fuse.

"(ii) An anti-personnel mine which was close to the electric fuse but not connected.

"(iii) A crater on the southern shoulder of the main roadway, approximately 75 centimetres from the hard surface. Crater was approximately 25 centimetres in depth and 50 centimetres in diameter.

"(iv) Seven button mines (anti-personnel) on the sand were shown to the observers, approximately 500 metres north of the crater. Button mines were approximately 5 centimetres in diameter and equipped with pressure fuses.

"(v) Approximately 5 metres from button mines observers saw a wooden box approximately 40 centimetres long and 20 centimetres in width which contained three button mines.

"3. Photographs were taken and a sketch was made."

4. The third summary of inquiry reads:

"1. At 1012 hours GMT the representative of the senior Israel representative informed Officer-in-charge, Kantara control centre, that mines had been found on patrol road 4 kilometres south of OP Pink (MR 7661-8281) and requested that United Nations military observers be sent to the area to verify presence of mines.

"2. Inquiry was conducted by two United Nations military observers from Kantara control centre:

"(a) Inquiry commenced at scene of incident at 1400 hours GMT on 13 February and was concluded at scene of incident at 1515 hours GMT the same day.

"(b) Scene of incident: approximately MR 7664-8238, on a hard patrol track parallel to and 15 metres east of the canal.

"(c) Summary of statements:

"(i) The First witness was an Israel Forces lieutenant who stated that he was commander of a tank which was leading a convoy of caterpillars from north to south on the track. The track is used daily and had last been used at dusk on 12 February. At 0500 hours GMT, 13 February, his tank struck a mine. Nobody was wounded.

"(ii) The second witness was an Israel Forces soldier who stated that he was driver of the tank and confirmed the statement of the first witness.

"(d) Physical evidence seen by United Nations military observers:

"(i) One tank slightly damaged by recent explosion;

"(ii) One crater approximately 80 centimetres in diameter and 40 centimetres in depth;

"(iii) Three anti-vehicle mines were seen in place on patrol track, one of which was found by the observers during the inquiry;

"(iv) Footprints were observed leading in both directions between Canal and scene of incident.

"3. Photographs were taken and a sketch was made."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.120

*[Original text: English]
[17 February 1969]*

The following report concerning the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, on 16 February 1969:

"1. At 0700 hours GMT 16 February the assistant liaison officer informed that: 'at 0030 hours GMT 16 February, UAR forces from west side of canal directed automatic weapons fire across canal for approximately 30 minutes in the OPs Red (MR 7675-8125) and Gold (MR 7672-8145) area'.

"2. OP Red observed several bursts of light and heavy machine-gun fire with tracers by UAR forces from west to east across canal between 0028 and 0045 hours GMT approximately 400 metres north of OP. At 0101 hours GMT, United Nations military observers at OP Red heard two single shots north of OP. OP Gold observed several bursts of machine-gun fire by UAR forces across canal between 0030 and

0052 hours GMT directly west of OP. OP Lima (MR 7662-8173) observed continuous machine-gun fire by UAR forces across canal between 0035 and 0048 hours GMT. Fire originated from 200 metres south and 200 metres north of OP. Several bursts of machine-gun fire were heard between 0053 and 0100 hours GMT."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.121

*[Original text: English]
[24 February 1969]*

The following report concerning the situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, on 22 February 1969:

"1. Chairman of Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) received following messages from Lebanese delegation at 1635 hours GMT on 21 February:

"(a) 'On 21 February at 1015 hours GMT two Mirage type jet aircraft coming from Maskaf Aam (approximate MR 2015-2948) overflow for five minutes and at an approximate altitude of 1500 feet the villages of El Khiam (approximate MR 2075-3035), Marjayoun (approximate MR 205-306), Arnoun (approximate MR 1995-3040), Chakra (approximate MR 1940-2888), and returned to Israel in the direction of Jbeil Echir (approximate MR 188-267). Consider as complaint.'

"(b) 'On 21 February at 1212 hours GMT two Mirage type aircraft penetrated Lebanese air space and overflow the villages of Ghandourieh (approximate MR 1905-2975), Aitaroun (approximate MR 1944-2802), Maroun Er Ras (approximate MR 1918-2786) for four minutes before disappearing over Israel territory. Consider as complaint.'

"2. At 1018 hours GMT and at 1208 hours GMT on 21 February one ILMAC United Nations military observer at MR 2000-3032 observed two Mirage type aircraft flying south from Marjayoun at approximately 1000 metres altitude."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.122

*[Original text: English]
[24 February 1969]*

1. The following report on the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, on 23 February 1969:

"1. At 1349 and 1403 hours GMT, OP Gold (MR 7672-8145) observed single rifle shots fired by UAR forces on west side across the canal. Origin of fire west of OP at edge of canal. Impacts seen in both cases 25 metres south of OP.

"2. At 1428 hours GMT, OP Gold heard a single rifle shot fired by UAR forces on west side across the canal. Origin of fire west of OP at edge of canal. Impact heard immediately north of OP. There was an Israel forces working team in impact area.

"3. When Ismailia control centre referred OP Gold's reports to senior UAR liaison officer, he informed the control centre that he had checked with his local commander in the area, who reported: 'Nothing happened from our side, not one shot was fired'."

2. A subsequent report was received from General Bull on 24 February and reads as follows:

"1. At 1254 hours GMT on 24 February, OP Gold observed three rifle shots fired by UAR forces across the canal. One shot fired from edge of canal west-north-west of OP and two from edge of canal south-west of OP. All shots fired within five seconds. One impact heard approximately 50 metres north of OP, and two impacts heard approximately 50 metres south of OP. Israel forces team working approximately 50 metres north of OP.

"2. At 1453 hours GMT the assistant IDF liaison officer reported: 'At 1254 hours GMT today UAR forces in OP Gold area fired one single shot across the canal. One Israel soldier was wounded. A few minutes later four more shots were fired in the same area'.

"3. At 1420 hours GMT senior UAR liaison officer stated that 'no shots have been fired from west side of the canal today'."

3. The following report concerning the cease-fire in the Israel-Syrian sector was received from General Bull on 24 February:

"1. Following overflights reported this morning:

"(a) At 0500 hours GMT from OP November (MR 23159-25635). Two unidentified jet aircraft observed flying from west to east over OP. Altitude approximately 4000 metres. The aircraft turned north after crossing Syrian FDL (Forward Defended Localities). Heard by OP Four (MR 23265-25955).

"(b) At 0511 hours GMT OP X-Ray (MR 23043-28910) reported two unidentified jet aircraft observed flying over OP from east to west. Altitude approximately 5000 metres. At the same time OP Yoke (MR 22710-29140) reported two unidentified delta-wing jet aircraft flying from east to west over OP at very high altitude.

"(c) At 0514 hours GMT from OP Yoke. One single jet aircraft observed flying over OP from east to west. Sounds of jet aircraft heard in an easterly direction.

"(d) At 0522 hours GMT from OP X-Ray. Two unidentified delta-wing jet aircraft flying from north-east to south-west just south of OP. Altitude 4000-5000 metres.

"(e) At 0528 hours GMT from OP Victor (MR 23280-26680). Two unidentified jet aircraft heard flying north-east to south-west over OP.

"(f) At 0540 hours GMT from OP Two (MR 23055-27355). Unknown number of jet aircraft heard flying north to south just east of OP.

"(g) At 0541 hours GMT from OP Yoke. Two unidentified jet aircraft observed flying north-east to south-west just south of OP. Approximate altitude 4000 metres. Confirmed by OP X-Ray.

"(h) At 0543 hours GMT from OP Victor. Two Mirage aircraft observed flying west to east. Altitude approximately 6000 metres. Confirmed by OP Three (MR 23080-26775).

"(i) At 0558 hours GMT from OP Five (MR 22851-27760). One Mirage aircraft observed flying south-west to north-east over OP. Altitude approximately 3000 metres. The aircraft carried rockets and bombs.

"(j) At 0600 hours GMT from OP X-Ray. Two unidentified jet aircraft observed flying south-west to north-east just south of OP. Altitude 3000-4000 metres.

"(k) At 0611 hours GMT from OP Yoke. Two Israel Mirage aircraft passed 200 metres north of OP at lowest possible altitude flying north-east to south-west.

"2. Syrian anti-aircraft fire was opened at 0600 hours GMT when the aircraft reported in paragraph 1 (j) above were well on the Syrian side of the Syrian FDL.

"3. Following activity west of the Israel FDL reported evening of 23 February:

"(a) At 1625 hours GMT, OP Sierra (MR 23171-25360) observed three flares in the general area of MR 230-255.

"(b) At 1715 hours GMT, OP Uniform (MR 23660-26210) reported one heavy explosion heard and smoke seen at approximately MR 2346-2619. Confirmed by OP Four and OP Victor.

"(c) At 1725 hours GMT, OP Victor heard two long bursts of heavy machine-gun fire four to five kilometres west to south-west of OP.

"(d) At 1832 hours GMT, OP November reported long bursts of light and heavy machine-gun fire and 10 to 12 heavy explosions four to five kilometres south-south-west of OP. Flares used. OPs Sierra and Romeo (MR 22935-24592) confirmed. OP Sierra reported explosions seemed to be mortar and tracers fired from north-west to south-east."

4. In a subsequent report later on the same day, General Bull stated that he had received the following message from the Syrian Arab representative to the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission:

"On 24 February 1969 at approximately 0700 hours local time (0500 GMT), several formations of jet fighters and bombers crossed Syrian FDL in the area of East Kuneitra checkpoint and from other areas and attacked civilian installations in the Hammah and Maisaloun areas and several civilian cars on the main road Damascus-Beirut. As a result of this aggression, 20 civilians were wounded. The customs checkpoint in Maisaloun was destroyed and four civilians' cars were damaged, including a DC vehicle."

General Bull indicated that the bombing of Hammah and Maisaloun had been confirmed.

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.123

*[Original text: English]
[24 February 1969]*

1. With regard to the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, reported on 24 February 1969 that United Nations military observers had conducted an inquiry on the same day in the area south of Lake Timsah and submitted the following summary of inquiry:

"1. At 0606 hours GMT on 24 February, senior Israel representative contacted Officer-in-charge Kantara control centre and stated: 'On 23 February at 0750 hours GMT an IDF (Israel Defence Force) vehicle hit a mine south of Lake Timsah. Request a party of United Nations military observers to check physical evidence'.

"2. Inquiry was conducted by one operations officer from Kantara control centre and another United Nations military observer:

"(a) Inquiry commenced at scene of incident at 0745 hours GMT on 24 February and was concluded at 0815 hours the same day.

"(b) The observers determined the map reference of scene of incident as approximately MR 7434-8676 on a sandy track approximately 100 metres east of canal.

"(c) No other witness than the senior Israel representative was available. He stated that at approximately 1025 hours GMT on 23 February an Israel forces truck was being driven northwards on the track and hit a mine. He stated that the four occupants of the truck were not seriously wounded. Senior Israel representative also stated that the mines were British Mark Seven.

"(d) Physical evidence seen by the observers at scene of incident:

"(i) Israel forces four wheel truck with front part badly damaged. Approximately two and a half metres east of damaged truck was a crater one metre wide and half metre deep.

"(ii) Approximately one and a half metres north of crater a disarmed anti-tank mine with words 'arm' and 'disarm' printed inside the centre piece.

"(iii) In an area approximately six metres north of crater, two other anti-tank mines. On one of these mines was written in white lettering 'G P C'.

"(iv) The area around the damaged truck and mines was covered black as if caused by fire.

"(v) No footmarks were found.

"(e) Photographs were taken and a sketch was made."

2. In this connexion, General Bull has indicated that Observation Post Foxtrot (MR 7430-8674) observed at 1030 hours GMT on 23 February an explosion on the east side of the canal approximately one kilometre north of the OP. After the explosion, a helicopter landed and took off in the area.

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.124

*[Original text: English]
[25 February 1969]*

With reference to his report of 24 February 1969 on firing in the Suez Canal sector [see S/7930/Add.122, para. 2], the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, submitted a further report on the morning of 25 February, which reads as follows:

"1. At 1743 hours GMT on 24 February, OP Gold (MR 7672-8145) observed one burst of machine-gun fire with tracers fired by UAR forces across the canal 400 metres south-west of OP. At 2050 hours GMT, OP Gold observed two single shots by UAR forces across the canal. Origin of fire 200 metres north-west of OP on west edge of the canal. Impacts heard on east side of the canal. At 2050 hours GMT, OP Lima (MR 7662-8173) observed two bursts of machine-gun fire with tracer fired by UAR forces across the canal approximately one kilometre south of OP.

"2. On 24 February, the assistant IDF liaison officer reported: 'At 1525, 1705 and 1720 hours GMT, UAR forces fired single shots across the canal in OP Gold area. At 1740 hours GMT, UAR forces fired a burst of machine-gun fire across the canal in the same area. One Israel soldier was wounded by the single shot at 1525 hours GMT. This was the second Israel soldier wounded by sniper shots in that area today.'

"3. The senior UAR liaison officer stated: 'We shot at them because they shot at us first.' This comment was made by the senior UAR liaison officer when queried about firings reported in para. 1 above."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.125

*[Original text: English]
[26 February 1969]*

1. The following report on the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, on the morning of 26 February 1969:

"1. At 1935 hours GMT on 25 February, a United Nations military observer at OP Silver (MR 7452-8583) observed one burst of machine-gun fire with tracers fired by UAR forces from the west side of the canal opposite the OP. Tracers passed close to the OP. The observer was on the observation platform at the time of firing and reported no unusual activity at this time in the area.

"2. The assistant IDF liaison officer alleged that UAR forces fired a few shots across the canal in the OP area at approximately 1930 hours GMT.

"3. The senior UAR liaison officer was contacted and stated: 'At 1940 hours GMT, one burst of light machine-gun fire was fired close to the canal from east to west in the OP Silver area.' The observers could not confirm any firing from the east side. Both observers were on the platform at 1940 GMT."

2. A second report was received from General Bull during the afternoon of 26 February and reads:

"1. Following firings by UAR forces across the canal observed by OP Silver on 26 February: At 1040 hours GMT, one rifle shot, at 1047 GMT one rifle shot, between 1243 and 1255 GMT five single rifle shots, at 1324 GMT one rifle shot and at 1416 GMT one burst machine-gun fire were observed. The United Nations military observers at OP Silver also heard single shots fired from the west side of the canal, at 1305, 1352 and 1409 hours GMT. An Israel forces team was working 100-150 metres north of the OP.

"2. The assistant IDF liaison officer informed that UAR forces on 26 February had fired across the canal in the OP Silver area as follows: At approximately 1040 hours GMT one rifle shot, a few minutes later two shots, at approximately 1238 GMT one rifle shot, at approximately 1248 GMT two rifle shots, at approximately 1255 GMT one rifle shot, at approximately 1302 GMT two rifle shots, at approximately 1323 GMT one rifle shot, at approximately 1343 GMT one rifle shot, at approximately 1409 GMT one rifle shot, at approximately 1417 GMT one burst machine-gun fire.

"3. The senior UAR liaison officer was contacted at 1303 hours GMT concerning firings up to 1255

GMT and stated: 'No shots have been fired from the west side of the canal. One shot was fired from the east side of the canal at 1235 GMT and one shot at 1245 GMT'. The senior UAR liaison officer was also contacted concerning firings after 1255 GMT but had no information."

3. A third report was received from General Bull later in the afternoon of 26 February and reads as follows:

"1. At 1815 hours GMT the assistant IDF liaison officer reported: 'The firing across the canal at 1409 hours GMT seriously wounded an Israel soldier. At 1639 GMT, UAR forces fired across the canal in the vicinity of OP Silver for approximately two minutes with automatic weapons fire. At 1727 GMT, UAR forces fired across the canal in the vicinity of OP Silver with heavy machine-gun fire both north and south of the OP. At 1745 GMT, UAR forces fired one single shot across the canal in the OP Silver area'."

"2. Following firing by UAR forces across the canal observed by OP Silver on 26 February:

"(a) At 1637 hours GMT, rifle, light machine-gun and heavy machine-gun fire with tracers from west to east approximately 150 metres south of the OP. The Ismailia control centre was informed and the senior UAR liaison officer stated that the local commander in the area stated that fire was from the east side of the Canal by light machine-gun.

"(b) At 1726 hours GMT, rifle, light machine-gun and heavy machine-gun fire with tracers from west to east both north and south of the OP. Some of these shots passed over the OP, which was illuminated. Firing ceased at 1735 GMT."

4. The following report concerning the cease-fire in the Israel-Syrian sector was received from General Bull on the morning of 26 February 1969:

"The following report was received from OP One (MR 22485-29600) on 26 February:

"1. At 0730 hours GMT, Syrian forces opened light anti-aircraft fire from a manned military position forward of Syrian FDL (Forward Defended Localities) (MR 2267-2948) at an Israel Piper Cub aircraft flying well west of Israel FDL over MR 222-294. Bursts of anti-aircraft fire seen in the vicinity of the aircraft. The Syrian fire ceased at 0732 GMT but reopened at 0742 GMT towards the Israel position mentioned in paragraph 2. Weapons used were machine-guns and light anti-aircraft guns.

"2. At 0731 hours GMT, Israel forces opened machine-gun fire from a manned military position forward of Israel FDL (MR 2250-2958) towards the Syrian position mentioned in paragraph 1. At 0750 GMT, machine-gun fire was opened from an Israel position approximately three kilometres north of OP One. Target not observed.

"3. A cease-fire proposal for 0830 hours GMT was passed by the Chairman of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission to the senior Syrian Arab representative at 0802 GMT and by the Officer-in-charge, Tiberias control centre, to the senior Israel representative at 0804 GMT. Fire by the Israel forces ceased at 0816 GMT and by the Syrian forces at 0822 GMT."

5. A subsequent report was received from General Bull during the afternoon of 26 February, and reads as follows:

"At 1723 hours GMT, OP Six (MR 22995-28468) reported hearing seven explosions and observing two of these in an area approximately four kilometres south-west of the OP. Fire was identified as medium mortar, with origin of fire near the Syrian FDL. United Nations military observers observed two bursts of machine-gun fire from target area but could not confirm firing across FDLs. OP Five (MR 22851-27760), OP Winter (MR 23205-27924) and the Kuneitra control centre confirmed hearing explosions at time reported by OP Six."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.126

[Original text: English]
[27 February 1969]

1. With reference to the Israel air attack in Syria mentioned in the report of 24 February 1969 [see S/7930/Add.122, paras. 3 and 4], the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, reported that an inquiry into the attack had been conducted by United Nations military observers at the request of the senior Syrian representative to the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission. The final summary of inquiry as received from General Bull on the morning of 27 February is as follows:

"1. At 1930 hours GMT on 24 February 1969, the senior Syrian representative requested an inquiry into an Israel air attack which occurred at approximately 0500 hours GMT on 24 February and during which a number of civilians were killed and wounded and civilian property damaged.

"2. Inquiry was conducted by two United Nations military observers from Damascus.

"(a) Inquiry commenced at the village of Hammah at 0832 hours GMT on 25 February and adjourned at approximately 1600 GMT at the Mezze Hospital in Damascus on the same day. Inquiry reopened at 0744 GMT on 26 February at Hammah and was concluded at 0940 GMT on the same day at the Mezze Hospital.

"(b) Scene of incident: area of Hammah approximately six kilometres west of Damascus and the Maisaloun customs control post approximately twenty-five kilometres west of Damascus.

"(c) Summary of witnesses' statements:

"(i) First witness: the owner of the Rover washing machine factory at Hammah. He stated that at approximately 0500 GMT on 24 February his factory was attacked by four aircraft. As his factory starts work at 0515 GMT all of his workers were still outside and five of his workers were killed and seven wounded. He added that eight bombs or rockets hit his factory or fell close by and that two of the bombs exploded about one hour after the attack.

"(ii) Second witness: an inhabitant of Hammah village stated that at approximately 0500 GMT on 24 February a number of aircraft attacked the village and dropped about twenty-four bombs or rockets. He pointed

out damaged houses where civilians were allegedly killed.

"(iii) Third witness: an inhabitant of Hammah village stated that at about 0500 GMT on 24 February two aircraft attacked the village and a further four aircraft were flying around higher and covering the two attacking aircraft. In his house he stated that one man and three children were killed.

"(iv) Fourth witness: an inhabitant of Hammah village stated that close to his house and in front of the village school one girl was killed and a shopkeeper wounded.

"(v) Fifth witness: a customs officer at Maisaloun control post stated that early in the morning of 24 February he heard machine-gun fire and noise of jet aircraft north of his post. He and his companion ran outside and saw four aircraft attack the customs post with bombs while another four aircraft flew overhead. He added that one girl on the roadway was killed.

"(vi) Sixth witness: a doctor in charge at the Mezze Hospital stated that in the air attack on Hammah fifteen persons had been killed and another forty-four brought to his hospital as wounded. At the present time there were thirty-one persons hospitalized with wounds as a result of the Israel air attack.

"(d) Physical evidence seen by the United Nations military observers:

"Hammah area

"(i) Six civilian houses totally destroyed and a large number of houses damaged or partially destroyed.

"(ii) A washing machine factory totally destroyed.

"(iii) One school building partially damaged.

"(iv) A candy factory badly damaged. The military observers on 25 February were not allowed to visit the candy factory and guards were around the building. The liaison officer accompanying the military observers stated that an unexploded bomb was still in the building and guards were a security force. The military observers were able to inspect the building on 26 February and stated that inside the building they observed stocks of sugar, a damaged drum of caramel, boiling pots, tinned food and some clothing.

"(v) Twenty-one bomb craters and one unexploded bomb.

"Maisaloun control post

"(i) Three buildings completely destroyed.

"(ii) Four civilian cars and one police jeep severely damaged.

"(iii) A petroleum station, approximately 100 metres south of the Customs Control Post, slightly damaged.

"(iv) Ten dead sheep.

"(v) Four bomb craters.

"Mezze Hospital

"(i) The United Nations military observers saw thirty-one persons who were allegedly injured in the air attack on Hammah and they

consisted of 14 men, 5 women, 7 girls and 6 boys.

"(ii) The military observers described the wounds as being consistent with the type of injuries that would be sustained by aerial bombing.

"3. Other information:

"(a) Death certificates have been requested and will be forwarded with the written report.

"(b) In response to a query by the observers, the accompanying liaison officer stated that there were no other places to visit and the only areas bombed were those that had been visited by the observers.

"(c) In response to a request by the observers to see the Israel aircraft which were allegedly shot down, the accompanying liaison officer stated that two were shot down over Israel occupied territory in the Mount Hermon area and one in the Kuneitra area and that it was not possible to visit these areas.

"4. Photographs were taken and a sketch of the areas made."

2. The following report concerning the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector was received from General Bull during the afternoon of 27 February 1969:

"1. Following firings by UAR forces reported by the assistant IDF (Israel Defence Forces) liaison officer on 27 February:

"(a) OP Silver (MR 7452-8583) area: at approximately 0505, 0525, 0704 and 0721 hours GMT, single shots; at approximately 1247 GMT, one shot and one burst; at approximately 1304 GMT, single shots and automatic fire for a few minutes: at approximately 1457 GMT, five single shots; at approximately 1533 GMT, a few bursts and single shots; at approximately 1546 GMT, heavy automatic fire; at approximately 1657 GMT, two single shots.

"(b) OP Blue (MR 7677-8055) area: at approximately 1232 hours GMT, sporadic shots; between approximately 1250 and 1345 GMT, continuous sniping fire; at approximately 1422 GMT, single shots; at approximately 1425 GMT, single shots and bursts; at approximately 1435 GMT, bursts and single shots.

"(c) OPs Red (MR 7675-8125) and Gold (MR 7672-8145) areas; at approximately 1250 hours GMT, three single shots; at approximately 1335 GMT, four single shots; at approximately 1355 GMT, one single shot; at approximately 1420 GMT, single shots; at approximately 1425 GMT, single shots and bursts; at approximately 1548 GMT, single shots; at approximately 1555 GMT, single shots; at 1614 GMT, machine-gun fire and single shots; at 1636 GMT, one burst machine-gun fire.

"2. At 0840 hours GMT, the senior UAR liaison officer reported that Israel forces had fired single rifle shots from a position 100 metres north of OP Silver from approximately 0700 GMT. He stated that no shots had been fired from west side and that the UAR local commander had given order not to fire. At 1020 GMT the senior UAR liaison officer informed that one burst of machine-gun fire was fired at 0945 GMT by Israel forces in OP Silver area. Origin of fire 100 metres north of OP.

"3. Following is a summary of breaches of the cease-fire and exchanges of fire in the Suez Canal sector on 27 February as reported by United Nations military observers:

"(a) From OP Silver: observers reported firing by UAR forces observed across canal from west side to east side at 0728, 0740 and 0955 hours GMT. At 1248 GMT, UAR fire from west side of canal increased in intensity and continued intermittently until 1559 GMT. At 1656 GMT, fire by UAR forces was observed from west to east side of canal.

"(b) From OP Blue: at 1240 hours GMT, fire by UAR forces was observed from west to east side of canal. Fire by Israel forces across canal was noted at 1241 GMT. Fire in this area ceased at 1329 GMT. At 1404 GMT, fire by both parties in this area was observed. Fire by UAR forces ceased at 1521 GMT and by Israel forces at 1510 GMT.

"(c) From OP Red: United Nations military observers observed fire across canal by UAR forces at 1434 hours GMT. Israel fire across canal observed at 1445 GMT. Both parties ceased fire at 1540 GMT.

"(d) From OP Gold: Fire by UAR forces across canal observed at 1427 hours GMT. Fire by Israel forces across canal observed at 1428 GMT. Fire in this area by Israel forces ceased at 1555 GMT and by UAR forces at 1607 GMT.

"(e) From OP Lima (MR 7662-8173): United Nations military observers reported hearing sound of small arms fire south of OP at 1433 hours GMT. At 1434 GMT, fire by UAR forces observed from west to east side of canal. Between 1451 and 1521 GMT, observers reported hearing firing south of OP. Between 1531 and 1557 GMT, observers reported observing sporadic firing by UAR forces from west to east side of canal.

"(f) From OP Mike (MR 7657-8037), observers reported hearing small arms fire to the north of OP between 1445 and 1544 hours GMT.

"4. All of the above reported firings were by small arms, automatic weapons and machine-guns. There was no reported mortar or artillery fire.

"5. Cease-fire proposal: a cease-fire was proposed for 1545 hours GMT. Cease-fire proposal was accepted by the senior UAR liaison officer at 1507 GMT and by the senior Israel representative at 1520 GMT. Cease-fire was generally effective at 1607 GMT."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.127

*[Original text: English]
[28 February 1969]*

1. The following report concerning the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, at 1852 hours GMT on 28 February 1969:

"1. Following is a summary of breaches of the cease-fire and exchanges of fire in the Suez Canal sector on 28 February as reported by United Nations military observers:

"(a) OP Silver (MR 7452-8583) observed fire across the canal by UAR forces at 0258, 0307, 1030, 1100, 1220 and 1329 hours GMT. Fire by Israel forces across the canal observed at 1330 GMT. Fire by Israel forces ceased at 1450 GMT and by UAR forces at 1510 GMT. OP Silver heard firing from west side of the canal at 0735, 1020 and 1139 hours GMT.

"(b) OP Lima (MR 7662-8173) observed fire across the canal by UAR forces at 1010 hours GMT and by Israel forces at 1011 GMT. Firing by Israel forces ceased at 1039 GMT and by UAR forces at 1045 GMT. OP again observed fire by UAR forces at 1348 GMT and by Israel forces at 1349 GMT. Fire by both parties ceased at 1404 GMT. Between 1518 and 1556 GMT rifle fire by UAR forces across the canal was observed. OP Lima heard firing from west side of the canal at 1128, 1344, 1512 and 1513 GMT and between 1616 and 1626 GMT.

"(c) OP Pink (MR 7661-8281) heard firing from west side of the canal at 0719 hours GMT.

"(d) OP Gold (MR 7672-8145) heard firing from west side of the canal at 0629, 1112, 1549 and 1602 hours GMT.

"(e) OP Red (MR 7675-8125) heard firing from west side of the canal at 0629 and 1519 hours GMT.

"(f) OP Blue (MR 7677-8055) observed fire across the canal by UAR forces at 0621 hours GMT, from 0918 to 0923 GMT and at 0935 GMT. OP Blue heard firing from west side of the canal at 0615, 0822, 0900 and 1247 GMT.

"2. All of the above reported firing was by small arms, automatic weapons and machine-guns. There was no reported mortar or artillery fire.

"3. Cease-fire proposal: a cease-fire was proposed for 1500 hours GMT, accepted by the senior Israel representative at 1427 GMT and by the senior UAR liaison officer at 1435 GMT. Cease-fire was generally effective at 1510 GMT, except for OP Lima area (see para. 1 (b) above).

"4. Casualties:

"(a) United Nations: no casualties reported.

"(b) Israel: two soldiers wounded.

"(c) UAR: no casualties reported."

2. In a subsequent message, General Bull reported that firing had broken out again in the southern part of the Suez Canal sector. The following report on the firings reported during the evening of 28 February was received from General Bull at 2341 hours GMT on the same day:

"1. Following is a summary of United Nations reported breaches of the cease-fire and exchanges of fire in the Suez Canal sector during the evening of 28 February:

"(a) OP Pink observed fire by UAR forces across the canal at 1910 hours GMT and by Israel forces at 1911 GMT. Fire by both parties ceased at 1950 GMT. Exchange of fire in OP Pink area observed by OP Juliet (MR 7590-8390).

"(b) OP Kilo (MR 7660-8225) observed fire by both parties across the canal at 1925 hours GMT. Fire by both parties ceased at 1926 GMT.

"(c) OP Lima observed fire by both parties across the canal at 1819 hours GMT. Fire by Israel forces at 1846 GMT and by UAR forces at 1935 GMT.

"(d) OP Gold observed fire by both parties across the canal at 1820 hours GMT. Fire by Israel forces ceased before 1930 GMT and by UAR forces at 1934 GMT.

"(e) OP Red observed fire by UAR forces across the canal at 1820, 1826 and 1838 hours GMT. Ten

bursts of machine-gun fire passed within 20 metres from caravans. Fire ceased at 1842 GMT.

"2. All of the above reported firings were by small arms, automatic weapons and machine-guns.

"3. At 1935 hours GMT, OP Pink heard two explosions sounding like mortar shells north of OP. Distance and side of canal unknown. At the same time, OP Juliet observed one explosion in OP Pink area.

"4. Cease-fire proposal: a cease-fire was proposed for 2045 hours GMT. It was accepted by the senior UAR liaison officer at 2013 GMT and by the senior Israel representative at 2032 GMT. Cease-fire was effective at 1950 GMT.

"5. No casualties reported."

3. General Bull has expressed concern, which the Secretary-General shares, that the continued firing in the Suez Canal sector, if not checked, may result in a still more serious breach of the cease-fire.

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.128

[Original text: English]

[3 March 1969]

1. The following report concerning firing which took place in the Suez Canal sector on 1 March 1969 was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, during the afternoon of 1 March:

"1. OP Silver (MR 7452-8583) observed following firings across the canal, all by UAR forces, on 1 March: at 1129, 1132, 1138, 1314, 1350 and 1416 hours GMT, single rifle shots; at 1417 GMT, two rifle shots; at 1445 GMT, one rifle shot; at 1451 and 1518 GMT, four rifle shots. At 0958 GMT, OP Silver heard two bursts of machine-gun fire from west side of the canal, approximately 600 metres south-west of OP.

"2. At 1121 hours GMT, OP Delta (MR 7401-9152) observed overflight across the canal from west to east by two UAR MIG 21 aircraft flying at approximate altitude of 160 metres just over OP. Depth of penetration and recrossing unknown. At 1123 GMT, OP Charlie (MR 7396-9264) observed two jet aircraft flying south to north along the canal over west side. Altitude 1,500 metres. Type not observed.

"3. Following firings across the canal reported by the assistant IDF (Israel Defence Forces) liaison officer on 1 March in OP Silver area: at approximately 0958 hours GMT, three shots, at approximately 1130 GMT, three shots, one Israel soldier wounded; at approximately 1142 GMT, rifle shot; at approximately 1350 and 1415 GMT, single shots; at approximately 1440 GMT, one rifle shot; at approximately 1450 GMT, ten shots.

"4. Following firings by Israel forces across the canal reported by the senior UAR liaison officer on 1 March: in OP Hotel (MR 7402-8765) area at 0700 hours GMT, machine-gun fire from a tank on east side of the canal just north of Ismailia control centre. In OP Silver area at 0905 GMT, one burst of machine-gun fire; between 1128 and 1130 GMT, single shots; at 1340 GMT, one burst of machine-gun fire; between 1435 and 1500 GMT, nine single shots."

2. The following report concerning firing in the Suez Canal sector on 2 March was received from General Bull during the afternoon of the same day:

"1. Following is a summary of breaches of the cease-fire, including exchange of fire, in the Suez Canal sector on 2 March reported by United Nations military observers:

"(a) OP Silver observed fire by UAR forces across the canal at 0532, 0533, 0612, 1503, 1505, 1620 and 1626 hours GMT. Fire across the canal by Israel forces was observed at 1624 GMT. Fire by UAR forces ceased at 1723 GMT and by Israel forces at 1728 GMT.

"(b) OP Foxtrot (MR 7430-8674) observed fire across the canal by UAR forces at 1633 and 1643 hours GMT.

"(c) OP Pink (MR 7661-8281) observed fire by Israel forces across the canal between 1725 and 1730 hours GMT.

"2. Firings by UAR forces west side of the canal heard as follows: by OP Yellow (MR 7427-8837) at 1002 hours GMT and between 1007 GMT and 1009 GMT and at 1721 GMT; by OP Hotel at 1135, 1220, 1233, 1341 and 1345 GMT; by OP Silver at 0525 and 1615 GMT; by OP Pink at 1710 GMT; by OP Gold at 0957 GMT; by OP Red (MR 7675-8125) at 0721 GMT.

"3. All the above reported firings were by small arms, automatic weapons and machine-guns.

"4. Cease-fire proposal: a cease-fire was proposed for 1730 hours GMT and was accepted by the senior UAR liaison officer at 1636 GMT and by the senior Israel representative at 1725 GMT. Cease-fire was effective at 1730 GMT.

"5. The assistant IDF liaison officer reported firings across the canal by UAR forces as follows: In OP Yellow area at approximately 1717 hours GMT; OP Hotel area at approximately 1215 and 1235 GMT; OP Silver area between approximately 0530 and 0540 GMT, at approximately 1200, 1503, 1505 and 1615 GMT, between approximately 1620 and 1631 GMT, between approximately 1635 and 1730 GMT; OP Juliet (MR 7590-8390) area at approximately 1645 GMT; OP Pink area at approximately 1645 and 1725 GMT.

"6. Senior UAR liaison officer reported firings across the canal by Israel forces as follows: In OP Hotel area at 1215 and 1553 GMT; OP Silver area at 1355 and 1622 GMT; OP Gold area at 1000 GMT. At 1050 hours, the senior UAR liaison officer stated: 'No shots were fired from west side of the canal this morning.'"

3. A subsequent report concerning further firing in the Suez Canal sector on 2 March was received from General Bull on the morning of 3 March and reads as follows:

"1. Following is a summary of breaches of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector during evening 2 March, reported by United Nations military observers:

"(a) At 1946 hours GMT, OP Pink heard three rifle shots by UAR forces from west side of the canal. A few seconds later, OP Pink observed several bursts of machine-gun fire by Israel forces across the canal. Israel firing ceased at 1952 GMT. OP Kilo

(MR 7660-8225) confirmed Israel firing in OP Pink area.

"(b) At 2036 hours GMT, OP Pink heard two rifle shots by UAR forces from west side of the canal. Immediately afterwards, OP Pink observed several bursts of machine-gun fire by Israel forces across the canal. At 2039 GMT, machine-gun fire by UAR forces across the canal in OP Pink area was observed by OP Kilo. Fire by UAR forces ceased at 2040 GMT and by Israel forces at 2048 GMT.

"2. Between 2213 and 2215 hours GMT, OP Silver heard six rifle shots by UAR forces from west side of the canal."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.129

[Original text: English]
[3 March 1969]

The following report concerning the cease-fire in the Israel-Syrian sector was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, on 3 March 1969:

"Following report concerning exchange of fire received from OP One (MR 22485-29600) on 3 March:

"(a) At 0838 hours GMT, Syrian forces opened fire from a manned military position forward of Syrian FDL (Forward Defended Localities²) (MR 2267-2948) and from the area of Point 29 Syrian FDL (MR 22490-29832). Target was an Israel position forward of Israel FDL (MR 2250-2958).

"(b) At 0839 hours GMT, Israel forces opened fire from a manned military position forward of Israel FDL (MR 2250-2958) and from the area of Point 8 Israel FDL (MR 22580-29480). Target was a Syrian position forward of Syrian FDL (MR 2267-2948) mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) above.

"(c) Fire by both parties ceased at 0912 hours GMT. Last shot was fired from a Syrian position.

"(d) Both parties used machine-guns. Thirty to forty air bursts were fired from Syrian positions. Twenty to thirty air bursts seen over Israel position at MR 2250-2958."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.130

[Original text: English]
[5 March 1969]

The following report concerning the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, on 5 March 1969:

"1. Following is a summary of breaches of the cease-fire reported by United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector on 5 March, when fire across the canal was observed:

"(a) From OP Silver (MR 7452-8583): firing by UAR forces at 0634, 0636, 0757, 0945, 1206, between 1239 and 1240, at 1259, 1305, 1309, 1310, 1318 and 1348 hours GMT, and by Israel forces at 0708 hours GMT.

"(b) From OP Gold (MR 7672-8145): firing by UAR forces at 0634 hours GMT.

²Forward Defended Localities as demarcated by United Nations military observers in June 1967 (see S/7930/Add.18, annexes I and II).

"2. Following is a summary of United Nations-reported breaches of the cease-fire when firing was heard in the immediate proximity of the canal:

"(a) From OP Hotel (MR 7402-8765): firing by UAR forces on fourteen occasions between 0552 and 1351 hours GMT and by Israel forces on eight occasions between 0740 and 1130 hours GMT.

"(b) From OP Silver: firing by UAR forces on forty-three occasions between 0356 and 1436 hours GMT and by Israel forces on eight occasions between 0740 and 0757 hours GMT.

"(c) From OP Pink (MR 7661-8281): firing by UAR forces at 0811 hours GMT and at 1454 hours GMT.

"(d) From OP Lima (MR 7662-8173): firing by UAR forces on nine occasions between 0524 and 1311 hours GMT.

"(e) From OP Gold: firing by Israel forces at 0806 hours GMT.

"(f) From OP Red (MR. 7675-8125): firing by UAR forces on five occasions between 0524 and 1126 hours GMT.

"3. Following firings heard, but origin of fire not confirmed: OP Silver heard firing on four occasions between 0520 and 1123 hours GMT; OP Pink on four occasions between 0518 and 1157 GMT; OP Lima between 0635 and 0637 GMT; OP Gold on eight occasions between 0524 and 0734 GMT; OP Blue (MR 7677-8055) at 0454 GMT.

"4. The assistant IDF (Israel Defence Forces) liaison officer reported firing across the canal by UAR forces 0400 and 1348 hours GMT as follows: in OP Yellow (MR 7427-8837) area on one occasion; in OP Foxtrot (MR 7430-8674) area on one occasion; in OP Silver area on forty occasions. One Israel soldier allegedly wounded at 0650 hours GMT in OP Silver area.

"5. The senior UAR liaison officer reported firing across the canal by Israel forces between 0515 and 1130 hours GMT as follows: in OP Lima area on five occasions; in OP Pink area on one occasion.

"6. All the above reported firings were by small arms, automatic weapons and machine-guns. There were no reports of mortar or artillery fire."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.131

*[Original text: English]
[6 March 1969]*

1. With reference to the supplemental information report of 5 March 1969 [S/7930/Add.130], the following report concerning further firing which took place in the Suez Canal sector on that day was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, on the morning of 6 March.

"1. Following is a summary of United Nations-reported breaches of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector during evening of 5 March when fire across the canal was observed:

"(a) From OP Silver (MR 7452-8583): firing by UAR forces between 1508 and 1511 hours GMT.

"(b) From OP Red (MR 7675-8125): firing by UAR forces at 1617 hours GMT.

"2. Following is a summary of United Nations-reported breaches of the cease-fire when firing was heard in the immediate proximity of the canal:

"(a) From OP Hotel (MR 7402-8765): firing by UAR forces at 1519 hours GMT.

"(b) From OP Silver: firing by UAR forces on three occasions between 1528 and 1541 hours GMT.

"(c) From OP Lima (MR 7662-8173): firing by UAR on four occasions between 1607 and 1614 hours GMT.

"3. Following firings heard but origin of fire not confirmed: heard by OP Silver at 1616 and 1620 hours GMT; by OP Pink (MR 7661-8281) on three occasions between 1511 and 2106 GMT; by OP Gold (MR 7672-8145) on four occasions between 1607 and 1617 GMT; by OP Blue (MR 7677-8055) at 1530 and 1545 GMT.

"4. The assistant IDF (Israel Defence Forces) liaison officer reported firing across the canal by UAR forces between 1530 and 1628 hours GMT as follows: in area of OPs Gold and Red on four occasions; in OP Blue area on two occasions. One Israel soldier allegedly wounded in OP Gold/Red area at 1628 GMT.

"5. The senior UAR liaison officer reported firing across the canal by Israel forces as follows: in OP Lima area at 1515 hours GMT; in OP Kilo (MR 7660-8225) area at 2035 GMT.

"6. All the above reported firings were by small arms, automatic weapons and machine-guns. There were no reports of mortar or artillery fire."

2. A subsequent report dealing with firing in the Suez Canal sector on 6 March was received during the afternoon of 6 March and reads as follows:

"1. Following is a summary of United Nations-reported breaches of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector on 6 March when fire across the canal was observed:

"(a) From OP Blue: firing by UAR forces at 0246 and 0337 hours GMT, and by Israel forces at 0321 GMT.

"(b) From OP Hotel: firing by UAR forces at 1231 hours GMT.

"(c) From OP Gold: firing by UAR forces at 0946 hours GMT.

"(d) OP Silver observed an exchange of fire by UAR forces at 0644 hours GMT and Israel forces at 0645 GMT. Weapons used were small arms and machine-guns. Cease-fire was proposed for 0930 GMT and accepted. Fire by Israel forces ceased at 0844 GMT, by UAR forces at 0916 GMT.

"(e) OP Pink observed an exchange of fire opened by UAR forces at 0726 hours GMT and at 0727 GMT by Israel forces. Weapons used were small arms and light machine-guns. Cease-fire was also proposed for 0930 GMT. Fire by UAR forces ceased at 0815 GMT, by Israel forces at 0824 GMT.

"2. Following is a summary of United Nations-reported firings heard in the immediate proximity of the canal:

"(a) From OP Hotel: firing by UAR forces on three occasions between 0608 and 1144 hours GMT and by Israel forces on nine occasions between 0811 and 1245 GMT.

[Original text: English]
[7 March 1969]

"(b) From OP Silver: firing by UAR forces on twelve occasions between 0449 and 0658 hours GMT.

"(c) From OP Lima: firing by UAR forces on seven occasions between 0620 and 0825 hours GMT.

"(d) From OP Blue: firing by UAR forces on three occasions between 0219 and 0300 hours GMT, and by Israel forces on two occasions between 0210 and 0212 GMT.

"(e) From OP Pink: firing by UAR forces on three occasions between 0455 and 0717 hours GMT.

"(f) From OP Green (MR 7394-9401): firing by UAR forces at 0655 hours GMT.

"(g) From OP Juliet (MR 7590-8390): firing by UAR forces at 0744 hours GMT.

"(h) From OP Kilo: firing by UAR forces on five occasions between 0923 and 1030 hours GMT.

"(i) From OP Gold: firing by UAR forces at 0914 hours GMT.

"3. Following firings heard but origin of fire not confirmed: OP Hotel heard firing on two occasions between 0804 and 0817 hours GMT; OP Blue on one occasion at 0210 GMT; OP Pink on six occasions between 0533 and 0711 GMT; OP Gold on three occasions between 0833 and 0841 GMT; OP Red on one occasion at 0855 GMT.

"4. The assistant IDF liaison officer reported firing across the canal by UAR forces between 0200 and 1559 hours GMT as follows: in OP Blue area on four occasions; in OP Pink area on six occasions; in OP Silver area on ten occasions; in OP Hotel area on two occasions; in OP Gold/Red area on one occasion. One Israel soldier allegedly wounded at 1020 GMT in OP Pink area. The assistant IDF liaison officer reported that the soldier died later in the afternoon.

"5. The senior UAR liaison officer reported firing across the canal by Israel forces between 0640 and 1130 hours GMT as follows: in OP Lima area on three occasions; in OP Blue area on one occasion; in OP Hotel area on two occasions; in OP Silver area on fifteen occasions.

"6. All the above reported firings were by small arms, automatic weapons and machine-guns. There were no reports of mortar or artillery fire."

3. The following report concerning the cease-fire in the Israel-Syrian sector was also received from General Bull on the morning of 6 March:

"United Nations military observers at OP 7 (MR 2203-2408) reported hearing machine-gun fire at 1820 hours GMT, 5 March, north-east of OP. Several bursts of machine-gun fire were seen and heard crossing the Israel FDL (Forward Defended Localities) and Syrian FDL in an east to west direction approximately three to four kilometres north-east of OP. At this time mortar rounds were heard and fifteen flares were seen. At 0825 GMT the observers observed machine-gun fire in same general area crossing the Syrian FDL and Israel FDL from east to west. By 1848 GMT, most firing had stopped but flare activity continued. All firing ceased at 1845 GMT. Observers at OP Romeo (MR 2294-2459) observed and heard machine-gun fire at the above times approximately four to six kilometres west-south-west of OP."

1. With reference to the firing reported in document S/7930/Add.131, paragraph 2, the following report concerning further firing which took place in the Suez Canal sector on 6 March 1969 was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, on the morning of 7 March:

"1. Following is summary of additional United Nations-reported breaches of cease-fire in Suez Canal sector on 6 March when fire across the canal was observed:

"(a) From OP Pink (MR 7661-8281): firing by UAR forces at 1533 hours GMT and by Israel forces at 1436 GMT.

"(b) From OP Hotel (MR 7402-8765): firing by UAR forces at 1456 hours GMT.

"(c) From OP Gold (MR 7672-8145): firing by UAR forces at 1955 and 2223 hours GMT.

"(d) From OP Lima (MR 7662-8173): firing by UAR forces at 1938 hours GMT.

"2. Following is summary of additional United Nations-reported firings heard in immediate proximity of canal on 6 March:

"(a) From OP Pink: firing by UAR forces on ten occasions between 1257 and 1529 hours GMT.

"(b) From OP Silver (MR 7452-8583): firing by UAR forces at 1011 hours GMT.

"(c) From OP Hotel: firing by Israel forces on five occasions between 1424 and 1551 hours GMT.

"(d) From OP Blue (MR 7677-8055): firing by UAR forces at 1609 hours GMT.

"(e) From OP Yellow (MR 7427-8837): firing by UAR forces at 1340 hours GMT and by Israel forces at 1359 hours GMT.

"(f) From OP Gold: firing by UAR forces on two occasions, at 2011 and 2020 hours GMT.

"(g) From OP Lima: firing by UAR forces on two occasions, at 1952 and 2001 hours GMT.

"(h) From OP Juliet (MR 7590-8390): firing by UAR forces on two occasions, at 2013 and 2020 hours GMT.

"3. Following firings heard but origin of fire not confirmed: by OP Blue on two occasions; by OP Yellow on one occasion; by OP Lima on two occasions, by OP Red (MR 7675-8125) on one occasion.

"4. The assistant IDF (Israel Defence Forces) liaison officer reported firing across the canal by UAR forces between 1215 and 2200 hours GMT as follows: in OP Yellow area on three occasions; in OP Pink area on nine occasions; in OP Blue area on three occasions; in OP Silver area on one occasion.

"5. The senior UAR liaison officer reported firing across the canal by Israel forces between 1130 and 2200 hours GMT in OP Gold area on one occasion.

"6. All the above reported firings were by small arms, automatic weapons and machine-guns. There were no reports of mortar or artillery fire."

2. The following report dealing with firing which took place in the Suez Canal sector on 7 March was received on the same day:

"Summary of reported breaches of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector on 7 March from 0001 to 1430 hours GMT;

"1. United Nations military observers observed and reported firings across the canal as follows:

"(a) From OP Pink: firing by UAR forces at 0910, 1047, 1049, 1230, 1402, 1413, 1421 and 1431 hours GMT.

"(b) From OP Gold: firing by UAR forces at 0126 hours GMT.

"2. Observers reported firings heard in immediate proximity of the canal:

"(a) From OP Pink: firing by UAR forces on eleven occasions between 0547 and 1044 hours GMT.

"(b) From OP Kilo (MR 7660-8225): firing by UAR forces on two occasions at 1129 and 1131 hours GMT.

"(c) From OP Lima: firing by UAR forces on one occasion, at 0715 hours GMT.

"3. Firings heard but origin of fire not confirmed: heard by OP Blue on four occasions between 0442 and 1021 hours GMT; by OP Red on one occasion, at 0620 GMT.

"4. The assistant IDF liaison officer reported firing across the canal by UAR forces between 0001 and 1600 hours GMT: in OP Red area on four occasions; in OP Pink area on fifteen occasions; in OP Blue area on three occasions; in OP Gold area on one occasion; in OP Silver area on two occasions; in OP Hotel area on one occasion.

"5. The senior UAR liaison officer reported firing across the canal by Israel forces between 0001 and 1300 hours GMT: in OP Pink area on one occasion; in OP Lima area on one occasion; in OP Hotel area on two occasions.

"6. All above reported firings were by small arms, automatic weapons and machine-guns. There were no reports of mortar or artillery fire."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.133

*[Original text: English]
[8 March 1969]*

1. With reference to the firing reported in document S/7930/Add.132, paragraph 2, the following report concerning further firing which took place in the Suez Canal sector on 7 March 1969 was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, on the morning of 8 March:

"Following is summary of reported breaches of the cease-fire on 7 March up to 2400 hours GMT:

"1. United Nations military observers at OP Blue (MR 7677-8055) observed and reported firings across the Canal by UAR forces at 1840, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2048 and 2127 hours GMT.

"2. Observers reported firings heard in immediate proximity of the Canal:

"(a) From OP Pink (MR 7661-8281): firing by UAR forces on 23 occasions between 1103 and 2020 hours GMT.

"(b) From OP Silver (MR 7452-8583): firing by UAR forces on two occasions at 1340 and 1357 hours GMT.

"(c) From OP Blue: firing by UAR forces on 19 occasions between 1118 and 2307 hours GMT.

"(d) From OP Gold (MR 7672-8145): firing by UAR forces on 4 occasions between 1223 and 1908 hours GMT, and also at 0137 hours GMT, which was omitted in the previous report (S/7930/Add.132, para. 2, sub-para. 2).

"3. Firings heard but origin of fire not confirmed: heard by OP Blue on 30 occasions between 1131 and 2203 hours GMT; by OP Silver on one occasion at 1155 GMT; OP Red (MR 7675-8125) heard one large explosion at 1226 GMT.

"4. The assistant IDF (Israel Defence Forces) liaison officer reported firing across the Canal by UAR forces between 1549 and 2350 hours GMT as follows: in OP Pink area on 7 occasions; in OP Red area on one occasion; in OP Blue area on 11 occasions and every few minutes between 2200 and 2350 GMT.

"5. All above-reported firings were by small arms, automatic weapons and machine-guns. There were no reports of mortar or artillery fire."

2. The following report pertaining to aerial activities in the Suez Canal sector on the morning of 8 March was received from General Bull on the same day:

"Following OP reports pertain to aerial activities in the Suez sector morning of 8 March:

"(a) From OP Juliet (MR 7590-8390): at 0915 hours GMT United Nations military observers heard jet aircraft and observed 3 contrails over the Canal south of OP. Could not identify aircraft. At 0923 hours GMT, they observed anti-aircraft fire over eastern bank opposite OP. At same time, they observed one large explosion on the ground approximately ten kilometres east of OP. At 1004 hours GMT, smoke still seen from place of explosion on a bearing of 25 degrees and at least ten kilometres from OP.

"(b) From OP Kilo (MR 7660-8225): at 0919 hours GMT, observers heard explosion to the north at a far distance and could see black smoke in that direction. At 0933 GMT, two MIG 21 aircraft observed 300 metres south of OP. One aircraft crossed the Canal from north-west to south-east at an altitude of 150 metres. Aircraft recrossed the Canal from east to west almost immediately. At 1012 GMT, observers saw smoke at a compass bearing of approximately 250 degrees.

"(c) From OP Gold: observers observed two unidentified jet aircraft flying from north-west to south-east on west side of the Canal at approximate altitude of 2000 metres. At 0935 GMT aircraft crossed the Canal at approximately 5 kilometres north of OP when making a turn to the east. Aircraft flew over east side of Canal for a few seconds only and recrossed the Canal from east to west and proceeded to the north.

"(d) From OP Pink: at approximately 0920 hours GMT, United Nations military observers observed three unidentified aircraft at high altitude over east side of the Canal. At approximately 0925 GMT, they saw a large explosion approximately ten kilometres north of OP. At approximately 0935 GMT they observed two unidentified aircraft over west bank of the Canal at very low altitude flying to the north."

[Original text: English]
[9 March 1969]

1. On 8 March 1969, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, reported that heavy exchanges of fire had broken out between Israel and United Arab Republic forces in the Suez Canal sector during the day. The final summary report on the exchanges of fire as received from General Bull on the morning of 9 March reads as follows:

"Following is a summary of the exchanges of fire in the Canal sector on 8 March 1969:

"1. Reports from observation posts:³

"(a) OP Hotel: at 1528 hours GMT, United Nations military observers observed mortar and artillery fire by UAR forces from 200 metres south-west of OP in direction 400 metres south-east of OP. At 1529 GMT, mortar and artillery fire by Israel forces was observed from 200 metres south-east of OP in a westerly direction. Escalation of fire by both sides and at 1552 GMT all weapons used. At 1740 GMT fire ceased from both sides.

"(b) OP Foxtrot: at 1528 hours GMT, United Nations military observers observed artillery fire by UAR forces from west of OP. Target area approximately two kilometres east of OP. Fire by Israel forces observed at 1543 hours GMT from east of OP in direction of OP. Heavy weapons used. Fire decreased from both sides at 1615 GMT to a few single shots. At 1630 GMT, fire again escalated to heavy weapons. At 1750 GMT, fire by Israel forces ceased and at 1855 GMT by UAR forces.

"(c) OP Silver: at 1530 hours GMT, observers reported artillery fire by UAR forces and at 1531 GMT mortar fire by UAR forces. At 1534 GMT, Israel forces fired with small arms and heavy machine-guns and at 1544 GMT Israel forces artillery fire observed. From 1730 GMT, de-escalation of fire, which ceased at 1756 GMT. From 1812 GMT, artillery fire heard far to south of OP. At 1830 GMT artillery fire was observed from west side. A few moments later there was an artillery exchange. At 1854 GMT, fire by Israel forces ceased and at 1900 GMT fire by UAR forces ceased.

"(d) OP Yellow: at 1531 hours GMT, United Nations military observers observed mortar fire by UAR forces and at 1534 GMT small arms and heavy machine-gun fire by Israel forces. At 1723 GMT, artillery fire by UAR forces ceased and at 1725 GMT fire by Israel forces ceased.

"(e) OP Mike: at 1532 hours GMT observers observed explosions approximately seven kilometres to the north of OP. Could not confirm source of fire. At 1602 GMT, machine-gun fire by UAR forces in vicinity of OP was observed. Prior to machine-gun fire reported at 1602 GMT, a number of explosions were observed in OP area. At 1625 GMT, observers confirmed fire by Israel forces in area of OP Blue. Heavy exchange of fire continued until 1700 GMT. Area was generally quiet until 1745 GMT, when artillery fire was resumed. Observers in

shelter could not confirm source. At 1805 GMT, there was a heavy exchange of artillery fire. Target on west bank appeared to be north of Suez town and the refinery area. Heavy exchanges of artillery fire in this area continued until 1940 GMT and thereafter became sporadic. Fire in area by Israel forces ceased at 2030 GMT and by UAR forces at 2035 GMT.

"(f) OP Red: at 1533 hours GMT, observers observed machine-gun and mortar fire from UAR forces. A few moments later, machine-gun fire observed from Israel forces. At 1550 hours GMT, mortar and artillery fire observed from west side. Exchange of fire with light and heavy weapons continued intermittently. At 2033 GMT, fire had ceased from both sides in immediate vicinity of OP.

"(g) OP Blue: at 1533 hours GMT, light machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire by UAR forces was observed. At 1602 GMT, OP observed mortar or artillery fire by Israel forces. Shortly after 2000 GMT, fire ceased from east side. Some light firing by UAR forces until 2045 GMT.

"(h) OP Lima: at 1534 hours GMT, OP observed heavy mortar fire by UAR forces from area opposite OP Gold. At 1551 GMT, OP observed heavy artillery fire by Israel forces from an area east of OP. Firing across Canal was to a target area approximately six kilometres south of OP. Between 1608 and 1830 GMT, heavy exchanges of artillery fire, and tank fire by Israel forces were observed. From 1830 until 1930 GMT, there were intermittent exchanges of heavy weapons fire. Between 1930 and 2030 GMT, observers reported exchanges of fire continuing both north and south of OP. Fire by Israel forces ceased at 2032 GMT and by UAR forces at 2036 GMT.

"(i) OP Gold: at 1535 hours, United Nations military observers observed machine-gun and mortar fire by UAR forces. At 1607 GMT, tank fire by Israel forces observed. Between 1639 and 2030 GMT, there was a continual exchange of fire, at times heavy. At approximately 2012 GMT, Israel forces ceased fire and at 2036 GMT UAR forces ceased fire.

"(j) OP Violet: at 1538 hours GMT, OP observed machine-gun, mortar and tank fire by UAR forces from west side of Canal. A few moments later machine-gun and tank fire by Israel forces from east side of Canal was observed. Fire by Israel forces ceased at 1800 GMT and by UAR forces at 1908 GMT.

"(k) OP Echo: at 1538 hours GMT, observers observed artillery and machine-gun fire by UAR forces from west side of Canal. Origin of fire was approximately two kilometres west of Kantara. At 1545 GMT, artillery and tank fire by Israel forces was observed. Origin of fire east of Kantara and target of fire to the west of Kantara. Fire in this area escalated at 1745 GMT. Fire by Israel forces ceased at 1800 GMT and by UAR forces at 1812 GMT.

"(l) OP Copper: at 1541 hours GMT, observers observed heavy machine-gun fire by UAR forces from west side of Canal. At 1545 GMT, artillery or tank fire by Israel forces from east side observed. Fire continued intermittently and de-escalated at 1730 GMT. At approximately 1800 GMT, firing by

³ The locations of the observation posts established by UNTSO in the Suez Canal sectors are given in document S/7930/Add.90.

Israel forces ceased and at approximately 1805 GMT firing by UAR forces ceased.

“(m) OP Delta: at 1546 hours GMT, observers observed artillery fire by UAR forces from west to east side of Canal approximately ten kilometres south of OP. No fire from east side was observed. Fire ceased at 1814 GMT.

“(n) OP Pink: at 1551 hours GMT, OP observed one mortar round impact on east bank. At 1610 GMT mortar and artillery fire by UAR forces was observed. A few moments later tank fire by Israel forces from east side of Canal was observed. Both sides ceased fire at approximately 1800 GMT. At 1825 GMT, heavy explosions were heard from west side of Canal. At 2023 GMT, there was an exchange of small arms and machine-gun fire. Both sides ceased fire in this area at 2024 hours GMT.

“(o) OP Kilo: at 1609 hours GMT, United Nations military observers observed artillery and mortar fire by UAR forces from west bank in direction of OP Pink. At 1625 GMT, they reported fire by Israel forces from east side of Canal. At 1630 GMT, their antenna mast was broken and heavy exchange of fire continued from both sides. Fire by Israel forces ceased at 1640 GMT and by UAR forces at 2020 GMT.

“(p) OP Juliet: at 1610 hours GMT, observers observed artillery and mortar fire by UAR forces from west bank south of OP. At 1611 GMT they observed artillery or tank and mortar fire from east side by Israel forces opposite the OP. Fire in this area by both parties ceased at 1707 GMT.

“2. Cease-fire proposals:

“(a) First cease-fire was proposed by UNTSO for 1630 hours GMT. Proposal was accepted by the senior UAR liaison officer at 1537 GMT. Proposal was passed for the senior Israel representative's office to the duty officer. Later, the latter replied that he was having difficulties in contacting the senior Israel representative and his higher authorities. Cease-fire was not effective.

“(b) A second cease-fire was proposed by UNTSO at approximately 1645 hours GMT, to be effective at 1715 GMT. Senior UAR liaison officer accepted at 1653 GMT. In the absence of the senior Israel representative the cease-fire proposal was passed to the assistant IDF liaison officer. At 1710 GMT, the IDF liaison officer said that they were having some difficulties in contacting their personnel in the Canal sector and that there was insufficient time to ensure that all units would be properly notified and suggested a new cease-fire for 1745 GMT. The senior UAR liaison officer accepted at 1720 GMT. Cease-fire at this time was generally effective in the OP Hotel and Juliet areas. Heavy fire continued in Suez area and intermittently in other areas.

“(c) A third cease-fire was proposed by UNTSO for 2030 hours GMT. Proposal was accepted by the assistant IDF liaison officer at 1942 GMT and by the senior UAR liaison officer at 1950 GMT. Cease-fire was effective and OPs reported NTR (nothing to report) at 2045 GMT.

“3. Statements by the parties:

“(a) The senior UAR liaison officer stated:

“(i) At 1525 hours GMT, that Israel forces had fired from east side in OP Copper area at 1515 GMT.

“(ii) At 1633 hours GMT, that UAR had stopped firing at cease-fire time but that Israel forces were still firing.

“(iii) At 1270 hours GMT, that at 1713 GMT Israel forces had fired at Suez town and petrol refinery.

“(iv) At 1830 hours GMT, that Israel forces were still firing in Port Tawfiq area with illuminated shells and artillery at 1820 GMT and 1825 GMT and that UAR was not firing.

“(v) At 1847 hours GMT, that Israel was still firing in area of Said (OP Silver area) in Great Bitter Lake with rockets.

“(b) At 1800 hours GMT, the IDF liaison officer stated: ‘Israel forces have ceased fire in the Suez Canal sector but UAR forces continue to fire in many sectors of the Canal area. If UAR firing continues, Israel will be compelled to return the fire in self-defence’.

“4. Casualties and damage report:

“(a) UNTSO:

“I. Buildings:

“(i) OP Foxtrot: windscreen of jeep broken and all tires flat, and windows of OP broken.

“(ii) OP Juliet: received 3 direct hits by heavy weapons fire. The radio room is completely destroyed and observers' living quarters are badly damaged. Their personal clothing and UNTSO binoculars and other items of equipment have been destroyed. Main Motorola and other items of radio equipment are out of order.

“(iii) OP Mike: minor damage to exterior of building.

“(iv) OP Kilo: antenna mast broken in two parts; generator destroyed, and roof and walls of building with several holes. Doors and windows broken; water tank destroyed. OP has no electricity.

“(v) Kantara control centre: main building received approximately one hundred impacts of machine-gun fire on exterior walls, five windows broken, water tank damaged. Carpenter's shop received approximately 250 small arms impacts; store building approximately 200 small arms impacts.

“(vi) OP Silver: the three caravans have approximately twenty bullet holes in them. Water trailer and water tank badly damaged. Many items inside the caravans, including water cans, refrigerator, telescope and furniture, damaged.

“(vii) OP Gold: caravans have several shrapnel and bullet holes and driver's cabin and engine compartment damaged.

“II. Vehicles:

“Four vehicles at Kantara control centre received shrapnel and bullet holes.

"III. Personnel:

"One observer at OP Gold was slightly injured.

"(b) Israel forces:

"The assistant IDF liaison officer reported that one Israel soldier had been killed and ten wounded.

"(c) UAR forces:

"The senior UAR liaison officer stated on 9 March that his Government issued a report concerning damage. One killed and fifteen wounded. Some houses and civilian establishments in Kantara, Ismailia and Suez were also hit by individual shots."

2. On 9 March at 0920 hours GMT, the following report concerning the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector was received from General Bull:

"1. The assistant IDF liaison officer informed that 'at 0730 hours local time (0530 hours GMT) on 9 March UAR forces in vicinity of OP Pink fired on an Israel observation aircraft flying over east side of Canal. Again at 0802 local time (0602 GMT) the same aircraft was fired at by UAR forces south of Lake Timsah. Aircraft was again flying well over east side of Canal'.

"2. The assistant IDF liaison officer further informed that 'at 0830 hours local time (0630 hours GMT), UAR forces fired on an Israel patrol approximately nine kilometres north of OP Yellow. Fire was not returned. One Israel soldier was wounded'.

"3. Following reports from OPs appear to pertain to complaint made by the assistant IDF liaison officer concerning firing at an Israel aircraft:

"(a) OP Kilo: at 0527 hours GMT, United Nations military observers observed fire by UAR forces from area west of OP and observed one large explosion at a high altitude over east side of Canal. One light aircraft was flying from south to north at low altitude over east side of Canal at time of incident.

"(b) OP Hotel: at 0556 hours GMT, observers observed anti-aircraft fire by UAR forces from a position 300 metres south of OP. A light aircraft was flying on east side of Canal from north to south at an altitude of approximately 500 metres.

"(c) OP Foxtrot: at 0556 hours GMT, observers observed, from an area approximately 500 to 1,000 metres north-west of OP, fire by UAR forces. No air bursts or tracers observed. At 0545 GMT, a light aircraft was seen flying south to north over east side of Canal. It circled over east bank opposite OP and continued northward at 0552 GMT."

3. In subsequent messages dated 9 March, General Bull reported that heavy exchanges of fire had broken out again in the Suez Canal sector. According to these messages, firing broke out at approximately 1317 hours GMT; a cease-fire proposed by UNTSO for 1600 hours GMT was accepted by both parties, but was not effective; however, at 1635 hours GMT, all UNTSO observation posts reported "NTR" (nothing to report). A more detailed report on this subject will be submitted when the necessary information is received from General Bull.

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.135

[Original text: English]
[10 March 1969]

With reference to the exchanges of fire in the Suez Canal sector mentioned in document S/7930/Add.134, paragraph 3, the following final summary report concerning these exchanges of fire was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, on the morning of 10 March 1969:

"Following is a summary of exchanges of fire in the Suez Canal sector on 9 March 1969:

"1. Reports from observation posts:

"(a) OP Mike: at 1317 hours GMT, United Nations military observers observed mortar and artillery fire by UAR forces from area north-east of Port Tawfiq in direction 300 metres south of OP Blue. At 1318 GMT, mortar fire by Israel forces was observed in direction east of Port Tawfiq. At 1430 GMT, firing escalated on both sides. Refinery in Suez was seen burning in eight places. Exchange of fire continued until 1605 GMT, when both parties ceased fire.

"(b) OP Blue: at 1317 hours GMT, observers observed an exchange of artillery fire. Artillery fire was exchanged intermittently until approximately 1600 GMT. Fire ceased in the OP Blue area at 1618 GMT.

"(c) OP Red: at 1318 hours GMT, observers observed machine-gun and artillery fire by UAR forces. At 1320 GMT, they observed fire by Israel forces. Exchange of fire continued intermittently and fire in this area ceased at 1621 GMT.

"(d) OP Hotel: at 1323 hours GMT, observers observed mortar and artillery fire by Israel forces from area opposite OP in direction of both sides of OP. At 1324 GMT, mortar and artillery fire by UAR forces was observed from west side of Canal both north and south of OP. At 1515 GMT, mortar and small rockets firing was observed from east side. Fire continued with artillery and tanks from east side and recoilless guns and what sounded like rockets from west side. Fire by Israel forces ceased at 1553 GMT and by UAR forces at 1628 GMT.

"(e) OP Gold: at 1323 hours GMT, observers observed machine-gun and mortar fire by UAR forces. Fire by Israel forces was observed a few moments later. Exchange of fire continued intermittently and fire ceased by Israel forces at 1606 GMT and by UAR forces at 1616 GMT.

"(f) OP Lima: at 1324 hours GMT, observers observed heavy artillery, mortar and tank fire by UAR forces from area four kilometres south-west of OP in direction of OP Gold area. At 1326 GMT, heavy artillery and mortar fire by Israel forces was observed from area approximately five kilometres south-east of OP in direction four kilometres south-south-west of OP. Heavy firing continued from both sides and stopped at 1558 GMT by Israel forces and at 1606 GMT by UAR forces.

"(g) OP Violet: at 1325 hours GMT, observers observed machine-gun fire by UAR forces. At 1327 GMT, fire by Israel forces was observed which was believed to be wire guided missiles. Exchange of fire

continued with artillery and mortar fire from east side and with lighter weapons from west side. Israel forces ceased fire at 1600 GMT and UAR forces at 1634 GMT.

“(h) OP Copper: at 1325 hours GMT, Israel forces were observed firing with artillery and what appeared to be wire guided missiles. UAR forces were observed firing from west side at 1342 GMT. Exchange of fire continued intermittently and fire by Israel forces ceased at 1618 GMT and by UAR forces at 1627 GMT.

“(i) OP Foxtrot: at 1325 hours GMT observers observed mortar, artillery and small arms firing by UAR forces from area behind OP in direction north-east of OP. Heavy weapons fire by Israel forces was observed at 1332 GMT from area north-east of OP in direction south of OP. Exchange of fire continued until 1442 GMT, when fire by Israel forces ceased and at 1604 GMT fire by UAR forces ceased.

“(j) OP Delta: at 1326 hours GMT, observers observed artillery fire by UAR forces from area approximately 10 kilometres south of OP in direction approximately 10 kilometres south-south-east of OP. Artillery fire by Israel forces was observed at 1329 GMT from area approximately 10 kilometres south-south-east of OP in direction approximately 10 kilometres south of OP. Sporadic fire continued. Fire by Israel forces ceased at 1558 GMT and by UAR forces at 1614 GMT.

“(k) OP Yellow: at 1327 hours GMT, observers observed firing by UAR forces and firing by Israel forces was observed at 1332 GMT. Observers believed fire by Israel forces to be small rockets or missiles. Exchange of fire continued and fire by Israel forces ceased at 1545 GMT and by UAR forces at 1610 GMT.

“(l) OP Echo: at 1327 hours GMT, observers observed artillery fire by UAR forces from area two kilometres west of Kantara. Exchange of fire ensued immediately, Israel forces using small rockets and artillery from area north of Kantara, with target area two to five kilometres west of OP. Exchange of fire with heavy weapons continued and Israel forces ceased fire at 1606 GMT and UAR forces at 1627 GMT.

“(m) OP Silver: at 1328 hours GMT, observers observed mortar fire in OP area. No further information provided due to break in communication system. Later information from Israel liaison officer at OP Silver through internal communication system to IDF liaison officer indicated that the generator at OP Silver had been damaged.

“(n) OP Kilo: at 1333 hours GMT, observers observed heavy artillery fire by Israel forces from east side of Canal to target area approximately 600 metres south of OP. At 1337 GMT, OP observed heavy mortar fire by UAR forces from area 100 metres west of OP. Sporadic exchange or heavy weapons fire continued with artillery and mortar fire by UAR forces and with tank and mortar fire by Israel forces. Rate of fire decreased by UAR forces at 1458 GMT and by Israel forces at 1517 GMT. Israel forces ceased fire at 1548 GMT and UAR forces at 1559 GMT.

