
**Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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**Working paper submitted by Ireland on behalf of Brazil,
Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and
Sweden as members of the New Agenda Coalition****I. Background**

1. In 1995, the States Parties extended the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely and undertook to make every effort to achieve its universality. The review process of the Treaty was strengthened and Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament were adopted. The resolution on the Middle East was adopted as an integral part of the 1995 package.
2. In 1996, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice concluded unanimously that: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”
3. The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference represents a positive step on the road to nuclear disarmament. In particular, nuclear-weapon States made the unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and agreed on practical steps to be taken by them that would lead to nuclear disarmament. To this end, additional steps were necessary to improve the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty.
4. The fact that the 2005 NPT Review Conference failed to agree on a substantive outcome document containing any measures to strengthen the Treaty, cannot, and does not, affect the validity of commitments made at these two previous Review Conferences. We believe that such commitments, freely made in consensus outcome documents, have a particular legitimacy. The outcome of the 2000 Review Conference, in particular, sets out the agreed process for systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament.



II. Fundamental principles

5. The participation of the international community as a whole is central to the maintenance and enhancement of international peace and stability. International security is a collective concern requiring collective engagement. Internationally negotiated treaties in the field of disarmament have made a fundamental contribution to international peace and security. Unilateral and bilateral nuclear disarmament measures complement the treaty-based multilateral approach towards nuclear disarmament. It is essential that fundamental principles, such as transparency, verification and irreversibility, be applied to all disarmament measures.

6. We remain genuinely concerned at the danger to humanity posed by the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used.

7. We reaffirm that any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of the maintenance of international peace and security.

8. Irreversibility in nuclear disarmament, nuclear reductions, and other related nuclear arms control measures is imperative. Nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes requiring urgent irreversible progress on both fronts.

9. Each article of the Treaty is binding on the respective States Parties at all times and in all circumstances. It is imperative that all States Parties be held fully accountable with respect to strict compliance with their obligations under the Treaty.

10. Further progress on disarmament must be a major determinant in achieving and in sustaining international stability. The 2000 NPT undertakings on nuclear disarmament have been given and their implementation remains the imperative.

11. A nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing mutually reinforcing sets of instruments.

III. The NPT review cycle 2007-2010

12. The New Agenda Coalition acknowledges that the agreements reached in 1995 and in 2000 provide for the total elimination of nuclear weapons to be achieved through systematic and progressive efforts. The task for all States Parties over the course of this review cycle will be to identify and address particular aspects on which incremental progress is necessary, and should be made, with a view to advancing towards the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

13. Without prejudice to the other important aspects of nuclear disarmament to which the New Agenda Coalition is fully committed, and on which it may make proposals over the course of this

review cycle, we believe that there is an urgent need at this juncture to address the following main issues, namely, and not necessarily in order of importance:

- (a) Universality;
- (b) Nuclear doctrines;
- (c) Reductions in nuclear forces;
- (d) Security assurances;
- (e) Nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- (f) Negotiation of a treaty on fissile material;
- (g) Testing of nuclear weapons.

Universality

14. Considering that universality is highlighted in Decision II of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference as an essential element in achieving international peace and security and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it is imperative that concrete steps are taken towards achieving this pivotal goal in order to fully realize both the declared objectives of the Treaty and the commitments made by the States Parties to the Treaty as part of the consensus package of decisions and resolutions achieved at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

15. The New Agenda Coalition calls upon all States Parties to spare no effort to achieve the universality of the NPT, and in that regard urges India, Israel and Pakistan, which are not yet Parties to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without any conditions.

16. The New Agenda Coalition recalls that, at the Review Conference in 2000, States Parties reaffirmed the unanimous agreement at the Review and Extension Conference in 1995 not to enter into new nuclear supply arrangements with parties that did not accept IAEA full-scope safeguards on their nuclear facilities.

Nuclear doctrines

17. The New Agenda Coalition is concerned at the emergence in recent years of new military doctrines emphasizing the importance of nuclear weapons not only to defence but also to the offensive capabilities of States. Plans to modernize nuclear forces have reinforced these doctrines. Moreover, certain policies have broadened the scope of potential use of nuclear weapons, for example as a preventive measure or in retaliation against the use of other weapons of mass destruction.

18. Doctrines incorporating such policies risk lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, and, in expanding the range of possible scenarios for use, act as an incentive for nuclear-weapon States to develop new nuclear weapons. They also reinforce the mistaken perception that nuclear weapons are an essential component of a modern military force. If the nuclear-weapon States continue to treat nuclear weapons as a security enhancer, there is a real danger that other States will start pondering whether they should do the same.

19. A mutual lowering of the operational readiness of deployed nuclear weapons can serve to build confidence between the nuclear powers and reduce the threat of nuclear weapon use, intentional or accidental. While this can never substitute for irreversible reductions in these weapons, it is essential that the nuclear-weapon States continue in this vein and remove the launch-on-warning option from their security doctrines by agreeing on reciprocal steps to take their nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert. The continuation of the cold war era high-alert status is of little sense in today's security environment and only serves to exacerbate the danger posed by the existence of these weapons.