“(o) OP Juliet: at 1334 hours GMT, observers observed mortar and recoilless rifle fire by UAR forces. At 1335 GMT artillery and tank fire

by Israel forces was observed. Exchange of heavy weapons fire continued until 1605 GMT, when both parties ceased fire. OP Juliet sustained damage to communications equipment and was out of contact with Ismailia control centre from 1545 GMT until 1630 GMT.

“(p) OP Pink: at 1342 hours GMT, observers observed firing from UAR forces. Exchange of mortar firing ensued almost immediately. Firing ceased in the area by 1553 GMT. Observers reported mortar fire by UAR forces between 1620 and 1625 GMT.

“(q) OP Charlie: at 1355 hours GMT, observers observed mortar and machine-gun fire by Israel from east side. At 1356 GMT, firing by UAR forces from area north and south of OP on west side was observed. Weapons used were mortars and machine-guns. Exchange of fire continued until 1515 GMT and thereafter observers reported sporadic small arms fire from west side. No firing by Israel forces after 1600 hours GMT was observed but exact time of cease-fire not known. Fire by UAR forces ceased at 1619 GMT.

“(r) OP Green: at 1517 hours GMT, observers observed machine-gun fire by UAR forces. Exchange of fire ensued immediately with tank guns from east side. Fire by Israel forces ceased at 1615 GMT and by UAR forces at 1625 GMT.

“2. Cease-fire proposals: a cease-fire for 1445 hours GMT was proposed to senior Israel representative at 1339 GMT and to senior UAR liaison officer at 1341 GMT. At 1409 GMT, senior Israel representative accepted the cease-fire. At 1415 GMT, senior UAR liaison officer stated that he had no contact with his authorities. Cease-fire could not be implemented. A second cease-fire was proposed for 1600 GMT. At 1507 GMT, the proposal was transmitted to both parties. Senior Israel representative agreed at 1529 GMT and senior UAR liaison officer at 1535 GMT. By 1634 GMT, the cease-fire was implemented all along the Canal.

“3. Communications with the parties:

“(a) Complaints by UAR:

“(i) At 1320 hours GMT in OP Hotel area, Israel forces began fire with artillery.

“(ii) At 1426 hours GMT, senior UAR liaison officer complained that two tanks were located behind OP Green and requested that they be removed.

“(b) At 1445 hours GMT, assistant IDF liaison officer stated that Israel forces would cease fire at the proposed cease-fire time for a period of ten minutes, even though the UAR authorities had not responded to the cease-fire proposal.

“(c) The following message was sent by Chief of Staff UNTSO to Israel and UAR authorities: ‘I am deeply concerned with the breach of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector today 9 March and I appeal to the Governments of Israel and UAR to observe the cease-fire and to suspend all military activities in the area. I suggest 1600 GMT as the hour of definite suspension of all military activity. I am informing the Secretary-General of the United Nations of this message’.

"(d) Following message was received from assistant IDF liaison officer at 1635 hours GMT:

"To the Chief of Staff from IDF Liaison Officer:

"I have been instructed by the Minister of Defence to reply to your message of 1727 hours local time of today.

"It was the Egyptians who initiated artillery fire yesterday and today, as you no doubt know from the reports of your observers. We accepted the cease-fire proposals and observed them, as we have always done in the past. This afternoon we accepted your cease-fire proposal for 1645 hours local time and held our fire. But the Egyptians, ignoring your proposals, continued their shelling and we were obliged to resume our defensive fire.

"The artillery fire of the last two days followed a long series of breaches of the cease-fire by the Egyptians, whose violations of air space, infiltration, mining and sniping have continued for the last two months.

"I would reconfirm our acceptance of the cease-fire proposal for 1600 hours GMT, of which we informed your headquarters seven minutes before your message of 1727 hours local time was received. At 1600 hours GMT, fire ceased from our side but continued from the Egyptian side.

"It seems that the appeal should be addressed solely to the Egyptians."

"4. Casualties and damage report:

"(a) From UNTSO:

"I. No UNTSO casualties.

"II. Buildings in Kantara Control Centre area:

"(i) Kantara Control Centre: garage and workshop severely damaged by direct hit. Roof completely demolished. Inspection pit area, floors, walls and doors received major damage. Main building received numerous small arms impacts. Several broken windows and portion of roof slightly damaged by unexploded mortar shells.

"(ii) OP Green: ten bullet holes in caravan, six in duty room caravan. Furniture and personal effects damaged or destroyed.

"(iii) OP Silver: numerous splinter holes in the three caravans and five broken windows. Water tank with several splinter holes is out of order. Minor damage caused to water trailer and to the two jeeps. Generator slightly damaged by splinters. Damage caused to main antenna mast was reason for breakdown in communications.

"(iv) OP Gold: two caravans completely destroyed. Radio mast knocked down. Personal effects and furnishings lost.

"(v) OP Blue: slight damage by small arms fire.

"III. Buildings in Ismailia Control Centre area:

"(i) Ismailia Control Centre and OP Hotel: motor transport workshop received direct hit by large calibre weapons. Workshop damaged by heavy calibre projectile that exploded one metre from wall. The blast wall of the new shelter at OP Hotel is cracked and one unexploded artillery shell embedded close to the shelter. Water pipe line is broken and water is flowing into

shelter. Windows and ceilings are cracked and broken in the living residences.

"(ii) OP Delta: ceiling damaged and windows broken.

"(iii) Advanced OP Echo: windows broken and power cable broken.

"(iv) OP Foxtrot: seventeen windows, one United Nations signboard and fifty sand-bags in front of OP damaged.

"(v) OP Juliet: one impact in stairs and broken windows.

"IV. Vehicles: one UNTSO vehicle at OP Juliet and one at OP Kilo damaged by small arms fire.

"(b) From Israel forces: assistant IDF liaison officer reported that two Israel soldiers were killed and eighteen wounded. On morning 10 March, IDF liaison officer called and stated that during previous day's incident at approximately 1630 local time (1430 GMT) one Israel light aircraft was shot down by UAR anti-craft fire in the area opposite OP Juliet on east side of Canal. Pilot and passenger parachuted, but pilot died later. Israel forces casualties are now three soldiers killed.

"(c) From UAR forces: no report received of casualties or damage."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.136

[Original text: English]
[11 March 1969]

1. The following report concerning firing which took place in the Suez Canal sector on 11 March 1969 was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, on the morning of the same day:

"Summary of reported breaches of the cease-fire for 11 March from 0001 to 0920 hours GMT:

"1. Firing across the Canal observed and reported by United Nations military observers:

"(a) From OP Pink (MR 7661-8281): one single shot by UAR forces at 0837 hours GMT, several bursts of machine-gun fire at 0917 and 0919 GMT.

"(b) From OP Red (MR 7675-8125): burst of machine-gun fire by UAR forces at 0903 hours GMT.

"2. United Nations military observers reported firing heard in immediate proximity of the Canal:

"(a) OP Pink reported firing by UAR forces on two occasions between 0854 and 0857 hours GMT.

"(b) OP Red reported firing by UAR forces on one occasion, at 0850 hours GMT.

"(c) OP Gold (MR 7672-8145) reported firing by UAR forces on one occasion, at 0842 hours GMT.

"3. Senior UAR liaison officer reported a breach of the cease-fire by Israel forces at 0850 hours GMT, with firing from east to west bank between OPs Lima (MR 7662-8173) and Gold.

"4. IDF liaison officer informed that at 0852 hours GMT UAR forces fired upon an Israel forces work party north of Tawfiq. One Israel soldier was wounded."

2. With reference to the aerial activities in the Suez Canal sector on the morning of 8 March 1969 [see S/7930/Add.133, para. 2], General Bull reported that the assistant IDF liaison officer had informed UNTSO that on that morning two MIG 21 aircraft had flown across the Canal in the vicinity of the Bitter Lakes and had been engaged by Israel forces aircraft and that in the ensuing air battle one of the MIG-21 aircraft had been shot down. At the request of the Israel authorities, an inquiry into this incident was conducted by United Nations military observers. The following summary of inquiry was received from General Bull on 11 March:

"(a) The inquiry was conducted by the Operations Officer, Kantara control centre, and another United Nations military observer who is an air force officer.

"(b) Inquiry commenced at scene of incident at 1430 hours GMT on 8 March and was concluded at 1520 GMT same day.

"(c) The observers determined the map reference of scene of crash as approximately 7639-8470.

"(d) Senior Israel representative was the only witness available. He stated that at 0940 hours GMT on 8 March four UAR planes overflew the Canal from west to east in OP Pink area and that one of these was shot down. The pilot parachuted and was collected by Israel forces. He was seriously wounded and evacuated to a hospital, location of which he did not know. He further stated that no other witness was available.

"(e) Physical evidence: The observers saw at scene of incident one badly burned and still smouldering plane. In the debris were found what appeared to be portions of two separate rockets and portion of a machine-gun. The area around the plane was blackened as though by fire. Type of aircraft could not be established and national markings could not be seen due to badly burned condition of the aircraft. Fuselage of the plane was facing south.

"(f) Photographs were taken."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.137

[Original text: English]
[11 March 1969]

1. With reference to the firing reported in document S/7930/Add.136, paragraph 1, the following report concerning further firing in the Suez Canal sector on 11 March 1969 was submitted by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, on 11 March at 1420 hours GMT:

"Summary of reported breaches of the cease-fire from 11 March from 0920 to 1240 hours GMT:

"1. Following firing observed and reported by OP Pink:

"(a) By UAR forces: small arms fire across Canal observed at 1147 and 1232 hours GMT and mortar firing between 1235 and 1238 GMT. Firings from west bank of Canal heard at 0958 and 1002 GMT.

"(b) By Israel forces: tank fire from east to west bank observed at 1013, 1023, 1116, 1120, 1147, 1150, 1155, 1157, 1212 and 1234 hours GMT.

"2. Senior UAR liaison officer reported breaches of cease-fire in OP Pink area by Israel forces as follows:

"(a) Between 0915 and 0920 hours GMT, automatic weapons fire from east to west.

"(b) At 1020 hours GMT and again at 1025 hours GMT, heavy weapons fire from east to west.

"(c) At 1030 hours GMT, automatic weapons fire.

"(d) At 1120 hours GMT, heavy weapons or tank fire from east to west. No fire from UAR.

"3. IDF liaison officer reported breach of cease-fire in OP Pink area by UAR forces at 0945 hours GMT and continuing."

2. In subsequent messages dated 11 March, General Bull reported that further exchanges of fire had broken out in the Suez Canal sector. These messages, which are of an interim and provisional nature, read as follows:

"(a) Message sent at 1420 hours GMT:

"Heavy shelling is taking place from both sides in OPs Mike, Blue, Red and Pink areas. Further report will follow."

"(b) Message sent at 1517 hours GMT:

"All fifteen OPs from OP Copper to Suez are reporting exchanges of heavy weapons fire to include mortar, artillery, tanks and rockets. Cease-fire proposed for 1500 hours GMT."

"(c) Message sent at 1604 hours GMT:

"1. Cease-fire was accepted by both parties for 1500 hours GMT. Cease-fire was not effective. Israel forces ceased fire in the OPs Echo, Pink, Gold, Red, Blue, Foxtrot, Juliet and Lima areas. Israel fire continued in the OPs Copper, Violet, Yellow, Silver, Hotel and Mike areas. UAR forces continued to fire in all areas previously reported.

"2. At 1530 hours GMT, heavy exchanges of fire were taking place in all OP areas except OPs Green and Charlie. A new cease-fire has been proposed for 1615 GMT."

"(d) Message sent at 1715 hours GMT:

"1. Cease-fire proposed for 1615 hours GMT was not effective. Israel authorities stated they had agreed to the earlier cease-fire and would agree to this cease-fire providing UAR authorities also agreed. Senior UAR liaison officer agreed to the cease-fire at 1613 GMT. Assistant IDF liaison officer was informed of senior UAR liaison officer's agreement to cease-fire. He stated that they could not implement a cease-fire at that late time.

"2. At 1615 hours GMT, exchange of fire by heavy weapons continued in most areas.

"3. A new cease-fire has been proposed for 1715 hours GMT and both parties have accepted.

"(c) Message sent at 1836 hours GMT:

"Cease-fire for 1715 hours GMT was effective and at 1730 GMT all OPs advised NTR (nothing to report)."

"(f) Message sent at 1947 hours GMT:

"1. Have just received report from Ismailia control centre that shooting in this area has broken out again at 1919 hours GMT.

"2. Initial damage report from Kantara control centre indicates that a number of OPs have sus-

tained damage. Caravan at OP Gold completely destroyed and caravans at OP Red are badly damaged."

"(g) Message sent at 2057 hours GMT:

"OP Hotel reported mortar fire by UAR forces at 1919 hours GMT from area west of OP. No return fire by Israel forces. Fire in area ceased at 1955 GMT, and all OPs report NTR."

A fuller and more detailed report on this new series of firing will be submitted when the final summary report on the subject is received from General Bull.

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.138

*[Original text: English]
[12 March 1969]*

1. The following report from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, concerning firing in the Suez Canal sector on 11 March 1969, is the final summary report on incidents dealt with in the preliminary reports set forth in documents S/7930/Add. 136, paragraph 1, and S/7930/Add.137:

"Following is a summary of the exchanges of fire in the Suez Canal sector, 11 March:

"1. United Nations reports and complaints from the parties prior to the main exchange of fire:

"A. United Nations military observers observed and reported firings across the Canal as follows:

"(a) From OP Pink: small arms fire by UAR forces at 0837, 0854, 0857, 0917, 0919, 0958, 1002, 1147 and 1232 hours GMT, and mortar fire between 1235 and 1238 GMT. Tank fire by Israel forces observed from east to west bank at 1013, 1023, 1116, 1120, 1147, 1150, 1155, 1157, 1212 and 1234 GMT.

"(b) From OP Red: small arms fire by UAR forces at 0850 and 0903 hours GMT.

"(c) From OP Gold: small arms fire by UAR forces at 0842 hours GMT.

"B. Senior UAR liaison officer reported breaches of cease-fire by Israel forces between 0850 and 1235 hours GMT, as follows:

"(a) At 0850 hours GMT, small arms fire between OPs Lima and Gold.

"(b) Between 0915 and 0920 hours GMT, automatic weapons fire in OP Pink area.

"(c) At 1020, 1025, 1030, 1120, 1158 and 1235 hours GMT, heavy weapons or tank fire by Israel forces from east of Canal in OP Pink area.

"C. IDF liaison officer reported breaches of cease-fire by UAR forces:

"(a) In OP Pink area: at 0830, 0837, 0852, 0857, 0914, 0923, 0950, 1003, 1105, 1138, 1140, 1145 and 1232 GMT, and from 1311 GMT to 1315 GMT, small arms fire from west side of Canal.

"(b) In OP Red area: at 0901 and 1010 hours GMT, small arms fire from west side of Canal.

"(c) In Kantara area: at 1258 and 1301 hours GMT, small arms fire from west side of Canal.

"(d) In OP Blue area: at 1116 hours GMT, small arms fire from west side of Canal.

"(e) At 1052 hours GMT, in firing in area of OP Pink, one Israel soldier was wounded.

"2. United Nations reports on main exchange of fire afternoon 11 March and cease-fire proposals:

"A. Reports from OPs:

"(a) From OP Pink: at 1319 hours GMT, United Nations military observers observed mortar fire by UAR forces from west side, which ceased immediately. At 1325 GMT, observers observed tank fire by Israel forces which ceased at 1334 GMT. Fire was resumed by Israel forces at 1353 GMT and UAR recommenced mortar fire. Fire continued sporadically. Israel forces ceased fire at 1450 GMT and UAR forces at 1515 GMT.

"(b) From OP Blue: at 1333 hours GMT, observers observed tank and rocket fire by Israel forces. At 1339 GMT, artillery and mortar fire by UAR forces was observed. At approximately 1500 GMT, Israel forces stopped firing for about ten minutes. Heavy exchange of fire resumed in this area with heavy weapons and last firing reported in this area was by UAR forces at 1721 GMT.

"(c) From OP Mike: at 1333 hours GMT, observers observed heavy weapons fire by UAR forces and at 1336 GMT heavy weapons fire by Israel forces. There was a continued exchange of fire with heavy weapons. Israel forces ceased fire at 1718 GMT and UAR forces ceased fire at 1721 GMT.

"(d) From OP Red: at 1335 hours GMT, observers observed artillery fire by UAR forces and at 1337 GMT artillery fire by Israel forces. At 1505 GMT, Israel stopped firing for approximately ten minutes. Heavy exchange of fire continued in this area. Israel forces ceased fire at 1705 GMT and UAR forces at 1720 GMT.

"(e) From OP Lima: at 1337 hours GMT, observers observed artillery and tank fire by Israel forces approximately five kilometres south of OP. At 1340 GMT, they observed artillery, mortar and what sounded like rocket fire by UAR forces. Exchange of fire ensued. At 1449 GMT, Israel ceased fire. Between 1545 and 1715 GMT, exchange of heavy artillery and tank fire was in progress in the area south of OP. Firing ceased at 1719 GMT. First party to cease fire could not be determined.

"(f) From OP Gold: at 1350 hours GMT, observers observed in vicinity of OP heavy weapons fire by UAR forces. At 1430 GMT, they observed tank fire by Israel forces. Israel ceased fire at approximately 1500 GMT but heavy exchanges fire resumed intermittently with last firing in the area by UAR forces at 1720 GMT.

"(g) From OP Juliet: at 1355 hours GMT, observers observed heavy weapons fire by Israel forces and recoilless rifle and mortar fire by UAR forces. Exchange of fire continued in this area until 1454 GMT, when Israel forces ceased fire. UAR forces ceased fire at 1502 GMT. Observers reported what sounded like rocket fire by UAR forces at 1535 GMT. Firing by UAR forces ceased at 1604 GMT.

"(h) From OP Kilo: at 1411 hours GMT, observers observed tank fire by Israel forces. At 1439 GMT, they observed heavy weapons fire by UAR forces. Heavy exchange of fire continued until 1545 GMT, when fire by Israel forces ceased. Fire by UAR forces ceased at 1548 GMT.

"(i) From OP Echo: at 1429 hours GMT, observers observed artillery and mortar fire by UAR forces. At 1431 they observed artillery and mortar

fire and what sounded like rocket fire by Israel forces. Heavy exchange of fire continued in this area with Israel forces ceasing fire at 1713 GMT and UAR forces at 1716 GMT.

"(j) From OP Silver: at 1439 hours GMT, observers observed heavy shelling by UAR forces. No firing by Israel forces observed immediately. However, heavy exchange of firing in progress at 1510 GMT and exchange of fire continued until 1659 GMT.

"(k) From OP Foxtrot: at 1439 hours GMT, heavy mortar and artillery fire by UAR forces observed. UAR continued heavy weapons fire until 1650 GMT. Observers did not observe fire by Israel forces in this area.

"(l) From OP Violet: at 1439 hours GMT, observers observed mortar fire by UAR forces. At 1442 GMT, they observed small arms, mortar and artillery fire and what sounded like rocket fire by Israel forces. Heavy exchange of fire continued in this area, UAR forces ceasing fire at 1707 GMT and Israel forces at 1716 GMT.

"(m) From OP Yellow: at 1440 hours GMT, observers observed artillery fire by UAR forces and automatic weapons fire by Israel forces at 1442 GMT. Exchange of fire continued in this area, UAR forces ceasing fire at 1639 GMT and Israel forces at 1653 GMT.

"(n) From OP Hotel: at 1440 hours GMT, observers observed artillery fire by UAR forces. At 1443 GMT, artillery fire by Israel forces. Exchange of fire with artillery, mortars, tanks and what sounded to be rockets from both sides. Israel forces ceased fire at 1619 GMT and UAR forces at 1640 GMT.

"(o) From OP Delta: at 1440 hours GMT, observers observed mortar and artillery fire by UAR forces. At 1555 GMT, firing in progress from both sides with tank fire by Israel forces. Israel forces ceased fire at 1620 GMT. UAR forces continued artillery and mortar fire until 1714 GMT.

"(p) From OP Copper: at 1440 hours GMT, observers observed artillery fire by UAR forces. Immediately they observed machine-gun and artillery fire and what sounded like missiles by Israel forces. Heavy exchange of fire continued in this area. At 1715 GMT, Israel forces ceased fire and at 1716 GMT UAR forces ceased fire.

"(q) From OP Charlie: at 1607 hours GMT, observers observed machine-gun fire by Israel forces. Fire not returned. Israel forces ceased fire at 1628 GMT. OP did not observe fire by UAR forces in this area.

"B. Cease-fire proposals:

"(a) A cease-fire was proposed for 1500 hours GMT and accepted by the senior Israel representative and by the senior UAR liaison officer at 1430 GMT. Cease-fire was not effective except in OP Pink area. Fire by UAR forces temporarily ceased in OP Blue area but later resumed. Fire by Israel forces temporarily ceased in OPs Echo, Hotel, Red, Blue, Juliet and Lima areas but later resumed. Fire continued in the other previously reported OP areas.

"(b) A second cease-fire was proposed for 1615 hours GMT. Assistant IDF liaison officer stated Israel authorities would accept cease-fire if UAR authorities would also accept. Senior UAR liaison

officer accepted at 1610 GMT and when assistant IDF liaison officer was notified of acceptance by senior UAR liaison officer he stated there was insufficient time remaining to effect a cease-fire. Cease-fire could not be implemented.

"(c) A third cease-fire was proposed for 1715 hours GMT, and the senior UAR liaison officer accepted at 1638 GMT and the senior Israel representative at 1643 GMT. Cease-fire was effective.

"3. United Nations reports on firing after the main exchange of fire afternoon 11 March:

"(a) United Nations military observers at OP Hotel observed mortar fire by UAR forces from west of OP at 1919 hours GMT. Fire ceased at 1955 GMT. Again at 2238 and 2254 GMT, several mortar shells from west side of Canal were observed.

"(b) At 2033 hours GMT, observers at OP Silver observed one flare fired by UAR forces from west to east side of Canal.

"(c) At 2039 hours GMT, observers at OP Echo observed mortar fire and flares from west to east side of Canal. Fire ceased at 2041 GMT.

"4. Complaints by the parties prior to the main exchange of fire are set forth in paragraph 1 above. Statements by the parties following the outbreak of the main exchange of fire are outlined below:

"(a) Statements by UAR authorities: senior UAR liaison officer reported:

"(i) At 1615 hours GMT, UAR stopped all firing but in Suez and Tawfiq area shooting continued by Israel forces from east to west.

"(ii) At 1720 hours GMT, three tanks fired from east side north of OP Blue towards Tawfiq.

"(iii) At 1923 hours GMT, firing by Israel forces in OP Silver area from east to west.

"(b) Statements by Israel authorities: assistant IDF liaison officer reported:

"(i) At 1350 hours GMT, artillery fire by UAR forces was initiated from west to east of Canal, in Tawfiq and OP Gold areas.

"(ii) At 1420 hours GMT, UAR initiated artillery fire from west to east side in OP Juliet area.

"(iii) At 1955 hours GMT, UAR initiated artillery fire from west to east side in OP Yellow area.

"5. Casualties and damage report:

"A. United Nations:

"(a) Damage to buildings and facilities:

"(i) At OP Violet: building damaged with all windows and doors broken.

"(ii) At OP Yellow: minor damage with some windows broken.

"(iii) At OP Silver: main radio not working. Numerous splinter holes and fragmentation damage to OP caravan.

"(iv) At OP Gold: caravan which was put into position 11 March completely destroyed. Minor damage to antenna and radio system.

"(v) At OP Red: both caravans badly damaged and all furniture and equipment of caravans destroyed. Both radio sets are out of order. Main antenna mast and one generator destroyed.

- "(vi) At OP Delta: heavy weapons impacts on the house which supports OP platform.
 - "(vii) At OP Echo: main antenna mast broken. Numerous windows in OP blown out by blast impact.
 - "(viii) At OP Juliet: some windows broken and other light damage.
 - "(ix) At Kantara control centre: fragmentation damage and windows broken.
 - "(x) All OPs in Canal area are manned and in contact with the control centres. However, communications capability between OPs and control centres and between control centres and UNTSO headquarters has been reduced. UNTSO still has one channel of communication between all installations, and repair teams are making necessary repairs.
 - "(b) Damage to vehicles:
 - "(i) Two vehicles located at OP Violet are moderately damaged with radiator and wind-shield and radios broken. Other minor damage.
 - "(ii) One vehicle at OP Yellow damaged with punctures in tires, cooling system and engine assembly.
 - "(iii) One vehicle at OP Silver with punctured radiator.
 - "(iv) Many vehicles damaged at Kantara control centre.
 - "(v) A number of other vehicles have sustained light to moderate damage from fragmentation and blast, but detailed assessment has not yet been completed.
 - "(c) Injuries to personnel:
 - "One United Nations military observer received very light cuts and abrasions on the right side of face at OP Juliet.
 - "B. Israel forces: assistant IDF liaison officer reported that one Israel soldier was killed and one wounded.
 - "C. UAR forces: senior UAR liaison officer did not furnish casualties and damage report."
2. The following report concerning firing in the Suez Canal sector on 12 March was submitted by General Bull at 1243 hours GMT on 12 March:
- "Summary of reported breaches of the cease-fire for 12 March from 0001 to 1130 hours GMT:
- "1. Firing across the Canal observed and reported by United Nations Military Observers:
 - "From OP Pink: machine-gun fire by UAR forces at 1052 hours GMT and mortar fire or anti-tank fire at 1118 GMT, and tank fire by Israel forces at 1120 GMT.
 - "2. Observers reported firing heard in immediate proximity of the Canal:
 - "(a) By OP Red: firing by UAR forces at 0726 hours GMT.
 - "(b) By OP Pink: firing by UAR forces at 1005 and 1036 hours GMT.
 - "(c) By OP Yellow: machine-gun fire by UAR forces at 1017, 1033 and 1039 hours GMT.
 - "(d) By OP Lima: machine-gun fire by Israel forces at 1035 and 1038 hours GMT.

- "3. Complaints by assistant IDF liaison officer:
 - "(a) In OP Red area: firing across Canal at 0655, 0827, 1035, 1045 and 1130 hours GMT.
 - "(b) In OP Pink area: firing across Canal at 1000, 1035, 1045 and 1052 hours GMT.
 - "(c) In OP Yellow area: firing across Canal at 1017 and 1054 hours GMT.
 - "(d) In OP Silver area: firing across Canal at 1010 and 1116 hours GMT.
- "4. Complaints by senior UAR liaison officer:
 - "(a) In OP Lima area: firing across Canal at 0555 hours GMT.
 - "(b) In OP Mike area: firing across Canal at 1010 hours GMT."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.139

[Original text: English]
[12 March 1969]

With reference to the firing reported in document S/7930/Add.138, paragraph 2, the following report concerning further firing in the Suez Canal sector on 12 March 1969 was submitted by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, on the same day at 1530 hours GMT:

"1. Firing across the Canal observed and reported by United Nations military observers:

"(a) From OP Gold: At 1130 hours GMT and from 1427 to 1429 GMT, tank fire by Israel forces.

"(b) From OP Pink: firing by UAR forces with automatic weapons at 1131, 1312 and 1316 hours GMT; at 1226 GMT, from 1233 to 1235 GMT and at 1417 GMT, mortar fire. By Israel forces: at 1130 and 1227 GMT, tank fire; at 1312 and 1315 GMT, machine-gun fire.

"2. Firing heard by observers but origin of fire not confirmed:

"(a) From OP Kilo: at 1117, 1130, 1138, 1225, 1234 and 1318 hours GMT, observers reported explosions on both east and west banks north of OP. Also reported between 0947 and 1318 GMT, sporadic small arms fire to north of OP.

"(b) From OP Lima: confirmed explosions to north of OP at 1119 and 1130 hours GMT.

"3. Assistant IDF liaison officer reported firing across Canal by UAR forces with machine-guns, mortars and anti-tank weapons between 1140 and 1422 hours GMT as follows: in OP Pink area on twelve occasions; in OP Silver area on two occasions; in OP Red area on one occasion.

"4. Senior UAR liaison officer reported firing across the Canal by Israel forces with machine-guns and tanks between 1115 and 1330 hours GMT as follows: in OP Pink area on six occasions; in OPs Blue and Silver areas on one occasion each."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.140

[Original text: English]
[13 March 1969]

1. The following report concerning firing in the Suez Canal sector on 13 March 1969 was submitted by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, on the same day at 1630 hours GMT:

"Summary of reported breaches of the cease-fire on 13 March from 0001 to 1500 hours GMT:

"1. United Nations-observed firing across the Canal reported by OP Pink:

"(a) By UAR forces: small arms fire at 0925, 0930 and 0934 hours GMT.

"(b) By Israel forces: two tank gun rounds at 1153 hours GMT; artillery fire at 1426 GMT; one tank gun round at 1500 GMT.

"2. United Nations reports of exchanges of fire: From OP Pink: at 1153 hours GMT, mortar, tank and machine-gun fire by UAR forces; at 1204 GMT, artillery fire by Israel forces. Fire by Israel forces ceased at 1245 GMT and by UAR forces at 1250 GMT.

"3. United Nations-reported firings heard in immediate proximity of the Canal: OP Mike reported machine-gun fire by UAR forces at 0909 hours GMT.

"4. The assistant IDF liaison officer reported firing across the Canal by UAR forces as follows:

"(a) In OP Pink area: rifle fire at 0925, 0930, 0934, 0939 and 1200 hours GMT; anti-tank and rifle fire at 1420 GMT.

"(b) In OP Silver area: rifle fire at 0930 hours GMT.

"(c) In OP Hotel area: rifle fire at 0932 hours GMT.

"(d) In OP Blue area: rifle fire at 0932 hours GMT.

"5. Senior UAR liaison officer reported firing across the Canal by Israel forces as follows:

"In OP Pink area: artillery fire at 1155 hours GMT; mortar fire at 1215 GMT; tank gun fire at 1230 GMT; rifle fire at 1340 GMT; tank gun and machine-gun fire at 1410 GMT."

2. Subsequently during the afternoon of 13 March, preliminary reports were received from General Bull concerning further exchanges of fire in the Suez Canal sector, details of which are still awaited.

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.141

*[Original text: English]
[14 March 1969]*

1. With reference to the firing in the Suez Canal sector on 13 March 1969 mentioned in document S/7930/Add.140, paragraph 2, the following summary report thereon was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, on the morning of 14 March:

"Following is summary report on firing in Suez Canal sector 13 March. Earlier firing in the Canal sector on 13 March was referred to in the previous report (see S/7930/Add.140, para. 1):

"1. Summary of reports from observation posts:

"(a) From OP Pink: at 1520 hours GMT, United Nations military observers observed tank fire by Israel forces and at 1523 GMT they observed mortar fire by UAR forces. Fire continued intermittently and fire by Israel forces ceased at 1623 GMT and by UAR forces at 1635 GMT.

"(b) From OP Delta: at 1531 hours GMT, observers observed machine-gun fire by Israel forces and at 1532 GMT machine-gun fire by UAR forces.

Fire by Israel forces ceased at 1542 GMT and by UAR forces at 1607 GMT.

"(c) From OP Charlie: at 1532 hours GMT, observers observed mortar and machine-gun fire by Israel forces and immediately thereafter mortar and machine-gun fire by UAR forces. Fire by both parties ceased at 1610 GMT.

"(d) From OP Lima: observers observed machine-gun fire by Israel forces at 1535 hours GMT and small arms fire by UAR forces at 1555 GMT. Moderate exchange of light and medium weapons fire continued until 1635 GMT, when Israel forces ceased fire. UAR forces ceased fire at 1715 GMT.

"(e) From OP Mike: at 1538 hours GMT, observers observed mortar fire by UAR forces and at 1543 GMT heavy artillery fire by Israel forces in direction of the Suez refineries. Heavy weapons fire continued and fire by Israel forces ceased at 1657 GMT and by UAR forces at 1716 GMT. Firing recommenced by Israel forces at 1727 GMT and by UAR forces at 1734 GMT. Both parties used mortars, and fire by Israel forces ceased at 1731 GMT and by UAR forces at 1735 GMT. Tank fire by Israel forces observed at 1755 GMT and mortar fire by UAR forces at 1759 GMT.

"(f) From OP Blue: at 1538 hours GMT, observers observed mortar and machine-gun fire by UAR forces. Observers then had to go to shelter and did not observe beginning of fire by Israel forces but confirmed fire by Israel forces at 1658 GMT. Intermittent fire continued in this area until 1715 GMT, when fire by Israel forces ceased. Fire by UAR forces ceased at 1718 GMT. At 1811 GMT, one rifle shot by Israel forces observed and at 1837 GMT one mortar round by UAR forces observed.

"(g) From OP Violet: at 1536 hours GMT, observers observed tank and artillery fire by Israel forces and at 1545 GMT rocket fire by Israel forces. They observed anti-tank, mortar and machine-gun fire by UAR forces at 1548 GMT. Exchange of light and heavy weapons fire continued until 1644 GMT when fire by Israel forces ceased. Fire by UAR forces ceased at 1650 GMT. Anti-tank and machine-gun fire by UAR forces observed at 1722 GMT.

"(h) From OP Hotel: at 1541 hours GMT, observers observed artillery fire by Israel forces and at 1545 GMT artillery fire by UAR forces. Intermittent artillery fire was exchanged and fire by UAR forces ceased at 1658 GMT and by Israel forces at 1701 GMT.

"(i) From OP Foxtrot: at 1541 hours GMT, observers observed heavy artillery fire by Israel forces and at 1601 GMT artillery fire by UAR forces. Exchange of artillery fire continued and fire by UAR forces ceased at 1640 GMT and by Israel forces at 1701 GMT.

"(j) From OP Copper: at 1536 hours GMT, observers observed artillery fire by Israel forces and at 1548 GMT machine-gun fire by UAR forces. Intermittent exchange of light and heavy weapons fire continued until 1645 GMT, when fire by Israel forces ceased. Fire by UAR forces ceased at 1649 GMT.

"(k) From OP Echo: at 1543 hours GMT, observers observed mortar and artillery fire by Israel forces and at 1548 GMT mortar fire by UAR forces. Fire by Israel forces ceased at 1644 GMT and by UAR forces at 1652 GMT. One tank round was fired by Israel forces at 1720 GMT and was followed by machine-gun fire by UAR forces. Firing by both parties ceased at 1723 GMT.

"(l) From OP Gold: at 1535 hours GMT, tank gun and mortar fire by Israel forces was observed. At 1545 GMT, mortar fire by UAR forces was observed. Israel forces ceased fire before 1715 GMT; exact time not observed. UAR ceased fire at 1715 GMT.

"(m) From OP Silver: at 1551 hours GMT, observers observed mortar fire by Israel forces and at 1553 GMT artillery fire by UAR forces. Fire in this area by both parties ceased at 1714 GMT.

"(n) From OP Yellow: at 1552 hours GMT, observers observed a short burst of machine-gun fire by Israel forces. At 1603 GMT, they observed mortar fire by UAR forces. Israel forces did not fire after 1552 GMT and UAR forces ceased fire at 1713 GMT.

"(o) From OP Red: at 1535 hours GMT observers observed artillery or heavy weapons fire by Israel forces and at 1545 GMT there was an exchange of artillery fire. Israel forces ceased fire before 1715 GMT; exact time not observed. UAR ceased fire at 1715 GMT.

"(p) From OP Kilo: at 1620 hours GMT, observers observed machine-gun fire by Israel forces and at 1632 GMT machine-gun and artillery fire by UAR forces. An exchange of light and heavy weapons fire continued until 1700 GMT, when fire by Israel forces ceased. Fire by UAR forces ceased at 1708 GMT.

"(q) From OP Green: at 1752 hours GMT, observers observed mortar and machine-gun fire by UAR forces and at 1753 GMT tank gun fire by Israel forces. There was a heavy exchange of firing in this area and fire by Israel forces ceased at 1814 GMT and by UAR forces at 1842 GMT.

"2. Cease-fire proposals:

"(a) Cease-fire for 1715 hours GMT proposed by UNTSO at 1559 GMT. Accepted by senior Israel representative at 1635 GMT and by senior UAR liaison officer at 1700 GMT. At cease-fire time there was a lull in firing all along Canal but fire later recommenced in the OP Green and OP Mike areas, as noted in paragraph 1.

"(b) New cease-fire proposed by UNTSO for OP Green and OP Mike areas for 1845 hours GMT. Accepted by senior Israel representative at 1825 GMT and by senior UAR liaison officer by 1831 GMT. Cease-fire was effective with last firing in OP Green area at 1842 GMT.

"3. Statements by the parties:

"(a) Assistant IDF liaison officer alleged firing of two flares from west side of Canal in vicinity of OP Pink at 1853 hours GMT.

"(b) Senior UAR liaison officer alleged Israel forces fired from east bank as follows:

"(i) At 1520 hours GMT, artillery fire in OP Pink area at a civilian train.

"(ii) At 1535 hours GMT and again at 1750 GMT, artillery fire in OP Hotel area.

"(iii) At 1730 hours GMT, tank and machine-gun fire in OP Blue area.

"(iv) At 1755 and 1800 hours GMT, artillery and mortar fire in OP Mike area.

"(v) At 1800 hours GMT, artillery and mortar fire in OP Green area.

"4. Casualties and damage reports:

"(a) UNTSO: blast damage to building at Kantara control centre and radio antenna damaged. No other damage reported, subject to confirmation morning of 14 March.

"(b) Israel forces: Assistant IDF liaison officer reported that two soldiers were slightly wounded.

"(c) UAR forces: no report given."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.142

[Original text: English]

[18 March 1969]

The following report concerning firing in the Suez Canal sector on 18 March 1969 was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, on the same day:

"Summary of reports from United Nations military observers and complaints from the parties on 18 March:

"1. Reports from observers and complaints from the parties not included in the reports of exchanges of fire in paragraph 2 below:

"(a) Reports from observation posts:

"(i) From OP Pink: tank fire by Israel forces between 0545 and 0546 hours GMT, between 0641 and 0645 GMT, and between 1022 and 1112 GMT.

"(ii) From OP Lima: heavy artillery fire by UAR forces between 1023 and 1126 hours GMT.

"(b) Assistant IDF liaison officer reported breaches of cease-fire between 0110 and 1237 hours GMT, as follows:

"(i) In OP Blue area: at 0110 hours GMT, three rifle shots; at 0941 GMT, artillery fire.

"(ii) In OP Silver area: at 0400 hours GMT, two rifle shots.

"(iii) In OP Pink area: at 0523 and 0640 hours GMT, a few rifle shots; at 1237 GMT, machine-gun fire.

"(c) Senior UAR liaison officer reported breaches of cease-fire by Israel forces as follows:

"(i) In OP Pink area: between 0515 and 0530 hours GMT and at 0628 GMT, tank fire towards a train.

"(ii) In OP Mike area: at 0942 and 0958 hours GMT, tank fire; at 1125 GMT, single artillery rounds.

"2. OP reports of exchanges of fire:

"(a) From OP Kilo:

"(i) At 0521 hours GMT, United Nations military observers observed tank fire by Israel forces and at 0532 GMT mortar fire by UAR forces. Firing by both parties ceased at 0539 GMT.

"(ii) At 1022 hours GMT, observers observed tank fire by Israel forces and artillery fire by UAR forces; firing started simultaneously. Firing by UAR forces ceased at 1032 GMT and by Israel forces before 1045 GMT (exact time not confirmed). Mortar fire by UAR forces was observed between 1050 and 1104 GMT.

"(b) From OP Blue:

"(i) At 0941 hours GMT, observers observed tank fire by Israel forces and at 0947 GMT mortar fire by UAR forces. At 1003 GMT, both parties used artillery. Firing by Israel forces ceased at 1114 GMT and by UAR forces at 1133 GMT.

"(ii) Firing recommenced at 1146 hours GMT, when observers observed tank fire by Israel forces, immediately followed by mortar fire by UAR forces. Firing by both parties ceased at 1150 GMT.

"(c) From OP Mike: at 0943 hours GMT, observers observed tank fire by Israel forces and at 0946 GMT artillery fire by UAR forces. Firing by Israel forces ceased at 1115 GMT and by UAR forces at 1122 GMT.

"(d) From OP Gold: at 1023 hours GMT, observers observed tank and mortar fire by UAR forces and at 1048 GMT artillery fire by Israel forces. Firing by Israel forces ceased at 1121 GMT and by UAR forces at 1126 GMT.

"(e) From OP Red: at 1031 hours GMT, observers observed artillery and tank fire by Israel forces and at 1036 GMT mortar and tank fire by UAR forces. Firing by Israel forces ceased at 1056 GMT and by UAR forces at 1127 GMT.

"3. Cease-fire proposal: cease-fire time for 1115 hours GMT was proposed by Kantara control centre. Accepted by senior UAR liaison officer at 1033 GMT and by senior Israel representative at 1043 GMT. Cease-fire was generally effective at 1150 GMT.

"4. Casualties and damage:

"(a) United Nations: nil.

"(b) Israel: three soldiers slightly wounded.

"(c) UAR: no reports received."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.143

*[Original text: English]
[24 March 1969]*

1. The following reports on firing in the Suez Canal sector have been received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, on the morning of 24 March 1969:

(a) First report, sent at 0721 hours GMT on 24 March:

"Shooting with heavy weapons has broken out in area of OPs Blue (MR 7677-8055), Mike (MR 7657-8037) and Kilo (MR 7660-8225). Cease-fire proposed for 0800 GMT. Report will follow."

(b) Second report, sent at 0932 hours GMT:

"Cease-fire for 0800 GMT was not effective and heavy fire has now spread along Canal from Kantara south to Suez. New cease-fire has been proposed for 1000 GMT."

(c) Third report, sent at 1155 hours GMT:

"At 1045 GMT, all OPs reported NTR (nothing to report). Summary report of incidents follows."

2. Further information will be conveyed to the Security Council when received.

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.144

*[Original text: English]
[24 March 1969]*

With reference to the firing in the Suez Canal sector on 24 March 1969 dealt with in the preliminary reports set forth in document S/7930/Add.143, the following final summary report on these firings has been received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull:

"Summary of reports of firing and exchanges of fire on 24 March:

"1. Summary of reports from observation posts:

"(a) From OP Pink:

"(i) At 0424 hours GMT, two explosions heard and smoke seen coming up on east side of Canal 500 metres south of OP.

"(ii) At 0600 hours GMT, one explosion heard approximately three kilometres south of OP. Sounded like mine explosion. OP Gold reported that this explosion took place on east side of Canal (see sub-para. (c) below).

"(iii) Exchange of fire: At 0647 hours GMT, artillery and mortar fire by Israel forces. At 0744 GMT, artillery and mortar fire by UAR forces. Firing by UAR forces ceased at 0901 GMT and by Israel forces at 1001 GMT.

"(b) From OP Kilo:

"(i) At 0600 hours GMT, two heavy explosions caused by UAR fire observed on east side close to Canal, one kilometre south-east of OP.

"(ii) Exchange of fire: At 0639 hours GMT, anti-tank gun and anti-tank rocket fire by UAR forces. At 0700 GMT, artillery and mortar fire by Israel forces. Fire by both parties ceased at 0757 GMT.

"(iii) At 0840 hours GMT, anti-tank fire by UAR forces. Firing ceased at 0936 GMT and was again observed at 0959 GMT being carried out by UAR forces with heavy artillery and rockets. Firing ceased at 1001 GMT.

"(c) From OP Gold:

"(i) At 0600 hours GMT, one big explosion observed on east side of Canal five kilometres north of OP (see sub-para. (a) above).

"(ii) Exchange of fire: at 0710 hours GMT, artillery, mortar and tank fire by UAR forces. At 0732 GMT artillery, mortar and tank fire by Israel forces. Fire by Israel forces ceased at 0944 GMT, and by UAR forces at 0947 GMT.

"(d) From OP Blue:

"Exchange of fire: at 0639 hours GMT, artillery, rocket, tank and machine-gun fire by Israel forces. At 0641 GMT, artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire by UAR forces. Fire by both parties ceased at 1000 GMT.

"(e) From OP Mike:

"Exchange of fire: at 0639 hours GMT, mortar, tank and machine-gun fire by Israel forces. At 0644 GMT, mortar and tank fire by UAR forces. At 0707 GMT, artillery fire by Israel forces at refinery in Suez. Fire by Israel forces ceased at 0954 GMT and by UAR forces at 1003 GMT. However, no firing by Israel forces was observed between 0904 and 0934 GMT.

"(f) From OP Red:

"Exchange of fire: at 0709 hours GMT, artillery and mortar fire by UAR forces. At 0733 GMT, tank fire by Israel forces. Fire by Israel forces ceased at 0912 GMT and by UAR forces at 1000 GMT.

"(g) From OP Lima:

"(i) Between 0733 and 0735 hours GMT, anti-aircraft fire by UAR forces.

"(ii) At 0836 hours GMT, tank fire by Israel forces.

"(iii) Exchange of fire: at 0945 hours GMT, artillery and tank fire by Israel forces. At the same time, anti-tank gun and artillery fire by UAR forces. Fire by Israel forces ceased at 0954 GMT and by UAR forces at 0958 GMT.

"(h) From OP Juliet:

"Exchange of fire: at 0833 hours GMT, artillery and mortar fire by UAR forces. At 0905 GMT, heavy weapons fire by Israel forces. Firing by Israel forces ceased at 0922 GMT and by UAR forces at 0955 GMT.

"(i) From OP Hotel:

"Exchange of fire: at 0843 hours GMT, heavy artillery fire by Israel forces. At 0845 GMT, artillery, mortar and tank fire by UAR forces. Firing by both sides ceased at 1026 GMT.

"(j) From OP Echo:

"Exchange of fire: at 0856 hours GMT, Daytime OP Echo observed artillery and mortar fire by Israel forces, and at 0858 GMT artillery and mortar fire by UAR forces. At 0857 GMT, OP Echo observed mortar fire by Israel forces, and at 0900 GMT artillery and mortar fire by UAR forces. Firing from both sides in Daytime OP Echo area ceased at 1002 GMT and at 1000 GMT by Israel forces and 1003 GMT by UAR forces in OP Echo area.

"(k) From OP Yellow:

"Exchange of fire: at 0856 hours GMT, artillery and mortar fire by Israel forces. At 0913 GMT, artillery and mortar fire by UAR forces. Fire by Israel forces ceased at 1002 GMT and by UAR forces at 1006 GMT.

"(l) From OP Violet:

"Exchange of fire: at 0857 hours GMT, artillery, missile and tank fire by Israel forces. At 0858 GMT, artillery, missile and machine-gun fire by UAR forces. Fire by Israel forces ceased at 1002 GMT and by UAR forces at 1004 GMT.

"(m) From OP Silver:

"Exchange of fire: at 0900 hours GMT, artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire by UAR forces. At 0907 GMT, mortar and machine-gun fire by Israel forces. Fire by Israel forces ceased at 0957 GMT and by UAR forces at 1004 GMT.

"(n) From OP Copper:

"Exchange of fire: at 0900 hours GMT, artillery, rocket, mortar and tank fire by Israel forces. At 0901 GMT, artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire by UAR forces. Fire by Israel forces ceased at 1000 GMT and by UAR forces at 1005 GMT.

"(o) From OP Foxtrot:

"(i) Between 0908 and 0935 hours GMT, mortar fire by UAR forces.

"(ii) Between 1014 and 1020 hours GMT, artillery fire by UAR forces.

"(iii) At 1052 hours GMT, one artillery round by UAR forces.

"2. Assistant IDF liaison officer reported following breaches of the cease-fire by UAR forces:

"(a) In OP Pink area: at 0420 hours GMT, two bazooka shells. At 0812 GMT, artillery fire.

"(b) In OPs Red/Gold area: at 0610 hours GMT, a few mines found. Inquiry requested. At 0835, firing (unspecified).

"(c) In OP Blue area: at 0835 hours GMT, firing (unspecified).

"(d) In OP Yellow area: at 0855 hours GMT, artillery fire. At 1014 GMT, one artillery shell.

"(e) In Kantara area: at 0855 hours GMT, artillery fire.

"(f) In OP Foxtrot area: at 1022 hours GMT, artillery fire. At 1025 and 1035 GMT, salvos of artillery fire.

"3. Senior UAR liaison officer reported following breaches of the cease-fire by Israel forces:

"(a) In OP Lima area: at 0420 hours GMT, tank fire. Senior UAR liaison officer also stated that there was no firing from west side of Canal. At 0640 GMT, rocket fire. At 0810 GMT, firing still in progress. Senior UAR liaison officer also stated that there was no firing from west side of Canal.

"(b) In OP Kilo area: at 0810 hours GMT, firing (unspecified). At 0840 GMT, rifle fire.

"(c) In Ismailia area: at 0855 hours GMT, artillery fire.

"4. Cease-fire proposals:

"(a) Cease-fire for 0800 hours GMT proposed by Kantara control centre. Accepted by senior Israel representative through assistant IDF liaison officer at 0715 GMT and by senior UAR liaison officer at 0747 GMT. Cease-fire was not effective.

"(b) A second cease-fire was proposed for 1000 hours GMT. Accepted by senior UAR liaison officer at 0927 GMT and by senior Israel representative at 0930 GMT. Cease-fire was generally effective.

"5. Casualties and damage report.

"(a) UNTSO:

"(i) No casualties.

"(ii) Minor damage to Kantara control centre buildings. Residence No. 1 had at least two direct hits from shells.

"(iii) Shelter mast at Kantara control centre seriously damaged. Four antennae were downed. Antenna at OP Blue also damaged.

"(b) Israel: no reports received.

"(c) UAR: no reports received."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.145

[Original text: English]
[26 March 1969]

1. With reference to the Israel complaint and request for inquiry mentioned in the report on the firing in the Suez Canal sector on 24 March 1969 [see S/7930/Add.144, sub-paragraph 2 (b)], the following summary of inquiry has been received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull:

"Summary of inquiry into alleged explosion south of OP Pink on 24 March at approximately map reference 7664-8223

"1. Inquiry was conducted by two United Nations military observers.

"2. Inquiry commenced at scene of incident at 1325 hours GMT on 25 March and was concluded at 1437 GMT the same day.

"3. Scene of incident was approximately map reference 7664-8223.

"4. Statements of witnesses:

"(a) First witness: Israel forces tank commander stated that on 24 March he was driving along track from south to north and at approximately 0530 hours GMT his tank ran over a mine. No one was wounded. He also stated that the other crew members were not available.

"(b) Second witness: local commander stated that the track had been used on 23 March.

"5. Physical evidence:

"(a) One bogey wheel and one shock absorber and parts of a tank track apparently blown away by explosion.

"(b) Two craters close together, one of 2.5 metres diameter and 45 cms. depth, the other 2 metres diameter and 30 cms. depth.

"(c) No other mines were seen in the area but inquiring United Nations military observers were informed that area had not been cleared for mines.

"(d) Footprints were noticed leading to Canal at kilometre marker 141.2, but they were not clear.

"(e) On the request of the observers to see the tank allegedly damaged, the local commander stated

that tank was not available for inspection because it was in workshop.

"(f) Sketch was made and photographs were taken."

2. With reference to the damage caused by the firing on 24 March [see S/7930/Add.144, sub-para. 5], General Bull has submitted the following supplementary report on the damage suffered by UNTSO:

"1. Kantara control centre:

"(a) Buildings: one building (residence No. 1) was damaged as follows: two rooms not habitable after direct hits in walls facing westwards; hole in ceiling after direct hit; three water tanks punctured but repairable; fifty-four window panes broken.

"(b) Vehicles: three vehicles were damaged in varying degree.

"(c) Others: damage to 400-litre aluminium water tank, generator, spare Chevrolet radiator and portable electric welder.

"2. Ismailia control centre: no damage."

DOCUMENT S/7930/ADD.146

[Original text: English]
[29 March 1969]

The following report concerning the cease-fire in the Israel-Syria sector was received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lt. General Odd Bull, on 29 March 1969:

"1. On 28 March at 1705 hours GMT, United Nations military observers at OP Five (MR 22851-27760), OP Six (MR 22995-28468) and OP Winter (MR 23205-27924) observed mortar fire by Syrian forces from approximately 2,000 metres east of OP Six. Two flares were seen and ten to eleven rounds of mortar fire were clearly heard. Impacts were heard in the Quneitra area (MR 227-281). Firing ceased at 1710 GMT.

"2. At 1710 hours GMT, fire by Israel forces from position at MR 22965-28155 with five bursts of machine-gun fire with tracers was observed. Firing was heard and seen. Target was in the approximate area of the Syrian mortar position mentioned in paragraph 1 above."

DOCUMENT S/8506/ADD.5

Report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of resolution 246 (1968) adopted by the Security Council at its 1397th meeting on 14 March 1968

[Original text: French]
[18 March 1969]

Since the submission of the Secretary-General's report of 31 March 1968 [S/8506] and the first four addenda thereto, issued on 3 and 16 April, 7 May and 10 July 1968 [S/8506/Add.1-4], additional replies to his note of 18 March 1968 have been received from Belgium and France. The substantive parts of those replies are reproduced in the annex to the present document.

ANNEX

Substantive parts of replies received from States Members of the United Nations to the Secretary-General's note of 18 March 1968

[Original text: French]
[12 August 1968]

BELGIUM

Belgium approves the principles which prompted the adoption of Security Council resolution 246 (1968). The point of view of the Belgian Government has been stated repeatedly in very

clear terms. The South African Government is well aware of Belgium's position.

FRANCE

[Original text: French]
[14 October 1968]

Referring to note TR 217/1 of 18 March 1968, in which the Secretary-General requested information on the action taken by the French Government on paragraphs 3 and 4 of Security Council resolution 246 (1968) of 14 March 1968 with regard to the detention and trial of South West Africans, the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations has the honour to confirm that the Ambassador of France to Pretoria has, in this

connexion, made to the South African Government the representations referred to in the letter of 7 February 1968 published in document S/8357/Add.7 of 13 February 1968.

Referring further to the Secretary-General's note No. 100 (3) SOWAF of 14 June 1968 regarding the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2372 (XXII) of 12 June 1968 on South West Africa, the Permanent Mission recalls that France, which had abstained at the time of the vote on that resolution, defined its position in this matter on the occasion of the statement made in the General Assembly by its representative on 27 May 1968.^a

^a 1663rd plenary meeting.

DOCUMENT S/8697/ADD.1⁴

Establishment of a Committee of the Security Council in pursuance of paragraph 20 of Security Council resolution 253 (1968)

Statement by the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[27 January 1969]

The President of the Security Council has the honour to announce that, following consultations with the members of the Council, it has been agreed that, in view of the expiry of India's term of office on the Security Council, Pakistan should replace India as a member of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968).

⁴ For document S/8697, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-third Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1968*.

DOCUMENTS S/8786/ADD.5-7

Report of the Secretary-General in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) adopted by the Security Council at its 1428th meeting on 29 May 1968

DOCUMENT S/8786/ADD.5

[Original text: English, French
and Spanish]
[30 January 1969]

In annex II of his report issued on 28 August 1968 [S/8786] and in the four addenda to that report issued on 25 September, 10 October and 1 and 27 November 1968 [S/8786/Add.1-4], the Secretary-General set out the substantive portions of eighty-six replies received from Governments of States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies in connexion with the implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 253 (1968). Since the circulation of addendum 4 on 27 November 1968 and following renewed requests by the Secretary-General on 5 and 20 November 1968 for information from those States which had not then replied, eleven additional replies have been received, the substantive parts of which are set out in the annex hereto.

ANNEX

Substantive parts of replies received from States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies to the Secretary-General's request for information on the implementation of Security Council resolution 253 (1968)

Canada*

[Original text: English]
[20 January 1969]

As was communicated to the Secretary-General in notes of 12 January 1966 [S/7082], 24 February 1966 [S/7164], 15 February

1967 [S/7747], 21 February 1967 [S/7780], and 23 August 1968 [S/8776], the Canadian Government acted promptly after the unilateral declaration of independence in Rhodesia by taking a series of measures against the illegal régime. These measures included the termination of Canadian economic aid to Rhodesia, the closing of the Canadian Government trade office in Rhodesia, and progressive trade embargoes. A complete ban on trade, with certain humanitarian exceptions, was imposed in February 1966, and remains in force. The Canadian Government also adopted regulations prohibiting activities relating to the commodities to which sanctions apply under the Security Council resolution of 16 December 1966 [232 (1966)] outside Canada by Canadian ships, aircraft and citizens.

When the Canadian representative in the Security Council announced his support for the Security Council resolution of 29 May 1968 [253 (1968)], he stated that implementation might require new regulations. This was found to be so, and the Canadian Government has now adopted measures to ensure full Canadian compliance with its obligations under that resolution. These consist, in part, of existing strict controls on trade. In addition, a new set of "Rhodesia Regulations" has been adopted [reproduced below], replacing and extending those issued as a consequence of Security Council resolution 232 (1966). The new regulations maintain the features of the previous ones, including their extraterritorial applicability, and in addition it is now illegal for Canadians to transmit money to Rhodesia. Another provision is designed to prevent flights by Canadian aircraft to Rhodesia and the co-ordination of air services between Canadian and Rhodesian aircraft. The Canadian Government has taken action under separate legislative authority to implement the Security Council's prohibition on the entry to Canada of persons travelling on Rhodesian passports and of persons, other than Canadians, who have assisted, or may assist, the unlawful actions of the illegal régime.

* Reply previously published under the symbol S/8973.

UNITED NATIONS ACT

United Nations Rhodesia Regulations

P.C. 1968-2339

At the Government House at Ottawa

Friday, the 20th day of December 1968.

Present:

His Excellency the Governor General in Council

Whereas the Security Council of the United Nations, acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter, has by resolution dated 29 May 1968,

(a) Reaffirmed that the present situation in Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security; and

(b) Decided upon certain measures to be employed to give effect to its decisions in the resolution and has called upon all members of the United Nations to apply such measures;

And whereas Canada, as a Member of the United Nations, is obligated by Article 25 of the United Nations Charter to apply such measures;

And whereas it appears to His Excellency the Governor General in Council that the annexed Regulations are necessary to enable such measures to be effectively applied,

Therefore, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and pursuant to section 2 of the United Nations Act, being desirous of fulfilling Canada's obligation under the United Nations Charter, is pleased hereby to revoke the United Nations Rhodesia Regulations made by Order in Council P.C. 1967-323 of 21st February 1967,^a and to make the annexed United Nations Rhodesia Regulations in substitution therefor.

UNITED NATIONS RHODESIA REGULATIONS

Short Title

1. These Regulations may be cited as the United Nations Rhodesia Regulations.

Interpretation

2. In these Regulations:

(a) "Business" in respect of goods means the business of manufacturing, transporting, purchasing, supplying, selling, storing or dealing in those goods;

(b) "Canadian aircraft" means an aircraft registered in Canada under regulations made under the Aeronautics Act;

(c) "Canadian citizen" has the same meaning as in the Canadian Citizenship Act;

(d) "Canadian corporation" means a corporation incorporated in Canada;

(e) "Canadian ship" has the same meaning as in the Canada Shipping Act;

(f) "Master" in respect of a ship has the same meaning as in the Canada Shipping Act;

(g) "Operator" in respect of an aircraft has the same meaning as in the Air Regulations;

(h) "Owner", in respect of a ship, means the registered owner of the ship, a person having a beneficial interest in the ship or a person to whom the ship is chartered, and, in respect of an aircraft, has the same meaning as in the Air Regulations;

(i) "Person" in respect of the doing of any act or thing in any place outside Canada means a Canadian citizen or a Canadian corporation;

(j) "Pilot-in-command" has the same meaning as in the Air Regulations.

Prohibitions

3. (1) No person shall knowingly, in Canada or any other place, sell or supply or attempt to sell or supply any goods that are outside Rhodesia to any person in Rhodesia.

(2) No person shall knowingly do anything, in Canada or any other place, to promote or that is calculated to promote the sale or supply of any goods that are outside Rhodesia to any person in Rhodesia.

(3) For the purposes of this section, "goods" does not include medical supplies, news material, educational equipment and materials for use in schools, universities or other educational institutions, or books, newspapers, magazines or periodicals.

4. No person shall knowingly do anything outside Canada that causes or assists or is intended to cause or assist any shipment, transshipment or diversion of any goods (other than goods of the kind described in sub-section (3) of section 3) to be made, from Canada or any other place, to Rhodesia.

5. No person shall knowingly do anything, in Canada or any other place, that causes or assists or is intended to cause or assist any shipment, transshipment or diversion of any goods produced or manufactured in Rhodesia to be made, from Rhodesia or any other place, to any other place.

6. (1) No person shall knowingly carry on or assist in the carrying on of any business, in Canada or any other place, in respect of any goods produced or manufactured in Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the coming into force of these Regulations.

(2) No person shall knowingly do anything in Canada or any other place, to promote or that is calculated to promote the export from Rhodesia of any goods produced or manufactured in Rhodesia to any other place.

7. No person shall knowingly make or cause to be made any payment, in Canada or any other place.

(a) For or in respect of any goods produced or manufactured in Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the coming into force of these Regulations; or

(b) For or in respect of the carrying on, in Canada or any other place, of any business in respect of any goods produced or manufactured in Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the coming into force of these Regulations.

8. (1) Subject to subsection (2), no person shall knowingly, in Canada or any other place, send, transfer or assign any money or cause any money to be sent, transferred or assigned from outside Rhodesia to any person in Rhodesia.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the sending, transferring or assigning of any money or the causing of any money to be sent, transferred or assigned to any person in Rhodesia,

(a) As payment to or in respect of that person of any pension or annuity benefit; or

(b) For any medical, educational or humanitarian purpose.

(3) In any prosecution for a violation of subsection (1), the burden of establishing that the sending, transferring or assigning of any money or the causing of any money to be sent, transferred or assigned to any person in Rhodesia was for any of the purposes described in subsection (2) shall be on the accused.

9. No owner or master of a Canadian ship shall knowingly carry, or cause or permit to be carried, on the ship, in Canada or any other place.

(a) Any goods produced or manufactured in Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the coming into force of these Regulations; or

(b) Any goods (other than goods of the kind described in subsection (3) section 3)

(i) That are loaded on the ship after the coming into force of these Regulations, and

(ii) That are for delivery to or bound for Rhodesia.

10. No owner, operator or pilot-in-command of a Canadian aircraft shall knowingly carry, or cause or permit to be carried, on the aircraft, in Canada or any other place,

^a SOR/67-93, *Canada Gazette*, part II, vol. 101, No. 5, Mar. 8, 1967.

(a) Any goods produced or manufactured in Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the coming into force of these Regulations; or

(b) Any goods (other than goods of the kind described in subsection (3) of section 3)

(i) That are loaded on the aircraft after the coming into force of these Regulations, and

(ii) That are for delivery to or bound for Rhodesia.

11. No owner, operator or pilot-in-command of a Canadian aircraft shall knowingly fly or allow that aircraft to be flown

(a) From Canada or any other place to Rhodesia, or

(b) From Rhodesia to any other place,

except for the purpose of carrying goods of the kind described in subsection (3) of section 3.

12. No owner, operator or pilot-in-command of a Canadian aircraft shall, in Canada or in any other place, make or knowingly carry out any arrangement or agreement for co-ordinating any air transport services provided by the aircraft with any aircraft services provided by any aircraft registered in Rhodesia or owned by any person in Rhodesia.

Offences

13. (1) Every person who violates any provision of these Regulations is guilty of an offence and liable

(a) Upon summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding three months or to both; or

(b) Upon indictment, to a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding five years or to both.

(2) No person commits an offence under these Regulations by doing an act or thing prohibited by these Regulations if, before he does such act or thing, the Minister of Trade and Commerce certifies to him in writing that, in the opinion of the Minister, United Nations Security Council resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May, 1968 did not intend that the doing of such act or thing be prohibited.

(3) No person commits an offence under these Regulations by doing any act or thing prohibited by these Regulations in respect of

(a) Any goods for the export of which to Rhodesia an export permit has been issued under the Export and Import Permits Act; and

(b) Any goods produced or manufactured in Rhodesia for the importation of which into Canada an import permit has been issued under the Export and Import Permits Act.

14. Where an offence under these Regulations has been committed

(a) In Canada by any corporation carrying on business in Canada, or

(b) Outside Canada by a Canadian corporation,

whether or not the corporation has been prosecuted or convicted for that offence, every person who at the time of the commission of the offence was a director or officer of the corporation and a Canadian citizen or person ordinarily resident in Canada is guilty of the like offence and is liable, on conviction, to the punishment provided for the offence, upon proof that the act or omission constituting the offence took place with his knowledge or consent or that he failed to exercise due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

15. Any proceedings in respect of an offence under these Regulations may be tried and determined by the court having jurisdiction at the place in Canada where the offence was committed or at the place in Canada in which the person charged with the offence is, resides or has an office or place of business at the time of institution of the proceedings or by any other court to which jurisdiction has been lawfully transferred.

16. (1) Where a violation of these Regulations is committed by a person outside of Canada, the prosecution of such

person for such violation may be instituted but not continued except with the consent of the Attorney General of Canada.

(2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall be construed as preventing the arrest or the issue or execution of a warrant for the arrest of any person for an offence under these Regulations or the remanding in custody or on bail of any person charged with such offence.

General

17. Where any person in Canada or any Canadian citizen outside of Canada suffers damage as a result of being prohibited or prevented by these Regulations from

(a) Carrying out a legal obligation imposed on him by a contract, licence or other agreement entered into by him before the coming into force of these Regulations, or

(b) Receiving a benefit to which he is entitled by law under a contract, licence or other agreement entered into by him before the coming into force of these Regulations,

such person may apply to the Government of Canada, through the Minister of Trade and Commerce, for compensation.

Chile*

[Original text: Spanish]
[20 January 1969]

The Government of Chile, in pursuance of its traditional policy of support for the cause of decolonization, has strictly observed the resolutions of the United Nations concerning Southern Rhodesia and, in particular, Security Council resolutions 232 (1966) and 253 (1968), which imposed compulsory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter.

I attach herewith the text of Supreme Decree No. 1.117 of the Ministry of Economy, Development and Reconstruction of 31 August 1968, which was published in the *Diario Oficial de la República* No. 27226, of 11 December 1968 and which implements the provisions of Security Council resolution 253 (1968).

TEXT OF DECREE TRANSMITTED BY LETTER DATED
20 JANUARY 1969

MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION

OFFICE OF THE UNDER-SECRETARY FOR ECONOMY,
DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION

*Implementation of United Nations Security Council
resolution 253 (1968)*

Santiago, 31 August 1968.

Today, the following Decree was issued:

No. 1.117. Bearing in mind:

That in resolution 253 (1968) the Security Council of the United Nations required Member States to adopt a series of measures designed to make effective the sanctions imposed on Southern Rhodesia, in conformity with the provisions of Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter;

That the measures in question are without prejudice to the provisions of Security Council resolution 232 (1966), already put into effect by Chile under Decree No. 740 of 14 June 1967 of this Ministry;

That Article 25 of the United Nations Charter requires Member States to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council;

That it has been the traditional policy of Chile to observe strictly international treaties and agreements, freely entered into;

Having regard to the provisions of the United Nations Charter already quoted, Memorandum No. 1646 of 21 August 1968 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Report No. 102 of 1 July 1968 from the Office of the Legal Adviser to that same Ministry;

*Reply previously published under the symbol S/8984.

1. The Government of Chile declares that it will fully implement United Nations Security Council resolution 253 (1968) imposing sanctions on Southern Rhodesia;

2. Consequently, the Chilean authorities, each within their respective spheres of competence, shall prevent the activities and apply the measures referred to in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Security Council resolution 253 (1968), which provide that all States Members of the United Nations shall:

"3. . . . prevent:

"(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution (whether or not the commodities or products are for consumption or processing in their territories, whether or not they are imported in bond and whether or not any special legal status with respect to the import of goods is enjoyed by the port or other place where they are imported or stored);

"(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export of any commodities or products from Southern Rhodesia; and any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Southern Rhodesia for the purposes of such activities or dealings;

"(c) The shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration or under charter to their nationals, or the carriage (whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across their territories of any commodities or products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution;

"(d) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories of any commodities or products (whether or not originating in their territories, but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, educational equipment and material for use in schools and other educational institutions, publications, news material and, in special humanitarian circumstances, food-stuffs) to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia or to any other person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply;

"(e) The shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration, or under charter to their nationals, or the carriage (whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across their territories of any such commodities or products which are consigned to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia, or to any other person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia;

"4. . . . not make available to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking, including tourist enterprises, in Southern Rhodesia any funds for investment or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from making available to the régime or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Southern Rhodesia except payments exclusively for pensions or for strictly medical, humanitarian or educational purposes or for the provision of news material and in special humanitarian circumstances, food-stuffs;

"5. . . .

"(a) Prevent the entry into their territories, save on exceptional humanitarian grounds, of any person travelling on a Southern Rhodesian passport, regardless of its date of issue, or on a purported passport issued by or on behalf of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia; and

"(b) Take all possible measures to prevent the entry into their territories of persons whom they have reason to believe to be ordinarily resident in Southern Rhodesia and whom they have reason to believe to have furthered or encouraged, or to be likely to further or encourage, the unlawful actions

of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia or any activities which are calculated to evade any measure decided upon in this resolution or resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966;

"6. . . . prevent airline companies constituted in their territories and aircraft of their registration or under charter to their nationals from operating to or from Southern Rhodesia and from linking up with any airline company constituted or aircraft registered in Southern Rhodesia;

"7. . . . give effect to the decisions set out in operative paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted before the date of this resolution."

To be noted, communicated and published. E. Frei M. — Juan de D. Carmona P. — Andrés Zaldívar L. — Gabriel Valdés S. — Edmundo Pérez Z., Minister of the Interior — Máximo Pacheco G., Minister of Public Education — Jaime Castillo V., Minister of Justice — Hugo Trivelli F., Minister of Agriculture — Alejandro Hales J., Minister of Mining — Tulio Marambio M., Minister of Defence — Sergio Ossa Pretot, Minister of Public Works and Transport — Eduardo León V., Minister of Labour and Social Welfare — Juan Hamilton D., Minister of Housing and Urban Development — Ramón Valdivieso D., Minister of Public Health — Victor González, Minister of Land Settlement.

Colombia

[Original text: Spanish]
[7 January 1969]

The Government of Colombia, which supports and respects the decisions of the Security Council embodied in its resolution 253 (1968), has not deemed it necessary to take specific measures with respect to trade with, the supply of commodities or products to or the transit of aircraft or persons to or from Southern Rhodesia, because it has no relations with that country at all. Should there be any change in this state of affairs, the Government of Colombia will of course comply strictly with the above-mentioned resolution.

Greece

[Original text: English]
[4 December 1968]

The Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations has the honour to transmit attached herewith the text, in English, of Emergency Act No. 540/1968, banning transactions with Southern Rhodesia.

Emergency Act No. 540, published in the Government Gazette of the Kingdom of Greece on 13 September 1968, modifies and supplements Emergency Act 95/1967, in order to meet effectively the provisions of resolution 253 (1968) adopted by the Security Council at its 1428th meeting on 29 May 1968 (see also our note dated 24 July 1968) [see S/8786, annex II].

No. PM-921

GOVERNMENT GAZETTE OF THE KINGDOM OF GREECE

Volume 1. Folio No. 203

Published in Athens on 13 September 1968

EMERGENCY ACT No. 540

Subject: Modification and supplementation of Em. Act 95/67 re: Ban on transactions with Southern Rhodesia

WE, CONSTANTINE,

KING OF THE HELLENES

On the recommendation of Our Cabinet of Ministers have decided and ordered and hereby do order as follows:

1. Article 1. The provisions described in articles 1, 2 and 3 of Emergency Act No. 95 of 1967 re: "Ban on (commercial) transactions with Southern Rhodesia" apply on any goods or product originating or destined for Southern Rhodesia and on any other transaction whatsoever with the said country.

2. *Article 2.* (a) It shall not be allowed that services of a commercial, industrial or touristic nature be extended to Southern Rhodesia or to any physical person, or persons, legal entities (corporations) domiciled or having their head office or in any way carrying out business activities in that country.

(b) It also shall not be allowed that any investments be made or any economic funds be placed in Southern Rhodesia or with the persons mentioned above.

(c) Restrictions mentioned above shall not apply with regards to payments of pensions, or funds intended exclusively for health, cultural or humanistic purposes.

3. *Article 3.* It shall be forbidden for regular chartered or hired flights of aircrafts belonging to Greek air companies or companies registered in the registers of the Civil Aviation of Greece or in those of foreign civil aviation companies destined for Southern Rhodesia and vice versa to be carried out.

4. *Article 4.* (a) Contraventions of the provisions of articles 1, 2 and 3 shall be subject to the penalties provided in article 5 of the Emergency Act No. 95 of 1967.

(b) Lawful representatives of persons with legal status or corporations shall be answerable for any contravention of the provisions of this Act as well as those described in articles 1 to 3 of Emergency Act No. 95 of 1967.

5. *Article 5.* The present Act shall take effect as from date of publication in the Government Gazette of the Kingdom of Greece.

Athens, 5 September 1968

IN THE NAME OF THE KING:

Signed: GEORGIOS ZOITAKIS
Regent.

Signed: G. PAPADOPOULOS
President of the Cabinet

Signed: Styl. PATAKOS
First Deputy President of the Cabinet

Signed: Dim. PATILOS
Second Deputy President of the Cabinet

Signed: I. MAKAREZOS — Rodinos ORLANDOS — El. KYRIACOPOULOS — P. TZEVELEKOS — Th. PAPACONSTANTINOU — Adam. ANDROUTSOPOULOS — Epam. TSELOS — Constantine KYPREOS — Sp. LIZARDOS — L. PATRAS — IOANIS HOLEVAS — Apost. VOYADZIS — C. VOVOLINIS — I. M. EVLAMPIOS — NIC. SIORIS — G. GEORGAKELOS — G. TSITSOPOULOS — El. DIMITRAS
(Members of the Cabinet)

Seen, Sealed with the Grand Seal of the State.
Athens, 9 September 1968

Signed: E. KYRIACOPOULOS
Minister of Justice

Indonesia

[Original text: English]
[2 December 1968]

1. Indonesia's position on the situation in Southern Rhodesia was clearly outlined on several occasions by its representatives in the plenary meetings and in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly.

2. The position was reaffirmed by its note No. 107/0128 of 5 February 1968 and its note of 14 February 1967 [S/7746], both addressed to the Secretary-General. In this latter document, the Government of Indonesia stated that it did not maintain any relations whatsoever with the illegal racist régime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia.

3. Indonesia reiterates its position that it does not recognize the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia and that it maintains no relations whatsoever with the Smith régime.

4. The Government of Indonesia states its adherence to and full compliance with the provisions outlined in Security Council resolution 253 (1968) and will accordingly extend its full co-operation in the implementation of the above-mentioned resolution.

Libya*

[Original text: English]
[25 November 1968]

As previously advised in our communications, circulated as official documents on 15 February 1966 [S/7144] and 15 February 1967 [S/7742], and our notes of 29 December 1966 and 25 April 1968 [see S/7718/Add.5, annex II], the policy of the Government of the Kingdom of Libya towards the illegal minority régime in Southern Rhodesia has been clearly defined.

The Government of the Kingdom of Libya has never recognized the illegal régime and have severed all economic relations referred to in paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 253 (1968), imposing a complete ban on all imports from and exports to Southern Rhodesia, including the export of Libyan oil, closing all ports to ships flying the flag of Southern Rhodesia and banning all aircraft of Southern Rhodesia from Libyan air space and airfields. The Government of the Kingdom of Libya is applying without limitation all the measures which the Security Council has decided should be adopted as sanctions against the Southern Rhodesian régime, and has offered moral and material assistance to the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle to achieve their freedom.

It will therefore be evident that the Government of the Kingdom of Libya has already taken all appropriate measures, which fully comply with the relevant provisions and stipulations of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968.

Philippines

[Original text: English]
[6 January 1969]

The Philippines does not maintain any diplomatic, consular, commercial or cultural relations with Southern Rhodesia. A draft executive order implementing Security Council resolution 253 (1968), has been submitted to the appropriate authorities in Manila for their consideration.

Portugal**

[Original text: English]
[2 December 1968]

The Portuguese Government had certain doubts, of both a legal and a procedural nature, regarding the resolution on the question of Rhodesia adopted by the Security Council on 9 April 1966 [221 (1966)], and in order to be able to take a position with respect to that resolution it addressed a letter to you on 27 April 1966 [S/7277], in which it submitted the queries to which the resolution had given rise.

No reply to the questions submitted at that time was received.

In notes dated 14 May, 29 July and 20 September 1966 addressed to the Security Council itself, the Portuguese Government pressed its request for the necessary clarification.

Those communications from the Portuguese Government elicited no response.

Nevertheless, the Portuguese Government, still seeking elucidation with regard to the important problems in question, reiterated its doubts and its request for clarification in its communication of 3 February 1967 [see S/7781, annex II], and again on 20 March 1968 [S/8481], it addressed a further note to the Security Council in which it once more requested that august body to take a position with regard to the serious questions raised by Portugal.

The Security Council likewise did not deign to reply to those two most recent Portuguese notes.

* Reply previously published under the symbol S/8915.

** Reply previously published under the symbol S/8913.

The Council's silence with regard to this matter compels the Portuguese Government to conclude that that organ of the United Nations is either unable to reply to the questions submitted or actually afraid to consider them because to do so would reveal profound and irreconcilable differences between the members of the Council, in particular its permanent members. These aspects of the matter, however, in no way concern the Portuguese Government.

In the circumstances, and since the Security Council is unable or unwilling to make clear its position with regard to the points which have given rise to concern on the part of the Portuguese Government, it is difficult to see how Portugal can be asked to take a position on problems and questions which the Council refuses to consider. Nevertheless, the Portuguese Government is ready to state its position when the Security Council or the Secretariat sees fit to reply to the numerous communications referred to above, which for all necessary purposes are deemed to be reproduced here.

Thailand

[Original text: English]
[9 January 1969]

The Government of Thailand has already taken the following steps to implement the Security Council resolutions on Rhodesia, in compliance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 253 (1968).

The Government of Thailand has, first of all, condemned the unilateral declaration of independence made by the racist minority, does not recognize the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, and has refrained from entertaining any diplomatic, economic, trade or other relations with that illegal authority.

The Government of Thailand supports and has enforced a total ban on imports from and exports to Southern Rhodesia. In connexion with the implementation of paragraph 5 of resolution 253 (1968), the Thai Government has taken action to deny entry visas for the holders of Southern Rhodesia passports. Concerning shipment in vessels or aircraft, in connexion with paragraph 3 (c) and (e) of the resolution, Thailand has no relation of any sort with Southern Rhodesia on this matter.

In conclusion, therefore, the Government of Thailand has examined all the provisions of the aforesaid resolution and found that the measures adopted by the Thai Government on this matter are adequate to ensure its full implementation.

Trinidad and Tobago

[Original text: English]
[3 December 1968]

The Government of Trinidad and Tobago had earlier implemented Security Council resolution 232 (1966) and now fully supports the stand taken by the Security Council in resolution 253 (1968) condemning the actions of the present régime in Southern Rhodesia, and in accordance with the provisions of that resolution does not maintain any relations, trade or diplomatic, with the illegitimate régime in Southern Rhodesia.

Turkey

[Original text: English]
[13 December 1968]

It will be recalled that on 11 April 1967 you were informed [S/7850] of the measures instituted by the Turkish Government for forbidding the importation from and exportation to Southern Rhodesia of the commodities enumerated in paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 232 (1966).

In connexion with the implementation of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 253 (1968), the Turkish Government has taken immediate action to deny visa and to refuse entry into Turkey to the holders of Southern Rhodesian passports, and declare these passports invalid, as of 17 June 1968. This was duly communicated to you on 6 August 1968 [see S/8786, annex II].

As to further measures connected with the implementation of resolution 253 (1968), I have the honour to enclose the Turkish Government Decree in its original Turkish.*

DOCUMENT S/8786/ADD.6

[Original text: English, French, Russian
and Spanish]
[3 March 1969]

1. By notes dated 7 June 1968, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) to all States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies, drawing attention to the Council's request to them to report on measures taken to implement the resolution. On 5 November 1968, the Secretary-General renewed his request for information from those States which had not as yet replied, and again on 20 November, in compliance with a request made by the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968), he urgently reiterated that request.

2. In his report [S/8786] on the implementation of resolution 253 (1968) and in five addenda thereto, issued on 28 August, 25 September, 10 October, 1 November and 27 November 1968 and 30 January 1969 [S/8786/Add.1-5], the Secretary-General has set out the substantive portions of ninety-seven replies received from Governments of States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies.

3. As is indicated in its report to the Security Council of 30 December 1968 [S/8954], the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) requested the Secretary-General to issue a further appeal to those States which had still not reported to do so without delay, and to invite all States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies to provide information on any further measures taken by them since their last reports. In response to that request, the Secretary-General addressed a note on 22 January 1969 to all States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies.

4. Since the publication of the fifth addendum on 30 January 1969, the Secretary-General has received fourteen additional replies concerning the implementation of the resolution. Of these fourteen, two (from Hungary and Mauritania) were simple acknowledgements of the note of 22 January. Five States (Greece, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia and Switzerland) had nothing further to add to their previous reports. The substantive parts of the remaining seven replies are set out hereunder.

ANNEX

Substantive parts of replies received from States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies to the Secretary-General's request for information on the implementation of Security Council resolution 253 (1968)

COSTA RICA

[Original text: Spanish]
[7 February 1969]

The delegation of Costa Rica has on many occasions reiterated the position of the Government of Costa Rica — namely, that it does not recognize or maintain relations of any kind

* Retained in the Registry files of the United Nations Secretariat.

with the unlawful and racist régime in Southern Rhodesia. This position is consistent with Costa Rica's traditional attitude to the process of the self-determination of peoples and the struggle against all forms of racial discrimination. Costa Rica has backed up its statements and declarations with deeds, since it does not have any kind of relations with the régime in power in Southern Rhodesia, and does not wish to have any relations until the Zimbabwe people has regained all its rights. Also, in regard to the sanctions imposed by the Security Council, Costa Rica shares the opinion of a large majority of Member States that sanctions are an appropriate means of compelling the racist minority in Rhodesia to discharge its obligations to the Zimbabwe people and to the international community.

Accordingly, the Government of Costa Rica has not taken any specific measure in regard to Southern Rhodesia, since there is no need to do so, in view of the total lack of contact with the unlawful régime which is in power in that country. However, Costa Rica has proved that it is ready to make sacrifices in order to help give effect to the principles and intentions of the United Nations, particularly those relating to the inalienable right of peoples to independence and to the full exercise of their fundamental rights and freedoms. For instance, in the case of *apartheid*, Costa Rica broke off commercial relations with the Republic of South Africa, though the trade balance in these relations was favourable at the time when it did so.

Costa Rica has fully demonstrated its concern for the situation in Southern Rhodesia, not only because fundamental principles of the Charter relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms are being violated in that country, but also because the authority of the United Nations is being flouted and the inalienable right of the Zimbabwe people to determine its fate in complete freedom and independence is thereby being impaired.

CYPRUS

[Original text: English]
[6 February 1969]

As will be noticed from the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus of 6 July 1968 [see S/8786, annex II], Cyprus is already fully implementing the above-mentioned relevant Security Council resolution.

The Ministry wishes further to refer the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the monthly statistical data on imports and exports of the Republic of Cyprus, which are regularly being dispatched to him, in compliance with his note No. PO 230 SORH (i) of 11 March 1968; the last one bears the reference No. 83986/434/68 and is dated 23 December 1968, and it is clearly shown therein that the Republic of Cyprus has completely ceased any trade whatsoever with the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia.

The Secretary-General will pertinently notice from this and the above-mentioned reports to him, that the Republic of Cyprus has taken all the necessary measures, in full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolution.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA*

[Original text: English]
[3 February 1969]

As is evident from the documents issued by the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic [S/7167, S/7757, S/7892] in connexion with Security Council resolutions 217 (1965) and 232 (1966), the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic does not recognize the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and does not maintain either diplomatic or other relations with it. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has met the requirements contained in paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 253 (1968), since it does not maintain any trade relations with Southern Rhodesia. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations about the severance of trade relations with Southern Rhodesia in the letter of its Permanent

Representative to the United Nations dated 25 February 1966 [S/7167]. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has neither consular nor trade representation in Southern Rhodesia. Likewise, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has not granted any capital funds or any other financial means to the Rhodesian régime or to enterprises and institutions in Southern Rhodesia. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has also fulfilled the requirements contained in resolution 253 (1968) concerning the transportation of goods, and the Czechoslovak Air Lines do not operate in Southern Rhodesia. Similarly, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has taken the measures required in paragraph 5 of that resolution.

It follows from the above-mentioned facts that the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, in conformity with Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, has fulfilled all the provisions of Security Council resolution 253 (1968). The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic expresses its full support for the measures taken by the United Nations in order to help the people of Southern Rhodesia to attain the exercise of its inalienable rights confirmed in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

IRAN

[Original text: English]
[4 February 1969]

In line with its policy aimed at bringing about the speedy liquidation of colonialism everywhere, and maintaining its support of the people of Southern Rhodesia in their legitimate struggle to achieve their freedom and independence, the Government of Iran has put into operation in particular, the following measures:

1. As indicated previously in the communication 322/116/21 of 27 March 1967 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, the Council of Ministers of Iran adopted, on 20 March 1967, a decree providing for imposition of a ban on exports to and imports from Southern Rhodesia, in accordance with Security Council resolution 232 (1967) of 16 December 1967.

2. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968, the Council of Ministers of Iran, on 27 July 1968, adopted another decree which provides for the total and full prohibition of all trade and transactions with Southern Rhodesia in accordance with that resolution, and to this end issued instructions to:

(a) The Ministries of Economics, Finance, Interior and Roads and Communications, as well as the customs and police authorities and the central and other banks, to ensure the implementation of the provisions of paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the same resolution;

(b) The Ministry of Posts, Telephones and Telegraphs to prevent any postal, telephonic or telegraphic communications with Southern Rhodesia.

In light of the foregoing, the Government of Iran has no relations with the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia and has thus taken the necessary measures to carry out the provisions of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968.

MONGOLIA

[Original text: English]
[21 February 1969]

The Mongolian People's Republic does not maintain any relations whatsoever with the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia.

The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic will continue firmly to pursue its policy which is in full conformity with the stipulations of resolution 253 (1968) of the Security Council.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Original text: Russian]
[10 February 1969]

The position of the Soviet Union on the question of Southern Rhodesia has been repeatedly explained in the statements of

* Reply previously published under the symbol S/8996.

the Soviet delegation both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council, and in particular is set forth in the notes verbales of the Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations dated 5 and 8 August 1968, contained in documents S/7781/Add.5, S/8736, in the Tass statement issued as a Security Council document [S/8920] and as a General Assembly document^a on 6 December 1968.

Regarding the appeal by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to States Members of the United Nations to provide information on the quantities of tobacco from Southern Rhodesia held in their territories, and the importation of Rhodesian tobacco under forged documents, the Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations has the honour to state that the Soviet Union does not import Southern Rhodesian tobacco and that there is, and can be, no such tobacco in its territory.

The Soviet Union also does not provide the Southern Rhodesian authorities with any television or other material, the sale or supply of which is prohibited under paragraph 3 (d) of Security Council resolution 253 (1968).

The Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations would like to take this opportunity to assure the Secretary-General once again that the Soviet Union, which is scrupulously carrying out the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia, is prepared to continue to co-operate in the implementation of those resolutions and does not intend to maintain any relations with the racist régime in Salisbury, whatever mask it hides behind.

UPPER VOLTA

[Original text: French]
[14 February 1969]

The Upper Volta does not maintain relations of any kind with Rhodesia, pursuant to Decree No. 67-107/PRES/AET of 11 May 1967 imposing sanctions against that country.

DOCUMENT S/8786/ADD.7

[Original text: English/French/Russian/Spanish]
[19 March 1969]

In annex II of his report issued on 28 August 1968 [S/8786] and in the six addenda to that report, issued on 25 September, 10 October, 1 and 27 November 1968, 30 January and 3 March 1969 [S/8786 Add.1-6], the Secretary-General set out the substantive portions of 104 replies received from Governments of States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies in connexion with the implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 253 (1968). Since the circulation of addenda 6 on 3 March 1969, 14 additional replies have been received. One State (Mauritius) had nothing further to add to its previous report. The substantive parts of the remaining 13 replies are set out hereunder.

ANNEX

Substantive parts of replies received from States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies to the Secretary-General's request for information on the implementation of Security Council resolution 253 (1968)

Albania

[Original text: French]
[25 February 1969]

As it declared in its statement of 16 November 1965, the Government of the People's Republic of Albania has not recognized and will not recognize the reactionary Smith Government and has not had and will never have any relations with it.

The Government of the People's Republic of Albania, true to its principled policy of full support for national liberation, anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist movements, has always vigorously condemned and condemns the unlawful act of Ian Smith's racist clique in "proclaiming independence", its atrocities against the Zimbabwe people, and the actions of its masters, the imperialist and colonialist Powers, against that people's vital interests. It reaffirms its solidarity with and support for the Zimbabwe people in its just struggle for national and social liberation.

Cambodia

[Original text: French]
[21 February 1969]

The Royal Government of Cambodia maintains no relations with the present Government of Southern Rhodesia, the régime of which is considered illegal.

Ecuador

[Original text: Spanish]
[26 February 1969]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes pleasure in stating that the Government of Ecuador has, since 28 February 1966, when it issued Supreme Decree No. 468, which is fully in conformity with United Nations Assembly resolution 2024 (XX), legally prohibited the maintenance of relations of any kind with Southern Rhodesia; consequently, the provisions of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) have been an official rule of Ecuador's international policy since 1966.

Italy

[Original text: French]
[7 March 1969]

Italy has fully implemented the Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on Southern Rhodesia. The measures taken by the Italian Government were communicated to the Secretary-General in a note dated 15 October 1968. The competent Italian authorities are ensuring that the measures are strictly enforced, and to that end the Italian Government is co-operating closely with the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968).

Kenya

[Original text: English]
[5 March 1969]

Regarding the implementation of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) on Southern Rhodesia, . . . has the honour to state that Kenya is a signatory of the above resolution and continues to comply strictly with the terms laid down therein.

Luxembourg

[Original text: French]
[13 March 1969]

The Permanent Representative of Luxembourg to the United Nations reported to the Secretary-General the measures taken by the Luxembourg Government in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) adopted on 29 May 1968 by the Security Council concerning Southern Rhodesia.

No other measures have been taken, in view of the fact that there are no longer any financial, economic or other relations of the kind referred to in resolution 253 (1968) between Luxembourg and Southern Rhodesia.

Maldives

[Original text: English]
[7 March 1969]

The Maldivian Government does not have political or economic ties with Southern Rhodesia.

^a A/7377.

Philippines

[Original text: English]
[26 February 1969]

The Philippine Government has enjoined its agencies to implement strictly the provisions of resolution 253 (1968) of the Security Council, imposing sanctions against the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia. So far, there has been no report of any attempt in the Philippines to circumvent the provisions contained in the said resolution.

Romania

[Original text: English]
[28 February 1969]

Constantly standing for the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and of the provisions of the United Nations resolutions referring to the liquidation of colonial domination and exploitation, the Socialist Republic of Romania made known its position concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia and Security Council resolution 253 (1968) by its letter of 27 August 1968 [see S/8786/Add.1].

As was pointed out in the above-mentioned letter, the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania does not recognize the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia and does not have any diplomatic, consular, economic, commercial or any other kind of relations with the authorities in Salisbury.

At the same time, guided by the fundamental principles and provisions of the United Nations Charter, Romania condemns the measures of political repression of the illegal racist minority régime in Salisbury, which is violating the rights and the freedom of the majority of the population in Southern Rhodesia, and supports the fight of the Zimbabwe people for freedom and national independence.

As regards the resolution of Security Council 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968, the Romanian Government has fully observed its provisions.

Spain

[Original text: Spanish]
[6 March 1969]

The Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations . . . has the honour to state that, as soon as Security Council resolution 253 (1968) was adopted, the necessary measures for its implementation were taken by the competent authorities, as had been done upon the adoption of Security Council resolution 232 (1966).

Since that time, by virtue of the relevant Order, the Ministry of Commerce has not approved any licences for imports from or exports to Rhodesia, thereby eliminating trade with that country, since such trade is subject to the issue of the said licences.

The Ministry of the Interior has also issued an Order prohibiting the entry into Spain of nationals of Southern Rhodesia and persons presenting passports issued by the Rhodesian Government.

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic*

[Original text: Russian]
[6 March 1969]

The Ukrainian SSR consistently adheres to a policy of non-recognition of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and does not maintain trade relations or relations of any other kind with it.

This position of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR in regard to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia has been set forth in previous notes from the Permanent Mission of the Ukrainian SSR to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, particularly in the note dated 12 August 1968 [S/8743].

* Reply previously published under the symbol S/9052.

The Ukrainian SSR has complied fully with the requirements of paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 253 (1968).

The Permanent Mission of the Ukrainian SSR to the United Nations would like to take this opportunity to confirm once again the immutability of the position of the Ukrainian SSR regarding the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, and to express its full support for measures taken by the United Nations to assist the people of Zimbabwe, which is waging a just struggle for its national independence and freedom.

The support given by the Ukrainian SSR for United Nations measures to assist the people of Southern Rhodesia is a reflection of its desire to contribute in every possible way to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

[Original text: English]
[20 February 1969]

In compliance with the request in your note of 22 January 1969 for details of any further measures taken by Her Majesty's Government to implement Security Council resolution 253 (1968) additional to those detailed in its note of 19 July 1968, I have the honour to enclose herewith copies of the Southern Rhodesia (United Nations Sanctions) (Overseas Territories) Order 1968, Statutory Instrument No. 1094 of 1968 made on 12 July 1968, and coming into operation on 31 July 1968. This instrument, having the force of law, makes provision in the dependent territories listed in the Schedule I of the Order corresponding to that in Statutory Instrument No. 1020 of 1968 which was reported in the note of 19 July 1968 referred to above. It replaces, with additions, the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Trade and Dealings) (Overseas Territories) Order 1967.

STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS

1968 No. 1094

UNITED NATIONS

The Southern Rhodesia (United Nations Sanctions) (Overseas Territories) Order, 1968

<i>Made</i>	12th July 1968
<i>Laid before Parliament</i>	18th July 1968
<i>Coming into Operation</i>	31st July 1968

At the Court at Buckingham Palace, 12th day of July 1968

Present,

The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council

Whereas under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations the Security Council of the United Nations has, by a resolution passed on 29th May 1968, called upon Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and other Members of the United Nations to take certain measures in relation to Southern Rhodesia, including measures relating to trade and dealings in, and the carriage of, goods, the operation of airlines and aircraft, entry into their territories of persons connected with Southern Rhodesia and the promotion of emigration to Southern Rhodesia;

And Whereas the said resolution reaffirmed, to the extent that it did not supersede, the resolution passed on 16th December 1966 by which the Security Council of the United Nations so called upon Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and other Members of the United Nations to take certain measures in relation to Southern Rhodesia, including measures relating to undertakings in Southern Rhodesia for the manufacture or assembly of aircraft and motor vehicles:

Now, therefore, Her Majesty, in exercise of the powers conferred on Her by section 1 of the United Nations Act 1946(a), is pleased, by and with the advice of Her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows:—

Citation and commencement

1. This Order may be cited as the Southern Rhodesia (United Nations Sanctions) (Overseas Territories) Order 1968, and shall come into operation on 31st July 1968.

Extent of Order

2.—(1) This Order extends to the territories (including the dependencies thereof) mentioned in Schedule 1 to this Order:

Provided that this Order shall extend to Bahrain, Qatar, the Trucial States and the New Hebrides only to the extent that Her Majesty has jurisdiction therein and in particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, Article 12 of this Order shall not extend to those territories.

(2) In the application of this Order to any of the said territories as part of its law the expression "the Territory" in this Order means that territory.

Importation of certain goods into the Territory

3.—(1) Except under the authority of a licence granted by the Governor, all goods that are exported from Southern Rhodesia after the commencement of this Order are prohibited to be imported into the Territory.

(2) Any person who imports any goods into the Territory in contravention of paragraph (1) of this Article shall be guilty of an offence against this Order.

(3) Nothing in this Article shall be construed so as to prejudice any other provision of law prohibiting or restricting the importation of goods into the Territory.

Exportation of goods from Southern Rhodesia

4.—(1) Except under the authority of a licence granted by the Governor, no person shall export any goods from Southern Rhodesia.

(2) Except under such authority as aforesaid, no person shall—

- (a) make or carry out any contract for the exportation of any goods from Southern Rhodesia after the commencement of this Order; or
- (b) make or carry out any contract for the sale of any goods which he intends or has reason to believe that another person intends to export from Southern Rhodesia after the commencement of this Order; or
- (c) do any act calculated to promote the exportation of any goods from Southern Rhodesia.

(3) Except under such authority as aforesaid, no person shall deal in any goods that have been exported from Southern Rhodesia in contravention of paragraph (1) of this Article, that is to say, shall, by way of trade or otherwise for gain, acquire or dispose of such goods or of any property or interest in them or any right to or charge upon them or process them or do any act calculated to promote any such acquisition, disposal or processing by himself or any other person.

(4) Any person who contravenes the foregoing provisions of this Article shall be guilty of an offence against this Order and, in the case of a person who—

- (a) is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or a British subject without citizenship or a British protected person; or
- (b) is a citizen of Southern Rhodesia; or
- (c) is a body incorporated or constituted under the law of the United Kingdom, Southern Rhodesia, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, an associated state, Tonga or any territory to which this Order extends,

shall be guilty of such an offence wherever the contravention takes place.

(5) Nothing in this Article shall be construed so as to prejudice any other provision of law prohibiting or restricting the exportation of goods from Southern Rhodesia or acts incidental or related thereto.

Exportation of certain goods from the Territory

5.—(1) Except under the authority of a licence granted by the Governor, all goods are prohibited to be exported from the Territory to Southern Rhodesia.

(2) Any person who exports any goods from the Territory in contravention of paragraph (1) of this Article shall be guilty of an offence against this Order.

(3) Nothing in this Article shall be construed so as to prejudice any other provision of law prohibiting or restricting the exportation of goods from the Territory.

Supply of goods to Southern Rhodesia

6.—(1) Except under the authority of a licence granted by the Governor, no person shall—

- (a) supply or deliver or agree to supply or deliver to or to the order of any person in Southern Rhodesia any goods that are not in that country;
- (b) supply or deliver or agree to supply or deliver any such goods to any person, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that they will be supplied or delivered to or to the order of a person in Southern Rhodesia or that they will be used for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia; or
- (c) do any act calculated to promote the supply or delivery of any goods in contravention of the foregoing provisions of this paragraph.

(2) Any person who contravenes the foregoing provisions of this Article shall be guilty of an offence against this Order and, in the case of a person who—

- (a) is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or a British subject without citizenship or a British protected person; or
- (b) is a citizen of Southern Rhodesia; or
- (c) is a body incorporated or constituted under the law of the United Kingdom, Southern Rhodesia, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, an associated state, Tonga or any territory to which this Order extends,

shall be guilty of an offence wherever the contravention takes place.

Carriage of certain goods exported from or destined for Southern Rhodesia

7.—(1) Without prejudice to the generality of Article 4 of this Order, no ship or aircraft to which this Article applies and no land transport vehicle within the Territory shall be used for the carriage of any goods if those goods are being or have been exported from Southern Rhodesia in contravention of Article 4(1) of this Order.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of Articles 5 and 6 of this Order, no ship or aircraft to which this Article applies and no land transport vehicle within the Territory shall be used for the carriage of any goods if the carriage is, or forms part of, carriage from any place outside Southern Rhodesia to any destination therein or to any person for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia.

(3) This Article applies to British ships registered in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, an associated state, Tonga or any territory to which this Order extends, to aircraft so registered or registered in Southern Rhodesia and to any other ship or aircraft that is for the time being chartered to any person who is—

- (a) a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or a British subject without citizenship or a British protected person; or
- (b) a citizen of Southern Rhodesia; or
- (c) a body incorporated or constituted under the law of the United Kingdom, Southern Rhodesia, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, an associated state, Tonga or any territory to which this Order extends.

(4) If any ship, aircraft or land transport vehicle is used in contravention of paragraph (1) of this Article, then—

- (a) in the case of a British ship registered in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, an associated state, Tonga or any territory to which this Order extends or any aircraft so registered or registered in Southern Rhodesia, the owner and master of the ship or, as the case may be, the operator and the commander of the aircraft; or
- (b) in the case of any other ship or aircraft the person to whom the ship or aircraft is for the time being chartered and, if he is such a person as is referred to in sub-paragraph (a) or sub-paragraph (b) or sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph (3) of this Article, the manager or the master of the ship or, as the case may be, the operator or the commander of the aircraft; or
- (c) in the case of a land transport vehicle, the operator of the vehicle,

shall be guilty of an offence against this Order unless he proves that he did not know and had no reason to suppose that the goods were being or had been exported from Southern Rhodesia in contravention of Article 4(1) of this Order.

(5) If any ship, aircraft or land transport vehicle is used in contravention of paragraph (2) of this Article, then—

- (a) in the case of a British ship registered in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, an associated state, Tonga or any territory to which this Order extends or any aircraft so registered or registered in Southern Rhodesia, the owner and the master of the ship or, as the case may be, the operator and the commander of the aircraft; or
- (b) in the case of any other ship or aircraft, the person to whom the ship or aircraft is for the time being chartered and, if he is such a person as is referred to in sub-paragraph (a) or sub-paragraph (b) or sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph (3) of this Article, the manager or the master of the ship or, as the case may be, the operator or the commander of the aircraft; or
- (c) in the case of a land transport vehicle, the operator of the vehicle,

shall be guilty of an offence against this Order unless he proves that he did not know and had no reason to suppose that the carriage of the goods in question was, or formed part of, carriage from any place outside Southern Rhodesia to any destination therein or to any person for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia.

(6) Nothing in this Article applies to any goods in so far as those goods are being carried for the purposes of the doing of any thing which, by virtue of the grant of any licence or permission, is not prohibited by this Order.

(7) Nothing in this Article shall be construed so as to prejudice any other provision of law prohibiting or restricting the use of ships, aircraft or land transport vehicles.

Manufacture or assembly in Southern Rhodesia of aircraft or motor vehicles

8.—(1) Except under the authority of a licence granted by the Governor, no person shall—

- (a) operate or use any undertaking in Southern Rhodesia, whether established before or after the commencement of this Order, as an undertaking to which this Article applies; or
 - (b) authorise any undertaking in Southern Rhodesia to be operated or used by any other person as an undertaking to which this Article applies or give his consent to or connive in or by his neglect contribute to such operation or use.
- (2) Except under such authority as aforesaid, no person shall—
- (a) establish in Southern Rhodesia any undertaking to which this Article applies; or
 - (b) convert any undertaking in Southern Rhodesia into an undertaking to which this Article applies; or

- (c) dispose (whether absolutely or for any lesser interest) of any undertaking in Southern Rhodesia to any other person if he knows or has reasonable cause to believe that that other person intends to use it as an undertaking to which this Article applies; or
- (d) acquire (whether absolutely or for any lesser interest) any undertaking in Southern Rhodesia with the intention of using it as an undertaking to which this Article applies; or
- (e) dispose (whether absolutely or for any lesser interest) of any property or assets of or forming part of any undertaking in Southern Rhodesia to which this Article applies to any other person otherwise than in the ordinary course of the business of that undertaking or acquire any such property or assets disposed of as aforesaid.

(3) No person shall—

- (a) make or carry out any contract for any of the following transactions, that is to say:—
 - (i) the use or operation of any undertaking or the authorisation of, or the giving of consent to, the use or operation of any undertaking; or
 - (ii) the establishment, conversion, disposal or acquisition of any undertaking; or
 - (iii) the disposal or acquisition of the property or assets of or forming part of any undertaking.

if that transaction would be in contravention of the foregoing provisions of this Article; or

- (b) do any other act calculated to promote any such transaction.

(4) The undertakings to which this Article applies are undertakings for the manufacture or assembly of aircraft or motor vehicles.

(5) Any person who contravenes the foregoing provisions of this Article shall be guilty of an offence against this Order and, in the case of a person who—

- (a) is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or a British subject without citizenship or a British protected person; or
- (b) is a citizen of Southern Rhodesia; or
- (c) is a body incorporated or constituted under the law of the United Kingdom, Southern Rhodesia, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, an associated state, Tonga or any territory to which this Order extends,

shall be guilty of such an offence wherever the contravention takes place.

Investigation, etc. of suspected British ships and aircraft

9.—(1) Where any authorised officer, that is to say, any such officer as is referred to in section 692(1) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894(a), has reason to suspect that any British ship registered in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, an associated state, Tonga or any territory to which this Order extends has been or is being or is about to be used in contravention of paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) of Article 7 of this Order, he may (either alone or accompanied and assisted by persons under his authority) board the ship and search her and, for that purpose, may use or authorise the use of reasonable force, and he may request the master of the ship to furnish such information relating to the ship and her cargo and produce for his inspection such documents so relating and such cargo as he may specify; and an authorised officer (either there and then or upon consideration of any information furnished or document or cargo produced in pursuance of such a request) may, in the case of a ship that is reasonably suspected of being or of being about to be used in contravention of Article 7(2) of this Order, exercise the following further powers with a view to the prevention of the commission (or the continued commission) of any such contravention or in order that enquiries into the matter may be pursued, that is to say, he may either direct the master to refrain, except with the consent of an authorised officer, from landing at any port specified by the officer any

part of the ship's cargo that is so specified or request the master to take any one or more of the following steps:—

- (a) to cause the ship not to proceed with the voyage on which she is then engaged or about to engage until the master is notified by any authorised officer that the ship may so proceed;
- (b) if the ship is then in a port in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, an associated state, Tonga or any territory to which this Order extends, to cause her to remain there until the master is notified by any authorised officer that the ship may depart;
- (c) if the ship is then in any other place, to take her to any such port specified by the officer and to cause her to remain there until the master is notified as mentioned in sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph; and
- (d) to take her to any other destination that may be specified by the officer in agreement with the master;

and the master shall comply with any such request or direction.

(2) Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph (8) of this Article, where a master refuses or fails to comply with a request made under this Article that his ship shall or shall not proceed to or from any place or where an authorised officer otherwise has reason to suspect that such a request that has been so made may not be complied with, any such officer may take such steps as appear to him to be necessary to secure compliance with that request and, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, may for that purpose enter upon, or authorise entry upon, that ship and use, or authorise the use of, reasonable force.

(3) Where the Governor or any person authorised by him for that purpose either generally or in a particular case has reason to suspect that any aircraft registered in the United Kingdom, Southern Rhodesia, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, an associated state, Tonga or any territory to which this Order extends has been or is being or is about to be used in contravention of paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) of Article 7 of this Order or of Article 10 of this Order, the Governor or that authorised person may request the operator and the commander of the aircraft or either of them to furnish such information relating to the aircraft and its cargo and produce for his inspection such documents so relating and such cargo as he may specify, and that authorised person may (either alone or accompanied and assisted by persons under his authority) board the aircraft and search it and, for that purpose, may use or authorise the use of reasonable force; and, if the aircraft is then in the Territory, the Governor or any such authorised person (either there and then or upon consideration of any information furnished or document or cargo produced in pursuance of such a request) may further request the operator and the commander or either of them to cause the aircraft to remain in the Territory until notified that the aircraft may depart; and the operator and the commander shall comply with any such request.

(4) Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph (8) of this Article, where the Governor or any person authorised by him, as aforesaid has reason to suspect that any request that an aircraft should remain in the Territory that has been made under paragraph (3) of this Article may not be complied with, the Governor or that authorised person may take such steps as appear to him to be necessary to secure compliance with that request and, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, may for that purpose—

- (a) enter, or authorise entry, upon any land and upon that aircraft;
- (b) detain, or authorise the detention of, that aircraft; and
- (c) use, or authorise the use of, reasonable force.

(5) A person authorised by or under the authority of the Governor to exercise any power for the purposes of paragraph (3) or paragraph (4) of this Article shall, if requested to do so, produce evidence of his authority before exercising that power.

(6) No information furnished or document produced by any person in pursuance of a request made under this Article shall be disclosed except—

- (a) with the consent of the person by whom the information was furnished or the document was produced:

Provided that a person who has obtained information or is in possession of a document only in his capacity as servant or agent of another person may not give consent for the purposes of this sub-paragraph but such consent may instead be given by any person who is entitled to that information or to the possession of that document in his own right; or

- (b) to any person who would have been empowered under this Article to request that it be furnished or produced or to any person holding or acting in any office under or in the service of the Crown in respect of the Government of the United Kingdom or under or in the service of the Government of the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, an associated state, Tonga or any territory to which this Order extends; or
- (c) on the authority of a Secretary of State, to any organ of the United Nations or to any person in the service of the United Nations or of the Government of any other country for the purpose of assisting the United Nations or that Government in securing compliance with or detecting evasion of measures in relation to Southern Rhodesia decided upon by the Security Council of the United Nations; or
- (d) with a view to the institution of, or otherwise for the purposes of, any proceedings for an offence against this Order (whether in the Territory or in any other territory to which this Order extends) or for an offence against any provision of law with respect to similar matters that is for the time being in force in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, any associated state or Tonga.

(7) Any power conferred by this Article to request the furnishing of information or the production of a document or of cargo for inspection shall include a power to specify whether the information should be furnished orally or in writing and in what form and to specify the time by which and the place in which the information should be furnished or the document or cargo produced for inspection.

(8) The following persons shall be guilty of an offence against this Order, that is to say:—

- (a) a master of a ship who disobeys any direction given under paragraph (1) of this Article with respect to the landing of any cargo; or
- (b) a master of a ship or an operator or a commander of an aircraft who, without reasonable excuse, refuses or fails within a reasonable time to comply with any request made under this Article by any person empowered to make it or who wilfully furnishes false information or produces false documents to such a person in response to such a request; or
- (c) a master or a member of the crew of a ship or an operator or a commander or a member of the crew of an aircraft who wilfully obstructs any such person (or any person acting under the authority of any such person) in the exercise of his powers under this Article.

(9) Nothing in this Article shall be construed so as to prejudice any other provision of law conferring powers or imposing restrictions or enabling restrictions to be imposed with respect to ships or aircraft.

Restrictions on the use of certain aircraft

10.—(1) Except under the authority of a licence granted by the Governor, no aircraft to which this Article applies shall fly on any flight between any place that is within Southern Rhodesia and any place, whether within or outside the Territory, that is outside Southern Rhodesia for the purpose of carrying passengers or cargo between those places.

(2) The aircraft to which this Article applies are—

(a) aircraft registered in the United Kingdom, Southern Rhodesia, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, an associated state, Tonga or any territory to which this Order extends;

(b) aircraft that are not so registered but that are operated by or on behalf of a body incorporated or constituted under the law of any country or territory referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph; and

(c) any other aircraft that is for the time being chartered to any person who is—

(i) a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or a British subject without citizenship or a British protected person; or

(ii) a citizen of Southern Rhodesia; or

(iii) a body incorporated or constituted under the law of any country or territory referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph.

(3) If any aircraft is flown in contravention of paragraph (1) of this Article, then—

(a) in the case of an aircraft such as is referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph (2) of this Article, the operator and the commander of the aircraft; or

(b) in the case of an aircraft such as is referred to in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph (2) of this Article, the operator of the aircraft and, if he is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or a British subject without citizenship or a British protected person or a citizen of Southern Rhodesia, the commander of the aircraft; or

(c) in the case of an aircraft such as is referred to in sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph (2) of this Article, the person to whom the aircraft is for the time being chartered and, if he is such a person as aforesaid, the operator or the commander of the aircraft,

shall be guilty of an offence against this Order.

Restrictions on certain air service linking arrangements

11.—(1) Except under the authority of a licence granted by the Governor, no person shall, whether alone or together with any other person or body, make or carry out any arrangement or agreement to which this Article applies.

(2) This Article applies to any arrangement or agreement—

(a) for co-ordinating any air transport service provided by means of an aircraft to which Article 10 of this Order applies and which is not a Southern Rhodesian aircraft with any air transport service provided by means of a Southern Rhodesian aircraft; or

(b) whereby a person operating an air transport service by means of an aircraft to which Article 10 of this Order applies and which is not a Southern Rhodesian aircraft provides any civil aviation facility for or on behalf of, or in collaboration or association with, a person operating an air transport service by means of a Southern Rhodesian aircraft, or for the purposes of or in connection with a civil aviation facility provided by any such last-mentioned person.

(3) In this Article—

(a) "air transport service" means any carriage of passengers or cargo by air, whether or not for reward, and whether organised on regular schedules or for one or more specific occasions;

(b) "civil aviation facility" means any facility or service provided for the purposes of or in connection with the carriage of passengers or cargo by air or for the purposes of or in connection with the operation of aircraft therefor; and

(c) an aircraft is deemed to be a Southern Rhodesian aircraft if, and only if, it is an aircraft to which Article 10 of this Order applies and—

(i) it is registered in Southern Rhodesia; or

(ii) it is operated by or on behalf of a body incorporated or constituted under the law of Southern Rhodesia; or

(iii) it is for the time being chartered to such a body.

(4) Any person who contravenes paragraph (1) of this Article shall be guilty of an offence against this Order and, in the case of a person who—

(a) is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or a British subject without citizenship or a British protected person; or

(b) is a citizen of Southern Rhodesia; or

(c) is a body incorporated or constituted under the law of the United Kingdom, Southern Rhodesia, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, an associated state, Tonga or any territory to which this Order extends,

shall be guilty of such an offence wherever the contravention takes place.

Restrictions on entry into the Territory

12.—(1) This Article applies to the following persons, that is to say—

(a) any person who, on seeking to enter the Territory, tenders to an immigration officer a document being or purporting to be a current passport or other document establishing a person's identity or nationality issued by, or in the name of, or on behalf of, or under the authority of, the Government of Southern Rhodesia, or the Governor or any Minister of Southern Rhodesia, or any persons or body of persons in Southern Rhodesia exercising or claiming to exercise any governmental functions in relation to that country, by whatever name described (including any person or body of persons claiming to be the Government of that country or to be a Minister or Ministers or any officer of such a Government or otherwise to exercise authority on behalf of such a Government); and

(b) any person whom the Governor has reason to believe—

(i) to be ordinarily resident in Southern Rhodesia; and

(ii) to have furthered or encouraged or to be likely to further or encourage any unconstitutional action in Southern Rhodesia or any action calculated to evade or contravene or to facilitate the evasion or contravention of this Order or of the Orders revoked by this Order or of any provision of law with respect to similar matters from time to time in force in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, an associated state or Tonga.

(2) Subject to paragraph (3) of this Article, an immigration officer may, in the case of a person to whom this Article applies who seeks to enter the Territory—

(i) refuse to admit him to the Territory (which refusal shall remain in force until expressly revoked); or

(ii) admit him to the Territory subject to a condition restricting the period for which he may remain there, with or without conditions for restricting his employment or occupation.

(3) The power to refuse admission conferred by paragraph (2) of this Article shall not be exercised on any occasion in respect of a person who—

(a) being a woman, satisfies an immigration officer that she is the wife of a person who is resident in the Territory or of a person who enters or seeks to enter the Territory with her; or

(b) satisfies an immigration officer that he is under the age of sixteen and that at least one of his parents is resident in the Territory or is entering or seeking to enter the Territory with him;

and the references in this paragraph to a person entering or seeking to enter the Territory shall be construed as not including a person who, on the occasion in question, is refused admission to the Territory.

(4) If any person to whom this Article applies—

(a) enters or remains within the Territory, otherwise than in accordance with the directions or under the authority of an immigration officer, while a refusal of admis-

sion under paragraph (2) of this Article is in force in relation to him; or

- (b) contravenes or fails to comply with any conditions imposed on him under that paragraph,

he shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £200 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or to both; and a person convicted of such an offence shall be deemed to be a prohibited immigrant and may be removed from the Territory in accordance with, and subject to the restrictions contained in the law of the Territory relating to the removal of prohibited immigrants.

(5) Nothing in this Article shall apply to any person who under any provision of the Constitution of the Territory has a right to enter the Territory or who under any other provision of law has the status of a person belonging to the Territory or of a permanent resident of the Territory or any other like status which carries with it a right to enter the Territory; and nothing in this Article shall be construed as derogating from the powers conferred by any other provision of law in relation to restrictions on the entry to or remaining in the Territory of any person to whom this Article applies.

- (6) In this Article—

“immigration officer” means any person who under the law of the Territory is, or has the powers of, an immigration officer and includes any person appointed by the Governor to be an immigration officer for the purposes of this Article;

“prohibited immigrant” means a person belonging to a category, however described, the members of which are, under the law of the Territory, declared to be prohibited from entry into the Territory (whether or not the prohibition may be raised) and to be liable to deportation from the Territory.

Restrictions on certain activities promoting emigration to Southern Rhodesia

13.—(1) Except under the authority of a licence granted by the Governor, no person shall—

- (a) publish, or be a party to the publication of, any advertisement or any public notice or announcement soliciting or encouraging other persons to take up employment or residence in Southern Rhodesia; or
- (b) do any other act calculated to solicit or encourage members of the public generally or members of any particular class of the public to take up such employment or residence.

(2) Any person who contravenes paragraph (1) of this Article shall be guilty of an offence against this Order unless, in the case of a person who publishes, or is a party to the publication of, an advertisement or a public notice or announcement of such a character as is described in sub-paragraph (a) of that paragraph, he proves that he did not know and could not with reasonable diligence have ascertained that the advertisement, notice or announcement was of that character.

(3) Nothing in paragraph (1)(b) of this Article shall be construed as prohibiting the publication of factual accounts of actions, events, places or things.

Obtaining of evidence and information

14. The provisions of Schedule 2 to this Order shall have effect in order to facilitate the obtaining, by or on behalf of the Governor, of evidence and information for the purpose of securing compliance with or detecting evasion of this Order and in order to facilitate the obtaining, by or on behalf of the Governor, of evidence of the commission of an offence against this Order.

Penalties and Proceedings

15.—(1) Any person guilty of an offence against this Order shall be liable—

- (a) on conviction before a superior court to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine or to both; or

- (b) on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding £500 or to both.

(2) Where any body corporate is guilty of an offence against this Order and that offence is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to be attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate or any person who was purporting to act in any such capacity, he, as well as the body corporate, shall be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.

(3) Summary proceedings for an offence against this Order, being an offence alleged to have been committed outside the Territory, may be commenced at any time not later than twelve months from the date on which the person charged first enters the Territory after committing the offence.

(4) Proceedings for an offence against this Order may be taken, and the offence may for all incidental purposes be treated as having been committed, in any place in the Territory where any person charged with that offence is for the time being.

(5) Proceedings for an offence against this Order shall not be instituted in the Territory except by, or with the consent of, the Attorney-General;

Provided that this paragraph shall not prevent the arrest, or the issue or execution of a warrant for the arrest, of any person in respect of such an offence, or the remanding in custody or on bail, of any person charged with such an offence, notwithstanding that the necessary consent to the institution of proceedings for the offence has not been obtained.

(6) In paragraph (5) of this Article “the Attorney-General” means the Attorney-General or other principal law officer of the Territory:

Provided that—

- (a) If there is no such office established for the Territory the reference to the Attorney-General in that paragraph shall be construed as if it were a reference to the Governor; and
- (b) if by the law of the Territory power is vested to the exclusion of any other person in some officer other than the principal law officer to take over and continue criminal proceedings instituted before any civil court of the Territory by any other person or authority the said reference shall be construed as if it were a reference to that other officer.

(7) Nothing in this Article shall apply in respect of an offence under Article 12 of this Order or proceedings for such an offence.

Exercise of powers of the Governor

16.—(1) The Governor may, to such extent and subject to such restrictions and conditions as he may think proper, delegate or authorise the delegation of any of his powers under this Order (other than the power to give authority under Schedule 2 to this Order to apply for a search warrant) to any person, or class or description of persons, approved by him, and references in this Order to the Governor shall be construed accordingly.

(2) Any licences granted under this Order may be either general or special, may be subject to or without conditions, may be limited so as to expire on a specified date unless renewed and may be varied or revoked by the authority that granted them.

Interpretation

17.—(1) In this Order the following expressions have the meanings hereby respectively assigned to them, that is to say:—

“commander”, in relation to an aircraft, means the person designated as commander of the aircraft by the operator thereof, and includes any person who is for the time being in charge or command of the aircraft;

“Governor” means the Governor or other officer administering the government of the Territory;

Provided that in the case of Brunei it means Her Majesty's High Commissioner for Brunei, in the case of Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States it means Her Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, in the case of Swaziland it means Her Majesty's Commissioner for Swaziland, and in the case of the New Hebrides it means Her Majesty's High Commissioner for the Western Pacific;

"land transport vehicle" includes a barge;

"master", in relation to a ship, includes any person (other than a pilot) for the time being in charge of the ship;

"operator", in relation to an aircraft or to a land transport vehicle, means the person for the time being having the management of the aircraft or the vehicle;

"owner", in relation to a ship, includes any person for the time being having the management of the ship and any person to whom it is chartered; and

"person in Southern Rhodesia" includes any body constituted or incorporated under the law of Southern Rhodesia and any body carrying on business (whether within Southern Rhodesia or not) which is controlled by persons or bodies resident in Southern Rhodesia or constituted or incorporated as aforesaid.

(2) In this Order any reference to the holder of an office by a term designating or describing his office shall be construed as including, to the extent of his authority, a reference to any person for the time being authorised to perform the functions of that office.

(3) Any provision of this Order which relates to goods exported from Southern Rhodesia (or to the exportation of goods from Southern Rhodesia) shall not have effect in respect of goods exported (or the exportation of goods) which have only passed through Southern Rhodesia in transit and have not been the subject of any transaction there other than a transaction relating solely to their transportation; and any provision of this Order which relates to the exportation of goods to Southern Rhodesia, the supply or delivery of goods to or to the order of any person in Southern Rhodesia or the importation of goods into Southern Rhodesia shall not have effect in relation to goods which are intended only to pass through Southern Rhodesia in transit and not to be the subject of any transaction there other than a transaction relating solely to their transportation.

(4) For the purposes of this Order, the entry into Southern Rhodesia of a vehicle shall not be regarded as constituting the supply or delivery of that vehicle to or to the order of any person in Southern Rhodesia or as constituting its importation into Southern Rhodesia if the entry is merely for the purpose of the vehicle transporting persons into, out of or across Southern Rhodesia or transporting goods across Southern Rhodesia and is not part of or associated with a transaction involving a transfer of the ownership of the vehicle or of any interest therein.

(5) This Order applies to or in relation to any ship or aircraft or any body corporate that purports to be registered in any particular place or, as the case may be, that purports to be incorporated or constituted under the law of that place as it applies to or in relation to any ship or aircraft that is so registered or any body corporate that is so incorporated or constituted.

(6) Any provision of this Order which prohibits the doing of a thing except under the authority of a licence granted by the Governor of the Territory shall not have effect in relation to any such thing done outside the Territory provided that it is so done under the authority of a licence granted in accordance with any law in force in the United Kingdom (being a law substantially corresponding to the relevant provision of this Order) by the authority competent in that behalf under that law; and any such provision as aforesaid of this Order shall also not have effect in relation to any such thing—

(a) done in the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, an associated state, Tonga or any territory (other than the Territory) to which this Order extends; or

(b) done elsewhere outside the Territory by a person who is ordinarily resident in, or by a body incorporated or

constituted under the law of, a territory referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph,

provided that it is so done under the authority of a licence or with permission granted in accordance with any law in force in that territory (being the relevant provision of this Order in the case of a territory to which this Order extends and a law substantially corresponding to that provision in any other case) by the authority competent in that behalf under that law.

(7) References in this Order to any country or territory (other than the Territory) shall, in relation to any foreign country or territory in which for the time being Her Majesty has jurisdiction, be construed as applying to that country or territory only to the extent that Her Majesty has jurisdiction in that behalf; and references in this Order to British protected persons shall, in relation to a person who has that status by virtue of his connection with such a foreign country or territory, be likewise construed as applying to him only to the extent that Her Majesty has jurisdiction in that behalf.

(8) The Interpretation Act 1889(a) shall apply, with the necessary adaptations, for the purpose of interpreting this Order and otherwise in relation thereto as it applies for the purpose of interpreting and in relation to Acts of Parliament.

Revocation and transitional

18.—(1) The Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Trade and Dealings) (Overseas Territories) Order 1967(b) and the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Trade and Dealings) (Overseas Territories) (Amendment) Order 1967(c) (hereinafter referred to as "the existing Orders") are revoked in so far as they are part of the law of any territory to which this Order extends.

(2) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 38 of the Interpretation Act 1889 as applied by Article 17 of this Order, references to this Order, or to a particular provision thereof, in Articles 9 and 14 (together with Schedule 2) of this Order shall be construed as including references to the existing Orders or, as the case may require, to the corresponding provision of any of the existing Orders.

(3) In the application of this Order as part of the law of any territory to which the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Trade and Dealings) (Overseas Territories) Order 1967 extended, the references in Articles 4(3) and 7 of this Order to goods that have been exported from Southern Rhodesia in contravention of Article 4(1) of this Order shall be deemed to include references to goods which have been exported from Southern Rhodesia in contravention of Article 4(1) of the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Trade and Dealings) (Overseas Territories) Order 1967.

W. G. Agnew

Article 2

Schedule 1. Territories to which this Order extends

Bahama Islands.
Bahrain.
Bermuda.
British Honduras.
British Solomon Islands Protectorate.
British Virgin Islands.
Brunei.
Cayman Islands.
Cyprus: Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
Falkland Islands.
Fiji.
Gibraltar.
Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony.
Hong Kong.
Montserrat.
New Hebrides.
Qatar.
Seychelles.
Swaziland.
St. Helena.
St. Vincent.
The Trucial States.
Turks and Caicos Islands.

Schedule 2. Evidence and Information

1.—(1) Without prejudice to any other provision of this Order, or any provision of any other law, the Governor (or any person authorised by him for that purpose either generally or in a particular case) may request any person in or resident in the Territory to furnish to the Governor (or to that authorised person) any information in his possession or control, or to produce to the Governor (or to that authorised person) any document in his possession or control, which the Governor (or that authorised person) may require for the purpose of securing compliance with or detecting evasion of this Order; and any person to whom such a request is made shall comply with it within such time and in such manner as may be specified in the request.

(2) Nothing in the foregoing sub-paragraph shall be taken to require any person who has acted as counsel or solicitor for any person to disclose any privileged communication made to him in that capacity.

(3) Where a person is convicted before a superior court for failing to furnish information or produce a document when requested so to do under this paragraph, the court may make an order requiring him, within such period as may be specified in the order, to furnish the information or produce the document.

(4) The power conferred by this paragraph to request any person to produce documents shall include power to take copies of or extracts from any document so produced and to request that person, or, where that person is a body corporate, any other person who is a present or past officer of, or is employed by, the body corporate, to provide an explanation of any of them.

2.—(1) If any judge, magistrate or justice of the peace is satisfied by information on oath given by a person authorised by the Governor to act for the purposes of this paragraph either generally or in a particular case—

(a) that there is reasonable ground for suspecting that an offence against this Order has been or is being committed and that evidence of the commission of the offence is to be found on any premises specified in the information, or in any vehicle, vessel or aircraft so specified; or

(b) that any documents which ought to have been produced under paragraph 1 of this Schedule and have not been produced are to be found on any such premises or in any such vehicle, vessel or aircraft,

he may grant a search warrant authorising any police officer, together with any other persons named in the warrant and any other police officers, to enter the premises specified in the information or, as the case may be, any premises upon which the vehicle, vessel or aircraft so specified may be, at any time within one month from the date of the warrant and to search the premises, or, as the case may be, the vehicle, vessel or aircraft.

(2) A person authorised by any such warrant as aforesaid to search any premises or any vehicle, vessel or aircraft may search every person who is found in, or whom he has reasonable ground to believe to have recently left or to be about to enter, those premises or that vehicle, vessel or aircraft and may seize any document or article found on the premises or in the vehicle, vessel or aircraft or on such person which he has reasonable ground to believe to be evidence of the commission of any offence against this Order or any documents which he has reasonable ground to believe ought to have been produced under paragraph 1 of this Schedule or to take in relation to any such article or document any other steps which may appear necessary for preserving it and preventing interference with it:

Provided that no female shall, in pursuance of any warrant issued under this paragraph, be searched except by a female.

(3) Where, by virtue of this paragraph, a person is empowered to enter any premises, vehicle, vessel or aircraft he may use such force as is reasonably necessary for that purpose.

(4) Any documents or articles of which possession is taken under this paragraph may be retained for a period of three

months or, if within that period there are commenced any proceedings for an offence against this Order to which they are relevant, until the conclusion of those proceedings.

3. A person authorised by the Governor to exercise any power for the purposes of this Schedule shall, if requested to do so, produce evidence of his authority before exercising that power.

4. No information furnished or document produced (including any copy or extract made of any document produced) by any person in pursuance of a request made under this Schedule and no document seized under paragraph 2(2) of this Schedule shall be disclosed except—

(a) with the consent of the person by whom the information was furnished or the document was produced or the person from whom the document was seized:

Provided that a person who has obtained information or is in possession of a document only in his capacity as servant or agent of another person may not give consent for the purposes of this sub-paragraph but such consent may instead be given by any person who is entitled to that information or to the possession of that document in his own right; or

(b) to any person who would have been empowered under this Schedule to request that it be furnished or produced or to any person holding or acting in any office under or in the service of the Crown in respect of the Government of the United Kingdom or under or in the service of the Government of the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, an associated state, Tonga or any territory to which this Order extends; or

(c) on the authority of a Secretary of State, to any organ of the United Nations or to any person in the service of the United Nations or to the Government of any other country for the purpose of assisting the United Nations or that Government in securing compliance with or detecting evasion of measures in relation to Southern Rhodesia decided upon by the Security Council of the United Nations; or

(d) with a view to the institution of, or otherwise for the purposes of any proceedings for an offence against this Order (whether in the Territory or in any other territory to which this Order extends) or for an offence against any provision of law with respect to similar matters that is for the time being in force in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, any associated state or Tonga.

5. Any person who—

(a) without reasonable excuse, refuses or fails within the time and in the manner specified (or, if no time has been specified, within a reasonable time) to comply with any request made under this Schedule by any person who is empowered to make it; or

(b) wilfully furnishes false information or a false explanation or otherwise wilfully obstructs any person in the exercise of his powers under this Schedule; or

(c) with intent to evade the provisions of this Schedule, destroys, mutilates, defaces, secretes or removes any document, shall be guilty of an offence against this Order.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

(This Note is not part of the Order)

This Order, made under the United Nations Act 1946, applies to each of the Territories specified in Schedule I. It revokes the Southern Rhodesia (Prohibited Trade and Dealings) (Overseas Territories) Order 1967 as respects those territories and replaces, with modifications, the provisions of that Order. It also introduces certain further restrictions and confers certain further powers in connection with Southern Rhodesia.

The Order restricts the importation into each territory of goods exported from Southern Rhodesia and the exportation from the territory of goods intended for Southern Rhodesia.

It also imposes restrictions on the exportation of goods from Southern Rhodesia and the supply of goods to Southern Rhodesia as well as certain related activities and dealings, including the carriage of goods in British ships or aircraft. The Order imposes restrictions with respect to undertakings in Southern Rhodesia for the manufacture or assembly of aircraft or motor vehicles. It restricts the use of certain aircraft operating to or from Southern Rhodesia and certain related civil aviation transactions. It authorises restrictions upon the entry into the territory of certain persons connected with Southern Rhodesia and prohibits certain advertisements and similar activities aimed at encouraging emigration to Southern Rhodesia.

The Order also makes provision for the investigation of ships and aircraft that are suspected of contravening the Order and it confers powers to obtain evidence and information for the purposes of the Order.

United States of America

*[Original text: English]
[3 March 1969]*

The United States Government has fully implemented the mandatory provisions of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) by means of Executive Order No. 11419, dated 29 July 1968, and other steps described in the United States representative's note to the Secretary-General dated 1 August 1968 [see S/8786, annex II]. It has not been necessary, therefore, to take further legal measures.

The result of United States implementation of the resolution has been a virtual cessation of all trade between the United States and Southern Rhodesia, except for those items expressly exempted by the resolution and of items legally shipped prior to the effective date of the above-mentioned Executive Order.

The United States Government continues to believe that the effective implementation of the mandatory sanctions programme by all Member States would contribute to the achievement of a peaceful change in the Smith régime's policies and the achievement of full political rights for all the Rhodesian people.

The United States Government notes that many States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies have not yet supplied the Secretary-General with information on specific measures taken to implement resolution 253 (1968). It appears that thirty-nine Member States have not replied in any way to inquiries from the Secretary-General. Of the ninety-one Member States which have replied, twenty-nine merely stated that they have no relations with Southern Rhodesia or merely that they condemn the illegal régime and/or racism, colonialism etc. None of those replies gives any definite indication of the action taken by the Member. It is impossible for the Security Council Sanctions Committee^a to have an accurate understanding of the implementation of the resolution or to perform its functions properly if it is not kept adequately informed by Member States.

^a Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968.

DOCUMENT S/8957

Letted dated 26 December 1968 from the representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council

*[Original text: French]
[3 January 1969]*

On the instructions of my Government and further to my letter of 16 December 1968 [S/8940], I have the honour to communicate to you, for the information of the members of the Security Council, the following facts.

On 1 November 1968, eight Viet-Nameese fishermen on board four boats penetrated Cambodian territorial waters at Beng Bania and Nam Yung, district of Angkor Borey, province of Takeo, to a depth of approximately 3,000 metres from the Cambodian-South Viet-Nameese frontier.

The eight Viet-Nameese, who were engaging in clandestine fishing, were caught in the act and arrested by the Royal Khmer Police of Takeo. They will be brought to trial for the two offences of illegally crossing the frontier and engaging in clandestine fishing. The individuals in question are the following:

Huynh Van Hy, Huynh Van Huong, Vo Van Au, Tran Van Thanh, Ho Van Gia, Tran Van Quat, Nguyen Van Duc and Nguyen Thi Pha.

On 19 November, at approximately 4.45 a.m., a group of soldiers of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces coming from the region of Hau Nghia penetrated Cambodian territory to a depth of approximately 1,000 metres from the frontier in the commune of Bavet, district of Svay Teap, province of Svay Rieng and fired on a mixed Cambodian patrol which was on an observation mission along the frontier, seriously wounding a member of the patrol named Meas Un, an inhabitant of the village of Svay Ta Yean.

On 22 November, at approximately 9 a.m., soldiers of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces coming from Dong Duc (Chaudoc) fired artillery into Cambodian territory. A number of shells landed near the Provincial Guard post at Bac Nam, commune of Prek

Tonlea, district of Koh Thom, province of Kandal. The post was also riddled with bullets by the United States-South Viet-Nameese soldiers.

On the same day, at about noon, soldiers of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces, guided by a spotter aircraft which was flying over Cambodia, fired artillery into Cambodian territory. Twenty-nine shells landed at a point approximately 800 metres from the Cambodian-South Viet-Nameese frontier in the village of Chrak Kranh, commune of Rong district of Mimot, province of Kompong Cham, damaging fifteen houses in the village.

Also on 22 November, at approximately 4.30 p.m., United States-South Viet-Nameese naval forces entered Cambodian territory and arrested three Cambodians named Try Hong, Try Yi and Chhan Neang, known as Tith, inhabitants of the commune of Prek Kroeus, district of Kompong Trach, province of Kampot.

On 23 November, at approximately 6 a.m., two helicopters of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces violated Cambodian air space and fired rockets at a point approximately 2,000 metres from the Cambodian-South Viet-Nameese frontier in the village of Mong, commune of Kravien, district of Mimot, province of Kompong Cham, seriously wounding two villagers named Nguon Lay Ou and Soum Kim.

On 24 November, at approximately 6 p.m., a helicopter of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces violated Cambodian air space above the village of Chrak Kranh and fired rockets at the village, destroying ten houses. Chrak Kranh had been subjected to artillery fire on 22 November.

On 25 November, at approximately 11.30 a.m., three aircraft of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces violated Cambodian air space and bombed and machine-

gunned a National Police post situated near national highway No. 13 at a point approximately 500 metres inside Cambodian territory in the commune of Khsim, district of Snuol, province of Kratie.

On 26 November, at approximately 11.30 a.m., elements of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces from the post at Vinh Dien (Kien Phong) fired artillery into Cambodian territory in the region of Peam Montea, district of Kompong Trabek, province of Prey Veng. Fifteen shells landed near the Provincial Guard post at Peam Montea. Two other shells landed on the grounds of the post, seriously wounding a Cambodian soldier named Nuon Uon and a guard.

The elements in question fired at the same post a second and a third time, at approximately 12.45 p.m. and 2.45 p.m. respectively. Fifteen shells landed on the grounds of the post, seriously wounding another guard and a young person sixteen years of age.

On 27 November, at approximately 11 a.m., three helicopters of the United States-South Viet-Nameese air force violated Cambodian air space above the commune of Chrak Motes, district of Svay Teap, province of Svay Rieng. However, after being fired upon by mixed Cambodian defence forces on patrol in the area, the aircraft returned to South Viet-Nam.

On the same day, at approximately 3 p.m., four helicopters of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces penetrated Cambodian air space and pursued an empty civilian truck which had come from Sen Monorom and was travelling on the Mondulkiri-Khsim road. At a point situated between kilometre stones 32 and 34 in the commune of Khsim, district of Snuol (Kratie), one of the helicopters landed and discharged eight armed soldiers, who immediately launched a savage attack on the truck with firearms and grenades,

seriously wounding the driver and inflicting heavy damage on the truck.

On 28 November, at approximately 9 a.m., a Cambodian patrol on a frontier observation mission near the village of Thlork, commune of Chrak Motes, district of Svay Teap, province of Svay Rieng, arrested a twenty-year-old United States soldier named Gurnsey Earl.

On 29 November, two spotter aircraft of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces violated Cambodian air space and pursued from kilometre stone 25 to a point near kilometre stone 45 a military convoy carrying Cambodian security forces who were on their way to Sen Monorom to make preparations for a projected visit by the Head of State. The two aircraft fired at the convoy several times with machine-guns.

The Royal Government of Cambodia has filed a vigorous and indignant protest against these new violations and attacks which the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces have committed against civilians and against security forces and soldiers of the Royal Khmer Army. These acts constitute increasingly dangerous provocation for whose consequences the Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of Viet-Nam must bear full responsibility. The Royal Government has called upon the Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of Viet-Nam to put an end to these acts of provocation forthwith and to make reparation for the damage caused by the attacks.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Huot Sambath
Permanent Representative of Cambodia
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/8958

Letter dated 31 December 1968 from the representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: French]
[3 January 1969]

On the instructions of my Government and further to my letter of 16 December 1968 [S/8940], I have the honour to communicate to you, for the information of the members of the Security Council, the following facts.

On 29 November 1968, at approximately 8 a.m., an armed band of some sixty men coming from Thailand entered Cambodian territory and opened heavy fire on a Cambodian patrol quartered at Bavel which was on an observation mission in the region of O Cham Neap, district of Sisophon, province of Battambang, at a point approximately fifteen kilometres from the Cambodian-Thai frontier, killing two Cambodian soldiers named Buth Sun and Nuon Thang Chan and wounding two others named Bin Savath and Yang Nang.

On 30 November, at approximately 10.45 a.m., two motor junks coming from Thailand were surprised while engaging in clandestine fishing in Cambodian territorial waters off Koh Yor, province of Koh Kong. They withdrew when they sighted the vessel of the Royal Khmer Navy which was patrolling the area.

On 1 December, at approximately 7.30 a.m., a booby-trap set by armed elements from Thailand at a point south-west of Kauk Romiet, district of Thmar Puok, province of Battambang, approximately four kilometres

from the frontier, blew up, seriously wounding two Cambodian soldiers named Neak Chhuom and Sin Chhay.

On 3 December, at approximately 7 p.m., armed fishermen on board ten junks coming from Thailand entered Cambodian waters at a point approximately ten kilometres west of the island of Koh Kong and fired on members of a Cambodian patrol which was on an observation mission in the area, seriously wounding two soldiers, one of whom died in hospital. A motor junk which had been used in the patrol operation was badly damaged.

The Royal Government of Cambodia has filed a vigorous and indignant protest against the constant violations of its territory and territorial waters and the deliberate attacks by armed elements coming from Thailand. It has called upon the Thai Government to take immediate steps to put an end to these criminal acts being committed by Thai soldiers and inhabitants.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Huot Sambath
Permanent Representative of Cambodia
to the United Nations

**Telegram dated 31 December 1968 from the Prime Minister of Norway
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original text: English]
[3 January 1969]

On behalf of the Norwegian Government and myself, I convey to you our most sincere thanks for your message of sympathy and condolences on the occasion of the death of Mr. Trygve Lie.

Per BORTEN
Prime Minister of Norway

DOCUMENT S/8961*

Letter dated 7 January 1969 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[8 January 1969]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention a statement prepared by a Jordanian national, Mr. As'ad Abdel Rahman, President of the Union of Palestine Arab Students in Lebanon, describing his treatment and that of other Arab prisoners in Israel jails in the occupied territories.

I have the honour to request that this letter, together with its enclosure, be circulated as official documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
*Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations*

STATEMENT BY AS'AD ABDUL RAHMAN (B.A., M.A., AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT, LEBANON), PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF PALESTINE ARAB STUDENTS IN LEBANON, ON HIS IMPRISONMENT IN ISRAEL OCCUPIED TERRITORY (21 DECEMBER 1967 TO 29 SEPTEMBER 1968) AND THE TREATMENT OF ARABS IN PRISONS UNDER THE OCCUPATION TO THE CLUB OF THE ALUMNI ASSOCIATION OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Beirut, Thursday 21 November 1968

Any discussion of the treatment of the inhabitants of the occupied territories in Palestine is bound to be affected by emotion, by preconceived ideas and by the temptation to distort facts for propaganda purposes. My awareness of this has prompted me to confine my remarks today to two sets of data: (a) what actually happened to me when I was arrested by the Israel authorities and during my period of imprisonment, and (b) what I gathered directly during my imprisonment by way of observation, conversation and verification concerning the experiences of other Arab inmates of Israel prisons. I shall include in this second category of data only the information that I believe to be strictly true. I am, therefore, here to report facts to you. My purpose is information, not propaganda.