20. States should not develop new nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons with new military capabilities or for new missions, or the replacement or modernization of their nuclear-weapon systems. As a minimum, States must refrain from developing nuclear weapons with new military capabilities or for new missions and must not adopt doctrines or systems that blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons, or lower the nuclear threshold. Such action would in our view directly contradict the disarmament and non-proliferation provisions of the Treaty.

Reductions in nuclear forces

21. The strengthening of non-proliferation obligations under the NPT is central to the Treaty's success. Attempts to secure advances on non-proliferation, while at the same time disregarding the significance of nuclear disarmament, are, however, counterproductive. Disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes. Genuine implementation of irreversible, verifiable and transparent nuclear-weapon reductions, leading to their total elimination, serves to diminish the perceived utility of these weapons, and thus their desirability.

22. The reductions in non-strategic and strategic nuclear arsenals which have taken place since the end of the cold war deserve recognition. However, progress in recent years has been less clear. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is due to expire before the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The negotiation of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in 2002 represented a positive downward trend in the deployment of nuclear weapons, but it did not involve any warhead destruction, agreed counting rules or new verification measures.

23. START and SORT cover strategic nuclear weapons. By also including tactical nuclear weapons in renewed negotiations, the possibility of eliminating an entire class of weapons in the near future would present itself.

24. The New Agenda Coalition therefore calls upon the United States of America and the Russian Federation to show leadership in the nuclear disarmament process by extending START, upgrading SORT to include verification and negotiating further reductions including destruction of warheads and to include tactical nuclear weapons in future negotiations.

Security assurances

25. The 2000 Review Conference agreed that legally binding security assurances strengthen the non-proliferation regime. The emergence of new nuclear doctrines which envision a role for nuclear

weapons in the offensive capabilities of States lends a new urgency to the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against such use.

26. The New Agenda Coalition submitted a specific working paper on this subject in the last review cycle, including a draft Protocol.¹ That paper reviewed the background to the question of security assurances, including the nature and scope of the assurances provided, the elements that should be included in a legally binding instrument and the format for such an instrument. The New Agenda Coalition reiterates the argument presented in the paper that the NPT is the most appropriate forum for the negotiation of this instrument as it would confirm the role of the Treaty and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Pending such a treaty the Coalition urges the nuclear-weapon States to renew and honour their existing commitments in relation to negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT.

27. The New Agenda Coalition calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security assurances pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties; which could either be in the format of a separate agreement reached in the context of the NPT or as a protocol to the Treaty.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

28. There has been progress on the further development of nuclear-weapon-free zones in some regions and notably in the southern hemisphere and in Central Asia. In this context, the ratification of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Raratonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk by all States of the region, and all concerned States is of great importance. The particular regime established by Mongolia as a nuclear-weapon-free State is also relevant in this regard. They should all work together in order to facilitate adherence to the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties by all relevant States that have not yet done so. States Parties to those treaties should be encouraged to promote their common objectives with a view to enhancing cooperation among the nuclear-weapon-free zones and to working together with the proponents of other such zones.

29. The New Agenda Coalition notes that, despite the adoption of the resolution on the Middle East as an integral part of the outcome of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, no progress has been achieved in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. The Coalition renews its support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction, and in this regard, deems it urgent to take concrete steps to achieve this objective. The New Agenda Coalition notes that all States of the region with the exception of Israel are States Parties to the NPT and calls upon Israel to accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State promptly and without conditions and to place all of its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

¹ Most recent version (submitted to 2005 RevCon): NPT/CONF.2005/WP.61

Treaty on fissile material

30. The 2000 Review Conference agreed on the necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Review Conference called for immediate negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

31. While disappointed that this timetable has not been met, the New Agenda Coalition is encouraged by the recent constructive discussions on this matter in Geneva and welcomes the efforts currently being exerted in the Conference on Disarmament, including the P6 proposal, to enable negotiations to get under way.

32. The New Agenda Coalition believes that there is wide support for the immediate commencement of the negotiation of a fissile material treaty. For such a treaty to be meaningful it should include a verification mechanism and cover existing stocks. Negotiation and conclusion of a fissile material treaty will limit the expansion of existing nuclear arsenals, and, therefore, can be understood as a significant step in a phased programme towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Testing of nuclear weapons

33. The New Agenda Coalition remains totally opposed to nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions. We have repeatedly underlined the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications to achieve the early entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) without delay and without conditions. Further progress in this direction will strengthen the norm against all nuclear weapons tests established by the treaty.

34. Pending entry into force of the CTBT, the New Agenda Coalition calls upon all States to uphold and maintain a moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions. The strict observance of the CTBT purpose, obligations and provisions is imperative to the path to a world free of nuclear weapons. In this connection, we welcome the progress made in the installation of the international monitoring system as an integral part of the CTBT verification regime.