1. *What happened to me*

On the morning of 21 December 1967 just after 9 o'clock, I was knocking at the door of a house in the Old City of Arab Jerusalem situated near the

Syriac Convent to meet a colleague of mine, Mr. Taysir Kuba'a, Vice-President of the General Federation of Palestine Arab Students. No sooner had I started knocking at the door than I found myself facing two men of the Special Branch of the Israel Jerusalem Police, who pointed their pistols at my face and the face of another friend who had come with me to show me the house. Within seconds we found ourselves handcuffed, while the policemen proceeded to empty our pockets of all their contents.

I started to protest and to ask for an explanation for such behaviour when one of the two policemen who had arrested us (Sergeant Rosenthal Joseph) ordered me not to utter another word. One of the Israelis then left us for about ten minutes and returned with six other Israelis. One of the six new arrivals immediately slapped my face and asked why we had come to the house, and whether we expected other visitors. I said that I had come to call on a friend and protested at our treatment. Thereupon, and after two of the Israelis were left behind in the house, my companion and I were each handcuffed to a policeman and we were led to a military vehicle parked some 200 yards away near Jaffa Gate. The car drove us to the prison in the Russian compound in central Jerusalem. The time was about 9.30 a.m.

My companion and I were led to separate rooms in the basement of the prison, where our interrogation started immediately. In the interrogation room I faced Commander Shimon Sapir who asked me two questions after which he asked me to take my clothes off. Every time I took off an article of clothing, he would order me to take off another, until I suspected the worst, and refused to continue my strip-tease. As soon as I had stopped, Sapir and four other men immediately rushed at me raining blows on me with their fists and the edges of their outstretched hands in expert karate fashion. The blows were aimed at my head and every part of my body. I shouted in protest and demanded to know the reason for such treatment. Their attacks persisted without interruption for a period I cannot calculate until I began to lose consciousness. Before I passed out I remember trying to show them a deep scar on my belly, the result of an operation, in the hope of putting them off, but their blows continued to be directed systematically, it seemed, at my head and neck.

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7500.

My next recollection is of water being splashed over me, after which I revived somewhat. As I came to, Sapir told me that my friend Taysir Kuba'a had been arrested. He showed me his identity card and told me that there was no point in further denial.

The interrogation then started all over again. A question would be put, but before one could answer the blows would fall again; another question would follow, then more blows, and so on. This time, however, the blows did not come from fists and hands only; a short thick knotted stick was also used. This was aimed at the head and every part of the body. This interrogation continued until about 2 p.m., after which I was taken to my cell.

My cell was a dark, damp, icy-cold corridor leading to Blanket Store Room No. 4. I found there another inmate, one Ali Al 'Awadah from Gaza. I spent the night in this cell.

The following day I was taken to cell No. 1 in the Muscovite Prison, where we were five in all. I was left alone during the whole of the second day, perhaps to build up suspense. On the third day we had a heated argument with our warden Jacob, because he ordered us to stand at attention every time he appeared, saying: "An Arab must stand at attention whenever an Israeli enters the room".

As a result of this argument, I was taken to a stinking underground cell into which no light penetrated. The cell was divided into two by iron bars across the middle. On the other side of the bars there was a tin full of faeces. In my cell, this side of the bars, there was no place to relieve oneself. One urinated through the bars into the tin, but for other purposes one looked for scraps of newspapers on which one relieved oneself and then deposited them through bars in the tin.

On the following day I was summoned for more interrogation. I was confronted by a certain Tolensky who, we were led to believe, was the deputy chief of Intelligence and a Major Joseph (these were probably fictitious names). My interrogators mentioned certain allegations against me, chiefly that I was one of the *fedayeen*. They threatened me with torture if I denied these allegations. I repeated what I had said on the first day, namely: I was the President of the Union of Palestine Students in Lebanon and the President of the Confederation of Arab Students in Lebanon. I had come to the West Bank to visit my family, who live in Nablous, on the occasion of the Bairam Feast and to bid them farewell before I left for the United States, where I intended to continue my graduate work for a doctorate. I also intended to take the opportunity of my presence on the West Bank to study the possibility of organizing passive resistance among students in the face of the forcible change in the school curricula imposed by the Israel authorities on Arab schools in occupied territories. I intended to collaborate with my colleague Taysir Kuba'a in drawing up a report on the subject, which we intended to submit to the Executive Committee of our Students' Federation.

On the following day a bedouin from Gaza was put in my cell. He could hardly stand up. His whole body was lacerated and covered with blood. His urinary system was almost completely damaged. One did what one could to help him out of his difficulties. He said he had been an inmate of a torture camp run by the

Israel Army and he reported gruesome details of the happenings in the camp.

On Friday, 29 December 1967, two members of the Israel Military Police appeared. At the sight of them, my bedouin companion shouted a warning that they were members of the staff of the torture camp. They asked for me and for another prisoner named Khalil Buhais, whom I had not met before. Our hands were handcuffed and shackles put on our legs. We were then led blindfolded to a lorry. We climbed on to the back of the lorry, where we were chained to a ring in the floor. In this manner we travelled to Sarafand—a forty-minute drive. The strain on our wrists was considerable and the manner in which we were tossed about produced nausea.

As soon as we arrived at our destination and got off the lorry, we were met with slaps and blows accompanied with jeers and a continuous flow of curses from a group of soldiers. Our escort led us across ditches and trenches filled with stinking water into which we stumbled because, being blindfolded, we could not see our way. Our clumsy attempts to climb out of the trenches were met with more jeers, laughter, curses, and blows. Suddenly there was firing, very close to us, and for a while I thought I had had it. It turned out, however, that they intended only to play with us.

After this I was taken to a cell of unbelievable stench. The cell was eighty cm. long and sixty cm. wide. This was to be home for the next days. There was no blanket or cover of any kind, no bed, no mattress, no water to wash, no place to relieve nature except a bucket already full to the brim with faeces and urine. I was still handcuffed, my legs shackled, my eyes blindfolded (except at mealtimes). It was impossible to lie down, to rest or sleep. I often found that my hands had slipped into the bucket.

Throughout the night the place echoed with the sounds of torture and interrogation. They always chose the night: your neighbours led away from the cell on the right, or the cell on the left; their screams piercing the night; yourself expecting your turn at any moment.

On the fourth day only, my turn came. Tolensky with two others called for me. On the way to the interrogation room the soldier who was dragging me stopped in front of a tree and violently knocked my head against the trunk, then he threw me down a flight of stairs.

What happened at the interrogation? A new development: the gradual transformation of any interrogation into a political investigation. There were no beatings but constant threats. I could in fact hear the cries of the tortured and I was constantly reminded that if I wanted to avoid their fate I had to speak up quickly. This was not Jerusalem, they said.

The interrogators seemed surprised at my explicit political stand and my analysis of the Israel entity as an imperialistic, expansionist and racist phenomenon, an analysis which I supported by quoting from documents and sources available in the Central Zionist Archives Office and the Hebrew University Library in Jerusalem.

After this interrogation session, I was transferred to a cell, larger than the one I had been in, where I stayed for six days.

The following day and for every subsequent day my interrogation continued. They would start at 9.30 a.m. and continue until 11 p.m. at the earliest. There were no breaks for meals. Food was brought to the interrogation room. I was subjected to political, intellectual and psychological probings by army and intelligence officers. They worked in teams of three to eight persons in endless relays, averaging twenty different persons a day. My political convictions, of course, remained the same, and I could see the expressions of puzzlement in their eyes. One effect of this seemed to be that the army officers who came to cross-examine me and listen to my views about the nature of Israel and Zionism became increasingly more senior in rank. Of course, this did not mean that I inspected a guard of honour on my way to or from the interrogation room. There were the same blows and attacks to the accompaniment of an unending background of the filthiest insults and curses from my escorts and the soldiers on the way.

On the thirteenth day, I was taken to wash my face for the first time since my arrival at Sarafand. I was also allowed for the first time in eighteen days to have a shave, after which I was asked to sign a paper testifying to the good treatment I had received. I signed.

I was then tied through my handcuffs back to back to another person and both of us were dumped into a lorry. As we were lying in the back of the lorry, a woman soldier (I could tell this from her voice) sprayed eau de cologne on my head and face and all over my clothes. The lorry took us to Jerusalem, where I found myself in my last cell there again.

I stayed in this cell for a month, during which my interrogation continued. During this period my health deteriorated and I began to feel the effects of undernourishment in addition to my other troubles. To give you an idea about the food provided in Jerusalem, this was our daily menu:

Breakfast (8 a.m.):

- (1) One small cube of salty margarine per person.
- (2) 3/4 tablespoonful of jam for all the cell, irrespective of the number of persons in it.
- (3) 1/4 loaf of bread per person, the loaf itself being about one foot long.
- (4) One small-sized glass of very weak, tepid tea.

Lunch (12 noon):

- (1) 2 tablespoonfuls of rice, tepid and soggy, with one hot dog served cold, per person.
- (2) 1/4 of a loaf of bread per person.
Every other day, a plate of cold, thin, vegetable soup.

Dinner (3.30-4 p.m.):

- (1) One hard-boiled egg per person.
- (2) 1/4 loaf of bread per person. Sometimes a small cube of margarine.

In the last third of January, I was transferred with other comrades to the Central Ramleh Prison, where we stayed for six days, after which we were transferred to another section of the prison commanded by an officer named Copani.

I stayed two months in Ramleh Prison. Food and sleeping conditions were not too bad, i.e. we had beds

and a lavatory but were twenty to twenty-five persons in a room ten by four metres. After continuous contacts with the Red Cross, we won the right to listen to one news broadcast a day (Radio Israel, 7.30 a.m., in Arabic) in addition to receiving some Arabic books, the most recent of which had been published in 1945. It was while I was in Ramleh Prison that I was taken, together with a friend named Ahmad Khalifeh, on two occasions (once towards the end of February, the other time in early March) to the torture camp in Sarafand, wrapped in canvas bundles, where we met General Gazit (an assistant to the Chief of Staff) and another apparently important but mysterious civilian person who listened to our views about the nature of Israel and Zionism. Gazit behaved with all the arrogance of the conqueror and the civilian mentioned the books I had written in Arabic on Zionism.

On 4 April 1968 I was transferred together with other comrades, to Ramallah Prison. We had quite a reception party of beatings and insults. We were hit with the hands, with sticks, with pistol-ends and rifle butts. Three of us, Taysir Kuba'a, another friend and myself, were put together in a cell two metres long and one metre wide. We were beaten daily but intermittently for four days and remained eighteen days in all in this cell. We were then isolated from the other prisoners in a special section. I stayed in this section for three months, during which I was brought to trial. There were no more beatings, only the occasional spitting. I was tried before a military court composed of one judge and an officer. I was charged with infiltration, membership of an illegal organization, and forging an identity card. I was not allowed the services of a team of French lawyers, who arrived in Ramallah to defend several of us. But we were allowed to obtain defence counsels from the territory occupied before 5 June. We had five lawyers, three of them Arab and two Jewish. They were all competent, honest and brave. I thank them all. My line of defence was to deny the competence of the court to try me. I based my case on the principles of international law, the United Nations Charter, the Geneva Conventions, the Security Council resolutions. In fact we introduced the whole Palestine question into the court from the moral, legal, national and humanitarian points of view. The first presiding judge was infuriated by this line of defence. He lost his temper altogether and publicly attacked the Jewish lawyers for repeating my arguments. He also constantly attacked me. This first judge was replaced by another more disciplined judge. With some exceptions, the trial was public and the procedure outwardly democratic. The lawyers, it was obvious, were under great duress. I was finally convicted of ordinary infiltration for social purposes and for forging my identity card. My sentence was one year of imprisonment.

Very gradually my treatment began to improve. On 18 July 1968 I was transferred to an ordinary cell with other prisoners where I remained until my deportation to the Eastern Bank on 29 September 1968.

2. What happened to others

Let me preface the second part of my statement with three observations:

(1) What I am about to describe does not always happen in its entirety, nor at the same level of intensity.

(2) It does not necessarily happen to all those who are arrested.

(3) The torture methods of the Israelis follow two axes: the psychological and the physical. These two axes often intersect to produce a compound effect, so that it is not always possible to draw a clear line of distinction between the one and the other. Nevertheless, for the purposes of clear presentation I shall deal with the two methods separately.

A. Psychological torture and the war of nerves

The moment one is arrested one is subjected to two influences simultaneously: inducements and threats. The threats take many forms. You are threatened with beating or torture, with the arrest of those dearest to you (your father, mother, sister, brother), with the blowing up of your home, with the rape of your nearest women relatives, with imprisonment in cells containing Israeli thieves and murderers; if you are a woman, with imprisonment in cells containing Israeli prostitutes.

The cells you are sometimes thrown into and the condition in which you are thrown into them (blindfolded, handcuffed, shackled) have already been described. But there are variations here too. The cells often are powerfully lit day and night without interruption. They are sometimes fitted with loudspeakers which continuously broadcast sounds and words deliberately calculated to break your nerve (e.g., the sound of weeping or wailing, the appeal of a mother or a sister, etc.). Sometimes the cell is fitted with blowers which direct strong waves of cold and hot air alternately. Sometimes a snake might be thrown into your cell. The snake is not poisonous, but you don't know it and, remember, you are blindfolded. Sometimes enormous highly trained dogs are introduced into your cell. They tear at your clothes and body and expertly snatch at the cloth blindfolding your eyes.

Sometimes you are led to an open grave and told that the grave has been specially dug for you. Sometimes the leg of a corpse (probably artificial) is sticking out of the grave covered with dirt and you are told it is the body of one or other of your friends. Sometimes you are taken into the torture chamber to see your friends or strangers undergoing torture. Sometimes you are merely shown the torture implements (e.g., batteries with wires and clips attached to them; handcuffs dangling from the ceiling). Sometimes you are deliberately starved. Sometimes you are taken to a "party". At these "parties", beating is usually moderate but their basic ingredients are jeering and insults from groups of soldiers accompanied by shooting at close range between your legs or above your head. Sometimes when you are transferred from one place to another, the information is volunteered that you are going to a torture camp. Always your identity is cancelled from the start and you become a mere number. Mine was 293. At least 60 per cent of those arrested on charge of helping the resistance receive some variations of this type of psychological treatment.

B. Physical torture

Within this general environment, which, as can be seen, lends itself to many combinations, physical torture, in the strict sense, is practised on you in one or more of the following forms.

It should be remembered, however, that this happens to only a minority of those arrested. The proportion varies. On the West Bank, up to about 15 per cent receive this physical treatment. In the Gaza Strip, the proportion is higher, reaching up to 25 per cent of those arrested.

As for the actual methods of physical torture, I have been able to identify sixteen different methods. These are methods that I am completely intellectually convinced have actually been practised. I am not saying they are all practised against the same person. Nor am I saying they are all practised with the same frequency. What I am saying is that all have actually been practised. This conclusion is based on continuous research that I carried out with my prison inmates. It is based upon a close examination of evidence given me by these inmates, on a long rigorous process of checking and counter-checking of the evidence, and on my objective appraisal of the integrity of my informants. To do less than this, to invent horror stories for you for cheap propaganda effect, would be to insult the manhood and humanity of hundreds of my compatriots. In this connexion, I would like to say that I am not mentioning names in public for obvious reasons. But I have the names of all the victims concerned, as well as other relevant details. These names and details I would be prepared to put at the disposal of specialized international agencies if I could get adequate guarantees that the victims would not be endangered.

As for the different methods of torture, these are:

(1) The prisoner is made to strip completely of all clothes. The body is whipped or beaten with sticks. No part of the body is spared. The beating and whipping continues until blood is drawn. Salt is thrown on the lacerations and the beating is resumed.

(2) Lighted cigarette ends are applied to various parts of the body.

(3) The prisoner is forced to sit naked on cactus leaves fixed on platforms.

(4) Enormous dogs are let loose on the prisoner who is usually handcuffed with hands behind the back. The dogs are trained to throw the prisoner on the ground. The prisoner is ordered by an interrogator, whip in hand, to get up on his feet as soon as he falls down, and so on...

(5) The fingers of the hand are placed on the edge of an open door and the door is slammed on the fingers.

(6) Finger nails are pulled out with ordinary pincers.

(7) The prisoner is injected with pepper solutions.

(8) The prisoner is suspended from the ceiling from his wrists or ankles. The interrogator throws his weight on the prisoner or pulls him downwards.

(9) Electric shocks are passed through the ear lobes, the chest and the privy parts.

(10) The prisoner is injected with solutions which, he is told, induce almost instant insanity. He is shown what he is told is an antidote, which he will be given if only he will confess in time.

(11) A large metal container is fitted over the head and neck and held firm to the body by extensions that are held in place by a waist-band. The container is then hit with sticks and rods on the outside, at first slowly and in routine fashion, and then with increasing tempo. The more battered the container is the more difficult it is to pull out.

(12) A certain chemical substance (possibly a nerve irritant) is put in the hand of the prisoner who is ordered to clench it. The substance gives the effect of an electric shock.

(13) Water hoses are applied to the mouth or anus and the water turned on.

(14) The motions of sodomy are enacted apparently by a man kept for the purpose.

(15) One of the prisoner's arms is firmly tied to the fixed bars of a window, the other to the handle of

a door. The door is slowly opened in the direction away from the window.

(16) Match-sticks are inserted into the urinary-genital tract. Sometimes they are lit. Or, alternatively, the fillings of dry ink pens are inserted in the tract.

These methods of physical torture are practised with great skill and artistry in order to avoid permanent damage. But the interrogators sometimes lose control of the situation and certain—perhaps unwanted—results follow, such as partial paralysis, the perforation of the stomach, the loss of an eye, or total nervous breakdown.

DOCUMENT S/8962

Letter dated 9 January 1969 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[10 January 1969]

In accordance with the request addressed to me by the General Assembly, I have the honour to transmit the text of resolution 2479 (XXIII), adopted by the General Assembly at its 1752nd plenary meeting, on 21 December 1968, in which the Assembly, *inter alia*, considered it desirable to include Russian and Spanish among the working languages of the Security Council.

(Signed) U THANT
Secretary-General

For the text of resolution 2479 (XXIII), see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 18.

DOCUMENT S/8964

Letter dated 8 January 1969 from the Secretary-General to Governments of all States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies containing a further appeal for voluntary contributions for the financing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus

[Original text: English/French/Spanish]
[13 January 1969]

I have the honour to draw the attention of your Government to the fact that by paragraph 3 of its resolution 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968, the Security Council extended the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further period ending 15 June 1969.

It will be recalled that paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 provides that all costs pertaining to the Force are to be met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus, with the provision that voluntary contributions for that purpose may be accepted by the Secretary-General.

As I have repeatedly indicated, this method of financing is far from satisfactory and the present financial situation in respect of UNFICYP bears out that evaluation. In my last report to the Security Council dated 4 December 1968, I felt obliged to point out that the deficit of the UNFICYP budget continued to be of alarming proportions and to appeal to the members of the Security Council to give their most serious and urgent attention to this matter (*see S/8914, para. 91*).

The estimated costs of UNFICYP to the Organization from its inception on 27 March 1964 to 15 June

1969 total \$103,985,000. This amount, of which \$8,150,000 represents the estimated cost of maintaining the Force at approximately its present strength for the period from 16 December 1968 to 15 June 1969, includes the cost of final repatriation of contingents and of liquidation of the operation, which is estimated at \$590,000.

The above estimates do not include costs which Governments providing contingents to the Force have agreed to bear at their own expense. For the period from 16 December 1968 to 15 June 1969 it is estimated, on the basis of reports received from these Governments, that Australia will be absorbing the sum of \$186,150; Austria, \$110,337; Canada, \$638,770 (exclusive of the cost of normal pay and allowances); Denmark, \$260,000; and Ireland, \$382,000. The United Kingdom has agreed to absorb the sum of \$300,000 for a three-month period. Finland and Sweden are also absorbing certain UNFICYP costs at their own expense.

The amounts paid or pledged by Governments to cover the Organization's costs totalled \$89,038,633 as at 8 January 1969. Details of contributions paid or pledged are annexed. To the above amount may be added \$503,000 which had been received as at 31 December 1968 from interest earned on investment

of temporary surplus funds, public contributions, gains on exchange and other miscellaneous income.

Accordingly, new pledges totalling approximately \$14,443,000 must now be received if the Organization is to be in a position to honour in full its past commitments to Governments providing contingents to UNFICYP and to cover the other costs involved in maintaining the Force until 15 June 1969.

Such contributions are, of course, entirely voluntary and are understood to be made without prejudice to the positions of principle adopted by Member States in respect of the financing of peace-keeping operations. It is, however, clearly essential that the necessary pledges be received if UNFICYP is to continue to carry out the task assigned to it.

I therefore once again appeal most earnestly to all the Governments to respond promptly and generously with voluntary contributions to provide the necessary financial support for the United Nations operation in Cyprus.

(Signed) U THANT
Secretary-General

PLEDGES TO THE UNFICYP SPECIAL ACCOUNT FOR
THE PERIOD 27 MARCH 1964-15 JUNE 1969 AS AT
8 JANUARY 1969

<i>Government</i>	<i>Total pledges (in US dollar equiva- lents)</i>
Australia	1,159,875
Austria	680,000
Belgium	1,334,003
Botswana	500
Cambodia	600
Congo (Democratic Republic of)	20,000
Cyprus	582,600
Denmark	1,245,000
Federal Republic of Germany	6,500,000
Finland	325,000
Ghana	11,667
Greece	6,850,000
Iceland	3,000
Iran	18,000
Ireland	50,000

<i>Government</i>	<i>Total pledges (in US dollar equiva- lents)</i>
Israel	26,500
Italy	2,202,618
Ivory Coast	30,000
Jamaica	13,800
Japan	525,000
Laos	1,500
Lebanon	997
Liberia	4,500
Libya	30,000
Luxembourg	45,000
Malawi	5,590
Malaysia	7,500
Malta	1,820
Mauritania	2,041
Morocco	20,000
Nepal	400
Netherlands	921,000
New Zealand	42,000
Niger	2,041
Nigeria	10,800
Norway	1,134,352
Pakistan	8,800
Philippines	2,000
Republic of Korea	16,000
Republic of Viet-Nam	4,000
Singapore	2,500
Sweden	1,900,000
Switzerland	1,095,000
Thailand	2,500
Trinidad and Tobago	2,400
Turkey	1,839,253
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	20,220,476
United Republic of Tanzania	7,000
United States of America	40,100,000 ^a
Venezuela	3,000
Zambia	28,000
TOTAL	89,038,633

^a Maximum amount pledged, part of which will be dependent on contributions of other Governments.

DOCUMENT S/8965*

Letter dated 13 January 1969 from the representative of Israel to the
Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[13 January 1969]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 7 January 1969 by the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations [S/8961].

This is undoubtedly the most scurrilous document ever to be circulated in the United Nations. It is atrocity-mongering of the cheapest and most vulgar kind and unworthy of the attention of any State Member of the United Nations.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7501.

DOCUMENT S/8967

Note verbale dated 16 January 1969 from the Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: Russian]
[16 January 1969]

The Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations presents its compliments to the President of the Security Council and, referring to General Assembly resolution 2479 (XXIII) of 21 December 1968 and to the Secretary-General's letter of 9 January 1969 [S/8962] to the President of the Security Council transmitting the above-mentioned resolution of the General Assembly, has the honour to request that a meeting of the Security Council should be convened to consider the question of taking measures in accordance with the provision of the above-mentioned resolution of the General Assembly which relates to the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/8968

Note verbale dated 16 January 1969 from the Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: Spanish]
[16 January 1969]

The Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations presents its compliments to the President of the Security Council and, with reference to resolution 2479 (XXIII) of 21 December 1968 adopted by the General Assembly, and to the letter dated 9 January 1969 [S/8962] from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council transmitting the above-mentioned resolution of the General Assembly, has the honour to request him to convene a meeting of the Security Council for the purpose of considering the said General Assembly resolution and the measures that should be adopted in relation to it in so far as it directly affects the Security Council.

DOCUMENT S/8969

Letted dated 16 January 1969 from the representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: French]
[16 January 1969]

On the instructions of my Government and further to my letter of 27 December 1968 [S/8944], I have the honour to communicate to you, for the information of the members of the Security Council, the following facts:

On 1 December 1968, at approximately 9 a.m., three aircraft of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces violated Cambodian air space and machine-gunned the village of Veal Chhmong in the commune of Dar, district of Mimot, wounding two villagers named Meng Seang and Chiep Phin.

On 8 December, at approximately 3.30 p.m., an automobile was subjected to fire from rocket-launchers and machine-guns by a group of United States-South Viet-Nameese soldiers who had been landed by helicopters at a point near kilometre stone 47 in the commune of Khsim, district of Snuol, province of Kratie. The vehicle was severely damaged.

On 12 December, at approximately 1 a.m., three patrol boats of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces, coming from Hatien and patrolling the Giang Thanh river, directed several bursts of automatic weapon fire at the Cambodian villages of Bat Banliek

and Prek Trahing, commune of Prek Kroeus, district of Kompong Trach, province of Kampot.

On the same day, at approximately 2 p.m., two helicopters of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces violated Cambodian air space and machine-gunned buffalo herdsman at a place situated approximately 1,500 metres from the Khmer-South Viet-Nameese frontier in the commune of Kokisom, district of Rumduol, province of Svay Rieng, killing a herdsman named Ouk Chem on the spot.

On 14 December, at approximately 4 p.m., five helicopters and a spotter aircraft of the United States-South Viet-Nameese air forces flew over and machine-gunned the frontier area in the vicinity of the commune of Khsim, district of Snuol, province of Kratie.

On the following day, at approximately 2 p.m., another five helicopters of the same forces flew over the Khsim-Mondulkiri road between kilometre stones 20 and 26, and on the following day, at approximately 11 a.m., a United States-South Viet-Nameese helicopter and a United States-South Viet-Nameese spotter aircraft flew over the same road between kilometre stones 15 and 25.

On 15 December, at approximately 5.30 p.m., members of the United States-South Viet-Name forces from the post of Kinh Thay Bang (Chaudoc) fired artillery into Cambodian territory. Six shells landed approximately 2,000 metres inside Cambodia in the village of Prek Khsach, commune of Kompong Krasaing, district of Koh Andeth, province of Takeo, seriously wounding a woman, who was a Cambodian national, and severely damaging her house.

On 17 December, at approximately 7 p.m., members of the United States-South Viet-Name forces from the post of Queo-Ba (Hau Ghia) fired artillery into Cambodia. Seven shells landed approximately 500 metres inside Cambodian territory in the commune of Mesar Thngak, district of Chantrea, province of Svay Rieng, severely damaging two houses and wounding two buffaloes and a pig.

On the same day, at approximately 3.30 p.m., two helicopters of the United States-South Viet-Name air forces flew over and machine-gunned for the fifth time the abandoned police post situated near road No. 13, approximately 500 metres from the Khmer-South Viet-Name frontier in the commune of Khsim, district of Snuol, province of Kratie. The same post had previously been bombed and machine-gunned on 25, 27 and 28 November and on 8 December.

On 19 December, at approximately 10 a.m., three helicopters, guided by two spotter aircraft of the United States-South Viet-Name forces, again machine-gunned and bombed this abandoned post.

On 20 December, at approximately 2 p.m., members of the United States-South Viet-Name armed forces from the posts of Cai Vang and Vinh Dien (Kien Phong) fired artillery into Cambodia; some twenty shells landed on the grounds of the provincial guard post of Peam Montea, district of Kompong Trabeek, province of Prey Veng, damaging a barracks.

The Royal Government of Cambodia has protested vigorously against the hostile fire directed by the United States-South Viet-Name armed forces against Cambodian territory, which endangers the lives of the innocent Khmer inhabitants of the frontier area and destroys their property. The Royal Government has called upon the Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of Viet-Nam to take adequate steps to prevent the recurrence of such reprehensible acts and to pay compensation to the victims.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Huor Sambath
*Permanent Representative of Cambodia
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/8970

Letter dated 16 January 1969 from the representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: French]
[16 January 1969]

On the instructions of my Government and further to my letter of 31 December 1968 [S/8958], I have the honour to inform you that, during the night of 15-16 December 1968, approximately ten Thai fishing junks entered Cambodian waters off the island of Koh Kong.

Surprised by elements of the Cambodian sea patrol, the Thais opened fire on these forces, who returned the fire. After an exchange of fire lasting approximately thirty minutes, one of these junks, equipped with a 300 CV Atlas motor, was captured with sixteen crew members, one of whom was fatally wounded, and two automatic pistols were seized on board.

The Royal Government of Cambodia has protested vigorously against the intrusion of Thai fishing junks into Cambodian waters and the opening of fire by the Thais against the Cambodian security forces. It has called upon the Thai Government to take adequate steps to prevent its nationals from again committing such acts.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Huor Sambath
*Permanent Representative of Cambodia
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/8971*

Letter dated 16 January 1969 from the representative of Syria to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[17 January 1969]

Acting upon instructions from my Government and further to my two letters of 10 August 1968 [S/8742] and 16 August 1968 [S/8749] regarding the systematic policy of annexation and colonization

relentlessly pursued by the Israel authorities in the Syrian-Arab occupied territories, I have the honour to draw your attention to the fact that the Israel occupying authorities have recently decided to intensify and widen further the scope of their predatory designs in Syrian occupied territories.

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7502.

The *Daily News Bulletin* of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported on 14 January 1969 the following news item:

"JEWISH AGENCY PLANS 22 ADDITIONAL GOLAN HEIGHTS SETTLEMENTS, BRINGING TOTAL TO 32

"Jerusalem, 13 January (Jewish Telegraphic Agency)—The Jewish Agency announced today that it will establish 22 more settlements in the Golan Heights, bringing the total to 32 since the June 1967 Six-day War, when the Syrian territory was seized by Israel in bloody fighting. A Jewish Agency official said that Israel had invested more than \$5 million in the Golan Heights and planned to invest \$5 million more. For the time being settlers are using abandoned Syrian Army camps as temporary quarters. Another project in the region will be development of six miles of the eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee which had formerly been within the range of Syrian guns on the Heights."

Moreover, on 12 January 1969 the Jewish Agency spokesman, while on a "press tour" to the occupied Syrian areas, unabashedly expounded what he termed a "plan" for the "development" of the Golan heights "as an integral part of Israel". Excerpts from his statement, dated 13 January 1969, which is reminiscent of nineteenth century colonialism, are reproduced in the annex hereto, as widely reported by news agencies.

I wish to reiterate once more that the Jewish Agency, which has branches scattered in many parts on the world, is defined by the authoritative *American Jewish Yearbook* as follows:

"JEWISH AGENCY AMERICAN SECTION (1929).

"515 Park Ave., N.Y.C., 10022. President Nahum Goldmann; Exec. Dir. Isadore Hamlin. Represents in the United States the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Israel, Jerusalem, which is recognized by the State of Israel as the authorized agency to work in Israel for development and colonization, the absorption and settlement of immigrants and the co-ordination of activities of Jewish institutions and associations operating in these fields." (Year 1967, vol 68, p. 496.) (My underlining.)

It is common knowledge that the Jewish Agency draws the largest part of its funds from the United States of America and, since these funds are tax exempt, it is clear that the Government of the United States of America is responsible for supporting the Jewish Agency plans for the colonization of Arab lands and the eviction by brutal force of their Arab inhabitants.

The American support to an agency which, by virtue of the Israel Status Law itself is but an integral part of the Government of Israel and whose main activity is the colonization of territories belonging to a State Member of the United Nations, occupied as the result of the Israel war of aggression of 5 June 1967, constitutes a flagrant breach of the Charter of the United Nations as well as a serious violation of all norms of international law.

The latest Israel plan for the establishment of twenty-two additional settlements, thus bringing to thirty-two the total of Israel settlements in occupied Syrian territories, and the systematic destruction of Arab life and property in these areas confirm once more the Israel expansionist designs and reveal to world public opinion the ominous nature as well as the predatory objectives of world zionism.

I wish also to draw your attention to the unfounded Israel allegation that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has not permitted the return of some 700 Syrians to the occupied Golan heights. The Red Cross has so far no knowledge of any such Israel permission as has been falsely claimed by the Israel authorities.

On behalf of my Government, while I strongly protest against the criminal acts of Israel authorities in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, of the elementary norms of international law and civilized behaviour and of scores of United Nations resolutions. I request that the necessary steps be promptly taken to ensure the inviolability of the Syrian territory and the liquidation of the consequences of Israel aggression.

I would request that this letter, together with the annex, be circulated as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH
*Permanent Representative of Syria
to the United Nations*

ANNEX

Excerpts from the statement of a representative of the Jewish Agency, dated 13 January 1969

The greatest need for the development of the Golan heights is people. Land, water, and even money are available in plenty, but without people there is no likelihood of developing the area as an integral part of Israel. This was emphasized by Jewish Agency representatives during a press tour of the area yesterday. In the last fifteen months ten settlements have been established on the Golan, six kibbutzim and four moshavim. The hundreds of settlers so far on the Golan have benefited from almost 15 million Israeli pounds in investments by the Jewish Agency. This figure will probably be doubled in the 1969-1970 budget year. Already 50,000 dunams are under various stages of cultivation. Field crops are mainly planted, as well as several varieties of vegetables. Cattle and sheep are also beginning to make their appearance and eventually it is hoped to have about 10,000 cattle and 5,000 sheep on the plateau. Virtually all the present settlers are in their early twenties, with a sprinkling of younger people who spend some time working in the settlements before their army service. The major problem which the settlers speak of is the slow pace of the building of their permanent quarters. In some cases the settlers are using abandoned Syrian army camps as temporary accommodation while waiting for their permanent homes to be completed. In other cases where the settlers have already moved in, they complain that the work of completing the housing is lagging. The Ministry of Housing has responsibility for this and apparently its main problem is a shortage of labour. The entire area of the Golan is one and a quarter million dunams, which in its 70 kilometres length drops from a height of 1,200 metres above sea level to 300 metres above sea level in the south. The Jewish Agency plans call for a population of 12,500 living in twenty-two settlements with a cultivated area of 170,000 dunams. The plan also provides for a yearly income of 10,000 Israeli pounds per family and an annual production of 55 million Israeli pounds. Among the future projects of

the Jewish Agency for developing the area is a road along the length of the Golan heights which will be further from the present border. The aim of this is to ensure that people can travel in the area in greater safety. Another big project is the development of the 11-kilometre stretch of the Kinneret coast formerly directly under the Syrian guns. It is planned

to turn this part of the coast into a sports area and to set up four settlements there. Interestingly enough, yesterday there was also a visit to the Golan area by Mr. Avraman Yoffe, head of the Nature Reserves Authority, the Civil Service Commissioner and other personalities, who discussed the company planned for the development of the Golan heights.

DOCUMENT S/8975

Letter dated 21 January 1969 from the representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: French]
[21 January 1969]

On the instructions of my Government and further to my letter of 16 January 1969 [S/8969], I have the honour to communicate to you, for the information of the members of the Security Council, the following facts.

On 18 December 1968, at approximately 7.50 a.m., seven shells fired from the South Viet-Nameese post at Cai Vang (Kien Phong), landed beside the Provincial Guard post at Peam Montea, damaging a barrack at the post.

On 23 December between 7 a.m. and 11 a.m., six shells fired from the South Viet-Nameese post at Tan Thanh (Kien Phong) landed in the vicinity and within the perimeter of the same post, wounding a guard named Kem Phean.

On 24 December, at approximately 10.30 a.m., five shells fired from the same post at Tan Thanh landed in the commune of Peam Montea, killing three pigs belonging to the inhabitants.

On 28 December, between 9.30 and 10.15 a.m., some twenty shells, again fired from the South Viet-Nameese post at Cai Vang (Kien Phong), landed on the Royal Police post at Peam Montea, damaging two dwellings and wounding a member of the post.

On 30 December, at approximately 11 a.m., the two South Viet-Nameese posts at Cai Vang and Tan Thanh again shelled the Cambodian Royal Police post, damaging a building and a barrack.

The following day, at approximately 11 a.m., these same South Viet-Nameese posts resumed firing on the Cambodian military post at Peam Montea, which was hit by six shells, several other shells landing in the vicinity of the post and in the compound of the Royal Police post.

At the same time, several aircraft and helicopters of the United States-South Viet-Nameese air forces violated Cambodian air space, bombing and machine-gunning the area along the Cambodian frontier in the commune of Peam Montea.

The bombing and machine-gunning seriously damaged seven houses belonging to the inhabitants of the area and caused the destruction of two barracks used as living quarters for the Royal Police. Two fortified

positions of the Royal Police were also seriously damaged.

During the night of 31 December 1968-1 January 1969, firing into Cambodian territory continued, causing serious damage to crops.

During the morning of 31 December 1968, two helicopters guided by a spotter aircraft of the United States-South Viet-Nameese air forces intruded into Cambodian air space over the commune of Bavet, district of Svay Teap (Svay Rieng). These aircraft opened fire with machine-guns and launched rockets against a group of peasants who were working in the rice fields in the frontier area, seriously wounding one of them named Un Doeut, who died while being transported to hospital.

On 2 January 1969, at approximately 6.30 p.m., elements of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces from the post at Vinh Dien shelled Cambodian territory. Some dozen shells landed north of the Royal Cambodian Police post at Banteay Chakrey, situated approximately 100 metres inside the frontier, in the commune of Banteay Chakrey, district of Kompong Trabek, province of Prey Veng, causing the death of a local inhabitant named Kim Sao.

The International Commission for Supervision and Control has already been invited to visit the area where the incident took place to conduct an investigation.

The Royal Government of Cambodia has protested vigorously against the shelling and deliberate attacks against Cambodian territory carried out by the armed forces of the United States and South Viet-Nam. It calls upon the Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of Viet-Nam to take appropriate steps to prevent the recurrence of similar hostile actions by their armed forces and to pay compensation to the families of the victims.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Huot Sambath
Permanent Representative of Cambodia
to the United Nations

Note by the Secretary-General in accordance with financial regulation 13.1 on the administrative and financial implications of the inclusion of Russian and Spanish among the working languages of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[23 January 1969]

1. By my letter dated 9 January 1969 [S/8962] addressed to the President of the Security Council, I transmitted the text of General Assembly resolution 2479 (XXIII) of 21 December 1968. Under the terms of paragraph 2 of that resolution, the General Assembly considers it desirable to include Russian and Spanish among the working languages of the Security Council. The purpose of this note is to inform the Security Council, in accordance with financial regulation 13.1, of the administrative and financial implications of any decision the Council may take to this effect.

2. With the exception of verbatim records in provisional form, all documents for the Security Council are already produced in Russian and Spanish as official languages. Further, speeches made in Russian or Spanish are reproduced verbatim in the language of delivery in provisional form. Thus, additional costs consequent upon the inclusion of Russian and Spanish among the working languages of the Council would relate solely to the provision of full verbatim records of Council meetings in each language. Taking into account language staff already available, three additional verbatim reporters and nine typists would need to be added for the necessary services in Russian at an estimated full year cost of \$159,100. In the case of Spanish, eight verbatim reporters and nine typists would be required at an estimated full year cost of \$240,200. Actual costs in 1969 would be in a lesser amount, taking into account, *inter alia*, delays in the recruitment of qualified staff.

DOCUMENT S/8978

Letter dated 25 January 1969 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[25 January 1969]

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, Mr. Abba Eban.

(Signed) Joel BARROMI
*Acting Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations*

**LETTER DATED 25 JANUARY 1969 FROM THE MINISTER
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

I have the honour to draw the attention of the members of the Security Council to the speech delivered by President Nasser on 20 January 1969, on the occasion of the official opening of the session of the National Assembly of the United Arab Republic.

This speech must be regarded as an authoritative statement of the official policies of the United Arab Republic, in regard to the cease-fire resolutions and the Security Council resolution [242 (1967)] of 22 November 1967.

In the course of his speech President Nasser declared (in translation):

"In talking about the forces of the Arab struggle, I must stress the glorious actions carried out by the Palestinian resistance forces. The rise of these resistance organizations, the crystallizing of their objectives and the expansion of their activities are one of the conspicuous features of the period after June 1967. These organizations raised a flaming torch at a time of darkness and despair . . . They

fulfil a vital task in sapping the enemy's strength and spilling his blood. In your name I express our admiration and appreciation to the four major organizations: El Fatah, the Popular Front, the Liberation Organisation and the Arab Sinai Organization . . . The Palestinian resolve must be given freedom to express itself without hindrance. It must be given the fullest opportunity to achieve its aspirations, without any guardianship. The United Arab Republic has maintained a consistent position in this matter since the heroic task of the Palestinian resistance began. In pursuance of this policy, the United Arab Republic places all its resources at the disposal of these organizations, without condition or reservation. In line with the same policy, the United Arab Republic appreciates the attitude taken by the Palestinian organizations in rejecting the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 that was accepted by the United Arab Republic. They are entitled to reject this resolution, which may serve the purpose of eliminating the consequences of the aggression carried out in June 1967, but is inadequate for determining the Palestinian fate."

This policy statement has far-reaching and deeply disturbing implications regarding the maintenance of the cease-fire under the Security Council resolution [233 (1967)] of 6 June 1967, and the establishment of a just and lasting peace as called for by the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967.

It gives explicit public sanction to a policy which has in fact already been pursued for some time. Arab

Governments, having officially accepted the cease-fire, have been continuing an armed struggle against Israel through irregular forces and terrorist organizations operating from their territory, and with their political and material support. Such policies and activities are in flagrant violation of the cease-fire and, in espousing them, the United Arab Republic and the other States concerned are repudiating the responsibilities they took upon themselves in accepting the cease-fire.

The hypothesis that it is permissible under the cease-fire for such armed organizations to be recruited, trained, armed, financed, harboured and even tolerated by Arab States for the purpose of conducting acts of violence and terror against Israel must be emphatically rejected by my Government. We shall continue to hold the Arab Government concerned fully and directly responsible for all such activities. It must be apparent to members of the Security Council that the policy proclaimed by President Nasser in stating that "in pursuance of this policy, the United Arab Republic places all its resources at the disposal of these organizations, without condition or reservation", is a threat to the Council's cease-fire resolution.

It must also be stressed that such conduct violates the general principles of the United Nations Charter and constitutes aggression by one State against another.

No less grave is President Nasser's remarkably candid disclosures as to what he really means by accepting the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. He defends this "acceptance" as a means of achieving the strictly limited objective of "eliminating the consequences" of the June 1967 war, without terminating the Israel-Arab conflict by establishing peace between Israel and the Arab States. On the contrary, he advocates that the armed struggle for the ultimate

liquidation of Israel should continue and he therefore regards it as logical and warranted for the terrorist organizations to reject the Security Council resolution. This dual policy, which he asserts has been consistently maintained by the United Arab Republic, is a total negation of the principles and purposes of the resolution, which calls for the promotion of agreement on a just and lasting peace based *inter alia* on "termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force". A solemn public endorsement of an armed conflict to be continued, even after the establishment of peace as envisaged in the Security Council resolution is not "acceptance" of the resolution but a fundamental repudiation of its letter and spirit.

My Government's basic position remains that the twenty-year Israel-Arab conflict can be effectively resolved only by a genuine peace negotiated and agreed by the parties directly concerned and contractually binding upon them. No combination of unilateral declarations, time-tables, arrangements, foreign Power or United Nations guarantees can form a realistic and durable substitute for a peace treaty.

My Government's conviction in this regard derives from sombre past experience, and is reinforced by the ominous concept of continued warfare contained in President Nasser's speech.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Abba EBAN
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Israel

DOCUMENT S/8980

Letter dated 24 January 1969 from the representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: French]
[27 January 1969]

On the instructions of my Government and further to my letters of 18 November 1968 [S/8903], 27 November 1968 [S/8907] and 16 December 1968 [S/8939], I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, for the information of the members of the Security Council, photographs relating to the criminal attacks carried out on 6 November 1968 at about 3.30 a.m. by three helicopters of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces against the peaceful Cambodian inhabitants of the village of Prey Tuol, commune of Daung, district of Romeas Hek, province of Svay Rieng.

I should like to remind you that this act of aggression by the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces against the Cambodian village of Prey Tuol, situated about 2,000 metres inside Cambodian territory, caused the following casualties among Cambodian civilians and their property: twenty-three persons wounded (ten men, four boys, five women and four girls), one of whom died of his wounds; two pigs killed; four oxen and six buffaloes wounded.

Also herewith are photographs relating to the criminal attacks carried out on 16 November 1968, in

the morning, by three armed motor-boats of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces against the peaceful Cambodian inhabitants of the village of Bat Banleak, commune of Prek Kroeus, district of Kompong Trach, province of Kampot.

It should be remembered that the casualties among the Cambodian civilian population resulting from this act of aggression by the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces amounted to twelve persons killed on the spot and seven wounded:

Killed

1. Neang Cap Buoy, aged 34, married with one child
2. A six-month-old baby
3. Vong Lorn, aged 41, married with seven children
4. Op Sam, aged 44, married with six children
5. Hau Nhang, aged 45, married with seven children
6. Chhorn Youm, aged 45, married with six children
7. An eight-year-old boy
8. Kong Kim, aged 54, married with ten children

9. Chhor Veth, aged 50, married with six children
10. Iuy Nhar, aged 34, married with six children
11. An eight-year-old girl
12. Kry Pol, aged 35, married with two children

Wounded

1. Hang Phoeung, aged 25, married with three children
2. Eap Khim, aged 17, unmarried
3. So Nuon, aged 57, widow with six children
4. Khuon Yean, aged 45, married with nine children
5. Huon Kim, aged 30, married with three children
6. Suon Troy, aged 33, married with six children
7. Uon Yim, aged 35, married with six children

Also herewith is a photograph showing the bodies of the provincial guards, Tork Sam Ath and Meas Ven,

and of the private, 2nd class, Ouk Van, who were killed as a result of the criminal attack carried out on 15 November 1968 at about 6.30 a.m. by elements of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces some 100 metres inside Cambodian territory, in the commune of Bosmon, district of Rumduol, province of Svay Rieng.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) HUOT Sambath
Permanent Representative of Cambodia
to the United Nations

[The photographs attached to the mimeographed version of the present document are not reproduced here.]

DOCUMENT S/8982*

Letter dated 27 January 1969 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[27 January 1969]

I regret to convey to you the shocking news that the Government of Iraq executed nine Iraqi Jews this morning by public hanging in a central square in Baghdad.

The charge that they were spying for Israel is without a shred of truth. The Iraq Government has perpetrated an act of barbarity which exceeds even what the world has come to expect from a country in which violence and murder have become almost commonplace. The appeals made through a number of channels were disregarded, including that of yourself as Secretary-General.

The statement made by Prime Minister Eshkol in the Knesset this afternoon expressed the grief and anger felt throughout Israel at this deed. I have asked the Acting Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations to give you a copy of that statement.

As you will be aware, the Israel Government and people have felt increasing anxiety at the persecution of Jews in certain Arab countries in the Middle East. The facts of the matter have on a number of occasions been placed before the appropriate organs of the United Nations. To our profound distress, it must be recorded that these bodies have failed to take the required action.

I can only express the earnest hope that everything possible will yet be done by the international community, and the United Nations in particular, to relieve the plight of these helpless Jewish minorities. They are being subjected to gross discrimination and oppression, to imprisonment and torture, and even, as in the case of Iraq, to brutal public murders that must arouse the greatest revulsion in the minds of all civilized men.

I would request that this letter be circulated as a Security Council and General Assembly document.

(Signed) Abba EBAN
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Israel

TEXT OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL, MR. LEVI ESHKOL, IN THE KNESSET ON 27 JANUARY 1969

What we have feared has come true. At dawn, the Iraqi authorities have hanged nine Jews. Let us pay homage to the memory of:

Ezra Naji Zilkha,
Fuad Gabbai,
Yaacov Gurji Namurdi,
Daoud Yehezkeel Baruch Dalal,
Daoud Ghali,
Yehezkeel Salah Yehezkeel,
Sabah Hayim,
Naim Kadoori Halal,
Charles Raphael Horesh.

The blood of the innocent martyrs of Babylon cries out to us and to the world from Iraqi soil. "Oh Daughter of Babylon, that art to be destroyed, happy shall be He, that repayeth thee as thou served us." The Lord shall avenge their blood.

The first spontaneous reaction in the heart of every one of us to the murder trial of nine Jews in Iraq is profound mourning and the redoubled determination to fulfil in Jewish history that thoroughgoing charge of Israel's redemption and ingathering of the exiles, to which our lives are consecrated.

Beyond any doubt, there is more than the merely humane aspect to this murder. Here is further evidence, if such evidence was needed, of the essence of the régimes in Arab countries and of the fate they have ordained for the Jewish people and for each of its individuals, if they could but do as they pleased. These régimes are incapable of solving the problems besetting their own nations and they try hard to disclaim responsibility, unburdening it on others. Thus they strive to blunt the sting of their nation's despair, redirecting it at helpless hostages whom they have imprisoned within their boundaries.

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7503.

The similarity between these régimes and movements and those régimes and movements which threatened the entire world until they were defeated in the Second World War is manifest to one and all.

The criminal plan of the Baghdad hangings and that of the demands of what goes by the name of "Liberation of Palestine" are part and parcel of the self-same design. Unless a halt is put to it from outside it will not cease on its own. Between the design of genocide and its perpetration there stands the State of Israel alone—Israel and its strength.

The world's élite must understand this reality. As in the days of May 1967, this is not a matter of demands and counter-demands, between which a compromise must be sought. The conflict is one between a furore of destruction and a nation defending itself from its would-be assassins.

The Baghdad hangings have illuminated the fate of the remnants of Babylonian Jewry with a nightmarish light. The land of Iraq has become one great prison for its Jewish remnant. Our brethren are prey to terror at the hands of villains.

Iraq has become a gallows to its Jewish citizens. For 2,500 years the Jews have helped to build up Babylon—Iraq—with all their hearts and souls. When Israel attained statehood we welcomed those driven out from there.

Now, the persecutions have culminated in the hanging of nine Jews, whilst Iraq's leaders promise that this is not the end. The sole crime of these nine martyrs consists in their Jewishness. We know full well, and I do declare that the Iraqi Government also knew, that all accusations levelled at these Jews were entirely baseless. It is not for nothing that their trial took place behind locked doors.

The oppression of Jews in the Arab countries has been going on incessantly for years—yet the world's

conscience has not been stirred. Thus, we have come to this pass—the hangings in Baghdad.

As soon as we learned of the death sentences, we appealed to everybody likely perhaps to take action in order to rescue these people in Iraq. Many, including States, personalities, religious leaders, as well as the United Nations Secretary-General, have appealed to the Baghdad rulers—to be fobbed off with mendacious denials and deliberately misleading statements. These lies were meant to cover up for the murderous death sentences already passed, in spite of statements to the contrary. Once the ground had thus been prepared, the murder was carried out. I cannot help but reach the sorry conclusion that the world and all its institutions have failed to muster the necessary determination in this matter—and in the matter of Jews in Arab lands in general. Last-minute appeals and making do with hypocritical replies will not offer relief from the awesome responsibility nor excuse the turning of a blind eye to the fate of the Jews in Arab countries.

From this rostrum I demand that the entire world should act, each one to the best of his capacity, in order to avert further acts of murder, to save the families and to protect the Jewish remnant.

If there is a conscience in this world, let its voice be heard, now. Let us awaken to the immediate need to rescue the remnant of the Jewish communities in the Arab countries.

Our hearts mourn for the victims and our fraternal feelings go out to the bereaved families and communities.

We are firmly resolved to accomplish Israel's revival until its full redemption.

Our actions will aim at strengthening the State of Israel and at the salvation of Jewish communities in distress.

DOCUMENT S/8985

Letter dated 28 January 1969 from the representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: French]
[28 January 1969]

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to communicate to you, for the information of the members of the Security Council, the text of the following message dated 25 December 1968 from Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, Chief of State of Cambodia, addressed to the Secretary-General.

"I have the honour, and regret, to inform you that Cambodia has just been the victim of a new and bloody act of aggression by the United States—South Viet-Nameese armed forces.

"On 17 December 1968, at about 9.30 a.m., a lorry transporting wood, which was proceeding along the Khsim-Sen Monorom (Mondulkiri) road, was attacked by a helicopter-borne unit lying in ambush eighteen kilometres inside Khmer territory. The vehicle was halted by an explosion and captured under heavy fire by grenade launchers and automatic weapons. Of the twelve people on the lorry, all of Cambodian nationality, seven were killed, two were seriously wounded, and one is missing. The aggres-

sors killed the wounded who were unable to escape and plundered the lorry and then left the scene on board five United States helicopters which had been summoned by radio. The International Control Commission carried out an investigation on the spot, collected material evidence (grenade launchers, grenades, cartridge cases) concerning the origin of the assailants, and interrogated the two survivors on the circumstances of the massacre.

"I should like to draw your attention to the seriousness of this new act of terrorist aggression which indicates a deliberate decision by the United States command to prohibit the use of the only road providing access to Mondulkiri and to isolate that province of Cambodia. A comparison might be made between Cambodia's humanitarian gesture in releasing its twelve United States prisoners at Christmas and the increase in crimes committed by the United States forces against the civilian population of my country. We are convinced that the United Nations

cannot remain for ever indifferent to acts which defy its Charter and all international law. I should therefore be extremely grateful if you would inform all the Members of the United Nations of this latest act of aggression and help us to compel the United States to respect our national rights and the lives of our peaceful population."

I should also like to inform you that on 19 December 1968 the International Control Commission, composed of Mr. H. C. Chandry (India), Chairman, and Mr. R. V. Gorham (Canada) and Mr. Edward Zdzowski (Poland), members, accompanied by Cambodian civilian and military officials, visited the place at which the act of aggression occurred in order to investigate the aforementioned attack by the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces.

Major Balakirev, Military Attaché of the Embassy of the USSR, Lieutenant-Colonel Sonolet, Military Attaché of the Embassy of France, and Colonel Given, Military Attaché of the Embassy of Australia, also accompanied them as observers.

The members of the International Control Commission were able to see the seven decomposing corpses of the peaceful Cambodian inhabitants, which had been left in their original position. The names of the victims were as follows:

1. Nhek Chhen, aged 33
2. Eal Khon, aged 35
3. Lim Voeung, aged 33
4. Prak Long, aged 39
5. Yong Yi
6. Meas Lonn, aged 48
7. Neang Neou, wife of Meas Lonn

It should be noted that, apart from these seven persons who were killed, one wounded man is missing, Yong Ngout, aged 48, and two wounded men are in hospital at Kompong Cham, Kong Dum, aged 45, who is in a serious condition, and Pol Hell.

The Commission was also able to see the lorry riddled with bullets and a damaged bicycle, as well as three 60 mm. grenade launchers, two of which were loaded, two tear-gas grenades, two hand grenades, one plastic bomb, and cartridge cases, left behind by the assailants and all bearing an indication of their United States origin. It also noted a paper with an inscription in Viet-Nameese which was stuck on one of the corpses.

In addition, the Commission interrogated the two survivors, Kong Dy, aged 21, and Uk San, aged 33, as well as the owner of the lorry, Pol Soun Hieng known as Var, a lumber dealer, aged 36. According to their testimony, the lorry was ambushed at about 9.30 a.m. A violent explosion forced it to halt and firing from grenade launchers and automatic weapons ensued. After the shooting, the assailants took the bananas and cigarettes which were on the lorry and gave the *coup de grâce* to all the wounded. They then communicated by radio and a few moments later five helicopters appeared, flying at low altitude, to carry off the assailants, who, the survivors were able to note, included Whites speaking in loud voices.

It should be pointed out that this act of aggression committed by the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces took place inside Cambodian territory, about eighteen kilometres from the frontier.

You will find attached photographs taken at the place of the aggression during the investigation carried out by the International Control Commission.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and the attached photographs circulated as Security Council documents.

(Signed) Huot Sambath
Permanent Representative of Cambodia
to the United Nations

[The photographs attached to the mimeographed version of the present document are not reproduced here.]

DOCUMENT S/8986

Letter dated 28 January 1969 from the representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: French]
[29 January 1969]

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 21 January 1969 [S/8975], I have the honour to communicate to you, for the information of the members of the Security Council, the following.

On 1 December 1968, units of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces, having violated Cambodian territory in the commune of Prey Yuthka, district of Preah Bat Chean Chum, province of Takeo, arrested and forcibly removed to South Viet-Nam seven Cambodians named Chan Toeng, Ey Nim, Sar-Sak, Im-Puth, residents of the commune of Phnom-Den, Nith-Chin and Moeng-Seang, residents of the commune of Krapum Chhouk, and Danh-Ve, a resident of the commune of Prey Yuthka.

On 1 January 1969, units of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces from the post at Long-Khot (Kien-Tuong), having violated Cambodian territory in the commune of Banteay Kraing, district of Kom-

pong Rau, province of Svay Rieng, arrested and took with them to South Viet-Nam a female resident named Neang Sam Chroek.

On 13 January, at approximately 8.30 a.m., units of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces from the post at Trapeang Robang deliberately fired several mortar shells into Cambodian territory in the village of Prek Pork, commune of Thna Thnong, district of Romduol, province of Svay Rieng, causing the instant death of Neang Hem Cheang (aged 70) and Chan Saron (aged 36) and wounding eight other residents of the village, two of them seriously.

The International Control Commission has already been invited to visit the area where the incident took place, in order to conduct an investigation.

The Royal Government of Cambodia has protested vigorously against these deliberate violations of Cambodian territory, with the subsequent arrest and re-

moval of its innocent residents, and against the deliberate firing of shots into Cambodian territory by units of the United States-South Viet-Namese forces. It has called upon the Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of Viet-Nam for the immediate release of the Cambodians who were arbitrarily arrested and for appropriate steps to prevent the recurrence of similar hostile actions by their armed

forces and to pay compensation to the families of the victims.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Huor Sambath
*Permanent Representative of Cambodia
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/8987

Letter dated 29 January 1969 from the representative of the United States of America to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[29 January 1969]

I have been instructed by my Government to draw to your attention the following statement issued by Secretary of State William P. Rogers on 27 January 1969, when he learned of the public execution of fourteen persons convicted for espionage in Iraq:

"We have had no United States representation in Baghdad since the Government of Iraq broke relations in 1967. We are not, therefore, in a position to comment on the facts surrounding the trial. On humanitarian grounds these executions are a matter of deep concern to us. The spectacle of mass public executions is repugnant to the conscience of the world. At my request, Ambassador Yost has called Secretary-General U Thant today to express our deep concern and to tell him that we share the expressions noted in his statement issued earlier today."

The Government of the United States recognizes the legal right of any Government to bring to trial and administer justice to any of its citizens. However, the manner in which these executions and the trials that preceded them were conducted scarcely conforms to normally accepted standards of respect for human rights and human dignity or to the obligations in this regard

that the United Nations Charter imposes upon all Members. Moreover, the spectacular way in which they were carried out seems to have been designed to arouse emotions and to intensify the very explosive atmosphere of suspicion and hostility in the Middle East.

The United States hopes that the world-wide revulsion aroused by the reports of these trials and executions will induce those responsible to carry out their solemn Charter obligations to promote universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Repetition of the recent tragic events would be bound to make more difficult efforts within and outside the United Nations toward the goals of peace, tolerance, and human understanding among nations and peoples, in the Middle East and throughout the world.

I respectfully request that this letter be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Charles W. Yost
*Permanent Representative of
the United States of America
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/8988*

Letter dated 30 January 1969 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[30 January 1969]

My Government has instructed me to inform you that, as a result of wind, rain, floods and snowstorms which swept over the eastern part of Jordan, namely the area where the refugees have their temporary camps, the plight of those innocent Jordanian citizens has acquired a new and greater dimension.

Hundreds of tents housing scores of thousands of refugees went down under the impact of the storms. Most of the tent camps are now in flooded areas and subject to unprecedented heavy rains and hurricanes.

With nothing to protect them against the ravages of nature, most of the 450,000 newly displaced persons are within walking distance of their homes and camps which remain empty in the Israel-occupied territories.

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7504.

This appalling situation cries out to the conscience of mankind. It is a challenge to human values. To keep silent about it would add to the refugees' miseries and lead to more tragedies.

On 14 June 1967, in resolution 237 (1967), the Security Council called upon Israel "to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities", and entrusted you with the task of following the effective implementation of that resolution.

This was reaffirmed on 4 July 1967 in General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V).

It was also the subject of deliberations in the Special Political Committee during the twenty-third session of

the General Assembly. The need for a speedy return of the displaced persons to their homes was emphasized. Addressing the Committee at its 612th meeting, you stated:

"It cannot be questioned that the plight of many of the refugees could best be relieved immediately by their return to their homes and to the camps which they formerly occupied.... I think it is necessary to state that if the camps on the West Bank could again serve their original purpose, and if the displaced persons could return to their former homes, a long step would have been taken towards reducing the hardships faced by a large number of the refugees and displaced persons in Jordan."⁵

Lord Caradon, speaking for the United Kingdom at the 616th meeting, said: "Many of them [*the displaced persons*] have homes, stone houses, to go back to on the other side of the Jordan Valley. They could go back tomorrow".⁵

Mr. Wiggins, for the United States, also emphasized at the same meeting the need for a greatly expanded programme for the return to the lands west of the Jordan of the displaced persons of the 1967 war.

General Assembly resolution 2452 (XXIII) which, *inter alia*, called upon "the Government of Israel to

⁵ These statements were made in the Special Political Committee, the official records of which are published in summary form.

take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities", was adopted.

None of the above resolutions was implemented by the Israel authorities. This is but another act of defiance of United Nations authority and disregard for international will.

Since you have been entrusted with following up the effective implementation of these Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and in view of the present situation, it is the earnest hope of my Government that appropriate steps will be taken to help the victims of continued Israel occupation and facilitate their speedy return.

In the words of Lord Caradon to the Special Political Committee at its 616th meeting: "And, after all, when you come to think of it, it is not asking a lot that people shall be allowed to go home. Surely this is an elementary human right".⁵

May I request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative
of Jordan
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/8989

Letter dated 31 January 1969 from the representative of Iraq to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[31 January 1969]

I have the honour to refer to Security Council document S/8987, containing the letter dated 29 January 1969 addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations and to attach herewith the text of a statement issued this afternoon by the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations.

I respectfully request that this letter together with the attached statement be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Adnan RAOUF
Deputy Permanent Representative
of Iraq to the United Nations

STATEMENT SUBMITTED ON 31 JANUARY 1969 BY THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS

A great many comments have been made during the last few days in connexion with the execution in Iraq of a number of Iraqi citizens who have been tried and found guilty of committing acts of sabotage and of espionage in favour of Israel. The comments and expressions of various sentiments—some of them made in good faith—were immediately exploited by the Israel propaganda machine to blow the issue out of proportion and to launch a vicious campaign of defamation against Iraq. It is, therefore, quite appropriate to state a few facts in order to clarify the issue and dissipate the clouds of malicious propaganda that have been raised about it.

Recently the Government of Iraq brought to trial a number of Iraqi citizens charged with conspiracy to commit acts of sabotage against some military and civil installations inside Iraq, and of espionage in favour of Israel. After an exhaustive trial, during which the defendants availed themselves of legal counsel and were adequately defended, sentences were passed by the court. Those found guilty were sentenced to death, the penalty for high treason, and were subsequently executed last Monday. They were three Moslems, two Christians and nine Jews. Those whose guilt was not proved were immediately acquitted, including seven Jews.

There was no question that the matter was entirely an internal affair of Iraq and the competence of the Iraqi Government to try Iraqi nationals in accordance with the laws of the land was never questioned by any party.

The trial was conducted *in camera* because its proceedings involved information regarding military bases and installations, troop stationing and other military matters. However, those parts of the trial which did not touch upon military secrets were broadcast several times on Baghdad radio.

Israel and all Zionist organizations immediately seized the opportunity to embark on a vicious campaign to malign Iraq by unduly dwelling on the fact that there were nine Jews among those executed, conveniently forgetting those of other religions, and entirely omit-

ting any reference to those who were acquitted, Jews or otherwise. The utterances of Israeli leaders on this occasion of course were part and parcel of Israel's pretensions to identify itself with all the Jews of the world, and to arrogate to itself the entirely rejected assumption of the right to represent all Jews regardless of their nationality.

But, apart from this fact, there were other motives behind the uproar created by Israel which helped to inflame passions in most of the areas of the world where Zionist organizations are vociferous and influential. It would take a little scrutiny and some knowledge of Israel's history to realize that the smoke-screen created by Israel around this issue is actually meant to veil Israel's designs for the area, and cover up its brutal acts against the Arab inhabitants of the

occupied Arab territories. As recently as two weeks ago, Israel forces opened fire against a demonstration of Arab women in Rafah, killing one woman and wounding many others. Again, it is an open secret that whenever Israel plans to commit a new act of aggression against an Arab country, it usually paves the way with a concentrated propaganda campaign against that country. The incident of the attack on Beirut International Airport is still fresh in our minds.

International quarters which are duly concerned about the prospects of peace in the Middle East would be well advised if they attempted to dispel the Israel propaganda smoke-screen and endeavoured to discern Israel's real motives. Several instances in Israel's history would be sufficient to show where the real danger to peace in the area looms.

DOCUMENT S/8991*

Telegram dated 3 February 1969 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[4 February 1969]

I have the honour to draw your attention with grave concern and regret to the alarming news that has reached the Arab world and world public opinion concerning events in the Gaza Sector and the barbaric acts perpetrated there by the Israel occupying forces against civilians, and in particular women and children.

News agencies reported on 2 February 1969, that thousands of women and children have demonstrated in protest against the massacres and the repressive acts carried out by Israel military occupation authorities in that sector, as well as the prison sentences pronounced by Israel military courts on three girls for varying terms. Israel occupying forces fired on demonstrators after tear gas bombs had failed to disperse them, resulting in the killing and wounding of more than a hundred school girls between the ages of fifteen and twenty, several of whom were transported to hospitals as a result of bullet wounds inflicted by occupying forces.

I feel compelled to point out here that the Gaza Sector and all its towns have in the past few weeks been turned into a battlefield in which a considerable number of unarmed civilians were killed or wounded as a result of brutal acts of repression carried out by the Israel military occupation authorities, acts that have reached lately an extent which could no longer be tolerated. Two weeks ago, when women and children carried out peaceful demonstrations in the town of Rafah to protest against the detention of the entire male population of the town, they were savagely confronted by Israel occupation forces and many mercilessly fired upon, as a result of which women were killed or wounded.

Since that day we have been receiving with serious concern additional news about more events concerning the inhuman treatment of the civilian population of the Gaza Sector, which constitute a flagrant violation of the most elementary human rights which are the basis on which the civilized world is founded. The

repetition of those criminal acts should be considered as a further evidence of Israel's indifference to the laws of war and to repeated violations of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.⁶ Israel's acts carried out lately are nothing new; they clearly reflect its intention of pursuing its aggressive policy against the Palestinian people by bombing their villages, destroying their homes and confiscating their property. Even refugee camps have not been spared such shelling. Those inhuman and terrifying acts have led the Security Council and organs of the General Assembly to condemn Israel on several occasions. The latest of these condemnations was the one adopted by the Security Council concerning Israel's flagrant and premeditated act of aggression on the Beirut civilian airport, an act which was also censured by world public opinion.

Any repressive and violent action Israel may resort to can never deprive the Palestinian people of their right to national existence and their homeland, because it is an inherent right which no one can deny. The Palestinian people have a just cause and it is therefore natural for oppressed people to struggle in order to attain their legitimate rights. It is, hence, natural for them to choose the ways and means for achieving their objectives. Israel, in following such a policy, aims, in fact, at creating a tense situation that would justify its aggression, its illegal occupation of Arab territory and its acts of reprisal. Israel's policy has always been and continues to be founded on the threat and use of force. This undoubtedly diminishes the chances of peace in the area and reveals Israel's true expansionist designs. This would explain its rejection of the peaceful settlement laid down by Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. The criminal acts taking place in the Gaza Strip today not only pose a threat to peace and security in that region but are also a direct challenge to United Nations humanitarian resolutions concerning the treatment of civilian populations in occupied territories, the latest of which, adopted by the General Assembly at

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7505.

⁶ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75 (1950), No. 973.

its last session set up a Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, composed of three Member States [*resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968*].

In view of your well-known concern over the protection of human rights, I urge you to take as soon as possible whatever action is deemed necessary to put an end to these barbaric acts and to intervene with the occupying authorities in order to stop all acts of oppression, terrorism and mass killing which

are in direct contradiction of the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

I request that this telegram be circulated as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) Mahmoud RIAD
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the United Arab Republic

DOCUMENT S/8992

Letter dated 4 February 1969 from the representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[4 February 1969]

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 28 January 1969 [S/8986], I have the honour to communicate to you, for the information of the members of the Security Council, the following.

On 29 December 1968, at about 11 p.m., members of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces at the post of Ong Tan (Kien Tuong) fired several shells into the Cambodian commune of Thmei, Kompong Rau district (Svay Rieng), seriously injuring a resident named Beng Khlaing.

On 4 January 1969, at about 7.30 a.m., a mine laid by members of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces exploded, killing a villager named Neang Song Kris and seriously injuring a young peasant woman named Neang Nay Khem. The incident occurred at Tuol Tatom, near the frontier, in the commune of Taor, Kirivong district (Takeo).

On the same day, at about 10.30 a.m., three helicopters of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces flew over Cambodian territory along the frontier, over the commune of Bavet (Svay Rieng), and scattered a poisonous powder which fell, as a result of the prevailing wind, near the Cambodian villages of Taboth and Prey Chidaun, causing very serious health damage to the inhabitants, two of whom, Sam Sopha and Sam Spohat, were seriously affected and had to be taken to hospital.

On 6 January, at about 9 a.m., two launches of the United States-South Viet-Nameese navy, coming from Hatien on a patrol along the Giang Thanh river, scattered powdered chemicals over crops belonging to the Cambodian inhabitants of the commune of Prek Kroeus, Kompong Trach district (Kampot). The crops in several fields affected by the chemicals were destroyed.

On the morning of 6 January a mixed Cambodian patrol fired on a helicopter of the United States-South Viet-Nameese air forces which violated Cambodian air space over the region north-east of Bu Sra in the province of Mondulkiri. The aircraft was seen to fall in flames in the same region and the wreckage was brought to Phnom-Penh.

On the same day, from 9.30 a.m. to about 8 p.m., United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces at the

Cai Vang and Vinh Dien posts kept up cannon fire into Cambodian territory. Several shells fell in the region of Prey Montea, Kompong Trabek district, Prey Veng province, causing considerable damage to the extensive rice-growing areas.

On subsequent days, during the nights of 7 and 8 January, these same forces again fired hundreds of shells into the same region, several of which fell inside the military post and the local station of the Royal Police. Three soldiers were wounded and one of them is in serious condition.

The above-mentioned region of Peam Montea has been subjected to intensive bombing by the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces ever since 20 December 1968.

On 10 January 1969, at about 8 p.m., United States-South Viet-Nameese forces disembarked commando troops dressed in black on the Cambodian bank of the Prek Beng-Gi, at the village of Chrey Thom, Koh Thom district (Kandal). These commandos opened rapid fire on a Cambodian patrol which discovered them, killing a Cambodian soldier named Kim Vong. They then retreated into South Viet-Nam under cover of heavy fire from the South Viet-Nameese post of Long Binh on the other side of the frontier.

On 13 January, at about 6.30 a.m., a mine laid by members of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces in the commune of Peam Montea (Prey Veng), approximately 200 metres from the Cambodian-South Viet-Nameese frontier exploded, seriously injuring an inhabitant named Reath Chin.

The Royal Government of Cambodia has protested vigorously against the hostile acts committed by the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces against the peaceful inhabitants and security forces of Cambodia. It has called upon the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Viet-Nam to take appropriate measures to put an end to such acts and to compensate the victims.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Huor Sambath
Permanent Representative of Cambodia
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/8993

Letter dated 4 February 1969 from the representative of Zambia to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[5 February 1969]

I have the honour to draw your attention to a skirmish which took place near Chingi, Zambia police camp, in the Balovale District of Zambia on 24 January 1969, in which a patrol of armed Portuguese soldiers crossed into Zambia and were engaged by Zambian soldiers.

For some years now Portuguese armed forces have been violating Zambia's territorial integrity and air space. In many cases, Zambian lives have been lost as a result of aerial bombing and the attacks launched by these Portuguese forces on innocent, peace-loving civilians. The Government of the Republic of Zambia consequently decided to station military contingents of the Zambia army along the border to protect Zambian nationals. Zambian troops have strict instructions not to cross the border into any foreign land. Their sole duty is to protect Zambian lives, soil, air space and property.

At 1630 hours on 24 January 1969, Zambian soldiers observed a Portuguese patrol of four armed soldiers approaching the Zambia/Angola border from the Portuguese garrison of Kalipande. On reaching the border track, the Portuguese patrol turned east and continued moving along it. On seeing this, Zambian soldiers took

up positions on the Zambian side about 250 yards from the border track.

After a short period one Portuguese soldier was seen approaching on the border track. Immediately afterwards, the remainder of the Portuguese soldiers appeared through the bush about twenty-five yards inside Zambia and about fifteen yards from the position held by the Zambian troops. The Portuguese troops were in patrol-formation and with rifles in the "on guard" position. Zambian troops fired a warning shot and the Portuguese soldiers immediately opened fire. A fire fight then developed which resulted in the death of three Portuguese soldiers.

The Zambian soldiers withdrew to better cover, since they were running short of ammunition, but they kept the area under observation.

I wish to emphasize that the incident occurred on Zambian soil and was a further proof of Portuguese unwarranted provocations against Zambia.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vernon J. MWAANGA
Permanent Representative of Zambia
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/8994*

Letter dated 5 February 1969 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[5 February 1969]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the communication addressed to you on 3 February 1969 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic [S/8991] and to state as follows.

The United Arab Republic bears the gravest responsibility for the perpetuation of warfare by terror against Israel, as has been explained fully by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel in his letter addressed to the Secretary-General on 25 January 1969 [see S/8978]. This has been further substantiated by the fact that the Council of the Arab terror organizations recently held, as in the past, another conference in Cairo, when it was addressed by the President of the United Arab Republic in terms similar to those of his earlier speech before the National Assembly of the United Arab Republic on 20 January 1969. President Nasser again promised his unreserved support for the pursuance of terror warfare against Israel in breach of the Security Council's cease-fire resolutions and in a way which gravely prejudices the establishment of a just and lasting peace called for in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967.

Under Egyptian inspiration, the terrorist organizations do not shrink from exploiting women and children in furtherance of their objectives, nor do they show

any qualms about wounding peaceful Arab civilians, as indeed occurred again in the course of the demonstration by the schoolgirls in Gaza on 2 February 1969, and as has happened on other occasions when grenades have been thrown at local schools and cinemas, or at Israel vehicles passing through Gaza streets when they are full of local inhabitants. For instance, on 3 February 1969 a grenade was thrown at an Israel vehicle in the main square of Gaza at a time when it was crowded with passers-by. The grenade missed the vehicle, but wounded ten of the local inhabitants, two of whom have since died, one a child aged seven and the other a young man aged nineteen. After the perpetrators had been apprehended, they boasted quite openly to the commander of the Gaza area, Brigadier-General Mota Gur, that it was a matter of utter indifference to them whether civilians were being killed, so long as the normal rhythm of life was being disturbed and hostility to the Israel forces increased.

As is by now customary in communications originating with the United Arab Republic, the description of facts in the communication from the United Arab Republic's Minister for Foreign Affairs is closer to fantasy than reality. Fire was not opened on demonstrators in Gaza on 1 February 1969. In the course of their dispersal, only three persons sustained injuries of any consequence. A wilful attempt has been made to inflate the number of demonstrators and injured to a degree which bears no relation whatsoever to the facts.

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7506.

It is recalled that during the period of Egyptian occupation, the Gaza Strip was virtually a closed camp, its inhabitants exploited and deprived of elementary human rights. The gaols were full of political prisoners confined in the most intolerable conditions. This is a matter of public record. On 12 October 1961, for instance, Radio Damascus broadcast an item to the effect that an orderly protest demonstration against Egyptian tyranny was fired upon by Egyptian forces and one man was killed. Referring to the mistreatment of the Gaza inhabitants by the Egyptian occupants, Radio Mecca stated on 10 March 1962:

"These are the very methods which the dictator Hitler used in the countries that he occupied during the World War. Imagine, Arabs, how Nasser, who claims to be the pioneer of Arab nationalism, treats the Arab people of Gaza, Gaza and its miserable people . . ."

The cynicism of the Egyptian communication's words of alleged concern for human lives is transparent in the light of the treatment meted out recently to student demonstrations in Alexandria, where Egyptian forces killed at least sixteen of the students.

The Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic finds it appropriate to misrepresent again Israel's position regarding the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. Israel's affirmative attitude to this resolution is on record. The Egyptian attitude has most recently been reflected in President Nasser's approval, in a series of speeches since 20 January 1969, of the rejection by the terror organizations of the Security Council resolution.

In the Gaza Strip, the Israel Defence Forces, whose duties include the protection of the law-abiding local population, displayed the maximum tolerance and limit their own actions to the minimum required to prevent outbreaks of violence which the Egyptian Government is fostering. The Government of Israel will continue discharging its responsibilities for the maintenance of the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the area.

I have the honour to request the circulation of this letter as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/8995

Letter dated 5 February 1969 from the representative of Jordan to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[6 February 1969]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the cable of the Mayor of Jerusalem dated 1 February 1969, addressed to you, and to request that it be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

TEXT OF CABLE SENT ON 1 FEBRUARY 1969 TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY THE
MAYOR OF JERUSALEM

In the name of humanity and justice I beseech Your Excellency and the United Nations and the Security Council to use your full weight and good offices in order to put an end to the sentences of liquidation being applied by Israel against the 70,000 Arabs of Jerusalem and also to stop the repressive measures being constantly and speedily promulgated by Israel to change the long established character of the Holy City in defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and international law.

Life sentences and long-term imprisonments and banishment orders imposed by Israel military tribunals on Jerusalem Arabs monthly subject hundreds of them to terrorizing measures exposing them to torture and liquidation.

Israel's uninterrupted policy of annexing Jerusalem and the forcible expropriation of Arab land and property including demolition and blowing up of such seized Arab property continues to expose thousands of Jerusalem Arabs to decimation and liquidation.

Israel's unabated threats to enforce the unjust law of 1968, and the incidence of this law, due for promulgation against Jerusalem Arabs as from 23 February, will liquidate the remaining Arabs of the City. It has been subjecting them to incessant anxiety and terror throughout the last twenty months.

I appeal to Your Excellency and to human conscience to put an end to this total liquidation of the Arabs of Jerusalem and to speedily implement General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

Rauhi KHATIB
Mayor of Jerusalem

DOCUMENT S/8997

Letter dated 6 February 1969 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[7 February 1969]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 31 January 1969 by the Deputy Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations [S/8989] and

attach hereto a list [see annex below] of some of the world-wide condemnations—from virtually every geographical area of the world—of the barbaric executions in Baghdad.

The enlightened world, which stands, as provided in the United Nations Charter, for the "realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion" cannot, a bare twenty-five years after the extermination of 6 million Jews, accept the theory that persecuting and executing Jews is "entirely an internal affair of Iraq" as is stated in the Iraqi note. Iraq's criminal and abusive policy toward its Jewish minority compels the Government of Israel to raise its voice, along with other Governments, and to use its utmost endeavours to secure the maximum amelioration of their intolerable plight. It was Muhammed Fadhil Bey El-Jamali, then Iraqi Foreign Minister, who stated bluntly before the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in the summer of 1947 that the fate of the Jews in Moslem countries depended on development in Palestine. This threat materialized when Iraqi troops joined in the invasion of Palestine in 1948. In fact, this anti-Jewish line, which was adopted in the forties, has been common to all Governments and régimes in Iraq up to the present time.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOA
*Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations*

ANNEX

1. *A United Nations spokesman, 27 January 1969*

"The Secretary-General has learned with regret and concern of the announcement of the sentencing and hanging in Iraq of fifteen persons charged with espionage, nine of whom were Jews. In the view of the Secretary-General, mass trials and execution are always to be deplored and are particularly abhorrent and dangerous when they are carried out in such a way as to inflame the emotions of the populace."

2. *Pope Paul VI, 28 January*

"Hangings have caused abhorrence in the world. There is a suspicion that this is not unconnected with racial motives. It causes us regret, for we too turned to Iraq asking for mercy for the accused."

3. *Foreign Minister of Norway, 28 January*

"... regardless of the basis on which these sentences were pronounced, public hanging means increased tension which can lead to fresh hostilities. As to the humanitarian aspect, I add my opinion to that expressed by others that this execution seems to have been totally unnecessary."

4. *Foreign Minister of Canada, 28 January*

"The Canadian Government is seriously concerned with the recent events in Iraq in which fourteen Iraqi nationals, nine of whom were of the Jewish faith, have been publicly executed on the charges of espionage. It is the view of the Government that events of this nature, deplorable in themselves, both retard and diminish the prospects of achieving a just and lasting settlement of the entire unfortunate Arab-Israel dispute. . . . Representations have been received from many Canadians concerning the disturbing events—events which must surely outrage public opinion everywhere."

5. *Brazil Foreign Ministry statement, 30 January*

"As a result of the violent nature of events in Iraq, where persons were hanged in a public square, accused of espionage in favour of Israel, and in view of threats of new sacrifices, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs instructed Brazil's Permanent Representative at the United Nations, Ambassador Araujo Castro, to officially inform the Iraqi Government about the deep humanitarian worry of the Brazilian Gov-

ernment concerning the lot of the Jewish population of that country, and especially concerning the treatment accorded to the heads of the Iraqi Jewish community."

6. *Foreign Minister of Mexico, 31 January*

"Mexico's policy is one of absolute and honest neutrality. Our country is a friend of all nations, it does not take absolving or condemning measures. Nevertheless, from a humanitarian point of view, Mexico deplores these deaths."

7. *Foreign Minister of Finland, 31 January*

"Executions in Iraq from the human point of view are shocking. Furthermore, they are the reason for increased tension in the political situation in the Middle East."

8. *President of the International Buddhist Association, Colombo, Ceylon, 28 January*

"Terribly shocked. Strongly condemn this cruel murder."

9. *Christian Council, Ghana, 1 February*

"The Council prays that Iraqi authorities exercise mercy as humanitarian gesture and refrain from further executions of Jewish Iraqis and make possible for such Jews to be rehabilitated elsewhere."

10. *Prime Minister of Australia, 3 February*

"I wish to express the deep concern of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia at the recent trials and mass public executions in Baghdad, which were contrary to the proper dictates of humanity. The timing and manner of the hangings have been condemned by peoples throughout the world. It is the sincere hope of my Government that there will be no repetition of this spectacle, which was so repugnant to the conscience of mankind."

11. *Foreign Minister of Sweden, 31 January*

"These inhuman actions stress the demand for an international agreement for the abolishment of capital punishment."

12. *Government of Guatemala, 1 February*

"The Guatemala Government requested through Chancellor Arenales Catalan that Iraq respect human laws and rights, in view of the numerous executions it is carrying out."

13. *United States Secretary of State, 28 January*

"On humanitarian grounds these executions are a matter of deep concern. The spectacle of mass public executions is repugnant to the conscience of the world."

14. *Foreign Minister of Belgium, 31 January*

"The Government joins the general condemnation. Hangings may aggravate dangerously tension in Mid-East. We ask Iraq to refrain from methods which shocked world opinion."

15. *A Netherlands Foreign Ministry spokesman, 30 January*

"The Netherlands Government has humanitarian objections to the execution of death sentences, particularly for political crimes. Such executions, taking place in such a tense political situation as now exists in the Middle East, may render it even more difficult to find a solution."

16. *Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom*

"We did take the question up informally with the Iraqi Government on humanitarian grounds, urging clemency and pointing out the effect on Iraq's reputation abroad. We very much regret that the Iraqi Government felt unable to show clemency. . . ."

17. *Secretary-General of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 29 January*

"Deep shock. We condemn with abhorrence. We consider grave threat to peace efforts. Urgently appeal for all appropriate action to be taken to ensure that such shameful deeds are not repeated."

18. *The New Light of Burma*, 30 January

"The international community is observing the recent events in the Mid-East with deep distress."

19. *Foreign Minister of the Philippines*, 30 January

"Recent events in the Middle East are a matter of deep concern for the whole world, including the Philippines. The mass public executions in Iraq deplored by Secretary-General U Thant must also be regretted by all who believe in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, an instrument acceded to by the Philippines and by other Members of the United Nations."

20. *Secretary-General of the International Buddhist Association*, 29 January

"In the name of the Mahasanga and Buddhists of the entire world we protest most vehemently at the failure of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to take meaningful steps as requested in our cable last September to prevent the brutal systematic murdering of innocent Jews on Hitlerite lines in Arab countries. The execution of Jews in Baghdad is a shameful and perverted act of murder."

21. *The Times of London*, 28 January

"The hanging of the eleven bodies from scaffolds in Liberation Square was savagely mediaeval. The running commentary on the radio, claiming an attendance of 200,000 supporters rallying to their Government, and the rhetoric coming over the loud speakers about the crushing blows given to enemies of the people and about the new era that is beginning, are an only too familiar touch of our own century."

22. *The Guardian of London*, 28 January

"Yesterday's executions in Iraq were barbaric. President al-Baker is admittedly the most vicious of all the Arab rulers. But yesterday morning he surpassed his own villainous record. The people, according to Baghdad radio, were urged officially to attend the public hanging of nine Jews and five others in Baghdad and Basra. Half a million Iraqis turned up to make it 'an eternal day in the life of Iraq and the Arab Nation'. It was an eternal day that the Arab Nation ought to remember with shame."

23. *The Nairobi East African Standard*, 30 January

"The first Jews to reach Babylon fled from the land of Israel in 586 B.C. There is an example of the persecution to which the Jewish people have been immemorially subjected. Today, another example occurs, unbelievable in its cruel disregard for civilized standards of behaviour. . . . The public is invited to witness an exhibition of erotic horror. Immediately afterwards, the Baatist régime announced more cases are to go before the revolutionary court."

24. *The newspaper Patris, Nicosia*, 2 February

"The executions of nine Jews in Iraq betray a barbaric spirit. These Jews, as well as the remaining 3,000 of their co-religionists, are innocent and only Iraqi revenge mania led them to the gallows. An Iraqi crowd, drunk with chauvinistic declarations, hastened to enjoy the spectacle of hanged bodies. The crime was condemned by all the world. If the Jews are dangerous, why don't the Iraqis let them go to Israel? Hostages and assassination of innocent people cannot be accepted by conscience of humanity."

25. *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 29 January

"The mass execution of nine Jews as spies in Iraq, before cheering mobs, is an act of barbarity which must shock the conscience of civilized people everywhere. The hanging of these men on such grotesque charges deserves the condemnation of the whole world, and it should spur the rescue from extermination of the torture-ridden remnant of about 3,000 Jews remaining in Iraq, many of them in prisons, the rest in abject poverty, and none of them permitted to leave the country."

"Arresting and executing the nine victims for espionage and plotting to overthrow the Government underscore the viciousness of the Iraqi deed. How could these men, or any like them, subjected as they have been to lives of impoverishment and confinement, 'spy' on the Arab régime or plot to overthrow it?"

26. *Critica, Panama*, 3 February

"In the Arab countries more than 10,000 Jews are virtual prisoners. Their life is infernal. They are harassed by the authorities of the countries where they live; they are in constant danger of being arrested, tortured, or hanged. There are many Arab terrorists in Israel prisons, terrorists who have assassinated Jews with firearms, bombs, and daggers, but none of them has been condemned to death."

27. *The Jornal do Brasil*, 30 January

"Ashes of Shame—The public execution of nine Jews is an outrageous exhibition of the plans of premeditated genocide, which lies in store for the people of Israel if it were ever to be at the mercy of Arab hatred. It is necessary that the general revulsion be of such dimensions as to bring about the miracle of dissuading the Iraqi Government from proceeding with this kind of shocking crimes, which are clearly defined in United Nations documents as crimes against humanity."

"It is inadmissible to allow further steps toward the systematic destruction of this defenceless population, whose sole guilt is the misfortune of having been born in the land of the enemies of the Jewish race."

"Today Baghdad is a synonym of Belsen, Dachau, Auschwitz, Lidice, names which are black signs covered by ashes of shame on the road trodden by the human race."

DOCUMENT S/8998

Letter dated 8 February 1969 from the representative of Jordan to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[8 February 1969]

I have the honour to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the continued Israel defiance of the Security Council resolution 252 (1968) on Jerusalem dated 21 May 1968.

Although the Security Council has in that resolution called upon Israel "to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem", the Israel authorities have never relented in their dis-

regard of this clear warning and of the General Assembly resolutions on this subject.

The most recent Israel measure was the enactment of legislation designed to destroy the character of the city and incorporate the Arab life and institutions into Israel life. The Arabs of Jerusalem have strongly expressed their opposition to this arbitrary and oppressive law, but the Israel authorities paid no attention to their request; they insisted that if by the deadline which

they have fixed in the legislation, i.e., 23 February 1969, the law is not complied with the oppressive measures embodied therein will be invoked.

The situation threatens not only the economic life of Christians and Moslems of Jerusalem, but also interna-

tional peace and security. It calls for immediate consideration by the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/8999*

Letter dated 8 February 1969 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[10 February 1969]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request that the attached memorandum sent by Arab lawyers in Israel-occupied territory to the Prime Minister of Israel rejecting the so-called "Administrative Provisions Bill, 1968", be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

The request of the Arab lawyers was not heeded by the Israel authorities. The bill was passed in the Israel Parliament on 27 June 1968, and became the "Administrative Regulation Law, 1968", as published in the *Israel Gazette* No. 542 of 23 August 1968. Its object is to complete the process of Israel's unilateral annexation of Jerusalem and its environs.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

MEMORANDUM OF 15 AUGUST 1968 ADDRESSED TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL THROUGH THE MILITARY GOVERNOR GENERAL, JERUSALEM

On 27 June 1967, the Israel Parliament enacted an amendment to the Judicial and Administrative Provisions Law No. 11/67 which provided, *inter alia*, that Israel administration and judgements apply to all Israel territory. On 28 June 1967, the Minister of the Interior promulgated an order entailing the extension of the Jerusalem municipal boundaries, whereby the Arab sector of Jerusalem as well as all its suburbs were ceded to Israel in contravention of the rules of international law, the provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the recommendations of the General Assembly and the resolutions of the Security Council passed after June 1967. The Israel authorities further unlawfully closed down Arab courts in Jerusalem, confiscated Arab property, drove away Arab nationals from their homes and settled Israel nationals in Arab habitations, thereby violating international law, decisions and practice.

A few days ago, it was brought to the attention of the Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem that the Israel Minister of Justice had placed before the Parliament a draft law (Administrative Provisions Bill, 1968). The said Bill confirms the previous territorial cession and has as its object the incorporation of the Arab population of Jerusalem as well as all its institutions into their Israel counterparts, by imposing the legislation on Arab nationals of Jerusalem who are under military occupa-

tion against their free will and in violation of the Geneva Conventions, the United Nations Charter and United Nations resolutions relating to Jerusalem.

The Arab population of Jerusalem, as well as members of the judiciary and the legal profession, object to the enactment of the said law for the following reasons:

(a) The act of ceding Arab Jerusalem is unlawful, lacks support in international law and contravenes the provisions of the United Nations Charter which prohibit the use of force in international relations, the threat to employ force and the resort to conquest as a means of ceding territories.

(b) It is a fundamental rule of international law that the will of the people in an occupied region should be respected. It is recalled here that our people had previously proclaimed that Jerusalem is a part of Jordan and the Arab homeland. Naturally the cession of Arab Jerusalem to Israel was not accompanied by the consent of its Arab population; on the contrary, it was against their lawful free choice.

(c) The Bill in question has no binding force, inasmuch as it is based on an enactment which is null and void.

(d) The said Bill envisages the disintegration of the Arab population of Jerusalem by forcing that population as well as all their professional associations (those of lawyers, engineers, physicians, etc.) firms and institutions, to amalgamate, against their free will, with their Israel counterparts.

(e) The enactment of such a law entails a flagrant breach of General Assembly recommendations and Security Council resolutions invalidating Israel's measures taken in respect of Jerusalem, as well as a blatant encroachment upon the territory of a United Nations Member State.

In view of the above, members of the Bar and the Bench in the West Bank, as well as the law graduates of Jerusalem, request the following:

(1) The withdrawal of the above-mentioned Bill from the Israel Parliament, and the renunciation of its enactment or the enactment of any similar legislation likely to infringe the rights of the Arab population of Jerusalem;

(2) The reopening of Arab courts in Jerusalem to enable Arab members of the Bar and the Bench to exercise their functions under the legal system in force before the occupation, also the reopening of all other Arab State departments which the Israel authorities had closed down in violation of the Geneva Conventions and international legal provisions;

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7508.

(3) The observation of international law and morality as well as United Nations resolutions in relation to the rights and privileges of the Arab population in the occupied territories.

(Signed)
Husni Jayyousi
Attorney-General, West Bank

Istawri Da'doush
Judge of Law Settlement Court, West Bank

Walid Toukan
Judge

(Signed)
Rashed Jayyousi
President of Court of First Instance, Nablus

Kazem Abu Ghazaleh
Judge

(Signed)
Said Abu Swai
Judge

Zuhair Murad
District Attorney, Jerusalem

Jerjes Khouri, Falah Al-Madi, Hussain Al-Jaghoub, Mustafa Audi, Abdulrahmann Hammad, Zuhdi Al-Hashwi, Hafiz Tahboub, Joudeh Shahwan, Jamil Habibi, Abdulmuhsin Abu Maizar, Yousif Takkouri, Isam Anani, Abdullah Abu Ied, Hashim Khalil Isa, Zahi Marmash, Hisham Shahin, Adnan Bakri Al-Khairi, Walid Asali, Shaith Khairi, Sharif Ali, Tariq Faidi, Said Al-Housaini, Mohammed Ayyubi, Isa Al-Hawa, Zakariya Abdin, Basim Al-Ghadban, Bahij Tamimi, Mitry Abu Aita, Zidan Al-Jilani, Mahmoud Shaikh Yasin, Taisir Nabulsi.

DOCUMENT S/9000

Note dated 10 February 1969 by the President of the Security Council

[Original text: French]
[10 February 1969]

The Israel Government having decided to postpone until 23 May 1969 the putting into effect of the legislative provisions which are the subject-matter of the Jordanian complaint [S/8998] dated 8 February 1969, the meeting of the Security Council urgently fixed for Tuesday, 11 February 1969, has been postponed.

DOCUMENT S/9001*

Letter dated 10 February 1969 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[11 February 1969]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention a list of protests submitted to the Israel occupying forces by religious men and institutions against the measures taken by the Israel Government and the behaviour of its Israel citizens, especially in the Holy City of Jerusalem.

None of the listed protests were answered or even acknowledged by the Israel authorities and no Israel action was taken to rescind such measures and discontinue such behaviour.

On 17 November 1968, a meeting of religious leaders to look into ways and means of conveying their

protests, to be held in Jerusalem, was outlawed by the Israel occupying forces and was never allowed to take place.

I need not emphasize that such Israel measures, whether in Jerusalem or elsewhere in the occupied territories, are null and void. They are in direct violation of United Nations resolutions and international law and against the will of the people.

I have the honour to request that this letter and the attachment thereto be circulated as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7509.

LIST OF PROTESTS SUBMITTED TO THE ISRAEL AUTHORITIES BETWEEN 24 JULY 1967 AND 16 OCTOBER 1968

No.	Date of protest	Israeli recipient	Sender	Nature of protest
1	24/7/67	Military Governor	Islamic High Commission	Protest against the desecration of Moslem holy places and sites
2	12/8/67	Military Governor	Director of Waqf (Moslem Endowment), Jerusalem	Protest against the desecration of Haram Al-Sharif (Al Aqsa Mosque)
3	14/8/67	Military Governor	" "	Protest against the desecration of Moslem holy places and sites
4	17/8/67	Military Governor	" "	Protest against Jewish prayers being held in Moslem holy quarters
5	17/8/67	Military Governor	" "	Protest against the usurpation of the school of Al Aqsa Mosque
6	26/8/67	Military Governor	" "	Protest against the occupation of Zawiyah Fakhriyah (a Moslem religious corner)
7	2/9/67	Military Governor	President of Waqf Council	Cable of protest against the confiscation of the key to one of the Al Aqsa Mosque doors

No.	Date of protest	Israeli recipient	Sender	Nature of protest
8	5/9/67	Prime Minister	President of Waqf Council	Cable of protest against the desecration of Al Aqsa Mosque
9	25/9/67	Prime Minister	" "	A request to re-open an Al Aqsa Mosque door closed by the Israel authorities
10	1/10/67	Prime Minister	" "	Protest against the excavation and destruction of Waqf properties
11	10/10/67	Military Governor	Bethlehem Qadi	Protest against the desecration of Qoubat Rachel Mosque
12	10/10/67	Military Governor	" "	Protest against the attacks on the Moslem cemetery in Bethlehem and on the Rachel Tomb Cemetery
13	15/10/67	Prime Minister	President of Waqf Council	Protest against the excavations taking place on Waqf land
14	15/10/67	Prime Minister	" "	Protest against trespassing on the sanctity of Al Aqsa Mosque
15	15/10/67	Military Governor	President of Waqf Council	Protest against the attacks taking place on the Moslem cemetery and on the Rachel Tomb Mosque in Bethlehem
16	24/10/67	Military Governor	President of Waqf Council	Protest against preventing Moslems from praying in Qoubat Rachel Mosque
17	29/10/67	Prime Minister	" "	Protest against Jewish prayers being held in the quarters of Al Aqsa Mosque
18	21/11/67	Prime Minister	Mufti of Jerusalem	Protest against trespassing on the sanctity of Al Aqsa Mosque
19	30/11/67	Prime Minister	President of Waqf Council	Protest against the attempt to destroy the Zawiyah Fakhriyah (a religious corner)
20	30/11/67	Defence Minister	" "	Protest against the desecration of Al Haram Al-Sharif Alibrahimi (Abraham Mosque in Al-Khalil, Hebron)
21	11/1/68	Military Governor	President of Waqf Council	Protest against the desecration of Prophet Samuel Mosque
22	13/1/68	Military Governor	Al-Khalil (Hebron) Qadi	Protest against the desecration of the sanctity of Abraham Mosque
23	25/1/68	Military Governor	President of Waqf Council	Protest against the desecration of Abraham Mosque
24	21/2/68	Prime Minister	President of Waqf Council	Protest against excavations and destruction of Moslem Waqf property
25	21/4/68	Prime Minister	" "	Protest against Jewish prayers being held in Al Aqsa Mosque
26	25/4/68	Defence Minister	" "	Protest against the desecration of Waqf property
27	12/5/68	Defence Minister	Director of Waqf Council	Protest against the demolition of Moslem Waqf
28	28/5/68	Military Governor	Moslem High Commission	Protest against the expropriation of Moslem holy places and Waqf property
29	12/6/68	Prime Minister	Custodian of Magharbah	Protest against the expropriation of the beneficiary Waqf's real estate
30	12/6/68	Prime Minister	Director of Jerusalem Waqf	Protest against the expropriation of the beneficiary Waqf's real estate
31	13/6/68	Prime Minister	" "	Protest against the expropriation of Waqf property
32	15/6/68	Military Governor	Moslem High Commission	Protest against the demolition and expropriation of Moslem Waqf
33	11/7/68	Prime Minister	President of the Moslem High Commission	Protest against the excavations taking place on Moslem Waqf land
34	23/9/68	Defence Minister	Notables of Al-Khalil (Hebron)	Protest against Jewish prayers being held in Abraham Mosque
35	26/9/68	Defence Minister	Moslem leaders	Protest against Jewish prayers being held in Abraham Mosque
36	28/9/68	Prime Minister	President of Waqf Council	Protest against Jewish prayers being held in Abraham Mosque
37	28/9/68	Military Governor	Notables of Hebron	Protest against Jewish prayers being held in Abraham Mosque
38	13/10/68	Defence Minister	Notables of Hebron	Protest against the demolition of steps leading to Abraham Mosque
39	14/10/68	Military Governor	Moslem High Commission	Protest against the excavations on Waqf land
40	16/10/68	Defence Minister	President of Waqf Council	Protest against Jewish prayers being held in Al Aqsa Mosque

DOCUMENT S/9003

Letter dated 10 February 1969 from the representative of Thailand
to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[12 February 1969]

On the instructions of my Government and further to my letter addressed to the President of the Security Council on 20 September 1968 [S/8832], I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Thailand has received the following confirmed report from the border authorities concerning piratical activities by Cambodia on the high seas:

"On 4 February 1969, between 9.12 a.m. and 9.50 a.m., a report was received by the Royal Thai Navy ship *Thayan Chol*, patrolling in Thai territorial waters near Koh Kut, *Amphur* of Klong Yai, Trad Province, that a Thai fishing-boat was being captured on the high seas by a ship of the Cambodian Navy. The *Thayan Chol* then proceeded to the vicinity and found a Thai fishing-boat being towed away by a Cambodian patrol boat at the distance of 20 miles from the Cambodian coast. Interception by the Royal Thai Navy ship was immediately made and the Cambodian patrol boat then began firing at her with its cannon and machine-gun. The *Thayan Chol* was compelled to respond to the Cambodian fire until the Cambodian vessel withdrew into Cambodian waters, abandoning the Thai fishing-boat on the high seas. Upon verification, it appeared that the fishing-boat was named *Chew Charoen Nava*. The Thai authorities found no one on board except the dead body of a 16-year old boy, who had been shot through the back."

The Government of Thailand therefore lodges a strong protest against this criminal act committed by Cambodian authorities against innocent and defenceless Thai citizens living in the border area.

I would be obliged if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Anand PANYARACHUN
Acting Permanent Representative of Thailand
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9004

Letter dated 12 February 1969 from the representative of Israel to the President of the
Security Council

[Original text: English]
[12 February 1969]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to the Secretary-General by the Foreign Minister of Israel on 25 January 1969 [see S/8978] and to my letter to the Secretary-General of 5 February 1969 [S/8994] concerning warfare by terror continuously being waged by the United Arab Republic against Israel.

As was stressed in those letters, the United Arab Republic has come out openly in full support of the terrorist organizations operating against Israel. Information obtained as a result of recent engagements with saboteurs in the Sinai area strengthens the evidence that these irregular forces are in fact the creation of the United Arab Republic Government itself, which directs their operations. It is the Government of the United Arab Republic that gives them political assistance and material resources. The members of these units are openly recruited in Egypt and dispatched by intelligence officers of the United Arab Republic armed forces to carry out sabotage operations behind the cease-fire lines, to be described later by the Egyptian propaganda machinery as actions of the "Organization of Sinai Arabs".

On 15 and 16 January 1969, two groups of saboteurs were captured by Israel forces in the south-west of the Sinai peninsula. The first numbered seven saboteurs and the second two. The men admitted that they had been sent by the Egyptian military intelligence service to perform acts of sabotage along the Sinai coast of the Gulf of Suez.

From the interrogation of one the prisoners, it was established that the United Arab Republic has been active for some months now preparing the conditions and the cover for its declaration on the establishment of the "Organization of Sinai Arabs". This declaration was published in mid-December 1968. It also became clear that the task of setting up the organization and its activation was assigned to the branches of the Egyptian military intelligence in Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. The prisoner and his companions were sent on their missions by the commander of the military intelligence office in Suez, Captain Fuad Zamzam.

The investigation also disclosed that recruiting for these operations is done through the sheikhs in the refugee camp of the "Tahrir Province" close to Alexandria, a camp inhabited by bedouin. These sheikhs

were forced to fill a quota of recruits and were rewarded by being granted facilities and diverse payments.

These activities have been going on sporadically since July 1968, when two bedouin were captured after they had infiltrated into Sinai to lay mines, under instructions from Egyptian authorities.

These operations organized and directed by the Egyptian Government constitute a serious and con-

tinuing breach of the cease-fire by the United Arab Republic.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9005

Letter dated 10 February 1969 from the representative of Greece to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[12 February 1969]

With reference to your letter dated 8 January 1969 [S/8964], containing an urgent appeal to make voluntary contributions in support of the United Nations Peace keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), I have been instructed to transmit to you the enclosed cheque of the Bank of Greece for the amount of \$600,000, representing the contribution of the Greek Government to UNFICYP for the six-month period from 26 December 1968 to 15 June 1969.

The Greek contributions to UNFICYP now total \$7,450,000.

I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to express once again the sincere appreciation of the Greek Government for the task accomplished by UNFICYP in Cyprus.

I would be grateful if you could have this letter circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Dimitri S. BITSIOS
Permanent Representative of Greece
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9006*

Letter dated 12 February 1969 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[13 February 1969]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention a grave violation by Israel of the Armistice Agreement and the cease-fire resolutions.

On 11 February 1969, at 11.10 hours local time, the Israel armed forces shelled the villages of Safi and Fefah south of the Dead Sea, using mortar and field artillery for thirty minutes.

At 12.30 hours on that same day eight Israel jet fighters and a helicopter raided Ghor Al-Safi and bombed the area for ninety minutes, using napalm bombs. As a result, six Jordanian soldiers were killed and ten others wounded, and property was heavily damaged.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7510.

DOCUMENT S/9007

Letter dated 12 February 1969 from the representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council

*[Original text: French]
[13 February 1969]*

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 4 February 1969 [S/8992], I have the honour to communicate to you, for the information of the members of the Security Council, the following.

On 19 January 1969, at about 3 p.m., members of the United States-South Viet-Name forces at Loc Ninh entered Cambodian territory and arrested and took by force into South Viet-Nam eight Cambodian inhabitants who were collecting resin in a wood situated in Khmer territory, in the area bordering on South Viet-Nam. The eight Cambodians, all inhabitants of the village of Trapeang-Sre, commune of Snuol (Kratie), are the following: Khuon-Hoeun, Hoeuk-Prock, Ngak-Him, Mauv-Loeub, Moeur-Rin, Sin-Chus, Hok-Moeuk, Sin-Srock.

The Royal Government of Cambodia has protested vigorously against the violation of Khmer territory and the arrest of eight innocent Cambodians by members of the United States-South Viet-Name forces, and has called upon the Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of Viet-Nam to take appropriate measures to effect the immediate release of the victims and to prevent a recurrence of such hostile acts.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

*(Signed) Huot Sambath
Permanent Representative of Cambodia
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/9008

Letter dated 13 February 1969 from the representative of the United Arab Republic to the President of the Security Council

*[Original text: English]
[13 February 1969]*

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic addressed to you.

I will be grateful if this letter could be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Mohamed Awad EL KONY
Permanent Representative of the
United Arab Republic
to the United Nations*

LETTER DATED 13 FEBRUARY 1969 FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to put before you and the distinguished members of the Security Council the following.

The first purpose of the United Nations, as stipulated in the Charter, is to maintain international peace and security, and to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention of threats to peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression.

The Security Council bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and carries out its functions according to the purposes and principles of the United Nations that prohibit aggression. Member States of the United Nations have agreed in the Charter to confer these responsibilities upon the Security Council, in order to ensure that action by the United Nations shall be carried out promptly and effectively. It cannot be

claimed that the Security Council has achieved that purpose if it confines itself solely to making recommendations for the settlement of a situation, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. In addition to the Council's functions in recommending procedures or methods of adjustment and terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate, the Council's responsibilities as well as those incumbent upon its members, and the permanent members in particular, require continuous efforts on their part to settle a situation that threatens international peace and security.

The Charter in its letter and spirit is based fundamentally on the concept of the prohibition of aggression. The purposes and principles of the Charter, which Member States have resolved to uphold, and the primary responsibility conferred upon the Security Council cannot and should not condone the state of continuing aggression still persisting for eighteen months against three Arab countries as a result of Israel's aggression committed against the Arab States on 5 June 1967 and despite the Security Council's resolution [242(1967)] adopted on 22 November 1967, which provides for peaceful settlement. The Council cannot accept the continuation of a situation that threatens international peace and security, resulting from the aggressor's persistent refusal to accept and implement that settlement. In pursuance of the United Nations principles, the Organization and its Members shall act in accordance with the seven principles enumerated in Article 2 of the Charter, which include the principle

that all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The purpose of the resolution [235 (1967)] which the Security Council adopted on 9 June 1967 was to stop the aggressors and to prevent them from pursuing further their aggression. The Council was expected to call at the same time upon Israel to withdraw from the territories it occupied as a result of its aggression. However, the Council failed at that stage to take this logical step, which has always been the case in similar circumstances in the past. It was then argued that other resolutions should be adopted to secure peace before calling upon the aggressor to withdraw.

Israel lost no time in exploiting that lapse on the part of the Security Council, and sought to reap the fruits of its aggression in spite of the Security Council's cease-fire resolutions and annexed Jerusalem, thus facing the world with a new *fait accompli*. The General Assembly, at its fifth emergency special session, refused in its resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, to accept as legal the measures taken by Israel to alter the status of the City of Jerusalem and considered them invalid. It called on Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem. On 14 July 1967, the General Assembly once more, by its resolution 2254 (ES-V) expressed its deepest regret and concern that Israel had not complied with the previous resolution and reiterated its call to Israel to rescind all measures taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem. Furthermore, the Security Council, in its resolution 252 (1968) dated 21 May 1968, reaffirmed the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by military conquest and deplored the failure of Israel to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly in this respect. It also considered invalid all the legislative and administrative measures and actions taken to alter the status of the City of Jerusalem, and urgently called upon Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and desist forthwith from taking any further action.

Israel, however, continues to refuse compliance with those resolutions. Its leaders have repeatedly made clear their intentions to retain the usurped city of Jerusalem; suffice it to refer to the press conference dated 26 May 1968 during which the Prime Minister of Israel announced that the Security Council resolution [251 (1968)] of 2 May 1968 was irrational and not practical, and it was the best measure for hampering peace in the Middle East. He stated once again on 22 September 1968 that Israel's insistence on what he called the preservation of the unity of its "capital" Jerusalem, was a matter above any discussion or evaluation and that the "liberation" of Jerusalem was beyond any military or political analysis.

As for the other resolutions which, as was claimed, should be taken to secure peace before calling upon Israel to withdraw, the Security Council, on 22 November 1967, unanimously adopted the British draft resolution for the peaceful settlement of the situation in the Middle East. On its submission and on subsequent occasions, the sponsors of that draft and its supporters were careful to affirm that it contained a delicate balance upon which depended the peaceful

settlement provided for in it. They also stressed that any addition to or detracting from it would destroy the draft resolution, since it was a balanced whole as it stood and should ensure a mutuality of rights and obligations.

The United Arab Republic declared its acceptance of the Security Council resolution [242 (1967)] of 22 November 1967 and its readiness to implement it. The United Arab Republic also pointed out that this acceptance, on its part, stood unequivocally on the basis that the resolution called on Israel to withdraw from all the Arab territories it occupied as a result of its aggression against the Arab countries on 5 June 1967. It is only normal that the United Arab Republic's acceptance of the resolution and its readiness to implement all of its obligations emanating from it requires, likewise, that Israel accept the resolution and further agree to carry out the obligations provided therein. Moreover, the United Arab Republic informed Ambassador Gunnar Jarring that it accepted the Security Council resolution and that it was ready to implement it. We suggested that he draw up a time-table for the implementation of all the provisions of the resolution. We have, furthermore, asked that the implementation of the resolution be carried out under the supervision and with the guarantee of the Security Council.

As to Israel's stand so far, it can be summarized in its refusal to implement the Security Council resolution, its determination to act against it, its refusal to withdraw and insistence on continuing the occupation.

In the Knesset on 5 November 1968, the Prime Minister of Israel declared that:

"...when we say the River Jordan is our security border, we mean that once a peace agreement is signed, no foreign forces will be allowed to cross that security border even after a peace treaty has been signed. Israel will insist that no Jordanian, Arab, or any other army will be stationed west of the Jordan in any final peace settlement."

Again, in the Knesset on 11 November 1968, Mr. Eshkol declared that "Israel would hold on to the captured Straits of Tiran as part of any Middle East settlement. In an interview with *Newsweek* magazine published on 9 February 1969, Mr. Eshkol stated: "The Jordan River must become the security border for Israel with all that that implies. Our army shall be stationed only on the strip along that border". In the same interview, he also said: "...as for the Golan heights, we will quite simply never give them up. The same goes for Jerusalem. Here there is no flexibility at all".

As to Sharm El-Sheikh, he said that he would demand the stationing of Israel troops at that point. This latest statement clearly explains why Mr. Eshkol now chooses to deride the establishment of demilitarized zones. And while he tries to deny the expansionist aims of Israel, he declared in his interview that Israel would never return to the boundaries that prevailed before 5 June 1967, and that the Armistice Agreements were dead and buried.

When we add previous and subsequent declarations made by the Israel Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence to the statements made by the Prime Minister of Israel, the complete picture of the real ambitions of Israel at the present stage emerge clearly.

Mr. Eban, in his interview with *Le Figaro* on 5 February 1969, reaffirmed the ambitions of Israel concerning Jerusalem, the Golan heights, the west bank, and stated that Israel was unrelenting in its position on the occupation of Sharm El-Sheikh. He had also alluded in a press conference on 17 January 1969 to the intention of Israel to continue the occupation of Sharm El-Sheikh, as well as a strip of land along the eastern edge of Sinai.

General Dayan made numerous declarations concerning the west bank. The most recent one, according to press reports of 11 February 1969, reiterates his demand for the economic and administrative integration of the Jordan west bank into Israel and the establishment of Israel settlements in the occupied territories.

Hence, the leaders of Israel, in clear and unequivocal terms, have now uncovered one aspect of their intentions, while still thinly disguising the others. Their declarations concerning the west bank clearly underscore their territorial ambitions in that part of the Arab land.

Israel demands that there be a continuous Israel military presence along the Jordan River, that no Arab forces be stationed to the west of it, that it be economically integrated into Israel and that Israel settlements be established therein. It is evident, therefore, that Israel seeks complete domination of the area, which amounts to an official declaration of annexation.

As to Sharm El-Sheikh, Israel demands not only an Israel military presence there, but also the domination of a strip of land in Sinai under the pretext of protecting that presence.

Thus Israel's expansionist plan, at this stage, as reiterated in the declarations of its Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence, can be summarized as follows:

- (1) The annexation of Jerusalem;
- (2) The continued occupation of the Golan heights in Syria;

(3) The continued occupation of the west bank in Jordan and its complete domination, practically terminating Jordanian sovereignty in that area;

(4) The economic and administrative integration of the Gaza Strip into Israel;

(5) The continued occupation of Sharm El-Sheikh and the Gulf of Aqaba area, as well as continued military presence in parts of Sinai; and

(6) The establishment of Israel settlements in the occupied territories.

Israel's expansionist aims and its ambitions to acquire new Arab lands create a situation which is in clear contradiction with the Security Council resolution.

Israel refuses to implement the Security Council resolution. Furthermore, after quibbling over specific questions addressed to it by Ambassador Jarring, who sought to clarify its understanding of what constitute secure boundaries. Israel now uncovers its expansionist ambitions through the declarations made by its Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence and other Israeli leaders.

Israel is now acting overtly against the solution recommended by the international community as reflected in the unanimity of the Security Council on the peaceful settlement provided for in its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967.

It is natural, therefore, that the international community should expect the Security Council, and in particular its permanent members, to take the positive steps necessary to repel the aggressor, to eliminate the consequences of the aggression and to implement the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, thus removing a situation the continuance of which endangers international peace and security.

(Signed) Mahmoud RIAD
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the United Arab Republic

DOCUMENT S/9009

Letter dated 13 February 1969 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[13 February 1969]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw urgent attention to a mounting series of new attacks by the United Arab Republic forces against Israel forces in the Suez Canal area.

These attacks are carried out in particular by means of sniping at the Israel forces on the east bank of the canal. There were repeated sniping attacks during 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 February. As a result of this sniping, Israeli soldiers were wounded on 5, 6, 10 and 11 February. Especially grave and prolonged attacks occurred on 10 and 11 February.

These new acts of aggression are recorded in reports submitted by Lt. General Odd Bull and circulated as documents S/7930 Add.112, 114, 115 and 117, of 5, 10, 11 and 12 February 1969, respectively. The reports testify to the total restraint displayed by the Israel forces in the face of the Egyptian attacks.

Today, 13 February 1969, eighteen mines were discovered at different points along the east bank of the Suez Canal. Nine were found near Kantara, three others between Kantara and Km 40, two south of the Bitter Lake, and three more to the north. Yesterday evening a mine exploded near Kantara.

There was more sniping by the United Arab Republic forces this morning, at 0830 and 0835 hours.

The Egyptian attacks are a deliberate and planned attempt to disrupt the relative tranquillity which has prevailed for some time in the Suez sector and to generate a situation of tension. The sniping and planting of mines in the Suez Canal sector and the recent incursions into Sinai by terror commandos, which were subject of my letter to you of 12 February 1969 [S/9004], follow upon a series of warlike declarations

by President Nasser in which, as I have indicated in previous letters, he emphasized the Egyptian intention to pursue terror warfare against Israel and approved the rejection of the 22 November 1967 Security Council resolution [242 (1967)] by the terrorist organizations. These acts of belligerency create, by their nature and timing, serious security dangers. Their political objective is obvious. They constitute a flagrant viola-

tion of the cease-fire and undermine the peace-making efforts.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9010*

Letter dated 13 February 1969 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[13 February 1969]

On 8 February 1969 my Government requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council [S/8998] to consider the grave continued violations by Israel of Security Council resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968.

You will recall that that resolution called upon Israel "to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem".

Instead of complying with the above directives, the Israel authorities proceeded to enact new legislation, i.e., Administrative Regulation Law 1968, to complete their hold on the Holy City and its people.

You will also recall that consideration of our complaint was deferred, in view of an Israel decree extending the deadline for the coming into force of the above-mentioned law, from 23 February to 23 May 1969.

Far from solving the problem, this postponement resulted only in some alleviation of the immediacy of the Jordanian complaint. The measure allowed for a

little extension of the time-limit during which efforts could be made for the repeal of the above legislation and the dissuasion of the Israel authorities from their determination to confront the world with the annexation of Jerusalem as a *fait accompli*.

My Government feels that you would greatly facilitate the task of the Council if, by virtue of the authority vested in you, and in pursuance of Security Council resolution 252 (1968), you would call on the Israel authorities to comply with the resolution and to rescind without delay all legislation that violates it.

In view of the urgent character of this matter, the Jordanian Government would be grateful if you would take the necessary steps to furnish the Security Council with a report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 252 (1968) as soon as possible.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7512.

DOCUMENT S/9011*

Letter dated 13 February 1969 from the representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[14 February 1969]

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a letter addressed to you by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

I request that this letter and the attached communication be distributed as documents of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) Adnan RAOUF
Deputy Permanent Representative of Iraq
to the United Nations

LETTER FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF IRAQ TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to bring to your attention the following facts which prove beyond any doubt the persistence of Israel in perpetrating the most barbaric acts

in the occupied Arab territories, which have exceeded in their brutality those committed by the nazis.

As recently reported by the various news agencies and amply covered by the Associated Press, Israel forces opened fire on innocent elementary school girls in Rafah. As a result of this inhuman act, ninety-three girls were injured, forty-five of them seriously, and a number of the girls died in the hospital. Such barbaric acts compelled a large number of Arab ladies to resort to a sit-in demonstration and fast in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem.

The news agencies have lately transmitted information on a new Zionist outrage committed in the Ramleh prison, where fourteen Arab prisoners were buried alive and left to die in the most atrocious manner, the like of which even the nazis did not dare to perpetrate.

The Government of Iraq expresses its sincere hope that the international community, and particularly the United Nations, represented by the Secretary-General,

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7513.

will make every possible effort to save the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories from the inhuman Zionist crimes. Some of these crimes are already known to the United Nations and several resolutions have been adopted deploring Israel's atrocities, but Israel, nevertheless, has ignored each and all of those resolutions. The genocide campaign to which the Arab inhabitants

of the occupied territories have been subjected has earned the condemnation of all the civilized peoples of the world who courageously and valiantly opposed nazism.

(Signed) Abdul-Karim AL-SHAikhli
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Iraq

DOCUMENT S/9013

Letter dated 17 February 1969 from the representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: French]
[18 February 1969]

I have the honour to lodge a strong and indignant protest against the fallacious accusations of the spokesman of the Thai Government contained in the letter which he addressed to you on 10 February 1969 [S/9003].

On instructions from my Government, I venture to inform you of what really happened on 4 February 1969 on the occasion of the violation of Cambodian territorial waters by armed Thai fishing junks, which was followed by the attack on a vessel of the Royal Khmer Navy by a Thai warship.

On that date, at about 6 a.m., a group of armed Thai fishing junks was surprised by a vessel of the Royal Khmer Navy on an observation patrol off Koh Yor (province of Koh Kong). These Thai junks were engaging in clandestine fishing in Cambodian territorial waters at a point situated five nautical miles from Koh Yor and three nautical miles within the maritime limit.

In answer to the challenge by signalling lights emitted by the Cambodian vessel in accordance with international practice, the Thai junks opened up with automatic weapon fire. The vessel of the Royal Khmer Navy was obliged to return the fire and succeeded in hitting a Thai junk, which was abandoned by its crew. The junk was captured and then taken in tow to be brought to the base of the Royal Khmer Navy.

On the way to the base, the vessel of the Royal Khmer Navy was surprised by a Thai warship which appeared in Cambodian territorial waters and fired first on the Cambodian vessel. There was an exchange of fire for forty minutes, after which the Thai vessel withdrew towards Koh Kuth on the Thai side. No damage was suffered on the Cambodian side, but the captured Thai junk was sunk during the encounter.

I should like to emphasize that the version given by the Thai spokesman does not conform to the truth and to recall that Cambodia is often the victim of Thai aggression both on land and on sea, as is proved by the numerous letters which I have had the honour to address to the Security Council.

Since January 1968 alone, Cambodia has recorded thirty-four cases of violation of its territorial waters by armed Thai fishing junks which act like pirates in the territorial waters of their neighbours.

For your information, I should like to cite an article which appeared on 21 November 1968 in the Rangoon newspaper *The Guardian*, reporting that the *Tankay*, a Thai fishing boat violating Burmese territorial waters, had opened fire at the approach of a vessel of the Burmese Navy. Captured half an hour later, the *Tankay* had on board sixteen Thais, of whom one was killed and three were wounded.

The violation of Cambodian territorial waters on 4 February 1969, followed by the attack on a vessel of the Royal Khmer Navy by a Thai warship, constitutes an extremely serious act of aggression, all the consequences of which will be borne by the Thai Government alone.

The Royal Government has lodged a vigorous protest with the Thai Government and demanded that such criminal acts of provocation and aggression be brought speedily to an end.

I should be obliged if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Huot Sambath
Permanent Representative of Cambodia
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9014

Letter dated 17 February 1969 from the representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: French]
[18 February 1969]

On the instructions of my Government and further to my letter of 16 January 1969 [S/8970], I have the honour to inform you that on 5 February 1969, at approximately 9.30 a.m., Khmer elements on patrol made contact with some twenty armed Thais violating Khmer territory in the region of Prek Mean, Koh Kong province.

The engagement resulted, in so far as the members of the Cambodian patrol were concerned, in the death of Private 2nd Class Sok Samoeun on the spot and in light wounds to two others.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Huot Sambath
Permanent Representative of Cambodia
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9015*

Note verbale dated 30 January 1969 from the representative of Guyana to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[19 February 1969]

The Permanent Representative of Guyana to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to draw his attention to document S/8954 of 30 December 1968, containing the report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968, in which Guyana has been listed as having traded with Southern Rhodesia during the months January-November 1967.

The Permanent Representative of Guyana to the United Nations wishes to refer the Secretary-General to his letter of 3 February 1967 [see S/7781, annex I], in response to the Secretary-General's note of 17 December 1966, with which the Secretary-General enclosed the text of resolution 232 (1966) on Southern Rhodesia, adopted by the Security Council on 16 December 1966, and to reconfirm that trade with Rhodesia was banned with effect from 18 November 1965 by Order No. 56 of 1965 made under the Trade Ordinance, 1958 (No. 34 of 1958).

Trade data submitted by Guyana showed that trade was conducted during 1967 with Southern Rhodesia. However, importation did not in effect take place within this period. The explanation for this given by the Ministry of Trade is as follows:

* Circulated as a Security Council document at the request of the Permanent Mission of Guyana to the United Nations.

"When Orders of this nature are made, it is usual to allow the importer to bring into the country, beyond the effective date of the Order, (a) goods which had been paid for before the date on which the Order was made, and (b) goods for which confirmation had been received and which may be lying at dock-side or which may be afloat before the date of the Order.

"After Order No. 56 was published, the Demerara Tobacco Company produced evidence to show that the Company had paid for 78,500 pounds of tobacco purchased from Rhodesia prior to the date of the order, and on the strength of the evidence produced the Company was allowed to import the tobacco.

"The shipment was warehoused on 12 January 1966. The Comptroller of Customs and Excise has advised that duty is collected, not when the cargo is warehoused, but when it is cleared from the warehouse, and the entries in the monthly accounts relate to the dates of the collection of duty, not to the date of entry. This explains the appearance of the January-November figures in the External Trade Account, but the importation did not take place within those periods."

The Permanent Representative of Guyana to the United Nations requests that the above explanation be reflected in the report of 30 December 1968 [S/8954].

DOCUMENT S/9016

Letter dated 19 February 1969 from the representative of the United States of America to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[19 February 1969]

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to convey to you our grave concern at the attack on an El Al airliner at Zürich airport on 18 February 1969. This attack, which my Government deplores as a reckless and wanton interference with peaceful air transport, is only the most recent of a number of incidents growing out of the Arab-Israel dispute and involving the safety of civilian air transport.

The United States has made clear in the Security Council on past occasions its view that armed intervention that disrupts the movement of civilian air transport represents an outrageous disregard for the laws of nations and an intolerable interference with the safety of civilian passengers. It has also emphasized the importance that it attaches to perfecting and strengthening rules of international law that will safeguard international civilian aviation against acts of unlawful interference. This latest incident gives added urgency to

efforts in appropriate international bodies to provide such vital protection.

The concern of the United States arises as well from the fact that the 18 February attack represents a continuation of the tragic cycle of violence that has come to characterize the Middle East situation and which in itself is so obstructive to the search for peace. This latest incident demonstrates once again how urgent it is that all concerned exercise restraint and prevent actions which increase tension and impede efforts toward peace.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Charles W. Yost
Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9017

Letter dated 20 February 1969 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[24 February 1969]

My Government has issued the following statement on the attack on an El Al airliner at Zürich on 18 February 1969:

"Her Majesty's Government condemn this armed attack on a civil airliner. Such attacks with the mortal risks they entail for innocent air passengers must be stopped. Her Majesty's Government call upon all parties concerned to exercise the utmost restraint. The terrifying chain of action and reprisal must be broken.

"This incident emphasises yet again the need for an urgent settlement in the Middle East, which Her Majesty's Government are doing all within their power to bring about.

"With regard to action in the United Nations, representatives of the four permanent members of the Security Council who are due to meet in New York very shortly will discuss the Middle East, and

this aspect—the need for all parties to exercise restraint—will be taken into account."

My Government believes that, unless attacks of this kind are stopped, there can be no safety for international air travel. It considers that the rule of law as it applies to international air travel must be upheld, and it is determined to play its part in achieving this. In its view, the proposed meetings in New York of the representatives of France, the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom offer the best opportunity for giving fresh impetus to the international effort to find a settlement.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) CARADON
Permanent Representative of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9018

Letter dated 20 February 1969 from the representative of Finland to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[20 February 1969]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to convey to you the following communication.

The Finnish Government wishes to associate itself with the statement made by the Secretary-General on 18 February 1969, expressing concern about the threat to international civil aviation posed by recent acts of violence and calling for constructive international action to prevent such acts in the future. The Finnish Government considers that there is an evident need for such international action to safeguard the security of civil aviation, which is an interest of the international community as a whole.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) MAX JAKOBSON
Permanent Representative of Finland
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9019*

Letter dated 20 February 1969 from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[26 February 1969]

The Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa has noted with grave concern the rapid extension of the international services of the South African Airways

made possible by increased facilities which have been provided to the South African Government by a number of Governments. The Special Committee has noted that, contrary to the request to Member States that they should refuse landing and passage facilities to all aircraft belonging to the Government of South Africa and to companies registered under the laws of South

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7516.

Africa, contained in General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) of 6 November 1962, flight routes of the South African Airways now connect the territories of the following States: Australia, Botswana, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Portugal, Spain, Swaziland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

This is a situation which the Special Committee views with serious concern.

The Special Committee is further constrained to observe that the provision of such increased and new facilities by States not only undermines the request to Member States contained in General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) but is also contrary to the requests in subsequent resolutions, calling on States to cease collaboration with the South African Government. Such collaboration enables the South African Government to defy world opinion and to intensify its policies of *apartheid*.

The latest development in this connexion is the announcement of the inauguration of new services of the South African Airways to New York via Rio de Janeiro with effect from 23 February 1969. This new service is being launched through the provision of new

facilities to the South African Airways by the Governments of Brazil and the United States of America. The Special Committee views this development with particular distress and urges the Governments concerned to consider withholding, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII), the provision of these facilities.

The Special Committee has asked me to request you urgently to convey this to the two Governments.

In conclusion, I have the honour, on behalf of the Special Committee, further to request you to convey to the Governments of all States which provide facilities to the South African Airways its grave concern in this matter and its earnest hope that these Governments will take the necessary steps for the observance of the provisions of General Assembly resolutions on this question.

May I, on behalf of the Special Committee, request you to arrange for the circulation of this letter as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdulrahim ABBY FARAH
*Chairman, Special Committee on the Policies
of Apartheid of the Government of the
Republic of South Africa*

DOCUMENT S/9020

Letter dated 20 February 1969 from the representative of France to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: French]
[20 February 1969]

I have the honour, as representative of France, to inform the Security Council of the profound concern of my Government at the development of the situation in the Middle East.

In the absence of any progress towards the establishment of a just and durable peace, the countries of that region find themselves being ineluctably drawn into a cycle of violence and reprisals which can only make more distant the chances of restoring a normal situation. The criminal attempt which has just taken place at Zürich—which we cannot but denounce—is a further proof of this.

This tragic event confirms, if that were necessary, the need for the States which are responsible for peace, in various capacities, to undertake urgent fresh efforts to reach a peaceful settlement in the Middle East by seeking the implementation of the Security Council resolution [242 (1967)] of 22 November 1967 with all possible dispatch.

I request that the foregoing be brought to the knowledge of all the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Armand BERARD
*Permanent Representative of France
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/9021*

Letter dated 21 February 1969 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[21 February 1969]

On instructions of my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter of 20 February 1969 addressed to you by the Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Abba Eban, and to request that it be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
*Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations*

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7515.

LETTER DATED 20 FEBRUARY 1969 FROM THE MINISTER
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL TO THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL

The assault on the crew and passengers of an El Al aircraft at Zürich on 18 February 1969 raises the deepest and most sensitive issues of international law and morality.

The attack on the aircraft at Athens Airport in December 1968 was the first occasion since men learned to fly on which an attempt was made to slaughter innocent civilian travellers helplessly exposed in a stationary aircraft on the ground with engines in full rotation and tanks loaded with highly inflammable fuel. The only possible motive which the attackers could have had was to explode the aircraft and burn all the passengers and crew alive.

Two months later, this outrage has been repeated.

The barbarity of the action is matched only by its cowardice. Once again, civilians in the most extreme condition of vulnerability were the targets of assault. The most elementary human decencies were violated, the principles embodied in international air conventions were cynically trampled upon, and the dignity and sovereignty of a peace-loving, neutral nation were mocked.

The central truth which the international community must face is that responsibility does not fall exclusively on the individuals who carried out the assault. They are members of known organizations which operate on and from the soil of United Nations Member States with the approval, encouragement and practical support of their Governments.

As recently as the beginning of this month, a conference of saboteurs took place publicly in Cairo and

received the official blessing of President Nasser. Without the support and co-operation of Arab Governments, these piratical groups could not exist or operate.

The question is whether the enlightened international conscience will confront these Governments with their responsibility for promoting armed violence against a United Nations Member in defiance of the Charter, the cease-fire, and the hopes for a just and lasting peace. By giving their protection to groups that carry out acts of international piracy and murder against civilian aircraft, these Governments are also flouting their obligations as members of the International Civil Aviation Organization and as signatories of air conventions.

The United Nations Security Council, in its resolution 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968, found it possible to avoid saying a single word of criticism of the Athens assault or of the Rome hijacking, perpetrated by this same group. The Zürich outrage has now taken place in the atmosphere of international indulgence thus created.

This letter is essentially an appeal to the moral conscience of mankind.

In requesting that it be transmitted to all Members of the United Nations, I permit myself to inquire what "constructive international action" you have in mind "to prevent such acts of violence against international civil aviation in the future". This phrase in your statement of 18 February 1969 aroused deep interest; and since Israel civil aviation is the main target of this governmentally sponsored piracy, we should like to be informed of all steps taken or planned.

(Signed) Abba EBAN
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Israel

DOCUMENT S/9022

Letter dated 20 February 1969 from the representative of Thailand to the President
of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[21 February 1969]

On the instructions of my Government, and further to my letters dated 20 September 1968 [S/8832] and 10 February 1969 [S/9003] addressed to the President of the Security Council, I have the honour to bring to your attention, for the information of the States Members of the United Nations, the following unprovoked and criminal acts committed by Cambodian armed forces personnel against the peaceable Thai inhabitants of the border areas.

On 26 August 1968, a group of twenty Cambodian soldiers entered Thai territory at Nong Ian Village, *Tambon* of Tha Kham, *Amphur* of Aranyaprathet, Prachinburi Province, and laid mines at a distance of five metres from the Klong Nam Sai frontier canal. Fortunately, the mines were discovered and disposed of in time by the Thai authorities.

On 18 September, while fishing off the bay of Haad Lek, *Amphur* of Klong Yai, Trad Province, well within Thai territorial waters, a Thai fishing boat named *Choke Davee Subaya*, with seven men on board, was fired upon by the Cambodian patrol boat. Nai Nam Akarem was shot dead and four other crew members were able to swim ashore. Two other men, Nai Pong Devaraksa and Nai Seub Charoenlib, were reported missing.

On 8 October, at about 1300 hours, a mine laid by Cambodian soldiers was discovered by the Thai border authorities at *Tambon* of Tha Kham, *Amphur* of Aranyaprathet, Prachinburi Province, at a distance of ten metres from the Prom Hota frontier canal.

On 12 October, a group of Cambodian soldiers entered Thai territory at Koke Krachai Village, *Tambon* of Noone Charoen, *Amphur* of Ban Kraud, Buriram Province and looted the belongings of the Koke Krachai villagers. Twenty-six water buffaloes were also taken away to Cambodia.

On 22 October, a group of twelve Cambodian soldiers entered Thai territory at Sanuan Village, *Tambon* of Dan, *Amphur* of Sangka, Surin Province and committed acts of plunder and depredation against the Sanuan villagers and also took away with them two water buffaloes and a home-made rifle belonging to Nai Roj Ounchitra.

On 23 October, at about 2200 hours, while fishing off the bay of Klong Yai, *Amphur* of Klong Yai, Trad Province, well within Thai territorial waters, a Thai fishing boat named *Duang Chandra Samuth*, with four men on board, was fired upon by the Cambodian patrol boat. Two men, Nai Tom Iam Vilai and Nai Hi Sae Tang were able to swim to safety. Two other men,

Nai Meuseng Sae Lao and Nai Samuth, were captured and taken to Cambodia together with the *Duang Chandra Samuth*. It was also reported that Nai Tom Iam Vilai was shot through the right hip.

On 29 October, at about 2130 hours, Cambodian soldiers fired about sixteen heavy mortar shells into Noone Sangha and Nong Ian Villages, *Amphur* of Aranyaprathet, Prachinburi Province. No casualties were reported.

On 30 October, at about 1930 hours, Cambodian soldiers threw a hand grenade from the Cambodian side of the Phrom Hota frontier canal at Nai Supit Nakpao's house situated near Nong Ian school, *Tambon* of Tha Kham, *Amphur* of Aranyaprathet, Prachinburi Province. The grenade, however, missed the target, but peaceable Thai villagers were jolted by its explosion.

On 15 November, Nai Rouy Kanman, a villager of Noone Mak Mun Village, *Tambon* of Koke Soong, *Amphur* of Ta-Phya, Prachinburi Province, stepped on a mine laid by Cambodian soldiers and was instantly killed.

On 17 November, at about 1900 hours, Cambodian soldiers entered Thai territory and directed about 100 rounds of machine-gun fire into Bak Charang Village, *Tambon* of Karb-Cherng, *Amphur* of Prasat, Surin Province, killing a villager named Nai Dode Bhokem and causing serious injuries to five other villagers.

On 30 November, at about 0830 hours, while fishing off the bay of Klong Yai, *Amphur* of Klong Yai, Trad Province, well within Thai territorial waters, a Thai fishing boat named *Charoen Chai*, with three men on board, was fired upon by a Cambodian Navy ship. Two crew members were killed and another was seriously injured.

On 7 December, at about 2100 hours, a group of seven Cambodian soldiers entered Thai territory in the *Tambon* of Kathiem, *Amphur* of Sangka, Surin Province, and robbed Thai villagers of their belongings. A villager named Nang Nao Somkan was forced to give them ten kg of rice, while Nai Koon Birongram, another villager, was forcibly dispossessed of his transistor radio.

The Thai Government, therefore, lodges a strong protest against the aforementioned acts of aggression and atrocity committed by Cambodian Army and Navy personnel to the detriment of innocent and peaceable Thai villagers living in the border areas and of peace and stability in the South-East Asian region.

I should be obliged if you would circulate the text of this communication as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Anand PANYARACHUN
Acting Permanent Representative of Thailand
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9023

Letter dated 22 February 1969 from the representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[22 February 1969]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following.

On 21 February 1969, between the hours of 10.30 a.m. and 4.45 p.m., military planes of Israel violated Lebanon's air space twelve times, overflying the following areas: Tyre, Litani, Al-Khayam, At-Taybeh, Marjayoun, Jisr Al-Khardaly, and Al-Ghandouryeh.

The intruding planes consisted each time of one or two or four. They were met by anti-aircraft artillery and chased to the border by units of the Lebanese Air Force.

This new act of aggression by Israel constitutes a flagrant and serious violation of Lebanon's sovereignty. It further constitutes an infraction of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and the norms and rules of international law. It should be viewed in the light of the aggressive policies of Israel against the Arab States and its oft-repeated threats against Lebanon.

Following the Zürich incident, the Israel officials renewed their threats, trying in vain to justify them by attempting to implicate Lebanon and hold it responsible for that incident.

On 19 February 1969, the Minister of Transport of Israel made a statement in the Israel Knesset to that effect. He linked the Athens incident with the Zürich incident and asserted that Lebanon was responsible for the Athens incident, trying thus to demonstrate that Lebanon was responsible for the Zürich incident.

It is worth noting that the statement by the Minister of Transport of Israel was made less than twenty-four

hours after the Zürich incident and while the investigation by the competent authorities in Switzerland was in its preliminary stages.

Moreover, the findings which then became known contradict fully the allegations of the Minister of Transport of Israel and other Israel officials.

The Security Council, in its resolution 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968, which strongly condemned Israel for the attack on the International Airport of Beirut, rejected the allegation by Israel that Lebanon was or could be held responsible for the Athens incident. Furthermore, the investigation undertaken by the Greek authorities demonstrated that Lebanon was not connected in any way with it.

These unjustified and unprovoked acts by Israel, as well as the statements made by Israel officials, clearly reveal Israel's aggressive designs against Lebanon. It is on the basis of unfounded allegations, on the distortion of facts, and on false prettexts that Israel is planning to carry out those designs.

The Government of Lebanon considers that the Security Council should give due attention to these developments, which endanger the security of Lebanon as well as international peace and security.

I respectfully request that this letter be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Edouard GHORRA
Permanent Representative of Lebanon
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9025

**Letter dated 25 February 1969 from the representative of Italy
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original text: French]
[25 February 1969]

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to express to you its deep concern about armed attacks against civil airlines, such as the one carried out recently at Zürich, on 18 February 1969.

Such acts are to be deeply deplored, firstly because they constitute a serious threat to the security of international civil air transport, and secondly because they maintain the cycle of violence and retaliation, which can only increase the tension in a region whose instability is a source of danger.

Furthermore, the Zürich attack took place at a time when new efforts were being made to seek a peaceful solution to the Middle East crisis. Consequently, it may compromise those efforts and increase the concern of the Governments most directly involved in the search for a peaceful solution.

Lastly, the Italian Government wishes to express its anxiety about the dangerous consequences which the recurrence of such incidents may have for communications in the Mediterranean. It believes that the specialized agencies of the United Nations should, as a matter of the utmost urgency, seek effective ways of preventing and repressing such acts.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this letter to be circulated as an official Security Council document.

(Signed) Piero VINCI
Permanent Representative of Italy
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9026

Letter dated 18 February 1969 from the representative of Portugal to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[25 February 1969]

I have the honour to transmit herewith, under instructions from my Government, the text of a letter addressed to you by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal:

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note PO 230 SORH (1-2-1), dated 7 January 1969,⁷ in which you invite the attention of my Government to the resolutions of the Security Council, 217 (1965) and 253 (1968), which have recommended the withdrawal of all foreign consular representations functioning in Rhodesia, and requests the comments of the Portuguese Government regarding the existence of a Portuguese consular representation in that country.

"In reply, I wish to communicate to you the following.

"At no time did the Portuguese Government inform the Security Council that it has recognized as valid the above-mentioned resolutions. In order that it might be enabled to define its position with regard to them, the Portuguese Government, on more than one occasion, asked that clarifications should be given concerning well-founded doubts raised for it by the texts in question. It must be recalled here that for that purpose numerous communications were addressed to the Security Council and to you. I cite the notes sent on 27 April 1966 [S/7271], 13 May 1966 [S/7294], 29 July 1966 [S/7445] and 20 September

1966, on 3 February 1967 [see S/7781, annex II] and 20 March 1967, and also on 2 December 1968. The Portuguese Government never received a reply to any of these notes. In the face of the silence of the Security Council, which has refused to elucidate the essential points raised in the communications referred to, the Portuguese Government considers itself exempted from taking position vis-à-vis the said resolutions, although it would be prepared to do so on receipt of the clarifications for which it has been asking for so long.

"Without prejudice to all the foregoing, the Portuguese Government has no hesitation, in the specific case being dealt with, in informing you that a Consulate-General of Portugal headed by a Consul-General functions in Salisbury having attached to it the personnel demanded by the service necessities of that post. The said Consulate was opened in Salisbury over forty years ago, and, since then, neither the conditions of its working nor the consular status of the officials discharging their functions there have been altered. In addition to other reasons, the establishment and maintenance of that Consulate is justified by the need for protecting the interests of a numerous Portuguese community, which has long been established in Rhodesia. It is not part of the Portuguese Government's intentions to close down that Consulate.

"The Portuguese Government wishes, in any case, to request the attention of the Security Council and of yourself to the fact that there are consular repre-

⁷ The text of the Secretary-General's note referred to is reproduced below as the annex to the present document.

sentations of other countries functioning in Rhodesia. Within the knowledge of the Portuguese Government, and in addition to the diplomatic representation of South Africa, there are in Salisbury the following other consular representations: Consulate-General of the United States of America, Consulate-General of Italy, Consulate-General of the Federal Republic of Germany, Consulate-General of Greece, Consulate-General of France, Consulate-General of Belgium, Consulate-General of Denmark, Consulate-General of Norway, Consulate of Austria, and Consulate of Switzerland. In Bulawayo, there is a Consulate of the Federal Republic of Germany and a Vice-Consulate of Belgium. Lastly, there is an official representation of the United Kingdom also in the city of Salisbury. In these circumstances, the Portuguese Government does not find any reason why the Portuguese consular representation should be invested with any special or exceptional character which it does not have.

"I wish to emphasize to you that the fact of my Government agreeing to furnish the preceding information does not alter the position of principle adopted by the Portuguese Government with regard to the resolutions referred to at the beginning of this note

and of others adopted by the Security Council on the question of Rhodesia.

"I should appreciate it very much if you would transmit this letter to the Security Council and circulate it as an official document in the usual terms."

(Signed) Duarte Vaz PINTO
Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent
Mission of Portugal to the United Nations

ANNEX

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal and has the honour to draw the attention of His Excellency's Government to paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968, emphasizing "the need for the withdrawal of all consular and trade representation in Southern Rhodesia, in addition to the provisions of operative paragraph 6 of resolution 217 (1965)".

The Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) has received information that Portugal is maintaining a consulate in Southern Rhodesia and has requested the Secretary-General to seek the comments of His Excellency's Government in the light of the provisions of resolution 253 (1968).

The Secretary-General would appreciate receiving the comments of His Excellency's Government as soon as possible.

DOCUMENT S/9027

Letter dated 18 February 1969 from the representative of Portugal to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[25 February 1969]

I have the honour transmit herewith, under instructions from my Government the text of a letter addressed to you by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal:

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note PO 230 (1-2-1), of 6 January 1969,⁸ in which you make reference to Portuguese airline companies which maintain air services to Rhodesia, and draws the attention of my Government to resolution 253 (1968) of the Security Council, which recommends a suspension of such services on the part of all foreign airline companies.

"In the note which I am addressing to you concerning the existence of a Portuguese consular representation in Rhodesia [S/9026], I set out the considerations which bear on this point and for this reason I refrain from repeating them, requesting that these same considerations may be deemed for all purposes to be reproduced here.

"Without prejudice to those considerations, the Portuguese Government has no hesitation, in the specific case being dealt with here, in informing you that airlines belonging to the company Transportes Aéreos Portugueses (TAP) and of Direcção de Exploração dos Transportes Aéreos (DETA) touch airports in Rhodesia. The services in question have been functioning for a long time and have not undergone any alteration in recent years, their objective being, above everything, to establish rapid communications with the numerous Portuguese community living in Rhodesia.

"The Portuguese Government wishes, in any case, to draw your attention particularly to the fact that other foreign companies maintain air connections with Rhodesia. Specifically this is the case with South Africa Airways, Air Malawi and Air Rhodesia, which effect flights to foreign countries. On the other hand, agencies or delegations are maintained in Salisbury by British Overseas Airways Corporation, Alitalia, Lufthansa, Sabena, Trans World Airlines. In these circumstances, the Portuguese Government is unable to discover any reason that might invest the aerial connections effected by Portuguese companies with a special or an exceptional character which they do not have.

"I wish to make it clear to you that the fact of my Government agreeing to furnish the preceding information does not alter the position of principle adopted by the Portuguese Government with regard to the resolution referred to at the beginning of your note and of the other resolutions adopted by the Security Council on the problem of Rhodesia.

"I should appreciate it very much if you would transmit this letter to the Security Council and circulate it as an official document in the usual terms.

(Signed) Duarte Vaz PINTO
Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent
Mission of Portugal to the United Nations

ANNEX

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal and has the honour to inform him that the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968)

⁸ The text of the Secretary-General's note referred to is reproduced below as the annex to the present document.

has received information that the airlines, Transportes Aéreos Portugueses and Direção de Exploração dos Transportes Aéreos are at present operating to and from Southern Rhodesia.

The Secretary-General has the honour to draw the attention of His Excellency's Government to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 253 (1968)—deciding that "all States

Members of the United Nations shall prevent airline companies constituted in their territories and aircraft of their registration or under charter to their nationals from operating to or from Southern Rhodesia and from linking up with any airline company constituted or aircraft registered in Southern Rhodesia"—and, at the request of the aforementioned Committee, to request comments.

DOCUMENT S/9028*

Letter dated 25 February 1969 from the representative of Syria to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[25 February 1969]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the latest Israel aggression, savagely committed against civilian populated targets in my country in utter violation of every norm of international law and justice and in complete disregard of the most elementary human rights.

On the early morning of 24 February 1969, a number of Israel bombers, escorted by Israel fighters, launched air attacks on deliberately selected civilian targets situated in the suburb and district of the capital, Damascus. Rockets and bombs hit Al-Hameh, Zebdani and Maysaloun. In Al-Hameh a number of houses and a washing-machine factory were destroyed; in Zebdani a youth summer camp was devastated and in Maysaloun a custom-police station was demolished. Eight private cars on the Beirut-Damascus road were not spared, among which was that of the Ambassador of the Hungarian People's Republic to Syria. To add cruelty to their attack and increase the number of casualties, the Israel aircraft dropped time-bombs which actually exploded at subsequent intervals. The ensuing massacre engulfed with its cruelty exclusively civilian victims. So far, fifteen persons are dead, including a number of women and children and a nurse of Lebanese nationality. The wounded, too, included women and children and the number of these, so far, has reached forty.

In self-defence, the Syrian air force intercepted the invading aircraft and brought down three of them. Two Syrian aircraft were lost in the operation.

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7518.

This wanton aggression has closely followed a series of statements made by Israel leaders, from the Prime Minister downwards, making crystal clear their expansionist policy aiming at the annexation of Arab lands, especially the Golan heights, to the land they have already usurped. "As for the Golan heights, we will quite simply never give them up. The same goes for Jerusalem." This is what Eshkol had to say recently to a *Newsweek* editor.

Neither violation of international law, international justice and United Nations resolutions, nor inconsistency with their own previous claims of non-expansionism constitute the slightest deterrent to the formulation of their policy of conquest by force and terror. Their latest series of aggressions, culminating in the air raid of the 24th of this month, unravels what is their understanding of international law and of human rights and illustrates what kind of barbarism the Arabs are facing.

It remains for the United Nations, and for the Security Council in particular, to assume their responsibilities and to put an end to Israel's arrogant defiance of international law and its threat to international peace and security.

I would be grateful if this letter could be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH
Permanent Representative of Syria
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9029*

Letter dated 21 February 1969 from the representative of Southern Yemen to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[26 February 1969]

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a telegram addressed to you by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Southern Yemen.

I request that the text be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Ismail Saeed NAOMAN
Permanent Representative of Southern Yemen
to the United Nations

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7517.

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF SOUTHERN YEMEN ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that I have heard with great sorrow and anxiety the news of the collective slaughter perpetrated by Israel on Thursday, 13 February 1969, by firing the guns of its tanks and other weapons at the civilian inhabitants of Khan Yunis. This brutal act resulted in injury to thirty civilians, of whom ten women died later.

We consider this a wholesale violation of the principles of human rights which all nations have sworn to respect by collectively upholding man's rights and freedoms, whether in countries that are independent, protected or occupied. We believe that the continuation of these massacres of human beings shows the fascistic and criminal methods persistently followed by Israel.

We beseech you to affirm your rejection of barbaric deeds and to show and express your support for the freedom and rights of the inhabitants of the occupied lands until they regain their freedom and until their human rights come to be respected.

We also beseech you to condemn these inhuman acts and to guarantee the lives of all Arab citizens against the barbarism of Israel and its methods of collective annihilation of the people who are law-

fully resisting the brutal occupation of their homes and lands.

The United Nations, today, must firmly stand against these Israel acts of aggression and genocide, which are a challenge to all the resolutions of the United Nations and which show a flagrant disregard for the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the basic principles of humanity and international law. We ask the United Nations to apply the rules of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949⁹ and to apply sanctions in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

Faisal ABDUL-LATIF
Minister for Foreign Affairs

⁹ Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

DOCUMENT S/9030*

Letter dated 26 February 1969 from the Secretary-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel

[Original text: English]
[26 February 1969]

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter to me of 20 February 1969 relating to the attack upon an El Al aircraft at Zürich on 18 February [S/9021]. In pursuance of your request, your letter was transmitted to all Members of the United Nations in the customary form of a *note verbale*. In response to a subsequent request by the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations it has also been circulated as an official document of the General Assembly.¹⁰

You have inquired as to what constructive international action is envisaged to prevent such acts of violence against international civil aviation in the future. Even before your letter was received, I was in contact with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Air Transport Association regarding the Zürich incident, and I have kept in close touch with ICAO since. I am also consulting with certain Members of the United Nations specially concerned, with a view to finding means to prevent such acts of violence.

There is no question that every effort should be made to put an end to attacks on civilian carriers which endanger innocent passengers and jeopardize international travel, from whatever quarter they may come. As I said through my spokesman on 18 February 1969 after the Zürich incident:

"Such attacks, involving as they do a great risk to innocent persons and the disruption of an important branch of international communication, are a matter of urgent concern to all Governments and peoples. If the hitherto peaceful world of civil aviation is to be saved from chaos and anarchy, Governments and peoples, regardless of their political views, must condemn acts of this kind and take all possible measures to prevent them."

In this connexion, improved methods of international police co-operation and regulations of a national as

well as an international character may contribute towards the prevention of those acts of terrorism and violence. However, I believe that the only sure way to bring an end to terrorist acts would be some substantial movement towards a peaceful settlement of the major issues underlying the Middle East conflict. In the circumstances, I hope you will agree that, although there may be some scope for positive action by the Secretary-General in a matter of this kind, the most natural and proper recourse, and that which should hold the best promise for constructive international action, is clearly the Security Council.

It is my firm conviction that the Security Council resolution [242 (1967)] of 22 November 1967 offers the only practical basis for the promotion of a just and lasting peace in the area. I also remain convinced that progress towards this goal can be made through the dedicated efforts of Ambassador Jarring to assist and promote agreement between the parties with the active co-operation especially of the major Powers. An essential first step towards this end, in my view, would be a declared readiness by the parties to implement the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967.

In this connexion, let me recall what I have stated on another occasion, that if only all the resolutions and decisions of the principal deliberative organs of the United Nations were heeded by the parties primarily concerned in the area, there would be no Middle East problem today.

In spite of the apparent lack of progress in the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, my abiding faith in the United Nations as the instrument for obtaining ultimate success remains unshaken. Indeed, I can see no practical alternative to the active continuation of this search.

Since your letter under reference has been circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council, I have arranged that this letter be circulated similarly. I am also arranging for my spokesman's statement of 18 February, to which you

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7519.
¹⁰ A/7515.

have referred in your letter, to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council [*see annex below*].

(Signed) U THANT
Secretary-General

ANNEX

The Secretary-General has heard with dismay and deep concern of the attack on an El Al airliner at Zürich Airport on 18 February 1969. This is the second attack of this kind within two months and the third occasion within eight months on which the same airline has been the target of terrorist activities.

Such attacks, involving as they do a great risk to innocent persons and the disruption of an important branch of international communication, are a matter of urgent concern to all Governments and peoples. If the hitherto peaceful world of civil aviation is to be saved from chaos and anarchy, Governments and peoples, regardless of their political views, must condemn acts of this kind and take all possible measures to prevent them.

The Secretary-General strongly hopes that this criminal act, dastardly as it is, will not be followed by an act of retaliation such as the attack on the Beirut Airport, which was condemned by the Security Council in its resolution 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968, but rather by constructive international action to prevent such acts of violence against international civil aviation in the future.

DOCUMENT S/9031

Letter dated 26 February 1969 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[26 February 1969]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to my letter of 7 February 1969 [S/8997] concerning the executions in Iraq on 27 January 1969 of fourteen persons, including nine Jews, and to state as follows.

On 20 February 1969, within less than four weeks, the same atrocious crime was repeated in Baghdad, when eight persons (none of them were Jews) were executed and their bodies left hanging for a public spectacle in the "Liberation Square". Again the trial was conducted in secret, behind closed doors. The fact that a trial had taken place was revealed only on 19 February through a broadcast on Radio Baghdad; several hours later there was another announcement that the condemned persons had already been executed.

The Government of Iraq continues in its public declarations to explain the new hangings by false and unfounded charges that the condemned persons were guilty of espionage for Israel, and it describes these judicial murders as part of the Iraqi or Arab struggle against Zionism or the State of Israel.

These excuses bring into sharp focus the atmosphere of terror and incitement which prevails in Baghdad in general, and which is directed by the Iraqi authorities specially against the remnants of the Jewish com-

munity, whose security and very life are continuously menaced.

Many Jews are still detained in prison and are subject to torture on similar charges. Five of the Jews arrested are known to have been tortured to death recently in Iraqi prisons. There is every reason to believe that the Baghdad authorities, in line with their public statements after the hangings in January that "there will be more hangings in the squares of Baghdad", will, as soon as they consider the time more propitious and when the pressure of world public opinion may appear in their eyes to have diminished, again start placing Jews on "trial" and hanging them.

In this situation, there is no recourse for the Jews of Iraq except to be allowed to leave that country.

The continuation of these arrests, trials and executions, apart from their being brutal and barbaric violations of human rights, increase the tension in the Middle East and constitute a danger to peace in the region. The international community must not, by its toleration, suffer this situation to continue to exist.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef ТЕКОАН
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9032

Letter dated 28 February 1969 from the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[28 February 1969]

On behalf of the United Nations Council for Namibia, I have the honour to inform you that the Council has decided to draw your attention to the deteriorating situation in the Territory of Namibia brought about by its continuing illegal occupation by the South African authorities in defiance of General Assembly resolutions 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, 2325 (XXII) of 16 December 1967, 2372 (XXII) of 12 June 1968 and 2403 (XXIII) of 16 December 1968. In this connexion, it should be

pointed out that there has been no advance towards the exercise of the right of self-determination and the attainment of independence by the people of Namibia and that the Council has been denied the exercise of its responsibilities under the aforementioned resolutions.

The Council is gravely concerned with the defiance of the expressed wishes of the international community which in itself is disruptive of the international atmosphere. The South African defiance and the denial of self-determination to the people of Namibia carry the

potential of racial war and thus constitute a serious threat to international peace and security. Consequently, the Council deems it necessary that the Security Council give urgent consideration to the situation and take appropriate action.

Since the adoption of the above mentioned General Assembly resolutions, the Government of South Africa has engaged in a number of illegal actions, *inter alia*, those aimed at destroying the territorial integrity of Namibia. Some of these illegal actions are:

(a) The calculated destruction of the unity of the people and the territorial integrity of the country by the establishing of "Bantustans" among others that of Ovamboland;

(b) The forcible removal of indigenous people from their native location at Windhoek to Katutura;

(c) The arrest, deportation, trial and conviction of Namibians, in contravention of General Assembly resolution 2324 (XXII) of 16 December 1967 and Security Council resolutions 245 (1968) and 246 (1968);

(d) The displacement of over a thousand Namibians from the Caprivi Strip who subsequently took refuge in Zambia;

(e) The projected removal of children from Hoachanas about which the Council has recently received reports.

The United Nations Council for Namibia, mindful of its responsibilities under General Assembly resolution

2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, feels constrained once again to draw the attention of the Security Council to these blatant violations by the South African Government of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, under the provisions of which the Mandate of South Africa over Namibia was terminated and the Government of South Africa was called upon to refrain and desist from any action, constitutional, administrative, political or otherwise, which would in any manner whatsoever alter or tend to alter the international status of Namibia.

In conclusion, the Council, frustrated in its efforts to discharge fully its functions and responsibilities as a result of South Africa's illegal presence in the Territory, considers that urgent action is required to secure the immediate withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia. At the same time, the Council is convinced that the progressive deterioration of the situation in Namibia arising out of various illegal measures adopted by the South African Government against the wishes of the people of Namibia points to the danger of the outbreak of widespread racial conflict in the area. In the view of the Council, these developments constitute a serious threat to international peace and security. The Council accordingly considers that the situation in Namibia calls for urgent consideration by the Security Council.

(Signed) Nuri EREN
President of the United Nations Council
for Namibia

DOCUMENT S/9033

Letter dated 28 February 1969 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[28 February 1969]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of Syria to the United Nations on 25 February 1969 [S/9028].

In the last five weeks, there has been a marked upsurge in Arab terror warfare against Israel. The majority of these terror attacks were carried out by a terror organization known as El-Fatah. Conspicuous during this period has been the increase in Arab acts of aggression along the Israel-Syrian cease-fire line.

On the morning of 24 February 1969, Israel took air action in self-defence to disable two El-Fatah bases in Syrian territory. The action lasted for thirty minutes. All Israel planes returned safely.

The targets were the El-Fatah bases at El-Hamma and Maisaloun, on the road between Damascus and Beirut. These are the central bases of the terror organization. El-Hamma is the operational headquarters for Syria and Lebanon, as well as a general logistic, administrative and supply centre. It is also an induction and instruction base for recruits; a reassignment centre for El-Fatah members who return from training in Egypt, Algeria and communist China. Here, El-Fatah also maintains its prison and interrogation branch. The Maisaloun base is auxiliary to the base in El-Hamma and is used for initial training. It is from El-Hamma and Maisaloun that acts of terror and murder against Israel citizens have been initiated and conducted. These facts have been widely reported in the international Press and confirmed by Arab information media.

The Government of Syria has for years openly sponsored, organized, supported and directed terror warfare against Israel.

On 17 December 1968, the former Foreign Minister of Syria, Ibrahim Makhus, reiterated this policy as follows:

"We are the first who called for action by the Fedayeen, the pioneers of the popular war of liberation. We were the first to support their organization and to reinforce their activities."

The present Syrian Foreign Minister declared on 8 January 1969:

"There is no alternative to armed struggle."

Indeed, Syria has rejected the Security Council resolution [242 (1967)] of 22 November 1967, and has refused to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring toward the establishment of a just and lasting peace.

The warfare by terror pursued against Israel is a flagrant violation by Syria of its international obligations and in particular of the cease-fire established by the Security Council. The Government of Syria bears full responsibility for it.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef ТЕКОАН
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9034

Telegram dated 27 February 1969 from the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the Secretary-General

[Original text: Spanish]
[27 February 1969]

Merely because the Spanish Diplomatic Mission accredited to this Republic was asked to reduce the number of flags to the same number as flown by other accredited embassies, the Spanish Ambassador, who is occupying unilaterally various public buildings, has committed a series of provocative acts violating the sovereignty of Equatorial Guinea. The following violations have been committed by Spanish Embassy: the general mobilization of Spanish forces stationed in the country; the occupation by the said forces of Santa Isabel airport; the occupation of telegraph and post offices; Spanish armed forces patrolling the principal towns; a Spanish vessel on detachment at Santa Isabel moved to Bata port with forces on board; the issue of weapons to the entire Spanish population residing in this Republic; the violent displacement by Spanish forces of the national forces of Equatorial Guinea in all posts formerly occupied by the latter. For all these reasons the Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea denounces to the Secretary-General of the

United Nations and to the whole world these facts, for which the Government of Spain is solely responsible. The Government of Equatorial Guinea requests from the United Nations peace forces of that Organization, and brings these facts to the attention of the Security Council.

Francisco MACÍAS NGUEMA
President

DOCUMENT S/9034/ADD.1

Telegram dated 28 February 1969 from the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the Secretary-General

[Original text: Spanish]
[1 March 1969]

In view of the violation of the sovereignty and independence of Equatorial Guinea by Spanish forces stationed in that country, I request, as a *de facto* and *de jure* Member of the United Nations, the urgent dispatch of mixed United Nations forces numbering 150; a larger contingent will be requested if the Spanish aggression persists.

Francisco MACÍAS NGUEMA
President

DOCUMENTS S/9035 AND ADD.1

DOCUMENT S/9035

Letter dated 28 February 1969 from the representative of Spain to the Secretary-General

[Original text: Spanish]
[28 February 1969]

On 27 February 1969, you kindly received me, at my request, at which time I had the opportunity to communicate to you the information then available on the events which had taken place in Equatorial Guinea, specifically in Río Muni.

I have now received additional information and can inform you that the government authorities of Equatorial Guinea recently asked the Spanish Consul at Bata to remove from the Chancellery of the Consulate the Spanish flag, which in accordance with international practice was flying on the building. The Spanish Consul in that town told the Equatorial Guinean authorities that their request should be submitted through the normal diplomatic channel and asked them to address their request to the Spanish Government.

On 23 February, a group of soldiers of the Territorial Guard entered the Chancellery of the Consulate and violently tore down the flag. The Spanish Ambassador submitted an appropriate protest. When the Spanish flag was hoisted again on 25 February, the Consul took the necessary steps to avoid any further violations.

When the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea was informed of these facts, he sent a cable to the Chief of the Spanish State, in which he reiterated the invitation which had been extended to the

Spanish Consul in Bata concerning the Spanish flag and made certain charges regarding the attitude adopted by the Spanish Consul, distorting the facts concerning the protective measures adopted by the Consul in order to ensure that the Spanish flag was properly guarded and Spanish nationals properly protected.

To present the adoption of these protective measures as a general mobilization of the small force, consisting of three companies with a total of 450 men, which is now stationed in the country at the request of the Government of Equatorial Guinea, in accordance with the Transitory Agreement, is completely contrary to the facts.

The Chief of the Spanish State, in his reply to that message, reiterated to the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea his profound hope that the atmosphere of goodwill between Spain and Equatorial Guinea, which had intensified since the date of independence, would in no way be altered. In his reply, the Chief of the Spanish State also stated that the co-operation initiated under the most favourable auspices should be continued and that there was no reason to alter the course that had been followed thus far. He further reaffirmed his highest respect for the independence and sovereignty of Equatorial Guinea and for its constitutionally elected President.

In addition, the Chief of the Spanish State said that the Spanish forces of public order which are still stationed in Equatorial Guinea, as mentioned above, in no way intend to impair the independence or intervene in the domestic affairs of this sovereign and friendly country.

At present, the three mobile companies are confined to barracks, and the Guinean Territorial Guard is maintaining public order in the towns and villages. However, according to information provided by the timber company Jover, S.A. which had employed the victim for the past few weeks, the Territorial Guard was unable to prevent the murder in Río Benito of a Spanish national, Mr. Juan José Bima, aged twenty-five, who was married only five months ago. In view of the seriousness of the situation, the Government of Equatorial Guinea itself has informed the Spanish Government, through its Minister of the Interior, that it is unable to guarantee the safety of Spaniards residing in that country.

In view of this lack of personal safety, the Spaniards who were scattered throughout the interior of the country are gathering together at the port of Bata in order to obtain the protection of our consular representatives. The Spanish Government is ready to send a ship to this port in case it should be necessary to provide accommodation for these Spaniards and evacuate all those who request it.

I believe you will be especially interested to learn that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Equatorial Guinea has gone to Madrid and is in contact with the Spanish authorities. He will return tomorrow (1 March) to Equatorial Guinea in order to examine the whole situation at a meeting of the Council of Ministers.

Any report which tends to present the facts in any other way is absolutely unfounded and I wish to assure you that my Government's only concern at this time is to guarantee the safety of the Spaniards residing in Equatorial Guinea, since the Government of Equatorial Guinea has notified the Spanish Government

that it is unable to do so. Once the lives and safety of these Spaniards have been guaranteed, my Government is ready to seek any formula that will satisfy the Government of Equatorial Guinea.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this communication in the same way as the communications addressed to you by the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea or any other communication you may receive on this subject.

(Signed) Jaime DE PINIÉS
Permanent Representative of Spain
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9035/ADD.1

Letter dated 1 March 1969 from the representative of Spain to the Secretary-General

[Original text: Spanish]
[1 March 1969]

With reference to my note of 28 February 1969 [S/9035], I wish to inform you that the Spanish forces which are remaining in Equatorial Guinea at the request of the Government of that country and in accordance with the Transitory Agreement amount to 260 men comprising two mobile companies.

The above-mentioned note erroneously gave a higher figure.

I should be grateful if you would have this communication circulated in the same manner as my above-mentioned note.

(Signed) Jaime DE PINIÉS
Permanent Representative of Spain
to the United Nations

DOCUMENTS S/9036 AND ADD.1

DOCUMENT S/9036

Letter dated 1 March 1969 from the representative of Spain to the Secretary-General

[Original text: Spanish]
[1 March 1969]

On 27 February 1969, as soon as I learned of the events which had occurred in Equatorial Guinea, I requested an opportunity to speak to you so that I could personally give you the information which was available to me at that time. When I received further information, I brought it to your attention through my notes of 28 February [S/9035] and 1 March [S/9035/Add.1]. Having now seen the text of the cable [S/9034] sent to you by the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, I feel obliged to send you this further communication with a view to clarifying, on instructions duly received from my Government, the statements made in that cable.

1. The incident involving the flag at the Chancellery of the Spanish Consulate at Bata was not simply a matter of a request to the Consul that the Spanish flag should be removed. The Equatorial Guinean authorities demanded the removal of the Spanish flag from the Consulate without sending a formal diplomatic communication or informing the

official mission of the Spanish State in Equatorial Guinea of the Equatorial Guinean authorities' desire that, contrary to international practice, the offices of the consular mission should not fly the Spanish flag under the same conditions in which flags were then and are now being flown at the other consular missions in the city of Bata.

When the Spanish Consul refused to remove the flag on the basis of a mere oral request, the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea himself dispatched an armed detachment commanded by an officer of the Equatorial Guinean Territorial Guard, which, after forcing its way into the consular building, forcibly lowered the flag.

2. This incident, the atmosphere of insecurity created by the violent threats made recently against a number of Spanish citizens and the fatal shooting of a Spanish subject, Mr. Juan José Bima, a married man and employee of a commercial establishment, who had recently arrived in Equatorial Guinea, prompted the Spanish citizens living in the interior of the country to come to the port of Bata of their own accord to seek protection from the Spanish consular authorities.

3. Under these circumstances, the Spanish Government requested the Equatorial Guinean Government to provide assurances that the lives of Spanish citizens

would be protected. The latter Government stated officially, through its Minister for Internal Affairs, that it was unable to guarantee such protection.

4. So that it could provide accommodations for the Spanish citizens who had taken refuge in the city of Bata and evacuate any of them who so requested, the Spanish Government was obliged to dispatch to the port of Bata two passenger ships together with a small escort vessel, which, in accordance with the wishes expressed by the Government of Equatorial Guinea and with the provisions of the Transitory Agreement, are permanently assigned to stations in the waters of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.

5. It is untrue that there has been mobilization of two police units which are stationed in the insular and mainland territories of Equatorial Guinea at the request of the Government of that country and in accordance with the provisions of the Transitory Agreement signed by the two Governments after Equatorial Guinea was declared independent. These units, which consist solely of two companies totalling 260 men, remain confined to barracks and have at no time carried out any action whatsoever which was not authorized by the above-mentioned Transitory Agreement or which could in any way be interpreted as an attempt to impair the sovereignty or independence of Equatorial Guinea.

6. It is also untrue that weapons have been issued to Spanish citizens residing in Equatorial Guinea; on the contrary, the individuals in question have been forced to abandon their homes and property in order to seek protection from the consular authorities.

In addition, my Government has instructed me to make a formal denial to you of the completely tendentious and inaccurate report which has apparently reached the secretariat of the Organization of African Unity to the effect that the Spanish Government intends to send military forces to the territory of Equatorial Guinea. The Spanish Government wishes to emphasize that, on the contrary, it has officially informed the Government of Equatorial Guinea of its desire to withdraw at the earliest possible date the limited police units which, as I have already mentioned, are present in Equatorial Guinea at the invitation of that country's Government.

In informing you of the foregoing facts, I wish to emphasize once again the Spanish Government's steadfast policy of respecting the integrity, unity and sovereignty of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, to whose independence Spain has made such a generous contribution, and its firm intention to avoid becoming involved in any of that country's domestic political problems.

Accordingly, in order to enable you to evaluate the information which has been brought to your attention, my Government would be most pleased if you would designate one or more personal representatives or observers who could make an on-the-spot inquiry into the accuracy of the information which I have transmitted to you and which I am now confirming.

I should be grateful if you would have this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Jaime DE PINIÉS
Permanent Representative of Spain
to the United Nations

Letter dated 3 March 1969 from the representative
of Spain to the Secretary-General

[Original text: Spanish]
[3 March 1969]

Further to my note of 1 March 1969 [S/9036], I have the honour to inform you that the accusations made by the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea in his cable of 2 March [S/9037], to the effect that two Africans have been seriously wounded by Spanish public security forces, are entirely groundless. The fact that this report does not contain any circumstantial account of what happened does not indicate the names or surnames of the persons alleged to have been wounded and does not give even the minimum personal details which would enable them to be identified, is proof of the lack of veracity of the report. In this connexion, I am obliged once again to reiterate that the Spanish public security forces, which are in the province of Río Muni at the request of the Government of Equatorial Guinea and by virtue of a temporary agreement which is still in force, amount only to 140 men and are still confined to their quarters, as they have been during the past few days.

On the other hand, and with a view to providing you with all the information available to me through the Spanish Government, I believe it important to inform you that the Consul General of Spain at Bata, an official declared *persona non grata* by the Equatorial Guinean Government, was denied access to the airport at Bata whence he was to be evacuated, and was obliged to take refuge in a passenger vessel anchored in Bata Bay.

I should also like to point out that the Government of Equatorial Guinea is refusing to allow some 200 Spanish officials, who have been in Equatorial Guinea as technicians loaned by the Spanish Government to Equatorial Guinea, to leave the territory of the Republic. These officials have not signed any contract with the authorities of Equatorial Guinea and their legal status has not even been defined in the relevant agreement; as a result, they have not contracted any commitment to the authorities they were assisting.

At the same time, I must inform you that an indeterminate number of Spanish nationals, amounting to about 200, are at the present moment in the interior of the province of Río Muni, and that the authorities of Equatorial Guinea have prevented them from assembling in Bata in order to place themselves under the protection of the consular authorities. The Spanish Government has no accurate information on the state and situation of the above-mentioned Spanish nationals, with whom it is not allowed to communicate.

I also regret to have to inform you that in the town of Bata itself groups of Spanish refugees have been maltreated in the streets of the town, and that the local authorities have decided to expel a small number of doctors who had been working in the town.

Furthermore, Bata radio has frequently been broadcasting proclamations and harangues directed against Spanish citizens. These broadcasts, in the present situation, are helping to worsen the existing atmosphere of tension and are making it even more difficult for the Spanish consular mission to carry out its task.

On behalf of my Government, and for purely humanitarian reasons, I wish to reiterate once again that, as soon as the last Spaniard wishing to leave has been evacuated from the territory of Equatorial Guinea, it will be possible to begin the immediate withdrawal of the small public security force which, by virtue of a

valid agreement that has not been denounced by the Government of Equatorial Guinea, is now in the territory of that Republic.

(Signed) Jaime DE PINIÉS
Permanent Representative of Spain
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9037

Telegram dated 2 March 1969 from the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the Secretary-General

[Original text: Spanish]
[3 March 1969]

I reiterate my two cables [S/9034 and Add.1] calling for the immediate and urgent withdrawal of Spanish forces stationed in my country. They still continue to commit aggression against the defenceless African population. Two Africans seriously wounded by the said Spanish forces. Request the urgent dispatch of a mixed United Nations peace force of not more than one hundred and fifty soldiers. Francisco Macías Nguema, President.

DOCUMENT S/9039*

Letter dated 4 March 1969 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[4 March 1969]

Further to my letter of 18 December 1968 [S/8935], I have the honour to bring to your attention a series of continued Israel attacks against Jordan in direct violation of the cease-fire resolutions and the Armistice Agreement.

Israel jet fighters and helicopters continue to bomb and strafe Jordanian villages and towns, killing and wounding civilians and damaging property. In their attacks, the Israel armed forces use rockets, missiles and napalm bombs. Such attacks are publicly admitted by the Israel Government, which must bear all responsibility for them.

I have the honour to request that this letter and its enclosure be circulated as official documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

LIST OF ATTACKS LAUNCHED BY THE ARMED FORCES OF ISRAEL AGAINST JORDAN BETWEEN 11 DECEMBER 1968 AND 14 FEBRUARY 1969

(1) On 11 December 1968 at 0700 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire with medium machine-guns and tank artillery on Jordanian positions in the area of Kattaf, south of Majami Bridge. The firing was returned and the exchange lasted for more than fifteen minutes.

(2) On that same day at 1735 hours local time, Israel armed forces opened fire on Jordanian positions near King Hussein Bridge. The fire was returned in self-defence.

(3) On 12 December at 0715 hours local time, Israel armed forces opened fire from a half-truck armoured

vehicle on Jordanian positions near King Hussein Bridge. The fire was returned.

(4) On that same day at 0725 hours local time, four Israel jet fighters bombed the area and the exchange of fire lasted for twenty minutes. One house was destroyed.

(5) Again on 12 December at 1107 hours local time, machine-gun fire was opened by the Israel forces on Jordanian positions in the Um Al-Shurat area. Fire was returned and the exchange lasted until 1135.

(6) On 14 December at 0240 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire on Jordanian positions near King Hussein Bridge. Fire was returned and the exchange lasted until 0255 hours.

(7) On that same day at 0845 hours local time, Israel armed forces opened fire on the area of Um Al-Shurat. Fire was returned and the exchange lasted until 0935 hours. One Jordanian was wounded.

(8) Again on that day at 1400 hours, Israel armed forces opened fire on the area near the Maghtas (baptismal site). Fire was returned in self-defence.

(9) On 15 December at 0750 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire on Jordanian positions south of King Hussein Bridge. Fire was returned and the exchange lasted until 0815 hours.

(10) Again on that same day at 1312 hours local time, Israel armed forces opened fire on Jordanian positions in Um Al-Shurat. Fire was returned and exchanged until 1325 hours.

(11) Again on 15 December at 2300 hours local time, Israel forces shelled civilian centres in the area of El-Safi south of the Dead Sea, using field artillery. Shelling lasted until 2325 hours. One Jordanian was killed and five seriously injured (a child, two women and two men).

(12) On 16 December at 1545 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire from their machine-guns on

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7520.

Jordanian positions near King Hussein Bridge. Fire was returned in self-defence.

(13) On 17 December at 1010 hours local time, two Israel jet fighters bombed farms near Shuna Shamaliyah, using missiles and napalm bombs. Crops and installations were destroyed.

(14) On that same day at 1700 hours, Israel forces opened up machine-gun and mortar artillery fire on Jordanian positions near King Hussein Bridge.

(15) At 1720 hours, the Israel forces spread and intensified their attacks, using field and 105 mm artillery, on the area of King Hussein Bridge, Um Al-Shurat and Thahrit Al Najjar. Fire was returned in self-defence and exchanged until 1925 hours.

(16) On 19 December at 2030 hours local time, Israel army units opened fire on Jordanian positions south of Damya Bridge. Fire was returned and exchanged until 2100 hours. One Jordanian was killed.

(17) On 20 December at 0820 hours local time, four Israel Skyhawk aircraft bombed and strafed the village of Addasiyah. Napalm bombs were used. Two houses were destroyed and another damaged.

(18) On 24 December at 0730 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire with their machine-guns, mortar and tank 106 mm artillery on Manshiyah area, in the northern part of the Jordan Valley.

(19) That same day at 0800 hours local time, four Israel Mystère jet aircraft bombed the area, using rockets and napalm bombs. Bombing continued until 0856 hours. Crops were burnt and property seriously damaged.

(20) On that same day at 1620 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire on Jordanian positions near Um Al-Shurat. Fire was returned and exchanged until 1640 hours.

(21) On 25 December at 1025 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire on Jordanian positions in Um Al-Shurat area. Fire was returned and exchanged until 1130 hours. The Israelis suffered two casualties.

(22) On that same day at 1155 hours local time, the Israelis resumed their fire on Um Al-Shurat, using medium machine-guns, tanks and 106 mm artillery. Fire was returned and exchanged until 1415 hours.

(23) Again on that same day at 1530 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire on Jordanian positions near King Hussein Bridge. Fire was returned and exchanged until 1545 hours.

(24) Again that day, at 1705 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire using mortar and field artillery. Fire was returned and exchanged for thirty minutes.

(25) On 29 December at 1405 hours local time, Israel forces, using heavy artillery, shelled the village of Shuna Shamaliyah. Fire was returned.

(26) Also on 29 December at 1435 hours local time, Israel forces shelled the area of King Hussein Bridge and Um Al-Shurat, using mortar and medium artillery. Fire was returned. At 1440 hours shelling ceased, but firing continued in the area of King Hussein Bridge until 1605 hours. In the village of Sunah, as a result of the Israel shelling: two Jordanian citizens were killed (one was in his seventies); nine were injured, among them one woman and two children; several buildings were destroyed or seriously damaged, such as the mosque, the post office, and the municipal building; four civilian cars were also destroyed.

(27) On 31 December at 1130 hours local time, three Israel helicopters, covered by two jet fighters, strafed a

security police car in the Gharandal area. As a result, three policemen were killed and two injured and the car was destroyed. At 1400 hours, two Israel helicopters, covered by a Mystère jet, flew over that same area.

(28) On 1 January 1969 at 1055 hours local time, two Israel helicopters, covered by a jet fighter strafed Jordanians in the Gharandal area. As a result, one soldier and two civilians were killed. At the same time, two Israel jet fighters flew over Ma'an area.

(29) Again on that same day at 1435 hours, two Israel helicopters flew over the Shubak area.

(30) Again at 1922 hours, Israel forces opened fire on Jordanian positions in the Shuna Shamaliyah area. Fire was returned and exchanged for a few minutes. During that day, Israel aircraft violated Jordanian air space in the south several times. Jet fighters and helicopters flew over the areas of Aqaba, Wadi Musa and Shubak.

(31) On 2 January at 0710 hours, Israel forces opened fire with medium machine-guns and tanks on a Jordanian farm west of Mahshiyah village, in northern Jordan.

(32) At 0730 hours local time, six Israel Mirage jet fighters bombarded the same area with rockets and napalm bombs. At the same time, four Israel jets bombed the Ziglab Dam area in northern Jordan with rockets and strafed the area with machine-guns. As a result, the crops in the two areas were damaged and a house in the Ziglab Dam area was damaged.

(33) On 3 January at 2105 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire on Jordanian positions in the Damia Bridge area, using mortar and field artillery. Fire was returned and exchanged intermittently until 2150 hours.

(34) On that same day between 0400 and 0420 hours, Israel military aircraft violated Jordanian air space and flew over the areas of Gharandal, Beir Mathkor and the area between Madaba and Theiban.

(35) On 6 January at 0905 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire with medium machine-guns on Jordanian positions in the Baqurah area. Fire was returned and exchanged until 0930 hours.

(36) On that same day at 1310 hours, Israel forces opened fire with medium machine-guns on Jordanian forces east of Prince Abdullah Bridge. Fire was returned and exchanged until 1330 hours.

(37) Again at 1510 hours, Israel forces shelled the village of El Safi south of the Dead Sea for twenty minutes, using field artillery. An Israel helicopter was sent to the village and strafed the civilians. At 1625 hours, Israel shelling was resumed for five minutes, followed by helicopter strafing. As a result of this Israel attack, four persons were killed, among them a child, and six were wounded. All the casualties were civilians from the village.

(38) On that same day at 1800 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire with mortar guns on Jordanian forces in the Maghtas area. Fire was returned and exchanged until 1840 hours.

(39) On 7 January at 1415 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire with medium machine-guns on Jordanian forces in the Damia Bridge area. Fire was returned. Soon the Israel forces extended their attack, using 106 mm guns, mortars and tanks. Fire was returned and exchanged intermittently until 1705 hours.

(40) on 8 January at 2155 hours local time, an Israel patrol tried to cross the Jordan River to the East Bank in the Manshiya area in the northern part of the

Jordan Valley. The Jordanian forces prevented the crossing and the patrol was forced to retreat. Immediately thereafter, the Israel forces opened fire with medium machine-guns, mortar and medium artillery from different positions on Jordanians in the area. Fire was returned and exchanged until 2215 hours.

(41) On 9 January at 1255 hours local time, five Israel half-track vehicles crossed the armistice lines, 8 km north of Gharandal.

(42) On 11 January at 0740 hours local time, four Israel jet fighters bombed Jordanian farms in the Manshiya and Shuna Shamaliyah areas in northern Jordan with napalm bombs and strafed the area with machine-guns. The aerial bombardment lasted for sixty-five minutes. The farms in these areas were damaged.

(43) On that same day at 1420 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire with medium machine-guns, tanks, and artillery on Jordanian forces in the Prince Abdullah Bridge area. Fire was returned.

(44) At 1540 hours local time that same day, four Israel jet fighters bombed that area for twenty minutes. Fire was exchanged until 1645 hours.

(45) During that same day, Israel jet fighters violated Jordanian air space thirteen times and flew over the following areas: Deir Abu Sa'Id and Kufr As'ad in the north, and Gharandal, Beir Mathkor, Shobak, Ghor El Safi and Musa in the south.

(46) On 15 January at 1420 hours local time, two Israel helicopters and a jet fighter violated Jordanian air space and flew over the Beir Mathkor area.

(47) On 16 January at 0715 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire with medium machine-guns, tanks and mortars on Jordanian forces in the northern part of Jordan. Fire was returned and exchanged until 0725 hours.

(48) At 0730 hours local time, Israel jet fighters bombed that same area with napalm for five minutes.

(49) On 17 January at 0920 hours local time, Israel jet fighters violated Jordanian air space and flew over the areas of Madaba, Ammab Swaylith, Irbid and Ajloun.

(50) On that same day at 2135 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire with medium machine-guns and mortars on Jordanian forces in the Adasiya area. Fire was returned and exchanged until 2205 hours.

(51) On 18 January at 1710 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire with medium machine-guns on Jordanian forces in the Maghtas area. Fire was returned and exchanged for twenty minutes.

(52) On 24 January at 0820 hours local time, two Israel helicopters and a jet fighter violated Jordanian air space and flew over the Gharandal and Wadi Musa areas.

(53) On 30 January at 0840 hours local time, two Israel jet fighters violated Jordan air space and flew over the Irbid area.

(54) On that same day at 1430 hours local time, four Israel jet fighters flew over the Irbid area.

(55) On 30 January at 2040 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire with medium machine-guns on Jordanian forces in Adasiya area. Fire was returned and exchanged for ten minutes.

(56) On 31 January at 2325 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire with medium machine-guns and mortar on Jordanian positions in the Adasiya area. Fire was returned and exchanged intermittently until midnight.

(57) On 2 February at 0955 hours local time, two Israel jet fighters violated Jordanian air space and flew over the Ma'an area.

(58) On 3 February at 0235 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire on Jordanian forces in the Adasiya area. Fire was returned and exchanged until 0340 hours.

(59) On 3 February at 0650 hours local time, two Israel jet fighters bombed the area south of Manshiya on the East Bank with napalm. As a result, crops were damaged.

(60) On that same day at 0900 hours, three Israel jet fighters flew over Jordanian positions in the north. One aircraft was shot down by anti-aircraft guns.

(61) At 0925 hours, another Israel formation of jet fighters flew over the same area. One aircraft was shot down by anti-aircraft fire and fell over the occupied Syrian heights.

(62) On 3 February at 1410 hours local time, two Israel helicopters, covered by two jet fighters, strafed bedouin in the Petra area. As a result, two women were killed. A man and a child were seriously injured.

(63) On 5 February at 0035 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire with medium machine-guns on Jordanian forces in the Adasiya area. Fire was returned and exchanged until 0135 hours.

(64) On 6 February at 2037 hours local time, an Israel patrol attempted to cross the river to the East Bank in the Adasiya area. Our forces engaged the patrol, using light machine-guns. The Israel forces opened fire with medium machine-guns on Jordanian forces in the area. Fire was returned and exchanged until 2050 hours.

(65) On 7 February at 2235 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire with field artillery on Jordanian forces in the Damia Bridge area. Fire was returned and exchanged until 2250 hours.

(66) At 2245 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire with field artillery on Jordanian forces in Qarn area. Fire was returned and exchanged until 2330 hours.

(67) On 9 February at 2130 hours local time, the Israel armed forces opened fire with their field artillery on Jordanian positions in Ghor El Safi. Fire was returned and exchanged until 0430 hours the next day.

(68) On 10 February at 0023 hours local time, the Israelis extended their shelling. They shelled the village of Fiefeh intermittently until 0430 hours. One house was damaged.

(69) On 10 February at 1925 hours local time, the Israelis shelled and bombed Fiefeh and its surroundings for over one hour.

(70) Again on that day at 2000 hours local time, the Israel forces opened fire on Jordanian positions near Damia Bridge using artillery. Fire was returned.

(71) On 11 February at 0715 hours local time, Israel forces opened fire with machine-guns and tank artillery on Jordanian positions in Manshiya. Fire was returned and exchanged for ten minutes.

(72) At 0940 hours that same day, the Israelis opened fire with their tank artillery on two bridges over the eastern section of the Ghor Canal. No damage was done.

(73) On 11 February at 1105 hours local time, six Israel jet fighters violated Jordanian air space over Aqaba and Wadi Yateem but were forced to retreat.

(74) On that same day at 1110 hours local time, Israel forces shelled the areas of Ghor El Safi and Fiefeh south of the Dead Sea, using mortar and field artillery, for thirty minutes.

(75) On that same day at 1230 hours local time, eight Israel jet fighters and two helicopters attacked Jordanian positions in Ghor El Safi and Fiefeh, using napalm bombs. The bombing and strafing continued for ninety minutes. As a result, six soldiers were

killed and ten others wounded. Sixteen military vehicles were destroyed or damaged. One building was damaged.

(76) On 14 February at 0710 hours local time, two Israel jet fighters bombed the area of Kattaf west of Shuna Shamaliyah until 0745 hours. The bombing and strafing were resumed at 0830 hours and napalm bombs were also used. As a result, crops were seriously damaged.

DOCUMENT S/9040

Letter dated 4 March 1969 from the representative of Spain to the Secretary-General

[Original text: Spanish]
[4 March 1969]

Further to my note of 3 March 1969 [S/9036/Add.1], I have the honour to inform you that on 3 March the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Equatorial Guinea sent the following cable to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain:

"Situation under control by Government of Equatorial Guinea; solution satisfactory. Permission granted for voluntary departure of Spanish dependants wishing to return to mother country. President and Government of Republic wish to conclude military agreement immediately. Request that withdrawal of *Guardia Civil* stationed in Guinea be studied urgently. Accept proposal for appointing former Spanish Ambassador in Panama as *Chargé d'affaires*. For Consulate-General at Bata, request that someone be sent who has not participated in Constitutional Conference, referendum and general elections. Atanasio Ndongo Miyone, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

In reply to this cable, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain has today sent the following cable to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Equatorial Guinea:

"I thank you for your efforts to solve the present situation, which, as you well know, Spain has not in any way provoked. We are sure that the Guinean people will appreciate that we are anxious to restore as soon as possible the climate of friendship in relations with Spain.

"However, I feel it is necessary to clarify the position of the Spanish Government and to re-state our firm intentions, which we have from the very outset expressed in various messages to the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea. These intentions are also reflected in our messages to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity.

"You know, more surely than anyone else, that Spain has never been interested in keeping public security forces or forces of any other kind in Equatorial Guinea. If the Transitory Agreements provided for the presence of a token force, this was because the Government of Equatorial Guinea displayed an interest in such an arrangement. In the existing circumstances, the Spanish Government has decided to

withdraw for good its military forces of all kinds, which are to move out of Equatorial Guinea the moment the last Spaniard voluntarily electing to leave the territory has departed.

"We believe that a time-limit of fifteen days might be sufficient, if we have the co-operation we anticipate from the Government. Our understanding is that permission to leave is to be granted not only to dependants but to all Spaniards voluntarily applying for permission, including officials. This is perfectly legitimate, since the officials are not yet committed to the Equatorial Guinean Government by any contract and may therefore request to be transferred to Spain.

"In this connexion, I wish to make it clear to you that, in adopting this position, the Spanish Government is not seeking to encourage a mass exodus of Spaniards who have been contributing to the policy of co-operation and development in Equatorial Guinea, which we have always supported. However, the Spanish Government cannot accept a situation in which Spanish citizens who are disturbed by the situation, and who are fully entitled under international law to return to their home country, are prevented from leaving the territory.

"In order to give effect to this plan, it will be necessary for the Equatorial Guinean Government, in accordance with the principles of international law, to allow our diplomatic and consular representatives in Equatorial Guinea to perform their duties without hindrance, to travel to any part of the territory to contact Spaniards, and to enjoy freedom of communication between the Embassy and the Consulates and between the Embassy and Spain.

"On the expiry of the above-mentioned time-limit, if these requirements are fulfilled, Spanish forces would leave Equatorial Guinea, and there would not therefore seem to be any need for the conclusion of a military agreement as suggested in your cable to me. Fernando Maria Castiella, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain."

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jaime DE PINIÉS
Permanent Representative of Spain
to the United Nations

**Letter dated 4 March 1969 from the representative of Syria to the President
of the Security Council**

[Original text: English and French]
[4 March 1969]

Acting upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to confirm my letter of 25 February 1969 [S/9028], reporting the savage attack by Israel air forces on civilian targets in the early morning of 24 February.

In his reply of 28 February 1969 [S/9033], the Israel representative—with the arrogance which has become his basic characteristic—while acknowledging the attack, gave two justifications:

1. "The targets were the El-Fatah bases at El-Hamma and Maisaloun, on the road between Damascus and Beirut." To prove this a big lie, I have only to refer you to the report received from General Bull which appeared in document S/7930/Add.126 of 27 February 1969:

"(d) Physical evidence seen by the United Nations military observers:

"El-Hamma area:

- "(i) Six civilian houses totally destroyed and a large number of houses damaged or partially destroyed.
- "(ii) A washing machine factory totally destroyed.
- "(iii) One school building partially damaged.
- "(iv) A candy factory badly damaged. The military observers on 25 February were not allowed to visit the candy factory and guards were around the building. The liaison officer accompanying the military observers stated that an unexploded bomb was still in the building and guards were a security force. The military observers were able to inspect the building on 26 February and stated that inside the building they observed stocks of sugar, a damaged drum of caramel, boiling pots, tinned food and some clothing.
- "(v) Twenty-one bomb craters and one unexploded bomb.

"Maisaloun Control Post:

- "(i) Three buildings completely destroyed.
- "(ii) Four civilian cars and one police jeep severely damaged.
- "(iii) A petroleum station, approximately 100 metres south of the Customs Control Post, slightly damaged.
- "(iv) Ten dead sheep.
- "(v) Four bomb craters.

"Mezze Hospital:

- "(i) The United Nations military observers saw thirty-one persons who were allegedly injured in the air attack on Hammah and they consisted of 14 men, 5 women, 7 girls and 5 boys.
- "(ii) The military observers described the wounds as being consistent with the type of injuries that would be sustained by aerial bombing.

"3. Other information:

"(a) Death certificates have been requested and will be forwarded with the written report."

This proves beyond any doubt that, contrary to the claim of Mr. Tekoah, the targets of the planned attack, as well as the forty wounded and fifteen dead, were all civilian. What Mr. Tekoah omitted to say is that this inhuman attack was in implementation of a new theory adopted by the Israel authorities, and confirmed in statements made according to the *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 26 February 1969, by Minister of Police Eliahu Sasson and General Haim Herzog, a government spokesman:

"The Knesset today endorsed the Sasson position, which was delivered on behalf of the Government. It was interpreted as meaning that Israel considers itself free to hit back at terrorists, wherever they are, and not necessarily in reply to a specific terrorist act against Israel or its nationals."

The sole purpose of this new theory is to justify attacks on Arab territories, wherever the neurotic leaders of Israel see fit to unleash them.

I wish to recall here that the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 95 (I) on 11 December 1946, affirming the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal, in accordance with which similar attacks planned and perpetrated by the Israel authorities constitute (a) crimes against peace, (b) war crimes, (c) crimes against humanity. It is a tragic fact of history that Israel, since its establishment, has committed against the Arabs all these crimes and remains, so far, the pampered and delinquent child of the international community.

2. Mr. Tekoah stated "that Syria has rejected the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967". I need not stress the obvious irrelevance of that reference. It would have been more relevant for Mr. Tekoah, who shows so much attachment to Security Council resolution 242 (1967), to answer my letter of 12 December 1968 [S/8928], reporting that twenty-five Israel settlements and a population of about 12,000 are being established and settled in the occupied Syrian territory. Nor did he have anything to say about the statement of the late Mr. Eshkol, which appeared in *Newsweek* of 17 February 1969, stating, "As for the Golan heights, we will quite simply never give them up. The same goes for Jerusalem. Here there is no flexibility at all". For twenty months now, since the 5 June war of aggression against the Arabs, and under the pretence of accepting the Security Council resolution, Israel continues the occupation of Arab territories, its rejection of all humanitarian and other resolutions, and its violations of the Geneva Conventions. Yet Mr. Tekoah, as well as other Israel and Zionist speakers, continues to preach law and practice lawlessness. But, perhaps, the best answer to Mr. Tekoah on the acceptance of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) was given by his Minister of Defence,

Mr. Dayan, who, asked whether the Government of Israel had really agreed to implement that resolution, replied: "If we had agreed, do you think there would have been so much international pressure to tell you so publicly?" (see *Le Monde*, No. 7430 of 3 December 1968).

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH
Permanent Representative of Syria
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9042*

Letter dated 4 March 1969 from the representative of Syria to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[5 March 1969]

Acting upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to report to you the following.

On 26 February 1969, at about 0900 hours local time, the Israel occupation forces set fire to the Syrian village of Khisfine, located approximately at 2265-2506 co-ordinates. This Israel action constitutes a flagrant violation of part III, section III, article 53, of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

It thus appears that there is no law which can make Israel respect recognized international obligations; this is shown by its continued flagrant violations of human rights. The senior Syrian representative to the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission submitted to the Chairman of that Commission on 28 February 1969, in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, a complaint about this new outrage committed by the Israel army of occupation.

I would be grateful to you if this letter were issued as an official document of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH
Permanent Representative of Syria
to the United Nations

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7522.

DOCUMENT S/9043

Letter dated 26 February 1969 from the representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: French]
[5 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government, and further to my letter of 12 February 1969 [S/9007], I have the honour to communicate to you, for the information of the members of the Security Council, the following.

On 12 February 1969, aircraft of the United States-South Viet-Name air forces violated Cambodian air space over Bavet Kandal and the commune of Prasat (province of Svay Rieng), which they bombed and machine-gunned at about 1.30 p.m. and 3 p.m. respectively. Cambodian defence units opened fire on the aircraft, and one L-19 aircraft was hit and crashed in Cambodian territory. The pilot of this aircraft, a United States serviceman named Laird P. Osburn, who was slightly wounded, was captured and taken to the headquarters of the Royal Khmer Armed Forces.

The Royal Government of Cambodia has lodged a vigorous protest against this violation of its air space and the deliberate attack committed by United States-South Viet-Name air forces against its territory. It has called upon the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Viet-Nam to take appropriate measures to put an end to these hostile acts against a peaceful and neutral country.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Huot Sambath
Permanent Representative of Cambodia
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9044

**Letter dated 5 March 1969 from the representative of Cambodia
to the President of the Security Council**

*[Original text: French]
[5 March 1969]*

On instructions from my Government, and further to my letter of 26 February 1969 [S/9043], I have the honour to inform you that three more United States servicemen, members of the crew of the aircraft of the United States-South Viet-Nameese air force which was shot down on 12 February 1969 at Bavet Kandal in Svay Rieng, have been captured by Cambodian forces and are now being held at the Royal Khmer naval base at Chrui Changwar (Phnom-Penh).

The names of the three persons held are Major Querin E. Herlik, Sergeant John Fisher and Sergeant Robert Pryor.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

*(Signed) Huot Sambath
Permanent Representative of Cambodia
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/9045

**Letter dated 5 March 1969 from the representative of Cambodia
to the President of the Security Council**

*[Original text: French]
[5 March 1969]*

On instructions from my Government, and further to my letter of 5 March 1969 [S/9044], I have the honour to communicate to you, for the information of the members of the Security Council, the following.

From 10 January 1969 onwards, a reconnaissance aircraft of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces violated Cambodian air space over the village of Pou-Kle, commune of Sen Monorom, district of O-Raing, province of Mondulhiri, nearly every day.

Four helicopters of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces flew low over the same village on 18 January 1969. Returning on 20 January, guided by a reconnaissance aircraft, they attacked the village with machine-guns and rockets, setting fire to a hut belonging to one of the villagers and to surrounding crops and shrub. At the same time, one of the helicopters dropped rounds of ammunition for Chinese rifles, together with a black flag, obviously intending to create

the impression that there were foreign troops in this area.

The Royal Government of Cambodia denounces this manoeuvre by units of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces, and has lodged a vigorous protest against the repeated violations of Khmer air space at Sen Monorom and against the machine-gun and rocket attacks on the village of Pou-Kle by aircraft and helicopters of the United States-South Viet-Nameese air forces. It has called upon the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Viet-Nam to take immediate measures to prevent any recurrence of such acts.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

*(Signed) Huot Sambath
Permanent Representative of Cambodia
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/9046

**Telegrams dated 5 March 1969 from the President of the
Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the Secretary-General**

*[Original text: Spanish]
[5 March 1969]*

Request urgent dispatch of United Nations peace forces. Situation created by ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs Atanasio Ndongo Miyone and ex-Deputy Saturnino Ibongo Iyanga has failed. Am in control of situation but presence of United Nations forces is essential. Urgently request withdrawal of Spanish forces stationed in this country.

Francisco MACÍAS NGUEMA
President

Regret to inform Your Excellency that at dawn this morning a *coup d'état* was attempted against legally constituted Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea. Above-mentioned *coup* was promoted and headed by Atanasio Ndongo Miyone, ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Saturnino Ibongo, ex-Deputy. All machinery had been set in motion for that purpose. Above-mentioned *coup d'état* has been frustrated. Am completely in control of situation. Repeat request for immediate withdrawal from this country of Spanish forces stationed here. Urge dispatch of United Nations peace forces.

Francisco MACÍAS NGUEMA
President

DOCUMENT S/9047

Telegram dated 5 March 1969 from the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the Secretary-General

[Original text: Spanish]
[6 March 1969]

In view situation country and failure *coup d'état* headed by ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs Atanasio Ndongo Miyone I inform you that as from this date I have assumed functions Head of State, Minister of National Defence and Minister for Foreign Affairs; request this decision be communicated all Members United Nations.

Francisco MACÍAS NGUEMA
President

DOCUMENT S/9048*

Letter dated 5 March 1969 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[6 March 1969]

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of 26 February 1969 [S/9030], in reply to my letter of 20 February [S/9021] about the attack on an Israel aircraft in Zürich on 18 February.

I note your view that "there is no question that every effort should be made to put an end to attacks on civilian carriers which endanger innocent passengers and jeopardize international travel...", as well as the text of the statement made through your spokesman on 18 February 1969. Israel is vitally interested in the promotion of the "improved methods of international police co-operation and regulations of a national and international character" to which you refer, and will actively associate itself with the discussion of the subject which has been proposed to the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization.

At the same time, it would be wrong to ignore the responsibility of Member States in this question. The barbarous attack at Zürich, as well as the previous one at Athens airport, and the hijacking of the Israel airliner taken to Algiers last year were not acts by individuals. They have a broader context. They were the work of a terrorist organization harboured, supported and aided by Arab Governments in violation of their international responsibilities under the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council, the Charter of the United Nations, and International Civil Aviation Organization Conventions. The question is whether constructive international action to safeguard civil aviation should not

include an undertaking by all States to prevent and condemn actions on their soil designed to endanger civil aviation.

It surely is the duty of the Arab Governments concerned to act as was suggested in your spokesman's statement of 18 February, namely, to condemn acts of this kind and take all possible measures against them. That demand goes to the root of the matter before us. It was for this reason that Ambassador Tekoah was instructed, after the Zürich incident, to request you to ask certain Arab Governments whether they would dissociate themselves from such attacks and take the required steps against their organizers and perpetrators. I regret that these questions were not conveyed. If these organizations were not supported by Governments of Member States, they would not be able to threaten the aviation interests to whose protection you rightly attach importance.

The cease-fire totally prohibits all armed action against Israel from the States that have adhered to it—whether through regular forces, irregular forces or terrorist groups. The cease-fire cannot be selective or one-sided and violations of one kind inevitably lead to self-defence by those attacked.

Terrorist activity has become a factor retarding progress towards a peaceful settlement. The Arab terrorist groups with the support of Arab Governments, denounce the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 [242 (1967)] and declare that an armed struggle must be pursued against Israel's very existence. The Governments that give them political endorsement and material aid are thus not only breaking the cease-fire, but also

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7523.

repudiating that resolution, which calls for a just and lasting peace. In that respect, I would recall my letter to the President of the Security Council of 25 January 1969 [S/8978], commenting on the statement made by President Nasser on 20 January to the National Assembly of the United Arab Republic.

Our own position on the acceptance of resolution in question and its implementation by negotiation and agreement was stated by me at the 1686th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 8 October 1968. We shall continue to co-operate with your Special Representative in his efforts to promote agreement. The

need, after fifteen months, is to break out of the semantic and declaratory phase, and to negotiate agreements on the concrete points at issue, and thus to build a structure on which peace can be established, signed and implemented. I hope to discuss this with Ambassador Jarring in the coming days.

I would be grateful if this letter could also be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Abba EBAN
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Israel

DOCUMENT S/9049

Letter dated 6 March 1969 from the representative of Spain to the Secretary-General

[Original text: Spanish]
[6 March 1969]

Further to my note of 4 March 1969 [S/9040], and having studied the contents of the two telegrams addressed to you by the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea [S/9046], I have to inform you that my Government's position concerning the withdrawal of the police force, which numbers 260 men, some of them stationed on the island and some on mainland territory—and which at the request of the Government of Equatorial Guinea is now in that country under the terms of the Transitory Agreement—has already been stated in the document mentioned above [S/9040]. This force will be withdrawn as soon as the last Spaniard voluntarily electing to leave the territory has departed.

In view of recent events, which seem to reflect the existence of internal strife between political groups with which neither my Government, nor the above-mentioned public security force nor the Spanish population has any connexion whatsoever, it is now becoming essential to evacuate all Spaniards wishing to leave the country under the terms of the proposal made by my Government to the Equatorial Guinean Government on 3 March 1969. These terms are set forth in the above-mentioned document which, on instructions from my Government, I am once again bringing to your attention.

As you will remember, in my note of 1 March 1969 [S/9036], I informed you that my Government would be most pleased if you would designate one or more personal representatives or observers who could make an on-the-spot inquiry into the accuracy of the information which I have transmitted to you.

In the present situation, my Government would be grateful if you would take such measures as you consider appropriate in order to facilitate the rapid evacuation of the above-mentioned Spaniards who have not yet been authorized by the Government of Equatorial Guinea to leave the territory of that Republic, and also if you could bring your moral authority to bear on that Government to dissuade it from placing obstacles in the way of this evacuation and to induce it to take the necessary steps to guarantee the safety of the above-mentioned Spaniards.

Having regard to the seriousness and urgency of the situation, I should be grateful if you could inform me as soon as possible of any decision you may take.

I should be grateful if you would have this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Jaime DE PINIÉS
Permanent Representative of Spain
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9050*

Letter dated 5 March 1969 from the representative the United States of America to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[7 March 1969]

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 20 February 1969 [S/9019], conveying the views of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa regarding the South African Airways link to New York.

The 1947 United States-South Africa Air Transport Agreement gave the United States two air routes to Johannesburg and granted South Africa rights to serve New York with actual routing to be defined at a later time. The South African Airways link to New

York, therefore, represented the fulfilment by the United States of a contractual undertaking going back to 1947. South African Airways could have activated its rights under the Agreement at any time since 1947 but only chose to do so recently. In this context, it is incorrect to state, as the Special Committee does, that the South African Airways link to New York represents the grant of a "new" facility or right by the United States to South Africa.

I would also point out that General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) of 6 November 1962, which requested Member States to deny landing and passage facilities to South African aircraft, was non-mandatory

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7524.

in character and did not receive United States support. In fulfilling its long-standing contractual obligation to South Africa, the United States was in no way acting contrary to its obligations under the United Nations Charter.

The implementation of the agreement does not represent any change in the well-known United States policy with respect to *apartheid*.

I would be grateful to you if you would bring this letter to the attention of the Special Committee and circulate it as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Charles W. Yost

Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations

DOCUMENTS S/9053 AND ADD.1-6

DOCUMENT S/9053

Report by the Secretary-General concerning Equatorial Guinea

[Original text: English and Spanish]
[7 March 1969]

1. In reply to cables dated 27 and 28 February 1969 [S/9034 and Add.1] addressed to me by Mr. Francisco Macías Nguema, President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, I sent to him the following cabled replies on 1 and 2 March 1969:

Cable dated 1 March 1969

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your cabled communications dated 27 and 28 February 1969, which are being circulated as Security Council documents. With regard to your request for dispatch of United Nations peace forces to Equatorial Guinea, allow me to inform you that such action would require the authorization of the Security Council, which must be convened for this purpose by interested party."

Cable dated 2 March 1969

"In order to co-operate in reducing tension and to help in solving the problems which your country faces, I am prepared, if the Government of Your Excellency agrees, to send a personal representative to Equatorial Guinea. I request Your Excellency to cable me the agreement of the Government of Equatorial Guinea in this regard. Upon receipt of Your Excellency's telegram, I shall have the honour to send you the details regarding dispatch of my representative."

2. On 5 March 1969, upon the receipt of two further cables from the President [S/9046], I sent him the following cable:

Cable dated 5 March 1969

"1. I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the two cables addressed to me by Your Excellency on 5 March in which, *inter alia*, Your Excellency repeats request for the urgent dispatch of United Nations peace forces to Equatorial Guinea. As I had the honour to inform Your Excellency in my cable of 1 March, the dispatch of United Nations peace forces requires authorization of the Security Council which must be convened at the express request of the State asking for such forces, or of some other State Member of the United Nations, in order to consider the matter. In other words, Government of Equatorial Guinea would have to make an express

request for a meeting of the Security Council, and send a representative to explain its request to the Council, or else another Member State would have to take such action.

"2. In the cable which I addressed to Your Excellency on 2 March, I offered to send a personal representative to Equatorial Guinea in order to help in solving the problems which your country is facing and to co-operate in reducing tension. In view of the circumstances, and if Your Excellency has no objection, it is my intention to send my personal representative this week-end to Santa Isabel and Bata. The relevant details, including the name and date of arrival of my representative, will be communicated to Your Excellency as soon as possible."

3. In view of the continuation of difficulties between Equatorial Guinea and Spain, and in the absence of objection from Equatorial Guinea, I have decided, pursuant to my proposal in paragraph 2 above, to dispatch Mr. Marcial Tamayo to the area as my representative. Mr. Tamayo, who is expected to arrive in Equatorial Guinea at the beginning of next week, will lend his good offices in order to help in the solution of the difficulties which have arisen between the Government of Equatorial Guinea and the Government of Spain, so as to reduce the tension created as a consequence of such difficulties.

DOCUMENT S/9053/ADD.1

Telegram dated 7 March 1969 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea

[Original text: Spanish]
[7 March 1969]

I have the honour to refer to the cable which I addressed to Your Excellency on 5 March 1969 and I wish to inform you that, in order to help solve the difficulties which have arisen between Equatorial Guinea and Spain, I have appointed as my representative Mr. Marcial Tamayo, a senior official of the Organization. Mr. Tamayo will arrive at Santa Isabel on Monday, 10 March, by flight IB 205, which is due to land at approximately 8 a.m. He will be accompanied by Mr. José Machado, Administrative Officer, Mr. Armando Gauto, Assistant, and Miss Elizabeth Hedegaard, Secretary. I should be grateful if Your Excellency would be kind enough to give Mr. Tamayo all the co-operation he needs in order to carry out his mission successfully.

U THANT
Secretary-General

**Report by the Secretary-General concerning
Equatorial Guinea**

*[Original text: English]
[13 March 1969]*

On 10 March 1969, my representative to Equatorial Guinea with his staff arrived in Santa Isabel (Fernando Póo). On the same day, he continued to Bata (Río Muni), where the President of Equatorial Guinea was at that time. On 11 March, my representative had a series of meetings with President Macías Nguema; during the latter part of the meetings, the Spanish Ambassador also was present. A number of outstanding issues were discussed frankly and in a good atmosphere. President Macías Nguema stated that he gave guarantees with regard to those Spanish citizens who wished to remain in Equatorial Guinea. He gave similar assurances regarding Spanish citizens who expressed a wish to leave the country and stated that no difficulties would be raised in connexion with their departure. The Spanish Ambassador would be given an escort to travel into the interior of the country for the purpose of contacting Spanish citizens living there. The President and the Spanish Ambassador also discussed several other points concerning relations between their two countries.

DOCUMENT S/9053/ADD.3

**Report by the Secretary-General concerning
Equatorial Guinea**

*[Original text: English and Spanish]
[24 March 1969]*

This report is based on information received from my representative in Equatorial Guinea and covers the period between my last report to the Council on this question [S/9053/Add.2] and 23 March 1969. It also contains a record of the action which I have taken during the period on this question.

1. In view of the lessening of tension which had occurred at the time, the Government of Equatorial Guinea terminated the state of exception (state of emergency) throughout the country as at Friday, 14 March 1969. This measure was received by the people of Equatorial Guinea with relief and satisfaction.

2. The meetings between the authorities of Equatorial Guinea and the Chargé d'affaires of Spain which my representative was instrumental in arranging led to the arrival in Equatorial Guinea of a special economic mission sent by the Government of Spain for the purpose of discussing a number of economic and financial matters between the Governments of the two countries. A conference took place at Bata on 15 March 1969. Although it was reported that it had not been possible to reach a complete agreement in regard to all issues, the conference was important in that it represented a formal beginning of discussions at different levels between the Governments of Equatorial Guinea and Spain on a number of outstanding problems.

3. During the following days, my representative was in contact with officials of the Government of Equatorial Guinea and with the Spanish Chargé d'affaires.

In his discussions with Equatorial Guinean officials, certain ideas emerged as a framework for a peaceful solution to some of the more pressing difficulties between Equatorial Guinea and Spain. These ideas, which had the approval of President Macías, were conveyed by my representative, in the exercise of his good offices, to the Spanish Chargé d'affaires. My representative also had occasion to discuss them with the representatives sent by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to Equatorial Guinea, Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun, Deputy Administrative Secretary-General of OAU, and Commandant Sliman Hoffman.

The main purpose of the ideas referred to above was to ensure that the withdrawal of the Spanish Civil Guard from Equatorial Guinea should take place without impairing either the economic and social situation of the country or its international policies. With this in view, the following steps were outlined:

(a) The maintenance of the political *status quo* in view of the initial economic agreements, which had begun under the most auspicious circumstances and had already been approved by the President of the Republic (particularly the agreement calling for the establishment of a fund amounting to 100 million pesetas);

(b) A study by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees of the situation which would arise in the event of the withdrawal of the Spanish troops leading to the departure of Spanish plantation owners and businessmen;

(c) The accelerated dispatch of experts by the United Nations Development Programme;

(d) The definite appointment of the Permanent Representative of Equatorial Guinea to the United Nations;

(e) Consultation with the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the possibility of sending a military adviser to supervise the above-mentioned evacuation and also to assess the internal security situation resulting from the withdrawal of the Civil Guard;

the moratorium to apply while the co-operative arrangements referred to above were set in motion would last for a period of two months, which could if necessary be reduced to a minimum of one month.

The Spanish Chargé d'affaires undertook to convey the above ideas to his Government for consideration.

4. On 21 March 1969, after a cabinet meeting, the Government of Equatorial Guinea withdrew its previous agreement to the moratorium outlined above, and President Macías cabled the same day to the Spanish Chief of State requesting the withdrawal of the Spanish troops by 23 March 1969. Also on 21 March, my representative was informed by the Spanish Chargé d'affaires that in the light of President Macías' telegram to the Spanish Chief of State, the Spanish Government had decided to withdraw immediately the Spanish Civil Guard from Equatorial Guinea on the understanding that all Spanish citizens who voluntarily wished to leave Equatorial Guinea should be allowed to do so, prior to the withdrawal of the Civil Guard.

5. The letter dated 21 March 1969 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations [S/9104] requested me to dispatch to Equatorial Guinea appropriate officials to supervise the evacuation of the Spanish forces and of the Spanish citizens who

might voluntarily wish to leave Equatorial Guinea. On 24 March 1969, I informed the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations that, owing to lack of time, it would not be possible to comply with his request.

6. On 22 March 1969, I received the following cable from President Macías:

"Because of evacuation Spanish forces stationed [here] 23rd instant according to radiogram from Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain request urgent dispatch military observers. This request has also been made to your personal representative Mr. Tamayo."

On the same date, I replied as follows:

"I acknowledge receipt your cable of 21 March received today 22 March requesting urgent dispatch military observers because of evacuation Spanish forces on 23 March. As you will surely understand it would be impossible because of lack of time for personnel requested by you to arrive in Equatorial Guinea on the desired date. I therefore regret that I am unable to satisfy your request."

7. In order to assist my representative in Equatorial Guinea, who up to the present has had only a small administrative staff at his disposal, I have dispatched Mr. Héctor Fernández, a United Nations official who is familiar with Equatorial Guinea. This step has been found necessary owing to the fact that some high officials of the Government of Equatorial Guinea remain most of the time in Bata while others conduct their official functions in Santa Isabel.

8. In the exercise of his good offices and with the concurrence of the parties, my representative is endeavouring to assist both sides in order that the arrangements for withdrawal are carried out in an orderly and peaceful manner.

DOCUMENT S/9053/ADD.4

Report by the Secretary-General concerning Equatorial Guinea

*[Original text: English]
[26 March 1969]*

The following information has been received from my representative in Equatorial Guinea:

1. All the necessary measures have reportedly been taken in Santa Isabel by the Government of Equatorial Guinea for the calm withdrawal of Spanish troops and Spanish citizens, scheduled to take place in the week beginning today, 25 March 1969. In Bata, the withdrawal operation has apparently suffered some delays due to a minor misunderstanding which, it was hoped, would be overcome by today.

2. Local newspapers in Bata and Santa Isabel have published in their front pages a statement by the President of Equatorial Guinea reiterating guarantees to the Spanish citizens who wish to leave and to those who decide to stay. The statement also contained an appeal to Equatorial Guineans to stay away from the site of withdrawal. The Acting Minister of the Interior, Mr. Oyono, officially informed the Spanish Chargé d'affaires of the measures which his Government was taking to prevent any incident from occurring.

DOCUMENT S/9053/ADD.5

Report by the Secretary-General concerning Equatorial Guinea

*[Original text: English and Spanish]
[28 March 1969]*

This report is based on information received from my representative in Equatorial Guinea; it also records the action which I have taken since my last report [S/9053/Add.4].

1. The embarkation of Spanish troops and equipment began at Bata on 26 March 1969 at 0600 hours and has proceeded in an uninterrupted fashion and in a calm atmosphere. There were no incidents reported. In Santa Isabel, preparations have begun to facilitate withdrawal immediately following operations in Bata. The Spanish passenger ship *Ernesto Anastasio* is being made ready to accommodate a still undetermined number of Spanish citizens who wish to follow their country's troops. Travel agencies report an average rate of reservations.

2. A matter of serious concern is the medical situation in Río Muni after the departure of the Spanish medical and ancillary personnel. On 24 March 1969, I received the following cable from President Macías Nguema requesting the urgent dispatch of technicians, especially doctors, to Equatorial Guinea:

"Inform you that all Spanish doctors have voluntarily left hospitals Equatorial Guinea, as have technicians and private individuals. Despite criminal desertion, the country remains calm and orderly. I should be grateful urgent dispatch technicians especially doctors."

I informed the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), Dr. M. Candau, of the above cable and have today received his reply indicating that, in agreement with the Minister of Health of Equatorial Guinea, WHO will send a team of experts to assist the Minister of Health in assessing the situation in the country and in planning for the immediate future. The WHO officials are expected to arrive in Santa Isabel on 31 March.

In addition, it is planned that the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme in the area will visit Equatorial Guinea shortly, in order to assist in an over-all assessment of the urgent needs of the country.

It is also understood that the International Committee of the Red Cross has proposed an emergency programme to cope with some of the medical and health problems in Fernando Póo, including the provision of antibiotics.

3. In response to a request from the Government, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees sent a mission to Equatorial Guinea to discuss matters which fall within the competence of his office. The situation of the Nigerian workers in Equatorial Guinea will be examined. The mission arrived in Santa Isabel on 22 March and began its work immediately.

4. The Organization of African Unity has been kept informed of the request from the Government of Equatorial Guinea to me for the provision of technical assistance and of the action being taken by the United Nations and its family of agencies in this regard.

**Report by the Secretary-General concerning
Equatorial Guinea**

*[Original text: English and Spanish]
[31 March 1969]*

This report is based on information received from my representative in Equatorial Guinea.

1. The withdrawal of all Spanish armed forces stationed in the Province of Río Muni in the Republic of Equatorial Guinea was completed on Friday, 28 March 1969 at 1615 hours GMT. The operation, which had started on 26 March, at 0500 hours GMT, was carried out with the co-operation of the Government of Equatorial Guinea and the Spanish officials involved. After the embarkation of the troops was completed, the parties subscribed to the following document dated at Bata, 28 March 1969:

"In compliance with the request of His Excellency the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, there was completed this day the operation for the peaceful and orderly evacuation of the Spanish armed forces stationed in Río Muni since 12 October 1968 by agreement between the two Governments.

"The Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea accorded its full support and friendly co-operation for this purpose, for which the Government of Spain is profoundly grateful."

The above document was signed by the commander of the Spanish armed forces in Equatorial Guinea, Colonel Eduardo Alarcón, and by the Chief of the Military Household (*Casa militar*) of the Presidency of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, Major Juan Manuel Tray Moeri. At the request of both parties, the document was witnessed by the Assistant to the representative of the Secretary-General in Equatorial Guinea, the representative being at the time in Santa Isabel for consultations with the Vice-President of the Republic.

2. The modalities and schedule for the withdrawal of all Spanish armed forces in Equatorial Guinea were agreed upon between the parties after a series of negotiations in Santa Isabel between the Vice-President of the Republic, Edmundo Bosio Dioco; members of the Equatorial Guinean cabinet; the Spanish Chargé d'affaires, Ambassador Emilio Pan de Soraluce; the commander of the Spanish armed forces in Equatorial Guinea; and the Secretary-General's representative. Further conversations for the first stage of the withdrawal took place in Bata, Río Muni, with the participation of the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, Mr.

Francisco Macías Nguema, and members of his Cabinet residing in Bata; from the Spanish side, the same personnel mentioned above, and the Assistant to the representative of the Secretary-General.

3. It was agreed by both parties that the withdrawal of forces was to be simultaneous with the departure of Spanish civilians wishing to leave the country. The authorities of Equatorial Guinea undertook to grant facilities to expedite the departure of civilians, their baggage, automobiles and household effects. It was also agreed that the old standing duty of 0.3 per cent on the value of property to be exported other than regular luggage be levied, instead of the higher recently approved duties which are to enter into effect after the completion of the entire operation. No duties were levied on regular baggage. Travellers who had already paid higher duties were to be reimbursed.

4. After the points of embarkation for the military and for the civilians in Río Muni had been agreed upon, measures were taken by the authorities of Equatorial Guinea to prevent the transit of civilians in such areas during the time required to carry out the operation.

All phases of the operation in Río Muni were observed by the United Nations official who participated in the talks at Bata together with a commission designated by President Macías and composed of Major Tray Moeri, two other military officers, and a customs expert. All necessary facilities were provided by both parties in a friendly spirit. Complete withdrawal of the troops and civilians concluded with the lowering of the Spanish flag and the signing of the document mentioned in paragraph 1 above.

5. Conversations on the time-table and further details for the withdrawal from Fernando Póo of Spanish forces and Spanish residents wishing to leave continued in Bata, both parties agreeing that the operation should be concluded by Saturday, 5 April 1969. On Saturday, 29 March, the parties met in Santa Isabel for the second stage of the operation. The representation of Equatorial Guinea was headed by the Vice-President of the Republic and the Ministers present in the capital. It was agreed to devote one or two days to reconnaissance, with the presence of United Nations officials, of adequate loading beaches; the facilities for embarkation at the port and airport were defined and security measures stipulated along the lines of the operation in Río Muni. Maritime agencies were to publish advertisements in the Press and radio to the effect that travellers could book reservations until 1700 hours GMT on 2 April 1969.

DOCUMENT S/9054

**Letter dated 7 March 1969 from the President of the Security Council
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original text: English]
[7 March 1969]*

I have the honour to inform you that I brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council the content of our consultation regarding your correspondence with the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea and the fact that you are sending Mr. Marcial Tamayo as your personal representative to Equatorial Guinea.

The members of the Security Council took note of this information and had no comment to make.

(Signed) Károly CSATORDAY
President
of the Security Council

Letter dated 7 March 1969 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[7 March 1969]

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt, late this evening, of your letter dated 7 March 1969 [S/9054] regarding my sending a representative to Equatorial Guinea.

When I saw you earlier today, I told you, as a matter of information, of my intention to send a representative to Equatorial Guinea. It was not a consultation in any sense.

During my tenure as the Secretary-General of the United Nations, I have taken similar action several times in the past without prior consultation with the President or members of the Security Council; I have only reported without delay to the Security Council the action taken on my own initiative. It was not my purpose, on the present occasion, to establish any precedent of prior consultation.

In this case also, as I have informed you orally, a report to the Security Council was being processed even before your letter was received.

(Signed) U THANT
Secretary-General

DOCUMENT S/9056**Letter dated 8 March 1969 from the representative of Spain to the Secretary-General**

[Original text: Spanish]
[8 March 1969]

Further to my note of 6 March 1969 [S/9049], I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a cable sent today by Mr. Castiella, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, to Mr. Francisco Macías, President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.

The cable reiterates the Spanish Government's unchanging policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, its desire to maintain cordial relations with Equatorial Guinea, and emphatically denies any participation in the serious events which are taking place in Equatorial Guinea as a result of internal political struggles. The cable also reiterates the Spanish desire to withdraw the public security forces which were stationed in that country at the request of the Government of Equatorial Guinea, as soon as permission has been given to those Spanish subjects who wish to leave.

In view of the fact that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Atanasio Ndongo, was removed from office by the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, the Spanish Government considered it necessary to send the cable, the full text of which is given below, so that the President of the Republic, on assuming the functions of Minister for Foreign Affairs, would have direct knowledge of the aims and intentions of the Spanish Government:

"I have received Your Excellency's cable informing me that you have personally assumed the functions of Minister for Foreign Affairs of Equatorial Guinea, a country with which Spain has always wished to maintain friendly relations. I must therefore inform you in all sincerity of my Government's dismay and surprise and its most energetic protest at the serious and unfounded accusation that our representative in the earliest days of independence was able to play the slightest part in the abortive *coup d'état* against Your Excellency, who has constantly received from His Excellency the Spanish Head of

State the greatest tokens of respect and consideration. Such a serious accusation can only help to destroy the friendship between our two peoples, when Your Excellency well knows that it has been an unchanging policy of our Government not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. In that respect, Spain's international prestige continues to be unimpeachable. We were not going to break our rule in the case of a nation whose accession to independence constituted the most recent and most genuine cause for pride on our part. On behalf of His Excellency the Head of State, on 4 March 1969 I informed your Government, the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity [S/9040] of Spain's attitude to the events which were taking place in Equatorial Guinea:

"Spain has never been interested in keeping public security forces or forces of any other kind in Equatorial Guinea. If the Transitory Agreements provided for the presence of a token force, this was because the Government of Equatorial Guinea displayed an interest in such an arrangement. In the existing circumstances, the Spanish Government has decided to withdraw for good its military forces of all kinds, which are to move out of Equatorial Guinea the moment the last Spaniard voluntarily electing to leave the territory has departed.

"We believe that a time-limit of fifteen days might be sufficient, if we have the co-operation we anticipate from the Government. Our understanding is that permission to leave is to be granted not only to dependants but to all Spaniards voluntarily applying for permission, including officials. This is perfectly legitimate, since the officials are not yet committed to the Equatorial Guinean Government by any contract and may therefore request to be transferred to Spain.

"In this connexion, I wish to make it clear to you that, in adopting this position, the Spanish Government is not seeking to encourage a mass exodus of Spaniards who have been contributing to the policy of co-operation and development in Equatorial Guinea, which we have always supported. However, the Spanish Government cannot accept a situation in which Spanish citizens who are disturbed by the situation, and who are fully entitled under international law to return to their home country, are prevented from leaving the territory.

"In order to give effect to this plan, it will be necessary for the Equatorial Guinean Government, in accordance with the principles of international law, to allow our diplomatic and consular representatives in Equatorial Guinea to perform their duties without hindrance, to travel to any part of

the territory to contact Spaniards, and to enjoy freedom of communication between the Embassy and the Consulates and between the Embassy and Spain.

"On the expiry of the above-mentioned time-limit, if these requirements are fulfilled, Spanish forces would leave Equatorial Guinea, and there would not therefore seem to be any need for the conclusion of a military agreement, as suggested in your cable to me. Fernando María Castiella, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain."

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jaime DE PINIÉS
Permanent Representative of Spain
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9057

Letter dated 8 March 1969 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[8 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to draw to your urgent attention the fact that a grave armed attack against Israel was launched today by the Egyptian military forces in the Suez canal sector.

At 1732 hours local time, the Egyptian armed forces opened an artillery barrage along the entire canal sector. Despite repeated attempts by the United Nations military observers to arrange a cease-fire, the Egyptian attack is, according to the latest reports, still continuing. Though Israel forces ceased fire several times, Egyptian firing did not stop. At the time of writing (1530 hours New York time) fighting is concentrated in the Port Tawfiq area with Egyptian sporadic fire in other sectors. Israel forces are returning fire in self-defence only in the Port Tawfiq area.

The artillery attack was preceded by an incursion this morning of four Egyptian MIG 21 aircraft into Sinai air space. Israel aircraft shot down one of the planes. Its pilot was wounded but succeeded in bailing out and is in Israel hands. No Israel aircraft were lost.

It will be recalled that for several weeks Egyptian acts of aggression have increased considerably in the Suez canal sector. Incessant sniping by Egyptian forces against Israel positions has been reported by General

Odd Bull in numerous reports. These Egyptian attacks have brought about expressions of concern by the Secretary-General and by General Bull [see S/7930/Add.115 of 11 February 1969 and S/7930/Add.127 of 28 February 1969]. It will be noted that Israel forces had refrained for several weeks from returning fire. In addition to the sniping, the Egyptian authorities have lately intensified terror warfare operations against Israel and in particular mining raids across the canal. These Egyptian acts of aggression have been subject of letters submitted by me to the President of the Security Council on 12 February 1969 [S/9004] and on 13 February 1969 [S/9009].

Today's attack, which constitutes a cease-fire breach of the utmost gravity, has resulted in one Israeli killed and ten wounded.

I reserve the right to submit further information as soon as it becomes available.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9058

Letter dated 8 March 1969 from the representative of Spain to the Secretary-General

[Original text: Spanish]
[8 March 1969]

Having learnt from document S/9053/Add.1 of the cable you sent on 7 March 1969 to the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, I take pleasure, on behalf of the Spanish Government, in thanking you for appointing Mr. Marcial Tamayo as your representative and for the dispatch with which he intends to proceed to Equatorial Guinea. I trust that in

this way you will receive direct information on the circumstances in Equatorial Guinea, which I have been reporting to you as my Government learned of what was taking place.

Nevertheless, I am obliged to inform you that, as a result of the arming of a "youth militia" which does not fall directly under the constitutional authorities,

the situation for Spanish subjects still residing in Equatorial Guinea has grown worse and they remain exposed to serious danger.

As a result of the reports circulated by the international news agencies, the disclosures of the refugees of different nationalities who have managed to leave Equatorial Guinea and the statements made by some victims concerning the ill-treatment to which Spanish citizens are exposed, you will have noted the distress my Government feels in following a situation which may directly affect many of its nationals.

I would draw your attention to the fact that the Spaniards in Equatorial Guinea are now defenceless, since the Spanish public security forces which were stationed in that territory at the request of the Government of Equatorial Guinea are staying in their barracks and have not left them since the incident concerning the flag at the Spanish Consulate at Bata, of which I informed you in my note of 28 February 1969 [S/9035].

In addition, the Spanish nationals, in compliance with an order issued by the Equatorial Guinean authorities relating to the surrender of arms belonging to all foreigners, handed in all their arms, which were mostly sporting weapons, some weeks ago, and prior to the outbreak of the present situation.

From eye-witness accounts, my Government has learnt that there are injured Spanish citizens in the hospital at Bata, the capital of the province of Río Muni, and that some of them have suffered ill-treatment. It has also learnt that the Spanish doctors working in the hospital wish to be evacuated as soon as possible, because of the personal risks they have to face in carrying out their humanitarian work.

As a result of this situation, the Spanish Government has applied to the International Red Cross Committee for assistance and, through me, would ask you to consider whether the World Health Organization could examine the desirability of helping in some way in operating the hospital and health services in Equatorial Guinea when the Spanish specialists who have been working there up to now are evacuated.

So far, the Spanish Government has not succeeded in obtaining an appropriate guarantee from Equatorial Guinea of the protection to which Spanish citizens are entitled or the necessary permission for Spaniards to leave the territory if they wish to do so.

Furthermore, it has not received permission from the Equatorial Guinean authorities to establish contact with the Spanish citizens living in the interior of the country who, because of the lack of protection, may be in a difficult situation.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, I should be grateful if you would inform your representative, Mr. Marcial Tamayo, of the Spanish Government's urgent interest in obtaining as soon as possible, on the one hand, the protection which the Equatorial Guinean authorities must provide for all foreign nationals and, on the other, the essential co-operation of those authorities so that all Spanish citizens wishing to leave may be evacuated quickly and safely.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jaime DE PINIÉS
Permanent Representative of Spain
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9059

Letter dated 9 March 1969 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[9 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your urgent attention the fact that Egyptian forces in the Suez canal sector are continuing their large scale aggressive armed attacks for the second consecutive day.

After having ceased fire last night at 2240 hours local time, following a five-hour artillery barrage, which I reported to you in my letter of yesterday, 8 March 1969 [S/9057], the Egyptian military forces opened a new attack this morning.

At 0830 hours local time, Egyptian forces opened fire across the Canal approximately 14 kilometres south of Kantara. This attack was followed by an all-out artillery assault at 1520 hours local time on a wide front in the Port Tawfiq area and to the north of it.

I shall keep you informed of further developments in this new grave violation of the cease-fire by the United Arab Republic.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9060

Letter dated 9 March 1969 from the representative of the United Arab Republic to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[9 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your urgent attention the latest series of flagrant violations by Israel of the cease-fire and premeditated attacks against the civilian population, houses, economic installations and our armed forces in the Suez Canal sector.

(1) Yesterday, 8 March 1969 at 1100 hours local time, four United Arab Republic fighters were proceeding with their routine flights over the Suez Canal area when eight Israel Mirage aircraft intruded. A fight followed this intrusion, resulting in the loss of one aircraft on each side.

(2) At 1730 hours the Israel forces opened fire indiscriminately in the zone of Ismailia. Our forces were compelled to return the fire in order to protect the inhabitants of the city.

(3) The Israel attack was later intensified by the use of artillery, mortars and other weapons, and was extended all along the Suez Canal and despite the request of the United Nations military observers to the Israel forces to cease the firing at 1830 hours, the shelling continued along the canal from Kantara in the north to Suez in the south.

(4) Though the exchange of fire in the Suez Canal area stopped at 2000 hours local time, the Israel forces embarked at 2010 hours on a systematic shelling of the refineries in Suez and other civilian installations in the city.

In this connexion, I would like to stress the following facts:

A statement by General Dayan was relayed by the Israel radio on the morning of the same day to the effect that it was Israel's intention to carry out a military attack against the United Arab Republic.

Israel's preparations for the impending military attack against the United Arab Republic were conspicuously observed. Rockets, artillery and tanks were mobilized on an exceptional scale on the east bank of the canal against our positions and especially in the Suez zone.

This wanton aggression has resulted in the loss of life of one civilian and the wounding of fifteen, besides the destruction of many houses and civilian installations and the breaking out of fires in Kantara, Ismailia and Suez.

These facts underline the premeditated nature of this latest attack and discloses the real intention of Israel to destroy the vital economic establishments in the Suez Canal area.

It further indicates clearly that Israel continues to pursue its policy of undermining any efforts towards a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The planning of this latest Israel aggression at the time when Ambassador Jarring is resuming his contacts in the area exposes Israel's determination to sabotage his mission.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohamed Awad EL KONY
Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9061

Letter dated 9 March 1969 from the representative of the United Arab Republic to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[9 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government, and further to my letter dated 9 March 1969 [S/9060], I have the honour to inform you of the gravity of the situation and its deterioration brought about by Israel's deliberate pursuit of its aggression in the Suez Canal sector.

(1) Today at 3.15 p.m. local time, the Israel occupying forces suddenly opened fire on the cities of Kantara, Ismailia, Deversoir and Suez, using artillery, mortars and tanks. In self-defence, our forces had to return the fire.

(2) The Israel occupying forces extended with intensity their shelling from Kantara in the north to Suez in the south, concentrating their artillery in depth on the petroleum installations in Suez. As a result, some oil reservoirs were set on fire.

(3) The Israel attack was particularly marked by its concentration on the ships in the port of Suez and the oil reservoirs, and the use of propeller planes as artillery observation posts to assist in the location of these civilian targets.

These renewed attacks today, with intensity and concentration on civilian targets, demonstrate again what I pointed out in my previous letter to you, namely,

"...that Israel continues to pursue its policy of undermining any efforts towards a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The planning of this latest Israel aggression at the time when Ambassador Jarring is resuming his contacts in the area exposes Israel's determination to sabotage his mission." [Ibid.]

Needless to say, this policy of continuous aggression will not daunt the Arab will to resist Israel's expansionist policy. It will only contribute to the aggravation of the situation, thus increasing the dangers to international peace.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohamed Awad EL KONY
Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

**Letter dated 9 March from the representative of Israel to the President
of the Security Council**

[Original text: English]
[10 March 1969]

In continuation of my previous letter to you of today, 9 March 1969 [S/9059], I now have the honour, on instructions from my Government, to transmit to you the following further information regarding today's large-scale aggressive armed attack by the United Arab Republic forces against Israel forces, in grave violation of the cease-fire.

At approximately 1510 hours local time, United Arab Republic forces opened fire on Israel forces in the vicinity of Al-Shat, north of Port Tawfiq. Fire was returned for ten minutes. Shortly thereafter, the United Arab Republic forces intensified their fire and employed artillery. Fire was returned.

At approximately 1530 hours, the United Arab Republic forces commenced an artillery barrage along the Suez Canal from Kantara to Port Tawfiq. Fire was returned.

The United Nations military observers proposed a cease-fire for 1645 hours. This was accepted by Israel. The United Arab Republic forces, however, continued shelling, and the Israeli forces were consequently compelled to resume fire in self-defence.

The military observers then proposed a cease-fire for 1800 hours. Israel accepted and at 1800 hours fire ceased from the Israel side. However, from the Egyptian side, fire continued with a heavy artillery barrage concentrated on Kantara, Kilometer 10, and south of Lake Timsah.

At 1835 hours, the United Arab Republic forces ceased fire. Israel's casualties from this Egyptian attack included one killed and thirteen wounded—the man killed was a pilot of a Piper aircraft which was shot down over the Israel side of the canal.

In connexion with the continued efforts of General Odd Bull to achieve a cease-fire after his earlier efforts had not obtained the adherence of the United Arab Republic, at 1727 hours local time (1527 hours GMT) the following message from General Bull addressed to the Minister of Defence was received by telephone:

"I am deeply concerned with the breach of the cease-fire in the Suez cease-fire sector and I appeal

to the Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic to observe the cease-fire and to suspend all military activities in the area.

"I suggest 1600 GMT as the hour of definite suspension of all military activity.

"I am informing the Secretary-General of the United Nations of this message."

The following reply was transmitted to General Odd Bull by telephone at 1935 hours local time:

"I have been instructed by the Minister of Defence to reply to your message of 1727 hours of today.

"It was the Egyptians who initiated artillery fire yesterday and today, as you no doubt know from the reports of your observers. We accepted the cease-fire proposals and observed them as we have always done in the past. This afternoon we accepted your cease-fire proposal for 1645 hours local time and held our fire. But the Egyptians, ignoring your proposal, continued their shelling and we were obliged to resume our defensive fire. The artillery fire of the last two days followed a long series of breaches of the cease-fire by the Egyptians through violation of our air space, infiltrations, mining and sniping, which have continued for the last two months.

"I would reconfirm our acceptance of the cease-fire proposal for 1600 GMT of which we informed your headquarters seven minutes before your message of 1727 local time was received. At 1600 GMT fire ceased from our side but continued from the Egyptian side.

"It seems that the appeal should be addressed solely to the United Arab Republic."

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Shabtai ROSENNE,
for Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9064*

**Letter dated 10 March 1969 from the Secretary-General to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Israel**

[Original text: English]
[10 March 1969]

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 5 March 1969 [S/9048], in reply to my letter of 26 February 1969 [S/9050], concerning the attack on an El Al aircraft on 18 February 1969 at Zürich. One point in your letter requires some clarification, and I feel that the episode to which it refers should be described in more detail, since no record of it was made public at the time.

You refer to the request, conveyed to me through the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United

Nations, to put two questions to certain Arab Governments and you state that you regret that these questions were not conveyed. Ambassador Tekoah transmitted to me on 19 February, by an informal aide-mémoire, the request of the Government of Israel that two questions should be transmitted through the good offices of the Secretary-General to the Governments of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the United Arab Republic. The questions were as follows:

- "1. The Government of Israel desires to be advised whether the Secretary-General can assume that the above Governments, Members of the United Nations and signatories to the international con-

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7526.

ventions on aviation, firmly dissociate themselves from the acts of violence of the kind that have been committed at airports of countries that are not involved in the Middle East conflict.

- "2. The Palestine Liberation Front has announced its responsibility for the acts committed in Rome, Athens and Zürich. It is known that this organization maintains contact with the above-mentioned Governments and enjoys their material and moral support. The Government of Israel desires to know whether these Governments are prepared to take steps against the organizers and perpetrators of the acts referred to above, so as to ensure the cessation of such acts."

I gave my reaction to this request to Ambassador Tekoah at the same meeting on 19 February, and this reaction was embodied in an informal aide-mémoire which I gave to Ambassador Tekoah on 20 February. The text of that aide-mémoire was as follows:

"The Secretary-General has already expressed his deep concern over the Zürich incident and previous incidents of a similar nature. He is giving serious and urgent consideration to the matter and to the steps that may be effective in helping to prevent a recurrence of such incidents in the future. He believes that such steps are more likely to be productive if taken on his own initiative.

"Recourse to the good offices of the Secretary-General is available to all Member Governments, and the Secretary-General will be glad to respond to such a request whenever he feels, in his discre-

tion and judgement, that such action would be helpful. In general, it would not be helpful if the Secretary-General were to transmit questions or messages of a political or controversial nature from one Government to another unless the parties concerned have previously agreed to such a procedure.

"Therefore, the Secretary-General considers that it would not be helpful if he were to act on the request of the Government of Israel that he should transmit certain questions to Arab Governments. The Secretary-General has suggested, however, that a communication from the Government of Israel to the Security Council might be an appropriate method of bringing these questions to the attention of those concerned."

You will understand, I am sure, my desire to have the full background of this matter on record.

I note your view that the need is "to break out of the semantic and declaratory phase", but I must reiterate my conviction that an essential first step towards a just and lasting peace in the area would be a declared readiness by the parties to implement the Security Council resolution [242 (1967)] of 22 November 1967. I certainly would not regard such a declaration as a semantic exercise.

Since your letter under reference has been circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council, I have arranged that this letter be circulated similarly.

(Signed) U THANT
Secretary-General

DOCUMENT S/9065*

Letter dated 10 March 1969 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[10 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 4 March 1969 by the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations [S/9039].

That letter is full of fabrications and false presentations of incidents which were in fact acts of aggression initiated and carried out from Jordan against Israel.

In the past two months, numerous attacks have been launched from Jordan, by regular and irregular forces, in the form of bombardment and firing at the territory of Israel and its population, armed incursions and the laying of mines and explosive charges. Israel forces had to take appropriate action in self-defence and foil those assaults.

Armed bands, terrorists and saboteurs are openly subsisting in Jordan, from whose territory they pursue terror warfare against Israel by various acts of violence

aiming at murder for murder's sake. They enjoy the sanction and the aid of the Jordanian authorities. The regular military forces of Jordan collaborate with them in committing deliberate armed breaches of the ceasefire. The victims of their attacks are mostly civilians.

All these facts are common knowledge and need no further elaboration. They are observed by all in Jordan, are openly publicized and glamourized through Arab public information media and are reported currently in the world Press. They establish beyond all measure of doubt the responsibility of the Government of Jordan for continued aggression against Israel.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef ТЕКОАХ
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7527.

DOCUMENT S/9066

Letter dated 10 March 1969 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General**

[Original text: English]
[10 March 1969]

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 7 March 1969 [S/9055], and I wish to make the following brief clarification.

** Circulated at the request of the President of the Security Council.

Whatever interpretation is given to the character of our meeting and conversation of 7 March 1969, I considered it as an exchange of information and views connected with the maintenance of international peace and security that in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations belongs to the competence of the Security Council.

For my part, as President of the Security Council I considered it to be my duty, in conformity with the general practice of the Security Council, to inform its members on the same day of the above-mentioned conversation. I proceeded accordingly, as I indicated to you in my previous letter [S/9054].

(Signed) Károly CSATORDAY
President of the Security Council

DOCUMENT S/9067

Letter dated 10 March 1969 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[10 March 1969]

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 10 March 1969 [S/9066].

For my part, I have nothing to add to my letter dated 7 March 1969 [S/9055], which explained my position on the subject.

(Signed) U THANT
Secretary-General

DOCUMENT S/9068

Letter dated 11 March 1969 from the representative of Iraq to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[11 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 26 February 1969 by the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations [S/9031].

Apart from the malicious continuation of the defamation campaign against Iraq, initiated by Israel and taken up by the Zionist organizations, the only purpose of the letter referred to above is to repeat the insidious attempt by Israel to claim the dubious right to represent all the Jews in the world. This pretension is entirely rejected, and it is doubtful that any Member State of the Organization would concede Israel its assumptions. However, having started to defend the Iraqis of the Jewish faith who were found guilty of espionage on behalf of Israel, the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations soon found himself in the unenviable position of defending other non-Jewish spies for Israel. His claim that the charges against those spies were "false and unfounded" is entirely refuted by the trial records. Nor is this new disavowal by Israel supported by previous cases of espionage and sabotage such as the Lavon affair or

the case of "their man in Damascus", Eli Cohen. It is well remembered and recorded how Israel initially disclaimed any responsibility or connexion in those instances, only to boast of them at a later stage.

The letter is a thread-bare attempt, of a kind which has become only too monotonous recently, to divert world public opinion from the brutal treatment of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories by the Israel authorities, and from the various acts of aggression committed by Israel against the Arab countries. It is not without significance that the Israel letter came only two days after the bestial attack by the Israel Air Force against the two Syrian towns of El-Hammah and Maisaloun—the subject of the letters of the Permanent Representative of Syria to the United Nations dated 25 February 1969 [S/9028] and 4 March 1969 [S/9041].

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Adnan RAOUF
Deputy Permanent Representative of Iraq
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9070

Letter dated 11 March 1969 from the representative of Hungary to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[11 March 1969]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour, as representative of the Hungarian People's Republic, to inform the Security Council of the protest

that has been sent through the good offices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden to the Government of Israel in connexion with the armed attack

committed by Israel forces against the Syrian Arab Republic on 24 February 1969. The *note verbale* reads as follows:

"The Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic presents its compliments to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden and, upon instruction from its Government, has the honour to request the Ministry to forward the following communication to the Israel Government:

"During the air attack carried out by Israel air forces against the Syrian Arab Republic in the morning hours on 24 February 1969, Mr. Pál Mányik, Ambassador of the Hungarian People's Republic at Damascus, was on his way by car towards Beyrouth.

"The air attack put the lives of the Ambassador and his driver in direct danger. At the time of the attack they were compelled to get out of the car, and thus they suffered no injury, but the car was

hit by bombshells and was smashed under collapsing buildings.

"The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic most energetically protests against the armed attack as a grave violation of international law and reserves the right to claim full compensation for damages."

"The Embassy would be grateful to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for taking the appropriate step as soon as possible.

"The Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden the assurances of its highest consideration."

I request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Károly CSATORDAY
Permanent Representative of Hungary
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9071

Letter dated 11 March 1969 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[11 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that further grave breaches of the cease-fire were perpetrated today by the armed forces of the United Arab Republic in the Suez Canal sector.

At approximately 1040 hours local time, the United Arab Republic forces opened small arms fire from the west bank of the Suez Canal on Israel forces on the east bank, in three areas: south of the Bitter Lake, Port Tawfiq, and about twelve kilometres north of Port Tawfiq. Fire was returned, and sporadic exchanges of fire continued until approximately 1200 hours.

During the afternoon, the United Arab Republic forces again opened small arms and artillery fire on the Israel forces in the southern sector of the Suez Canal. At approximately 1545 hours, the United Arab Republic forces commenced shelling in the Mitla Pass area and southwards to Port Tawfiq. Artillery fire was returned.

At 1605 hours the United Nations military observers proposed a cease-fire, to take effect at 1700 hours. This was accepted by Israel at 1610 hours. The United Arab Republic forces, however, intensified their fire and extended it northwards to the Kantara, Ismailia, Deversoir and Firdan Bridge sectors. Since the United Arab Republic forces continued their attacks, the Israel forces were compelled to resume fire in self-defence.

At 1715 hours the military observers suggested another cease-fire, to take effect at 1815 hours. This was accepted by Israel but rejected by the United Arab Republic, and the firing continued. At 1913 hours, heavy Egyptian shelling continued in the Port Tawfiq and Kantara areas. At 1915 hours Israel forces ceased firing, and at 1930 hours quiet was restored.

At 2121 hours, the United Arab Republic forces again opened artillery fire in the Ismailia area. Fire was not returned. At 2155 hours the United Arab Republic forces opened fire in the Firdan Bridge area, and continued until 2200 hours. Fire was not returned.

In addition to the foregoing other sporadic sniping and firing by Egyptian forces on Israel forces took place throughout the day. These Egyptian attacks caused the wounding of one Israel soldier.

In this connexion, I should like to recall that the reports submitted by Lt. General Odd Bull concerning the incidents of 8 and 9 March 1969 [see S/7930/Add.134 and 135] established conclusively the responsibility of the United Arab Republic for the breaches of the cease-fire on those dates.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9072

Letter dated 11 March 1969 from the representative of the United Arab Republic to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[11 March 1969]

I have the honour to bring to your attention the third consecutive attack by the Israel armed forces in the latest series of aggressions against the Suez Canal sector.

At 1545 hours local time today, Israel occupying forces opened fire on Port Tawfiq, Suez, and El-Shatt, using heavy artillery and tank guns. Our armed forces were forced to return fire and shot down an Israel

propeller plane which the Israel forces have been lately using for purposes of artillery reconnaissance.

The military engagements extended later in the afternoon to Ismailia and Kantara in the north. Artillery and mortars were used by the Israel forces.

The recurrence of such attacks indicates clearly that those attacks are of a premediated nature aimed at the destruction of civilian installations and homes in the densely populated areas of the cities along the Suez Canal.

It is significant that Israel forces, twice during the engagements, refused to comply with the cease-fire

proposals of the United Nations military observers in the area, the second of which was made by General Odd Bull himself, who was in the area during the exchange. Israel shelling only stopped at 1935 hours local time, i.e. twenty minutes after the initial time proposed by General Bull set at 1915 hours.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. EL KONY

*Permanent Representative of
the United Arab Republic
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/9073

Letter dated 11 March 1969 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: Russian]
[11 March 1969]

I have the honour to transmit herewith a Tass News Agency statement of 28 February 1969 concerning acts of aggression committed by Israel against neighbouring Arab States and to request you to have this statement distributed as an official document of the Security Council of the United Nations.

(Signed) Y. MALIK

*Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
to the United Nations*

STATEMENT BY THE TASS NEWS AGENCY

The Israel militarists have committed a further series of acts of aggression against neighbouring Arab States in recent days.

On 24 February 1969, the Israel air force invaded Syrian air space and bombed population centres in the vicinity of Damascus. Some people were killed and wounded and substantial material damage was caused. Israel aircraft and armoured personnel carriers attacked Jordanian troops deployed south of the Dead Sea; Israel forces opened artillery fire in the Suez Canal area. Israel officials openly threaten further military actions against the Arab countries, including Lebanon and Iraq.

Tel Aviv government circles seek to justify these abominable acts of provocation committed by Israel, and universally condemned, by spurious references to the need for "massive reprisals" against the Arab countries in view of the growth of popular resistance in the occupied Arab territories. They also boast of the recent piratical raid on Beirut airport in Lebanon, although the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned this act of piracy and warned Israel that appropriate sanctions would be applied if such actions were repeated.

Israel's latest acts of aggression are committed at a time when active efforts are being made to reach a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of the Security Council resolution [242 (1967)] of 22 November 1967. These acts clearly show that those responsible for Israel's present policy are pursuing a course aimed at aggravating the situation in the Middle East and are increasing the tension, with the evident intention of creating *de facto* conditions which would preclude the possibility of establishing a lasting peace in the region.

It looks as if the extremist circles in Israel, intoxicated with chauvinism, arrogance and hatred of the Arab peoples, want a protracted war in the Middle East, pinning their hopes on assistance from some of their foreign protectors. Such calculations may, however, turn out to be a grave disappointment for the Tel Aviv rulers.

As regards the statements by Tel Aviv politicians concerning "massive reprisals", they should bear in mind that the struggle of peoples against invaders and occupiers is justified and legitimate from the point of view of international law. The longer the Israel forces remain in occupied Arab territories, the stronger and more extensive will the Arabs' struggle for liberation become. This should be kept in mind by those short-sighted politicians who are heading for a protracted war while professing their readiness for talks.

The Soviet Union declares itself to be firmly in favour of an immediate peaceful political settlement in the Middle East, in conformity with the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. The States and peoples of the Middle East must finally have the opportunity of living in a fair and lasting peace, free from violence and no longer at the mercy of aggressive forces.

DOCUMENT S/9074

Letter dated 11 March 1969 from the representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: French]
[12 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government, and further to my letter of 5 March 1969 [S/9045], I have the honour to communicate to you, for the information of the members of the Security Council, the following.

On 11 January 1969, at about 9 a.m., the units of the United States-South Viet-Namense forces at the Long Khot (Kien Tuong) post directed mortar-fire into Cambodian territory. Six shells fell 2,000 metres inside

Khmer territory, in the commune of Banteay Kraing, district of Kompong Rau (Svay Rieng), where they exploded, seriously injuring two oxen belonging to the local residents.

On 21 January, at about 10.45 a.m., two helicopters of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces, guided by a spotter aircraft, violated Cambodian air space over the commune of Kokisom, district of Rumduol (Svay Rieng), where they dropped chemical powders which caused inflammations of the skin among the local residents.

On 26 January, at about 8 a.m., four launches of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces moving along the Giang Thanh river directed gun-fire into Cambodian territory. Several shells fell in the commune of Beng Sala, district of Kompong Trach (Kampot), injuring an ox and a buffalo belonging to the local residents.

On 28 January, at about 4 p.m., units of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces from the Thai Tri (Kien Tuong) post entered Cambodian territory, in the commune of Thnot, district of Chantrea (Svay Rieng). They opened fire on the local residents who were working in their fields, seriously wounding one of them, named Sao Im, who had to be taken to hospital immediately.

On 5 February, at about 5 p.m., the units of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces at the Tan Thanh (Kien Phong) post directed gun-fire into Cambodian territory. Four shells fell in the commune of Peam Montea. These units fired on the same place again on the next day, at about 3 p.m., seriously damaging the telecommunication cables.

On 8 February, at about 9.30 p.m., the units of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces stationed at the Cai Vang and Tan Thanh (Kien Phong) posts fired on Cambodian territory, and about ten shells fell near the Khmer provincial guard post in the commune of Peam Montea, district of Konpong Trabek (Prey Veng).

During the night of 8-9 February, the units of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces at the Moc Bai (Hau Nghia) post directed mortar-fire into Cambodian territory. About ten shells fell approximately 500 metres inside Khmer territory, in the commune of Bavet, district of Svay Teap (Svay Rieng). The exploding shells seriously wounded a local woman resident, named Mau Ngauth, who had to be taken to hospital.

On 9 February, at about 4 p.m., the units of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces at the Katum (Tay Ninh) post directed gun-fire into Cambodian territory. The bursting of a shell which fell in the village of Sre Tanong, commune of Chan Moul, district of Mimot (Kompong Cham), seriously wounded a local resident, named An Phan, who had to be taken to hospital.

On 13 February, at about 7 a.m., two boys living in the commune of Koh Sampeou, district of Peam Chor (Prey Veng) were killed when a shell, fired by units of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces based in South Viet-Nam, exploded.

On 16 February, at about 3.30 p.m., five launches of the United States-South Viet-Nameese navy, while moving along the Giang Thanh river, fired automatic weapons at the village of Kompong Ting, which is approximately 500 metres inside Cambodian territory, in

the commune of Prek Kroeus, district of Kompong Trach (Kampot), killing an ox which belonged to the residents of that village.

On the same date, at about 11 p.m., the units of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces at the Thanh Tri post fired several mortar shells into the Khmer commune of Khset, district of Kompong Rau (Svay Rieng).

On the same date, at about 12 midnight, the units of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces at the Queo Ba post directed gun-fire into Cambodian territory.

On 17 February, at about 10 p.m., units of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces at the Thanh Tri post fired six shells which fell in the commune of Khset (Svay Rieng), wounding a local resident.

On 19 February, at about 12 midnight, units of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces from the Ong Tan post, moving along the Khmer-South Viet-Nameese frontier, fired automatic weapons at Cambodian residents who were in Khmer territory in the commune of Thmei, district of Kompong Rau, province of Svay Rieng. One of them was killed on the spot and another seriously wounded.

On 20 February, at about 4 p.m., four helicopters and a spotter aircraft of the United States-South Viet-Nameese air forces violated Cambodian air space over the commune of Cheam Kravien, district of Mimot (Kompong Cham) and opened fire on a resident who was riding a motor cycle. The motor cycle was hit by bullets and put out of action.

On 21 February, between about 9.30 and 11.30 a.m., twenty-two helicopters of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces landed troops near the village of Tralock Bek, commune of Daung, district of Romeas Hek (Svay Rieng). After landing the troops, four of the helicopters and two spotter aircraft, supported by mortar-fire, flew over the village and fired rockets at it. Two women, named Neang Hem Ot and Neang Lam, were wounded and the house of a man named Khoy Sann was set on fire during this attack.

On 22 February, at about 8.30 p.m., the units of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces at the Thanh Tri post again fired on the place mentioned above. Three local residents were wounded by exploding shells, which fell approximately 500 metres inside Cambodian territory.

On 23 February, at about 6 a.m., three helicopters of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces machine-gunned a provincial guard post under construction at Chrak Leav, commune of Bavet (Svay Rieng). A member of the guard named Nong Peou was wounded and had to be taken to hospital.

During the night of 24 February, at about 10 p.m., the units of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces at the Moc Bai post directed artillery fire into Cambodian territory. Several shells fell approximately 500 metres inside Cambodian territory in the commune of Bavet, district of Svay Teap, province of Svay Rieng. A member of the Khmer Royal Police was killed on the spot by the exploding shells.

The Royal Government of Cambodia has vigorously protested against these repeated violations of Cambodian territory and this provocative firing by United States-South Viet-Nameese forces on the peaceful resi-

dents and members of the defence forces of Cambodia. It warns the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Viet-Nam of all the consequences which may result therefrom, and demands that they should take immediate measures to put an end to such hostile acts.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Huot Sambath
Permanent Representative of Cambodia
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9075

Letter dated 12 March 1969 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[12 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 4 March 1969 [S/9041] sent to you by the Permanent Representative of Syria to the United Nations.

Referring to the statement in my letter to the President of the Security Council of 28 February 1969 [S/9033] that "Syria has rejected the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967", the representative of Syria writes: "I need not stress the obvious irrelevance of such a reference" (emphasis is placed in the original on the word "irrelevance").

There could not be a more revealing expression of Syria's destructive and aggressive posture. Not only does Syria arrogate to itself since 1948 the right to wage war against Israel in defiance of the United Nations, and to pursue warfare in breach of the cease-fire, but it suggests to the Security Council that its rejection of the Council's call for a just and lasting peace with Israel is irrelevant. This is the height of arrogance on the part of a country self-convicted of a standing violation of the fundamental provisions of the United Nations Charter. Its spurious claims and complaints reflected in the letter of 4 March 1969 must be treated accordingly.

With regard to the Syrian representative's allegation that the Israel defensive air action of 24 February

1969 at El-Hamma and Maisaloun was not directed against bases of the El Fatah terror organization, I should like to point out again that international and Arab information media have not been as inhibited in admitting the known facts as the representative of Syria apparently is. It is enough to mention the statement of the El Fatah spokesman on 24 February 1969 (quoted for instance by the Lebanese daily *Al-Yom* of 25 February 1969) to the effect that "El-Hamma and Maisaloun served as bases of our organization". The spokesman went on to say that since the attack on the Israel passenger aircraft at Zürich International Airport, Israel counter-action was expected and the bases were consequently evacuated. Careful study of General Bull's report of 27 February 1969 [S/7930/Add.126] reveals how the Syrian authorities attempted, by placing obstacles in the way of the United Nations military observers' investigation and in other ways, to camouflage the real nature of those El Fatah bases.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9076

Letter dated 13 March 1969 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[13 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to bring to your attention the fact that Algerian armed forces participated in the aggressive attacks carried out against Israel in recent days along the Suez Canal sector.

According to the report submitted to the Security Council by Lt. General Odd Bull [see S/7930/Add.134-138], attacks on Israel forces were launched from the west bank on 8, 9 and 11 March 1969. Reuters reported from Algiers on 9 March that "Algerian forces stationed on the west bank of the Suez Canal took part, alongside the Egyptian forces, in the artillery battle on Saturday against the Israel forces". According to Reuters, this was announced by the official Algerian information services.

It will be recalled that Algeria has refused thus far to accept the cease-fire established by the Security-Council in June 1967. I have already stressed the

gravity of this behaviour in a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council on 29 October 1968 [S/8875]. The Algerian Government has not modified its position since then and persists, contrary to its international obligations, in a policy of aggression against Israel. In this connexion, the provisions of Article 23 of the United Nations Charter are of particular interest. The Article states that in electing the non-permanent members of the Security Council due regard will be specially paid "in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security".

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9077

**Letter dated 13 March 1969 from the representative of Israel
to the President of the Security Council**

*[Original text: English]
[13 March 1969]*

On instructions of my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic to the President of the Security Council on 13 February 1969 [S/9008].

In view of the resumption of the Jarring mission, it would be superfluous to react at length to that letter. I should like, however, to state that the letter misrepresents historical facts, Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and Israel's attitude toward it.

The United Arab Republic's negative position on the above resolution and peace in the area has been frankly expressed in President Nasser's recent statements and in particular in his speech to the National Assembly of

the United Arab Republic on 20 January 1969. These statements were brought to the attention of the Security Council by Israel's Minister for Foreign Affairs on 25 January 1969 [S/8978] and in my letter to the Secretary-General on 5 February 1969 [S/8994].

Egypt's policy and real intentions have been fully demonstrated in the artillery, sniping and mining attacks carried out in recent weeks along the Suez Canal sector and reported by Lt. General Odd Bull.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/9078

**Letter dated 13 March 1969 from the representative of Israel
to the President of the Security Council**

*[Original text: English]
[13 March 1969]*

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your urgent attention the fact that today, 13 March 1969, the United Arab Republic forces in the Suez Canal sector have again launched, in flagrant violation of the cease-fire, a large-scale attack against Israel.

Between 1125 and 1139 hours local time, the United Arab Republic forces opened fire at several points across the Canal in the Bitter Lake-Port Tawfiq area.

At 1405 hours, United Arab Republic forces opened small arms and heavy mortar fire on Israel positions on the east bank of the Canal, about two kilometres north of Port Tawfiq. Fire was returned in self-defence and the exchange continued till 1545 hours.

At 1620 hours the United Arab Republic forces resumed their fire across the Canal south of the Bitter Lake. Fire was returned.

At 1732 hours, the Egyptian forces opened up with an artillery barrage along the entire canal sector from Kilometre 25 in the north to Port Tawfiq in the south. Fire was returned by the Israel forces.

At 1810 hours the United Nations military observers proposed a cease-fire, to take effect at 1915 hours. This was accepted by Israel at 1820 hours. The Israel forces

ceased fire at 1845 hours. The Egyptian attack, however, continued and the Israel forces were compelled to resume fire.

At 1957 hours, the United Arab Republic forces opened heavy artillery fire at Kilometre 10. Fire was returned. Firing ceased only at 2045 hours.

Today's attack is another demonstration of the United Arab Republic's policy of aggression, which is pursued in violation of the cease-fire and seriously hampers peace-making efforts. Lt. General Odd Bull's reports state unequivocally that in recent weeks the United Arab Republic forces have been repeatedly initiating attacks in the Suez Canal area. This has been openly confirmed in Egyptian official pronouncements, which promise a policy of preventive military action, and "offensive strategy" against Israel and dismiss as unimportant the fact that United Arab Republic forces are the first to open fire.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/9079

**Letter dated 12 March 1969 from the representative of Sweden
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original text: English]
[13 March 1969]*

With reference to your letter of 8 January 1969 [S/8964] in which you appealed for voluntary contributions to provide the necessary financial support for the United Nations Peace-keeping Operation in Cyprus, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Sweden has decided to make a further contribution

of \$180,000 to meet the costs of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for the period ending 15 June 1969.

The decision by the Swedish Government to make a contribution for this six-month period in the same amount as for previous six-month periods, despite the

reduction by 25 per cent of the Force since November 1968, was made in recognition of the serious financial situation facing the United Nations in regard to UNFICYP, as well as in the expectation that other Member countries will also find it possible to maintain their voluntary contributions for the Force at their previous level.

My Government has taken this decision without prejudice to its attitude on the principle of collective

financial responsibility for United Nations operations of this nature.

I would be grateful if you could have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Sverker ÅSTRÖM

*Permanent Representative of Sweden
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/9080

Letter dated 13 March 1969 from the representative of the United Arab Republic to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[13 March 1969]

I have the honour to bring to your urgent attention the latest act of aggression committed by the Israel occupying forces in the Suez Canal sector.

At 17.30 hours local time, Israel occupying forces opened fire, beginning with small arms. Shortly afterwards firing was intensified through the use of artillery, mortars and rockets in Kantara, Ferdan, Ismailia and Toson. Our armed forces had no alternative but to return the fire.

At 17.45 hours local time, the Israel forces extended the area of engagement southward to Port Tawfik and Suez, concentrating the shelling on vital installations. Firing stopped at the request of United Nations military observers at 19.15 local time.

At 19.55 hours despite the cease-fire arranged by the United Nations military observers forty minutes earlier, and in flagrant violation of that cease-fire, the Israel occupying forces resumed their heavy firing which extended all along the canal from El-Kab southwards to Ismailia, Suez and Port Tawfik, concentrating on the industrial area.

A second cease-fire had to be arranged by the United Nations military observers at 20.45 hours in the evening.

As a result of this latest Israel premeditated attack, some civilians have been killed and many others wounded. Several houses and a number of schools, mosques and hospitals were destroyed or damaged.

I feel it necessary to stress that the repeated Israel attacks against the United Arab Republic and its continued occupation of Arab territories constitute clear violations of United Nations resolutions and the Charter of the United Nations.

So long as Israel continues to flout the resolutions of the United Nations and, in particular, rejects resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, adopted unanimously by the Security Council, which calls on Israel to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories, any military reinforcements that Israel attempts to install in the occupied Arab territories should be viewed very gravely and considered as new acts of aggression which should be strongly condemned by the international community.

It must seem grotesque that Israel, which still occupies Arab countries as a result of its aggression in June 1967, in defiance of all norms of international law and the principles of the Charter, deems it appropriate to lodge complaints and protests to the United Nations against the victims of its perfidious aggression. Thus, Israel is attempting by deliberate distortions to confuse the issue. Those so-called complaints and protests on the part of Israel should be considered by the United Nations as null and void, since they are based on aggression which contravenes the Security Council resolution and which is, besides, condemned by the United Nations Charter.

I am sure that the United Nations will ignore such fictitious complaints as long as Israel continues to reject and fails to implement the Security Council resolution and other resolutions of the United Nations.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohamed EL KONY
*Permanent Representative of the
United Arab Republic
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/9081

Letter dated 7 March 1969 from the representative of Denmark to the Secretary-General*

[Original text: English]
[14 March 1969]

With reference to your letter of 8 January 1969 [S/8946], in which you appealed for voluntary contributions to provide the necessary financial support for the United Nations Peace-keeping Operation in Cyprus, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Denmark has decided to make a further contribution of \$120,000 to meet the costs of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for the period ending 15 June 1969.

* Circulated at the request of the Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations.

The decision to contribute the same amount as previously, despite the reduction by 25 per cent of the Force since November 1968, was made in recognition of the serious financial situation facing the United Nations in regard to UNFICYP, as well as in the expectation that other Member countries will refrain from reducing their voluntary contributions for the Force.

My Government has taken this decision without prejudice to its attitude on the principle of collective financial responsibility for United Nations operations of this nature.

As previously, the above-mentioned amount will be placed with a bank account in Denmark and offset against expenses paid by the Danish authorities in connexion with the Danish contingent to UNFICYP.

(Signed) Otto BORCH

*Permanent Representative of Denmark
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/9082

Letter dated 14 March 1969 from the representative of Spain to the Secretary-General

[Original text: Spanish]
[14 March 1969]

Further to my letter of 8 March 1969 [S/9058], I have the honour to inform you that, following the arrival of your representative, Mr. Marcial Tamayo, in Equatorial Guinea, several talks were held in his presence between the Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy of Spain in that country, Mr. Emilio Pan de Soraluce, and the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea.

According to the information from my Government and from your report [S/9053/Add.2], the President of the Republic, Mr. Francisco Marías, stated that he was giving guarantees with regard to those Spanish citizens who wished to remain in Equatorial Guinea and similar guarantees regarding Spanish citizens who expressed a wish to leave the country, and also that no difficulties would be raised in connexion with their departure and that the Spanish representative would be given an escort to travel into the interior of the country for the purpose of contacting Spanish citizens living there.

Nevertheless, more than three days after the President of the Republic made that statement in the presence of your envoy, I am informed by my Government that, by various procedures, difficulties are still being placed in the way of the departure of Spaniards of all kinds who want to leave the country and that, in spite of their urgent requests, the diplomatic and consular representatives of Spain have still not been granted facilities for travelling into the interior of the country or the authorization to do so.

Since the present situation in Equatorial Guinea began over three weeks ago and since, owing to the disorders and incidents connected with internal policy which have occurred in the country, many Spanish citizens have felt compelled to leave their homes or places of residence and to assemble precariously in the main urban centres, I wish, for humanitarian reasons, to draw to your attention the urgency which the Spanish

Government attaches to the need for Spanish citizens to be given authorization, without further delay, to leave the country. I also call to your attention the growing anxiety with which the Spanish Government views the plight in which some two hundred Spanish citizens living in the interior of the country may be finding themselves. In spite of the time which has elapsed, the diplomatic and consular representatives of Spain have been unable to contact them, in spite of the promises made to your representative.

In view of these circumstances, which can be verified by your representative, I would be grateful if you would impress upon Mr. Tamayo the need for the Spanish Government to ensure that the statements made by the President of Equatorial Guinea, to which I referred above, are followed by action as soon as possible.

For the humanitarian reasons which are at this moment uppermost in my Government's thoughts, any pending problem affecting the bilateral relationship between the two countries will be considered with the utmost care and urgency, but this must not, of course, interfere in any way with the evacuation of the Spanish citizens who want to leave, or with the safeguards and full protection by the consular authorities to which those Spaniards who choose to remain in the country and who have been so authorized by the authorities of Equatorial Guinea are entitled. The arbitrary prolongation of the present situation places in serious jeopardy the fate of those Spaniards who are being prevented from departing and of the others living in the interior of the country who have no guarantee or safeguard whatsoever.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jaime DE PINIÉS
*Permanent Representative of Spain
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/9083*

**Letter dated 16 March 1969 from the representative of Jordan
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original text: English]
[16 March 1969]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention serious raids by Israel against civilian centres in Jordan, in flagrant violation of the cease-fire resolution and the Armistice Agreement.

Yesterday, 15 March 1969, four Israel jet fighters bombed and strafed the villages of Shunah Al-Shamaliyah, Waqqas and Zamaliyah for fifteen minutes, using rockets and machine-guns. As a result, two farmers were killed and nine others wounded. Two civilian cars were destroyed and five others and a tractor damaged. Farms were badly damaged.

Today, 16 March, at 06.30 hours local time waves of Israel jets bombed and strafed various civilian centres deep in Jordanian territory. Napalm, rockets and machine-guns were used.

The areas south west of Amman and its suburbs, Jarash and Shuback, were subjected to intermittent

Israel raids from 6.30 hours until 10.05 hours. As a result, three civilians were killed and seven others wounded, one seriously. Five cars and a house were destroyed.

In their recent attacks against Jordanian farmers and villagers, the Israelis resorted once again to the use of napalm bombs. Similar cases were brought to the attention of the Security Council in the past, but no adequate steps were taken. You will certainly appreciate that if the use by Israel of napalm and other destructive weapons, in brutal defiance of the United Nations cease-fire resolution, is allowed to go unchecked, the Israelis will continue to embark upon more violations and acts of aggression.

May I request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

* Incorporating document S/9083/Corr.1 of 17 March 1969.

DOCUMENT S/9085

**Letter dated 17 March 1969 from the representative of Jordan
to the President of the Security Council**

[Original text: English]
[17 March 1969]

Further to my letter of yesterday 16 March 1969 [S/9083], and upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention further attacks by Israel for the third consecutive day.

Today, 17 March, at 08.10 hours local time, two Israel jet fighters bombed and strafed the Addasiyah area near the capital Amman. Again, rockets, napalm and machine-guns were used.

At 09.10 hours local time, two other Israel jet fighters raided the areas of Manshiyah and Shunah Al-Shamaliyah in the north. The Israelis bombed and strafed these areas intermittently until 09.30 hours, using rockets and machine-guns. As a result, one civilian was seriously wounded, two cars were destroyed and crops badly damaged.

The new Israel policy of aggression aimed at the capital of Jordan and its suburbs is intended to intimidate the people and undermine efforts for peace in the area and thus further complicate an already deteriorating situation.

May I request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9086

**Letter dated 14 March 1969 from the representative of Norway
to the Secretary-General**

[Original text: English]
[17 March 1969]

With reference to your letter of 8 January 1969, [S/8964] in which you appealed for voluntary contributions to provide the necessary financial support for the United Nations Peace-keeping Operation in Cyprus, I have the honour to inform you that the

Government of Norway has decided to make a further contribution of Norwegian Kroner 715,000—approximately \$US100,000—to meet the cost of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for the period ending 15 June 1969.

The decision to contribute the same amount as previously, despite the reduction by 25 per cent of the Force since November 1968, was made in recognition of the serious financial situation facing the United Nations in regard to UNFICYP, as well as in the expectation that other Member countries will also find it possible to maintain the voluntary contributions for the force at the previous level.

My Government has taken this decision without prejudice to its attitude on the principle of collective financial responsibility for United Nations operations of this nature.

In view of the difficult financial situation of UNFICYP, my Government has also decided to make a further contribution of Norwegian Kroner 145,000—approximately \$US20,000—towards meeting the deficit in the account of UNFICYP. The two amounts, totalling \$US120,195.66, have already been transferred to the UNFICYP account with the Irving Trust Company of New York.

I would be grateful if you could have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Edward HAMBRO
Permanent Representative of Norway
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9087

Letter dated 14 March 1969 from the representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: French]
[17 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government, and further to my letter of 11 March 1969 [S/9074], I have the honour to communicate to you, for the information of the members of the Security Council, the following.

On 22 February 1969, at about 4.30 p.m., a spotter aircraft of the United States–South Viet-Nameese forces repeatedly violated Cambodian air space over the village of Chrak Kranh, commune of Rong, district of Mimot (Kompong Cham). At the same time, the units of the United States–South Viet-Nameese forces at the Katoum post fired several artillery shells in the direction of Cambodian territory. The explosion of these shells wounded a Buddhist monk and four buffaloes and killed four other buffaloes.

On 26 February, a helicopter of the United States–South Viet-Nameese forces violated Cambodian air space over the commune of Kokisom, district of Rumduol (Svay Rieng). A Cambodian inhabitant named Phoeung Khien, who was fishing at a point inside Cambodian territory, was killed by shots fired from the aforementioned helicopter.

During the night of 27 February, from 8 p.m. to midnight, several aircraft of the United States–South Viet-Nameese forces violated Cambodian air space over the area of Mesar Thngak, district of Svay Teap (Svay Rieng) and attacked the area with rocket and machine-gun fire, damaging one house and severely wounding five female inhabitants, one of whom succumbed to her wounds while being taken to hospital. The victims were the following: Néang Sot Lon, age 15 (deceased); Néang Sot Lan, age 10, Néang Phan Nin, age 15,

Néang Pan Tieng, age 21, Néang Peou Sum, age 27 (hospitalized).

On 2 March, at about 1.30 a.m., units of the United States–South Viet-Nameese forces estimated at sixty persons intruded into Cambodian territory in the village of Keo Chas, commune of Banteay Kraing, district of Kompong Rau (Svay Rieng), at a point approximately 800 metres from the Khmer–South Viet-Nameese frontier. The aforementioned units opened fire with their automatic weapons on the said village, killing on the spot a little girl named Néang Pauk Sabor, age 12. When the aggressors withdrew, they took away property and poultry and destroyed five sacks of paddy belonging to the inhabitants of the village.

The Royal Government of Cambodia has lodged a vigorous protest against these violations of Cambodian air space and territory and these deliberate attacks committed by the United States–South Viet-Nameese forces against peaceful and innocent Khmer inhabitants. It has demanded that the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Viet-Nam should take appropriate measures to punish the guilty, compensate the families of the victims and put an end to such acts of banditry.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Huot Sambath
Permanent Representative of Cambodia
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9088

Letter dated 14 March 1969 from the representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: French]
[17 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter of 14 March 1969 [S/9087], I have the honour to communicate to you, for the information of the members of the Security Council, the following text of a statement by the Royal Government of Cambodia, dated 7 March 1969:

“On 27 February 1969, from 8 p.m. to midnight, several aircraft of the United States–South Viet-Nameese air forces violated Cambodian air space and attacked the area of Mesar Thngak, province of Svay Rieng, with rocket and machine-gun fire. Five young women and girls of a village of the sangkat

of Bati, *srok* of Chantrea, situated approximately 4 kilometres inside the frontier, were severely wounded. One of them died while being evacuated to the provincial hospital.

"The Royal Government denounces this new crime, which follows many others committed by the United States armed forces and always having peaceful Khmer peasant men and women as their sole victims. This latest act of terroristic aggression confirms the hypocrisy and bad faith of the American command, which claims that its air raids are aimed at Viet-Cong bases or sanctuaries established in Cambodia. It becomes apparent once more that the said military objectives are actually the villages,

rice-fields and innocent civil populations of our country.

"The Royal Government earnestly desires international opinion and all peaceful countries to demand that the United States should put an end to its incessant terroristic attacks on Cambodia. It demands, furthermore, that the United States Government should furnish legitimate compensation for the damages suffered by the Khmer population."

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Huor Sambath
Permanent Representative of Cambodia
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9089

Letter dated 17 March 1969 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[17 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 16 March 1969 by the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations [S/9083].

In my letter to the Secretary-General of 10 March 1969 [S/9065], I drew attention to persistent armed attacks against Israel by regular and irregular forces from Jordan, necessitating measures of self-defence by Israel. These murderous attacks, and in particular the acts of violence carried out indiscriminately by terror organizations against the civilian population, have continued unabated.

On 15, 16 and 17 March 1969, Israel was compelled again to take action in self-defence. The targets were terror organization camps and bases situated in Jordan territory outside the centres of population. This in fact has been confirmed in press reports from

Jordan and especially in communiqués issued by the terror organizations themselves.

Tranquillity on the cease-fire line can be ensured and Israel defensive actions made unnecessary if the Jordanian authorities will stop harbouring the terror organizations in Jordan territory and assisting their activities against Israel in violation of the cease-fire. The Government of Jordan cannot escape its responsibility under the cease-fire for the continuation of terror warfare from its territory against Israel.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9090 AND ADD.1-3*

Letter dated 14 March 1969 addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia

[Original text: English]
[14 March 1969]

Upon instructions from our respective Governments, we have the honour to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to examine the deteriorating situation in Namibia.

Your Excellency and the members of the Security Council will recall that the General Assembly, by its resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, terminated the mandate of the South African Government to ad-

minister Namibia (South West Africa), and decided that "henceforth South West Africa comes under the direct responsibility of the United Nations". That resolution also reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the people of the Territory to self-determination, freedom and independence, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

It will also be recalled that the Security Council, in its resolution 246 (1968), recognized its special responsibilities towards the people and Territory of Namibia. In spite of the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, the Government of South

* Document S/9090/Add.1, dated 18 March 1969, indicated the addition of Cyprus, Ethiopia and Libya, document S/9090/Add.2, dated 19 March 1969, the addition of Mongolia and Turkey, and document S/9090/Add.3, dated 20 March 1969, the addition of Liberia, to the signatories of the letter.

Africa continues to maintain its occupation of the territory of Namibia, constituting a grave threat to international peace and security.

Having regard to General Assembly resolutions 2372 (XXII) of 12 June 1968 and 2403 (XXIII) of 16 December 1968, our Governments believe that it is incumbent upon the Security Council to examine urgently this grave situation and to take, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter, appropriate measures and action to enable the people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination and independence.

*Signed by the representatives of the following States
Members of the United Nations:*

Afghanistan	Chad
Algeria	Congo (Brazzaville)
Burundi	Congo (Democratic Republic of)
Cameroon	Cyprus

Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Ghana
Guinea
India
Indonesia
Ivory Coast
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mongolia
Morocco
Nepal
Niger
Nigeria

Pakistan
Philippines
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Somalia
Southern Yemen
Sudan
Syria
Togo
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United Arab Republic
United Republic of Tanzania
Yugoslavia
Zambia

DOCUMENT S/9091

Letter dated 18 March 1969 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[18 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 11 March 1969 by the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations [S/9073] enclosing a Tass News Agency statement dated 28 February 1969.

The relationship of the Tass statement to truth is illustrated by such pronouncements as, for instance, that "Israel forces opened artillery fire in the Suez Canal area", this after weeks of almost daily reports by the United Nations military observers circulated as Security Council documents, bluntly stating that it was the United Arab Republic forces which repeatedly opened fire.

That, however, is not the most sinister aspect of the Tass statement. Of the utmost gravity is the blanket approval expressed in it for the Arab terror warfare waged against Israel. The spurious attempt to legitimate this warfare is open encouragement to the Arab States to continue to violate the cease-fire and undermine further the prospects for peace through the initiation of and support for the terror operations. The terror operations being directed against Israel civilians, such a statement is an open invitation to murder for murder's sake.

The Soviet position on this was expressed without any embellishment in an article that appeared in *Pravda* on 27 February 1969, defending the terrorist attack on an Israel civil passenger aircraft at the Zürich airport. The entire civilized world had expressed its horror at this wanton attack against innocent men, women and children in a neutral country; and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in a statement issued on 18 February 1969, had called it a "dastardly" and "criminal act", which "Governments and peoples, re-

gardless of their political views, must condemn . . .". Instead of heeding the Secretary-General's call to all Governments to take all possible measures to prevent any repetition of these acts, the Soviet organ glamourizes them and in fact calls for more.

Associations of European anti-Nazi resistance fighters, and many others, including the Nobel Peace Prize winner for 1968, René Cassin, as well as the world Press, have condemned Arab terror warfare as similar to the Nazi murders of Jews. The Soviet Government, however, has associated itself with this despicable movement directed against the liberty and life of the Jewish people in Israel. It is a matter of common knowledge that the proclaimed objective of Arab terror warfare is the destruction of Israel.

The foregoing throws light on the persistently grim role of the Soviet Union in the continuation of Arab belligerency against Israel and in the adamant refusal of the Arab States to join with the Government of Israel in the quest after a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Had the Soviet Union desired to see the termination of the Arab war waged against Israel since 1948 and had it favoured the promotion of peace agreements between Israel and the Arab States as called for in the 22 November 1967 Security Council resolution [242 (1967)], it would not have come out in support of one of the principal factors which are today endangering the achievement of that objective.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef ТЕКОАХ
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9092

Letter dated 18 March 1969 from the representative of the United Arab Republic to the President of the Security Council

*[Original text: English]
[18 March 1969]*

I have the honour to bring to your urgent attention yet another premeditated act of aggression by the Israel occupying forces in the Suez Canal sector.

At 7.20 hours local time today, 18 March 1969, the Israel occupying forces opened sporadic fire from moving tanks on the east side of the Suez Canal in the Lakes area, which lasted about forty minutes. Our armed forces did not return the fire.

Despite the fact that our forces refused to be provoked, or maybe because of it, at 11.42 hours local time, the Israel occupying forces opened fire once again heavily, this time against Port Tawfiq and Suez. Our forces were compelled to return the fire, to protect the civilians and civilian installations which have constantly been the target of Israel shelling. A cease-fire was arranged in the Suez area at 13.20 local time. The exchange had lasted about two hours.

I have had occasion in my previous correspondence to underline the fact that the primary targets of Israel attacks against the United Arab Republic are civilian and economic installations situated in the Suez Canal sector. Today's attack was no exception. The concentrated shellings of such vital establishments denote clearly that they form part of a carefully planned policy aimed at the destruction of the urban and economic centres in this area, a fact that can only substantiate their premeditated nature.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Mohammed Awad EL KONY
Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/9093

Letter dated 18 March 1969 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

*[Original text: English]
[18 March 1969]*

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you, as a matter of urgency, that the United Arab Republic has again renewed its armed attacks on Israel.

Today, 18 March 1969, between 0600 and 0900 hours local time, United Arab Republic forces opened fire across the Suez Canal on Israel positions at a number of points south of the Bitter Lake. Fire was returned.

At approximately 1140 hours, the United Arab Republic forces opened an artillery assault on Israel positions in the area between Port Tawfiq and Al-Shat. Later, they extended the shelling to the sector south of the Bitter Lake. Artillery fire was returned.

The United Nations military observers proposed a cease-fire, to take effect at 1315 hours. The Israel forces accepted and complied on time. Egyptian fire continued, however, until 1325 hours.

At approximately 1335 hours, the United Arab Republic forces resumed artillery fire near the Firdan Bridge. By 1341 hours, all fire ceased. In the course of the Egyptian attacks, two Israel soldiers were wounded.

Today's Egyptian attack was a further manifestation of the policy of "preventive defence", by which the United Arab Republic tries to explain away its repeated acts of aggression against Israel.

The dangers inherent in this policy have already been brought to the attention of the Security Council in the debates held in September and November 1968 and in a number of letters addressed by me to the President of the Council.

The policy of premeditated "preventive" aggression was reiterated by the spokesman for the United Arab Republic Government, Mr. Zayyat, in a press conference on 13 March 1969 and in the letter addressed to you on the same day by the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations [S/9080].

Both gave improvements in the Israel defences on the east bank as one of the excuses for the Egyptian attacks. These defence installations are needed to protect the Israel forces, in view of the continued Egyptian attacks against them. Furthermore the Israel forces are at the Suez Canal in accordance with the cease-fire and the United Arab Republic is prohibited under the cease-fire from interfering with them.

I should also like to point out that the letter of the representative of the United Arab Republic, like other official Egyptian pronouncements, continues to distort the 22 November 1967 Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and Israel's attitude toward it. Moreover, the United Arab Republic has no right to single out any particular provision in that resolution and disregard

the others. The resolution is an integral whole and until the just and lasting peace for which it calls is attained, Israel forces will remain deployed on the Canal in accordance with the cease-fire. The cease-fire established by the Security Council and agreed to by Egypt is unconditional and the Council rejected all attempts to link it with the withdrawal of forces other than in the context of peace.

The breaches of the cease-fire perpetrated by the United Arab Republic forces in the Suez Canal area and the recent warlike statements by Egyptian representatives demonstrate again the United Arab Repub-

lic's aggressive intentions. These were unabashedly expressed by Egypt's Foreign Minister, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, on 15 March 1969, when he declared: "The Arab objective is the liberation of Palestine and not merely the liberation of the territories occupied in 1967. The military solution is the only sure solution."

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9094*

Letter dated 18 March 1969 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[19 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to confirmed reports on the entry and stationing of Iraqi armed forces in Syria.

It will be recalled that Iraq actively participated in the hostilities of June 1967; it has been evasive in respect of its acceptance of the cease-fire, as I had occasion to point out last in my letter of 18 November 1968 to the President of the Security Council [S/8902]; and it is continuing to maintain an expeditionary force on Jordanian territory in proximity to the cease-fire line, this force having taken part in aggressive breaches of the cease-fire against Israel and actively supported terror warfare against Israel.

The stationing of Iraqi forces in Syria aggravates the situation in the area, in particular in view of the absence of any assurance that these forces would observe the cease-fire.

My Government would accordingly appreciate it if you would obtain from the Government of Iraq an affirmation that Iraq accepts the Security Council cease-fire resolutions and that all Iraqi forces will respect the cease-fire.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7528.

DOCUMENT S/9095

Letter dated 19 March 1969 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[19 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 11 March 1969 by the Deputy Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations [S/9068], as well as to my earlier letter to the President of the Security Council of 7 February 1969 [S/8997].

Wherever violations of human rights take place, the conscience of all decent people will be aroused, and the Governments which represent them will feel a moral duty, arising out of a sense of international responsibility and human solidarity, as well as out of principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, to give expression to their views. This is particularly the case when the victims are defenceless individuals

or minority groups, who, through no fault of their own, are made scapegoats by the rulers of the country they live in for narrow purposes of domestic or foreign politics. When the persecutors invoke the name of a foreign country to buttress their false charges, that country has every right to defend its name. Moreover, that the truth should be known is in the interest of the entire international community.

What the Government of Iraq is trying to do is to ensure for itself a free hand to pursue its barbaric treatment of the Jews in Iraq by resisting international scrutiny of its gross misdeeds. It is understandable, therefore, that the deep and natural concern which these persecutions arouse among the Jewish com-

munities in the world, and notably in Israel, where the majority of Jews who fled from previous persecutions in Iraq have found refuge, should cause embarrassment to the Government of Iraq.

Discrimination and oppression of Jews in one country or another have always kindled feelings of profound anxiety among the Jewish communities throughout the world. Jews regard themselves as in duty bound to help fellow-Jews, particularly when other nations and peoples have failed or have been unable to come to their rescue, as was tragically demonstrated in recent decades in Europe and elsewhere. The State of Israel, as the Jewish State, follows and will continue to follow this noble and humane tradition.

This attitude has found understanding among nations that are concerned with the protection of human rights. These nations have also raised their voices to deplore the inhuman treatment of Jews by the authorities of Iraq.

The efforts of the Government of Iraq to shelter behind specious arguments and malicious legalisms

cannot win for it any reprieve from objective world opinion.

The treatment of the Jews in Iraq by the Government of Iraq reflects that Government's attitude towards Israel. The Government of Israel cannot remain silent when political hostility towards itself becomes a pretext for cruelty against Jews simply as Jews.

As for the conditions of the Arab inhabitants in the territories under Israel's administration, when the citizens of Iraq, Jews or non-Jews, begin to enjoy, even only partially, freedom of movement, freedom of thought and expression, and personal security as they are enjoyed by those Arab inhabitants, Iraq will have made great progress toward democracy and the respect for human rights required by the United Nations.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9096

Letter dated 18 March 1969 from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[19 March 1969]

I have the honour, on behalf of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, to draw the attention of the Security Council to the following decision taken by the Special Committee today on the current trial of twelve Africans in Pietermaritzburg.

"The Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa expresses its grave concern and indignation at the current trial of twelve Africans in the Natal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa under the notorious Terrorism Act of 1967 and the Suppression of Communism Act, which violate all canons of law and provide for death sentences.

"The Special Committee notes in particular:

"(a) That the twelve Africans are being tried for participation in the struggle for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all the people of South Africa—a struggle which has been recognized by the United Nations and world opinion as a legitimate struggle deserving support by the international community;

"(b) That this trial represents a further defiance by the racist Government of South Africa of resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council calling on that Government to abandon the inhuman policy of *apartheid* and the trials under arbitrary laws and release all persons imprisoned or restricted for their opposition to *apartheid*;

"(c) That this summary trial is being conducted under retroactive legislation, and that the identities of State witnesses are withheld;

"(d) That several of the accused and State witnesses had been captured in Southern Rhodesia by

the security forces of the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia and handed over to the South African Government, and kept for long periods in solitary confinement;

"(e) That police officers of the illegal racist minority régime of Southern Rhodesia have appeared as witnesses for the State; and

"(f) That one of the State witnesses, Mr. Dasinger Francis, testified in court that he had been held in solitary confinement for 421 days and had been mercilessly tortured by the police.

"The Special Committee recalls, in particular, that the General Assembly, in its resolution 2396 (XXIII) of 2 December 1968, expressed its grave concern over the ruthless persecution of opponents of *apartheid* under arbitrary laws and the treatment of freedom fighters who were taken prisoner during the legitimate struggle for liberation; condemned the Government of South Africa for its cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of political prisoners; called again for the release of all persons imprisoned or restricted for their opposition to *apartheid*; appealed to all Governments to intensify their efforts in order to induce the Government of South Africa to release all such persons and to stop the persecution and ill-treatment of opponents of *apartheid*; and declared that freedom fighters taken prisoner during the legitimate struggle for liberation are entitled to treatment as prisoners of war under international law, particularly the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949.

"The Special Committee considers the institution of this new trial as a challenge to the authority of the United Nations, as a step towards the aggravation of racial conflict and, indeed, as a further evidence of those inhuman acts resulting from the policies of

apartheid which have been recognized as a crime against humanity.

"The Special Committee therefore urgently appeals to all States to exert all efforts to secure an end to this trial and the unconditional release of the prisoners.

"Towards this end, it encourages the maximum efforts to inform world public opinion about this trial.

"It decides to draw the attention of the Security Council to this matter.

"It decides to transmit this communiqué urgently to the Commission on Human Rights, now meeting at Geneva."

(Signed) Abdulrahim ABBY FARAH

Chairman

*Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid
of the Government of the Republic of South Africa*

DOCUMENT S/9097

Letter dated 19 March 1969 from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English and French]
[20 March 1969]

In accordance with a decision taken by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples at its 661st meeting, on 19 March 1969, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the statement made by me concerning the question of Namibia at that meeting.

In accordance with the same decision, I have the honour to request you to bring to the attention of the Security Council the statements made by members of the Special Committee on the question at the above-mentioned meeting.

(Signed) Mahmoud MESTIRI

Chairman,

*Special Committee on the Situation
with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration
on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples*

STATEMENT ON THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA MADE BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMEN- TATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES AT ITS 661ST MEETING, HELD ON 19 MARCH 1969

Developments relating to Namibia which have occurred since early 1968 reveal a progressively deteriorating situation and give cause for grave concern. The Government of South Africa has not only persisted in its blatant defiance of the United Nations, of which it is a founding Member, by refusing to comply with the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and by continuing to deny to the people of Namibia their right to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), but it has taken further measures aimed at destroying the unity and territorial integrity of Namibia and incorporating that Territory within South Africa.

Despite the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its resumed twenty-second session and at its twenty-third session calling upon the Government of South Africa to comply with Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, that Government has persistently refused to relinquish its illegal control over the Territory or to allow the United Nations Council for Namibia to enter the Territory in order to discharge

the tasks assigned to it. The South African Government has also refused outright to implement the resolutions [245 (1968) and 246 (1968)] adopted unanimously by the Security Council in January and March 1968.

At the same time, the Government of South Africa has taken far-reaching measures in accordance with the recommendations of the notorious Odendaal Commission to extend its system of *apartheid* to Namibia and to partition the Territory by creating "Bantustans" or so-called "self-governing homelands" for the non-white population groups. In June 1968, in further violation of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), which stripped it of all authority in Namibia, South Africa enacted "legislation" providing for the creation of six of the proposed "homelands" and by the end of the year, it had already brought one of these, Ovamboland, into being. Measures recently taken to set up others have included the appointment of the first Herero Affairs Commissioner, further development of "Damaraland", and a plan for the forcible removal of the Nama inhabitants of Hoachanas to their "homeland".

At the same time that it is pushing forward with its plans for partitioning the Territory, South Africa has been accelerating the process of integrating the Territory into South Africa. After announcing its intentions with regard to the transfer of governmental functions in a White Paper issued in mid-1968, the South African Government later incorporated them in a bill which it moved for adoption by the South African Parliament in February 1969. Under the bill, known as "the South West Africa Affairs Bill, 1968", a major part of the administrative, legislative and financial powers currently vested in the Territory would be transferred to South Africa, thereby leaving to the local authorities essentially the same limited functions as those exercised by the provincial governments in South Africa. According to recent reports, the bill has passed its third reading in the South African Parliament and is expected to become effective on 1 April 1969. Also in February, another bill, entitled "the Land Bank Amendment Bill", was introduced in the South African Parliament; it provides for the incorporation of the Land and Agriculture Bank of South West Africa into the Land and Agriculture Bank of South Africa. Racial segregation in urban areas has also been progressively intensified, one particularly telling example being the forcible removal of the indigenous people from the Old Location in Windhoek to a new African township at Katutura.

It will also be recalled that, earlier, South Africa had extended the South African Terrorism Act, 1967, to the Territory, and that a group of Namibians, all members of the South West Africa People's Organization, were arrested in the Territory, deported to South Africa and, after a long detention, tried and convicted in Pretoria for alleged "terrorist activities" in violation of General Assembly resolution 2324 (XXII) and of resolutions 245 (1968) and 246 (1968) adopted unanimously by the Security Council. In further defiance of the authority of the United Nations, the Appellate Division of the South African Supreme Court at Bloemfontein in November 1968 rejected an appeal by 31 of these Namibians. The appellants based their appeal on the fact that all of South Africa's illegal actions referred to above, including the enactment of the Terrorism Act under which they had been charged, had occurred after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), which terminated the Mandate and declared that South Africa no longer had any authority in the Territory. They therefore claimed that South Africa's authority to legislate for the Territory had been nullified by the decision of the General Assembly.

In the absence of any legitimate redress, the people of Namibia have intensified their armed struggle to exercise their legitimate right to self-determination and independence. On several occasions between June and

December 1968, freedom fighters reportedly clashed with South African police, mainly in the Eastern Caprivi Strip. According to reports, as of October 1968, the South African police had killed 46 Namibians and arrested 117 others in operations there. As a result of the fighting, about 1,000 Africans from the area fled to Zambia and about 60 others sought asylum in Botswana. During the same month, South Africa's Minister of Police and of the Interior said in a speech that in anticipation of increased "terrorist" attacks from across its borders, the Republic was sending hundreds of policemen to help fight "terrorists" there.

In previous resolutions, the General Assembly has recommended that the Security Council should urgently take effective measures, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, to ensure the immediate withdrawal of the South African presence from Namibia, so as to enable the Territory to attain independence in conformity with General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2145 (XXI). Bearing in mind the increasing gravity of the situation in Namibia and taking into account the growing intransigence of the South African Government as regards the legitimate aspirations of the people of the Territory, the Special Committee considers that the Security Council should take urgent action in the spirit of the recommendations of the General Assembly.

DOCUMENT S/9098

Letter dated 19 March 1969 from the representative of the Ivory Coast to the Secretary-General

*[Original text: French]
[20 March 1969]*

In reply to your letter dated 8 January 1969 [S/8964], in which you appealed for voluntary contributions to provide the necessary financial support for the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operation in Cyprus, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Ivory Coast has decided to contribute the sum of \$30,000 for this purpose.

Kindly find attached a cheque for this amount made out to the United Nations.

I wish to take this opportunity to stress that this decision by my Government is wholly without prejudice to its position on the principle of the collective financial responsibility of Member States for the financing of peace-keeping operations.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter circulated as a Security Council document.

*(Signed) Siméon AKE
Permanent Representative of the Ivory Coast
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/9101

Letter dated 19 March 1969 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the President of the Security Council

*[Original text: Russian]
[21 March 1969]*

I have the honour to inform you herewith that the Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations has today, 19 March 1969, addressed a letter in the following terms to the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

"The Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the

United Nations and has the honour to state that it could not refrain from drawing attention to the fact the Secretary-General of the United Nations has sent his personal representative, Mr. Tamayo, to Equatorial Guinea with extensive powers, including the power to assist Equatorial Guinea in the solution of its differences with Spain, to help the parties in settling their difficulties peacefully and also in lessening the

tension in Equatorial Guinea. The fact that Mr. Tamayo has been given such powers has become known from a letter addressed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to His Majesty Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, on 10 March 1969 and published as a United Nations Secretariat press release on 11 March.

"In this connexion, the Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations considers it necessary to emphasize that under the United Nations Charter decisions on matters connected with action by the United Nations relating to the maintenance of international peace and security are taken by the Security Council.

"The Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations considers it necessary to recall that

the Soviet Union's position of principle regarding action of this kind relating to the maintenance of international peace and security has already been stated on previous occasions, particularly in the letter dated 27 August 1966 from the Permanent Representative of the USSR to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council [S/7478]."

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this letter of mine to be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Y. MALIK

Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9102*

Letter dated 21 March 1969 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General

[Original text: English]
[21 March 1969]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention serious and arbitrary measures taken by Israel against the Arab population under Israel occupation and in particular those living in Arab Jerusalem."

In the first week of this month, hundreds of innocent Jordanian citizens were detained arbitrarily and tortured; religious and secular leaders were arrested and imprisoned; schools were attacked and students brutally beaten; several houses were completely demolished.

In the cities and towns of Jerusalem, Nablus, Al-Khalil (Hebron), Gaza, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Beir Zeit, mass arrests were carried out. Information received today shows that a new wave of arrests has included larger groups of Arab women and teen-age girl students from Nablus, Gaza and Jerusalem. Mrs. Isam Abdul Hadi, President of the Palestine Women's Union, was also arrested and imprisoned. More than 250 persons, including elderly women, were imprisoned and tortured.

In an unprecedented move, the Israel authorities arrested the Anglican priest, the Reverend Elia Khouri, in Ramallah, and closed and sealed the Anglican Church there. People in all walks of life protested against this. Women in Jerusalem, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Beit Sahur took refuge in their churches and protested against such measures. Hunger strikes have taken place in churches and mosques in many other parts of the occupied territories.

Christian and Moslem leaders, some of whom were expelled from Jerusalem, have sent a cable to you on this question. The text of this cable is attached [see annex I below].

Dr. Nabih Muammer, the Director of the Makasid Philanthropic Hospital, situated on the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem, and the only surgeon of the hospital, whose services are indispensable, was also arbitrarily arrested and imprisoned.

Physicians at a meeting held in Makasid Hospital on 9 March 1969 issued a declaration condemning these and other Israel measures. The text of their declara-

tion and protest is also attached to this letter [see annex II below].

On 2 March 1969, two high school girls were attacked by Israel soldiers and the girls and teachers were savagely beaten. In the Ramallah Secondary School, a teacher lost consciousness and many girls were brutally beaten and injured. The scene in the Bethlehem Secondary School was similar. While holding a peaceful sit-in strike in their school, the girls were suddenly attacked by Israel soldiers and savagely beaten. The Secretary of the Municipal Council of Bethlehem and sixteen students were also beaten and imprisoned. The Mayor of Bethlehem protested vehemently to the Military Governor of this area.

Moreover, the destruction of Arab houses continues. In the first two weeks of this month, several houses were destroyed; six in Jerusalem, four in Gaza, four in Ramallah, three in Al-Khalil (Hebron), two in Nablus and one in Beir Zeit.

Teddy Kollek, whom the Israelis have illegally declared as the Mayor of Arab Jerusalem, expressed his satisfaction that the houses in "his" city were bulldozed rather than dynamited!

In Arab Jerusalem, Israel continues to put into effect further measures to consolidate its illegal annexation of the city. The citizens have expressed their rejection of such measures. Their latest protest and rejection were addressed to you; the original copy of this (in Arabic) and its translation are attached [see annex III below].

The expulsion of Jordanian citizens, especially young men, continues to be a corner-stone of Israel's policy towards the occupied Arab territories. On 4 March 1969, after one year of torture and imprisonment, seven young Palestinians were expelled. These were Hamdan Hamad, Ibrahim Hamad, and Suleiman Safadi of Rafah, Ibrahim Abu-Ismael and Yasser Suleiman of Khan Yunis, Mohammad Barakat of Gaza and Gabir Abu Farah of Jabalia refugee camp, Gaza.

You will recall that, in accordance with Security Council resolution 259 (1968), you have submitted a report [S/8851] informing the Security Council of Israel's refusal to comply with its resolution, and

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7531.

therefore, as you reported, you "have not been able to give effect to the decision of the Security Council". This report has not been discussed by the Council yet.

The above measures by Israel increase daily in intensity and cruelty. This fact makes the consideration of your report an urgent necessity, the more so since Israel, instead of complying with the request in Security Council resolution 237 (1967), "to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants", is tightening its grip on them.

No attitude of indifference should be allowed to prevail in the face of such criminal actions by Israel. Nor should the Israel policy of distortion and deceit be permitted to conceal the truth about the Israel occupation, which continues to pose a most serious challenge to the authority of the United Nations.

I have the honour to request that this letter and its annexes, together with the original text of the letter in Arabic and the signature that appear therein, be circulated as official documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

ANNEX I

Text of cable addressed to the Secretary-General by religious leaders

We, Christian and Moslem religious leaders in Jordan's capital [city], join voices of Moslem and Christian masses who stayed all today in mosques and churches in silent protest and solidarity against atrocities perpetrated by Israel authorities in our territories under occupation. We appeal to human conscience to put an end to Palestinian tragedy and take effective measures for return of Arab refugees and exiles to their native land. We strongly condemn repressive measures and policy of intimidation and expulsion applied against Arab inhabitants and directed lately against innocent ladies and schoolgirls. We demand full restoration of Arab rights and return to us of our Holy Places and shrines within an inseparable national unity for our Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on both banks [of the Jordan]. May we request Secretary-General to distribute this message to all United Nations delegations.

(Signed)

Archbishop DEADORAS

Sheikh Abdallah GOSHE

Archbishop ASSAF

Sheikh Abdelhamid SAYEH

Bishop SIMMAN

Sheikh Abdallah GALGHILY

ANNEX II

Declaration of 9 March 1969 of physicians against Israel arbitrary and illegal measures in Jerusalem

We, Arab physicians of Jerusalem, met in the Jordanian Government Hospital of Jerusalem on 9 March 1969 to state our position and declare our opinion, as a group which feels especial and humane responsibilities, particularly in the light of present circumstances and the dangerous events that affect our country, and decided to hold a sit-in strike for two days in the hospital to bring what has befallen us before world public opinion and to reject all illegal steps and measures taken by the Israel occupying authorities, which include:

1. Israel's illegal annexation of Jerusalem and other steps which followed for the unification of professional, economic and administrative activities against the wish and will of the people, not to mention its violations of international law and United Nations resolutions;

2. The confiscation of the newly-built Jordanian Government Hospital in Jerusalem's Sheikh Jarrah Quarter and its transformation to serve other purposes (Israel police headquarters);

3. The Israel Government's decision to close down the old hospital, the Blood Bank, the Government Medical Laboratories, the T.B. Sanitarium Centre and Department of Health and hence to obliterate all Arab medical services;

4. The arbitrary imprisonment of some Arab physicians and the expulsion of others, adversely affecting medical treatment in the occupied territories;

5. The imprisonment of Dr. Nabih Muammer, the Director and only surgeon of the Makasid Philanthropic Hospital on the Mount of Olives. Dr. Muammer's services are indispensable in the present circumstances.

We, as a group, feel very saddened that the occupying authorities proceed relentlessly with their arbitrary measures of detainment, imprisonment, intimidation and torture of thousands of citizens of all ages and groups, students (boys and girls), religious men, elderly men and women.

In holding our sit-in strike, we add our voices to others of our people who have preceded us, hoping that world public opinion and world institutions and people of free conscience, wherever they are, will stand by us and add their voices to ours. We are, after all, seeking truth, justice and peace.

ANNEX III

Text of protest by Arab citizens and organizations against measures taken by the Israel occupation authorities in Jerusalem

[The photostat copy of the protest submitted in Arabic, which was attached to the mimeographed version of the letter from the representative of Jordan, is not reproduced here; the English translation, supplied by him, is given below.]

We, the undersigned, representatives of different groups and sectors of Arab Jerusalem, strongly condemn the arbitrary and inhuman measures being practised by the Israel occupation authorities in violation of United Nations principles, international agreements and the Geneva and Hague Conventions.

Measures taken by the Israel occupation authorities with respect to Jerusalem, such as the unilateral annexation of the Holy City and its suburbs and the illegal legislation aimed at consolidating this annexation, the obliteration of the Arab character of the city, the replacement of expelled Arabs by Jewish settlers, and the confiscation of Arab land and property, are in utter disregard of relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions which called upon Israel to desist forthwith from taking any measure tending to change the status of Jerusalem. All these measures demonstrate Israel's disregard of world public opinion and of the principle of self-determination for the Arabs under occupation, as well as its expansionist intentions and ambitions in this area.

We note with increasing concern that the latest Israel legislation forces all professional persons, companies, societies, hospitals and other Arab institutions to register as Israel bodies. This is only one more attempt to liquidate the Arab character of Jerusalem, to transform it into a Jewish city as part of Israel's expansionist plans and thus to increase tension in the area.

We request you, and appeal to world conscience and freedom-loving people in all corners of the world, to stand by us in our just cause and fight to protect our entity against the Israel policy of liquidation. We further request you to help stop the Israel plans of aggression and expansion which is a prerequisite for a just peace in the area.

[Signatures of a number of Jerusalem dignitaries, professionals, leaders of women's organizations, societies and trade unions.]

**Letter dated 20 March 1969 from the representative of Equatorial Guinea
to the Secretary-General**

[Original text: Spanish]
[21 March 1969]

On 8 March 1969, Mr. Francisco Macías Nguema, President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, sent me the following cable:

"I hereby appoint you, as from 5 March 1969, to the post of Representative of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to the United Nations and to other organizations established in New York, United States. I am notifying your appointment to the Secretary-General of the United Nations."

I have the honour to inform you that in another cable dated Saturday, 8 March 1969, I confirmed to my President the fact that I was accepting the appointment and assuming the responsibilities of my post at the present time of historic reality for my country, representing it in the world Organization under your wise leadership.

I have read carefully and thoroughly all the statements issued thus far by the Spanish Ambassador to the United Nations in documents S/9035 dated 28 February 1969, S/9035/Add.1 dated 1 March 1969, S/9036 dated 1 March 1969, S/9036/Add.1 dated 3 March 1969, and S/9040 dated 4 March 1969. I have also read the articles published in the Press under the heading "Diplomatic circles", or, to put it more accurately, "Spanish diplomatic circles". My long silence may have been interpreted unfavourably, but the reason for it is obvious: I was waiting for an official appointment from my Government and direct information from the President. In a cable to the President of the Republic dated 3 March 1969, I wrote: "Send information urgently by cable concerning the present situation in the country."

On 10 March 1969, I received three cables from the President; the cable which is relevant in the present case reads as follows:

"The following account explains the situation and facts that gave rise to the state of conflict in Equatorial Guinea; you are to present this account and support it objectively before any and all organizations. In early February the Vice-President travelled from Santa Isabel to Bata and ordered the lowering of Spanish flag No. 6 among the flags of the Consul's residence in Bata. In mid-February His Excellency the President ordered that the said flag should be lowered. The Consul replied personally to the President, refusing to lower the flag without an order from Generalissimo Franco. On 26 February the President returned from the interior of the province to Bata and was informed that by order of the Spanish Ambassador and Consul all fuel supplies had been cut off, Spanish forces stationed in the entire territory had been ordered to remain in their quarters, Spanish forces were occupying the airport and post and telegraph offices, Spanish forces were patrolling the principal towns, the Spanish warship RFZE IPHCOB had left for Bata carrying troops, and Spanish forces stationed in the country had distributed more than 4,000 weapons of all kinds, together with ammunition, to the resident Spanish population. The Government of Equatorial Guinea was greatly surprised at these measures, which had been taken without provocation of any kind. The

Spanish forces subsequently fired on the completely defenceless [Equatorial] Guinean civil population. These facts were communicated to the Secretary-General and the Security Council of the United Nations. Spain was called upon to order the immediate withdrawal of its forces stationed in the country. The United Nations was asked to send peace forces."

I do not wish to contradict the statements of the Spanish Ambassador or to question, even for a moment, the veracity of Spain or of the Spanish Press; I merely ask you to read the statements and the above text of the cable from the President of the Republic: if anything is true, it is that the violent situation and the disorders which have developed in my country were provoked by the Spanish troops. The Spanish troops provoked the disturbances, and in accordance with Chapter VI, Article 33, of the Charter of the United Nations, the Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea and the Government of Spain must reach agreement to restore the peace and order violated by the Spanish troops. If they do not, the departure of the Spanish civil population will be no longer a mere evacuation but an exodus, resulting from Spanish provocations; what is more, owing to the colonial situation of the country, in which Spain has not invested any capital whatever, its economy will come to a standstill when the Spanish civil population leaves. Who will pay the wages of the thousands of workers left without employment? When the representative of Spain uses the word "humanitarian", it is not right for him to consider only the Spanish population.

While it is a fact that agreements exist, the fundamental point was that Spanish troops were to intervene only if the Government of the Republic requested it. Such was not the case. The Spanish troops provoked and brought about the disorders at Santa Isabel and Bata, and now the Spaniards would like to wash their hands of the matter; for this reason my Government has repeatedly asked for United Nations peace forces. Having analysed the situation, my Government directly accuses the Spanish forces of an act of aggression against the peace, sovereignty and integrity of the people of Equatorial Guinea.

On behalf of my Government, I wish to draw attention to the fact that the Spanish representative has distorted the events which took place, referring to them in the letter he addressed to you on 14 March 1969 [S/9082] as "incidents connected with internal policy". By arranging the exodus, Spain has shown its irresponsibility following an act of aggression against a completely defenceless people. I emphasize that these incidents began on 26 February at Bata, capital of the province of Río Muni, as a result of the colonial attitudes of the irresponsible Spanish troops stationed at Bata.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Thomas M. MALANGO
Permanent Representative of Equatorial Guinea
to the United Nations

**Letter dated 21 March 1969 from the representative of Spain
to the Secretary-General**

[Original text: Spanish]
[21 March 1969]

Further to my letter of 14 March 1969 [S/9082], I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the following cable which the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea sent today to the Spanish Head of State:

"Spanish administrative staff, military personnel, clergymen, private individuals, etc., having left my country, the latter is in a state of complete calm and order in spite of the criminal abandonment of all services and schools. In view of the constant provocations being committed by the Spanish forces stationed here, I hope that the evacuation of those forces will start on Sunday, 23 March, in conformity with the cable of 8 March from Mr. Castiella, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he stated that the Spanish forces would be completely evacuated within a period of fifteen days.

"In order to ensure tranquillity in the country, my people once again insists that the evacuation of the forces should start on 23 March, pursuant to the above-mentioned cable, with the assistance of military observers of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity."

In transmitting this cable to you, I cannot but express the profound astonishment with which my Government has received a communication which, apart from the inaccuracy to which I shall draw your attention below, indicates disregard of the steps which were being taken by your representative, Mr. Marcial Tamayo, and at the same time is flagrantly at variance with the undertaking entered into by the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea himself as recently as 18 March, when he agreed to the proposal addressed to him by Mr. Tamayo.

To substantiate what I have just stated, I am reproducing below the full text of the communication, dated 18 March 1969 at Santa Isabel, which Mr. Tamayo sent to the Spanish representative in Equatorial Guinea.

"I have the honour to inform you that, in order to ensure that a future withdrawal of the Spanish Civil Guard from the territory of Equatorial Guinea takes place without affecting the country's socio-economic position or its newly developing foreign policy, I have proposed to the President of the Republic that there should be a moratorium so as to permit the following steps to be taken:

"(a) Maintenance of the political *status quo* in view of the initial economic agreements, which have begun under the most auspicious circumstances and have already been approved by the President of the Republic (particularly the agreement calling for the establishment of a fund amounting to 100 million pesetas);

"(b) A study by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees of the situation which would arise in the event of the withdrawal of the troops leading to the departure of all plantation-owners and businessmen;

"(c) The accelerated dispatch of experts by the United Nations Development Programme;

"(d) The definite appointment of the Permanent Representative of Equatorial Guinea to the United Nations;

"(e) Consultation with the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the possibility of sending a military adviser to supervise the above-mentioned evacuation and also to assess the internal security situation resulting from the withdrawal of the Civil Guard.

"The moratorium would last for a period of two months, which could if necessary be reduced to a minimum of one month, while the co-operative arrangements referred to above were initiated.

"I am pleased to inform you that the President of the Republic has agreed to my proposal, taking a position which shows that he is concerned with ensuring the conditions essential to the tranquillity and well-being of Equatorial Guinea.

"I am certain that your Government will take the same position in the spirit of understanding which is characterizing this phase of the relations between the two countries."

With regard to the inaccuracy contained in the cable from the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea which is reproduced above, I wish to remind you that Security Council document S/9040 reproduces the text of the cable which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Equatorial Guinea on 4 March 1969. The following statement is made in this cable:

"In the existing circumstances, the Spanish Government has decided to withdraw for good its military forces of all kinds, which are to move out of Equatorial Guinea the moment the last Spaniard voluntarily electing to leave the territory has departed. We believe that a time-limit of fifteen days might be sufficient, if we have the co-operation we anticipate from the Government."

I should also like to remind you that Security Council document S/9056 reproduces the full text of the cable which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain sent on 8 March to the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea in his capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs—the previous Minister had been removed from office—in order that the President might have direct knowledge of the cable of 4 March to which I referred earlier. The cable of 8 March repeats exactly the sentence quoted above referring to the withdrawal of the Spanish forces present in Equatorial Guinea.

From the contents of these two cables you will have seen that the Spanish Government had resolved from the beginning of the current crisis to withdraw all its forces stationed in Equatorial Guinea and that the sole condition for the withdrawal was that all Spanish subjects wishing to leave the territory of Equatorial Guinea should be permitted to do so. Assuming that this logical request would be accepted and that the authorities of Equatorial Guinea would naturally wish to co-operate in view of their desire that the Spanish

forces should be withdrawn, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain considered that the whole of the operations could be accomplished within a time-limit of fifteen days. None of these communications contained any statement or promise that the withdrawal of the Spanish forces would begin on 23 March.

Since 8 March, your representative and the two observers sent by the Organization of African Unity have reached Equatorial Guinea. At the suggestion of these two observer missions, and in order to facilitate as much as possible the smooth and orderly replacement of the Spanish technicians who by their presence had been assisting the Government of Equatorial Guinea, the Spanish Government agreed to consider closely and in the highest spirit of friendship a prolongation of the present *status quo*, including the opening of economic negotiations with the Government of Equatorial Guinea for the purpose of providing that Government with suitable economic assistance enabling it to cope with the more urgent problems confronting it at the present time. The response to this spirit of friendship and these negotiations was the communication of 18 March from Mr. Marcial Tamayo to the Spanish representative, quoted above. The Spanish Government's intention was to attempt to overcome the difficulties which had arisen as a consequence of internal political struggles and of the lawlessness which caused, apart from numerous victims in the governing circles of Equatorial Guinea, the death of a Spanish national and the ill-treatment, harassment and imprisonment of many other citizens of my country. My Government was prompted by a desire to look to the future in order to find means, within its possibilities, of continuing the assistance, support and co-operation which it was always prepared to extend to Equatorial Guinea if the Government of that country so wished. It was never the thought of the Spanish Government to create a difficult situation for Equatorial Guinea, a country with which it feels most intimately associated.

Nevertheless, the attitude adopted by the Government under the Presidency of Mr. Francisco Macías and the request set forth in the above-quoted cable received today by the chief of the Spanish State compel my Government to take a final decision to withdraw the public security forces forthwith, following the departure of all Spanish citizens wishing to leave. My Government is accordingly prepared to begin the evacuation on 23 March if the appropriate officials you may send to supervise the evacuation can be present in Equatorial Guinea by that date. In this connexion, my Government is today approaching the Organization of African Unity in order that that Organization may also send the observers it deems proper, in accordance with the request which the President of the Republic himself addressed to the Chief of the Spanish State. I trust that the presence of these officials may facilitate the smooth and orderly departure of all Spaniards who wish to leave the territory of Equatorial Guinea and all the Spanish public security forces which are present in the country at the request of its Government and in accordance with the Transitory Agreement in force between the two countries.

In drawing to your attention the urgency with which my Government views the arrival of the appropriate officials you may send, I should like to reiterate the decision taken by my Government that the evacuation should begin the moment these officials arrive and to inform you that the Spanish Government accordingly sees no difficulty in having the evacuation begin, with the co-operation of the authorities of Equatorial Guinea, on 23 March 1969.

I should be grateful if you would have this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Jaime DE PINIÉS
*Permanent Representative of Spain
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/9105

Letter dated 22 March 1969 from the representative of Spain to the Secretary-General

[Original text: Spanish]
[22 March 1969]

In my letter of 21 March 1969 [S/9104], I informed you of the unexpected attitude which the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea has adopted, going back on the undertakings given to your representative, as can be seen from the letter Mr. Tamayo sent to the Chargé d'affaires of the Spanish Embassy in Equatorial Guinea on 18 March, which I quoted in my letter of 21 March.

This extraordinary attitude, which is contrary to all international custom, has now been confirmed by the letter full of falsehoods sent to you by the representative of Equatorial Guinea on 20 March 1969 of which I have learnt today as a result of its circulation as Security Council document S/9103.

I greatly regret the fact that, just when Mr. Tamayo's efforts seemed close to producing an understanding and when the Spanish Government was ready to consider sympathetically the continuation of technical and economic assistance to Equatorial Guinea, the Government of that country should arbitrarily have destroyed

the possibility of co-operation and resorted to the facile procedure of putting out a whole series of statements contrary to the truth, which I find it my painful duty to deny. In order to do so, I have to go into matters and details which my Government would have preferred to pass over, because of the friendly feelings that it continues to have for the people of Equatorial Guinea.

The document to which I refer attributes the articles published in the Press to Spanish diplomatic circles. I quote below short extracts from the reports put out by the international agencies France Presse, Reuter and United Press International and a brief account of the reports or comments published by various non-Spanish journals which have dealt with the subject. My delegation would not have wished to publicize this material, but cannot remain silent in the face of the document in question.*

*Translator's note. All the following quotations from the Press have been translated from Spanish.

France Presse:

(7 March 1969). "Scenes of brutality are to be witnessed, however, both at Fernando Póo and at Santa Isabel. Bands of youths humiliate and beat the Whites they come across."

(11 March 1969). "The seven correspondents who returned on Monday night saw the lynching of an African the day before yesterday at the very gates of the Presidential Palace in Bata." "No Spanish woman questioned has admitted to being raped, but some of them have been stripped and subjected to jeering and harassment. A sixty-five-year-old woman was stripped completely in Bata and made to dance the cha-cha-cha in this condition for the amusement of a group of [Equatorial] Guinean youths. Others have had to sweep the street in front of their houses in the same state. Some correspondents got the impression that some of the women who had been ill-treated were too ashamed to admit they had been raped. Many residents of Bata have been severely beaten by groups of African youths." "It is still risky for a White to go about the streets of Bata alone. The situation is better in Santa Isabel, but there have also been cases of brutality in that city."

(13 March 1969). "Mrs. Ndong, widow of Félix Mounié, the former leftist leader in Cameroon, was raped and severely ill-treated by members of the [Equatorial] Guinean youth movement after her husband's attempted *coup d'état*. Mrs. Ndong was dragged naked and bleeding through the streets of Bata."

Reuter:

(6 March 1969). The following statement is attributed to the United Kingdom Vice-Consul in Santa Isabel, Mr. Sidney Dunne: "This was at one time a peaceful and tranquil paradise and now it is practically anarchy."

(8 March 1969). "It is reported that bands of armed youths have been roaming the streets, attacking Whites."

(9 March 1969). Mr. Tarnowski, the Reuter correspondent, says: "It is calculated that some 2,000 Spaniards have fled since the anti-Spanish disturbances which took place following the violent speeches against the Spaniards in the territory made by President Macías".

United Press International:

(15 March 1969). Referring to the [Equatorial] Guinean youth organizations, this agency states: "They told me that they were responsible for beating almost all the white men in Río Muni."

La Tribune de Genève:

(5 March 1969). This publication states, among other things: "The impassioned speeches made by Macías in Río Benito seem to have been the spark that set off the anti-White disturbances, leading to the death of a Spanish youth and the burning of a Spanish flag in Bata."

Le Figaro:

(7 March 1969). Referring to the [Equatorial] Guinean youth organizations, this publication states: "These organizations have been much in evidence

since the beginning of the crisis by reason of their attacks on white men."

Le Monde:

(9 March 1969). (Editorial) "The fact is that the appearance in the streets of this city (Bata) and in Santa Isabel of armed members of the [Equatorial] Guinean youth organizations loyal to Fernando Macías has resulted in an exodus of Europeans, who consider that their safety is no longer guaranteed."

Time (magazine):

(21 March 1969). "Political unrest, combined with the growing anti-Spanish attitude of Macías, has been sufficient to persuade more than 2,000 Spaniards to leave the country."

Document S/9103 states that the representative of Equatorial Guinea cabled the President of the Republic on 3 March 1969 asking for information and did not receive a reply until 10 March. Thus, for seven days the Government of Equatorial Guinea did not see fit to keep its representative to you informed, despite the fact that during that time people were dying violent deaths in Equatorial Guinea, including Mr. Malango's own predecessor.

The document in question reproduces a cable from President Macías, dated 10 March, containing a series of accusations which had already been rejected in my notes. Nevertheless, I consider it necessary to remind you that the Spanish police forces in Equatorial Guinea are there at the request of the Government of that country and under the Transitional Agreement signed by President Macías himself after the country had attained independence.

I should also like to remind you that since 10 March, the date of President Macías' cable to his representative, Mr. Malango, your representative and two observers for the Organization of African Unity, in addition to many foreign journalists invited by the President of the Republic, have been in Equatorial Guinea; none of them has published the least information which could support these charges.

Document S/9103 goes on to state that there was no provocation on the Equatorial Guinean side. With reference to this, I wish to point out that, quite apart from the unfortunate events referred to above, which have been widely publicized by international information media, at the end of December 1968, the President of the Republic, on a political tour in the province of Río Muni, made a series of speeches full of threats and violence against the Spaniards who were working isolated in the forest; that those statements were followed by the arbitrary dismissal of a number of Spanish officials, whose current accounts were blocked; that, from February 1969 onwards, the Spaniards have been subjected to constant threats and ill-treatment which have terrorized them; that when the Spanish Ambassador protested against this situation to the President of the Republic on 11 February, the President himself answered that "his Government did not have control in Río Muni."

I regret to have to remind you that Mr. Juan José Bima, a Spanish subject, was murdered in the neighbourhood of Río Benito.

Another matter referred to in the document in question is the exodus of the Spanish population. I regret once again to have to remind you that violent speeches

by the President of the Republic, persecution, beating to death in public, disorder, arbitrary arrest and the disappearance of the established constitutional order are not the most suitable means of trying to thwart the desire of some terrorized persons who wish to seek safety for their lives outside the territory of Equatorial Guinea. Those who are fleeing are people the great majority of whom have devoted their whole lives to Equatorial Guinea and on leaving find themselves obliged to abandon all their property.

As regards the violent situation and disorder that has occurred in Equatorial Guinea, I should point out that, in the struggle for power which took place in the country and which led to the death of some Equatorial Guinean political leaders, the President of the Republic organized bands of so-called juvenile militia, which, having been armed, created all kinds of disorder and violence, being beyond the control of the authorities themselves. The international agencies have published full reports of these facts, reports which I have cited earlier.

In connexion with these disorders, I should like to inform you that, at an audience given by the President of the Republic on 11 March 1969, at which your representative, Mr. Tamayo, and the representative of my Government, Mr. Pan de Soraluece, were present, the chief executive of Equatorial Guinea explicitly acknowledged the correct behaviour of the Spanish forces.

It is strange, moreover, that Mr. Malango, after complaining of the exodus of the Spanish population, should also complain that with their departure the economic life of the country is coming to a standstill, when shortly before he asserted that Spain had not invested any capital whatever in Equatorial Guinea. Apart from that, the exodus has not in any way been encouraged by the Spanish Government, as is shown by the many approaches made to the President of the Republic, requesting the minimum guarantees which would have made it possible for the Spaniards to remain and the efforts made to that end by your representative, Mr. Tamayo, unfortunately without avail.

I doubt, moreover, whether the people of Equatorial Guinea would support the statement that Spain has not put any capital into their country when it is obvious that Equatorial Guinea's deficit economy could only have maintained the degree of development it has reached, which is one of the highest in the area, through the large annual subsidy paid by Spanish taxpayers, which was to continue under the Transitional Agreements.

In my letter to you of 14 March [S/9082], I spoke of incidents connected with internal policy, without wishing to go into them in detail out of consideration for the Government of Equatorial Guinea, but since the representative of that country accuses me of distorting the facts, I find myself obliged to remind you

that it was the President of the Republic himself who cabled you [see S/9047] about a failed *coup d'état* and the dismissal of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ndongo. I should also like to add that, following this so-called *coup d'état*, Mr. Ndongo was seen badly hurt in a courtyard of the Palacio de Gobierno in Bata, his subsequent fate being unknown; that Mr. Saturnino Ibongo, member of the Assembly of the Republic and representative of the President to you, has died in prison; that the Mayor of Santa Isabel, Mr. Armando Balboa, junior leader of the Monalige Party, to which Mr. Malongo belongs, has also died in prison; that the President of the Assembly and President of the Monalige Party, Mr. Pastor Toras, has been arrested; that Mr. Enrique Gori Molubela, Vice-President of the Provincial Council of Fernando Póo, Diplomatic *Chef de Cabinet* of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and leader of the delegation of Equatorial Guinea at the twenty-third session of the United Nations, is in prison, apparently badly hurt; that Dr. Gustavo Watson, former Councillor for Health and an important figure in another political group, is also under arrest; and that according to information in the non-Spanish Press, there are over 200 political prisoners in an uncertain situation in the country's prisons. These facts would seem to justify my discreet reference to the existence of internal problems in my letter to you of 14 March.

Finally, I should like to draw your attention to the insult to the Spanish police forces, whose presence was requested by the Government of Equatorial Guinea itself. They are accused of aggression, disorder and irresponsible conduct, when in fact, setting an example difficult to maintain, they have remained in their quarters, in an orderly and peaceful way, despite the constant provocation implicit in this insult and the treatment given their fellow-countrymen.

Nevertheless, my Government wishes to express its friendship for the people of Equatorial Guinea and is confident that their internal difficulties can be overcome. At all events, I wish, on behalf of my Government, to draw your attention to document S/9104, announcing the decision to withdraw the Spanish police forces for good, after those Spanish subjects who voluntarily choose to leave the country have done so.

I hope that the internal differences of the people of Equatorial Guinea will be quickly settled, so that the spirit of friendship and concord which has always prevailed between our two countries can be restored.

In order to answer the accusations made by the representative of Equatorial Guinea, I should be grateful if you would arrange for this letter to be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Jaime DE PINIÉS
Permanent Representative of Spain
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9106

Letter dated 24 March 1969 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[24 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your urgent attention a new series of premeditated acts of aggression committed by the

armed forces of the United Arab Republic against Israel in the Suez Canal sector, today, 24 March 1969.

At approximately 0630 hours local time, a mortar

shell was fired from the Egyptian positions across the canal on Israel forces in the Bitter Lake area. The Israel forces refrained from returning the fire.

At approximately 0850 hours, artillery fire was opened by the United Arab Republic forces across the Canal on Israel forces at several points in the section between the Bitter Lake and Port Tawfiq. Artillery fire was returned in self-defence.

At 0905 hours, the United Nations military observers proposed a cease-fire to take effect at 1000 hours. Israel accepted and complied, but the Egyptian attack continued and at 1009 hours was extended also to the area about 10 kilometres north of Port Tawfiq. Fire was returned in self-defence.

After a lull between 1040 and 1055 hours, an artillery assault was initiated by the United Arab Republic in the area of Kantara and the Firdan Bridge, and increased within half an hour to a massive artillery bombardment spreading along the Canal from Kantara to Port Tawfiq. Fire was returned. A new cease-fire was arranged, through the United Nations military observers, for 1200 hours. By 1210 hours the firing ceased and quiet prevailed.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef ТЕКОАН
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9108

Letter dated 24 March 1969 from the representative of the United Arab Republic to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[24 March 1969]

I have the honour to bring to your urgent attention another serious attack committed by the Israel occupying forces against the Suez Canal sector.

At 6.30 hours local time, an Israel moving tank opened quick fire on our forces in the southern section of the Lakes area. The fire was not returned.

Again at 8.40 hours local time, the Israel occupying forces opened fire heavily in the vicinity of Suez and Port Tawfik, using artillery and tank guns. This time our armed forces returned the fire in order to put an end to this latest Israel act of aggression.

It is to be stressed in this connexion that the Israel occupying forces, instead of complying with the request of the military observers for a cease-fire, which had been arranged for 10.00 hours local time, persisted with their attack, intensified their heavy shelling and extended the area of engagement to the north, reaching Ismailia, Deversoir and Toson. At 11.00 hours local time, the Israel assault was still under way. The military observers had no other alternative but to arrange

for a second cease-fire, which was effective at 12.15 hours local time.

I hardly need to elaborate at any length on the targets of this most recent Israel onslaught, for it is by now an open secret that one of the cardinal points in the Israel military strategy and a salient feature of the Israel policy as a whole is to cause the maximum damage to the civilian population, and to destroy as many civilian installations as can be reached in the area. At present, the Port of Suez seems to be their prime target, as can be ascertained by the damage caused to a vessel flying the Panamanian flag moored in the harbour.

I would be grateful if this letter were circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohamed EL Kony
Permanent Representative of the
United Arab Republic
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9109

Letter dated 24 March 1969 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[25 March 1969]

Further to my letter to you of today, 24 March 1969 [S/9106], I have the honour to inform you that United Arab Republic forces have continued their acts of aggression in the Suez Canal sector.

The cease-fire arranged through the United Nations military observers for 1200 hours local time was repeatedly breached at 1223, 1225 and 1235 hours, when Egyptian artillery opened fire south of Lake Timsah. The Israel forces refrained from replying.

The purpose behind these repeated aggressions has been openly explained in official Egyptian declarations as serving a calculated policy of the United Arab Republic designed to undermine the cease-fire. That this policy is being continued and that today's attack is

another manifestation of it, finds confirmation in the editorial by Mr. Husnein Haikal, President Nasser's spokesman in *Al-Ahram* of 21 March 1969, wherein it is stated that the United Arab Republic is aiming to release itself from the cease-fire commitment.

Referring to the cease-fire as made necessary at the time as the consequence of the six-day war, Haikal wrote that the jettisoning of the disengagement between the forces of the two sides was the best guarantee for the pursuit of the moral and material mobilization necessary for the continuation of the war. He went on to explain that it was necessary to initiate incidents so as to turn the situation into an international crisis: "The rejection of disengagement has been and still is the way to place world opinion in a state of continuous

alarm and to impress upon its attention the seriousness of the Middle East crisis."

In the light of this, there is hardly any need to emphasize that violation of the cease-fire is a planned and deliberate policy on the part of the United Arab Republic.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9110

Letter dated 25 March 1969 from the representative of Syria to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[25 March 1969]

Upon instructions from my Government, and following my letters of 25 February 1969 [S/9028] and 4 March 1969 [S/9041] concerning the premeditated criminal air attack by Israel on the morning of 24 February last against purely civilian targets, notably El-Hammah and Maisaloun, I have the honour to list below the names of the Syrian civilian victims killed and wounded, including children and women, as a result of that attack.

CHILDREN KILLED

Name	Age
Fouad Ahmad Saleh	4
Hayysam Mustafa Sardar	5
Eeitaf Mustafa Sardar (girl)	8
Fatimah Ahmad Jassoumah (girl)	11
Rajae Ahmad Saleh 6.....	1½
Bassam Mustafa Sardar	14

ADULTS KILLED

Name	Age	Occupation
Mouhammad Adyb Almassry	28	Teacher
Hassan Mouhammad Souleyman ..	24	Worker
Aabdoh Ahmad Rahym	19	Worker
Nazyh Mouhammad Hawwary	25	Worker
Mouhammad Ibn Kamel Nahhass..	27	Worker
Aabdul Majyd Mouhammad Tak- ryty	30	Worker
Dawood Ismail Qassem	22	Worker
Fawzy Ibn Aaly Abou Dhyqah (Lebanese nationality)	27	Worker
Yessra Ahmad Karym (female) ..	40	

SERIOUSLY INJURED

Name	Age	Occupation
Mauwaffaq Ben Mouhammad Ezzat Tarjouman	30	Worker
Housny Ibn Aaly Qamar	28	Worker
Fawziah Bint Ismail Zakaria (female)	25	Worker
Bashar Ibn Mouhammad Zoulghina Dr. George Ghaybah and his young daughter, who is on the critical list (Lebanese nationality)	7	Physician
Mouhammad Mehdy Ibn Houssny Alnahhass	33	Worker
Maemoun Mouhammad Sayrawan..	25	Worker
Tayysyr Ibn Youssef Joumeeah ...	28	Worker

SERIOUSLY INJURED (continued)

Name	Age	Occupation
Ahmad Ibn Mouhammad Albou- Qaei	25	Worker
Ahmad Mouhammad Kawwarah ..	40	Worker
Moustafa Ibn Mohammad Sardar ..	60	Worker
Saiid Ibn Ahmad Saleh	42	Worker
Shafyq Mouhammad Aaly Hhijazy	27	Worker
Yassyn Mouheddine Barakat	45	Worker
Mouhammad Salyn Ibn Saiid Altabk	28	Worker
Eousamah Mouhammad Rashad Albaba	14	Student
Mouwaffaq Ibn Ahmad Saleh	7	Student
Wafae Bint Ahmad Qassem (girl)	10	Student
Ahmad Ibn Aaly Mouhayysen	24	Civil servant
Aaly Ibn Ahmad Salloum	31	Civil servant
Ghassan Ibn Salym Abou Khalifah	26	Civil servant
Mahmoud Ahmad Alzein	27	Civil servant
Khayriah Bint Ismail Kyky (female)	42	Civil servant
Salimah Bint Khaled Ghayyadh (female)	35	Civil servant
Aazyzah Bint Khaled Ghayyadh (female)	16	Civil servant
Ahmad Aabdul Mounceim Alrahym	44	Peasant
Faryzah Hamdan Altaqwa	45	Housewife
Souad Ahmad Aabdul Mounceim Alrahym (female)	15	Student
Nazek Ahmad Aabdul Mounceim Alrahym (female)	13	Student
Rihab Ahmad Aabdul Mounceim Alrahym (female)	12	Student
Basimah Ahmad Aabdul Mounceim Alrahym (female)	9	Student
Halah Ahmad Aabdul Mounceim Alrahym (female)	5	Student
Randah Aabdul Mounceim Alra- hym (female)	3	
Mouhammad Khayr Aabdul Mou- neeim Alrahym	1½	
Mouwaffaq Ibn Mahmoud Bakry Alkhatat	3	
Aavdyl Razzaq Salloum	16	Student
Basimah Mustafa Sardar (female)	12	Student

There could be no more revealing expression of Israel bestiality than this inhuman attack on the civilian population. This savagery conforms with the paranoiac Israeli "strategy", shamelessly and deceptively labelled "active self-defence", which is nothing less than active unlimited attack against innocent children, women and men

as substantiated by General Odd Bull's report of 27 February 1969 [S/7930/Add.126] and indeed as arrogantly recognized by the Israel representative in his letter of 28 February 1969 [S/9033], in which he stated: "On the morning of 24 February 1969, Israel took air action in self-defence to disable two el-Fatah bases in Syrian territory".

It is the duty of the civilized community to avoid double standards in judgement and to remind the leaders

of Israel that, under contemporary international law, they are as accountable for their war crimes and crimes against humanity and peace as their Nazi predecessors.

I would request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH
Permanent Representative of Syria
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9111

Letter dated 25 March 1969 from the representative of Syria to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[26 March 1969]

Acting upon instructions from my Government, and with reference to the letter from the representative of Israel of 18 March 1969 [S/9094], on what he termed "the entry and stationing of Iraqi armed forces in Syria", which he qualified as aggravating the situation in the area, I have the honour to state the following.

1. Ever since its premeditated war of aggression against the Arab countries in June 1967, and its occupation of territories belonging to three Arab States, Israel has flagrantly pursued a policy of oppression and eviction of Arab residents of the occupied territories, in violation of the United Nations Charter and of all international obligations. Furthermore, its regular armed forces continue their premeditated aggressive attacks against Arab countries, irrespective of whether the objectives are civilian or military.

2. The leaders of Israel do not conceal their aggressive designs, arrogantly stating their determination to maintain their occupation and annexation of Arab territories, while others among them call for still further occupation of Arab lands. Indeed, to mention only the latest example, Mrs. Golda Meir, in her first statement as the new Israel Prime Minister, spoke of "such natural borders of Israel as the Golan Heights, captured from Syria, and Sharm el-Sheik, the former Egyptian outpost" (see *The New York Times*, 19 March 1969). On 13 March 1969, Major-General David Elazar, commander of the so-called "northern sector", i.e. the occupied Syrian Golan heights, told a Keren Hayesod-United Jewish Appeal meeting that "the future of the occupied Golan heights would be determined by the presence of Jewish settlement rather than by the presence of Israel soldiers in the region", adding that "only the establishment of settlements would give the

area a Jewish identity" (see the Jewish Telegraphic Agency's *Daily News Bulletin*, 14 March 1969). Menahem Begin, the present Minister without portfolio and leader of the Herut Party, said: "Both sides of the Jordan form a historical and a geographical unit."

3. The Arab Governments have submitted to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council letters containing Israel official statements proving decisively that Israel intends to commit new aggressive acts against the Arab States.

4. The Arab States are exercising their legitimate right of self-defence against the imminent danger from Israel threatening the very existence of their peoples and their future. This right of self-defence is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and is recognized by international law. Consequently, suffering as they are from a continued, ruthless occupation and the threat of further expansion by Israel they are justified in co-ordinating their own defence, in accordance with the Arab common defence pact.

5. The Syrian Government holds Israel responsible for any aggressive act it may undertake against Syrian territory and considers itself in duty bound to warn against the imminent danger. This is the more so since the world by now has become used to Israel allegations and falsifications on the international level as a prelude to aggression against the Arabs.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) George J. TOMEH
Permanent Representative of Syria
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9113

Letter dated 26 March 1969 from the representative of Jordan to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[26 March 1969]

Further to my letters of 16 and 17 March 1969 [S/9083, S/9085] concerning active Israel aggression against civilian centres in Jordan, I have the honour to inform you that today, 26 March 1969, Israel jet fighters brutally attacked Jordanian villages and civilian centres in the area of Es Salt.

At 14.30 hours local time, Israel jets attacked rest houses and winter resorts in Ein Hazar, one kilometre

from Es Salt City. These resorts are frequently visited by civilian citizens. The main roads connecting the villages around Es Salt and the city itself were also raided, bombed and strafed. Heavy bombs and rockets were used.

As a result of these Israel attacks and from information received from my Government so far, 17 civilians were killed and 25 wounded, three of them

seriously. Among those killed was an entire family from the Kuloob tribe, two students walking on their way back from school and a 12-year-old boy.

Many of the casualties were elderly women and children. Six houses and a number of trucks were destroyed. The attacks caused serious and heavy damage to the main roads linking the villages to the city of Es Salt. One of the Israel rockets left a 10-metre-deep pit. Some have not exploded.

In my letter to you dated 16 March [S/9083], I reminded the Council that "if the use by Israel of napalm and other destructive weapons, in brutal defiance of the United Nations cease-fire resolution, is allowed to go unchecked, the Israelis will continue to

embark upon more violations and acts of aggression". Today, the Israelis executed another grave attack, causing heavy loss of life and damage to property.

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider these continuous and grave violations by Israel and to adopt more adequate and effective measures to check Israel acts of aggression and restore international peace and security.

May I request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9114

Letter dated 27 March 1969 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[27 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government, and further to my letter of 17 March 1969 [S/9089], I have the honour to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the complaint of grave and continual violations by Jordan of the cease-fire, the provisions of the United Nations Charter, and of international law, including:

(a) Armed attacks, armed infiltration and acts of murder and violence by terrorist groups operating from Jordan territory with the official support, aid and encouragement of the Jordanian Government and armed forces;

(b) Firing across the cease-fire lines by Jordanian forces, and in particular the wanton shelling of Israel villages.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef TEKOAH
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9117

Letter dated 26 March 1969 from the representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: French]
[27 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government, and further to my letter of 14 March 1969 [S/9088], I have the honour to communicate to you the following, for the information of the members of the Security Council.

On 21 February 1969, at about noon, a vedette boat carrying units of the United States-South Viet-Name forces penetrated Cambodian territorial waters up to a point situated about 1,500 metres from the village of Koh Chanlos, commune of Russey Srok, district of Kompong Trach (Kampot). There they seized the Cambodian fishermen with their fishing gear and took them by force into South Viet-Nam.

On the night of 22-23 February after midnight, four helicopters of the United States-South Viet-Name forces violated Cambodian air space over the commune of Bavet, district of Svay Teap (Svay-Rieng). They attacked the Cambodian defence positions with rocket and machine-gun fire wounding a member of the Provincial Guard.

On 23 February, at about 9 a.m., some ten M.113 armoured vehicles of the United States-South Viet-Name forces entered the commune of Prasat, district of Chantrea (Svay-Rieng). They remained there for a few minutes before withdrawing into South Viet-Nam.

On the same day, at about 9.30 p.m., cannon and mortars were fired from posts of the United States-South Viet-Name forces at Gau Dau Ha and Moc Bai on the public buildings at Bavet, causing the following material damage, namely one Customs and Excise warehouse burned and one Royal Police billet damaged.

On 25 February at about 9 p.m., the Cambodian posts at Bavet were again subjected to attacks, made with mortars and automatic by units of the United States-South Viet-Name forces at the Moc Bai post. Three Khmer soldiers were wounded in the attack, and two of them are in serious condition.

On 4 March, at about 6 p.m., units of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces from the Thanh Tri post fired mortars on the Buddhist monastery of Prey Vor, situated about 1,600 metres from the Khmer-South Viet-Nameese border, in the commune of Thmei, district of Kompong Rau (Svay-Rieng). Two of the buildings belonging to the monks were damaged and a boy was seriously wounded in the attack. He succumbed after being evacuated to a hospital.

On 7 March, at about 6.25 a.m., units of the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces based in South Viet-Nam at a point opposite the Cambodian commune of Bavet resumed harassment by mortar fire of the Cambodian post of Bavet-Krom, seriously wounding five members of the Cambodian defence forces.

The names of the five are as follows: Mao Mok, Quartermaster-Sergeant; Hul Tin, Private First Class;

Uy En, Private Second Class; Pich Lon, Private Second Class; Neou Nay, Private Second Class.

The Royal Government of Cambodia has protested vigorously and with indignation against the repeated violations of Cambodian territory and the acts of provocation deliberately committed by the United States-South Viet-Nameese forces against Cambodia. It has demanded that the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Viet-Nam should take immediate steps to have the Cambodian fishermen released, prevent the repetition of such hostile acts, and compensate the victims.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this communication circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Huot Sambath
Permanent Representative of Cambodia
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9118*

Letter dated 27 March 1969 from the representative of Iraq to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[27 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 19 March 1969 by the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations [S/9095].

Apart from repeating the usual Israel presumptions, the letter does not amount to more than an exercise in rhetoric. However, the gross falsifications with which the letter is so abundantly imbued make it imperative to set the record straight again.

1. The very first statement in the letter, to the effect that "wherever violations of human rights take place, the conscience of all decent people will be aroused", immediately rules Israel out as qualified to take any stand on human rights. Nor does it appear that Israel is moved by the reaction of decent people all over the world to the various violations of basic human rights in the Arab territories occupied by Israel. In the light of Israel's record since its inception, and particularly since its aggression in June 1967, any reference by it to "moral duty" and "international responsibility" should be taken with extreme caution, if not with downright suspicion.

2. Unabashedly, the letter of the Israel representative again repeats the now worn-out allegation that the Iraqis who were found guilty, by a court of law, of espionage for Israel were "defenceless individuals". No individuals in the recent history of the Middle East earned the adjective of "defenceless" more than the people of Deir Yassin and Kafr Qasm, for whose massacre pre-natal and post-natal Israel is solely responsible. This is apart from those displaced by Israel's recent acts of aggression or those detained and imprisoned or those whose houses were dynamited by the Israel authorities in the occupied territories without benefit of a trial.

3. In the customary exercise of semantics, the letter of the Israel representative refers to the Iraqis (or at least those of them who in Israel's view are defence-

less) as people who happen to "live" in the country. It may be useful to assure the Israel representative that all loyal Iraqis have better and more valid rights to their country than any Zionist could claim to Palestine. The only people who happen to "live" in a country are those who usurped it from its rightful inhabitants.

4. Again, the letter of the representative of Israel reiterates various false charges with regard to the trial and conviction of persons found guilty of espionage for Israel, in spite of the fact that those charges have been time and again rejected and entirely refuted. He may find his repetitions helpful in order that he may eventually be convinced of the truth of them, but I have no remedy for this.

5. It is also customary, when Zionists assume the self-awarded role of representing other Jews, for them to refer time and again *ad nauseam*, to the alleged "previous persecutions in Iraq". And although the circumstances in which Iraqi Jews were given the option to relinquish freely their nationality some eighteen years ago have been amply covered in previous documents—reference should be made to this Mission's letters of 3 and 27 June 1968, issued as documents S/8610 and S/8657 respectively—the Israel representative always finds it appropriate to call the granting of that choice to Iraqi Jews "persecution". He even alleges that the majority of those Iraqi Jews who freely chose to renounce their Iraqi nationality have found "refuge" and haven in Eretz Israel.

If the Israel representative is still in doubt of the true nature of the Jewish "flight" from Iraq, he may be referred to Mr. Ovadin Sehayek, whose address is at present unknown, or any of his eight brothers and sisters, for an informative treatise on the objective and methods of the *halutz* movement in Iraq. Or better still, he may be referred to Mr. Israel Galili, the present Israel Minister of Information, who is reputed to be quite an authority on the subject. But giving the Israel representative the benefit of the doubt and assuming that he is really unaware of the enormity of the lies

* Incorporating document S/9118/Corr.1 of 31 March 1969.

he keeps repeating, then we may be doing him a service by referring him to what was published in the Israel weekly *Haolam Haze* on 20 and 27 April 1966. In the latter issue the first paragraph of an article by Shalom Cohen under the title, "This can only happen in Israel", reads as follows:

"This could happen only in Israel. Last week *Haolam Haze* published the scoop of the year . . . It was the story of the explosion of bombs that were thrown some 15 years ago into the synagogues and other Jewish centres of Baghdad with a view to spurring the Jews of Iraq on to a hasty *aliya* to Israel. These things were known to but a few people, who guarded them as a terrible secret; they have made public now for the first time officially and responsibly."

One would have thought that the Zionists were going to maintain a discreet silence regarding this episode, which in reality constitutes another infamous chapter in the history of Zionism. This chapter has no parallel in infamy, perhaps, except in the Zionist practice immediately after the Second World War of using condemned ships to transport European Jews in order that these ships might be scuttled *en route* to Palestine and thus arouse world sympathy for the helpless Jews "fleeing from persecution", only to drown within sight of the promised land.

Now it may come as a shocking revelation to the Israel representative to know that the individuals who threw those bombs were not Iraqi non-Jews "persecuting" the Iraqi Jews, but rather Zionist Jews working on behalf and at the behest of Israel and the Zionist organizations. It may be quite a surprising discovery, if the Israel representative is really seeking the truth, for him to find that the Jews who left Iraq early in the fifties were not actually fleeing the "persecution" of non-Jews but rather the pressure, cajolment and terror of other Jews. He may then become

aware of the irony of the following quotation from his letter: "Jews regard themselves as in duty bound to help fellow-Jews, particularly when other nations and peoples have failed or have been unable to come to their rescue." Then the question would arise of who would help the Jews when they become, wittingly or unwittingly, the victims of Zionist machinations.

6. The representative of Israel concludes his letter by repeating the big lie in respect of the "conditions of the Arab inhabitants in the territories under Israel's administration". He boasts of alleged freedom of movement, freedom of thought and expression, etc., etc.

Notwithstanding the fact that these boastful claims have no relation to reality, they are ominously reminiscent of the justifications the white colonialists in Southern Rhodesia and other colonial territories invoke in order to maintain their dominance and illegal usurpation and the denial to the African and indigenous peoples of their basic human rights. These boasts, which Israel is actually borrowing from a page in the annals of nineteenth century colonialism, are tantamount to a demand that the Arabs who are now or who may potentially come under Israel's rule should rejoice and forgo their rights to a country and a homeland and other basic human rights, in view of the material benefits Israel occupation would bring them. Are we then expected, in the second half of the twentieth century and in the era of the United Nations, to welcome the advent of the "Zionist burden" to replace that of the white man? Let the United Nations take note of this attitude.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Adnan RAOUF
Acting Permanent Representative of Iraq
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/9121

Letter dated 31 March 1969 from the representative of Jordan to the President of the Security Council

[Original text: English]
[31 March 1969]

Further to my letter of 26 March 1969 [S/9113] and with reference to the present Security Council deliberations, in which the Israel representative alleged that "Israel took action to disable terror bases in Jordanian territory", I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's attention the attached photographs as further evidence of the Israel attack against Jordanian civilians and their means of livelihood.

May I request that this letter together with the photographs be urgently circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhammad H. EL-FARRA
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

[The photographs attached to the mimeographed version of the present document are not reproduced here.]

**Letter dated 31 March 1969 from the representative of Israel
to the Secretary-General**

[Original text: English]
[31 March 1969]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 21 March 1969 by the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations [S/9102].

That letter is another manifestation of the close ties subsisting between the Government of Jordan and the terror warfare activities being conducted against Israel. The letter singles out for attention a number of security measures taken against those who had committed acts of murder and terror or aided and abetted them, and it distorts those measures, blowing them up out of all proportion.

The acts of murder and terror are directed against civilian objectives and are quite indiscriminate. In January and February of this year alone, there were no less than twenty-five cases of terror acts of this nature in which Arabs too were among the victims. In those two months alone, three Arabs were killed and thirty-six wounded, including women and children, in these terror activities. In this connexion, it will not be overlooked that those who are behind this warfare do not shrink from exploiting women by sending them forth and hiding behind them in the execution of terror acts and by inciting them to violations of law and order. That is what they did in a Jerusalem supermarket on 21 February 1969 and in the students' cafeteria of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem on 6 March. One of the earliest instances of this since June 1967 occurred on 7 October of that year, when a number of young men and women sneaked a bomb into the Zion cinema during

a crowded performance. Those responsible for provoking acts of terrorism also have no qualms about taking advantage of young persons, and even boys and girls, in carrying out their breaches of public order, acts of violence and terror endangering the lives of the youths and even leading to death and injury amongst them, as has happened in a number of instances in the past.

The above-mentioned security measures are very much milder than any which were taken by the Jordanian authorities before June 1967 against Arab inhabitants of territories occupied by Jordan whenever public order was disturbed. In this connexion, I may point out that the communication of the representative of Jordan vividly illustrates—what indeed is a matter of common knowledge—that the Arabs of Jerusalem and of the West Bank (and indeed of the Gaza Strip) today enjoy freedom of thought and freedom of expression far exceeding anything which they experienced under Jordanian occupation.

By virtue of general international law and by virtue of various resolutions of the Security Council, Israel is responsible for the security and well-being of all the civilian population in areas under its control and intends to continue to discharge its responsibilities in that regard.

I have the honour to request the circulation of this letter as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yosef ТЕКОАН
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

* Also circulated as a General Assembly document under the symbol A/7534.

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